The ANSO Report (1-15 November 2011)

CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2011

Issue 85 REPORT 1‐15 November 2011 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-5 With echoes of mid-year 2010, the recent for comparative graphs). Northern Region 6-10 spate of NGO staff abductions in Faryab In broader conflict dynamics, IED’s re- Western Region 11-12 provided the defining dynamic affecting main a keystone tactical element with this the NGO community this period, with 4 period being no exception. Despite minor Eastern Region 13-16 separate incidents (including 3 actual ab- periodic fluctuations, the detonation (both ductions and one near miss) reported in Southern Region 17-21 actual and premature) to discovery rate just over a fortnight. The death of 2 NGO ANSO Info Page 22 remains relatively stable at roughly 50/50, a national staff members in one incident also rate that also is generally unaffected by the proved to be the most significant occur- changing volumes (+/-) of device deploy- rence resulting from these. While the exact ment. Of note, civilians remain the most HIGHLIGHTS causative factors of this short-term trend affected, accounting for 55% of all IED remains shrouded, it is likely a mix result- related deaths this period with the ANP  NGO abductions in ing from the fluid operational environment Faryab second to this for a further 38%. These in which these incidents happened (AOG statistics bear out the reality that with the migrations, indigenous vs. exogenous  2 NGO staff fatalities continued expansive use of victim operated this period groups, and security force operations), devices, particularly when coupled with the command and control issues related to the high exposure rate these 2 groups experi-  Civilians remain most mixed nature of AOG elements through- ence, this will continue to be the case affected by IED detona- out the North, as well as possible local through to the conclusion of 2011. tions financial motivations. Though there were actual incidents related  Inauguration of the Tra- The inclusion of these recent NGO staff to the inauguration of the Traditional Loya ditional Loya Jirga in fatalities brings this years total to 30, a con- Jirga in Kabul (the most significant occur- Kabul siderable volume in comparison to previ- ring in Paktya), this period served to high- ous years, though 2010 was exceptional due light the sophistication and prevalence of ANSO is supported by to a single incident high casualty rate (8), a the IEA information operations campaign. definite outlier to standard trends which While both verbal and written methods generally account for 1-2 casualties per in- (night letters) were used to warn against cident (see graph p. 5 detailing the yearly attendance, as well as refute the events NGO incident/fatality rates). The practice ‘legitimacy’, during the run up to the Jirga, of nationalisation and localisation of pro- it was the publication on an IEA website of gram staff, while a sound strategy for gar- an apparent security plan related to the nering access and acceptance, nonetheless Jirga that garnered the most attention. puts the burden of risk squarely onto these While the veracity of this plan was immedi- same staff, as attested by the fact that all ately disputed by authorities (an almost NGO fatalities this year were nationals. Of irrelevant factor in such campaigns) it had note, while the South and Central Regions the appearance of legitimacy and served its account for the lowest NGO incident vol- ultimate purpose: garnering considerable umes countrywide (7 and 24 respectively), media coverage and bringing into sharp they accounted for the highest fatality rates relief once again the question of AOG pen- (7 each) followed by the West and North (6 etration within the ANSF. each) and finally the East with 4 (see p. 18

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C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL K ABUL Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 2 Criminal attempts targeting high- 40 profile vehicles in transit with a incidents (85%) ensured by 30 ‘tyre-slashing’ technique are a well ANSF-IMF, the events in Kabul 20 established component of the were dominated by the run-up to 10 the ‘Traditional Loya Jirga’, set to NGO threat profile in the capital. 0 Two late reports related to this provide a platform in order to activity were corroborated with discuss the strategic Afghanistan – NGOs during this cycle and date US agreement as well as the future KABUL AOG KABUL Crime back to the 31st of October and of the GOA-sponsored peace the 20th of September. The inci- process. Firstly, ANSF-IMF en- gaged in a large amount of pre- Bagrami) to a media-focused propaganda cam- dents took place respectively in paign including the release on the IEA website Shahre Naw, between the Haji emptive operations along the ac- cess routes to Kabul City, with the of an alleged ‘ANSF security plan’ specifying Yakub Circle and the Hanzala details on the set-up and movements of VIP Mosque (PD 4), and on the Jala- most tangible outcomes reported from Paghman (Chawki Arghan- participants to the event. While the authorities labad Road (PD 9). On a positive naturally denied the authenticity of the materiel note, the NGO staff members di), Musayi (Qalai Abdul Rauf) and several locations in Chahar released, the compilation nonetheless included that were dealing with the inci- some rather accurate details surrounding those dents followed the recommended Asyab and Muhammad Agha. Indeed, the authorities took a par- involved in the preparations. While such in- mitigation measures and drove to formation is not necessarily revealing, as many safe locations, or calling a back-up ticular care to control the access routes from Logar and Wardak. sensitive details or vulnerabilities could be ob- vehicle, before changing the tained thru other means, the impact of releas- slashed tyre. This interdicted any Secondly, an external security pe- rimeter was established around ing such information on the sense of safety on chances for the criminal groups the part of those involved cannot be disregard- which followed them in traffic. the capital including additional checkpoints, mobile patrolling of ed. Ultimately, this marked a ‘victory’ in the Since September 2010, 5 such ongoing IEA information operations cam- attempts directly impacted NGOs the elevated grounds along strate- gic arteries, as well as deployments paign, as attested by the considerable media in Shahr-e Naw, Taimani, on the coverage of this release. Jalalabad Road and in Kote Sangi. into the potential staging areas for Of note, two out of three latest AOG IDF attacks. A new devel- An actual event occurred on the 14th, two days incidents took place in PD 4 (Old opment, ANA air-support, is sup- prior to the inauguration of the event, when a Taimani Square and Haji Yakub posed to be a part of the arrange- lone AOG operative carrying an explosive Circle) and targeted NGO vehi- ment. In Kabul City, besides the charge in a hand bag attempted to approach cles that were transporting NGO layered security perimeter sur- the main entrance to the venue; though he was staff after bank visits. During one rounding the venue of the event, a spotted and killed by ANSF detail. An addi- such occurrence, the attackers hit number of security operations tional 3 individuals were arrested in the vicinity the mark and snatched a signifi- were reported by ANSF-IMF shortly after the escalation. While this may cant amount of cash from the from PD 12, 9, 7 and 4. have been a possible dry-run to test the securi- vehicle while the NGO staff were AOG interest to side track the ty structures in place, the attempt lacked the busy changing the tyre. These Jirga was obvious throughout, spectacular features of the strike at the incidents further reinforce the with recurrent verbal and written Chamkani DAC, Paktya, where a multi-vector need for established ‘actions on’ intimidation efforts ranging from suicide attack targeted an on-going jirga-related for such cases and the instruction night-letter campaigns and session of local elders hosted by the wuluswal th of staff in the same. preaching at mosques in the prov- on the 10 . Despite the AOG intimidation campaign, a large majority of the anticipated Featuring consistent volumes and inces (in Central for instance in Chaki Wardak, Saydabad, Baraki 2000 participants nonetheless made it to Kabul activity patterns, with the over- to attend the event. whelming majority of reported Barak, Puli Alam, Khushi, Tagab, THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents ARDAK Year to Date 4 WARDAK W 100 This Report Period 0 During the first two weeks of No- 80 vember the conflict developments Jaghatu marked a distinctive spate 60 of 6 AOG attacks, including 5 in Wardak matched the patterns 40 of the previous month, with a stand-off attacks. 2 IED strikes 20 slight exception of the geographic effectively impacted ANP and distribution. This cycle, Jaghatu ANA on the roads, though in an- 0 hosted a rather unusual concen- other case a pressure-plate device was triggered by a civilian vehicle. tration of AOG activity. WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime In addition, the DAC/ANP HQ Out of 30 corroborated events so area attracted two cases of night- far, AOG ensured 15, slightly time direct and indirect fire. Only jority of cases concentrated in Saydabad (7), more than the incidents authored one case related to a close-range followed by Nirkh and Jalrez (2 each), and by IMF-ANSF (12). Within the engagement of ANP. Such a Jaghatu and Chaki Wardak (1 each). The same standard AOG portfolio of direct portfolio indicates that the AOG set of ANSO data reveals that schools in attacks (7), indirect fire (1) and effort was meant to open access Wardak have never been directly targeted dur- IED detonations (4), 3 AOG- avenues throughout the district ing classes. Arson attacks, usually after-dark, initiated abductions & killings rather than being an attempt to appear the most common subset of this group warranted attention. Whereas 2 change the current distribution of with 9 cases, while an additional case pertained cases staged on the highway in force and influence in the district to a three-fold RPG attack. The last arson Saydabad and targeting GOA- in the longer term. attack was recorded in December 2009 in PSC personnel can hardly be de- Saydabad. 3 incidences related to IED attacks In an atypical incident on the 6th, scribed as out of the norm, the of which one (a recent RCIED recorded on the construction site at a public third case was less common for it the 19th of September this year in Saydabad school in Akhundkhel, Jalrez, wit- occurred during daylight along the DAC) could have actually targeted a passing nessed a command-wire IED ex- Jalrez - Maydan Shahr road in IMF convoy. An additional 3 explosive devic- plode in the room used as a stor- Mullah Khel, an area which has es were collected by ANP from schools in age and accommodation facility seen a sustained daylight presence Nirkh (twice in the same school in Ibrahim by construction workers. The of ANSF-IMF forces in the last Khel of Nirkh in April and July 2010) and in detonation damaged the facility weeks. Perusing mobile phones Saydabad (Kamran Khel, September 2010). A but did not create any casualties. of the passengers intercepted at an single case of a criminal intrusion resulted in The school had been founded in illegal checkpoint set up at 1700 the theft of equipment including a generator th the frame of an NGO project and hrs on the 6 , AOG identified 3 from a school in Haidar Khel, Saydabad (April handed over to the GOA with ALP members who travelled low- 2010). While a larger part of the direct inci- classes still hosted in tents. This key from Jalrez towards Maydan dents could be interpreted as year, GOA authorities subcon- Shahr. The gunmen executed one AOG/community refutation of GOA- tracted a private construction of them right on the spot while sponsored education, there is no convincing company to provide the school the remaining two were taken data to suggest any strict gender-based delinea- with a building. There was no away. Three days later and within tion, such as schools providing education for immediate claim or evidence to the same time window, AOG at- girls would be physically targeted more often elucidate the motivation or the tacked an ANP patrol with SAF than other facilities. This is less true for other identity of the attackers. on another section of the same efforts, night-letter campaigns in particular, road in Zewalat, demonstrating a ANSO records include nearly 30 which form another distinctive group. On at degree of confidence and regained incidents involving education fa- least 5 incidences, AOG intimidation efforts freedom of movement along this cilities and personnel in AOG and targeted GOA-schools either as a symbol of strategically important artery ACG initiated violence in Wardak GOA presence, or more specifically due to the which connects Kabul and the since 2006. Physical premises curriculum or particular features of the educa- provincial capital, western Wardak were deliberately targeted on 13 tional system such as the education of girls and the Central Highlands. different occasions with the ma- beyond a certain grade. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents P ARWAN Year to Date 4 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 In the aftermath of the ANSF- 40 cal ANP forces reconstituted, IMF clearance operation in Ghor- 30 mainly along former Hizbi Islami band wa Siyagerd, the Ghorband 20 Valley remained quiet. The afore- networks, the ALP restore the mentioned maneuver extended local balance of power with a 10 over a week prior to Eid and re- strong Jamiat influence, a fact em- 0 sulted in a limited number of en- bodied in the choice of the main gagements with AOG. Yet it was commanders in each district. Evi- the ‘hold’ phase of the operation denced by the lack of significant PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime which brought the most signifi- AOG activity since the last two weeks, ANSF-IMF seem to have cant consequences. 5 permanent While AOG overt activity in Ghorband has regained dominance in Ghorband. ANP checkpoints have been es- been mainly dedicated to hard security targets, The only attempted strike by tablished along the Bamyan- the INGO incident during the previous cycle AOG this cycle, a night-time SAF Parwan road in Ghorband, with in Shekh Ali warrants against complacency. on the residence of a GOA attor- additional regular patrols ensured However, it should be expected that if reac- ney in Katasang, Ghorband on by ANCOP. Meanwhile, ANA tivated, opposition networks will seek to target the 13th, was interdicted by a have been introduced into the the new security infrastructure, including the quick deployment of ANP from a district setting up a base in Puli ALP with both direct and stand-off attacks newly established checkpoint in Rangab. A key component of the forming a part of local AOG repertoire. For the area. Whether AOG regroup IMF counter-insurgency strategy, the latter, deployments of ‘victim-operated to counter the ANSF build up the ALP program has come to the IEDs’ on the main road network appear a less before the on-set of the winter or fore with several dozens of local imminent possibility than night-time indirect leave the combat initiative for the recruits returning to Shinwari and fire, though road-side IEDs were a common fighting season next spring re- Siyagerd after a three-week long enough feature during 2010 and in the first 8 mains to be seen. Thus far, the induction in Kabul. With the lo- months of 2011. latter appears more likely.

NGO Incidents L OGAR Year to Date 6 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 Conflict developments in Logar 40 on an ANP patrol in Tape Khaki did not deviate from the estab- 30 on the 12th which resulted in 2 lished patterns and this cycle con- 20 tinued to be defined by a seasonal ANP casualties. AOG success 10 downturn of significant AOG rates, however, were higher when activity and a consistent pressure it came to other target groups. 0 exerted by IMF-ANSF, which On the 12th, AOG abducted two represented two thirds of this pe- PSC employees in Tangi Saydabad LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime riods volume. in neighboring Wardak Province. The PSC members were shot dead The core of AOG activity consist- in an execution style killing and failed to reach its intended recipient. In one ed of direct attacks on security located by ANP the next day in instance in Charkh, an RCIED detonation cre- targets and infrastructure in Baraki Barak, Logar. In another ated multiple civilian casualties. Baraki Barak. During one such typical strike on a soft target in The IMF-ANSF efforts appeared more fre- attempt on the 1st , AOG engaged Baraki Barak, with a probable ele- quent and coherent, with the international an IMF-ANA convoy in transit ment of collusion of political and forces providing the impetus for the majority thru the Qalai Shaki section of the criminal interests, a group of gun- of significant events. In Puli Alam in 5 cases main road which connects the men abducted a son of a retired and in Baraki Barak on 3 occasions, the securi- district to Charkh. The security NDS officer in Zaqum Khel on ty forces struck the mark capturing AOG force outmanoeuvred the ambush the 7th. AOG stand-off attacks fighters and affiliates, while one targeted arrest and returned fire causing 13 AOG completed the portfolio, although was also reported from Azra. Searches result- casualties while a single ANA sus- this activity stayed limited to in- ing in the seizure of weapons and ammunition tained injuries. Overall, the close- conclusive IED attempts in were reported from Muhammad Agha, Azra range attacks remained ineffective Charkh and Puli Alam which and Baraki Barak. with the exception of an ambush THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 2 50

This Report Period 0 40 The incident volumes remained low and consistent with the pat- the latter escalation causing an 30 terns of the last two cycles. Yet ANP casualty in Tatar Khel. In 20 the early afternoon hours of the the low rate of AOG attacks (6 as 10 13th, AOG marked another suc- of the last fortnight) and ANSF- 0 IMF incidents (3 for the same cess with intercepting three off- period) translates rather a status duty ANA officers in transit along quo stalemate rather than any ca- the Tagab – Alasay road in Isa pacity gaps or a lack of willingness Khel (Qor Ghul Area). The fate KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime on the side of the conflict parties. of the servicemen, who tried to of Nijrab, such as the Afghaniya Valley and the In a key event this cycle for in- maintain a low profile during their Mahmudi Raqi – Nijrab road. Whereas a simi- stance, AOG accurately targeted travel, has not been elucidated so lar IDF strike targeted the DAC of Kohistan 1 an IMF detachment with long- far. Closing the record of direct in August, the remaining 3 AOG strikes rec- range sniper fire while the interna- attacks this cycle, an early- orded in Kohband & the two Kohistans this tional military were assisting ANA morning hand grenade attack tar- year related to IED deployment, and were to secure a logistical convoy pass- geted a private residence in Seh th equally poorly targeted. ing thru Joybar in the morning of Padar on the 7 , killing three and the 9th of November. One ISAF injuring two civilian members of On the 3rd, a ‘victim-operated’ IED was col- soldier was killed in the attack the household. Criminal motives lected by ANP from the Ashro Khel section of while another sustained injuries. behind the attack appear most the Mahmudi Raqi – Nijrab DAC road and on The Joybar junction has witnessed likely. the 13th, a pressure-plate IED detonated over a dozen of AOG attacks on Meanwhile, indiscriminate stand- against an IMF-contracted food supply convoy security personnel over the last off attacks continued to pose an in Shukhi. Shukhi in particular remains a sen- three years. Among these, the imminent challenge to the civilian sitive point in regards to political and criminal BBIED strike on a halted IMF population. The IDF strikes and violence. While AOG activity there usually patrol on the 13th of July this year IED activity, despite exploring the stays within the realm of night-time move- remains the most prominent at- same set of targets, remained ments and IED placements, early morning and tack, recording 8 IMF, 1 ALP and mostly off the mark. On the 11th, late afternoon AOG/ACG incursions on the 1 civilian casualty. two BM-1 rockets impacted in the main road remain a possibility. Perhaps less of an issue in the ‘kinetic parts’ of the province In accordance with October pat- vicinity of the Koh Band District than on the road network in the north and terns, direct AOG strikes were Administrative Center causing no north-west, occasional AOG attempts at dedicated exclusively to the secu- casualties. A likely attempt at boosting local recruitment may translate into rity forces along the main roads demonstrating presence without poorly trained and inexperienced AOG opera- with AOG attention distributed facing the risks of a targeted tives in the field, a factor which may alter the fairly equally among IMF, ANA, counter-strike (the rockets are threat profile for NGOs operating there. ANP and ALP targets. Besides usually launched using a timer), Maintaining distance in both space & profile the Joybar incident, ANP check- the attack did not deviate from from IMF/ANSF-GOA-PSC parties at all points came under direct AOG the established trends of occasion- times is an important mitigation strategy to attack on two occasions in Tagab al AOG incursions outside of the reduce the risk of ignorant or mistaken target- (on the 3rd and on the 12th) with main conflict zone formed by Ta- gab, Alasay and the adjacent parts ing.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 16th of November 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents B AMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 Kahmard hosted an unusual con- 40 centration of three AOG attacks, larities with the appearance of 30 including two strikes on GOA GOA-ANSF road missions. Until 20 and ANSF targets. In the third this cycle, Do Ab Mikhzarin was 10 the exclusive location for this case, a pressure plate IED in the 0 Shikary Valley detonated against a year’s IED activity with an early- civilian vehicle. morning detonation on an IMF convoy in April and a case of a On the 6th, a small AOG unit tar- BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime premature detonation in July. Of geted the convoy of the District note, out of the 3 IED cases so Governor during a routine move- far, only one reached an explicit April and September. Also dating back to Sep- ment in Sang Chelagh in the dis- security target. For NGO consid- tember, the ambush on an ANP convoy in trict center. The attack ensued eration, all 3 cases happened after Dahane Sayghan remains the most lethal direct and the gun fight which turned 1800 hrs and before 0830 hrs attack this year with a combined four fatalities out more favorably for the GOA making the IED emplacement an incl. 3 ANP and a civilian. party, leaving an AOG dead on after-dark/pre-dawn activity. By It appears plausible that the recent attacks the spot and likely causing anoth- the same token, avoiding move- were authored by exogenous networks operat- er AOG casualty while a single ments outside this time-window ing from Tala wa Barfak. Whereas there may member of the governor’s security appears as a reasonable NGO be a more or less stable interest by local AOG detail sustained injuries. Whereas strategy to mitigate the threat. leadership to destabilize the situation in Shi- occasional armed escalations are a This precaution will also serve the kary Valley, the current AOG imprint does not well-established feature in the Shi- purpose of limiting exposure to indicate many prospects to sustain significant kary Valley, AOG strikes in the criminal activity in Shikary Valley volumes of activity in Kahmard over a long district center remain extremely which continues to be mentioned period of time. rare. Shikary Valley indeed hosted in local accounts on a regular ba- the other two incidents. In the Finally, with the on-set of the winter, NGOs sis although the documented cases morning hours of the 11th, a white should expect deteriorating winter conditions remain rare. Toyota Hilux belonging to a Ko- to impact the roads in Central Highlands and rean construction company drove On the 12th, AOG directed sever- along the high mountain passes elsewhere. into an IED on the main road in al RPG and SAF rounds against Winterizing cars and equipping the passengers Kalmak though the detonation an ANP checkpoint in Eshpushta. with a reasonable package of emergency food, did not result in casualties. While Prior to the November series, the water, clothing and communication equipment the deliberate targeting of the AOG track record in 2011 en- is a necessary precondition for safe travels. agency cannot be ruled out, the compassed 2 direct attacks against profile of the vehicle shares simi- the same facility in Eshpushta in

200 172 180 160 148 137 133 140 129

120 106 Yearly NGO Incident 100 Volumes 80 Yearly NGO Fatalities 60 37 30 30 40 24 15 19 20 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents F ARYAB Year to Date 12 FARYAB This Report Period 3 50 Although Faryab continued to 40 suffer a high level of recorded sequently engaged by a Pro- 30 security incidents (20), with Government Milita (PGM)—and 20 Qaysar (8) remaining the focal shortly after by a supporting team 10 point, it was the abundance of of ANP—while the 4 NGO staff 0 NGO related abductions, includ- members were kept safe in a vil- lage. ing the discovery of 2 of those FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime NGO members slain, that domi- The individuals in all 4 events are nated the province’s security pro- now accounted for. The groups NGOs have followed their ’no ransom’ poli- file this reporting period. in the 2nd and 3rd incidents were cies, but it is not always clear what transpires Between October 30th and No- returned after negotiations con- between local communities and/or families vember 3rd, 3 NGO related ab- ducted by local elders, and the and the abductors, and the possibility that ran- ductions occurred, with a 4th at- fourth group were in fact never soms are being paid by non-NGO actors must tempted NGO abduction narrow- abducted (despite early reports not be dismissed. If this were to occur, it ly avoided on the 15th. The inci- that they had been), while the 2 would make the concept of NGO abductions a dents were as follows: NGO staff members from the 1st potentially lucrative one, but also one that re- incident on October 30th—minus On October 30th, as reported in mains sensitive to higher AOG leadership, the driver, who was released on the PRP, 3 NGO members went which has been openly critical of wrongful the 5th—were found dead in missing as they moved from abductions and requests for ransom—which is Pashtun Kot. The reasons for Khwaja Sabz Posh to Maymana contrary to the Taliban Code of Conduct. this killing, after—according to around noon. the NGO and open media What is certain is that Faryab has become On the 1st of November, 3 na- sources—a ransom had been paid more active—especially in regards to abduc- tional employees of a private com- for their release, are not yet clear, tions—as surrounding areas that were known pany that was working for a local and the incident exists as an outli- AOG havens (such as the Tri-Provincial Area Shura (on a road construction er to existing abduction patterns, and Ghormach) have become less hospitable project that was being financed by though a disturbing one. Anecdo- due to an influx of new operations conducted an International Government Or- tal reports suggest that ransoms by the full range of security actors. On the ganization (IGO) and monitored were demanded in the 3 sustained surface, it would appear logical that AOGs are by an NGO) were abducted cases, but to what extent they being squeezed out of their previous areas of around Narin Village in Qaysar were or were not paid remains operation and gathering in existing strongholds District (1130 hours). unclear. throughout Faryab (specifically Qaysar, Almar, On the 3rd, along the Qaysar – and Pashtun Kot), but this may not denote the Although the volume of abduc- entire answer, as AOG presence is partially Almar road (right near the bor- tions may be partially the result der), 4 national employees of an enabled by their ability to maintain community pre-Eid crime trends, it would not support, and NGOs tend to operate only in NGO were abducted in a GOA explain the killings, as the last ambulance at approximately 1030 those areas where they can gain community time NGO staff members were acceptance and support. It has also been re- hours. The 4 included 2 women abducted and then killed in the who were immediately released. ported that—despite existent rumors about North was approximately 3 years new AOG leadership—some or all of these th Finally, on the 15 , in the ago (August 17, 2008) in Kunduz. abductions were carried out by known local Sorkhab Area of Pashtun Kot In that incident, the killing was AOG commanders (potentially including the District (at approximately 1300), 4 assessed as the result of an exist- killing, where the NGO staff may have been NGO staff members were ing dispute, which remains a pos- sold further up the AOG chain of command). stopped by locals from a village sible cause for this incident as and warned about an illegal check- well. While more assessment is necessary, it appears clear that the security situation in Faryab is point ahead, where armed men An important factor in the devel- were waiting to abduct them. The declining and the careful monitoring of present oping dynamic is the question of trends by NGOs operating there is crucial. AOG at the checkpoint were sub- ransoms. In most abductions, THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents BALKH B ALKH Year to Date 10 50 This Report Period 0 Balkh recorded a significantly low 40 volume of insecurity this report- Nahri Shahi) have suffered from 30 ing period, notching only 6 securi- the presence of CIPs (with ap- 20 proximately 200 in Chahar Bolak ty incidents, 3 of them in Sholga- 10 and 100 in Chimtal) and the ef- ra, 2 in Balkh District (including 0 the discovery of explosives in an forts of Operation Ebtekar 3. abandoned house in Hazrati Shish Notably, a mid-level commander Shirin) and 1 in Chimtal (an has been moving in and out of BALKH AOG BALKH Crime armed clash over a land dispute). Tandorak and gathering support- The lull appears to be the result of ers there. live at the gateway of Tandorak and those in a number of contributing ele- Of interest, one of the 3 incidents Tandorak, creating potential access issues for ments. The coming of winter, a in Sholgara—when an AOG the AOG trying to move freely between the 2 cold and snowy Eid period, con- opened fire on locals in a mosque (unless the AOGs feel they have stronger local tinued Operation Ebtekar 3 ef- on the 5th—occurred in Rahmata- support in Rahmatabad and its surroundings forts, and the CIPs in Chimtal and bad Village, which sits practically than presently reported). Chahr Bolak (historically the 2 at the entrance way to the road Other incidents in the district included a mod- most insecure districts in the from Sholgara into Tandorak. erately sized group of 8-10 armed individuals province). The last 2 may be the The attack, which occurred at wearing ANA uniforms shooting at a private most relevant to the short spike of 1700 on the 5th, killed 5— vehicle that refused to stop for them—killing 2 manifested insecurity incidents in including a pro-government mili- civilians—likely in an attempt to commit a pre- Sholgara over the first half of the tia commander and 3 of his body- Eid robbery, and another group of armed men cycle. Eastern Sholgara is the guards—and injured an additional – also believed to be members of an AOG – starting point for a road to Tan- 6. Should this be an attack con- opening fire on local civilians, killing 3 and dorak (in Chahar Kint), which has ducted by AOG members from injuring 4. This relative spike in violence in seen its role as an AOG strong- Tandorak, which appears to be Sholgara District—as other districts become hold grow as other AOG strong- the initial assessment, it could cre- (at least temporarily) less habitable for holds (Chimtal, Chahr Bolak, and ate a division between those who AOGs—bears monitoring.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ K UNDUZ Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 Kunduz recorded a significantly 40 low volume of security incidents strong decline in recorded insecu- 30 (12) this reporting period, with 6 rity, dropping from 9 incidents 20 of them attributed to pro-active last cycle to 2 this cycle, including 10 st security force operations (3 IED a November 1 AOG attack on a 0 discoveries, and 3 operations). Critical Infrastructure Protection Although the decline is not pro- (CIP) checkpoint in Zadran Pahin KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime jected to last, the total equalled area in the evening. The Khana- less than half that of the previous bad – Kunduz road saw another AOG in Bagh Shirkat on the 5th, where the reporting period’s, and suggests illegal checkpoint (the last occur- th ANP were attacked while conducting a patrol, that the province is entering the ring on October 29 ) at 1630 on th and subsequently discovered and safely re- winter lull in conjunction with an the 12 , with the culprits being an moved 2 IEDs, and an ACG abduction of a influx of new security actors, in- ACG (non-political), but other- civilian in Sesad Family area on the 7th were cluding new ALP and CIP pro- wise, Kunduz District accounted the only ones not initiated by security forces. grams initiating throughout vari- for the majority, with 8 other inci- The 6 operations made up the rest, resulting in ous districts. As an example of dents. Amongst these, an armed a total of 2 RCIEDs discoveries and 7 arrests. this, Chahar Dara witnessed a clash between the ANP and an THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents B AGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 The first 2 “successful” BBIED 40 attacks to occur in Baghlan this cycle, with a PGM member being 30 year—both over Eid—made up killed in Baghlani Jadid in Zeker 20 nd the most significant news in Khel Village on the 2 as well. 10 Baghlan Province this reporting BBIED attacks are extremely rare 0 cycle. Both targeted ALP com- in the province. The only other

manders, the first taking place on attempted in the province this BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime the 6th in a Mosque in Baghlani year was an unsuccessful BBIED Jadid, and the second taking place attack which was thwarted on considered inconsistent with the general secu- near an ALP commander’s house September 5th in Puli Khumri, rity paradigm of the North (or Baghlan’s spe- in Puli Khumri on the 7th. The when the assailant was shot and cifically), although the use of BBIEDs— first—the more deadly of the killed before being able to deto- especially during Eid (which was mostly quiet two—killed 8 (the ALP com- nate his device. However, strong elsewhere)—was a strong outlier. mander, 3 bodyguards, 3 civil- tensions have existed between ians—including a community el- AOGs and ALPs/PGM members Outside of these 2 incidents, Baghlani Jadid der—and the suicider), while in for a few years. In the most re- saw an active cycle, with an IED detonating on the second, the assailant was cent set of attacks, the 2 com- an IMF vehicle in Baghlan Old City on the stopped by the ALP commander’s manders did not come from the 11th, the discovery of an IED on the 7th, an guards and briefly engaged in a same party (the ALP commander AOG shooting at the contracted truck of a fire-fight before detonating his killed on the 6th was Junbesh local private construction company as it was BBIED, killing himself and 2 oth- while the targeted commander on carrying gravel to a military base on the 10th, ers, as well as injuring an addition- the 7th was HiG), but the strong and an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint on al 3. The targeted commander— ALP/PGM vs AOG tensions be- the 12th. Although these—combined with the who was also involved in a con- gan in the province prior to 2010, BBIED attacks—denote a relatively active cy- frontation with other Pro- and were exasperated as members cle in a province that has recently been under- Government Militia members in of the HiG party joined PGMs or going IMF/ANSF operations, the 2 most no- Chishma-e Shir on September ALPs, turning against the AOGs table incidents—the BBIEDs—are not yet 24th—was not injured in the se- (and competing with them for assessed as a sustained shift to tactics in the cond attack, which also witnessed resources) in the process. Anec- province, and the targeting of ALP/PGM—as a second assailant escape the sce- dotal sources from the area sug- well as the other attacks against ANP/IMF ne. Of note, these were only 2 of gest that these 2 ALP command- elements in Baghlani Jadid—remain relatively the 3 attacks against Pro- ers provided strong leadership to consistent with existing long term trends. Government Militias (PGMs) groups combating local AOGs, so and/or ALPs over the reporting that their targeting should not be

NGO Incidents S AMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Samangan was mostly quiet this 40 reporting period, with a notable vehicle. Prior to this discovery, 30 outlier in the IED that was found the only IED related incident to 20 around Ghaznigag Village occur along the main road (within 10 (Hazrati Sultan District), along the the district) took place a year ago 0 main Aykbak – Mazar road at (November 2010), and also con- th 1000 hours on the 7 . This marks sisted of an IED discovery. SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime only the second IED related inci- Outside of this, Samangan was dent in the district this year, with marked by 3 armed robberies—all 11th. Although criminal activity has been rela- the first occurring on August 17th in Aybak—with 2 taking place on tively notable, it is expected to return to nor- (not along the main road) when the 1st and 2nd during the pre-Eid mal with the conclusion of Eid. an IED detonated against an NDS crime spike, and a third on the THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents S AR- E PUL Year to Date 4 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Incident reporting increased in 40 th Sar-e Pul—which had recorded lages at 1700 on the 4 . The ex- 30 only 5 security incidents over the plosion, which occurred with no 20 entire month of October—but obvious political target in the vi- 10 remained below previously rec- cinity, killed 4 civilians including 2 0 orded levels as the usual winter children. Other incidents in the lull appears to be setting in. No- district included an IED discovery SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime table in a province that—as men- and an attack on an ALP check- point. Despite the skirmishes in tioned in previous reports—has other manifestations of insecurity has become the area prior to the lull, the seen a number of new security somewhat more common in the southern dis- above marked only the third IED force actors such as ALPs, IM- tricts recently, especially along the Sar-e Pul – detonation in the district this year, F/ANSF, and CIPs introduced Sozma Qala road, potentially because AOGs and despite the well documented into districts neighbouring the have been relocated from the north during existence of AOGs, Sayyad has Tri-Provincial Area. recent operations. been more of an AOG stronghold Sayyad District, Sar-e Pul’s contri- than a base of activities. Lastly, 2 other somewhat related incidents oc- bution to the strongly contested curred in Sar-e Pul District. 9 AOG members The southern districts also contin- Tri-Provincial Area (TPA), had who had been operating in Sheram area and ued to witness some significant been mostly quiet since the initia- Khwaja Baland Village of Sayyad District sur- activity—especially along the tion of the ALP program and the rendered to the GOA, and on the 4th, in the roads. On the last day of the pre- influx of CIPs into Darzab and same area where the above had surrendered vious cycle (October 31st), an Qush Tepa in Jawzjan and Bilchi- from, an AOG attacked a Pro-Government ACG robbed vehicles along the ragh in Faryab. In fact, until this Militia checkpoint. Like in Sayyad, the 3 total Sozma Qala –Sar-e Pul Main cycle, Sayyad had recorded no incidents in the district amount to a low total Road, and in Sar-e Pul (to the security incidents of any type volume, but represent a return to a level of south, along the Sar-e Pul – Ko- since late August. However, that manifested insecurity as seen prior to the in- histinat road), an ACG stopped lull concluded this reporting peri- flux of new actors and operations. However, and robbed private vehicles on od with 3 incidents, the most sig- the volume is not expected to rise to the level the 11th. Both incidents happened nificant of which was an IED det- it was at prior to (and during) early summer, during evening hours. Roadside onation on a private vehicle be- until after an expected winter lull. tween Mirza Olang and Aqso vil- robberies, illegal checkpoints, and

NGO Incidents J AWZJAN Year to Date 4 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Jawzjan, which saw only 8 inci- 40 dents over the entire month of only incident of significance being 30 October, again remained relatively an AOG attack on a Pro- 20 quiet. Of note, a night raid was Government Militia checkpoint in 10 Qush Tepa (no casualties). There conducted in the Dashti Lili area 0 of Shibirghan on the 4th, killing 5 has been a significant decrease in AOG members, allegedly includ- activity in the TPA following the JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime ing 2 mid level commanders (who introduction of ALP and CIP pro- grams—in conjunction with sources claim were the District th th ANSF and IMF operations—to niqa District on the 5 and 6 , when an IED Shadow Governors of Darzab th various areas in Qush Tepa, Dar- detonated prematurely on the 5 , and then and Qush Tepa). That claim th zab, Bilchiragh, and Sayyad. Oth- another was discovered on the 6 . These could not be independently veri- mark only the 6th and 7th incidents recorded fied. Outside of this, the Tri- erwise, and of some note, the province saw 2 IED related inci- this year in Khaniqa District, and the first re- Provincial Area (TPA) remained lated to IED placements since Sep 2010. again mostly inactive, with the dents in Beshqala Village of Kha- THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents T AKHAR Year to Date 3 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 Taluqan District witnessed 2 IED 40 detonations this period, a signifi- cludes the stabbing of an IGO 30 cant number considering that the guard—likely due to an interper- 20 entire province had recorded only sonal dispute unrelated to his em- 10 nd 10 IED detonations over all of ployment—on November 2 in 0 2011 prior to these (with just 3 of Badakhshan (see Badakhshan sec- those in Taluqan). On the 13th at tion), and on October 9th, an IGO TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime 1600—just barely outside of regu- staff member was briefly abducted lar NGO travel times—an IED and then released along the Puli (likely an RCIED) detonated Khumri – Kunduz road, but the provincial council (who is also serving as the against an International Govern- last time there was anything close current head of Junbesh party) at 1600 inside ment Organization (IGO) vehicle to the targeting on an IGO in Taluqan City itself. The leader of the Junbesh as it moved from Chal to Taluqan Takhar was March 10th, when party was apparently having a meeting with 2 along a district road. The vehicle there was a brief round of RPG other friends when the attack—allegedly initi- that was hit was a white Land and SAF on a wall that separated ated by one of his attending friends— Cruiser, which many sources from the Ariana Hotel from an IGO occurred, injuring the Junbesh leader and his the area believed was a GOA ve- compound. In that attack there other Junbesh colleague as well. While open hicle, suggesting that the vehicle were no casualties nor any follow sources claim that the friend confessed to hav- may have been similarly misdiag- up engagement, and it remains ing been turned against the Junbesh command- nosed and mistakenly targeted by unclear whether the Ariana or the er by AOGs, the question remains as to the those initiating the attack. Chal is IGO was the main target. situation surrounding the confession. Alt- a relatively quiet area within Ta- Prior to the above, the first IED hough these IED explosions were significant, luqan, and further to this, IGOs detonation to occur in Taluqan they are not assessed as linked or necessarily have rarely been targeted in the since the May 28th explosion that denoting any shift to the existing security para- North. The recent history of such killed General Daoud occurred digm, which in Takhar, has consisted primarily targeting across the region in- against the former head of the of non-political criminal activity.

NGO Incidents B ADAKHSHAN Year to Date 8 BADAKHSHAN This Report Period 0 50 Badakhshan may be bracing for 40 the expected onset of winter efforts, the attack was deemed 30 snow, but in terms of the security personal in nature. It consisted of 20 the stabbing of an IGO gate guard paradigm, the province remained 10 on the morning of November 2nd relatively calm for another cycle. 0 Exceptions to this did manifest, after a conversation the guard was specifically including anecdotal having with a local escalated into a reporting on an increased pres- quarrel. It has been reported that BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime ence of AOG members in Raghi- the 2 knew each other prior to the stan (particularly near Patir—as confrontation, and that the assault District that resulted in the killing of 1 AOG discussed in the PRP), IMF/ANA had nothing to do with the IGO’s member and the arrests of 3 others. Argo has operations in Argo, and an assault profile or politics, or the guard’s been known to have some existing AOG ties, on an International Government employment there. The attacker and IMF claimed via open media to have been Organization (IGO) security subsequently fled the area but was seeking a “Haqqani facilitator” who guard in Fayazabad (New City). later arrested on the 4th, while the “coordinates suicide attacks with other insur- guard was moved to the hospital While the latter of these incidents gent leaders in the area.” Although an AOG to be treated. appears to stand out to those in presence exists in the district, the extent of a the humanitarian community, as it Elsewhere in the district, IM- Haqqani presence in the area remains un- includes the direct targeting of F/ANA forces conducted an op- known at this time. those involved in international eration in Toroq Village of Argo THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents G HOR Year to Date 14 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 This reporting period, besides 40 Eid, the arrival of winter was re- the death of two family members 30 sponsible for a further downturn from each side. While the conflict 20 in AOG activity, the number of was temporarily solved after the 10 AOG initiated incidents dropping negotiation by elders, it occurred 0 from 6 to 1 compared to the PRP. again last year, with a further rela- In spite of this, disputes among tive of one of the commanders GHOR AOG GHOR Crime local powerbrokers continued to dying in the fighting. remain a notable concern in the A longstanding power struggle province, with two incidents oc- the nature of the conflict here. Although the among local commanders also deepening of winter will likely cause a further curring which involved armed reappeared in Du Layna (this con- clashes between the same two drop in conflict levels, and the two aforemen- flict had not surfaced since 14 tioned local disputes have been reportedly local commanders in Charsada. September of this year). In fact, While the tension between these successfully mediated by local elders, disputes nearly 65% of the total security among local commanders are likely to remain a particular commanders had been incidents recorded this year in relatively unknown until it key destabilizing factor in the province’s secu- Ghor are in some way related to rity paradigm for the foreseeable future. emerged in violence, their conflict disputes among local powerbro- is rooted in a land dispute dated kers, in an interesting insight into back to 2006, which resulted in

NGO Incidents B ADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 After reaching the annual peak of 40 AOG activity the PRP, the sea- highest in the province for the 30 sonal downturn kicked in in first time). 20 Badghis this reporting period, This significant change in the geo- 10 with Eid also playing a role; the graphical pattern of AOG activity 0 total number of AOG incidents is likely attributable to the increase

dropped from 27 to 12 between of ANSF/IMF presence and pa- BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime periods, a considerable drop. At trolling measures elsewhere, par- the provincial level, while the ticularly in Muqur. ANSF/IMF were reportedly regenerated under the effective downturn occurred in districts had reportedly used both air and command of a District Shadow Governor re- with traditionally high levels of land assets for patrols and main- cently nominated by the IEA. While the geo- AOG concentration (from 6 to 4 tained these strict measures even graphical pattern of AOG activity is subject to in Murghab, from 16 to 3 in during the nighttime. These change due to the limited size and capacity of Muqur, and from 1 to 0 in Ghor- measures were taken mainly be- ANSF/IMF to counter relocation of AOG mach), the volume of AOG inci- cause of the sharply heightened elements, the overall downturn trend will likely dents in Qadis, in contrast, in- AOG activity in Muqur during the continue during the winter season. creased (from 4 to 5, making it the PRP, particularly after AOGs THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents ERAT Year to Date 8 HERAT H 50 This Report Period 1 Herat recorded one NGO inci- 40 dent this reporting period. In AOG efforts to destabilize the 30 security situation in its peripheral Herat City, ANSF arrested an in- 20 districts increased. There were 2 dividual involved in the robbery 10 of a vehicle belonging to an IN- AOG attacks in the airport area GO; the vehicle was taken togeth- where ANSF/IMF facilities are 0 er with 2 national INGO staff concentrated (the complex attack members to Kushk in July (these on a PSC and the RPG attack on HERAT AOG HERAT Crime abductees were released following the IMF airfield). Also, in Injil, the negotiations by elders). In there were 3 AOG incidents (2 tained kinetic AOG activity with 4 AOG inci- spite of AOG’s initial claims of along the airport road and 1 along dents (mostly IED attacks on ANSF/IMF the INGO’s involvement in NSP, Herat-Islam Qala main road). convoys/patrol vehicles) whose volume main- the recent incident suggests that As for the eastern districts, sea- tained the level of the peak season, while the AOG was also motivated by fi- sonal trends as well as Eid slowed number of AOG activity dropped from 3 to 0 nancial gains. down AOG activity, with no in Kushk in comparison between the last two In the broader provincial security AOG incidents recorded in Pash- reporting periods. While the strategic im- environment, Herat province re- tun Zarghun and only one IED portance of particular areas such as Shindand mained calm with 10 AOG inci- incident in Obe; kinetic is likely to sustain kinetic activity by AOGs, dents, a volume consistent with ANSF/IMF operations a likely the deepening of winter and on-going the countrywide seasonal down- contributing factor. As for the ANSF/IMF operations will likely continue to turn. However, while Herat City southern and northern districts, affect a downturn in AOG activity. continued to remain quiet with where AOG activity is traditional- only one minor ACG incident, ly concentrated, Shindand main-

NGO Incidents FARAH F ARAH Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 This reporting period, Farah host- 40 ed 13 AOG incidents in total In contrast, Bala Buluk, particular- 30 (nearly a 24% decrease from the ly along the road in the Shinwan 20 PRP) consistent with the wider area that connects Farah City to 10 national downturn trends due to the Herat-Kandahar Highway), 0 the arrival of winter and Eid. continued to be the center of This continuing downturn, which gravity of the conflicts between FARAH AOG FARAH Crime began in the second fortnight of ANSF/IMF and AOG in the the last month, appeared particu- province. 7 out of the 13 total larly in Pusht Rod, where the AOG incidents (mainly targeting appears to have shifted within the same dis- number of AOG incidents ANSF/IMF with IEDs or direct trict: from the Highway to secondary roads in dropped from 5 to 0. Beyond the attacks) were derived from this the Dilaram area, after a large additional above factors, an increased district alone and 2 ANSF/IMF ANSF/IMF forces deployed along the High- ANSF/IMF presence is also a operations were recorded. way in last fortnight of the previous month. likely reason; ANSF/IMF in- As for Bakwa, another district While Bala Buluk and Bakwa are likely to re- creased the number of CPs along where AOG has strong presence main the main focus of AOG activity, the major roadways in an effort to due to the strategic importance of overall downturn trends will likely continue restrict AOG freedom of move- Herat–Kandahar Highway for during the winter. ment. security force logistics and supply convoys, the area of AOG activity THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents AKTYA PAKTYA P Year to Date 7 150 This Report Period 0 While Paktya witnessed a signifi- 100 cant overall decline in conflict AOG units involved were never credibly in ‘control’ of the DAC, incidents during the Eid fortnight, 50 consistent with wider trends, it their penetration of the facility, particularly given the proximity of was home to a high impact AOG 0 operation in the north of the standing IMF units, is a further province. On the afternoon of example of the problems that the 11th, while a meeting between GOA facilities outside of major PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime community elders and district of- provincial population centres will ficials concerning local Loya Jirga increasingly face; the fact that Shahr-e Naw is Paktya’s second had been concentrated in recent months, a few representation was taking place in days after a preceding operation had arrested 5 the Chamkanay DAC facility, in urban centre, and the most im- portant in the strategically im- AOG fighters under his command. Beyond Shahr-e Naw town, a unit of these no other operations took place, including BBIED operatives attacked and portant northern border districts, only serves to further highlight in the Zadran and Mangal districts upon which penetrated the main gate of the there was a recent focus, although IMF did facility, killing 3 ANP when one this vulnerability. Moreover, at the time of writing it remained the defuse a 9-strong IED chain on the road to detonated his vest. They subse- Gerda Tserai DAC. quently holed themselves up on only incident across the country in the ground floor, although didn’t which local preparations for the Beyond the DAC assault in Chamkanay, the succeed in reaching the upper Loya Jirga appear to have been northern districts of Lija Mangal, Jaji and Jani floor where the meeting was tak- specifically targeted. Finally, it Khel saw the only other AOG operations this ing place, and repelled ANSF and was also an excellent demonstra- period, the most significant being an IED IMF responders for approximate- tion of the resilience of the strike on an IMF vehicle that killed 2 IMF sol- ly 3 hours before being killed. HQN’s operational capabilities diers in Shawat, close to Sayid Karam. In Jani Another AOG unit reportedly and sophistication in the face of Khel, the DAC was briefly attacked, and in Jaji, located in a mosque near the facil- recent heavy IMF pressure across AOG fighters attacked the district ANP HQ, a ity engaged in IDF fire against a the southeast. joint patrol in Kharmana, and an ANP patrol neighbouring IMF facility, as well The rest of the now-frozen prov- in Bayankhel – which no casualties reported as against IMF air assets, before ince, however, saw the aforemen- from belligerents on either side. Finally, in the mosque was rocketed and de- tioned drop in intensity, from all Jaji’s Ali Khel area, an IED struck an ALP ve- stroyed, killing all fighter inside. sides of the conflict. International hicle injuring 4 of the local policemen. For nearly 36 hours subsequently, military operations did continue in In and around the provincial capital, the most the Shahr-e Naw bazaar was Zurmat, where, during two sepa- serious incident was an escalation of force inci- closed by security forces as they rate operations, a local IE- dent near Gardez University, when an ANA searched for 2 BBIED operatives A/Mansur commander and sever- soldier at a CP fired on an approaching civilian believed to have escaped the sce- al other AOG fighters were de- vehicle, killing a young girl. The soldier was ne, although their search was ulti- tained. In Chamkanay, a joint arrested by ANP pending an investigation. mately fruitless. force arrested a local HQN com- Beyond this, a suspected AOG member This incident, likely the work of mander who appears unconnected stabbed and injured two ANP in the Gardez the Haqqani Network faction to the complex attack, while a vegetable market, fleeing the scene, while an- which has strengthened its posi- HQN commander was similarly other was arrested while loitering outside the tion in neighbouring Kurram detained in Sayid Karam’s Mach Kabul Bank branch in the city, with the inten- Agency this year, is significant in a area, a little south from where tions of the detained individual unknown at

number of manners. While the much of that district’s insecurity the time of writing. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents N ANGARHAR Year to Date 14 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 Nangarhar’s most important de- 80 As such, the area will likely con- velopments related to the ongoing 60 fallout from the Shinwari land tinue to pose potential problems 40 dispute, which seems to have ar- for NGOs operating in the area, 20 rived at a temporary but fragile in terms of the tribal identity of status quo. On the 9th, members of their local employees and the po- 0 the Sepai tribe engaged in a cere- tential this has for causing prob- lems between the NGO and the monial handover of a small num- NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime ber of weapons to the provincial local community. government, after reaching an In Jalalabad city, a number of Kot continued to be the most problematic area agreement with a mediating IO, noteworthy incidents occurred. of the province, with 3 of the 4 direct attacks although the opposing sub-tribe, Firstly, the latest in a series of ab- on ANSF occurring in the district, 2 of which the Alisher Khel, did not them- duction for ransom incidents, a were in Chardeh. In the Farm-e 3 area of the selves accept the revision to the local, unarmed employee of a district, moreover, an IED struck the vehicle original agreement, seeing the PDO was nearly kidnapped by 4 of an NDS employee as he transited the area, more favourable terms of the revi- gunmen travelling in a civilian injuring him. However, in a sign of the trouble sion as a reward for the Sepai’s vehicle but dressed in ANP uni- that AOGs are likely to have with their own bad behaviour, that is, their form, just tens of metres from the people, on the 14th it was reported two sepa- AOG-supported attack on senior provincial NDS HQ. Due to rate groups of AOG fighters fought each other GOA and IMF officials during quick reactions, however, the tar- with SAF in the Chardeh area, with the racket attempts at the previous decom- get managed to escape. Secondly, alerting the ANSF and leading to the arrest of missioning. While provincial au- gunmen broke into the home of 8, 5 of whom had been injured. A little before thorities and the IMF claim this is an IO employee in Zone 3, steal- this, on the 12th, IMF also conducted a search now a non-issue, there are some ing a quantity of cash money and operation in Chardeh, arresting 13 people and reasons to think that this will not non-cash items. Lastly, on the seizing a cache of ammunition. The district’s th be the case. First of all, a very 14 an IED was planted outside recent troubles are now quite clear, and it can small percentage of the actual the Zone 4 home of a GOA offi- be expected that it will receive further IMF weapons base of the key belliger- cial perceived to be pro-IMF. attention in coming months. ents has been handed over to the While he had been previously sus- government. Secondly, the Se- pected of securing financial assis- In Khogyani, trouble continued to bubble, pai’s opportunistic leadership con- tance and security protection although relative to late 2010 the situation is tinues to signal it does not recog- through embellishing the threat calmer. In Hashemkhel, gunmen shot and killed an off-duty ANP officer, while in nise the legitimacy of the provin- posed to him by AOGs, this inci- cial government, and by extension dent does appear to be authentic: Fatehkhel, gunmen shot another individual for its IMF backers, choosing instead while the initial detonation was reasons unknown. In Memla, an IED struck to mediate with IOs and the cen- small, ANP responders discov- an IMF vehicle as its convoy was passing the area, while in Wazir, IMF conducted the latest tral government, leaving open the ered an undetonated second phase possibility of further collaboration of the IED consisting of 4 mortar in a series of raids on AOG locations, killing 3 with both armed and provincial shells. These three incidents indi- suspected AOG fighters. political opposition. Moreover, cate the balance of threat that cur- Finally, in an escalation in the seriousness of localised inter-tribal animosity will rently exists in the city; as interna- cross-border incursions by Pakistani military continue to exist. As such, the tional money decreases, armed and paramilitary forces, in Lal Pur on the 4th it potential for a spark to re-ignite criminality enjoying political pro- was reported that 5 AOG fighters were killed armed hostilities remains a very tection is becoming a greater in PakMil air strikes in the Nazar Khel area of real concern even as the situation problem, but AOG penetration, the border with Mohmand Agency; most seri- is currently non-violent – and lo- after the long, quiet summer, does ously, military helicopters were reported to cal AOGs that had been exploit- also appear to be slowly re- have subsequently landed at the site of the air ing the tensions appear to have escalating. strike and taken the bodies of the AOG fight- moved into neighbouring districts. Outside the provincial capital, Bati ers away. THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents UNAR Year to Date 8 KUNAR K 150 This Report Period 0

During the Eid fortnight, Kunar 100 did not see a significant decrease accumulated wages owed to the employee by the Nuristani-owned in opposition activity, unlike some 50 of the larger falls recorded else- RCC as part of his work on the where in the region. However, in construction of a road in Nuri- 0 spite of maintaining its overall stan’s Wama district. Given the intensity, there were no stand-out employee’s Pashtun ethnic identi- ty, and that Nuristanis travelling incidents or major changes in con- KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime flict-related security trends, dis- from Kunar to their province are tinct from the previous period affected to a much greater degree by such a blockade than their Ku- Manogai, and further hit-and-run SAF attacks when a female BBIED operative on ANP CPs in Shagai and Tasha, on the out- detonated her vest at an NDS nari neighbours, the issue quickly took on a tribal dimension, which skirts of Asadabad. There was also one suc- office in the provincial capital. cessful IED strike against an IMF vehicle in Indeed, perhaps the most notable makes it less likely to see a swift resolution – the absence of any Wata Pur’s Kamchay area, while another IED development was the armed killed 2 ANBP officers in Bari Kot, Nari, with blockading of the Asadabad- district government in Chapa Da- ra complicating the matter further. a secondary device striking the vehicle of the Parun road by a disgruntled RCC first responders, injuring 4 further policemen. employee and members of his Other than that, the conflict envi- extended family in the Trenik area ronment remained characterised Finally, in the HIG-dominated Shigal, Shinko- of Chapa Dara, which began on by AOG direct attacks on security rak area, community members from the local the 9th and remains in place at the force targets outside of the pro- Shinwari sub-tribe fought with AOG fighters time of writing. While Nuristani vincial capital, as well as IDF at- from the Gujjar tribe that had entered the dis- officials allege that the man has tacks from across the border and trict, in a first manifestation of a Shinwari- done so at the behest of AOGs, in Pech valley. Notable incidents Gujjar tension stemming from the killing of a this is unlikely; instead, it appears amongst the former include the Shinwari elder late in 2010 earlier in the sum- that the blockade was initiated in targeted killings of two ANP of- mer. While it’s too early to tell, this may be the protest of the large quantity of ficers in the Lachalim area of beginning of a sustained conflict dynamic in the district.

NGO Incidents L AGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 As always, Laghman recorded a 40 first time did not continue during small number of conflict inci- 30 dents, reflecting the low intensity the Eid fortnight. In Mihtarlam 20 of the conflict there, but as al- city, the only notable incidents ways, there were noteworthy were an IED detonation in an 10 events amongst them. Perhaps empty shop in Deh Malik, and a 0 the most significant was an IED breaking-and-entering incident in striking a civilian vehicle on the Tajkari village, in which gunmen main Alingar road, which led to entered a local home and killed LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime the death of a total of 9 civilians, the wife of the house for reasons ly, they also detained an allegedly senior HQN including a woman and a child, a unknown. Finally, in Qarghayi, commander alongside two associates in particularly bloody incident for AOG fighters attacked an ANP Qarghayi, who reportedly facilitated HQN the province. In Alishing’s inse- CP in Surkhakan, which resulted attacks into Kabul. However, no corroborat- cure Salaw valley, gunmen abduct- in the wounding of two of the ing information could be found, and Qarghayi ed a local civilian for unknown assailants. is not on a main infiltration route into the capi- reasons before setting fire to his From the IMF side, an airstrike in tal from the Pakistan border, making the re- vehicle, but the pattern of IED Dawlat Shah resulted in the killing port a strange outlier from normal patterns. attacks on the main district road of several AOG fighters late in that emerged in October for the the period, while, highly unusual- THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents K HOST Year to Date 4 KHOST This Report Period 1 150 Khost saw the region’s only NGO incident during the period, in AOG fighters were arrested, while 100 what appears to be a case of IMF a little east again, in Shinkay, an information gathering. A new ANP CP received rocket fire from 50 NGO medical facility currently AOG fighters which ultimately under construction to the north of missed. In the same area, it was 0 Khost city was searched by IMF also reported that two clans in the ground forces late at night on the Mahdikhel area who had been KHOST AOG KHOST Crime 1st, who departed after apparently feuding over a piece of land for satisfying themselves that no two decades managed to agree on marked change from the tight ship the threat was contained within. a settlement, reportedly just be- fore further arms escalation was Haqqani Network usually commands. Lastly, In the wider provincial conflict, due to take place: hope, indeed, in Tere Zayi, a Haqqani commander was de- the intensity of AOG operations st that even the oldest feuds can be tained in a night raid on the 1 , while just one dropped by about a third over the resolved. Back at Salerno, an IED AOG direct attack was recorded against an Eid fortnight, similar to the rest of planted in a local shop detonated, ANBP CP. the country. That it didn’t drop injuring 2 in what appears to have An IMF operation, Knifetip, began in Tere further, however, is attributable to been the latest in a series criminal- Zayi and Bak at the end of the period, with no the warmer climate than its north- ly motivated IED incidents. In reports of consequences at the time of writing. ern neighbour Paktya, as well as the city itself, a magnetic IED Prior to this though, Bak did see two signifi- the high degree of AOG satura- attached to the motorcycle of an cant AOG operations, one an attack on the tion and consequent strategic im- ASG detonated in the vicinity of DAC, and one the assassination of a retired portance of the province to the the city’s military hospital, though ANP officer and tribal elder in the Kotkay major belligerents, more akin to not reportedly causing any inju- area. In other IMF operations, which focused its southern neighbour Paktika. ries. on Sabari, a total of 15 AOG fighters were In and around Khost city, the sit- In the border districts to the arrested across a number of operations, and 2 uation remained relatively calm. south and east of the provincial killed in an air strike as they planted an IED; From the IMF side, 3 operations capital, things were also relatively later in the period a large weapons and ammu- took place, the first two of which calm; Tani did not record any nition cache was also discovered in the district. focused on the same HQN com- conflict incidents while in Gur- In Nadir Shah Kot, a local HQN commander mander operating to the east of buz, the most notable incident was killed and 4 of his fighters detained during the city; the first operation de- was an AOG fighter killed in the a clearing operation in Karee village. In these tained 2 of the commander’s premature detonation of the IED highly hostile districts—Sabari, Musa Khel, fighters on the 4th, with a follow- he was planting in Nazari Khel, Qalander and Nadir Shah Kot—there were up operation in the same area, though an IED did strike an ANP also a small number of AOG attacks, both likely working off information vehicle in Sheikh Amir, injuring 3. direct and IDF, on security force targets, but gleaning from the detainees, In Spera, the DAC was briefly none recorded any success in causing fatalities wrapped up the commander him- attacked, while 8 AOG fighters or damage. However, in Shamal, a series of self 48 hours after. Later in the from two different units were successful IED strikes were recorded, in Bor- period, just east of FOB Salerno killed when they fought each oth- gai village and the Said Khel bazaar, targeting in Kunday village, IMF conducted er near the border on the 12th, in a the ANA and an ASG escort vehicle; in all, 6 a clearing operation in which 3 ANA were wounded and 2 ASG killed. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents H ELMAND Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 After the highly kinetic summer months - with a peak in AOG In the last fortnight AOG direct activity recorded in August - Hel- attacks continued on a lower rate mand seems to be displaying a when compared to the high downward seasonal trend in the fighting season period, with 9 sep- overall number of incidents. De- arate incidents reported from spite this, the number of AOG Marja, Nahri Sarraj and Nad Ali. attributed incidents remained in This period these attacks were line with the previous cycle. focused on targeting ANP/ALP facilities and personnel, and re- The most significant incident this sulted in 1 ANP and 1 ALP killed, vehicle of the District Chief of Police, killing period occurred during the even- and 3 ANP, 3 ALP and 1 civilian the official along with 2 of his bodyguards. ing hours of 10 November, with wounded. An additional 2 fatali- The AOG targeting of ANSF/GOA officials an SVBIED that detonated in ties were reported as a result of remains one of the key features of the security Durahi area of Lashkar Gah Dis- AOG ‘hit teams’. In Nad Ali, an paradigm in the Southern Region. Of note, trict. The device targeted a pass- off-duty ANP official was killed in this reporting period also saw the death of the ing IMF convoy and injured 2 Locha area, whereas two AOG COP of Rashidan District (Ghazni), as well as IMF soldiers. At the same time, operatives riding on a motorcycle the District Governor of Sar Hawza (Paktika), the explosion collaterally involved shot and killed a tribal elder in both killed in IED strikes. civilians, killing 2 and wounding 1 Benador area of Garmser. 3 serious road accidents occurred along High- (a child). The incident marks the way 1 in Nahri Sarranj and Lashkar Gah dis- th IED emplacement once again was 10 attack involving a suicide tricts, in which a total of 15 people were killed component recorded in Helmand robust in the province, with at least 20 IED strikes in addition to and 7 people injured. Of note, 2 incidents this year. Including the most re- th 22 reported discoveries. IED re- took place on the 12 of November at inter- cent occurrence, Lashkar Gah vals of less than 1 hour apart. At first, a Toyo- District was the recipient of 6 lated incidents were concentrated this period in Lashkar Gah, Nahri ta Corolla collided with a motorbike, resulting such attacks, followed by Sangin in 4 civilians killed, including a woman and a (2) and a single incident respec- Sarranj and Sangin districts. De- spite a high ratio of discov- child. Then a bus collided with a Toyota Sara- tively Nad Ali and Nahri Sarranj. cha, killing 9 civilians, including a woman and The recent incident further con- ery/disposal, IED strikes re- mained effective and caused the 4 children. Four others passengers were also firmed the trends that have ap- wounded in the latter accident. The men- peared over the past few months death of 2 ANP, 1 IMF and 1 civilian, and injured another 4 tioned cases are a reminder that despite the in the South, of an AOG prefer- ongoing conflict, data shows that one of the ence towards using VBIEDs as a IMF and 3 ANP. In addition to this, in Drauw area of Garmser on main risks throughout the country for the pop- common tactic while carrying out ulation (incl. NGOs) remains road accidents. suicide or/and complex attacks. 6 November, an IED targeted the

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents G HAZNI Year to Date 2 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 Similar to other areas in the south, 200 Ghazni witnessed a drop in the that prior to this incident; the 150 overall number of incidents rec- number of emplaced explosive orded during the current reporting devices in Rashidan was very low, 100 cycle. with only 3 reported IED events 50 recorded in 2011. On the other Although IED deployment has 0 usually played a minor role in the side - in line with provincial pat- terns - the large majority of AOG province when compared to the GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime volume of direct attacks, it fre- activity that was recorded in the quently accounts for the majority district this year consisted of di- rect attacks, in particular against while on leave. Another incident that attracted of reported casualties. This re- the attention of media was reported from porting period the province expe- the DAC – the recipient of 26 such occurrences. Ghazni city on 9 November, when during the rienced at least 9 IED detona- night time 2 women (a mother and her daugh- tions. Noteworthy, 2 IED strikes Indeed, direct attacks accounted ter) were shot and killed, allegedly after being occurred in Ghazni District, for the majority of AOG actions. accused of adultery. Regardless of the exact where in addition to a premature These were primarily targeting motivation behind the killing, the incident detonation that killed 2 AOG ANP check posts as well as DAC prompted questions regarding the security members in Noghi Village, a pri- areas with the Khogyani, Ajristan within the city which - along with some other vate vehicle struck a roadside IED and Rashindan district centres all areas in the south - is slated for (a rather sym- on 8 November in Piraki area, receiving SAF attacks. Albeit nu- bolic) transition as part of the second tranche. causing the death of 1 civilian. In merous, such attacks generally AOGs operating in Ghazni - in addition to addition, in the DAC area of consist of brief engagements and carrying out strict military actions - remain Qarabagh, a roadside IED deto- usually do not involve any casual- frequently mobilized in organizing intimidation nated against an IMF vehicle, ties, with this cycle being no ex- campaigns prior to significant GOA events (it wounding 5 IMF soldiers. ception. was the case, for instance, in September 2010, Much like Helmand and Paktika, In Ghazni the trend of targeted when they warned locals in several districts not Ghazni saw an effective IED at- killing is also continuing. In the to vote in the elections). This reporting peri- tack targeting a high-ranking last fortnight, in Qarabagh, AOG od, night letters had been distributed in nu- GOA official in early November. ambushed 2 ANCOP while they merous villages of Qarabagh, Deh Yak, Ab On the 1st in the DAC area of were returning to their duty sta- Band and Gelan threatening locals not to par- Rashidan, a roadside IED deto- tions in Kandahar Province, kill- ticipate or support the Loya Jirga (scheduled to nated on the vehicle of the Dis- ing one official and wounding take place in Kabul City) or face “severe con- trict Chief of Police. The detona- another. In addition, in the dis- sequences”. tion killed the official and two trict centre of Ajristan, an ANP other ANP. It is worth noting was abducted from his residence

NGO Incident Volume‐ Regional Distribution NGO Staff Fatalities‐Regional Distribution

North North 18% 20% 23% 33% East East South South West West 18% 14% Central Central 20% 5% 26% 23% THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR K ANDAHAR Year to Date 3 200 This Report Period 0 Kandahar has enjoyed the season- 150

al decrease in incident volumes as dren) injured in 2 separated IED 100 well as an absence of ‘media im- strikes in Districts 7 and 6 in addi- pact’ attacks over the past two tion to 2 ANP wounded. Another 50 weeks. Nonetheless, the province IED detonation was also reported 0 experienced a variety of typical in Zhari, where 1 ANP was killed. AOG tactics, focused on the typi- AOG direct attacks were also KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime cally kinetic areas of Zhari District prominent in Zhari, which wit- and Kandahar city. Showing an nessed 8 events, asserting its posi- upward trend as compared with tion as the most kinetic area with- har Airfield, impacting inside the perimeter. the previous cycle, IEDs were the in the province. Further AOG The incident marks the 8th IDF attack reported dominant threat this period, with authored direct attacks affected at least 27 IED related incidents. in the vicinity of the airfield thus far. Alt- Maywand, Ghorak and Kandahar hough frequently inaccurate, it is worth noting Kandahar city itself accounted for City, however at a lower scale, that 3 separate rocket attacks targeting KAF 29 % of IED incidents, and be- with one occurrence reported in sides several discoveries, experi- involved casualties. The most significant inci- each district. As a result of these th enced 5 IED strikes. Within the dent occurred on January, 19 when following attacks, 1 IMF was killed, and 1 an attack it was reported that 1 IMF soldier city, District 7 witnessed 2 deto- ANP and 2 IMF soldiers were was killed, and 17 others, including 2 civilians, nations, while Districts 9, 6 and 4 wounded. In addition, one target- were wounded. saw one each. AOG target selec- ed killing was reported in May- tion fit well established patterns, wand on the 5th, when AOG shot On the ANSF/IMF side there were 14 docu- with ANP vehicles being the most and killed an ANP while the vic- mented arrests/operations focused on the dis- common target. However, given tim was on the way home. tricts of Panjwayi, Zhari and Kandahar city. the robust IED deployment, the These operations netted a variety of weapons, To complete the profile of AOG ammunition and drugs as well as resulting in collateral involvement of civilians tactics, it should be noted that on the death of 9 AOG members and the deten- remained frequent, and Kandahar the evening of 9 November 3 city saw 4 civilians (incl. 2 chil- tion of 8 suspects (incl. 3 potential suicide at- rockets were fired towards Kanda- tackers in Kandahar city).

NGO Incidents U RUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 In Uruzgan AOG activity slightly 80 increased with 12 out of a total 22 ies/disposals this period. Where- 60 incidents recorded this period. as in Yak Leka area of Tirin Kot, Though the rate of direct attacks an IED detonation on an ANA 40 remained low (as is usual in the vehicle did not cause any casual- 20 province) with 3 separate inci- ties, 2 ALP members were killed 0 dents in Tirin Kot and 1 in Dih- in Chora (Khwaja Qadir area) and rawud, all of them resulted in 1 ANP was wounded in Shah URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime ANSF/IMF casualties. Beside Mansoor area of Tirin Kot. The security force personnel, suspect- most noteworthy incident oc- soldiers. The shooting echoed another inci- ed AOG continued their cam- curred in the latter district when dent that occurred at the end of the previous paign of intimidation with this on 9 November a roadside IED period, on 28 October in Nesh District of period in Chora District AOG hit a civilian vehicle, killing three Kandahar, when a rogue ANA officer opened operatives shot and killed a local occupants and wounding another. fire on IMF elements resulting in numerous civilian. Frequently the victims of In the last fortnight Uruzgan at- casualties before being shot himself. Although such incidents have been accused tracted media attention with a geographically separate and without clear moti- of cooperating with the GOA shooting that took place on the 8th vation or reason, these incidents could poten- or/and ANSF, however the cir- inside a joint IMF/ANA base in tially have a negative impact on IMF coopera- cumstances of the latter incident Charmestan area of Tirin Kot. tion with their ANSF counterparts, especially have not been clearly elucidated. An ANA soldier opened fire, re- as the second phase of the often emphasised Uruzgan experienced 6 IED portedly following a verbal quar- “security transition” is expected to be an- strikes in addition to 8 discover- rel, wounding 1 ANA and 3 IMF nounced in the coming days. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents N IMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Nimroz continues to witness a 80 low rate of security incidents, in 2011. nonetheless this reporting period In regards to the overall level of 60 AOGs carried out several notable AOG activity in the province re- 40

actions in order to assert their ported this year, the data shows a 20 presence, particularly in the north- drop of 8.5 % in comparison to ern areas of the province. In the January – early November 0 Khash Rod, AOG fired a rocket period of last year. Concurrently, towards Ghor Ghori Town on 9 the geographical distribution of NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime November though the attack was AOG attributed events remains in confirming its position as the favoured tactic ineffective and caused no casual- line with previous trends, as the of AOGs. For instance, statistics show that ties. This incident marks the 9th large majority of incidents contin- indirect fire incident that has been IED emplacement (both discoveries and deto- ue to be focused on Khash Rod. nations) has increased by 166 % this year when recorded thus far in 2011, with The latter continues to be as- compared to last year’s data (albeit, as men- Khash Rod being the exclusive sessed as the most kinetic district tioned, affecting mainly Khash Rod). recipient of them. Worth noting, within the province, and has ac- this figure displays a 30% decrease counted for almost 90% of all Given that the majority of deployed devices when compared to the same peri- incidents attributed to AOGs in are pressure-plate IEDs - which unlike od in 2010. 3 days later, also in 2011. Further to this, the data RCIEDs are non-discriminatory in their target- Khash Rod, AOG elements riding reveals that on the tactical level, ing - IEDs remain a key threat for the civilian in a vehicle shot and killed a tribal the rate of AOG direct and, as population, including NGOs operating in the elder in front of the mosque in previously mentioned, IDF at- province. IED deployment continued this Rizi village. Targeted killings, tacks has dropped when com- period with a discovery of 3 IEDs, which were such as this attack, are quite rare pared to the last year, while IED located by ANP in Posht-e-Hassan area of in Nimroz, and prior to this only emplacement has witnessed a sig- Khash Rod District. 3 similar incidents were recorded nificant increase during this year

NGO Incidents ABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL Z 100 This Report Period 0 In the last fortnight Zabul wit- 80 nessed a significant drop in inci- defend the area against AOG at- 60 tacks and/or to prevent AOG dents, resulting from both an 40 infiltration, had already been tar- AOG and ANSF/IMF decrease 20 in activity. Amongst a total of 21 geted by AOG on several occa- 0 security incidents that were re- sions, in particular in Shahjoy Dis- ported across the province, AOGs trict. authored 11, with Shahjoy experi- There were 3 cases of targeted ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime encing 5, Tarna Wa Jaldak 3 and killing with 2 in Shahjoy and 1 in Qalat 2. This AOG activity was Qalat. On 2 November, in Chi- IED emplacement remained in line with the confined to direct attacks, IED nay area, a local civilian was killed previous cycle, with a total of 11 incidents re- emplacement and targeted killings. by AOG over the accusation of ported, including 5 detonations. This period This cycle, AOG launched attacks spying for the IMF and a few days Tarna Wa Jaldak saw 3 strikes targeting IMF in Shahjoy District on 2 separate later on the 8th, 2 individuals rid- and PSC vehicles, although none of them occasions that directly targeted ing on a motorbike shot and in- caused casualties. On the other hand, Shahjoy ALP personnel. In Hilal China jured another civilian in experienced 2 incidents, including an IED det- village, AOG attacked an ALP Ghaznawiyano village. The exact onation that killed 2 nomads (Kuchis) riding a post killing one, and in the other, motivation behind the second donkey in Joyband village area. AOG targeted the residence of an incident remains unknown as an- Lastly, the previously mentioned downscale in ALP commander located in Chi- ecdotal reporting suggests possi- ANSF/IMF activity resulted in 7 documented nay area. The ensuing fire fight ble criminal motivations. Lastly, cases, for a total of 14 AOG killed and another between claimed the life of 1 ALP AOG members riding on a mo- 5 detained from those operations in Naw Ba- and injured 2 AOG members. torcycle killed an ANP official in har, Qalat and Shinkay districts. ALP units, which are meant to Qalat city on 14 November. THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents AKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA P 200 This Report Period 0 While Paktika saw a decrease in 150 the absolute number of conflict involved. 100

incidents during the Eid fortnight, This is the third (foiled) major 50 consistent with wider security attack on the outpost in the last trends, the significance and inten- year, including a disabled 0 sity of the fighting that did occur SVBIED during October, and an

meant the highly insecure prov- indication of the strategic im- PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime ince had its most violent period portance placed on the facility by since the Sar Hawza operations in the opposition. Moreover, this is July that led to the deaths of the second time in 4 months that the Mirzak area of the district, arresting 25 roughly 80 local and foreign such large, amassed forces have AOG fighters and killing one teenage boy in Haqqani Network fighters. It also attempted to take strategically the process. meant that the province was far important security force-held fa- Moreover, on the 14th the well-known but con- and away the most violent in the cilities in Paktika – the first being troversial Urgun-based militia commander and entire eastern border region. the large force that had en- IMF ally Azizullah was reported injured in an Most significantly, on November trenched itself in a cave network IED attack on his convoy as he transited the 8th a massed force of Haqqani in Sar Hawza in reported prepara- district, alongside a bodyguard. In all then, Network fighters descended on a tion for an assault on the nearby while the cave complexes of Sar Hawza may joint IMF-ANSF outpost in Mar- provincial capital, but disrupted remain empty after the violence of July, the gha, a border area of Barmal, the prior to the assault after infor- district remains heavily saturated with active province’s most kinetic district mation about it leaked to the IMF. and aggressive AOG units that remain highly given that it shares a long border Coincidentally, but indicative of capable of scoring significant tactical successes. with both North and South Wa- the risks in the district, Sar Hawza Other highly kinetic incidents further added to ziristan, including a major road was the site of the other major the picture of Paktika’s stubbornly high levels crossing at Shkin/Angur Ada. incident this period—the killing of violence. In Yahya Khel DAC area, 18 Similar tactics had been success- of the district governor in an IED AOG fighters were killed by an IMF air strike, fully utilised on similarly isolated strike on his convoy on the very while in a search operation in the same district, security force bases in Nuristan in same day as the Margha attack. in the Abdullah Khan area, 2 further AOG 2008 and 2009, inflicting some of The detonation also killed one fighters were killed, the IMF also seizing a the IMF’s most heavy casualty ANP, and injured 4 more, includ- cache of weapons and explosives which includ- tolls and scoring major propagan- ing the District Chief of Police. ed a BBIED vest. 6 further IMF operations of da victories. However, in this While in August an attempt was lesser significance took place across the prov- latest case, a higher standard of made on the life of the provincial ince. In Yosuf Khel, an AOG ambush of a defensive capabilities, including governor when AOG fighter am- joint ANP-NDS patrol caused the death of better detection mechanisms and bushed his convoy with SAF as it two NDS officials, while the IDF campaign base defence, as well as, crucially, travelled through the district, this also continued in Barmal, Dila and Gayan, pri- a rapid response by air assets, led is the first successful assassination marily targeting IMF facilities on the border, to the successful repelling of the of a senior GOA official across albeit at a reduced level and with no resultant AOG force. In two hours of the province this year. On the casualties. fighting in the early evening, these same day again, an AOG ambush As such, in spite of the downturn in overall combined ground and air defenc- on another ANP convoy with AOG operations, this period has seen the es led to the killing of an estimat- SAF and RPGs injured 5 police- greatest overall fortnightly AOG death toll in ed 70 AOG fighters, with no re- men, while 5 days later, another the province in 2011. Paktika’s security envi- ports of security force casualties, IED attack, this time on an ANA ronment remains, therefore, deeply problemat- in spite of the use of relatively convoy, killed one ANA soldier ic, and all evidence suggests it will continue to well planned and executed small and injured another. On the 11th, be so through the winter and into next year. unit tactics by the AOG fighters IMF conducted an operation in Contact List Mukhtar Noori Nic Tomas Vacant Naseer Nathan Brian COUNTRY CENTRAL Sayed Taro WEST SOUTH Rory EAST NORTH Firoz Camille Patrick od Device Islamic mili Explosive Police ACG

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DIVISIONS ng

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Peri sed

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