CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2011 Issue 85 REPORT 1‐15 November 2011 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-5 With echoes of mid-year 2010, the recent for comparative graphs). Northern Region 6-10 spate of NGO staff abductions in Faryab In broader conflict dynamics, IED’s re- Western Region 11-12 provided the defining dynamic affecting main a keystone tactical element with this the NGO community this period, with 4 period being no exception. Despite minor Eastern Region 13-16 separate incidents (including 3 actual ab- periodic fluctuations, the detonation (both ductions and one near miss) reported in Southern Region 17-21 actual and premature) to discovery rate just over a fortnight. The death of 2 NGO ANSO Info Page 22 remains relatively stable at roughly 50/50, a national staff members in one incident also rate that also is generally unaffected by the proved to be the most significant occur- changing volumes (+/-) of device deploy- rence resulting from these. While the exact ment. Of note, civilians remain the most HIGHLIGHTS causative factors of this short-term trend affected, accounting for 55% of all IED remains shrouded, it is likely a mix result- related deaths this period with the ANP NGO abductions in ing from the fluid operational environment Faryab second to this for a further 38%. These in which these incidents happened (AOG statistics bear out the reality that with the migrations, indigenous vs. exogenous 2 NGO staff fatalities continued expansive use of victim operated this period groups, and security force operations), devices, particularly when coupled with the command and control issues related to the high exposure rate these 2 groups experi- Civilians remain most mixed nature of AOG elements through- ence, this will continue to be the case affected by IED detona- out the North, as well as possible local through to the conclusion of 2011. tions financial motivations. Though there were actual incidents related Inauguration of the Tra- The inclusion of these recent NGO staff to the inauguration of the Traditional Loya ditional Loya Jirga in fatalities brings this years total to 30, a con- Jirga in Kabul (the most significant occur- Kabul siderable volume in comparison to previ- ring in Paktya), this period served to high- ous years, though 2010 was exceptional due light the sophistication and prevalence of ANSO is supported by to a single incident high casualty rate (8), a the IEA information operations campaign. definite outlier to standard trends which While both verbal and written methods generally account for 1-2 casualties per in- (night letters) were used to warn against cident (see graph p. 5 detailing the yearly attendance, as well as refute the events NGO incident/fatality rates). The practice ‘legitimacy’, during the run up to the Jirga, of nationalisation and localisation of pro- it was the publication on an IEA website of gram staff, while a sound strategy for gar- an apparent security plan related to the nering access and acceptance, nonetheless Jirga that garnered the most attention. puts the burden of risk squarely onto these While the veracity of this plan was immedi- same staff, as attested by the fact that all ately disputed by authorities (an almost NGO fatalities this year were nationals. Of irrelevant factor in such campaigns) it had note, while the South and Central Regions the appearance of legitimacy and served its account for the lowest NGO incident vol- ultimate purpose: garnering considerable umes countrywide (7 and 24 respectively), media coverage and bringing into sharp they accounted for the highest fatality rates relief once again the question of AOG pen- (7 each) followed by the West and North (6 etration within the ANSF. each) and finally the East with 4 (see p. 18 ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL K ABUL Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 2 Criminal attempts targeting high- 40 profile vehicles in transit with a incidents (85%) ensured by 30 ‘tyre-slashing’ technique are a well ANSF-IMF, the events in Kabul 20 established component of the were dominated by the run-up to 10 the ‘Traditional Loya Jirga’, set to NGO threat profile in the capital. 0 Two late reports related to this provide a platform in order to activity were corroborated with discuss the strategic Afghanistan – NGOs during this cycle and date US agreement as well as the future KABUL AOG KABUL Crime back to the 31st of October and of the GOA-sponsored peace the 20th of September. The inci- process. Firstly, ANSF-IMF en- gaged in a large amount of pre- Bagrami) to a media-focused propaganda cam- dents took place respectively in paign including the release on the IEA website Shahre Naw, between the Haji emptive operations along the ac- cess routes to Kabul City, with the of an alleged ‘ANSF security plan’ specifying Yakub Circle and the Hanzala details on the set-up and movements of VIP Mosque (PD 4), and on the Jala- most tangible outcomes reported from Paghman (Chawki Arghan- participants to the event. While the authorities labad Road (PD 9). On a positive naturally denied the authenticity of the materiel note, the NGO staff members di), Musayi (Qalai Abdul Rauf) and several locations in Chahar released, the compilation nonetheless included that were dealing with the inci- some rather accurate details surrounding those dents followed the recommended Asyab and Muhammad Agha. Indeed, the authorities took a par- involved in the preparations. While such in- mitigation measures and drove to formation is not necessarily revealing, as many safe locations, or calling a back-up ticular care to control the access routes from Logar and Wardak. sensitive details or vulnerabilities could be ob- vehicle, before changing the tained thru other means, the impact of releas- slashed tyre. This interdicted any Secondly, an external security pe- rimeter was established around ing such information on the sense of safety on chances for the criminal groups the part of those involved cannot be disregard- which followed them in traffic. the capital including additional checkpoints, mobile patrolling of ed. Ultimately, this marked a ‘victory’ in the Since September 2010, 5 such ongoing IEA information operations cam- attempts directly impacted NGOs the elevated grounds along strate- gic arteries, as well as deployments paign, as attested by the considerable media in Shahr-e Naw, Taimani, on the coverage of this release. Jalalabad Road and in Kote Sangi. into the potential staging areas for Of note, two out of three latest AOG IDF attacks. A new devel- An actual event occurred on the 14th, two days incidents took place in PD 4 (Old opment, ANA air-support, is sup- prior to the inauguration of the event, when a Taimani Square and Haji Yakub posed to be a part of the arrange- lone AOG operative carrying an explosive Circle) and targeted NGO vehi- ment. In Kabul City, besides the charge in a hand bag attempted to approach cles that were transporting NGO layered security perimeter sur- the main entrance to the venue; though he was staff after bank visits. During one rounding the venue of the event, a spotted and killed by ANSF detail. An addi- such occurrence, the attackers hit number of security operations tional 3 individuals were arrested in the vicinity the mark and snatched a signifi- were reported by ANSF-IMF shortly after the escalation. While this may cant amount of cash from the from PD 12, 9, 7 and 4. have been a possible dry-run to test the securi- vehicle while the NGO staff were AOG interest to side track the ty structures in place, the attempt lacked the busy changing the tyre. These Jirga was obvious throughout, spectacular features of the strike at the incidents further reinforce the with recurrent verbal and written Chamkani DAC, Paktya, where a multi-vector need for established ‘actions on’ intimidation efforts ranging from suicide attack targeted an on-going jirga-related for such cases and the instruction night-letter campaigns and session of local elders hosted by the wuluswal th of staff in the same. preaching at mosques in the prov- on the 10 . Despite the AOG intimidation campaign, a large majority of the anticipated Featuring consistent volumes and inces (in Central for instance in Chaki Wardak, Saydabad, Baraki 2000 participants nonetheless made it to Kabul activity patterns, with the over- to attend the event. whelming majority of reported Barak, Puli Alam, Khushi, Tagab, THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents ARDAK Year to Date 4 WARDAK W 100 This Report Period 0 During the first two weeks of No- 80 vember the conflict developments Jaghatu marked a distinctive spate 60 of 6 AOG attacks, including 5 in Wardak matched the patterns 40 of the previous month, with a stand-off attacks. 2 IED strikes 20 slight exception of the geographic effectively impacted ANP and distribution. This cycle, Jaghatu ANA on the roads, though in an- 0 hosted a rather unusual concen- other case a pressure-plate device was triggered by a civilian vehicle. tration of AOG activity. WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime In addition, the DAC/ANP HQ Out of 30 corroborated events so area attracted two cases of night- far, AOG ensured 15, slightly time direct and indirect fire. Only jority of cases concentrated in Saydabad (7), more than the incidents authored one case related to a close-range followed by Nirkh and Jalrez (2 each), and by IMF-ANSF (12).