CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 96 REPORT 16‐30 April 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-3 The end of April maintained this year’s Despite these lower volumes, NGO expo- 4-11 Northern Region significant retraction in AOG activity levels sure to ambient violence was nonetheless Western Region 12-13 in comparison to the previous two years. highlighted by the series of eight direct in- Current volumes of AOG attacks (close cidents recorded this period. The responsi- Eastern Region 14-17 range, indirect fire, suicide) were down by ble actors’ profile remained consistent with 45% compared to the equivalent period in this year’s established trends, as 5 out of 8 Southern Region 18-21 2011 as well as by 19% below the volumes escalations were linked to crime whereas 22 ANSO Info Page for 2010 with this dynamic being primarily only 2 were initiated by AOG and one by driven by the decline in AOG attack vol- the security forces. In counter-point, the umes in the South. When compared to the territorial distribution denoted a significant HIGHLIGHTS first 4 months of 2011 (with 2012 data as shift as 5 cases occurred in the North, of the 25th of April) the January - April against only 2 in the East and 1 in the West Low incident volumes AOG incident volumes in Helmand are while none was recorded for Central this country-wide down by 78%, by 53% in Ghazni and by cycle. NGO exposure to ambi- 44% in Kandahar. In the East, compara- An NGO vaccination campaign member in ent criminality in the tive volumes are at par in Nangarhar but North Kunduz was killed during a residential rob- down by 22% and 48% in Kunar and bery attempt accounting for the second Khost respectively, which remain the two IED blast in NGO clinic in NGO fatality this year. Intimidation ef- Khost most kinetic provinces in the region. forts, including SAF on NGO facilities, While late reporting and the last 5 days of were common in the North, including two AOG threats close April will eventually modify the round up, schools in Ghazni cases from Balkh and Badakhshan. A the significant decline of AOG activity in 5 clear-cut warning was also sent to an NGO out of the 6 most kinetic provinces in the clinic in Khost in the form of an IED, country is a fact which, at this stage, seems likely an expression of the local ‘medical ANSO is supported by to owe more to a deliberate AOG strategy mafia’. Also related to intimidation efforts, rather than to restricted access or capabili- the temporary closure of schools in Ghazni ties on their side. The comparison of following explicit threats issued by local AOG incident volumes for the January- AOG is another serious development to be April periods is illustrated on page 11 of monitored by the NGO community. this report. ANSO: NGO Incidents and Fatalities ANSO: Direct NGO incidents in 2012 180 172 18 160 148 16 137 137 140 129 14 120 106 12 100 Yearly NGO Incident 10 Security Forces Volumes 80 8 Crime Yearly NGO Fatalities AOG 60 6 37 37 30 31 40 24 4 15 19 20 2 2 0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 EAST NORTH CENTRAL WEST SOUTH ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION ABUL NGO Incidents KABUL K Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 In the aftermath of the coordinat- 40 ed attacks on the 15th, ANSF mo- chemical explosives (between five 30 bilized for a series of sweep oper- to six tons) concealed under a 20 ations in the city center, with a layer of vegetables on a truck 10 significant proportion of re- heading from Jalalabad towards 0 sources committed to the searches Kabul. NDS arrested two Paki- of construction sites and the ar- stani and two Afghan nationals, rests of Pakistani construction with the case ultimately providing workers. The security forces - further evidence of on-going KABUL AOG KABUL Crime with NDS and ANCOP in the AOG efforts to pre-position mili- tured the perceptions of insecurity, fulfilling fore - reported multiple arrests of tary supplies in the capital, as well the ultimate objective of such AOG efforts, suspects, mostly on charges of as to the increased presence of whereas very little physical activity was actually illegal immigration and employ- eastern IEA networks in the enacted by the opposition in the field. The ment, but no evidence of their AOG landscape in the capital. two significant incidents authored by AOG direct involvement in AOG activi- Two other significant seizures of reverted to a number of IEDs along the access ty was documented. The ANSF ammunition and weaponry were routes. This included a remote-controlled de- one-off raids change little regard- reported from Paghman (Darwish vice prematurely detonating in Sangi Neveshta ing the fact that the unprotected and Zar Shah areas) including the (access to Logar), which usually features a high high-rise structures under con- discovery of a primed 120mm concentration of ANSF-IMF targets incl. sup- struction are rightly considered to rocket. This type of long-range ply trucks. More accurate was a magnetic de- be a major vulnerability, and one weapons has been successfully vice which detonated on a fuel tanker on the which will likely continue to at- utilized in the past by HIG units Jalalabad Road on the 17th. As opposed to tract the attention of the conflict for attacks launched from the ‘victim-operated’ IEDs, the use of remote- parties. eastern outskirts (Bagrami in par- controlled devices as well as of the ‘sticky’ Nonetheless, the security forces ticular) towards the capital, alt- bombs affixed to the vehicles reflects the pre- achieved more tangible results in hough local reports suggest that cautions taken by the authors of such attacks the peripheral areas, in particular this particular discovery was ra- towards more accurate targeting efforts, and along the access routes, where ther linked to IEA units active are usually set-up after-dark/in the early morn- light IED activity on the opposi- along the Wardak - Paghman bor- ing hours. By the same token, the targeting tion side was also recorded. On der. and the timing patterns constitute a solid basis the 20th, the NDS/ANP disposi- The echo of the coordinated at- for NGOs to effectively mitigate the residual tive along the Jalalabad Road in- tacks continued to resonate threat of road-side IEDs around Kabul. tercepted a significant load of throughout the capital and nur- NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 25th of April 2012. The NGO Incident Table includes Direct NGO Incidents by all authors including AOG, ACG and security forces. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Following the intensive combat period which accompanied Shinkay and Tatarkhel, a further 30 ANSF-IMF expansion in Tagab expansion of IED activity from 20 and Alasay at the end of January, Tagab along the access road to- 10 wards Nijrab and Mahmudi Raqi incident volumes had adopted a 0 downwards trend. This changed at reconfirmed a significant pattern the beginning of April, when the established over recent cycles. volumes exhibited positive growth Two effective IED strikes hit again, due mainly to the opposi- ANP convoys in Shukhi and in KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime Kora, further down the Mahmudi tion reacting to the expanding of the previous cycle. Roadside devices will Raqi - Tagab, injuring five police- ANSF infrastructure. continue to challenge the safety of NGO ac- men. The RCIED in Shukhi Whilst in Tagab, the opposition cess and can only be mitigated by avoiding kept targeting ANSF patrols and came shortly after another after-dark and early morning movements in RCIED in Nawabad, on the out- checkpoints with direct attacks combination with maintaining a safe distance skirts of Mahmudi Raqi, which incl. heavy weapons fire such as in from the security targets on the roads. killed three ANP on the last day NGO Incidents P ARWAN Year to Date 0 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 AOG activity in the Ghorband 40 with the use of unmarked 4x4 Valley increased over April and 30 expanded this cycle with three vehicles. Of note, AOG attack 20 separate AOG attacks of varying volumes thus far this year remain intensity. The opposition assault- in line with the patterns recorded 10 ed an ALP checkpoint in Dahane for the same period in 2011, 0 Estama, whereas ANCOP patrols which indicates that AOG access came under AOG SAF on two has not been significantly impact- different occasions in Puli Rangab ed by the ANSF and ALP build PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime and in Wazhgher, the first two up. As such, it is reasonable to locations sitting on the access assume that conflict activity in usually finds its expression in IED placement route to Bamyan. However, the Ghorband will continue to grow meant to disrupt ANSF patrolling efforts, only fatality resulting from these and eventually impact movements which indicates that Kohi Safi is mainly ex- attacks was a young boy caught in between Bamyan and Parwan in plored as an AOG rear base, and a transit area the exchange of fire while walking the coming summer months. for access between central Parwan, northern past the ALP checkpoint in Daha- The Pachakhak area in Kohi Safi Kabul and the east.