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Issue 96 REPORT 16‐30 April 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-3 The end of April maintained this year’s Despite these lower volumes, NGO expo- 4-11 Northern Region significant retraction in AOG activity levels sure to ambient violence was nonetheless Western Region 12-13 in comparison to the previous two years. highlighted by the series of eight direct in- Current volumes of AOG attacks (close cidents recorded this period. The responsi- Eastern Region 14-17 range, indirect fire, suicide) were down by ble actors’ profile remained consistent with 45% compared to the equivalent period in this year’s established trends, as 5 out of 8 Southern Region 18-21 2011 as well as by 19% below the volumes escalations were linked to crime whereas 22 ANSO Info Page for 2010 with this dynamic being primarily only 2 were initiated by AOG and one by driven by the decline in AOG attack vol- the security forces. In counter-point, the umes in the South. When compared to the territorial distribution denoted a significant HIGHLIGHTS first 4 months of 2011 (with 2012 data as shift as 5 cases occurred in the North, of the 25th of April) the January - April against only 2 in the East and 1 in the West  Low incident volumes AOG incident volumes in Helmand are while none was recorded for Central this country-wide down by 78%, by 53% in Ghazni and by cycle.  NGO exposure to ambi- 44% in Kandahar. In the East, compara- An NGO vaccination campaign member in ent criminality in the tive volumes are at par in Nangarhar but North Kunduz was killed during a residential rob- down by 22% and 48% in Kunar and bery attempt accounting for the second Khost respectively, which remain the two  IED blast in NGO clinic in NGO fatality this year. Intimidation ef- Khost most kinetic provinces in the region. forts, including SAF on NGO facilities, While late reporting and the last 5 days of were common in the North, including two  AOG threats close April will eventually modify the round up, schools in Ghazni cases from and Badakhshan. A the significant decline of AOG activity in 5 clear-cut warning was also sent to an NGO out of the 6 most kinetic provinces in the clinic in Khost in the form of an IED, country is a fact which, at this stage, seems likely an expression of the local ‘medical ANSO is supported by to owe more to a deliberate AOG strategy mafia’. Also related to intimidation efforts, rather than to restricted access or capabili- the temporary closure of schools in Ghazni ties on their side. The comparison of following explicit threats issued by local AOG incident volumes for the January- AOG is another serious development to be April periods is illustrated on page 11 of monitored by the NGO community. this report.

ANSO: NGO Incidents and Fatalities ANSO: Direct NGO incidents in 2012 180 172 18

160 148 16 137 137 140 129 14

120 106 12 100 Yearly NGO Incident 10 Security Forces Volumes 80 8 Crime Yearly NGO Fatalities AOG 60 6 37 37 30 31 40 24 4 15 19 20 2 2 0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 EAST NORTH CENTRAL WEST SOUTH

ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1

C ENTRAL REGION

ABUL NGO Incidents K Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 In the aftermath of the coordinat- 40 ed attacks on the 15th, ANSF mo- chemical explosives (between five 30 bilized for a series of sweep oper- to six tons) concealed under a 20 ations in the city center, with a layer of vegetables on a truck 10

significant proportion of re- heading from towards 0 sources committed to the searches Kabul. NDS arrested two Paki- of construction sites and the ar- stani and two Afghan nationals, rests of Pakistani construction with the case ultimately providing workers. The security forces - further evidence of on-going KABUL AOG KABUL Crime with NDS and ANCOP in the AOG efforts to pre-position mili- tured the perceptions of insecurity, fulfilling fore - reported multiple arrests of tary supplies in the capital, as well the ultimate objective of such AOG efforts, suspects, mostly on charges of as to the increased presence of whereas very little physical activity was actually illegal immigration and employ- eastern IEA networks in the enacted by the opposition in the field. The ment, but no evidence of their AOG landscape in the capital. two significant incidents authored by AOG direct involvement in AOG activi- Two other significant seizures of reverted to a number of IEDs along the access ty was documented. The ANSF ammunition and weaponry were routes. This included a remote-controlled de- one-off raids change little regard- reported from Paghman (Darwish vice prematurely detonating in Sangi Neveshta ing the fact that the unprotected and Zar Shah areas) including the (access to Logar), which usually features a high high-rise structures under con- discovery of a primed 120mm concentration of ANSF-IMF targets incl. sup- struction are rightly considered to rocket. This type of long-range ply trucks. More accurate was a magnetic de- be a major vulnerability, and one weapons has been successfully vice which detonated on a fuel tanker on the which will likely continue to at- utilized in the past by HIG units Jalalabad Road on the 17th. As opposed to tract the attention of the conflict for attacks launched from the ‘victim-operated’ IEDs, the use of remote- parties. eastern outskirts (Bagrami in par- controlled devices as well as of the ‘sticky’ Nonetheless, the security forces ticular) towards the capital, alt- bombs affixed to the vehicles reflects the pre- achieved more tangible results in hough local reports suggest that cautions taken by the authors of such attacks the peripheral areas, in particular this particular discovery was ra- towards more accurate targeting efforts, and along the access routes, where ther linked to IEA units active are usually set-up after-dark/in the early morn- light IED activity on the opposi- along the Wardak - Paghman bor- ing hours. By the same token, the targeting tion side was also recorded. On der. and the timing patterns constitute a solid basis the 20th, the NDS/ANP disposi- The echo of the coordinated at- for NGOs to effectively mitigate the residual tive along the Jalalabad Road in- tacks continued to resonate threat of road-side IEDs around Kabul. tercepted a significant load of throughout the capital and nur-

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 25th of April 2012. The NGO Incident Table includes Direct NGO Incidents by all authors including AOG, ACG and security forces. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Following the intensive combat period which accompanied Shinkay and Tatarkhel, a further 30 ANSF-IMF expansion in Tagab expansion of IED activity from 20 and Alasay at the end of January, Tagab along the access road to- 10 wards Nijrab and Mahmudi Raqi incident volumes had adopted a 0 downwards trend. This changed at reconfirmed a significant pattern the beginning of April, when the established over recent cycles. volumes exhibited positive growth Two effective IED strikes hit again, due mainly to the opposi- ANP convoys in Shukhi and in KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime Kora, further down the Mahmudi tion reacting to the expanding of the previous cycle. Roadside devices will Raqi - Tagab, injuring five police- ANSF infrastructure. continue to challenge the safety of NGO ac- men. The RCIED in Shukhi Whilst in Tagab, the opposition cess and can only be mitigated by avoiding kept targeting ANSF patrols and came shortly after another after-dark and early morning movements in RCIED in Nawabad, on the out- checkpoints with direct attacks combination with maintaining a safe distance skirts of Mahmudi Raqi, which incl. heavy weapons fire such as in from the security targets on the roads. killed three ANP on the last day

NGO Incidents P ARWAN Year to Date 0 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 AOG activity in the Ghorband 40 with the use of unmarked 4x4 Valley increased over April and 30 expanded this cycle with three vehicles. Of note, AOG attack 20 separate AOG attacks of varying volumes thus far this year remain intensity. The opposition assault- in line with the patterns recorded 10 ed an ALP checkpoint in Dahane for the same period in 2011, 0 Estama, whereas ANCOP patrols which indicates that AOG access came under AOG SAF on two has not been significantly impact- different occasions in Puli Rangab ed by the ANSF and ALP build PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime and in Wazhgher, the first two up. As such, it is reasonable to locations sitting on the access assume that conflict activity in usually finds its expression in IED placement route to Bamyan. However, the Ghorband will continue to grow meant to disrupt ANSF patrolling efforts, only fatality resulting from these and eventually impact movements which indicates that Kohi is mainly ex- attacks was a young boy caught in between Bamyan and Parwan in plored as an AOG rear base, and a transit area the exchange of fire while walking the coming summer months. for access between central Parwan, northern past the ALP checkpoint in Daha- The Pachakhak area in Kohi Safi Kabul and the east. ne Estama. witnessed a night-time ANP oper- In spite of the above, NGO safety was most Whereas the trending patterns ation on the 23rd, during which visibly impacted during transit via Salang due indicate a clear AOG orientation the police eliminated two, and to adverse weather conditions and frequent on ANSF targets, their concen- arrested one, AOG fighters. This closures and blockages in the tunnels. Besides tration on the access roads, in- marked the first conflict-related the uncomfortable bottlenecks inside the tun- cluding the Parwan - Bamyan link escalation in the district this year. nels, the current weather package, with dra- road, is a source of concern due Nevertheless, AOG infiltrations matic changes in temperatures and heavy pre- to the obvious risks of collateral from Tagab and Surobi attract cipitations, will continue to constitute a safety exposure, as well as of mis- regular ANSF operations in the risk to NGO travel. NGOs are encouraged to targeting NGO road missions spring in this cluster area. Despite contact ANSO for up-to-date advisories prior when their profile comes closer to the regular movements, AOG to undertaking travels across Salang in the that of GOA convoys, such as kinetic activity remains rare and coming weeks. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents L OGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 Following the very slow start of 40 section of the highway was home the season, AOG activity gained 30 to the most significant event when in intensity in April and peaked 20 with the coordinated attack in Puli the local ANP checkpoint person- 10 Alam on the 15th. Overall, how- nel shot and injured two AOG ever, AOG attack volumes in members moving on a motorcycle 0 April 2012 exhibit a 40% decrease towards , after the pas- when compared to the same peri- sengers failed to heed ANP sig- od last year. nals to stop. It appeared that they LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime were transporting two suicide This cycle, AOG escalations were vests. According to ANSF, both last year. A similar territorial focus on the concentrated in Muhammad Agha individuals were from Azra dis- north was also apparent on the IMF-ANSF and encompassed an attack on the trict which may indicate that the side, with a series of arrest operations in Zar- residence of a police officer in Azra - Muhammad Agha corridor ghun Shahr, an important population hub in Surkhab as well as an IED strike will continue to feature heavily in Muhammad Agha, although the security forces on an ANA convoy on the high- the opposition activity as it did also remained active in Baraki Barak. way in Deh Naw. The Bini Shir

NGO Incidents ARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK W 50 This Report Period 0 Although the AOG attack vol- 40 umes remain 63% below the lev- single IED blast killed 10 ALP 30 members in Alikhel. A day earlier els recorded for the equivalent 20 period last year, this cycle con- in the same district, a civilian 10 firmed that the armed opposition household was impacted by an have reestablished operations RPG during an AOG-IMF clash 0 along the highway in Nirkh and in Dawrankhel which resulted in Saydabad, as well as in the strong- seven civilian casualties including WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime holds in the rear, Chaki Wardak in three women killed. particular. Despite the fact that The ANSF and IMF responded to ANSF initiated large clearing operations in most escalations converged on the the AOG resurgence with a num- Maydan Shahr, Chaki Wardak and Saydabad, highway, Chaki Wardak hosted ber of targeted operations. To- with Nirkh and Jaghatu expected to see further the most significant attack when a wards the end of the cycle, the deployments shortly.

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI D AYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 A presumed ACG staged a rare late-evening SAF attack on an attack remains an outlier thus far 30 this year. Meanwhile an AOG ANP checkpoint in the Qunakh 20 Pass located on the access road unit in Kajran attempted to ab- 10 from southern Bamyan to duct two civilian passengers from Miramor and onwards to Shah- a mini-van in Chawzar, along the 0 ristan and Nili on the 28th. The access route to Kandahar, but the clash caused injuries to one po- effort was successfully disrupted liceman. Documented criminal by ANP and ALP. AOG activity DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime escalations along this route have along the southern border is an became quite rare following the established, though infrequent, ANP build up in 2010/11, and the feature of the landscape in Kajran. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH B ALKH Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 1 In the early hours of April 17th, an 40 unknown number of armed men ker from Toqi had just conducted 30 entered an INGO compound in a graduation ceremony—allegedly 20 drawing a host of individuals to the northernmost district of Balkh 10 the area, including some with (Shortepa), and sprayed the com- 0 pound and vehicle with SAF. AOG connections—and that fol- With the NGO staff inside the lowing the graduation there were compound, the group then set the a number of speeches including BALKH AOG BALKH Crime car on fire and stood by quietly some with anti-foreign organiza- for approximately 30 minutes un- tion rhetoric. Although the loca- the damaged truck. Initial reports suggest the til the approach of the ANP could tion where the current attack took use of RCIEDs in the attack, which is some- be heard, at which point they re- place (Arigh Batar Markazi village) what peculiar since it seems like a waste of leased a last volley of gunshots is a fair distance from Toqi, the assets with no obvious target present (GOA, before withdrawing. Nobody was power broker from Toqi is one of ANSF, IMF, or otherwise). While Shortepa injured. During the subsequent the more influential in the district, has witnessed an increase in activity over the investigation, the ANP suggested and it has been suggested that past 16 months (which account for 19 of the that their trail seemed to lead to- some of his followers might have 38 incidents recorded in the district since 2006, wards Toqi (a fair distance away) gotten stirred up following these with 7 of those occurring over the first 4 where the majority of insecurity in speeches (hence the close proxim- months of 2012), the district has typically been Shortepa has generally taken place ity in the timing of the 2 inci- considered a relatively permissive environment (9 of the last 17 security incidents dents). Of note, the last 2 NGO for NGOs, especially outside of the Toqi area. in the district), and where - just 17 direct incidents to occur in the However, 2 other incidents occurred in Shorte- hours prior to this incident - mul- district—the only 2 NGO direct pa this reporting period, both consisting of tiple IED detonations had oc- incidents on record prior to this alleged AOG members calling the headmasters curred against a civilian truck and one—also occurred after a gradu- of schools (both in Toqi) and ordering them to villagers in the vicinity (see be- ation ceremony from this particu- collect Usher (religious dues). Further analysis low). Determining the cause for lar madrassa (both in June 2011, of this district’s security paradigm may be re- this attack has not been straight on the 20th and 24th), when 2 IN- quired should this insecurity continue. forward. There are two schools GO wheat storage facilities were Outside of this, the most significant develop- of thought on the motives. The burnt down. ment was the increasing AOG presence in first is that the incident was Another of the 4 incidents to oc- Chimtal and Chahar Bolak (most especially caused by internal rifts amongst cur in Shortepa this period was Chimtal). The 2 traditionally insecure districts the community over the NGO’s the detonation of duel IEDs on accounted for 5 incidents this period, including programming and program imple- the morning of the 16th in the vi- 4 in Chimtal (with an IED detonation against mentation. In this case, the attack cinity of Shaikh village in the Toqi IMF and an IED discovery). Although the would probably be a means to area (as eluded to above). Alt- districts have yet to see the level of activity intimidate the NGO in the hope hough only 2 civilians were in- from last Spring, it appears the AOG presence that such a move would force the jured, what makes this case espe- there—as well as their inclination to conduct NGO to favour the disgruntled cially notable is the targeting pat- activities—is growing daily. Potentially related, community members, or at the tern. The first IED detonated on an IED was removed from Tana village in least strongly register their dissat- a civilian truck carrying rocks, Balkh district on the 25th. Balkh insecurity has isfaction. On the other hand, an- while the second detonated ap- often been tied to these same groups. ecdotal reports suggest that a proximately 10 minutes later as a madrassa run by a local powerbro- group of locals gathered around THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents K UNDUZ Year to Date 1 KUNDUZ 50 This Report Period 1 On the night of the 27th/early 40 morning of the 28th, an armed worth noting that in other NGO 30 man entered the residence of an direct incidents that occurred this 20 period in the North (see, for in- NGO staff member who worked 10 stance, Sar-e Pul, Balkh, Badakh- conducting vaccinations at a local 0 NGO clinic in Imam Sahib. It shan), NGO staff members did appears that the man jumped over not choose to pursue or attack the wall of the compound and armed aggressors, and in all of KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime entered the house through an those incidents, no NGO staff open window to find the NGO were injured. curred last cycle, and 15 had occurred this cy- employee confronting him, which While Imam Sahib has consistent- cle as of the writing of this report. The 5 in caused the would-be thief to flee. ly shown decreases in security Kunduz—including 1 of the 2 IED detona- Reports suggest that the NGO reporting since 2010 (92 security tions that occurred this period—is relatively employee pursued the robber, incidents in 2010, 47 in 2011—18 consistent with existing trends (7 last cycle), who turned and shot the NGO between January and April—and while the 4 in Chahar Dara showed a low employee—killing him—and then only 11 thus far this year), crimi- grade increase (and represented the largest to- escaped over the wall.. No other nal activity and interpersonal vio- tal in that district recorded this year). Chahar family members at the house were lence is not outside of the dis- Dara—traditionally a district with a strong injured or threatened. trict’s security paradigm. In fact, AOG presence—was the other district to wit- ness an IED detonation. What AOG activity All signs point to this being a rob- earlier this year a somewhat simi- has occurred in Kunduz continues to revolve bery gone awry, with no connec- lar incident occurred on January th around IED related insecurity, with 2 IED tion to the NGO staff member’s 25 , when 2 armed men shot and detonations, 5 IED discoveries, and one sei- employment, or the NGO’s activi- killed a community elder in zure of warheads occurring this cycle. Of ties. Anecdotal reports suggest Naseriha village over an interper- note, both IEDs targeted ANSF/IMF targets, that the NGO employee—who sonal dispute, and relatively simi- with 1 detonation against an ANP Ranger did not live in a particularly afflu- lar incidents took place 6 times in (Kunduz) and the other against an IMF vehicle ent area—had just come into 2011, including the abduction of 2 (Chahar Dara), in total wounding 2 ANP, 1 some money, and that this fact local doctors (non-NGO related). IMF, and 2 civilians. Again, to put this in con- was known to the community, So while this marks the first direct text, during the same 15 days in 2011, there potentially creating the motive for NGO incident to occur in were 8 IED detonations causing the death of 1 the robbery. It appears that there this year (and ANP and injuries to 5 civilians and 1 other was no political rhetoric spoken at the first to occur in Imam Sahib ANP. the time of the attack, and the since 2010, when 2 NGO staff NGO claims no knowledge of any and their driver were abducted for It is of note that Kunduz Province continues programming issues with the 48 hours before being released), it to witness an overall decline in the volume of community or any ACG, AOG, does not appear to suggest any security reporting as opposed to last year. In or other actors in the area. The immediate shift to the NGO secu- 2012, Kunduz has totalled 112 security inci- incident serves as an important rity paradigm. The district contin- dents through the end of April, as opposed to reminder to NGO staff about the ues to see a relatively minor vol- the 198 between January and April in 2011. In dangers of escalation and con- ume of manifested insecurity, in- fact, this April Kunduz has recorded only 28 frontation. ANSO does not rec- cluding only 3 incidents in April security incidents, a total that is less than half ommend NGO staff attempt to (2 this period). of the 61 recorded in April 2011. Despite this pursue or attack intruders, as the Outside Imam Sahib, the security decline, IED related insecurity still made up risk of escalating the situation and paradigm for the entire province half of the security incidents recorded in the causing potentially unnecessary remains relatively consistent de- province this period, and collateral damage casualties remains significant. spite numerous local reports from IED strikes remains one of the most po- This holds true in robberies as about AOGs returning to various tent risks to NGOs throughout Kunduz. well as in illegal checkpoints. It is areas. 15 security incidents oc- THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents S AR- E PUL Year to Date 1 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 1 50 Although Sar-e Pul registered a 40 being told that they were abduct- low overall volume of manifested 30 insecurity, with only 5 incidents ed mistakenly. Apparently the group—believed to be an AOG— 20 recorded this period, the incidents 10 were significant to the security of were waiting for GOA employees 0 NGOs, including 2 illegal check- who were supposed to be travel- points, one of which involved an ling along the same road at that NGO. same time, and in a similar type of SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime vehicle. The incident is 1 of 4 to On the 23rd, 2 NGO staff mem- occur over the last month along other two security incidents this period took bers (a married couple) were the Sar-e Pul – Shibrighan road, place in the south and east, and both on the stopped in the late evening at an and 1 of 7 to occur since the be- 17th. illegal checkpoint as they were ginning of the year (see also travelling from Sozma Qala to In Sozma Qala, an IED detonated on a tele- Jawzjan section). While this total Kariz village in . communications company vehicle between is well below the volume that oc- The 2 were questioned and then Kata Qala and Dare Charak villages (causing curred over the first trimester of allowed to move on after the hus- no casualties). Telecommunications com- 2011 (13 incidents prior to the band explained he was taking his pounds and elements were targeted in a few end of April, with 8 illegal check- wife for medical treatment. The locations across the north-western provinces points and 2 abductions), it de- individuals were not robbed, sup- this reporting period, likely as AOGs move notes a recent spike (especially porting the notion that the check- back into the area and work to force them to considering that 3 of those 7 were point was political in nature. Alt- turn their services off at night (so that AOG abductions), and points to in- hough illegal checkpoints are rare- movements cannot be tracked, and villagers creased activity along the road. ly recorded in this area, anecdotal cannot call to report these movements). Also, This fits with anecdotal reports sources suggest that AOGs from in Kohistanat, the homes of 4 ALP members from the area that AOGs have Balkh move through the area living in Kala Khana village were set on fire by recently become more active, be- more commonly than reporting an AOG. The ALP project in Kohistanat is a ing seen regularly along the road might suggest. This is the 3rd inci- relatively recent development, and although in the late night and early morn- dent to occur in Sozma Qala this few AOG operations are reported in the ings, despite the increased pres- month, with this one occurring mountainous district, it is widely known as a ence of ANSF checkpoints. It late in the evening and in a loca- strongly permissive environment for AOGs, also highlights the fact that the tion with little ANSF presence, with large portions primarily under AOG in- majority of abductions along this presenting a likely environment fluence and little GOA presence or control. road have been targeted, rather for AOGs and/or ACGs to oper- Further to this, the second of two secondary than involving random stoppages. ate without much concern of means of transit from west to east go through NGOs will benefit from adopting ANSF engagement. Kohistanat (with the first passing from Daw- a profile which cannot be mistak- latabad in Faryab through the Tri Provincial Of equal significance to NGOs en for GOA/ANSF convoys as area and then through Shiram to Alburz), mak- operating in the province was the well as from using varied depar- ing it potentially an important area for the abduction of 4 civilians in the oft ture times within the recommend- GOA to attempt to regulate and control, espe- contested Hawze Haji Moham- ed travel hours. cially as the southern route through Kohistanat med Omar area of the main Sar-e One other incident occurred in becomes more traversable in the spring and Pul - Shibirghan road on the the Shiram area of Sar-e Pul dis- summer. How the district will respond to the morning of the 20th. The group trict, when an AOG attacked new ALP program remains to be seen, as re- was stopped as they were driving members of a local defence initia- gion wide local defence initiatives, CIP, and from Sar-e Pul towards Shibir- tive (similar to patterns that have ALP programs have all started to attract more ghan in a white Toyota 4runner, begun to occur in the Tri- attention from AOGs, who compete for the and were subsequently taken to Provincial Area, as AOGs seek to same resources including the community sup- the Shiram area of the district and reclaim their previous spheres of port and acceptance. held there for approximately 5 influence), but outside of that, the hours before being released, after THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents F ARYAB Year to Date 3 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 Three IEDs attached to an old 40 flee when an ANP vehicle ap- motorcycle were discovered by 30 children approximately 5-10 me- proached, suggesting that the IEDs had been discarded there so 20 ters from the wall of an NGO 10 compound in on the men could avoid arrest. 0 the 26th. The ANP cordoned off Faryab is currently the most kinet- the area before informing the ic province in the North, with ANA, who came from Maymana Qaysar in particular being the FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime the following day and removed all most insecure district in the prov- 3 devices. While nobody was hurt ince. The district has recorded 39 Qaysar witnessing IED related insecurity (with over the course of the incident, it security incidents thus far this the discovery detailed above, plus 2 other IED raises the question of whether the year, with nearly half of them (17) discoveries and an AOG attack on an ANP IEDs had specifically been em- IED related. Looking at the checkpoint), while Pashtun Kot saw 2 inci- placed to target the NGO. The province as a whole, Faryab actu- dents involving a clash between AOGs in their agency—a national NGO that was ally witnessed only 16 security local communities. implementing a youth education incidents this period—prior to The 2 incidents in Almar both involved attacks project—did not report having late reporting—which denotes a on civilians. Of particular note was an AOG any known issues in the commu- significant decrease from the 34 ambush of a local elder. Local reporting sug- nity, and had not received any recorded during the PRP. To gested that the elder was killed after AOGs in threats. It appears likely that de- further illustrate this difference, at the area accused him of being a spy and linked spite the close proximity to the the time of reporting, Faryab had him up to a recent IMF operation that resulted NGO compound, the IED was witnessed only 9 in the insecure in 4 arrests, including that of a local influential actually positioned with the intent southern cradle of the province (4 AOG operative. to target an IMF convoy which in Qaysar, 3 in Pashtun Kot, and was scheduled to travel from 2 in Almar) as opposed to the 20 While none of the above denoted significant Qaysar to Maynmana that day. that occurred in these districts shifts to the security paradigm, an IED detona- While the possibility that the IED over the PRP. Outside of these 9, tion in Kohistan was of some note. The was targeting the NGO is a dis- incidents occurred in Dawlatabad mountainous district has witnessed only 2 se- turbing one, ANSO has no record (3), Maymana (3), and Kohistan curity incidents thus far this year, and both of any NGO ever having been (which saw 1 IED detonation and have occurred this month (the first on April th expressly targeted for an IED the discovery of 5 more IEDs at 5 ), with each consisting of an IED detona- strike in Qaysar. In contrast, the same location). Besides the tion. It is likely that activity in Kohistan will IEDs targeting the IMF convoys volumes, the trending remained continue to increase somewhat as the good fits within the existing security strongly consistent with the previ- weather opens up routes through the district to paradigm. Further to this, at least ous cycle, with Dawlatabad pri- the east towards Sar-e Pul which were previ- one report surfaced that 2 men marily recording skirmishes be- ously closed during the winter. That being had been seen pushing the IED- tween AOG and ANSF (2 of the said, some of this movement may be mitigated laden motorbike, and that they 3 incidents consisted of AOG by the development of the ALP program in had suddenly had to leave it and attacks on ANSF patrols) and Kohistanat along this route (see Sar-e Pul).

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents B ADAKHSHAN Year to Date 1 BADAKHSHAN This Report Period 1 50 The relatively isolated district of 40 Outside of this, Warduj district Yawan was the source of the first 30 again recorded the most signifi- direct NGO security incident this 20 year for the province, when an cant security incidents in Badakh- 10 unknown number of armed men shan this period, accounting for 3 assaulted an NGO compound of the 5 cases reported. The first 0 (including a living facility, an occurred when an AOG attacked an ANBP checkpoint with SAF NGO clinic, and the landlord’s BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime house) from close range with a and RPGs on the evening of the 25th (resulting in 4 ANBP mem- low volume of SAF which impact- connection to the community. Of note to this, bers killed, 2 injured, and 15 ed walls and windows, but caused ANSF also arrested an ANBP officer who al- ANBP abducted—and later re- no injuries despite the presence of legedly had ties to the AOG and may have leased—with 3 of their vehicles). NGO staff on the premises. helped facilitate attacks against other ANBP. Second to that, on the 28th, the This marked the 4th NGO related AOG attacked another ANBP The AOG in Warduj has shown itself to be an incident to ever occur in Yawan checkpoint, causing the ANBP to active group, growing consistently in size, and district, and more notably, the 3rd withdraw, and essentially ceding accounting for just over half (24 out of the last SAF attack on this compound. control of Teergaran village—one 47) of the security incidents recorded in Ba- Twice in July 2011 (within days of of the contested villages in the dakhshan since December 2011. Of note, a each other) the same compound area—to the AOG, (although the disproportionate 11 of those occurred that received SAF aimed just above it AOG had effectively controlled December. While it is unclear whether a deal in an apparent attempt to intimi- much of this and Bashund village was struck between the AOG and the GOA in date the NGO and/or the land- already). terms of the release of the 15 ANBP, it is likely lord. While the NGO is known that some type of agreement was reached, and The first incident was strongly to enjoy strong community sup- that the ANBP withdrawal from the CP in reminiscent of the December 5th port, it appears that the landlord is Teeragaran just after may have been a part of incident (2011) which occurred a local powerbroker with his own that. Nevertheless, these are preliminary as- after a number of AOG initiated disputes, and that this may have sessments, and more analysis will be necessary illegal checkpoints, when the ANP attracted the harassing fire. as further information becomes available. and an AOG engaged in direct The district—which lies along clashes resulting in 3 ANP killed, The only other incident recorded this period trafficking routes towards Tajiki- 7 ANP policemen injured, and 12 occurred when 62 AOG members – including stan—saw 9 incidents in 2011, but ANP policemen captured. Those a prominent AOG commander – who were after the NGO worked with the ANP were also released shortly previously operating in Dawong Ha Area of community following the 2 at- after without ransom. While the Shahri Buzurg - district joined the APRP at the tacks in July, they were not both- reason that the ANP have been provincial governor’s office in Fayzabad City. ered again until now. At this time released remains a question, it Although there continue to be semi-regular it appears probable that the NGO likely stems from either some sort occurrences of purported AOG joining the has been caught up in the land- of deal the AOG is working out APRP program (such as in Baghlan), there lord’s issues, but further infor- with the police force, or the fact have been strongly dissenting views as to mation will be necessary to assess that the AOG has achieved—and whether the majority of those joining are actual the incident. It nevertheless wishes to maintain—strong com- fighters or just groups attempting to cash in on shines light on the importance of munity support in the area, and APRP payments, and in that light, the potential navigating away from local con- since many of these ANP are lo- effect of such defections remains unclear at flicts and maintaining an inde- cal, their release allows the AOG this time. pendent presence aside from local to exert power and reinforce the power brokers. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents J AWZJAN Year to Date 1 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 The 9 security incidents recorded 40 this period in Jawzjan included year. At this time it is unclear 30 whether the IO’s involvement in irregular robbery attempts in 20 Shibirghan and Mardyan, and the project had anything to do 10 IED activity along the main Sar-e with their being targeted. Pul - Shibirghan road, as well as in Also of note, in an incident that 0 Khamyab, Mingajik and Qush occurred in the Kappadar area of Tepa. The latter of those districts Shibirghan district the PRP (but JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime saw a significant 4 security inci- only reported this cycle), 4 mem- dents, all but 1 related to IEDs. bers of a CDC from Bilchiragh was discovered and removed in Shaikh village along the Mingajik - Aqcha road. Neither of The most notable singular inci- (Faryab) claim they were robbed while en route back from Shibir- these districts had seen any IED related securi- dent this cycle occurred on April ty this year prior to this. 20th in Mardyan district, when an ghan with freshly withdrawn NSP armed group attempted to stop funds. Although 1 CDC member Lastly this period—but of import—were the 4 and abduct 5 civilians (4 nationals claims he was shot during the at- incidents which occurred in Qush Tepa of the and 1 international) who were tack, the allegations—and his inju- Tri-Provincial Area (TPA). These included an working for a national private ry—have been controversial, rais- IED detonation, 2 incidents involving the re- construction company. The ing some question as to whether moval of IEDs, and an attack on a CIP check- workers were returning from a the robbery occurred at all. The point. The increased IED activity, and the project site in the area where they group was heading towards Qush latter direct attack, beg the question of whether were working on the Balkh – Tepa at the time of the incident, AOGs will start challenging CIPs for their pre- Mardyan road as part of a project which puts them in a relatively viously controlled territory. Although still not for an IO, when approximately 8 insecure environment, so the no- at the level seen in 2011, the 7 security inci- armed men on motorcycles tion that they could have been dents recorded in Qush Tepa in April are equal stopped their car. Although con- robbed is not unreasonable, but to the total volume of incidents recorded in flicting reports exist, it appears reports have been conflicting. the district from January to March, and the that 2 of the construction compa- While incident volume along the incidents are significant ones, with all 7 of ny staff got out of the car and ran Sar-e Pul - Shibirghan road has them involving AOG activity in one way or the away, being pursued by the armed begun to increase lately (see Sar-e other. As previously reported, the CIP men, while the other 3 attempted Pul section), the activity there has (Critical Infrastructure Protection) program to drive away and escape. The 3 rarely consisted of IED emplace- has been implemented differently in the TPA who drove escaped successfully ment. However, an IED was dis- than elsewhere throughout the region. While (as did those who fled), but only covered and removed in the Man- most of the other CIPs consist of ‘deputized’ after 1 of them was injured by goti area of Shibirghan (close to existing pro-government militias (most of SAF as the armed group shot at the Sar-e Pul border) on the 25th. which were already in conflict with AOGs), the departing vehicle. As the indi- This is consistent with a general the TPA has used AOGs from the area. This viduals were never in captivity, it increase in IED activity noted makes them the most likely to be targeted, as is unclear what the armed group’s throughout the province, although AOGs will not want to cede territory they have motives were, but according to rare for this particular stretch of long held to the GOA, nor lose community local reporting it is believed that it road. Other districts with IED support to the GOA, and therefore make a was a criminal attempt by an ACG activity included Khamyab, where point out of targeting CIPs to dissuade others that maintains AOG ties, and was an IED detonated against an from joining them. In this context, insecurity economically motivated. The in- ANBP vehicle near the border in Qush Tepa is likely to intensify over the cident occurred in the evening with Turkmenistan, killing the coming month, as AOGs attempt to reclaim and outside of NGO travel hours, district ANBP commander and their sphere of influence. Whether CIPs will and was only the 3rd incident to his driver (and wounding 2 oth- confront them or the two sides will accommo- occur in the district thus far this ers), and Mingajik, where an IED date their interests remains to be seen. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents S AMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Generally speaking, Samangan 40 members of the local religious continues to demonstrate the least 30 community in Aybak that the manifested insecurity in the 20 Northern Region, with this re- GOA should not allow micro- finance institutes to work in Sa- 10 porting period being no excep- 0 tion. In fact, at the time of re- mangan, citing their practices as porting, the province had record- un-Islamic. Although this is of ed only 4 security incidents this importance to NGOs working in SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime period, and only 7 for the month, the micro-finance field, the issue making it relatively consistent appeared quickly sorted out after incident of intimidation in the Omali area with the PRP (which witnessed 8 the GOA met with the religious where for the second time in April, AOG security incidents). Despite the community and told them that members entered the area and demanded reli- lack of manifested insecurity, micro-finance should be allowed gious dues from the villagers. The Omali area some issues of relevance to the to stay, since community mem- borders Baghlani Jadid (Baghlan), which has NGO community surfaced. bers had the right to take—or not seen strong activity the last few months, and partake—of their services. Re- the presence of an AOG there could be the While the more significant of the ports indicate that the religious result of increased AOG migrations. That incidents was the discovery and community accepted this answer, being said, Hazrati Sultan generally witnesses removal of an IED in Robatak and nothing further came of these very little manifested insecurity, with the 5 inci- Village of Aybak—as IED related conversations. dents recorded in the district thus far this year insecurity is uncommon in the matching the total number of incidents record- province—the most significant saw 2 of the ed in all of 2011. circumstance was the posturing of 4 incidents, including a second

NGO Incidents B AGHLAN Year to Date 0 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 Baghlan saw a significant decline 40 in incident reporting this cycle, hough this stretch of road had 30 recording only 9 security acts, ex- witnessed robberies and attacks, these marked the first IED dis- 20 actly half that of the previous cy- 10 cle (18). The decline was especial- coveries in 2012. Kelegay has ly notable in Baghlani Jadid with generally seen a significant level of 0 only 3 incidents documented this insecurity—accounting for ap- period as opposed to 5 during the proximately one third of all re- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime PRP and 8 in late March. Con- ported incidents in Dushi—but have often attempted to claim AOG status in sistent with existing patterns, the the most recent road side IED order to cash in on the APRP payments, with Baghlani Jadid incidents consisted discovery prior to this was in Oc- witnesses across the region often noting that of 2 IED discoveries and a night tober 2011. In that context, it is those joining the process do not appear to raid. likely that activity will continue there in the near future. consist of actual AOG combatants, and 2) in Of significance to NGOs travel- Also of note, 2 districts in the Baghlan (especially in Baghlani Jadid), HIG ling from Kabul to Puli Khumri members have often juggled back and forth was the discovery of 2 IEDs in province saw sizeable groups join the APRP process. Andarab between the GOA and AOGs, depending on separate incidents along the Ka- where the power and money is at any given bul – Puli Khumri road. The first notched 40 individuals, with Puli Hisar adding 20. However, as time. It remains unclear at this time who ex- occurred in Dushi district in the actly the 2 current groups consist of, and th often noted, 2 trends have come Kelegay area on the 18 , and the whether their joining the APRP is likely to ef- th to light in terms of such defec- second occurred on the 30 just fect either district’s actual security paradigm. 10 kilometres south of there. Alt- tions: 1) Non-AOG members THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents T AKHAR Year to Date 0 TAKHAR This Report Period 0 50 Although Takhar saw only a mod- 40 erate volume of incident reporting rate incidents—1 of which was 30 positioned along the Taluqan – this period—recording only 10 20 incidents at the time of this re- Kunduz road—and a grenade attack against a Jihadi command- 10 port—some of those that oc- 0 curred were of note. Taluqan er’s residence (causing no casual- marked 5 incidents this period, ties). Although none of these which accounted for half the ac- incidents alone changed the secu- TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime tivity in the province, and denoted rity paradigm for NGOs, 9 inci- a significant spike in activity that dents recorded in the district in (although 2 individuals, allegedly seen in the also included the discovery of 2 April constitute an increase over vicinity of the water tanks, were being ob- IEDs, and incidents involving the 6 that occurred in March, and served). Further to this, the water came from former Jihadi commanders. the 5 that occurred in February a source that fed much of the community, and January combined, suggesting On the morning of the 23rd, an whom did not fall ill, so it appears the incident that will continue to see ex-Jihadi commander from was relegated to the tanks that the girls at the increased insecurity for the imme- with some links to school were using. Although the incident has diate future. an assortment of parties (GOA remained assessed as a poisoning—as agreed and AOG) drove through an Outside of Taloqan, the Rustaq on by doctors and multiple officials— ANSF checkpoint without stop- incident involving 150 female stu- contaminates such as cleaning fluids cannot be ping, causing those manning the dents getting ill from contaminat- ruled out. post to open fire on the vehicle. ed water on the 17th received the Also effecting education facilities—albeit only A short exchange of fire took most attention. While open temporarily—students were cleared out of place, during which the com- source media was quick to blame their school in Abu Osmani area (PD#4) of mander and his companion were the incident on AOG and suggest Taloqan when an IED threat was reported killed, and 1 ANA soldier was an attack against educating girls (a (and subsequently disregarded after a thorough injured. The incident happened few such incidents were seen in examination by ANSF) on the 29th. Kunduz and Sar-e Pul in 2010, approximately 8 kilometers out- Despite the 2 potential issues involving mostly consisting of the release of side of Taluqan city, but did not schools this period, Takhar has not seen any poisoned gas into classrooms, not affect security in Taluqan or local- sustained trends suggesting AOG targeting of the poisoning of water), the con- ly in Farkhar. Other incidents in educational facilities recently, and neither of taminate had still not been identi- Taluqan included the discovery this period’s related incidents would suggest fied at the time of this report, and and removal of 2 IEDs in 2 sepa- the development of such a trend at this time. no arrests had been made

ANSO: JAN-APR AOG Incident Comparison: 2006-2012 (as of the 25th of April 2012) 1400

1200

1000 Jan Feb 800 Mar Apr 600

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0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents H ERAT Year to Date 3 HERAT 50 This Report Period 0 Herat recorded only six AOG 40 poppy season. In contrast, the incidents, marking a 63% decline 30 over the PRP. Further to this ANSF eradication campaign con- 20 trend, overall security incident tinued in Shindand, another AOG volumes decreased by nearly 50%. stronghold, where security forces 10 This was clearly seen in Kushk, a focused on the Zer Koh area and 0 known AOG hotspot in the eradicated 270 acres of poppy fields. During the campaign, sev- northern districts, where AOG HERAT AOG HERAT Crime activity fell from five to one attack en AOG members were killed and over the last cycle. It is worth three additional AOG members and one AEF member received less conflict activity but criminality was promi- noting that the areas between nent, namely with the kidnap for ransom in- Kushk and Kushki Kuna are injuries in direct clashes, indicat- ing a firm AOG resistance despite dustry. The actual attacks encompassed two home to a sizeable AOG popula- targeted abductions aimed at local business tion, as well as to opium produc- ongoing negotiations between the GOA and the communities. families, while NDS also interdicted two other tion, and the poppy season kept attempts against the same target group and the AOG fighters off the battle- AOG activity was also visible in Aziz Abad–where the military air arrested 14 individuals involved. Meanwhile, field. Further of note, ANSF an IO contracted staffer had to deal with a have so far stayed away from the base is located–with one roadside IED attack on an ANP patrol series of intimidations linked to a personal dis- poppy fields in this part of the pute. Ambient criminality constitutes the ma- province. The current lull in con- vehicle and the abduction and assassination of a GOA official. jor concern for the NGO community in the flict activity is assessed to be a city, seconded by AOG IED activity along the short-term dynamic which will Herat City, as well as the subur- main roads. likely conclude with the end of the ban areas in Injil and Guzara, saw

NGO Incidents G HOR Year to Date 1 GHOR This Report Period 1 50 The abduction of a female NGO 40 being, with no AOG initiated inci- staffer along with her son during 30 transit in the western part of Cha- dents recorded this cycle as op- posed to seven during the previ- 20 ghcharan - by an armed group 10 affiliated with a local commander ous cycle. This decline appears to 0 - constituted this year’s first NGO be primarily the result of a lack of incident for the province. The AOG initiative in the southern districts of Pasaband and Tay- group, based in an area bordering GHOR AOG GHOR Crime and Shahrak, re- wara, where Helmandi AOG had leased the abductees two days added to the local presence over their commanders–one of whom is the brother later following negotiations con- the last two reporting periods. of a prominent AOG commander active in ducted by a parliament member. The bad road conditions caused Shahrak–joined the APRP this period. The The case appears to have been by heavy rains along with the relo- family linkages between the reconciled com- motivated by an interpersonal cation of a portion of Helmandi mander and his influential brother may consti- dispute. fighters to their home province tute a breakthrough in the relationship be- for the poppy harvest are assessed The intensity of AOG operations tween the Shahrak-based AOG and the pro- as the most probable reasons for in the province seems to have Government forces, but the actual outcome of the lull. A sizeable group of 34 declined significantly for the time the latest development remains to be seen. local AOG members along with THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents ARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH F 50 This Report Period 0 This reporting cycle Farah experi- 40 enced 12 AOG incidents, ac- trated in the same district and 30 counting for a 30% decrease when took the form of three direct at- 20 tacks on ANSF as well as one compared to the PRP. The drop 10 food poisoning of ANP person- was mainly attributed to a slow- 0 down in AOG activity in Bakwa, nel. The opposition also main- which recorded only three AOG tained a moderate level of activity incidents, accounting for nearly a along the Herat-Kandahar high- FARAH AOG FARAH Crime 60% decrease. It is worth noting way in Bakwa, including IED at- that the eastern districts of Bakwa, tacks on ANSF and PSC vehicles. ing the killing of a notorious ALP commander Gulistan, and Bala Buluk, contain This reporting period, AOG during the previous cycle, AOG attacks on the largest poppy fields in the fighting forces were particularly ALP continued with two other attacks on ALP province, and the intensifying absorbed with the poppy harvest checkpoints. Further to this, although ALP is conflict between AOG and in Bakwa and Gulistan, which tasked with a mostly defensive role, they en- ANSF/IMF over the ongoing made up another contributing gaged in an offensive operation in Renji, killing poppy eradication campaign likely factor to the downturn in AOG 2 AOG members. Other cases of AOG intim- affected the geographical distribu- activity in those districts, while idation efforts directed at the ALP included tion of AOG attacks and the Gulistan remained devoid of the abduction of an ALP member’s relative in choice of tactics. Indeed, ANSF AOG escalations. Pusht Rod. It appears obvious that the intro- has focused their eradication cam- Despite the above, AOG also duction of ALP has impacted local power dy- paign mainly on Bala Buluk, eradi- continued to be active in the cen- namics, and its further expansion into the east- cating approximate 210 acres of tral districts of Khaki Safed and ern districts will likely continue to have ramifi- poppy fields this cycle alone (to Pusht Rod. In total, four AOG cations for the conflict there. the neglect of other districts). incidents were recorded there, AOG attacks have been concen- with three targeting ALP. Follow-

NGO Incidents B ADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 While AOG activity remained 40 relatively moderate this reporting ANSF/IMF patrol or CPs, the 30 period—with 13 AOG initiated initiation of the poppy eradication 20 incidents recorded—the overall campaign affected the conflict 10 volume of security reporting de- dynamics in Muqur. The AOG 0 creased significantly to a total of incident volume increased from 21, accounting for nearly a 30% two to five there including three decrease when compared to the direct attacks against ANSF eradi- BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime PRP. This was largely attributed cation units. Although the district to the sharp decline in contains a relatively small quantity Muqur to disturb the eradication campaign ANSF/IMF initiated incidents, of poppy fields, the poppy harvest may be expected. which in turn pertained to less still constitutes an AOG financial While an AOG commander from Murghab IED discoveries indicating a lack lifeline in the province which is and ten of his followers joined the APRP, cas- of initiative on the AOG side. On geographically isolated from the es of ALP rejoining AOG were also reported the other hand, AOG remained AOG heartland in the south of in Qadis, such as in Darae Boom. It is worth active in Murghab and Muqur, the country. The greater intensity noting that the IEA has recently called on ALP which accounted for nearly 85% of conflict engagements linked to to rejoin AOG, but it remains to be seen of the total AOG incidents rec- the eradication campaign in which side will eventually win more support orded throughout the province. Muqur will most likely prolong from local armed groups, whose motivation While the tactical patterns re- into the next cycle. In terms of seems to be primarily financial. The scale of mained unchanged in Murghab territorial patterns, AOG migra- benefits offered by each party will most readily and featured a combination of tion from the neighboring districts affect the result. direct attacks and IEDs against of Murghab and Qadis into THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents N ANGARHAR Year to Date 8 NANGARHAR This Report Period 1 50 For the second consecutive re- 40 porting period, Nangarhar wit- observed IED deployments. While 2 IEDs were control deto- 30 nessed an NGO incident. On the 20 19th in the Memla area of Khog- nated in Zone 4 of Jalalabad city 10 yani, ANSF/IMF entered an (with one device localized in NGO-run medical facility and Mastufiat Square area), the neigh- 0 searched the building, as well as boring Bihsud saw an additional 2 explosive devices located respec- the NGO’s internal documents, NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime for proof that the facility was sup- tively near the ANA Brigade (PRT area) and along the Ring Road. plying assistance to AOG mem- AOG IDF strike against the IMF base. bers. In addition, the clinic man- Although on the decline when ager was temporarily detained and compared to the PRP, IED activi- In contrast, AOG close-range attacks were questioned by security forces re- ty remains robust in the province. relatively limited, but nonetheless appeared to garding the issue. Upon finding Including the aforementioned be efficient in causing casualties amongst secu- no evidence, the NGO staff was incidents, there were at least 16 rity forces. These type of attacks were report- released after approximately 3 IED related cases, the majority of ed from Bihsud, Bati Kot, Kama, Hisarak and hours. The incident occurred in which were discoveries. Only 5 Kuz Kunar. During an attack on an ANP ve- the aftermath of an ANSF/IMF devices detonated including a hicle in Kama, the district NDS chief was operation conducted in response premature detonation in Old Mar- wounded, while in Hisarak, AOG attacked to repeated AOG attacks on koh area of Shinwar on the Jala- security forces with RPGs (as they returned ANSF poppy eradication teams in labad – Torkham road. from an operation) killing a bodyguard of the Memla area on the 16th and the Bihsud also witnessed AOG in- District Governor and wounding 2 other bod- 17th. The operation involved IMF timidation efforts. In the Akhun- yguards and an ANP officer. Similar to the air strikes in , which dzada area, AOG distributed previous period, AOG in Khogyani focused caused substantial AOG casualties night letters urging the locals to on disrupting poppy eradication, and the activ- on the 18th and most likely, the stop working for and supporting ity continued to involve a number of civilian latter event triggered the search of the GOA and IMF. Moreover, casualties. Such was evidenced during 2 clash- the NGO premises. Although during the second week of this es in Memla area which occurred just prior to having a plausible causal chain, reporting period, a renewal of the NGO incident, causing the deaths of 4 the incident is not an isolated case AOG activity (IDF) was reported civilians, and injuries to an additional 4, as well in the Eastern Region, and re- on the 21st when a single rocket as 3 ANP and 2 ANA. Noteworthy, a daytime th mains deeply problematic in re- was fired towards the JAF. The attack was reported on the 24 against an gards to the respect of humanitar- projectile impacted a residential ANP patrol in transit on the Jalalabad – Asa- ian norms and principles related area, killing one civilian and injur- dabad road in the area of Kanday, Kuz Kunar. to NGO medical facilities. ing another. A further illustration Although inconclusive, it is notable that the of the risks of exposure on the incident occurred within NGOs travel times After the series of complex at- (at approximately 0940hrs) and the possibility tacks recorded last period, the side of the civilian population was recorded in Chaparhar, where 3 of such activity should be factored into NGO security paradigm in Jalalabad City movements on this road. and the surrounding areas has locals received injuries in Khazanu returned to the more commonly area as a result of an inaccurate THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents K HOST Year to Date 6 KHOST This Report Period 1 100 On the 17th, an IED detonated 80 IED detonated on the north side inside an NGO-run medical facili- 60 ty in Khost City. The device was of the clinic, appearing to be posi- tioned in such a way as to send a 40 placed in one of the clinic’s bath- 20 rooms located directly adjacent to message rather than to cause sig- 0 the waiting area, and detonated nificant casualties. This series of during the late morning hours attacks appears to be driven by local commercial interests rather when a number of people were KHOST AOG KHOST Crime present in the clinic. The blast than by AOG agenda, although the placement of the latest device caused injuries to 7 individuals, occurring in Khost city against non-security including 2 children. The detona- inside the facility and the timing of the strike seem to suggest the targets usually remain related to criminal activi- tion represented the most serious ty, the victim of the latter attack was an ANP of 3 IED incidents targeting the authors’ intention to cause harm as the ultimate warning. contractor which could indicate an overlap same facility, all recorded over the with AOG elements. Further IED strikes Beyond the above NGO incident, past 4 months. Firstly, an IED were reported this period in Qalandar, Musa nd Khost city hosted an additional 2 detonated on the 2 of January in Khel, Gurbuz, Shamal and Sabari districts. front of the secondary access IED incidents. An explosive de- Significant amongst these, 1 ANA soldier was vice was located and defused in point of the facility, creating a killed in Shamal during a foot patrol, and on 2 the area of the Medicine Market, small explosion that did not cause separate occasions - in the DAC area of Qalan- while another IED detonated any significant damage to the ac- dar and in Musa Khel – IEDs struck private tual compound. Two months lat- against a local butcher’s shop. vehicles wounding a total of 6 civilians. er, on the 14th of March, another Although the majority of incidents

NGO Incidents AKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA P 50 This Report Period 0 The 24 security incidents in Pak- 40 tya remained relatively consistent Chawnay area along with 2 AOG 30 with the volumes of the previous close-range attacks. The latter 2 20 targeted an ANA convoy, and the cycle, although AOG activity— 10 represented by 17 initiated attacks residence of an interpreter work- 0 this cycle alone—exhibited signifi- ing at the Police Training Centre cant growth. AOG activity was (Baghaka area), but all of the concentrated in Gardez, Jaji, Zur- above ended with no reported mat and Jani Khel districts, and casualties. In fact—not only in PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime the portfolio included the killing Gardez, but also in Zurmat and of the District Governor Shwak—most of the AOG as- injured. (Wuluswal) of Tsamkanay in saults consisted of direct attacks The opposition also carried out three attacks transit between Zurmat and on security convoys and facilities. on the DACs in Jani Khel (on the 16th and Gardez. In Zurmat, 1 ANP was killed in 21st) and in Jaji. In the latter district, AOG what appeared to be a targeted In line with previous patterns, activity consisted mainly of IDF assaults, alt- attack in the Tameer Bazaar area, AOG deployed a whole range of hough another outlier was a cross-border mor- while the opposition also staged tactics including 12 direct attacks, tar attack against an ANBP checkpoint in the mentioned assault on the con- 4 IED deployments, and 2 IDF Gawi area, which resulted in 1 ANBP casualty. voy carrying the district governor strikes. Whereas Gardez city re- The proximity of the border provides wide of Tsamkanay on the 29th in Zaw. mained calm, the district experi- opportunities to access such materials, as illus- The ambush turned into an exten- enced 3 IED events with 2 of trated by another IDF attack in Jaji that in- sive firefight which left the Dis- those—1 premature detonation volved 12 rockets fired towards the DAC trict Governor dead and 3 ANP and 1 discovery—occurring in which caused injuries to 3 ALP members. THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents L AGHMAN Year to Date 2 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 Laghman experienced a steady 40 growth in incident volumes, with and 1100 hrs, but with limited 30 impact on traffic flows. Similar to AOG volumes growing from 13 20 incidents in the PRP to 16 this the patterns observed last year, 10 cycle. AOG activity affected these attacks consisted primarily mostly Qarghayi, Mehtarlam and of brief engagements on hard se- 0 Alingar, followed by Alishing and curity targets. Besides avoiding Dawlat Shah.. early morning and after-dark trav- el, NGOs will benefit from factor- LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime The main road to the Qarghayi ing the possibility of day-time DAC witnessed a day-time IED brief SAF clashes into their travel devices were recovered from the same area by strike which impacted a civilian. protocols and ensure that road security forces. Still in Sandarwa, AOG at- However, the vast majority of missions avoid all unnecessary tacked another IMF convoy with SAF, with 2 AOG operations were not related proximity to the security convoys civilians impacted in the cross-fire. This ex- to IED emplacement, but rather and infrastructure which will most tremely busy period was further underlined to direct attacks and sporadic SAF likely continue to attract the core with the abduction of a boy’s school teacher on security targets along the Jala- of AOG escalations. on the 21st in Sangar area. AOG intimidation labad – Kabul Highway. After 2 was also recorded in the neighboring district of AOG IED cells continued to be incidents in Kheirokhel and Ma- Alishing, where AOG assassinated an off-duty active in Alingar, with this period shala during the previous cycle, ANP in Salow. Lastly, Mehtarlam saw an in- notching an IED strike on an late April saw 4 AOG attacks in crease in AOG operations, with 2 IED strikes Tangi Valley (3) and Khairo Khel IMF vehicle transiting thru and a close range attack, although they did not Sandarwa area on the access road (1). Two of these, both in Tangi involve any casualties. Valley, occurred between 0900 to the DAC, while an additional 2

NGO Incidents URISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN N 50 This Report Period 0 In the last fortnight, Nuristan rec- 40 orded 7 incidents in Kamdesh, the 19th with the officially report- 30 Nurgaram and Waygal districts, ed reconciliation of 80 AOG 20 although it is to be noted that the members. It hardly comes as a 10 actual level of insecurity is signifi- surprise that local reporting ques- 0 cantly higher than the document- tioned the number of the fighters ed incident volumes. The ANSF as well as their actual AOG identi- operation that had been launched ty. GOA officials also announced during the second week of the the reconciliation of an additional NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime PRP in Kamdesh remained ongo- 13 AOG members in the neigh- ing in the central areas of the dis- boring district of Waygal on the presence has been reported in the remaining trict. So far, the operation result- 22nd. For obvious reasons, the areas of the district, in particular along the bor- ed in a reported 19 AOG mem- APRP announcements are not der. Although sporadic incidents did occur, it bers killed in Jojoz area on the expected to alter the security land- seems that the armed opposition is reinforcing 22nd , and was accompanied by a scape in the province in the short and reorganizing its forces, likely in prepara- number of AOG arrests, including term. tion to answer the recent ANSF incursions. several elements joining the APRP With this, further conflict in the area is likely While ANSF remained focused on forthcoming. process. This was highlighted on central Kamdesh, a strong AOG THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents K UNAR Year to Date 0 KUNAR 100 This Report Period 0 Kunar remains a highly kinetic 80 province, with AOG activity ac- The victim was forced to follow 60 counting for 88% of all reported his abductors to the Bach area, 40 incidents this period. In the last where he was shot and killed pur- 20 fortnight, AOG activity was con- portedly for having resisted the 0 centrated in particular in Sirkanay, abductors. Prior to this, on the Chawkay, Manogai, Wata Pur and 15th, another AOG set fire to the Bar Kunar. In line with estab- private residence of the Head of KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime lished trends, AOG focused on Development close-range attacks on ANSF and Assembly, resulting in injuries to 2 security convoys in Patang Saraye and Batun IMF facilities with ANP/ALP children. A further two abduc- fell outside of the recommended NGO travel check posts bearing the brunt of tions targeted the clerk of a high hours (0900 – 1500 hrs), whereas Tora Tega these assaults. Despite their sig- school in Khas Kunar, and an area saw an attack on IMF occur at approxi- nificant number, this strand of ANA soldier as well as an Afghan mately 1420 hrs. The engagement was brief attacks rarely involved casualties. Security Guard (ASG) employed and the AOG quickly withdrew, but the clash A total of 39 AOG attacks result- at an IMF base in Ghaziabad. triggered a follow-up operation, involving IMF ed in only 5 ANSF members in- AOG-lead abductions were also air assets, that blocked the traffic along the jured. Nonetheless, such engage- reported in Nangalam area of main road and resulted in a reported 6 AOG ments continue to represent a Manogai, where 4 individuals (a members killed, 1 detained and an additional 3 tangible risk to the local popula- prosecution officer, 2 doctors and (including a mid-level commander) injured. tion. For instance, 3 civilians sus- a shura member) were taken, but AOG level of confidence—as demonstrated tained injuries in two separate all were released 2 days later fol- through such day-light attacks—is significant, attacks in Manogai, including one lowing mediation efforts by tribal and the activity should be reflected in NGO on the DAC. elders. contingency plans and movement protocols. An AOG intimidation campaign In Nurgal – the only district Lastly, after a certain lull in cross-border inci- continued unabated throughout amongst all those bordering the dents, this reporting period experienced fresh the cycle. On the 17th of April in highway without an active ALP IDF attacks in Daman, with volleys of mortars Marawara, AOG abducted a force - AOG conducted several impacting the Afghan territory but failing to Community Development Coun- heavy and small arms attacks on cause any casualties on three different occa- cil (CDC) member while he was ANSF/IMF convoys in transit. sions. en route to the district bazaar. Elsewhere, AOG brief attacks on

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ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR K ANDAHAR Year to Date 1 100 This Report Period 0 80 In line with historical patterns, the 60 incident volumes continued to rest occurred in the districts of grow in Kandahar, a dynamic Zhari, Panjwayi, Reg, Maruf, 40 largely driven by IED activity and Shorborak, and Maywand. What 20 - in general terms - by conflict is noteworthy here is the jump in 0 escalations related to the poppy IED use in Maywand – host to 3 eradication campaign (although separate IED incidents – and also ‘green-on-blue’ incidents also fea- in the relatively remote areas of KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime tured prominently this cycle). Reg and Maruf, which usually ex- perience little insecurity. The in- The cycle peaked with a high- crease in IED emplacements in In contrast to Helmand, where the AEF units profile attack carried out by 2 Maywand suggests a link with the have markedly reduced their operations, Kan- AOG operatives equipped with poppy trade, as the district is dahar hosted a large number of eradication pistols, who gained access to the home to substantial crops, and campaigns this cycle, nearing 30 in total. The governor’s compound in the pro- AEF units have been relatively majority of operations were focused on Ar- vincial capital at around 1100 hrs active in the area. The most casu- ghandab district, with some AEF also present on the 28th and engaged the secu- alty-heavy IED incident was rec- and active in Maywand and Zhari districts. rity personnel in a firefight. Alt- orded in Zhari, where a single Other significant incidents included a ‘green hough both attackers were even- blast hit a joint foot patrol killing on blue’ shooting wherein an ANA soldier tually killed, the incident high- 4 IMF and 3 ANA soldiers as well opened fire on a passing IMF vehicle near the lighted AOG’s capability to take as a national interpreter. entrance to an ANA facility within the security advantage of security gaps at perimeter of Kandahar Airfield. As the attack- GOA premises. Following the Direct attacks were primarily con- fined to the surrounding districts er was instantly shot and killed by IMF sol- attack, ANSF located a Toyota diers, his immediate motivations have not been vehicle and a tricycle and appeared less frequently than during the previous period. elucidated. Both ANSF and IMF have been rigged as VBIEDs outside of the tight-lipped about the incident, most likely to compound. Against the usual volume of 5 to 8 of ANSF mem- avoid raising tensions between the two. Inter- It should be noted that two other bers in Kandahar City per cycle, estingly, no reference has been made to this VBIEDs were discovered in other this period marked only one such incident by AOG either, although the opposi- parts of Kandahar City this cycle. occurrence in District 4. AOG tion usually tends to explore such attacks either In District 10 in the Aino Mena also abducted an ANP officer by claiming direct involvement or commenting parking area, NDS discovered a riding a motorcycle in Zhari dis- on these as being a result of spontaneous acts another Zaranj tricycle rigged with trict. His corpse was found two of courage against the IMF presence in the explosives, while in District 9 in days later on the outskirts of the country. Another serious incident which high- Loya Wala area – a location with a village of Seachoy. Zhari also lighted the uneasy cooperation between ANSF history of AOG escalations – an witnessed 6 direct attacks, includ- and IMF occurred in Shah Wali Kot, where ANP patrol discovered a large ing 2 in Pashmul, where AOG during a targeted operation a verbal dispute VBIED rigged in a Mazda truck attacked ANP posts with heavy degenerated into firefight between ANA spe- which required the intervention of weapons and SAF. It is likely that cial forces and an IMF unit, resulting in the an IMF EOD team. Among the the Zhari operations served the death of 2 IMF and 2 ANA soldiers and the 20 IED incidents this cycle, 4 purpose of distracting ANSF en- injuries of 1 IMF interpreter. took place in the city while the gaged in AEF efforts elsewhere. THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents H ELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 100 The incident volumes in Helmand 80 appear to have decreased, primari- strike killed at least 8 AOG mem- 60 ly due to a less active poppy eradi- bers and injured 4. Lastly, in cation campaign. Against 50 sepa- ’s Zaminabad vil- 40 rate eradication operations during lage, IMF air-assets were called in 20 the previous cycle, this period to alleviate pressure from an IMF 0 accounted only for 10, although patrol ambushed by AOG, and this proportion may still change repelled the attack killing 3 AOG with late reporting. Nevertheless, members. The training and HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime there was also a corresponding equipment required for such ef- decrease in clashes between AEF fective use of both fixed wing and where an AOG member fitted with a suicide and AOG, with only 2 attacks rotary assets is at present beyond vest entered an ANP post while the ANP were reported in Nad Ali and in Nahri the capabilities of ANSF. It can having dinner. First, the operative attacked the Sarraj. In contrast, IMF airstrikes be assumed that attack helicopters personnel with SAF, and then - after running continued to increase in regularity, and ‘fast air’ (as fixed wing ground out of ammunition - detonated his device, kill- an expected development which attack aircraft are known), will ing 5 ANP officers, including the post com- will likely shape the future of the continue to feature heavily into mander, and severely injuring 7 others, 2 of conflict in the South for the long the conflict developments on the whom subsequently died of their injuries. An- term and beyond the withdrawal IMF side. Even without a sub- other attempted attack on the Musa Qala DAC of IMF ground troops. The most stantial surface-to-air threat, flying deserves mention, as this location witnessed a effective of the three major opera- in the region involves risks. On multi-phased attack by 4 AOG operatives tions occurred in the village of the 20th, an IMF helicopter armed with BBIEDs the PRP. This cycle, an Folad, in Washer district, where crashed while proceeding to ANP patrol discovered a Toyota Corolla IMF air-assets accounted for the Garmser district on a med-evac rigged as a VBIED in the area near the en- majority of 20 AOG fatalities - mission, most likely due to tech- trance to the DAC. Such an important con- which included their commander - nical failure. All 4 IMF crew centration of AOG resources denotes a shift and an additional 12 injured in a members were killed. The med- against the patterns in place since the IMF- single operation. Also in Washer evac mission was sent to Garmser ANSF takeover of the DAC, and will require district, in the area known as Ko- to evacuate the victims from an further assessment as the fighting season pro- shake Safid, another IMF air- attack near the village of Lakari, gresses.

NGO Incidents N IMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 50 The sole documented incident this 40 cycle in Nimroz warrants atten- In fact, a coordinated attack had tion. During the evening hours been staged in the capital city on 30 th on the 28th, a BBIED operative the 5 of May 2010, when 9 20 BBIED attackers engaged the detonated his charge against an 10 IMF convoy in Barakat Chawk security personnel at the gover- area of Zaranj city. Besides the nor’s office, the Provincial Coun- 0 attacker, the detonation killed one cil, governor's guesthouse, and the IMF soldier and one ANP mem- ANP HQ. It remains to be seen NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime ber, and injured 2 IMF, 3 ANP whether the BBIED attack was a and 6 civilians. It is likely that the precursor to more sustained AOG Rod has accounted for more than 55 % of all attacker sought to take advantage activity around the capital. For reported incidents and 71% of the incidents of a large and out-of-norm pres- the general trending patterns, con- authored by AOG. In counter-point, Zaranj ence of IMF elements. The use of flict engagements usually impact District witnessed only 3 AOG escalations, suicide vectors is rare, although the northern district of Khash including 2 attacks on ANP checkpoints and 1 precedent cases do exist in Zaranj. Rod. Thus far this year, Khash targeted killing so far. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents AKTIKA PAKTIKA P Year to Date 0 100

This Report Period 0 80 Paktika hosted 27 incidents, in- 60 cluding a number of indirect fire incidents during the last two attacks, as well as a limited num- weeks. In Faqiran area of Urgun, 40 ber of IED strikes and direct at- an IED detonated against an ANP 20 tacks. Of note, despite the im- vehicle wounding a child on the 0 proving weather conditions, AOG side of the road. Further casual- activity volumes remain well be- ties were reported in Barmal, low the projections based on the where an IED strike caused inju- PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime trending last year. ries to 1 IMF and 1 ANA soldier The opposition launched IDF in Magha area. In the Ghaibi Khel area of Yahya Khel district, ly Dila, Nika, Ziruk and Zarghun Shahr dis- attacks against the DACs of Ga- tricts, but remained low. In the latter district, yan, Dila, Nika, Omna and Bar- NDS officers discovered two roadside IEDs, while near the AOG attacked an ANP convoy with RPGs mal – all with a customary lack of and SAF, resulting in the deaths of two ANP effectiveness, as no casualties DAC of , an IMF helicopter engaged and killed 4 officers and serious injuries to another. and/or damages were achieved AOG intimidation efforts were quite visible in during these. In addition, an IMF AOG members in the process of emplacing a device. Another 3 the unstable districts of Barmal and in Urgun. base near the village of Lwar in In the former, a primary school was set ablaze Gayan district also came under devices were neutralized by ANP in Omma DAC on 2 different in Mandori village whereas in Urgun, 4 work- several rounds of indirect fire ers of a telecommunication company were which also remained inconclusive. occasions. AOG direct attacks affected main- temporarily abducted by an AOG in Shatori There were only 9 IED-related and safely released 6 hours later.

NGO Incidents G HAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 50 Up to 120 schools in Ghazni 40 province have been closed down tate government policies, although 30 due to AOG threats in a develop- local reports suggested that unof- ment which surpassed local dy- ficial negotiations were opened 20 namics and was discussed nation- between local administration and 10 AOG. Taking education as a wide. During a three-day period 0 starting on the 19th, local AOG proxy in the political conflict is not a new development, and the issued a province-wide request to GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime shut down educational facilities if current situation will require fur- ther assessment on the NGO side, the GOA continue to implement AOG attacks continued to increase, albeit regulations requiring all motorcy- in particular should the ban trans- late into physical attacks on edu- slowly, as ANSF/IMF operations appeared to cles to have current valid registra- have taken out a significant number of AOG tion or be banned from the cational facilities and stakeholders. On the other hand, it also holds fighters. Large IMF operations were also re- roads. Some 60 schools would ported in Qarabagh after a sizeable AOG force th true that the education sector is at have been closed as of the 25 , engaged an IMF patrol near Jamrad. The long mostly in the provincial capital times considered a favourable terrain for GOA and AOG lead- exchange of fire concluded by an IMF airstrike and its environs and others in which killed 11 AOG and injured 17 others. Deh Yak and Andar. The only ership to open direct dialogue and develop confidence-building The group apparently included a number of districts which have not seen sub- foreign nationals. There have been no reports stantial closures are Ajristan, measures for future negotiations. Unlike local deals which are far of casualties on the IMF side. However in Malistan and Jaghori, where AOG another incident reported in Muqur, an IED presence is markedly weak. GOA more usual and feasible for the stakeholders to negotiate, policy- strike caused injuries to 4 IMF soldiers in the officials have made public state- Company area. ments to the effect that such level negotiations on education threats cannot be allowed to dic- have been very limited so far. THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents U RUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 50 The incident volumes in Uruzgan 40 remained low and very consistent killed 2 AOG members and with the previous period. Inclem- wounded another while being em- 30 ent weather may have played a placed along the road just outside 20 role. Heavy rains produced some of the village of Gordin. Further, 10 two successful IED disposal oper- flooding and caused damage to 0 dozens of houses in the south- ations took place in Tirin ’s Spinlandi area and Shali west of the province. This may URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime have hampered movement, as well Nawa village in Khas Uruzgan. as forced some local fighters back In the absence of AOG close- or real collusion with ANSF-IMF or GOA, the into their communities to assist range and IDF assaults, the prov- exact motivation behind this specific incident with reconstruction efforts. Oth- ince recorded 2 cases of targeted has not been elucidated as of the time of writ- erwise, IEDs continued to be the killings. In Sarmurghab area of ing. main driver of insecurity, with 6 Tirin Kot, an AOG shot and recorded incidents, including 3 killed an ANP officer when he Dihrawud district saw another noteworthy detonations on ANP vehicles in stepped out of his post. Another incident when in the Bazaar area, an AOG Tirin Kot, Dihrawud and Khas shooting took place in Dihrawud, member attempted to gain entry into the com- Uruzgan districts. No casualties Dizak area, where AOG killed a pound where district tribal elders were holding were reported in relation to any of local resident. Whereas the civil- a meeting. The ANP detail assigned to the these strikes. In Char Chino dis- ian victims in similar incidents are event confronted the attacker who was subse- trict, a premature IED detonation usually targeted for their perceived quently shot and killed.

NGO Incidents Z ABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 50 This Report Period 0 experienced a 40 slight increase in security incidents South are reckoned to have high 30 standards of recruitment and vet- over the last month; this reporting 20 ting in place when compared to period featured a variety of IED 10 strikes as well as direct AOG at- any other arms of the ANSF. 0 tacks which were actively coun- IED incidents made up the major- tered by ANSF/IMF operations. ity of entries during this period. A AOG infiltration into ANSF came locality near Baba Gak village in ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime to the fore with a shooting in Qalat hosted two effective IED Mullah Nasar Kala village of strikes. In the first event, an ALP member. ANSF collected additional , where an NDS RCIED hit an ANP patrol, killing IEDs on 4 different occasions in Qalat and officer shot and killed one of his one ANP officer and wounding Shahjoy districts, including an assortment of colleagues and reportedly joined two others. Four days later, an- 18 IEDs ready for deployment discovered in a an AOG unit, bringing along an other IED hit an ANP vehicle in cache in a ruined house in Bazaar Gan of assortment of weaponry and his the same location, wounding 2 Shahjoy. In the Mulla Din area of Qalat dis- duty motorcycle. Despite being ANP. A roadside device also hit trict, NDS discovered 70 kg of explosives un- an outlier, the desertion is signifi- an ALP vehicle in Kala Khel in der a bridge, most likely intended to be used cant as the NDS units in the Shahjoy district and wounded one against the frequent IMF patrols. Contact List Dr. Dr. -0700Mohibullah- [email protected] 492550 -0796 [email protected] 688 416 Dimitroff Peter SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) - 077Naseer [email protected] 2546 242 Rory [email protected] 362 EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) -0799408252 [email protected] Firoz Brian Laguardia-north.afg@ NORTH REGIONOFFICE(MAZAR) Patrick Malach - [email protected] -0793Patrick [email protected] 230118 - [email protected] 0797 093073 Camille Tomas [email protected] -0797165 017 Ronaldson-director.af Nathan COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) -0799322 [email protected] 116 Mukhtar -0799Vacant- [email protected] 323 792 CENTRAL REGIONOFFICE (KABUL) Sayed Karim- west2.afg@ Taro Yamagata - [email protected] -0799 322192 WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) of ()/ Explosive Device/ APRP porting Period/ Improvised Explosive Device/ Body BorneImprovised ExplosiveDevice/ Afghan National Police / ACG -Armed Criminal Group/ Criminal -Armed - Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program / Program AfghanPeaceandReintegration - PSC PDO -Private Security Company / SecurityCompany -Private -Private Development Organisation / AOG ngosafety.org -0707 ngosafety.org 474 135 PSG gsft.r 794467 -0799ngosafety.org 404617 AEF -Armed OppositionGroup/ [email protected] [email protected] - 0799325349 -Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / (IEA) Governor Shadow -Provincial IMF -Afghan EradicationForces / -Afghan -International Military / Forces DC -District Centre/ -District RPG CIP -Rocket Propelled Grenade / -Rocket Propelled Grenade -Critical Infrastructure Protection APPF COMMON ACRONYMS ALP -Afghan PublicProtectionForce ANA GOA -Afghan LocalPolice/ -Afghan

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WWW.NGOSAFETY.ORG BADGHIS LDI ANSO Small Arms Fire/ Small Arms HELMAND please yourlocal contact office. ANSO [email protected] [email protected] -Local Defence Initiative / GHOR [email protected] FARYAB ANBP

SOUTH KANDAHAR (re-branded GOAPSCservices) /

MISSING THIS PERIOD:  URUZGAN DAYKUNDI -Afghan National Border Police / ANSO JAWZJAN IDF ANSO Bamyan, Panjshir. Panjshir. Bamyan,

ZABUL

-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / mortars) Fire(ex: -Indirect

NORTH BAMYAN

BALKH GHAZNI SAMANGAN PGM

VBIED CENTRAL

WARDAK

PAKTIKA or bad, letthemknow on: KUNDUZ r production. Citation

BAGHLAN - Pro-Government Militia / PARWAN

-Vehicle BorneImprovised KABUL

KHOST NANGAHAR IEA BADAKSHAN ANSO PRP

-Islamic Emirate Emirate -Islamic

REGIONAL -Previous Re-

. BBIED

DIVISIONS IED ANP - - -