IN THIS ISSUE “BIG WAR” AIR POWER FOR “SMALL WAR” OPERATIONS A RETURN TO ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE RANKS: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL-LEVEL EDUCATION: AN UPDATE TERMINOLOGY TALK - ARTICLE 5 AIRMINDEDNESS: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF AIR POWER AND MUCH MORE! THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL is an official publication of the Commander Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and is published quarterly. It is a forum for discussing concepts, issues and ideas that are both crucial and central to aerospace power. The Journal is dedicated to disseminating the ideas and opinions of not only RCAF personnel, but also those civilians who have an interest in issues of aerospace power. Articles may cover the scope of air force doctrine, training, leadership, lessons learned and air force operations: past, present or future. Submissions on related subjects such as ethics, technology and air force history are also invited. This Journal is therefore dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of air warfare and is central to the intellectual health of the RCAF. It ser ves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the RCAF as well as members from other environments, employees of government agencies and academia concerned with air force affairs. EDITORIAL STAFF Editor-in-Chief: Colonel Martin Cournoyer, CD Senior Editor: Major William March, CD, MA EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel William Lewis (Retired), OMM, CD, M Eng, M Ed, MBA, MDS, PhD Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Johnston, CD, MA – Canadian Forces College Major Raymond Stouffer, CD, PhD – Royal Military College Doctor Allan English, CD, PhD – Queen’s University Doctor James Fergusson, PhD – University of Manitoba Doctor Stephen Harris, CD, PhD – Directorate of History and Heritage Doctor Randall Wakelam, CD, PhD – Royal Military College Published by Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre ISSN 1927-7601 ASSISTANT EDITORS Adri Boodoosingh, Lisa Moulton and Françoise Romard GRAPHIC DESIGN Denis Langlois and Luc Leroy ONLINE EDITION ANIMATION Hope Smith http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/index.page http://trenton.mil.ca/lodger/cfawc/eLibrary/Journal/Current_Issue_e.asp ACTING PRODUCTION MANAGER Denis Langlois For copies of this publication or to be placed on a distribution list contact [email protected] NOTE TO READERS As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where quotations are translated from their original language, we will use the term [Translation] at the end of the quote to indicate that readers can find the original text in the other language version of the Journal. Unless otherwise noted, photographs appearing in the RCAF Journal are attributable to the public domain.

SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL welcomes the submission of articles, book reviews and shorter pieces (which will be published in the Letters to the Editor, Points of Interest and Pushing the Envelope sections) that cover the scope of air force doctrine, training, leadership, lessons learned and air force operations: past, present or future. Submissions on related subjects such as ethics, technology and air force history are also invited. JOURNAL SECTIONS ITEM WORD LIMIT* DETAILS LETTERS TO 50-250 Commentary on any portion of a previous Journal. THE EDITOR ARTICLES 3000-5000 Written in academic style. Written in academic style and must include: • the book’s complete title (including sub-title); • the complete names of all authors as presented on the title page; BOOK 500-1000 REVIEWS • the book’s publisher, including where and when it was published; • the book’s ISBN and number of pages; and • a high resolution .jpg file (at least 300 dpi and 5 by 7 inches) of the book’s cover. POINTS OF 250-1000 Information on any topic (including operations, exercises, and anniversaries) that is of interest to the INTEREST broader aerospace audience. PUSHING Forum for commentary, opinions, and rebuttal on Journal articles and/or issues that are of interest to the THE 250-2000 broader aerospace audience. ENVELOPE * Exclusive of endnotes AUTHORS ARE ASKED TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES • Submissions may be made in either official language. • Authors must include a brief (one paragraph) biographical sketch which includes current appointment/position, telephone number, and email address. Please include all professional and academic designations as well as military decorations. • Selected articles that have been peer reviewed have a to the left of the title. • The Senior Editor will notify contributors on the status of their submission. It may not be possible to publish all submissions. • All text submissions must be digital, in Microsoft Word or rich text format. Files must not be password protected and must not contain macros. Files may be submitted by mail or email at the addresses provided below. • All supporting tables, images and figures that accompany the text should be sent in separate files in the original file format (i.e., not imbedded in the text). Original vector files are preferred; high resolution (not less than 300 dpi) .psd or .jpg files may be submitted. • Authors are now required to provide “alternate text” with detailed description for all figures. The alternate text is to be labelled as such and placed below the caption. • Copyright permissions are required for all material that is not Department of National Defence or author originated. It is the author’s responsibility to obtain and submit the necessary written permissions which must include the author’s/artist’s name as well as the publisher’s name and location. Any material not meeting these requirements may be omitted from the article. • The Senior Editor may select images or have graphics created to accompany submissions. • Authors should use Oxford English or Petit Robert spelling. When required, reference notes should be endnotes rather than footnotes and formatted in Chicago style. For assistance refer to The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th Edition, Le guide du rédacteur, or CFAWC Production Section at [email protected] • Acronyms and abbreviations should be used sparingly: • If they are required in the text, the term is to be written out in full the first time it is used and then followed by the abbreviated form in parentheses. • A list of all abbreviations (and their terms) used in the text will be included at the end of each submission. • The Senior Editor reserves the right to edit submissions for style, grammar, and length, but will not make editorial changes that will affect the integrity of the argument without consulting the author. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OR TO MAKE A CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS SUBMISSION PLEASE CONTACT THE SENIOR EDITOR AT: For the Summer 2014 issue: 30 April 2014 Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre For the Fall 2014 issue: 30 July 2014 8 Wing Trenton For the Winter 2015 issue: 30 October 2014 Box 1000 Stn Forces Astra, Ontario K0K 3W0 For the Spring 2015 issue: 30 January 2015 Attn: Major William March [email protected] DISCLAIMER Opinions expressed in the Journal remain those of the author and do not represent Departmental or Canadian Forces policy. Doctrine, training and other material published in the Journal does not represent authority for action on that particular topic. All published material remains copyright of the Department of National Defence and may not be used without written permission. VOL. 3 | NO. 1 ARTICLES WINTER 2014 A RETURN TO ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE 5 RANKS: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION By Lieutenant-Colonel John J. Alexander, CD, MDA

“BIG WAR” AIR POWER FOR “SMALL WAR” 15 OPERATIONS By Wing Commander David Glasson, EDITOR’S Royal Australian Air Force MESSAGE 4 IN PRAISE OF BOMBER HARRIS AND 28 AREA BOMBING By David L. Bashow, OMM, CD, MA

BOOK REVIEWS FROM THE SKIES OF GERMANY TO THE NORTH 57 AFRICAN DESERT: THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE AT WAR, 1939–1945 Review by Commander Mark R. Condeno, CF Photo: Sgt Gaétan Racine Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary

PROUD TO BE: MY LIFE, THE AIR FORCE, THE 59 CONTROVERSY Review by Captain Liz Allard, CD

POINTS OF INTEREST ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL- 62 LEVEL EDUCATION: AN UPDATE By Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Anderson, CD CF Photo: Cpl Pierre Létourneau TERMINOLOGY TALK ­‑ ARTICLE 5 66 By Major James Bound, CD, BSc (Hons)

PUSHING THE ENVELOPE AIRMINDEDNESS: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF 70 AIR POWER By Brigadier-General Christopher J. Coates, OMM, MSM, CD, MSS

CF Photo: MCpl Dan Shouinard THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014

EDITOR’S MESSAGE

elcome to 2014! It promises to be As an interesting piece of trivia, I was a most interesting and exciting asked to prepare a quick summary of the year from a number of different old RCAF rank structure and found a bit of Wperspectives. Not only will the Royal Canadian information that you can try out ... at your Air Force (RCAF) celebrate its 90th birthday peril. Apparently, at one time, the rank of (and is still looking good for its age), the warrant officer, class I (WO I), now known country as a whole will start to commemorate as chief warrant officer, when translated notable events and achievements related to the into French, became sous-officier breveté, world wars and the post-war period. Once the 1re classe (SOB 1). So, if and when we revert proposed events have been approved, we shall back to the old ranks, you can dredge up this see about putting them into print so that you historical tidbit and call your chief a “first- can plan ahead. class SOB.” I tried it—he was not amused.

It never ceases to amaze me how much There are times when you really have to our past seems to influence our future. Often look at how an acronym plays out in BOTH it is not a large change, but I never thought languages. that I would have to relearn how to read “pips and crowns” to know if I was speaking to an Enjoy the read. Army captain or major. Nor did I ever think that I might have to relearn the old RCAF Sic Itur Ad Astra rank designations (although “squadron leader” does have a nice ring to it). Each and every time something like this transpires, I am reminded of the old Meatloaf (for those of a younger age, you can Google him) song “Objects in the Rear-view Mirror May Appear Major William March, CD, MA Closer than They Are.” Senior Editor

4 Editor’s Message THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014

A Return to Royal Canadian Air Force Ranks: A Historical Examination 5 A Return to Royal Canadian Air Force Ranks: A Historical Examination THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014

he Government of Canada has how one would recognize the appointment of recognized the history of the various master corporal whilst honouring our history environments of the Canadian and heritage. How can one be a squadron TForces through the re-introduction of the leader and yet not command a squadron? In title “Royal” within the Royal Canadian pondering such questions, it is important to Navy (RCN), the Royal Canadian Air Force recognize that the history which we choose to (RCAF) and certain line units of the Canadian recognize was not easily arrived at in the first Army.1 Other recognitions such as utilizing place. This paper will reflect upon the history the executive curl on naval ranks, the use of of RCAF and Canadian Forces (CF) ranks the Naval Jack and returning to the pips and in order to inform the on-going discussions crowns of the Army have led to some personnel across our Air Force. As will be seen, many in the RCAF pondering whether a return to of the same considerations of developing an traditional RCAF ranks will be forthcoming. RCAF esprit de corps, independent of the other Many a lunchroom discussion has centred on environments, are as relevant today as they how one could implement the former RCAF were at the birth of our Air Force. rank structure wherein political correctness necessitates addressing gender neutrality or

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The birth of an air force The initial CAF headquarters opened Though the RCAF chooses to recognize 17 May 1920 at 529 Sussex Street in Ottawa 1 April 1924 as its formation date, the history and consisted of six personnel: Wing of the Canadian Air Force (CAF) extends back Commander R. F. Redpath, Flight Lieutenant further to the establishment of a Canadian wing G. J. Blackmore, Warrant Officer H. H. in Europe which “became operational nine Atkinson, Flight Sergeant F. Aldridge and days after the First World War had ended.”2 Sergeant A. H. McKay.8 With such a small Demilitarization post World War I (WWI) headquarters, initial CAF regulations were was the first challenge of a burgeoning air adapted from those of the Royal Air Force force. At the time, “middle-ranking civil (RAF). The CAF chain of command for the servants in Ottawa” took up the challenge of first air officer commanding was a relatively “converting the expansive potential of aviation, direct line through the inspector general to so clearly demonstrated in war, to constructive the Air Board. peacetime uses.”3 “[T]he government delegated responsibility for aviation to an autonomous While the initial cadre of CAF officers Air Board in the summer of 1919.”4 This Air and enlisted men were considered “in Board was primarily concerned with conserving continuous service but on inactive, unpaid the aviation experiences of WWI through the leave except when on refresher training,”9 promotion of civil flying. The military arm of their ranks were transferrable from their the Air Board, the CAF, was established along former RAF or army ranks held during WWI, militia lines. Colonel Oliver Mowat Biggar, “one once they completed their first training period. those few middle-ranking personnel in Ottawa,” Hence, both RAF and traditional army ranks proposed the formation of the Canadian were acceptable10 and used interchangeably Air Force “as a non-permanent service”5 in at the discretion of the holder. In the earliest November 1919 to work alongside the civil days, the choice to use army or RAF ranks aviation division under the control of the Air seemed to be along civil versus military flying Board. The government accepted the argument duties. Quite often, members employed the for the creation of the Canadian Air Force in army ranks when flying in support of the February 1920, and Sir Willoughby Gwatkin civil branch of the Air Board. The same became the first inspector general of the CAF individual would then utilize the air-force in April 1920 with Air Commodore A. K. Tylee rank when flying within the military branch.11 appointed as air officer commanding. The The rank structure laid down for the CAF decision to have this militia arm within the included: air vice-marshal, air commodore, Air Board was not universally accepted and, group captain, wing commander, squadron indeed, almost did not happen. leader, flight lieutenant, flying officer, pilot officer, warrant officer, flight sergeant, The question of whether Canada would sergeant, corporal, air mechanic (1st class) even have an air force was best summed up and air mechanic (2nd class).12 by then leader of the opposition, William Lyon Mackenzie King, when he asked in the House, As mentioned, the Air Board was “Where does the Minister expect invasion from? comprised of two flying divisions—the civil … defence against whom[?]”6 The concept and the Canadian Air Force—and would of an Air Board was not novel. The United remain a dual system until 1922. It was not Kingdom had established an Air Board in until the elimination of the dual system that 1916 and replaced it with an Air Council in the concurrent usage of army and air-force 1917. However, unlike Canada’s Air Board, ranks within the Air Board was resolved. the developments of command and control of This was eloquently demonstrated in Camp air power in the United Kingdom were centred Borden’s routine orders of 28 November 1922, on the military aspects only.7 wherein it stated:

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The use of Military Equivalent of Prior to the official designation of the Royal Canadian Air Force ranks will be Canadian Air Force, uniforms were loosely discontinued throughout the Service styled on the army dress, with army-style forthwith and only the ranks hereunder rank badges (pips and crowns).15 Afterwards, quoted (i.e., group captain to pilot officer) it was decided to adopt the dress and motto of will be used both in correspondence and the RAF, and the uniform was patterned on conversation.13 the RAF uniform of the day. These changes would remain extant until unification on The Royal Canadian Air 1 February 1968. As an aside, the translation Force of Royal Canadian Air Force to French was not On 1 January 1923, the former Air Board resolved until June 1940, thereafter referred to (predominantly civilian in nature prior to this as Corps d’aviation royal canadien, abbreviated point) was consolidated within the CAF under as CARC.16 The date 1 April 1924, which we the newly formed Department of National now celebrate as the “official” birthdate of the Defence, under the control of the chief of the RCAF, was significant in that the new King’s general staff. Although discussion of seeking Regulations and Orders (KR&O) for the RCAF the “Royal” designation had preceded the were now completed after two years of staff amalgamation of 1 January 1923, application for work and came into effect on this date. It also said designation was not made to the Secretary marked the commencement of the new fiscal of State for External Affairs until 5 January year, after which the new pay and allowances 1923. Formal reply from the Secretary of State could be administered.17 It also marked the date for the Colonies in England was received on after which the use of the “Royal” designation 15 February 1923. Weekly Order No. 21/23 was now approved by KR&O. As demonstrated, on 12 March 1923 promulgated the new title however, the true date for the birth of Canada’s “Royal Canadian Air Force.”14 Although the Air Force could have been much earlier. promulgation of “Royal” within the title was conferred in 1923, it was not formally adopted With the adoption of the KR&O for the until 1 April 1924. RCAF, largely based on the RAF and the

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United Kingdom Force Act, the enlisted ranks would remain in effect in the RCAF until were adjusted to the following: warrant officer unification many years later in 1968. During 1st class (WO1), warrant officer 2nd class (WO2), World War II, gender-specific language flight sergeant (FS), corporal (Cpl), leading would be included in the rank titles, such as aircraftman (LAC), aircraftman 1st class (AC1) aircraftman/aircraftwoman, to address the and aircraftman 2nd class (AC2). No significant inclusion of women in uniform. Concurrent changes were made to officer ranks with the with the maturing of the RCAF, questions were exception of adding air marshal and air chief already beginning to arise about dedicated air marshal. The RAF had arrived at this rank support to the Navy. structure as a means of severing the Air Force from the other services. The intent was “to Even before unification in 1968, the use preserve and emphasise the principle of the of the RAF rank structure within the RCAF independence and integrity of the Royal Air was not without some controversy. In a Force as a separate service among fighting memorandum to the RCAF Senior Advisory services to the Crown” while recognizing Group in February 1965, the author (Deputy the requirement for the Air Force to serve Chief of Personnel)20 suggests that the titles, the special needs of the both the Army and “in many instances, originated with the Royal the Navy “in addition [to having] a strategic Naval Air Service and later were adopted by the and tactical sphere of action independent Royal Flying Corps, which in turn became the of the other two fighting services.”18 Just as RAF in 1918.”21 Principal among the arguments Canada’s burgeoning Air Force was seeking its was that the ranks in use by the RCAF were independence, so too, the RAF was seeking to no longer indicative of the officer’s function establish itself as a credible and independent as it was 40 years previously when the ranks force separate from the Army and the Royal were created. Other arguments included Navy.19 Canada automatically adopted the the lack of one-word ranks, thus leading to RAF ranks for use in the RCAF when it based confusion among the public. RCAF ranks also the RCAF KR&O upon the RAF KR&O and did not easily translate into French whereas the the United Kingdom Force Act. These ranks Canadian Army ranks did. Lastly, in 1965 it was

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considered advantageous to adopt the Canadian On 5 September 1918, the Royal Canadian Army rank structure as it was similar to the rank Naval Air Service was established by Order in structures used by the other members of the Council, only to be disbanded three months later United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty following armistice.23 This creation reflected Organization with whom the RCAF could be the significant contributions of Canada’s airmen expected work alongside on operations. The flying in the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal recommendation of this report was to retain Navy Air Service throughout WWI. However, the rank insignia but adopt the Canadian Army as Canada had no ships capable of launching and rank titles as this result would be “the best of recovering aircraft after WWI, the RCN Naval both choices.”22 Air Service had little chance of survival. Slow development continued in shore-based support Prior to unification in 1968, the Canadian to the RCN such that by 15 September 1938, Army and the RCN had developed aviation and Eastern Command was established to monitor air arms of their own, which did not belong the territorial waters off Canada’s coast.24 This to the RCAF. Based on this, questions arise is not to suggest that aviation in support of the today among the tactical aviation and maritime Navy did not exist prior to 1938. In fact, RCAF aviation communities as to whether it would Station Dartmouth had, at this point, existed even be appropriate to return to RCAF ranks. for almost two decades, as did RCAF Station The question is a little more complicated in that Vancouver—seaplanes flew from both locations. those aviation arms, as will be demonstrated, Maritime Group was subsequently formed in had closer links to the RCAF than many of April 1949 and, finally, Maritime Air Command today’s aviators realize. in January 1951. “Maritime Air Command was absorbed into the Canadian Forces Maritime The development of naval and Command in January 1966 … .”25 Army aviation capabilities In Canada, the division of aviation in The post-war years also saw the emergence direct support to the Navy evolved gradually. within Army circles of a sincere interest

CF Photo

10 A Return to Royal Canadian Air Force Ranks: A Historical Examination THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 in aviation. RCAF acquisition plans for new Unification transport planes evolved in close consultation The process of unification, which with the Army (the Army fearing RCAF culminated in February 1968, had actually requirements might not appropriately address begun in 1964 in an effort to eliminate their requirements).26 Similar to the RCN’s duplication in recruiting, training and other emergence of a full aviation capacity, the Army aspects of military support, such as a unified developed aviation capabilities such as air pay system.28 This single command structure observation post throughout the period 1946 to under the Chief of the Defence Staff made 1975, culminating in the formation of 10 Tactical perfect sense. Unification resulted in the Air Group in September 1968. 10 Tactical abolition of distinctive uniforms in favour Air Group included two CF-5 fighter squad- of the “Jolly Green Jumpers”29 and the rons, T-33 reconnaissance aircraft, Buffalo elimination of RCAF ranks, among many tactical transport and a variety of helicopters other changes. Whereas the Navy vehemently for transport and observation/reconnaissance. fought the aspects of unification that would In September 1975, the Canadian Armed threaten their history and heritage, it is Forces “retreated slightly from unification … suggested that many in the senior ranks of the upon the establishment of Air Command.” It RCAF silently retired without fuss or learned would become “the focal point of tradition to accept the changes without dissent.30 Even and professional expertise for airmen of the this interpretation that the RCAF senior Canadian forces.”27 ranks retired silently without fuss is not

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universally held. Lieutenant-General William The RCAF version 2.0 Carr (Retired), the first commander of Air This brief historical visit of the evolution Command in 1975, was an air commodore in of the RCAF leads to the current discussion. 1968 at the time of unification. He holds no The latest amendment to the National Defence recollection of any senior officer retiring as Act (NDA), dated 19 June 2013, retains the a result of unification.31 The memorandum provision for the re-establishment of an RCAF of 1965 to the RCAF Senior Advisory Group rank structure.32 Notably, master corporal is not substantiates his recollections. It appears, represented on the chart under any of the three from at least this one source, that the RCAF environments. However, as master corporal is was in favour of adopting Army ranks, and an appointment, it is not considered a “rank” by it was approved by the Air Council just prior definition of the NDA. The ranks are provided to unification in 1968. in Table 1.

Unification Ranks RCAF Ranks (Column I) (Column IV) English French

General Air Chief Marshal Maréchal en chef de l’Air

Lieutenant-General Air Marshal Maréchal de l’Air

Major-General Air Vice-Marshal Vice-maréchal de l’Air

Brigadier-General Air Commodore Commodore de l’Air

Colonel Group Captain Colonel d’aviation

Lieutenant-Colonel Wing Commander Lieutenant-colonel d’aviation

Major Squadron Leader Commandant d’aviation

Captain Flight Lieutenant Capitaine d’aviation

Lieutenant Flying Officer Lieutenant d’aviation

Second Lieutenant Pilot Officer Sous-lieutenant d’aviation

Officer Cadet Officer Cadet Élève-officier

Chief Warrant Officer Warrant Officer Class 1 Adjudant de 1re classe

Master Warrant Officer Warrant Officer Class 2 Adjudant de 2e classe

Warrant Officer Flight Sergeant Sergent de section

Sergeant Sergeant Sergent

Corporal Corporal Caporal

Private Aircraftman Aviateur

Table 1. Schedule to Section 21 of the NDA

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Section 21(2) of the National Defence Act honours those who have come before us and currently permits for the usage of other rank serves to foster a sense of pride and esprit de designations. All that is required is a change in corps in our service now and in the future. The regulation by Governor in Council “prescribing evolution of the RCAF occurred over many the circumstances in which a person holding a decades and not without a certain amount of rank set out in Column I of the schedule shall conflicting opinions on how it should be use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank structured. Therefore, it would seem fitting set out in Column II, III or IV of the schedule from a historical perspective that any discussion opposite the rank held by that person.”33 around a return to a unique rank structure should contain some differences of opinion. At the outset, the question was posed, how The RAF’s consideration to the contributory can one be a squadron leader and not command a nature of both the navy and the army cultures squadron? This question does not seem to bother in formulating their rank structure demonstrates our own RCN wherein a lieutenant-commander the inclusive nature and dynamics of both these is referred to as capitaine de corvette in French, environments to how the RAF arrived at their even though we no longer have corvettes in structure. Presumably by extension, the RCAF’s the fleet. Furthermore, this question does not rank structure represents a reasonable raise similar questions with our allies such compromise of all parties. Whatever as the RAF and Royal Australian Air Force evolutionary step the current RCAF takes next, (RAAF). Anecdotal discussions with officers it should be clear that there is no one single in the RAF indicate that the present view taken solution which, based on our history, is the is that a squadron leader is a leader within the “right way” to recognize our past. squadron—not the leader of the squadron. The officer commanding a squadron in both the RAF Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol) John Alexander, and RAAF is traditionally of the rank of wing CD, has served in the Canadian Forces in commander. Although these ranks originally excess of 23 years and holds a Bachelor of described the functional responsibilities held Arts in History from Western University by the individual, this is virtually no longer the and a Master of Defence Studies from the case in any Commonwealth country employing Royal Military College of Canada. A tactical the RAF-like ranks. Like the aforementioned aviation and special operations pilot, he most question of squadron leaders not commanding recently commanded 427 Special Operations squadrons, the matter of gender neutrality in Aviation Squadron in Petawawa, Ontario. ranks does not raise concern with our allies LCol Alexander now serves as Director either. However, were it to remain a concern in Structure Integration 7 at National Defence the Canadian context, the historical employment Headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario. of RCAF ranks between World War II and 1968 demonstrates the practice of gender-specific Abbreviations ranks. For example, an aircraftman (AC1) was referred to as aircraftwoman (AW1) as was CAF Canadian Air Force a leading aircraftman (LAC) referred to as DCP Deputy Chief of Personnel leading aircraftwoman (LAW). Conceivably, KR&O Kings Regulations and Orders these gender-specific ranks could be used again; however, it would require a change in the NDA National Defence Act National Defence Act to once again recognize RAAF Royal Australian Air Force aircraftwoman. RAF Royal Air Force Conclusion RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force This paper opens for consideration some RCN Royal Canadian Navy of the history behind our rank structure which WWI World War I

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Notes 17. Ibid., 116. 1. Canadian Press, “Army Goes Back to the Future with Return to 18. Spaight, 212. British-Style Ranks and Designations,” 19. Mayne, 29. Ottawa Citizen, July 9, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.ottawacitizen. 20. It is not clear within the memorandum com/news/+style+ranks+designations/8634783/ what office DCP holds within the RCAF. The story.html. abbreviation DCP is without context, although at 2. Richard Mayne, “Royal Matters: the time, the office of Deputy Chief of Personnel Symbolism, History and the Significance of was extant. the RCAF’s Name Change, 1909–2011,” The 21. DCP memorandum to RCAF Senior Royal Canadian Air Force Journal 1, no. 4 Advisory Group, 1 February 1965, Adoption of (2012): 26. Canadian Army Officer Rank Titles, 1. 3. W. A. B. Douglas, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, ed. Norman 22. Ibid., 3. Hillmer, vol. 2, The Creation of a National Air 23. J. D. F. Kealy and E. C. Russell, A Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, History of Canadian Naval Aviation: 1918– 1986), 35. 1962 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 4. Ibid. 1965), 141.

5. Ibid., 48. 24. Douglas, 373.

6. House of Commons, Debates, 16 June 25. Don Nicks, “A History of the Air 1920, 3646. Services in Canada,” CanMilAir, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.canmilair.com/ 7. J. M. Spaight, The Beginnings of rcafhistory.htm. Organised Air Power: A Historical Study (New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1927), 26. Brereton Greenhous and Hugh A. 77, 157. Halliday, Canada’s Air Forces 1914–1999 (Ottawa: Editions Art Global and the Department 8. Wing Commander F. H. Hitchens, Air of National Defence, 1999), 140. Board: Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 27. For both quotations, Ibid., 142. 1972), 12. 28. Ibid., 138. 9. Douglas, 50. 29. Ibid. 10. Hitchens, 18. 30. Ibid. 11. Ibid., 92. 31. Lieutenant-General William Carr 12. Ibid., 18. (Retired), personal communication with author, October 2, 2013. 13. Ibid., 95. 32. Government of Canada, National 14. Ibid., 98–99. Defence Act (Ottawa: Minister of Justice, 15. Douglas, 51. 2013), 237.

16. Hitchens., 99. 33. NDA, Sect 21(2).

14 A Return to Royal Canadian Air Force Ranks: A Historical Examination “Big War” Air Power for “Small War” Operations THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014

Editor’s note: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australia or any other authority referred to in the text. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statements made in this document.

Introduction operations have progressed from an initial n air force’s first duty is the defence conventional big-war phase, such as involving of the nation from foreign aggression, removal of the established regime, to a longer Abut in today’s global environment this period of unconventional warfare including high-level state-versus-state conflict seems a counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. This remote possibility. In contrast, the past 60 years issue affects not only the type of aircraft and have seen air forces predominantly fighting weapons platforms used but also how they smaller, more unconventional wars. In order to are employed. ensure the right balance of air force structure, it is essential to understand the most likely The nature of irregular warfare is that no scenarios for the employment of air power. situation or opponent is likely to be the same. In many situations, these less conventional Certainly, there are shared experiences and

SHIELD

COMMAND Desired State Current State Direct Decide Assess Plan ACT SENSE [SHAPE and MOVE]

SUSTAIN Effects

GENERATE

Figure 1. Royal Canadian Air Force functions7

16 “Big War” Air Power for “Small War” Operations THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 lessons, but it is essential that air forces are strike capabilities. Move deals with air not geared to fight the last war. Accordingly, mobility and personnel recovery. Both of it is posited that air forces should maintain a these areas are formed and structured for foundation based on conventional air power conventional war scenarios. but be adaptable to meet the challenges of irregular warfare. Canada has specific requirements to maintain essential conventional air power Conventional air power doctrine functions in order to fulfil the obligations During the cold-war era, Canada geared of the contribution to the North American its air power to fight the big-war threat posed Aerospace Defence Command, the North by the Soviet Bloc. The period since the end Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the cold war saw a significant reduction its unique role in the protection of the in the size of the Canadian Forces with more Arctic.8 Canada must, therefore, maintain a emphasis on joint interaction.1 This time has, fundamental capability of conventional air however, seen numerous operations in support power functions to meet these obligations. of smaller conflicts, yet air power doctrine It is essential that Canada maintain its has continued to focus on the primary aim conventional edge which has been the key of protecting a nation’s citizens and primary to past successes and will continue to be interests.2 Doctrine determines the method necessary in the future.9 of command and control, the force structure and the concept of operations. Aerospace Defining small war operations doctrine also determines the types of weapon The NATO Joint Air Power Competence platforms and, in particular, the aircraft types Centre describes three operational themes to be acquired and how they will be employed. of future warfare: big war, long war and contained war. Big war is classed as a The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) conventional state-versus-state confrontation. defines three core functions of air power: Long war is defined as “countering irregular Command, Act and Sense. These core activity,” while contained war is limited functions are displayed with the surrounding to “inter alia denial, blockade, and no-fly enabling functions in Figure 1. Command zones.”10 Small-war operations can be classed incorporates the term command and control, as a combination of the second and third encompassing systems, procedures and themes—countering irregular activity and structures in order for the commander the limited operation of a contained war. to direct their authority.3 Conventional command practices have a foundation in Irregular warfare is nothing new; it the hierarchical structure of the continental has been documented from rebellions in staff system.4 The Sense function includes ancient times through to its prevalence in collecting and processing data, which in modern-day conflicts. Throughout this period, the conventional meaning is aimed at a the methods of fighting have been broad, strategic level of the “situational awareness including guerrilla warfare, insurgency of the land, air and maritime approaches.”5 and terrorism.11 Adapting air power to The Act function includes the operations meet this range of possible scenarios is a that involve manoeuvre, firepower and difficult undertaking, as there is unlikely information gathering and is divided into to be a one-size-fits-all approach.12 This the two subfunctions of Shape and Move.6 leads to the conclusion that air forces need The Shape subfunction, control of the air, to determine a foundation for their air power is a cornerstone of conventional warfare. It doctrine and then maintain the ability to adapt includes the support of land and sea forces that capability to meet the challenges of the through close air support, interdiction and specific irregular war situation. Steven Metz

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argues that COIN operations need to be outstanding example of the use of air power undertaken less as a belligerent nation but in a contained war. The establishment of a more as a “neutral mediator and peacemaker” no-fly zone removed the Libyan government’s and goes on to argue that the best option ability to use air power against its own people is to reduce the “human suffering that is and essentially “levelled the playing field” for associated with the violence.”13 Air power the rebels.15 Special operations airlift forces can play a significant role in this regard and were able to retrieve Western personnel from should be part of a comprehensive approach harm’s way. These operations were a clear to irregular warfare.14 This further implies message of support to the insurgents and that it is unfeasible to design an air force against the established regime. In contrast, the around one specific small-war possibility. blockade and no-fly zones over Iraq against Air forces should, therefore, determine the the Saddam Hussein administration were less best way to adapt air power for small wars effective in enforcing the United Nation’s and remain flexible to meet the changing mandate on Iraq. Both of these examples, operational requirements. however, demonstrate the successful use of more conventional air power with its specific Air power in contained war operations weaponry, in a smaller war operation.16 Contained war can be an effective means of providing assistance to the local Air power in COIN operations population, either against insurgencies or Air power often provides an essential against ruling governments. The recent NATO asymmetric advantage over irregular assistance to insurgent forces in Libya was an forces and ensures a high level of speed,

CF Photo: Cpl Mathieu St-Amour

GLB-12 laser-guided bomb on CF18

CF Photo: Cpl Mathieu St-Amour

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MQ-9 Reaper UAV

flexibility and reach.17 Conventional forces Air strike find it difficult to adapt to counter insurgent In conventional thinking, air power tactics and need to tailor their actions to provides the ability to “strike at an adversary’s meet the specific threat and environment … center of gravity” using precision kinetic they face. The conventional success of the activity.21 Generally, irregular forces are more Iraq “shock and awe” campaign was followed dispersed and do not present the same centre- by years of COIN operations and nation of-gravity targets as conventional forces. A building. The Afghan campaign showed that precise strike capability, however, provides more effective results could be achieved by many advantages in small wars, such as “lighter, mobile ground forces supported the ability to destroy centres of operations, by precision air power.”18 Dubbed the deny safe havens and ensure the continual Afghan model, small numbers of special dispersal of insurgent forces. In addition to forces operate integrally with air power and this strategic role of precision strike, close local troops.19 This leads to the use of more air support provides an essential tactical role. network-enabled operations (NEO) where This includes a range of options to rapidly smaller units are able to react swiftly and respond to the needs of ground forces with with a greater amount of local knowledge. To precision engagement to physically destroy support these operations, air power has the the insurgent forces. Conventional strike/ ability to perform these functions through fighter jets are able to loiter over the battlefield “centralized control and decentralized and be called onto targets with accurate execution.”20 This allows for the effective methods such as laser designation.22 and efficient allocating of limited and costly air resources. Air power can provide a range One of the arguments against the use of capabilities to counter the insurgent forces of conventional fast jet aircraft is that they including air strike, information operations usually deploy from rear-echelon, safe, and air mobility. support bases, some distance from the

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forward area. This requires aircraft to be pre- The air strike capability can present a deployed ahead of planned ground operations number of issues in the small-war environment. or extends the lead time to respond to the The prime objective of current United States requests of ground forces.23 An alternative and coalition forces in recent Middle East to conventional aircraft would be using operations has been the protection of the local smaller aircraft that are custom designed population.25 Air strike can “tend to aggravate for COIN operations. Smaller, customized, an insurgency situation”26 by producing manned aircraft (like the Skyraider used in collateral damage or simply by causing fear in Vietnam) provide a specialized alternative the civilian populace. It is, therefore, essential but are vulnerable to small arms and man- to make sound and considered judgements portable air-defence systems. Unmanned relating to targeting, using the most accurate aerial vehicles (UAVs) have adapted well and timely information possible. to this role by being able to be forward deployed, being responsive to ground forces Information operations and delivering precise munitions, even if of a Accurate and timely information is lower calibre than larger manned aircraft.24 critical to effectively counter insurgent forces. UAVs have proven an effective addition to the The RCAF Sense function includes a number air power regime in big wars such as DESERT of information operations such as intelligence, STORM and likewise in small wars such as surveillance, targeting acquisition and in Kosovo. Conventional aircraft are still able reconnaissance (ISTAR) as well as to provide the “big hitting” power that may airborne command and control. Airborne be needed to support planned operations. assets are able to collect and disseminate

CP140 Aurora & 2 CF18 Hornets

Photo: Antoine Letarte, CC BY 3.0 http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portail:Forces_canadiennes/Image/47

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Heron UAV

CF Photo: Cpl Andrew Saunders a range of information, including signals, In Afghanistan, these functions have communications as well as fixed and moving been provided by both conventional and target imagery.27 This information can then be purpose-built platforms. Conven­tional rapidly disseminated to commanders or direct ISTAR platforms (such as E-3D Sentry, to ground forces, enabling network-enabled Sentinel R1, Nimrod R1 and RAPTOR- operation. These air-power assets are most equipped Tornado GR4s) have been deployed efficiently controlled through a centralized against irregular opponents in both Iraq and command to minimize duplication and ensure Afghanistan with positive results.31 These the appropriate level of joint force priority conventional platforms are often adapted of limited resources.28 to suit the specific requirements of COIN operations. For example, the RCAF CP140 Irregular forces are often widely Aurora and the Royal Australian Air Force dispersed and integrated into the general P3-C Orion were procured primarily as civilian community. Air power has proven maritime surveillance and antisubmarine critical in being able to locate, identify platforms. In addition to conducting a and track insurgents and their leaders.29 maritime role against irregular sea forces, Surveillance can be conducted around the however, these platforms have been modified clock on compounds, routes and suspected to conduct ground ISTAR operations in locations. Current airborne technological Afghanistan, providing imagery and myriad equipment can track back from an improvised other surveillance techniques.32 Other explosive device to locate the bomb-making conventional aircraft that have been designed facility or trace the launch point of rocket or for explicit purposes (such as the B-1 and mortar attacks.30 B-52 bombers plus fast jet fighters) and are

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E-3D Sentry

Photo: Adrian Pingstone

not normally considered traditional ISTAR troops and materiel over a long distance in a platforms have demonstrated a “significant very short time period. Air mobility provides ability to gather intelligence.”33 the ability for a force to manoeuvre as defined in the Move subfunction of the RCAF’s Act UAVs have proven to be extremely function. Air mobility also provides the successful in the ISTAR role. The Canadian supporting function of Sustain. Forces identified the requirement for unmanned vehicles in this role and responded Air mobility provides the essential reach by procuring the Heron UAV at “record that armed forces need to operate in a foreign speed.”34 This demonstrates the importance country. COIN forces are often deployed to of an air force being able to adapt to meet remote locations, and air mobility is essential the changing needs of technology and the for infiltration, exfiltration and ongoing strategic environment. logistical support. In addition to this physical support, airlift provides important support Air mobility for morale. This has an extremely positive Air power provides an important function effect of reducing the COIN forces’ sense of in providing air mobility in small wars. isolation and provides them the confidence General Norton Schwartz argues that air that they will be “reinforced, supplied and mobility is “air power’s greatest contribution evacuated when needed.”36 in counter insurgency” and that it plays a pivotal role in the COIN effort.35 This is due One of the advantages of air mobility in to the ability to transport high volumes of COIN operations is that it can overcome the

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CH147 Chinook

CF Photo: Cpl Tina Gillies problems faced by ground transport. Intra- government and by providing humanitarian theatre lines of communication are often over and medical assistance. This role of nation difficult terrain and involve poor local ground building is immediately visible and improves transportation networks. Furthermore, ground the quality of life for the general population.40 transport convoys are highly attractive and vulnerable targets for insurgents.37 Air Air mobility is also a joint enabling force, mobility offers the essential tool to overcome allowing the option for smaller ground units these obstacles and provides the critical to conduct operations over a wider, more manoeuvre element. In Afghanistan, road dispersed area.41 This has proven to have a convoys are particularly vulnerable to Taliban successful force multiplier effect in numerous attack through the use of suicide bombers, COIN situations. In countering the irregular mines and improvised explosive devices, forces in Algeria, the French used air mobility prompting Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, to avoid larger concentrations of force and former commander of Task Force Orion, to opted for smaller dispersed units with lower state: “That has produced a risk that would be levels of command.42 This strategy of using reduced if we could take helicopter flights.”38 air mobility as a force multiplier has also been Following recommendations of the Manley used successfully by the British in Kenya, Report, the RCAF purchased an initial six Malaya and Oman.43 CH147D Chinooks from the United States and began a long process to improve its heavy-lift In conducting this range of operations, helicopter fleet.39 the air force can rely on its general airlift capabilities with only minor adjustments In addition to supporting COIN forces, to the method of employment, doctrine and air mobility can provide a high level of training.44 At the tactical level, conventional psychological influence on the civilian and unconventional warfare can be essentially population by supporting the incumbent the same, yet planners and operators need

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to amend their tactics to suit the specific processes.49 Procurement processes should threat environment. This may require random also be streamlined to ensure specialized scheduling as well as changes to routing and aircraft can be acquired to meet the flight profiles, as the intelligence regarding threat environment. The C-17 and Heron insurgents’ weaponry and areas of operation projects are prime examples of how this are updated. can be achieved.50

COIN intra-theatre air mobility would, Conclusion however, require a different balance of the Although small wars share certain type of aircraft used, in contrast to state- similar characteristics, no two will versus-state warfare. A smaller proportion of encounter the same strategic environment heavy airlift would be needed, with a greater or tactical scenarios. An air force should reliance on smaller, quick-response missions not, therefore, be structured to fight the and, therefore, suitably capable aircraft to last war. The first priority of a nation’s meet those objectives.45 defence force is to defend the homeland and its national interests, and Canada has a number of obligations that require the Adapting conventional air power for maintenance of conventional air forces. Air small wars power should, therefore, have a foundation of doctrine, structure and aircraft types While maintaining a foundation of based on conventional war fighting. Due to doctrine, structure, tactics and aircraft based the nature of warfare and the ever-changing on the concepts of conventional warfare, an global situation, this foundation would be air force needs to be able to adapt to meet geared to respond to new challenges and the specialized demands of the small-war adapt its capabilities accordingly. environment. Robert Owen remonstrates that an air force should be capable of adapting Air power provides an essential to different types of war instead of focusing asymmetric advantage in COIN operations, on one particular type of warfare.46 This particularly in the elements of air strike, follows from the principle that COIN air information operations and air mobility. operations, while having certain specific Conventional air strike capabilities have requirements, do not differ drastically from proven adaptable to the requirements of COIN conventional air operations. The British warfare with an understanding of the need Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal for accurate information and precision Sir Stephen Dalton, argues that the “Afghan targeting. Canada has adapted quickly to model may not fit future scenarios” and that adopt the use of UAVs in this role. air power should maintain the flexibility Conventional aircraft have also proven to act “against technically and militarily efficient in information operations with proficient adversaries” in future operations.47 modifications to technology and operating tactics. Air mobility has proven to be a pivotal To be able to adapt to a small-war function in small wars, yet the operations environment, an air force should maintain are essentially the same in conventional and a centre of expertise in COIN warfare unconventional warfare. Once again, adapting and ensure the ongoing development and to the operating environment is the key to education in small-war concepts.48 It is successful air power. It is, therefore, also essential to continue to develop joint fundamental that air forces should maintain doctrine on the use of air power and have a foundation based on conventional air power aviation specialists integrally involved in yet be adaptable to meet the challenges of the joint-planning and decision-making irregular warfare.

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Wing Commander David Glasson is an 6. Ibid. experienced Royal Australian Air Force transport pilot and qualified flying instructor. 7. Ibid., 35. He recently graduated from the Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff 8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Program and is currently serving in the (NATO), Joint Air Power Competence active reserve in capability development at Centre (JAPCC), “Air Power in Countering Headquarters Air Lift Group. Irregular Warfare” (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, June 2008), Abbreviations 18, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www. COIN counter-insurgency japcc.de/fileadmin/user_upload/projects/ DND Department of National Defence expeditionary_security/080609_Air_Power_ ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target in_Countering_Irregular_Warfare.pdf. acquisition and reconnaissance JAPCC Joint Air Power Competence 9. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Centre Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and NATO North Atlantic Treaty Space Power Journal (Summer 2007): Organization 11, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.isn. RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/ UAV unmanned aerial vehicle Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2- 8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=120059. Notes 1. Canada, Department of National 10. For both quotations, NATO, Defence (DND), B-GA-400-000/FP-000, JAPCC, 4. Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace 11. Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare: Warfare Centre, 2010), 17, accessed July 8, One Nature, Many Characters,” Strategic 2013, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/ Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 37. CDD/Doctrine_e.asp. 12. English, 18. 2. Australia, Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publication (AAP) 1000-D, 13. Steven Metz, “New Challenges and The Air Power Manual (Canberra, ACT: Air Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Power Development Centre, 2007), 53. Insurgency,” Parameters 37, no. 4 (Winter 2007–08): 31. 3. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/ FP-000, 37. 14. NATO, JAPCC, 1. 4. Allan English, Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual 15. Christian Anrig, “Allied Air Power Foundations (Trenton, ON: Canadian over Libya,” Air and Space Power Journal Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2008), (Winter 2011): 104. 24, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.rcaf- arc.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/pubs/ 16. Mark Tobin, “Operation IRAQI C2_Conceptual_Foundations_e.asp. FREEDOM Air Campaign: A Tactical Military Success, or a Strategic Information 5. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/ Failure?” Air Power Review 14, no. 3 FP-000, 38. (Autumn/Winter 2011): 109.

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17. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in accessed July 8, 2013, http://readperiodicals. Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” com/201112/2536740831.html. PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011): 128. 33. Swartz, 134. 18. Tobin, 102. 34. Captain Kyle Welsh, “Task Force 19. Richard Andres, “The Afghan Model Erebus: Providing Essential Support for in Northern Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan,” Canadian Studies 29, no. 3 (June 2006): 395–422. Air Force Journal 3, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 19, accessed July 8, 2013, http://airforceapp. 20. Peck, 12. forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/Vol3- 2010/Iss2-Spring_e.asp. 21. Ibid., 11. 35. Swartz, 128. 22. Swartz, 131. 36. Robert Owen and Karl P. Mueller, 23. Major Arthur Davis, “Back “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. to the Basics: An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgency Operations” (Santa Counterinsurgent Warfare” (Air Command and Monica: RAND, 2007), 42. Staff College research paper, United States Air Force, Air University, December 2005), 7. 37. Swartz, 128.

24. NATO, JAPCC, 19. 38. Defence Industry Daily, “On the Verge: Canada’s $4B+ Program for 25. Swartz, 130. Medium-Heavy Transport Helicopters,” Defence Industry Daily, accessed July 8, 26. B. Raman, “Counter-Insurgency: 2013, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ Use of Air Power Vs Use of Air Force,” on-the-verge-canadas-47b-program-for- South Asia Analyst Group Paper No. 3756, mediumheavy-transport-helicopters-02390/. (April 2010), 1, accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/ 39. John Manley and others, paper3756.html (site discontinued). “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan” (Ottawa: Public Works 27. Peck, 13. and Government Services, January 2008), 27, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.afghanistan. 28. Ibid. gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghan_ Report_web_e.pdf. 29. Swartz, 131. 40. Peck, 14. 30. Peck, 13. 41. NATO, JAPCC, 8. 31. Stuart Evans, “Combat-ISTAR: A New Philosophy on the Battle for Information 42. Davis, 16. in the Future Operating Environment,” Air Power Review 14, no. 3 (Autumn/Winter 43. Owen and Mueller, 33. 2011): 4. 44. Ibid., 33 and xv. 32. Roy Braybrook, “Looking Down from a Great Height,” Armada International, 45. Ibid, xii.

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46. Robert Owen, “Structuring Global No. 3, Air Media Centre, HQ Air Command, Air Forces for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 2010), 4. in No Clear Flight Plan: Counterinsurgency and Aerospace Power, Silver Dart Canadian 48. Alan Vick and others, “Air Power Aerospace Studies IV, ed. James Fergusson in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The and William March (Winnipeg: Centre for Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory Defence and Security Studies, University of and Assistance Missions” (Santa Monica: Manitoba, 2008), 234. RAND, 2006), 135.

47. David Stubbs, “Afghanistan Needs 49. Ibid, 137. Our Air Power Not Our ‘Boots on the Ground’” (RAFCAPS Discussion Paper 50. Welsh, 19.

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In Praise of Bomber Harris and Area Bombing

By David L. Bashow, OMM, CD, MA

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Editor’s note: This article was provided as part of a letter to the editor (Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol 2, No. 4) written in response to “Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris” by Major Lynne Chaloux (Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol 2, No. 2). Much of the material contained in this article was taken from the author’s book, None But the Brave, published in 2009.

Introduction strong continental army, loath to revisit the abattoir of massive armies stalemated in bloody confrontation that hile few of even his most ardent had characterized the Western Front critics would judge Sir Arthur during the First World War, and realizing Travers Harris, the longest-serving that a naval blockade of Germany was Wwartime commander of Royal Air Force impossible in this war (due to the (RAF) Bomber Command, as anything strength of the German navy), the bomber less than an outstanding war leader, offensive became the only viable means this does not mean that his leadership of striking back. It provided a massive was flawless or that it did not generate diversion to the Soviet allies at a time considerable controversy. However, those when none other was possible, and it flaws need to be placed in perspective constituted the very embodiment of and measured against the wartime gains an overall guerrilla warfare strategy, to Allied victory that were generated by attacking the enemy on its peripheries, the strategic courses of action he followed in this case its industrial centres. with such dogged determination. To that end, this article will attempt to address From 1942 onwards, the Combined the majority of the controversial elements Bomber Offensive (CBO) was a highly associated with his leadership, with effective, prolonged, cooperative overall emphasis upon the success/failure effort between the American United of the strategic area bombing campaign. States Strategic and Tactical Air Force (USSTAF) and the “British” or Bomber And now, to war Command camps. While both camps at times placed the emphasis of efforts upon different components of the enemy’s For much of the war, the bomber war-making capabilities, there was a offensive constituted for Britain and tremendous amount of overall synergism the Dominions the only viable form of and mutual support. For example, the offensive action against a thoroughly combined efforts of Bomber Command evil, repressive regime. Lacking a and the USSTAF ultimately destroyed

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virtually all of Germany’s coke (which London and demoralize its citizens by is coal after the removal of associated bombardment but also paralyse Britain’s gases), ferroalloy and synthetic rubber broader industrial and commercial industries; 95 per cent of its fuel, hard capabilities. In sum, therefore: coal and rubber capacity; and 90 per cent of its steel-making capacity.1 Conversely, Inch by painful inch, both British Bomber Command attacked many and German policies were slipping precision manufacturing targets during from ones aimed at precise the course of the war. objectives to ones of area bombing with psychological overtones. On Very early on, Bomber Command 2 September, for example, Portal determined that daylight attacks were [Sir Charles Portal, Air Officer cost prohibitive in terms of aircrew Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) and aircraft losses, accepting the fact Bomber Command] observed that that the protective mantle of darkness although he was not yet involved in would also, until improvements could be attempts to burn down whole towns, made, adversely affect navigation and “that stage would come.” The next bombing accuracy. Then followed a long day Churchill asked that Bomber period of changing attack priorities and Command “pulverise the entire lacklustre, indecisive bombing results. industry and scientific structure” And, in terms of policy inputs from of the German war economy; and, senior leadership, as early as 8 July 1940, three days later, he called for a series Churchill had written: of “minor” but “widespread” attacks on smaller German towns intended When I look round to see how we to destroy the population’s faith in can win the war I see that there their air defences.3 is only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat While enemy oil assets continued to be the German military power. The a high priority target when the weather blockade is broken and Hitler has cooperated, on 9 July 1941, yet another Asia and probably Africa to draw policy directive postulated that “the from. Should he be repulsed here weakest points in [the enemy’s] armour or not try invasion, he will recoil lie in the morale of the civilian population eastward, and we have nothing to stop and in his inland transportation system.”4 him. But there is one thing that will This directive would pave the way bring him back and bring him down, for even broader policy changes, and and that is an absolutely devastating, henceforth, Germany would be bombed exterminating attack by very heavy more frequently, with greater intensity bombers from this country upon the and with less target discrimination. Nazi homeland.2 Throughout the first half of 1941, it In counterpoint, on 9 October 1940, was becoming increasingly obvious that after repeated attacks upon the British the night campaign was not meeting cities, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, damage expectations. Delivery accuracy Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was still woefully inadequate. A 1941 made public a plan to not only obliterate analysis commissioned by Churchill’s

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scientific advisor, Frederick Lindemann daylight raids—was considered just (later Lord Cherwell), and known as the too dangerous. Butt Report ultimately stressed the need to examine bombing techniques and to In sum, the Butt Report deemed the improve navigational procedures, as bombing—with respect to accuracy the only realistic alternative—massive and results obtained for the costs

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incurred—pathetic. In the near future, told his deputy to tell Bomber Command in acknowledgement of existing and Headquarters that ‘the aiming points are anticipated capabilities, less target to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, discrimination would be demanded and the dockyards or aircraft factories where more aids to navigation and targeting these are mentioned.’”7 This last point would be developed. Lord Cherwell, deserves emphasis, for it acknowledges a firm believer in the efficacy of area the command’s non-precision capabilities bombing and in full agreement with at this particular point of the war as the Butt Report, presented a seminal well as the generalized propensity paper to Cabinet that advocated area in the Western world for building up bombing as the keystone of a concentrated suburbs around industrial complexes. strategic bombing campaign against the It is also important to understand that Axis forces. The plan proposed attacking aiming for the hub of an industrial city Germany’s industrial centres in order to was likely to inflict damage upon key destroy as much working-class housing as transportation and communications nodes, possible in order to displace the German such as telephone and telegraph command work force and to disrupt/reduce their services, railway stations and marshalling ability to work.5 yards, since they tended to be centralized within urban developments. The next pivotal bombing policy direction came on 14 February 1942, with And while it is probably fair to say the release of Policy Directive #22. Issued that urban centres of the industrial cities by Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, were the default aim point of Bomber former AOC-in-C Bomber Command Command throughout much of the war, and now Chief of the Air Staff, and as it must be emphasized that the industrial a direct result of the Butt Report and city bombing constituted only a portion Cherwell’s approved Cabinet presentation, of the command’s efforts. To be precise, Portal mandated that, henceforth, the of Bomber Command’s wartime total of primary objective of Bomber Command nearly 1,000,000 tons [907,000 tonnes] was to be “the morale of the enemy of ordnance expended—or half the civil population and in particular, of Anglo–American aggregate dropped upon the industrial workers.”6 These attacks the Third Reich and its proxies—only were to be manifested as large raids 431,000 tons [391,000 tonnes] (43 per cent) upon selected area targets in the major were dropped upon the industrial cities. industrial areas of Germany, and while Quite simply, Bomber Command was industrial, military and infrastructure not a force dedicated to the assault of aim points were always to be identified Germany’s economic system.8 and specified, collateral damage in terms of “dehousing” the civilian population A new helmsman was considered an acceptable, indeed a desirable, adjunct to the bombing. The Ruhr area, especially Essen, as well On 24 February 1942, Arthur Harris as Berlin, were considered of primary became the AOC-in-C of Bomber interest. Further, “to make sure there Command. Throughout the war, Harris was no misunderstanding about what would remain hostile to the concept of was being called for, the next day Portal “panacea” targets, specific elements

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of the enemy’s military, industrial While Singleton’s report played down the and infrastructure capabilities and view that area bombing could win the war capacities that, if totally eliminated, by itself, he believed it would impede the would destroy its ability to wage war. German war effort and would also provide And although the accuracy of Bomber much-needed relief to the Soviet Union. Command increased remarkably over the He asserted that Germany’s war efforts course of the war, Harris believed that could be limited and hampered by attacks an enemy economy and social structure upon factories engaged in war work as could not be dislocated, thus forcing a well as by damage to communications political decision to capitulate, by an grids and public utility services. Reports attack on any single element. Electronic of the period coming in from citizens of aids, sophisticated marking techniques, neutral countries visiting the Third Reich stabilized automatic bomb sights, vastly tended to bolster this view. Singleton improved weaponry as well as highly believed that significant gains could be refined and sophisticated attack tactics realized by tying-down enemy resources would significantly improve delivery required to defend against the bombing accuracies over the course of the war for threat and repair bomb damage, and he Bomber Command’s main force, although offered that enemy morale was also likely many of these refinements would not to be adversely affected by the bombing. fully blossom until the closing months He also saw a need for more sophisticated of the European war. However, with the target identification devices that were exception of several highly specialized, unaffected by atmospheric conditions, and precision-attack units (such as 617 he recommended the establishment of a and 9 Squadrons flying Lancasters specialized target identification force.10 and 106 Squadron of the Light Night Striking Force flying Mosquitos), the Harris and his planners took great heart bulk of Bomber Command remained “a from these findings, and accordingly, in blunt instrument,” generally incapable August, a specialized target identification of attacking targets with the uncanny and marking unit was officially precision, accuracy and reliability of established as the Pathfinder Force, today’s forces and munitions. This in #8 Group. Through trial and error as well mind, Harris pursued a broader strategy as the development and implementation that he believed would use that instrument of innovative techniques and equipment to best effect, and his dogged obstinacy for target detection and marking, the to reject all specific, exclusive types Pathfinders would significantly enhance of targets (notably ball bearings but the accuracy of the main-force bombing, particularly oil) would become the main particularly during the closing hours of objection to his wartime leadership of the European war. the command.9 However, in fairness to Harris, he had sound reasons for applying On an encouraging note for Bomber his broader strategy. Command during 1942, there was a growing body of evidence that, in spite The next pivotal policy determinant of the direct damage to German industry was “The Report on the Bombing of caused by the bombing raids, “the most Germany,” written by an independent serious problem confronting the German assessor, Mr. Justice John Singleton. authorities [was] that of re-housing the

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bombed-out population and providing demonstrations, unless the mass them with clothing and other necessities raids are successfully dealt with. of life.”11 Again, various source inputs But if the SS [Schutzstafel] has to appeared to be providing compelling be used against the civil population, proof of the validity of area bombing. a deplorable situation will arise. Citing a well-placed, clandestine source According to these officers the great of the period, in close touch with the danger is not an invasion, but the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM or systematic destruction of German German Air Ministry): towns by the RAF.12

At the moment the fear of the RAF The importance of bringing forward giant raids is far greater than any excerpts from these source documents anxiety about an invasion … . These is to make the point that the bombing big raids cause mass destruction. offensive was evolving and developing, In spite of the statements in the based upon capabilities, analysis and Wehrmacht reports, the destruction direct feedback from reliable intelligence of war production facilities is fairly sources. Bombing policies were not being considerable. The loss caused by developed in a void. the destruction of food stores and depots is extraordinarily great, as At this point in time, a few words with the food cannot be replaced. The respect to Harris’s relationship with his effect on the civil population of such wartime charges as well as his method raids is not to be underestimated. of command are perhaps appropriate. For instance, in Köln (Cologne), Although Harris was not able to visit his there were between 3000 and 4000 aircrew and ground crew as frequently as dead [officially only just over 100 he would have wished, he still managed were reported], which of course the to win and hold their respect, loyalty and population of Köln knew very well. trust, even when they were faced with the They spread the information, and most daunting odds, and he cared deeply this undermines confidence in the about his people. Harris’s biographer, Air reports of the Wehrmacht. In Köln Commodore Henry Probert, elaborates: there were at least 200,000 persons rendered homeless, who for the Harris’s firmness could easily be most part have been evacuated, as seen by others as stubbornness and in the city itself no new buildings or obstinacy; his single-mindedness temporary premises could be erected could come across as an inability quickly enough. The problem of the to see others’ points of view or to homeless people is the most difficult. appreciate the wider political and There is a shortage of houses and military constraints; his all too accommodation everywhere, in the frequent exaggerations, usually country as well as the towns. As intended as a means to emphasise a result, wooden hutments have to his views, were often considered as be erected everywhere … . In the lapses of judgment. There is truth in RLM there are officers of high rank such criticisms, and despite his good and influence who seriously fear work in his two Air Ministry tours of that the winter will see unrest and duty he was never cut out for top level

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staffwork, as he himself knew. He especially away from the immediate was essentially the sort of commander business, found him kind, generous, who emerges in a crisis, one for which humorous, compassionate, amply his knowledge and experience happen possessed of the human touch. He to have particularly prepared him. … did care for people, and never more than the men who served under Yet all too often Harris continues to him—including, most importantly, be portrayed as the hard, insensitive those who came from the nations of man, totally concentrated on using the Commonwealth and elsewhere. his bombers to beat the enemy Towards the enemy, while he by destroying his homeland, and hated the slaughter involved, his unconcerned about the implications feelings were dominated by the for the human beings involved. This conviction that the war must be is far from the truth. Certainly he won as quickly as possible, in their could be remote and difficult at interests as much as in those of his times but the many who knew him, own compatriots.13

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Friends join the fight its peripheries but postponing a cross- Channel invasion for the time being. Meanwhile, the combined forces of Commencing in July 1942, Britain Britain, the Dominions and the United and the Dominions would no longer States would mount a mighty CBO find themselves alone in their bombing against targets in the greater German campaign against the Reich. With Reich, the European Axis powers and characteristic American vigour and Occupied Europe. Sir Charles Portal, enthusiasm, the “Mighty Eighth” Air in particular, as Chief of the Air Staff, Force of the United States Army Air firmly believed that the CBO would Forces (USAAF) had begun a rapid render 25 million Germans homeless build-up in southern and central Britain. and, more importantly, would bring Between the Eighth Air Force and the war production to a complete standstill. many stations occupied by Bomber This campaign would entail “the Command, the little island nation was progressive destruction and dislocation soon transformed into a vast, stationary of the German military, industrial and aircraft carrier. Ultimately, the American economic system, and the undermining contribution would be huge, and from of the morale of the German people to January 1944 onwards, the Eighth Air a point where their capacity for armed Force would be joined by heavy bombers resistance is fatally weakened.”14 Within of the Fifteenth Air Force, operating that general concept, the primary from bases in North Africa and Italy. objectives at that time, subject to By early August 1942, advance crews of the demands of weather and tactical the Eighth had been pronounced combat feasibility and in order of priority, were ready, but based upon their own early war to be German submarine construction experience, the British remained highly yards, the German aircraft industry, sceptical of the American daylight-only, transportation targets, oil plants and massed-formation tactics. other targets within the enemy war industries. Every opportunity was to Nonetheless, in spite of British be taken to attack Germany by day, concerns, the Americans were bound destroy objectives that were not suitable and determined to implement a daylight for night attack (in other words, the bombing strategy. At the Casablanca American mandate), sustain continuous Conference of January 1943, a working, pressure upon German morale, impose synergistic bond was formed that would heavy losses upon the German day provide the blueprint for the cooperative fighter force, and contain German effort that would characterize the fighter strength and keep it away from bomber war over Europe until the end the Soviet and Mediterranean theatres of hostilities. After Churchill and of war. Roosevelt had reaffirmed their overall “Germany First” plan to defeat the “Bombing around the clock” became Third Reich and its cronies prior to an enormous Anglo–American strategic “finishing the job” in the Pacific, a cooperative effort which lasted for the strategic compromise was struck to following 16 months until the spring of carry the land war next to Sicily and 1944, when Bomber Command would Italy, continuing to attack the enemy on be seconded temporarily to Supreme

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Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Anglo–American differ- (SHAEF) under General Eisenhower, ences of opinion over the flying in support of the planned D-Day importance of enemy oil landings in France.

Within the overall broad strategy that A significant point of divergence had been agreed upon at Casablanca, the between Bomber Command and the two Anglo–American bombing armadas Americans was the importance initially would place their operational emphasis allocated to oil as a priority target. upon different mandated priorities with Furthermore, this divergence eventually respect to the enemy’s resources at would lead to a confrontation between different periods of the campaign, although Sir Charles Portal, as Chief of the Air there was also a great amount of synergism Staff, and Sir Arthur Harris in his role as and overlap conducted throughout. Bomber Command’s helmsman. By late- Nonetheless, until Bomber Command September 1944, once the land campaign was seconded to SHAEF in April 1944, had stagnated in northwest Europe and the it tended to favour attacks upon the strategic bomber forces had been returned broader Axis industrial base, particularly to the fold of their respective air staffs, the primary industries and associated Harris sensed that an unrestricted return infrastructure that supplied and fuelled to his general area-bombing campaign the precision manufacturing element, of the German industrial heartland such as production of coal, steel and pig was in the wind, but this was not the iron as well as transportation nodes, priority intention. At that time and for power sources and mines. By contrast, the immediate future, although earlier the Americans preferred direct attacks counter-air action no longer had any upon the aircraft-manufacturing and ball- particular priority, relative air superiority bearing industries and enemy oil resources. having now been attained, the generalized However, readers must bear in mind city offensive was only to be undertaken that Bomber Command had previously when conditions were unfavourable to identified enemy oil as a significant target executing the new priorities. These new much earlier in the war but had temporarily priorities certainly suited General Spaatz, abandoned pursuit of this target due to the since oil, which had been a priority target pinpoint accuracy required to successfully for the Americans since the summer attack the refineries and the concomitant of 1943, had been placed squarely in inconsistency this presented with the night the highest position by the British Air area-bombing strategy. Thus commenced Staff, which, by the autumn of 1944, in earnest the great, cooperative aerial had warmed to the American point of onslaught against Hitler’s Festung Europa view, and it was once again Harris who (Fortress Europe). It would result in over appeared to be out of synchronization. To 2,000,000 tons [1,814,000 tonnes] of Harris, oil remained the hated panacea ordnance being dropped upon European he had perceived it to be from the Axis targets. However, it would also outset, albeit for good reasons, given demand a very high toll in aircrew blood, the Soviet capture of Ploesti and the other including over 81,000 total wartime Rumanian oil fields in August 1944, the aircrew fatalities from RAF Bomber concomitant denial of Rumanian oil to Command and the USAAF. the Axis powers, and the fact that Bomber

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Command had already expended, as we aforementioned differences of opinion, have seen, considerable time and effort the counter-oil campaign was a highly with respect to enemy oil. Furthermore, successful cooperative effort. the relative accuracy required to hit these targets was hampered in both the The war against enemy American and the Commonwealth camps transportation by the vagaries of northern European weather during the period. That said, by late autumn 1944 and throughout 1945, An earlier joint effort known as the Bomber Command was actually outdoing Transportation Plan also proved to be a the Americans in sorties against enemy very effective precursor to the Normandy oil assets. However, according to Probert: landings. Designed to disrupt rail communications by attacking some 74 He [Harris] was still deeply key rail centres in France and Belgium suspicious of the prognostications as an obvious Operation OVERLORD of the Ministry of Economic Warfare; priority, on 15 April 1944, Bomber synthetic oil production was spread Command was allocated 37 of the rail over many plants, often small, in targets; the other half were assigned to different parts of Germany, and the Americans. By the eve of D-Day, some up-to-date intelligence about them 60 separate attacks had put at least two- was hard to obtain; the Germans thirds of the assigned Bomber Command under Speer were adept at dispersal targets out of action for a minimum of and repair; and effective attack a month, a much better record than that required a degree of accuracy which accomplished by the Americans against he was far from convinced his aircraft their assigned targets.16 And continued, could achieve, especially against unrelenting pressure by the strategic more distant targets.15 bombing forces upon Axis road, rail and waterways from this point onwards As Harris himself later recognized, oil until the end of hostilities would yield did prove more critical than he had judged very tangible results against an enemy at the time. Influenced by the views of transportation network that was already Albert Speer, Hitler’s Armament Minister, stretched to the limit, due to the dynamic Harris wrote in 1947 that in the final and changing operational requirements weeks of the war all the German armed and the tremendous additional burden of forces had been immobilized for lack forced industrial decentralization, which of fuel, rendering the triumph of the oil had been brought about by the bombings. offensive complete and indisputable. It was the one panacea that actually paid off. With respect to the overall trans- portation campaign, Bomber Command’s Nonetheless, there is no doubting the deliberate area bombing of industrial city ultimate success of the Oil Plan, and it centres from early in the war generated remains an unanswerable question as to a high, prolonged and sustained degree just how much, if at all, the European war of damage to core road and rail assets, could have been shortened had Harris a much more concentrated degree embraced the plan with more enthusiasm of damage than that waged by the at the outset. That said, in spite of the sporadic attacks of the Americans until

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they specifically targeted enemy city could scarcely manage 12 per cent of centres later in the war. Downstream throughput of critical resources to the from the pre-OVERLORD attacks, industrialized Ruhr, and this included Bomber Command devoted extensive the near-total curtailment of coal.17 Also resources against enemy transportation due to strategic bombing, the virtual networks and facilities. Perhaps none collapse of the transportation networks by were more effective than the attacks 1945 meant that Germany’s still-enormous upon the German waterway systems, field armies could no longer be reliably particularly those on the Rhine River supplied or armed. and the Dortmund Ems Canal. During the last four months of the war, Bomber Pounding the Reich Command devoted 15.4 per cent of its total efforts against enemy transportation assets. And between October 1944 and It was during the last calendar year of March 1945, the attacks on both rail the war that Bomber Command reached and water transportation networks its most productive and destructive apex. were so effective that the Germans Back on 3 November 1942, as a precursor

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to the Casablanca Conference, Portal, blind-bombing radar devices. Without with a major input from Harris, had these aids important targets would presented the British Chiefs of Staff with have enjoyed weeks or months of a blueprint for a joint Anglo–American respite and on several occasions major bombing offensive, which based their task forces failed even with radar bombing strategy on the assumption that to reach their objectives because a combined bomber fleet of 4,000–6,000 of adverse weather … . In mid- aircraft would be continuously available.18 November 1944, operations analysts And 1944–1945 was decisive for the of the Eighth estimated that nearly strategic bombing campaign, with over half the blind missions were near two-thirds of the total wartime bomb failures, or worse.20 tonnage being dropped on the greater German Reich from July 1944 onwards. Richard Overy takes this point Also, along with vastly declining German even farther: “The US air forces soon defensive capabilities, due in no small abandoned any pretence that they could measure to the overrunning of German bomb with precision, and two-thirds of early warning sites in the land battle their bombs were dropped blind through for the Continent, Bomber Command’s cloud and smog. A staggering 87 percent monthly average number of sorties of all bombs missed their target.”21 increased from 5,400 in 1943 to 14,000 in 1944, and their average payload-per- In their defence, weather conditions sortie nearly doubled.19 And from the over the European continent were forcing summer of 1944 onwards, once relative the blind-bombing option upon both air superiority had been attained over camps. It is ironic, however, that while Northwest Europe, Bomber Command the USAAF had commenced in earnest to would complement its night attacks with make area attacks from late-1944 onwards, more frequent daylight operations. Bomber Command, on a selective basis, was now making precision attacks, both At this point, the frequently night and day, upon specific military misunderstood concepts of American and industrial targets. Technological precision, daylight bombing and British advances abounded. Gee-H22 represented night area bombing need to be addressed a quantum leap in the development of and placed within a proper context. navigation systems, since it combined levels of accuracy comparable to Oboe23 In point of fact, from late-1943/ with the universal applicability of Gee. early-1944 onwards, both the British It had been introduced to service by and the Americans were area bombing 3 Group in 1943, and it was eventually or “blind bombing,” as it was referred used by other formations. Around the to in USAAF circles. From the official same time, the K-band H2S Mark VI radar USAAF history: was also fielded, and this alleviated some system limitations over poorly defined or Approximately 80 percent of all obscured targets. Furthermore: Eighth Air Force and 70 percent of all Fifteenth Air Force missions Bomber Command coupled these during the last quarter of 1944 were new devices with revised tactics. characterized by some employment of Navigation was now so accurate that

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decoy fires and spoof raids could be the rest of the bombing campaign. By used within a few miles of the actual early 1945, in a further broad distillation route. The navigators and bomb- of precision bombardment and a tacit aimers were now sufficiently skilled acknowledgement that area attacks had to use an offset bombing point chosen become accepted American strategy, for its visibility, and to aim their a new crew member known as the bombs at a given range and bearing “togglier” frequently replaced the much from that point.24 more extensively trained (and usually commissioned) bombardier in American The final round bomber crews. Dresden By 1945, target-marking techniques in Bomber Command had reached new levels of maturity and sophistication, Operations by both Bomber Command including the increasing use of offset and the USAAF on 13/14 February tactics. The offset procedure reduced the 1945 against Dresden resulted in predictability and, thus, the vulnerability massive destruction and loss of life. of the attacking bombers. Also, multiple Conditions combined to produce a true streams consisting of simultaneous large- firestorm, one of just three that occurred scale efforts on different targets were in the European theatre, the others being at common by 1945, further confusing Hamburg in July 1943 and then at Kassel the defences and further reducing in October 1943. predictability. By this stage of the war, given the predominating weather over Dresden. … The city, and its very the Continent, Bomber Command had name, has become a poster child for the acquired so much expertise in blind opponents of the area-bombing campaign, bombing and the innovative use of but there is a lot of mythology that has radar and other electronic aids that its been generated over these late-war most experienced crews were generally raids. While it is true that the bombing as comfortable bombing in obscured destroyed much property and thousands conditions at night, with comparable of German lives, the number of fatalities results, as they were when bombing “in was greatly exaggerated from the outset the clear” by daylight. For their part, the (by a factor of up to 1,000 per cent)27 in an Americans had accepted that weather, extremely effective propaganda campaign navigation and target finding were waged by the German Propaganda significant problems affecting operations. Ministry through the neutral countries and the United States and then later by By early 1944, the Eighth Air Force had the USSR during the cold war. come to rely extensively upon “blind” attacking targets by Oboe and by H2X.25 And contrary to popular belief, In fact, “on only one occasion in six weeks Dresden in 1945 was far more than just [during January and early February 1944] a beautiful baroque centre of cultural were the skies clear enough for visual significance. It was also an armed camp bombing.”26 And that reliance upon and was home, most importantly, to a electronic aids would only increase during vital communications and transportation

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hub as well as a control node for the historians would later consider “perhaps resupply and sustainment of Eastern Front the least felicitous,” well-expressed or operations. In addition, it hosted scores appropriate of all the prime minister’s of embedded factories that produced wartime correspondence.29 The minute goods vital to the German war effort, appeared to endorse all the latest public including the massive Zeiss-Ikon complex. criticism of Allied bombing policy, and Furthermore, it had been a long time it also seemed to shift the blame from since Zeiss-Ikon had produced anything the prime minister’s shoulders to those as innocent as a holiday snapshot camera. of the air commanders responsible for Dresden, in short, was a highly legitimate implementing the policy. The implication military target.28 was that Churchill had been misled and that his air leaders were conducting terror A certain duplicity bombing on their own initiative, without his knowledge, but both conditions were patently false.30 Portal immediately However, by the spring of 1945, the solicited Harris’s comments, who eddies of public disquiet generated by vehemently objected to the minute, the Dresden bombings were swirling. deeming it a serious slight against his By late March, perhaps with an eye cast aircrews who had endured so steadfastly towards his legacy, Churchill penned a throughout the campaign. Churchill also minute to his senior uniformed chiefs appears to have exercised a conveniently which Bomber Command’s eventual selective memory when he penned the

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offending minute, choosing to ignore political future, took effect rapidly. The the various telephone conversations, Air Staff recommendations that fell out memos and directives to the Secretary of the prime minister’s wishes were of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, subsequently approved up the chain of in January which had urged bombing command, and Sir Arthur Harris was so attacks upon the eastern cities. “Churchill informed on 6 April. However, Portal was well aware that the RAF was going very clearly articulated the purpose to attack Dresden …; the decision to do of, the justification of and the caveats so had originated in Cabinet and had his under which area bombing could, if full support.”31 Also, his enthusiasm for necessary, still be conducted. Portal using bombing as a punishment had led has been cited frequently, like Churchill, to excesses in rhetoric on occasion, and as having an eye to the historical record they frequently required others, including and distancing himself from Harris and Harris, to set Churchill’s moral compass Bomber Command’s campaign against the straight. The repeated considerations of industrialized cities. However, in spite of reprisal raids in response to the German the aforementioned disagreements with razing of Lidice, Czechoslovakia, Harris, Portal staunchly defended him to in 1942 and the Crossbow campaign those in higher authority, and he made against the V-weapons in 1944 constitute it very clear that area bombing still had ample proof of this trend in the prime its place. He remained convinced that it minister’s behaviour.32 Ultimately, was useful under certain circumstances, Portal enthusiastically endorsed Harris’s even at that late stage of the war. He also views with respect to the Dresden raids, made it clear that Bomber Command’s in particular, and with respect to area precision attack-capability was relatively bombing, in general. Sir Archibald newfound and that, even with all the Sinclair then asked Churchill to withdraw technological and tactical advances, it the offending minute, and on 1 April 1945, had its limitations, as precision-bombing Churchill substituted a replacement note. capabilities were still not widely practiced The revised minute contained no further by the bulk of the main force.34 reference to either terror attacks or to the raid on Dresden. Nonetheless, the damage Shortly thereafter, hostilities in Europe had been done, and in spite of Chairman would conclude, but a vast amount of of the Chiefs of Staff Lord Ismay’s unfinished business still remained in assurances to the contrary, the first minute the Pacific theatre. Strategic bombing also remained on file, and the effects of had truly come of age in the European public scrutiny and analysis of it in future theatre of operations, and many of the would be far-reaching.33 bloody lessons learned there would soon be applied to telling effect against the With a view to the future Empire of the Sun. Area bombing and the As spring 1945 continued to unfold, the Japanese war prime minister’s newfound determination to put an end to the bombing of the German cities, undoubtedly fuelled by Not the least of the wartime contri- concerns for both his legacy and his butions of the Allied bombing campaign

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in Europe was its influence upon the to commit the nation to mass suicide war against the Japanese empire. In the if necessary, calling “for the sacrifice Pacific theatre, B-29 Superfortresses of up to 100,000,000 Japanese lives, if started pounding the Japanese home necessary, to repel the Allied invasion of islands from bases in the Marianas the home islands.”37 The area bombing of in late-1944. However, their attempt Japan had certainly dealt a debilitating at precision bombing from high blow to the Japanese war industries, and level using high-explosive weaponry the remaining factories were on the verge proved relatively ineffective. Early in of collapsing for wont of component March 1945, they borrowed a page from parts and damage to infrastructure. the area-bombing methods honed in However, there was also no shortage Europe; abandoned attempts at precision of suicidally inspired pilots available bombardment; and switched their bomb and willing to substitute courage for runs to delivery from medium level technological inadequacy and to dive their against area targets, commencing with aircraft into a massed Allied invasion incendiary laydowns. The high-water force. Furthermore, “orders went out that mark of these raids was that conducted every Japanese man between the ages of against Tokyo on 9/10 March 1945, 15 and 60 and all women aged 17 to 40 which left nearly 125,000 killed and would meet the invaders at beaches with over a million homeless. Overall, by sharpened bamboo poles. Allied peace war’s end, most major Japanese cities feelers were rejected.”38 had been laid to waste, and 42 per cent of the nation’s industrial capacity had At home, all the Allied nations were been destroyed.35 Intensely demoralizing, becoming increasingly war weary in light these raids brought Japan to the brink of of the extensive casualties endured during surrender. And yet, based upon the fierce the last calendar year of the European determination to resist an Allied invasion and Asian wars and the economies of the home islands, the Allied Executive that had been excessively “tapped” was gravely concerned about the blood by war expenses. Labour unrest was costs to both sides should an invasion of intensifying, particularly in Britain. the home islands prove necessary. Therefore, the perceived cost of invading the home islands, both in America and By the summer of 1945, extensive in Britain, posed serious challenges to planning was taking place for Operation public will and support. Although it DOWNFALL, just such an invasion, and was a painful decision for the Allies, on a scale dwarfing that accomplished the two atomic drops on Hiroshima and on D-Day. It was scheduled for Nagasaki—the epitome of strategic area commencement on 1 November 1945, bombardment—with the concomitant initially through the southernmost loss of an additional 150,000 Japanese island of Kyushu. Recent and compelling citizens—and many more to follow from research makes the point that the true radiation poisoning—when combined estimates Allied planning forces were with a rapidly worsening war situation, working with at the time with respect to the entry of the USSR into the Pacific their anticipated losses were 1.7–4 million war, and the continued decimation of casualties.36 Indeed, the Japanese the industrial cities, all helped convince Supreme War Council was determined the Japanese that further resistance

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was pointless. Defending against massed the gruelling campaign in northwest fleets of formidable, heavily protected Europe, and that industry could have been B-29 Superfortresses was difficult used to produce more weapons for these enough, but the atomic drops helped fighting services. However, proponents of convince the Japanese that they were this line assume that the weight of effort relatively powerless to defend the entire expended upon the bombing campaign nation from the high and fast flying, was inordinately high. Overy maintains singly penetrating B-29s that could be that it was actually rather modest. using atomic weapons on any part of “Measured against the totals for the entire the nation, the ultimate shell game, to war effort (production and fighting), draw an analogy. bombing absorbed 7 per cent, rising to 12 per cent in 1944–45. Since at least a Finally, on 10 August 1945, the proportion of bomber production went Japanese stated that Imperial Japan to other theatres of war, the aggregate would accept the surrender terms figures for the direct bombing of Germany previously announced at the Potsdam were certainly smaller than this. Seven Conference, provided the Allied powers per cent of Britain’s war effort can explicitly allowed Emperor Hirohito hardly be regarded as an unreasonable to remain as the country’s sovereign allocation of resources.”40 Further, some ruler. The underscoring of the futility Bomber Command squadrons were in fact of further resistance plus the guaranteed seconded to Coastal Command for limited preservation of the Japanese monarchy patrol duties, but Bomber Command’s spared the Japanese people from the operational fleet was not particularly obligation of being killed to the last suited to long-range maritime patrol. available man and woman.39 Therefore, As it was, these secondments diluted the strategic area bombing, honed in the resources of the command when it was European war, undoubtedly played its still not at its fully effective strength. part in preventing many casualties, Aerial relief in the North Atlantic, in the both Allied and Japanese, by helping to form of closing the so-called “black hole” eliminate the need for an armed invasion of patrol coverage, would eventually be of the Japanese mainland, the costs of provided through the acquisition of very- which, measured by any yardstick, would long-range Consolidated B-24 Liberator have been horrific. patrol aircraft, a type not included in Bomber Command’s inventory in Europe. The balance sheet Much of the criticism of the bombing campaign has focused upon the human Critics of the bomber offensive suggest cost, the unquestionably heavy loss rates that the materiel and human cost of endured by Anglo–American aircrews, the campaign far overshadowed the 81,000 of whom forfeited their lives gains and that the resources dedicated aboard 18,000 downed aircraft from the to it could have been more effectively Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command utilized elsewhere. They have argued alone. On the Axis side, approximately that the combat manpower could have 593,000 non-combatant fatalities are been better used in the other fighting attributable to the bombings. However, services, especially by the army during these losses need to be placed in

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perspective, especially when compared industrialized cities were frequently to 20–27 million war dead suffered by tactical rather than strategic, conducted the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the human in support of the advancing Allied land cost of the campaign was formidable. armies. For much of the first four years of the war, support for naval operations— During the war, Bomber Command’s particularly the mining of enemy littoral 125,000 airmen flew 364,514 sorties waters and the Western Baltic Sea, over Europe, and the majority of the attacks against the U-Boat production command’s tonnage was dropped from and operational facilities as well as the the summer of 1944 until the cessation destruction of six German capital ships of hostilities. Approximately 74 per cent (the entire Royal Navy only destroyed of the total tonnage was delivered after four)—comprised a significant portion of 1 January 1944, and 70 per cent of the Bomber Command’s overall effort,42 while total after 1 July 1944, from which time for much of 1944, it was extensively used forward the Bomber Command loss rates in support of the invasion of northwest were greatly reduced. “If the bombing of Europe. Additionally, Bomber Command Germany had little effect on production aircraft were utilized for reconnaissance, prior to July 1944, it is not only because propaganda missions, electronic warfare she had idle resources upon which to and deception operations, support to draw, but because the major weight of Occupied Europe’s resistance movements the air offensive against her had not been as well as humanitarian aid and mercy brought to bear. After the air war against missions towards the end of hostilities. Germany was launched on its full scale, Bomber Command was a true jack of all the effect was immediate.”41 trades, and it required the full resolution of its commander, Sir Arthur Harris, not The contributions to to become excessively and repeatedly victory of the Bomber diverted from its primary mandate, due offensive to all the competing demands upon its limited resources.

The gains not only were those directly That said, and with the benefit of “20/20 attributable to the bombing, such as the hindsight,” while Arthur Harris was actual destruction of targets, but also undoubtedly correct in his assessment constituted a host of indirect benefits of the need for a broad application of area brought on as adjuncts to the bombing. bombing during most of the campaign, his While part of the bombing effort was dogged rejection of the so-called panacea to be directed at Germany’s home-front targets later in the war appears to have military and economic structures, very been somewhat myopic. Albert Speer and large portions of the overall effort were others dreaded timely follow-on efforts directed at many other targets for which to the highly successful 1943 attacks Bomber Command’s aircraft were needed. on the Ruhr dams, Hamburg and the As Overy has mentioned, not even half the ball-bearing industry, and they believed Command’s total wartime dropped bomb that such a concentration of effort at the tonnage was dedicated to the industrial time would have been cataclysmic for cities. Also, during the latter stages the Reich.43 Similarly, an earlier and of the campaign, even attacks against more dedicated application of effort

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against the enemy’s oil resources, which of Air Chief Marshal Harris. From pitted the Commander-in-Chief Bomber the earliest days of the war there Command against the Chief of the Air was a continual diversion of bomber Staff, might have brought the European strength, with aircraft and crews sent war to a somewhat earlier conclusion. to North Africa and Italy, to Coastal But such is the fog of war, and Arthur Command and to the Far East. This Harris sincerely believed he was following steady drain prevented Harris from the correct course and was utilizing his ever achieving the size of force he command to inflict the most damage needed to carry out the instructions under the circumstances presented to him. he was given.44 [emphasis in original]

Furthermore, British historian Robin The bomber offensive made possible a Neillands believes that, unlike the later combat initiative that was deemed vital, atomic drops upon Japan, Harris simply not just for the damage it would cause the did not have the weapon to devastate Third Reich but also for the galvanizing of Germany in a manner that would both British and global support. It affected concomitantly crush the German will to American and Commonwealth opinion as resist. Neillands offers that Harris: well as that of potential allies and enslaved nations, telegraphing British resolve to was also hindered throughout his forcefully press home the fight against campaign by a classic piece of the tyranny of Nazism, alone if necessary. military miscalculation, a failure Its very prosecution assured Britain a by the Allied Combined Chiefs of pivotal say in the conduct of the war. It Staff to maintain the aim. also did wonders for home-front morale, bolstering the British public in a time The aim of Bomber Command of great need for reassurance and hope. operations, [apart] from the time they This evidence of commitment was never began in 1939, was to carry the war more important than after the German to the heart of the enemy homeland. invasion of the Soviet Union during the That was what the strategic bomber summer of 1941. The bombing offensive was for, and no one in authority constituted a second front, a significant disputed this. [Churchill had said,] source of relief to the beleaguered “There is one thing that will bring Soviets when no other offensive action him (Hitler) down, and that is an was realistic or even possible. Later, absolutely devastating, exterminating bombing’s contributions would become attack by heavy bombers on the a prerequisite to the successful invasion Nazi homeland. …” … [But] what of northwest Europe, “an independent [Harris] needed was more aircraft campaign to pave the way for a combined and a free hand. arms invasion of Hitler’s Europe.”45 From April until September 1944, the Instead, there was a failure, at all majority of Bomber Command’s activities levels, to maintain this intention and were conducted in lockstep with the carry it through. The main failure lay preparation, execution and aftermath in not providing Bomber Command of the invasion through Normandy. And with the wherewithal to carry out this in the wake of this effort, the command declared intention; it was not the fault would deal decisive blows to the enemy’s

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transportation and petroleum resources, a state of total war was declared only effectively paralyzing the Third Reich in after the German defeat at Stalingrad in its final hours. February 1943 and production then went to a frantic 24-and-7 mode from what had With respect to the charge that German been, at Hitler’s direction, a relatively war production actually increased after sedentary pace, since he was adamant the start of the CBO, that is because that the military endeavours of the Reich

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would not interfere with the consumer of indiscriminate area bombing by industries. And this vast acceleration of Germany, including Warsaw in 1939; production was borne largely on the backs Rotterdam, London and many other of millions of slave labourers dragooned British cities in 1940; then Belgrade, into service from the occupied territories Yugoslavia and additional British urban of the Reich. It is difficult to conceive of centres in 1941 and 1942. Area bombing just what the Germans would have been was really the only viable offensive tool able to accomplish had they not been available to the British at the time, and forced into a very demanding industrial it served due notice to friends and foes decentralization programme, had they alike that Britain could, and would, not been forced to honour the bombing fight back. It provided offensive relief threats through so much bolstering to the Soviets when no other form of of their homeland defences, had they concentrated, sustained attack upon maintained uninterrupted use and control the enemy was yet possible. Further, of their production facilities, and had substantial and repeated feedback from they maintained unimpeded use of their intelligence sources inside the Third very diversified transportation networks. Reich indicated that the bombing was scoring telling blows. Much of this The morality issue rationale was still applicable after the United States entered the war. Further, the Americans were exerting pressure As the late-war evidence of Nazi upon their British partners to conclude atrocities mounted, there developed a the European war as expeditiously as significant hardening of Allied sentiment possible and then to turn their combined to bring the German people so completely attentions against the Japanese. The to their knees that they would never Americans also learned—both through again contemplate bringing another associations with the British and from holocaust down upon the world. This their own combat experiences—that their was reflected in the partial tactical use of own bombing forces were also, in reality, strategic bombers during the push through “blunt instruments of destruction,” with Germany in the closing weeks. These little true precision-bombing capabilities. actions served to reinforce the points that This, in spite of the long-fostered, no citizen of the Third Reich was immune mythological public stance that they to or exempt from the bombing and that could deliver munitions precisely and further armed resistance was futile. The effectively in all weather conditions. deliberate demoralization of the enemy Much of the present-day abhorrence of undoubtedly helped shatter the German the wartime area-bombing strategy has will to resist, hastening the capitulation been fuelled by the current propensity for of German forces in the western urban viewing the campaign through the lens of centres and, thereby, saving many lives, today’s technological capabilities. While both Allied and Axis. existing “smart” weapons can surgically demolish a specific room in a building The British had been the first of without figuratively “rattling the china” the two great Western democracies to in an adjacent room, such technology, engage the Axis forces, and they had taken for granted today, simply was not been provided with many prior examples available during the Second World War.

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Today, along with Randall Hansen, The legal issue Margaret MacMillan and Robert Bothwell, there are others who continue to condemn the bombing. One of the Although the Red Cross Convention on most prominent recent examples is the the Protection of Civilians in Wartime was British philosopher Anthony C. Grayling, agreed upon in Stockholm in August 1948, who has implied a “moral equivalency” it was never formally ratified, and the between the Allied strategic bombing matter has only been fully codified since campaign and the 9/11 (11 September 1977 in the wake of the Vietnam War, 2001) attacks on the United States. when the First Protocol to the Fourth Part of the problem, I believe, is a Convention expressly forbade deliberate widespread current propensity to view military attacks upon civilians. And it historical decisions and the actions that should be emphasized that this particular resulted from them through the filtering legislation was made possible largely by lens of present-day sensitivities and significant technological advances with technological capabilities. History can respect to weapons delivery, which have, only be judged properly from within for the most part, rendered area bombing the context of the times during which it unnecessary. occurred. Hindsight invariably benefits from 20/20 clarity. Closing thoughts As to the frequently advanced argument, fatuous at best, that the Bomber Command played an essential Second World War was “Hitler’s war” part as a guarantor of Allied victory and that 78 million Germans wanted no during the Second World War. It provided part of it, those attitudes were not much an offensive tool that took the fight to the in evidence when Nazi legions were enemy when none other was available, and having their way with most of Eurasia it gave the citizens of the Allied nations during the first three years of the war. hope and pride while it did so. It provided Nor is that argument of any consolation Britain and the Dominions, through its to the ghosts of the millions who were very prosecution, a political dimension systematically exterminated in the by which it could influence the conduct death camps and elsewhere. Lost in of the war. It demanded a significant much of the debate is the fact that diversion of German resources away from Nazism was a thoroughly repulsive and the Eastern Front, thereby aiding the evil force bent upon world domination. USSR in its part of the combined struggle. Public opinion surveys from the war It struck substantial and unrelenting confirm widespread support for the blows against enemy morale. It threw bombing. Neither politicians nor Germany’s broader war strategy into historians of the period challenged the disarray, forcing it to adopt a reactive policy extensively at the time. Further, rather than a proactive stance though there was very little questioning of industrial decentralization, which placed the morality of the bombing during unsupportable burdens on a transportation the war, and what little that did occur network that was already stretched to came primarily from isolated British the limit. It delivered crippling blows religious leaders. to the enemy’s sophisticated and diverse

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transportation network, and it generated If Bomber Command reduced the length a loss of German air superiority, along of the war by one day how many Jews with doing much significant damage were saved? What if Bomber Command to the Reich’s war industrial base. It reduced the length of the war by a week? eventually starved the nation of petroleum By a month? Such a grotesque numbers products, and it made the way safer for game can never be accurately completed an Allied re-entry into northwest Europe and it would seem perverse to even in 1944. It effectively stymied German try. However, these numbers remind economic mobilization and technological us that when great evil stalked Europe and Britain had to take the fight to its development in many areas, and it goaded Nazi enemy, Harris more than anyone the Nazis into costly and ineffective else was prepared to embrace a lesser retaliation campaigns, such as the V-1 evil in order to defeat it. He never and V-2 vengeance rocket programmes, at shirked from his task, never denied it, the expense of technologies with greater never apologized and never regretted war-winning promise, such as the jet and his actions. Harris had blood on his rocket fighters and the Type XXI and hands and never tried to hide it, and XXIII U-Boats. Many military resources it was this that singled him out as a and personnel were diverted away from scapegoat. Churchill wanted his legacy the fighting fronts just to honour the and many in the country wanted to threats to the Reich, and massive amounts forget what they demanded of Harris of manpower and material were needed in the darkest hours when fear and to address the damage sustained by the danger were overwhelming. It is time bombing. While a great human price we remembered Harris’s role and moral was paid for these accomplishments on culpability in its proper perspective and both the combatant sides, in relative recall him from the wilderness.46 terms, the losses incurred to the Anglo– Americans were small when compared to At this juncture, it is perhaps fitting those suffered elsewhere, such as in the that Harris’s biographer, Probert, should USSR. And the overall cost was relatively have the last words on the man and low as a percentage of the total war effort, his command. considering the gains that were realized. So what of his achievements and those Wartime Bomber Command was a highly of the Command he led? For over viable and effective fighting force, led three years he directed its immense with great dedication and purpose by a build-up and endeavoured ceaselessly resolute and resourceful commander in to ensure its efficiency; he inspired Sir Arthur Travers Harris. not just the aircrew but also the hundreds of thousands in other roles Dr. Peter Lee, a Portsmouth University whose tasks were essential to its Principal Lecturer in military leadership support; he fought endless battles on ethics, based at the Royal Air Force their part at many different levels of College Cranwell, and a former RAF command; and he did his utmost to chaplain summarized Sir Arthur Harris’s publicise and explain their work. At tenure at the helm of wartime Bomber the same time, while always subject Command as follows: to the frequent directives he received

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from above, he made virtually all the Lieutenant-Colonel David L. Bashow key operational decisions. On top of (Retired) has written extensively in all this he gave unstinted help and books and select periodicals on a variety encouragement to his United States of defence, foreign policy and military colleagues—and in the process helped history topics. His published books have lay the foundations of the close ties been well received by academics and between the Royal Air Force and the general readers alike, and most have United States Air Force which have achieved best-seller status. In 2004, he been of such importance ever since. retired after 36 years of military service True, there were disputes over as an Air Force fighter pilot, a senior policies and methods, not surprisingly staff officer and a military academic. with such a forceful, independently His flying time includes nearly 2400 minded Commander-in-Chief. So, hours in the CF104/F-104G Starfighter, also not surprisingly, he had at times and he is a graduate of the United States to be overruled, but once the Air Force / German Air Force Fighter arguments were over he obeyed his Weapons School and the United States orders, and most notably when Navy’s Topgun at the postgraduate level. supporting the invasion operations In 2002, he was appointed an Officer and earning the undying gratitude of of the Order of Military Merit, and Eisenhower and his top-level he has also received the United States commanders. It was over Harris’s Meritorious Service Medal. Dave has also primary role, the bombing of received commendations from both the Germany itself, that the main disputes Canadian Forces and the United States arose, particularly in the final months Air Force for saving aircraft in extreme of the war, yet while there will always emergency situations. He is currently be debate over specific targets which Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Military he selected at different times his total Journal and an associate professor at the achievements and those of his Royal Military College of Canada. His Command are clear. They rightly latest commercially available book is took the war to the enemy in the only entitled No Prouder Place: Canadians way possible in the earlier days, they and the Bomber Command Experience and their American comrades-in-arms 1939–1945, and it represents more than forced his air forces on to the five years of scholarship and research. defensive, which was all-important It has received outstanding reviews and for the great sea and land campaigns has already had a second printing. He waged by the Allies; they caused has also been extensively involved in massive division of his resources of championing Canada’s Bomber Command all kinds; and they steadily wrecked veterans in their struggles against the his economic structure. It was a Canadian War Museum and what they unique offensive carried out in a believe was an unjust and inaccurate unique war, and for his conduct of it portrayal of their contributions to Sir Arthur Harris deserves to rank victory during the Second World among the great high commanders War. This has included publication of of modern history.47 several well-received opinion pieces and articles in prestigious journals and newspapers across the country and a

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highly successful presentation to the 4. Ibid., 544. Senate Sub-Committee for Veterans’ Affairs in July 2007 on the issue. Dave 5. Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His has subsequently had two additional Life and Times (Toronto: Stoddart, 2001), books dealing with the Second World 54; and Richard Holmes, Battlefields of War bomber offensive published the Second World War (London: BBC by the Canadian Defence Academy Worldwide, 2001), 183. Press in Kingston. 6. Charles Webster and Noble Abbreviations Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, ed. James Butler, vol. 4, Annexes and Appendices (London: Her AOC-in-C Air Officer Majesty’s Stationary Service, 1961), 144. Commanding-in-Chief CBO Combined Bomber 7. Air Historical Branch (AHB) Bomber Offensive Command Narrative, IV, 130, Directorate of PRO Public Records Office History (Canada), File 86/286. Bottomly to Baldwin, 14 February 1942, quoted in RAF Royal Air Force Webster and Frankland, vol. 4, 143–45. RLM Reichsluftfahrtministerium Portal to Bottomley, 15 February 1942, (German Air Ministry) as quoted in Charles Webster and Noble SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Allied Expeditionary Forces against Germany, ed. James Butler, vol. 1, USAAF United States Army Air Preparation (London: Her Majesty’s Force Stationary Service, 1961), 324, as quoted in Greenhous and others, 576. USSTAF United States Strategic and Tactical Air Force 8. “Royal Air Force Bomber Command Official History,” accessed May 15, 2005, Notes http://www.nucleus.com/twright/bc-stats/ html/ (site discontinued). Richard Overy’s research closely mirrors these findings 1. Edward Jablonski, America in and acknowledges the diversified effort in the Air War (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life many other areas. Other Bomber Command Books, 1982), 142. taskings included land operations, long- range reconnaissance, mine-laying, 2. Sir Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour: support to Resistance operations, attacks Winston Churchill 1939–41 (London: on communications centres and airfields Heinemann, 1983), 655–56. as well as the war at sea. Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939–1945 (London: 3. Lord Portal, as quoted in Brereton HarperCollins, 1997), 51. Still other Greenhous and others, The Off icial diversions were designated precision History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, attacks, propaganda (leaflet) raids, vol. III, The Crucible of War 1939–1945 electronic warfare support as well as (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, humanitarian and relief missions towards 1994), 539. the end of hostilities. David L. Bashow,

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No Prouder Place: Canadians and the 178; and John Terraine, The Right of Bomber Command Experience 1939–1945 the Line: The Royal Air Force in the (St. Catharines, ON: Stoddart Publishing, European War 1939–1945 (London: 2005), 459. Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 678–79.

9. Overy, Bomber Command, 80. 20. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 10. John Singleton, “Report on the vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Bombing of Germany to Prime Minister Press, 1958), 6. Churchill,” 20 May 1942, in Public Records Office (PRO) Premier 3/11/4, 124. 21. Richard Overy, “Are We Beasts?” Literary Review (March 2007), 11. Air Intelligence Result of Recent accessed November 4, 2013, http://www. RAF Attacks Report to Prime Minister, literaryreview.co.uk/overy_03_07.html. 23 September 1942, in PRO Premier 3/11/12, 621. 22. Gee was the code name given to a radio navigation system used by 12. Air Intelligence Report No. the RAF during WWII. Originally 346 to Chief of the Air Staff, 22.9.42, designed as a short-range blind landing in PRO Premier 3/11/12, 627–29. system to improve safety during night operations, it developed into a long- 13. Probert, 413–14. range general navigation system. “Gee (navigation),” Wikipedia, accessed 14. Webster and Frankland, The November 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia. Strategic Air Offensive, vol. 4, 153–54. org/wiki/GEE_(navigation). Officially the AMES Type 100, the Gee-H was a 15. Probert, 306. radio navigation system developed during World War II to aid Bomber Command. 16. Ibid., 292. “Gee-H (navigation),” Wikipedia, accessed November 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia. 17. Franklin D’Olier and others, The org/wiki/Gee-H_(navigation). US Strategic Bomb Survey – Overall Report – European War – September 23. “A British, aerial, blind-bombing 30, 1945 (Washington: US Government targeting system in World War II, based Printing Office, 1945), 62. on radio transponder technology.” “Oboe (navigation),” Wikipedia, accessed 18. Sir Charles Portal, Memorandum November 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia. for the British Chiefs of Staff, 3 November org/wiki/Oboe_(navigation). 1942, in PRO Air 14/739A. 24. Bill Swetman, “Avro Lancaster,” 19. Martin Middlebrook, “Bomber in The Giant Book of World War II Command: The Turning Points,” Flypast Airplanes, ed. Jeffrey L. Ethell (Tokyo: no. 209 (December 2006): 85. Ancillary Zokeisha Publications, 1984), 417–18. data from Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945 25. The American development of (Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, 1986), the British H2S radar. It was used by

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USAAF in WWII for daylight overcast 34. Note to Prime Minister (Top and night-time operations. “H2X radar,” Secret, undated) by Sir Charles Portal, Wikipedia, accessed November 4, 2013, at PRO Premier 3/12, 18–21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H2X. 35. H. P. Willmott, The Second World 26. Robin Neillands, The Bomber War in the Far East, ed. John Keegan War: The Allied Air Offensive against (London: Cassell, 1999), 198. Nazi Germany (New York, Overlook Press, 2001), 293. 36. D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of 27. Probert, 320; and Group Captain Japan, 1945–1947 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Peter Gray, “Dresden 1945: Just Another Institute Press, 2009), xv, 92. Raid?,” Royal Air Force Airpower Review 4, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 5. 37. Transcribed by author during a visit to the Hiroshima Peace Museum, 28. For a more detailed discussion Hiroshima, Japan, 15 July 2002. The War of the Dresden raids, including the Cabinet, apparently figuratively, was calling justification, the results and recently for the sacrifice of every Japanese man, revised civilian casualty estimates, see woman and child, if necessary, to repel David L. Bashow, None but the Brave: the invaders from the west, since the total The Essential Contributions of RAF population of Japan, as late as April 1947, Bomber Command to Allied Victory during was just over 73 million. the Second World War (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 38. Jablonski, 169. Peter Jennings and Tod 151–53 and Chapter 3 Notes 85–88. Brewster, The Century (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 276. The Allied Potsdam Declaration 29. Charles Webster and Noble of 26 July 1945 called unequivocally for Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive the “unconditional surrender” of Japan, against Germany, ed. James Butler, but on 31 July, Emperor Hirohito made it vol. 3, Victory (London: Her Majesty’s clear that the Imperial Regalia of Japan (i.e., Stationary Service, 1961), 112. the royal throne) had to be defended at all costs. “Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and 30. Neillands, 373. Nagasaki,” access date not provided, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_ 31. Ibid., 372. of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki (content updated). Also, Koichi Kido, Yoshitake Oka, 32. For an extensive discussion of this and Kido Nikki Kenkyūkai,Kido Koichi nikki issue, including the offending minute and (Tokyo: Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), 1120–21. its eventual replacement, see David L. Bashow, Soldiers Blue: How Bomber 39. Giangreco, 110, Note 38. A third Command and Area Bombing Helped atomic weapon was going to be available Win the Second World War (Kingston, by mid-August, and 8 or 9 of them were ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, to be available for planned battlefield 2011), 55–61 and Notes 89–98. tactical use during the invasion of Kyushu in November, along with the planned use 33. Ibid., 61. of poison gas. Ibid., 201–2.

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40. Overy, Bomber Command, 200. 44. Neillands, 301.

41. D’Olier and others, 71. 45. Overy, Bomber Command, 183.

42. For a detailed discussion, see 46. Peter Lee, “Return from the Bashow, None but the Brave, 144–47. Wilderness: An Assessment of Arthur Harris’s Moral Responsibility for the 43. Albert Speer, Inside the Third German City Bombings,” Royal Air Reich (New York: Galihad, 1970), 286; Force Air Power Review 16, no. 1 and Joachim Fest, Speer: The Final (Spring 2013): 86. Verdict (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001), 166–67. 47. Probert, 414.

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From the Skies of Germany to the North African Desert: The Royal Canadian Air Force at War, 1939–1945 Review by Commander Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary FLYING UNDER FIRE: CANADIAN UNSUNG HEROES OF THE ROYAL FLIERS RECALL THE SECOND WORLD CANADIAN AIR FORCE: INCREDIBLE WAR TALES OF COURAGE AND DARING DURING WORLD WAR TWO Edited by William J. Wheeler By Cynthia J. Faryon

Calgary, AB: Fifth House, Canmore, AB: Altitude 2001 Publishing, 2003 256 pages 123 pages ISBN-10 1894004795, ISBN 1-55153-977-2 ISBN-13 978-1894004794

FLYING UNDER FIRE: MORE AVIATION TALES FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR ine days after Germany’s invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, Edited by Canada would heed Great Britain William J. Wheeler Nand the other Commonwealth nations with a declaration of war against Germany. This Calgary, AB: Fifth House, string of events would mark the escalation 2003 of the Second World War. As it was during 228 pages the Great War, Canadian mobilization was ISBN-10 1894856074, stepped up as the threat of Axis domination ISBN-13 978-1894856072 increased. After an initial build-up and

From the Skies of Germany to the North African Desert: 57 The Royal Canadian Air Force at War, 1939–1945 THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014

rearming of the armed forces, the squadrons she made with various aircraft types from of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Mosquito bombers to the Westland Welkin would fly alongside their Royal Air Force Interceptor. Lastly, we have a grand view of (RAF) counterparts in every theatre of the airstrike against the German battleship conflict, from the skies of Great Britain and Tirpitz over the Norwegian fjord by the Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa famous 617 “Dambuster” Squadron through on through the jungles of Southeast Asia. the cockpit memories of Squadron Leader The RCAF squadrons conducted various Donald Bell. missions from photo reconnaissance and close air support to antisubmarine warfare More Aviation Tales from the Second against the German and Japanese navies in World War comprises the second volume of both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Flying under Fire, this time recounting 10 stories of Canadians at war. In the ensuing The story of the RCAF’s participation pages, readers meet Squadron Leader Martin during the Second World War is again Cybulski, a night fighter pilot and a recipient brought to light by two notable historians of the DFC whose exploits flying missions of aviation history. The first two volumes over enemy territory are remarkable. From discussed here are edited by the prolific Europe, we proceed to North Africa with aviation author, William J. Wheeler (Skippers Squadron Leader James Collier flying of the Sky and Images of Flight). They cover P-40 Kittyhawks against the Luftwaffe and the experiences of Canadians serving in the Reggia Aeronautica Italiana (Italian Royal RCAF and RAF during the turbulent years of Air Force) to escort Prime Minister Winston 1939 to 1945. The stories previously appeared Churchill on one of his frontline visits and onto in the Canadian Aviation Historical Society becoming the first RCAF pilot to bring down Journal, which was also edited by Wheeler, a Messerschmitt (Me) 262 jet fighter. Next, one of the founders and a key officer of the Flight Lieutenant John Winship, DFC, takes society. The third book is written by Cynthia the reader on a photo reconnaissance mission J. Faryon, a western Canadian author whose over Japanese-held Burma; notable in this diverse works cover topics on national history, chapter is his long-range flight from Britain travel and family issues. to India. Subsequently, another significant account is that of retired Lieutenant-General Flying under Fire: Canadian Fliers William Carr, who flew as a Spitfire photo- Recall the Second World War spearheads reconnaissance pilot with an RAF squadron the trio as it recounts 12 aviation stories during operations in Malta and Italy. from RCAF personnel, from flying the Avro Manchester bomber to night-intruder Unsung Heroes of the Royal Canadian Air missions over Germany. Notable among Force is divided into 12 chapters. It commences the subjects here is celebrity and music with a prologue in which the author meets bandleader Jackie Ray, a flight lieutenant who one of the characters whose story is featured flew the ubiquitous Spitfire during the Dieppe in the book, that of Flying Officer Kenneth operation and finished the war having been Moore who recalls his years as a pilot of a awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC). B-24 Liberator bomber over Germany. Other We then soar over the Mediterranean with notable accounts within the tome are that of torpedo bomber pilot Murray Hyslop as his Flying Officer William Maclean, a Lancaster Bristol Beaufighter dodges heavy anti-aircraft bomber skipper who heroically saved his crew fire from German and Italian warships. A few when their aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft pages further and Air Transport Auxiliary fire over Wiesbaden and of Squadron Leader (ATA) Officer Vi Warren recounts her entry Edward Blenkinsop who, after being shot into the ATA and the numerous ferry flights down on one of the bomber offensives in 1944,

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would join the resistance in Belgium and wage was a member of the Philippine Coast Guard harassing attacks against Axis positions in Auxiliary Officer Indoctrination Course the area. Another remarkable personality and class of 1999. a heroine is Ms. Dedee de Jongh, who helped hundreds of downed Allied airmen to cross into Abbreviations friendly lines via a mountainous trek to Spain. ATA Air Transport Auxiliary Lastly, readers are treated to a retelling of the DFC Distinguished Flying Cross valiant engagement between an RCAF B-24 PCGA Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary Liberator bomber flying antisubmarine missions RAF Royal Air Force against the German submarine U-373. RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force Faryon is to be lauded for these fine, stirring accounts. The individual stories PROUD TO BE: MY LIFE, THE AIR furnished by the fliers provide a perspective FORCE, THE CONTROVERSY from their generation, a time in which freedom had a high price. It captures their By Kelly Flinn hopes and, more importantly, highlights both their patriotism in serving their country New York: Random amidst the dangers they encountered while in House, 1997 their cockpits as well as the strong bonds of 259 pages friendship they established with each other. ISBN 0-375-50109-8

The first two books are supported by over 50 photos each, along with sketches of the combat aircraft flown by the service. Both are Review by Captain Liz Allard, CD supplemented with detailed glossaries, a listing of Canadian aviation museums and an he United States Air Force lifted its index. Faryon’s volume is documented with ban on women becoming pilots in four photos, a map and a bibliography. These the 1970s; however, it was not until books provide a valuable addition in the T1991 that Congress lifted the ban on women popular historiography of Canadian military flying in combat aircraft. Integrating into aviation, specifically, and the Second World their squadrons was challenging during this War, in general, and should be welcomed by period; they not only faced hostility by those lay people; for the younger generation, these who felt they did not belong but also became works might serve as an inspiration to delve the focus of much media scrutiny as they further into Canadian military history as a became the first women to accomplish each means to discover what their forefathers did milestone. Proud to Be is the autobiography to preserve the freedom that we enjoy today. of Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, who was one of these ground-breaking female pilots and Commander Mark R. Condeno, Philippine quickly fell from grace as a result of adultery Coast Guard Auxiliary (PCGA) is currently and conduct-unbecoming charges. dual-hatted as Liaison Officer, Foreign Armed Forces Attaché Corps, International Flinn’s story begins with her childhood Affairs Directorate, PCGA and Command and takes the reader through her Academy Historian stationed in Manila. He holds a days, pilot training and her time on squadron Bachelor of Science Degree in Architecture at Minot Air Force Base, at which time she from Palawan State University. He was with becomes involved with a man who is married the Class of 1997 of the Basic Naval Reserve to an Air Force enlisted member. As the story Officer Training Course, Philippine Navy and progresses, a number of themes become

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apparent and are highlighted by the chapter Flinn’s selection of the B-52 titles that Flinn selects (“Playing to Win,” Stratofortress strategic bomber put her “Learning to Keep Quiet” and “Poster Girl”). into the media limelight because she was to be the first female pilot of that aircraft. The first theme is the strength and drive As mentioned, Congress had only recently that Flinn develops as a result of growing opened combat positions to women, and the up with brothers and sisters who were media was covering all the “firsts” for this considerably older, as she had to wrestle group of individuals. Thus, the third theme a brother to have control of the television is the unwanted special treatment—which programming and play sports with them at alienated her from her male counterparts— their level. This strength prevails throughout that began as soon as she made her selection the book and is seen in her success at high and continued after her arrival at Minot Air school, in her scholastic achievements at the Force Base. Very shortly after her arrival on Air Force Academy and throughout pilot squadron she was handpicked to be part of the training. Flinn cites the awards she received “show crew,” which meant that she received a and positive proficiency report comments lot of plum flying assignments and was tasked made by her pilot training officers as evidence to fly the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila of the success of her hard work and drive. Widnall, on a mission. Also, instead of being assigned to a regular crew during her on-job The second theme that surfaces is that of training period, Flinn was bounced around, mistrust of the military leadership system; it flying with most of the colonels on the base. began during her recount of an assault incident Flinn admitted that the increased attention at the end of her Academy freshman year. and lack of consistent training adversely Discouraged to report it by her room-mate (who impacted her flying, and it wasn’t until one of was also assaulted at the same time) and a male the instructors intervened that Flinn regained classmate friend, Flinn lived alone with this her confidence and flying skills. experience until second year when she sought counselling. According to Flinn, the counsellor The final theme that prevails throughout was more concerned about Flinn drinking the entire book is Flinn’s social and love underage (a glass of wine with her parents) than life, or the lack thereof. She admits that the assault incident and threatened to report she focused her attention on getting into the former to Flinn’s chain of command. Other the Academy through most of high school, examples are cited throughout the remainder of which meant that she did not do the normal Flinn’s stay at the Academy where the victims dating and socializing that teenagers were forced into silence or ostracized for tend to do. Flinn indicated confusion at reporting a wrong doing. the Academy situation of having a large number of randy teenagers living in close This theme prevails throughout the quarters and then telling them it is against book and is evident during the investigations the rules to have sex. The Honour Code into the accusations of adultery. It certainly at the Academy and the need to protect appears that Flinn delayed getting the proper one’s back within the corps of cadets both advice and guidance from military lawyers hindered the development of any type of and counsellors as she tried to deal with the normal relationship during that period. On situation herself. Unfortunately, when she a number of occasions, Flinn indicated that finally turned to her chain of command, it the Air Force Academy and the Air Force seemed more interested in washing their itself did not prepare her for having normal hands of the situation and moving it to social relationships. From the comments higher authority, which sought the harshest made throughout the book, it appears that punishment for the offence. Flinn certainly lacked maturity.

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When it comes to describing the events in 2010.1 Even more disconcerting, “only of the investigation into her adultery and 3,400 attacks were reported”2 in 2012, and conduct-unbecoming charges, the reasoning currently, “less than 1 percent of the predators for the four themes becomes apparent. To this [are] convicted.”3 In the 20 years since Flinn reader, they appear to be the excuses she graduated from the Air Force Academy it provides for how she got herself into the certainly does not appear that much has mess she did. Flinn devoted her energies changed in the American military culture. to succeeding at school and in the military, Flinn’s story illustrates both the decision- which left her little time to develop socially. making pitfalls young officers are capable of Indicating that the Academy and Air Force and the inappropriate leadership decisions did not prepare her for social relationships made by those in positions of authority. Those appears to be a ruse to deflect some of the who wish to learn from the mistakes of others responsibility off her shoulders and onto the should add Proud to Be to their reading list. military’s. Flinn uses the poster-girl theme to illustrate how she became marginalized Captain Liz Allard, CD, a CC130 air combat from her squadron mates because of the extra systems officer, is currently stationed at the attention, which she implies contributed to her Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre social-life dilemmas. The mistrust of military as the Information Management Officer. She leadership garnered after a number of bad has a degree in Political Science and has twice experiences throughout her career certainly deployed to Haiti with Canada’s Disaster caused her to be gun-shy when it came to Assistance Response Team. dealing with the investigation against her. Notes Whether Flinn was unfairly railroaded is 1. United States, Department of certainly up for conjecture. If the timelines Defense, Department of Defense Annual and information presented in her book are Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: accurate, then it certainly appears that may be Fiscal Year 2012, Volume 1 (Washington, the case, particularly with the lack of support DC: Department of Defense, May 3, 2012), she received from her chain of command 13, accessed August 16, 2013, ht t p:// almost from the outset as well as the speed www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/ and efficiency Flinn indicated they processed FY12_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_ her release—something that normally takes Sexual_Assault-VOLUME_ONE.pdf. weeks, not days. On the other hand, Flinn knew the rules and chose to ignore them or 2. PBS Newshour, “Does the Pentagon’s bury her head from the truths. Her lack of Plan Do Enough to Curb Sexual Assault in the maturity and, in many respects, honesty in Ranks?” PBS.org, accessed August 16, 2013, dealing with some of the issues she faced http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/ makes it hard to find sympathy. july-dec13/military_08-15.html.

Proud to Be is easy reading and a great 3. Ibid. This statistic is provided by summertime, feet-up book to occupy a few Susan Burke, a lawyer who specializes in hours. The subject was particularly poignant, defending women in military sexual assault considering that a recent Congressional report cases and is disputed by Major General John estimates that 26,000 troops were sexually Altenburg (Retired), who when he retired in assaulted (everything from groping to rape) in 2001 was the second-highest-ranking lawyer 2012, an increase of 37 per cent from 19,000 in the Army.

Proud To Be: My Life, The Air Force, The Controversy 61 POINTS OF INTEREST Royal Canadian Air Force Operational-Level Education: An Update

CF Photo: Hope Smith By Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Anderson, CD

n the spring of 2011, the Canadian Forces undertaken a continuous cycle of adaptation, Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC) modification and improvement. The final offered the first air component commander serial in its current format was conducted at I(ACC) seminar, a one-week programme CFAWC Trenton, 15–19 April 2013. designed to strengthen the understanding of operational-level command and control Based on feedback received and lessons (C2) within the Royal Canadian Air Force learned during exercises and operations, this (RCAF). Since that time and in keeping final instalment followed a similar path to with the CFAWC motto—Agile, we have previous serials. In addition to some initial

62 Royal Canadian Air Force Operational-Level Education: An Update THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 general briefings on command, C2, operations The second group then continued planning and an overview of the combined playing the next two war-game scenarios— air operations centre (CAOC) processes, an expeditionary Canadian joint-task-force briefings on aspects of Sense, Act and operation and a Canadian contribution to Sustain doctrine were provided. The seminar a coalition joint-task-force operation. Each audience then participated in a domestic- scenario had four vignettes, most of which operations scenario—based on a table-top are based on actual situations that have been war game that has been developed around drawn from lessons learned during recent the B-GA-401-000/FP-001, Canadian Forces exercises and operations, to provide planning Aerospace Command Doctrine to include and decision-making challenges for the C2 processes and operations planning—two seminar audience. The first group continued new components that will be incorporated with the considerations for logistics planning. in edition 2 of the publication, scheduled for this year. Both groups reconvened for the final day to address target engagement authority and The seminar audience was then divided “red card holder” subject matter. The final day into two groups. The first focused on was concluded with a series of scenarios and logistics planning considerations. The second vignettes that were conducted using the Air group focused in more detail on the roles, Exercise (AIREX)—a tailorable operational- responsibilities and processes of the CAOC’s level C2 exercise conducted in the synthetic divisions as well as the products of the air environment. tasking cycle. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)—Major-General The purpose of the seminar has been St-Amand—engaged the seminar audience to provide a level of knowledge and under­ via video teleconference (VTC) to provide his standing of the full range of responsibilities commander’s intent for deployed C2. of command, plan, task, execute and assess

CF Photo: Hope Smith

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that an ACC or air command and control to work within their deployed air task force element (ACCE) director and the operational headquarters or air component headquarters. staff, air operations centre or ACCE would require as the deployed C2 for the JFACC/ CFAWC will also continue to develop the CAOC in exercises or on operations. Given AIREX to provide a means of exercising this the range—scope and scale—of expectations RCAF deployed C2 in a variety of scenarios, for deployed C2, the commanders of 1 and contributing to the 1 Canadian Air Division 2 Canadian Air Divisions directed that a managed readiness programme. training needs analysis (TNA) be conducted to determine more precisely what education/ The combination of the RCAF OCCC, training ought to be provided. AFOD Block 5 and AIREX will give the Air Force an opportunity to better prepare for The TNA resulted in the draft qualifi­ potential force employment at the operational cation standard for the next evolution of the level within either a Canadian joint task force seminar: the RCAF Operations Command or a coalition combined joint task force, and Control Course (OCCC). The pilot course thus effectively contributing to RCAF was conducted in November 2013. CFAWC operational-level education. In order to ensure will continue to deliver this graduate-level a broad and thorough understanding of all course in a seminar format, leveraging the aspects of the operational level, CFAWC is also table-top war game to focus on decision developing additional modules for inclusion in making for the operational-level deployed the table-top war game based on each of the leadership teams which include air task force B-GA-400 series doctrine manuals. Using commanders, air component commanders lessons learned to shape future seminars and and air component coordination element AIREX content closes CFAWC’s Observe, directors and their deputies. The CFSAS Air Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop, see Figure 1, Force officer Development (AFOD) Block 5 bringing “what is” closer to “what will continue to generate knowledgeable staff ought to be.”

What is? = REALITY

EDUCATION B-GA-401.1 EDUCATION B-GA-401.? EDUCATION B-GA-401 B-GA-401.2 ACC SEMINAR ACC SEMINAR ACC SEMINAR 400 SERIES WG C2 WAR GAMES AIREX DOCTRINE DOCTRINE DOCTRINE

What ought to be? = DOCTRINE Figure 1. CFAWC OODA Loop

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Lieutenant-Colonel John Anderson is an air Abbreviations combat systems officer (ACSO) with two tours flying fighters and electronic-warfare ACC air component commander aircraft, and three tours flying tactical airlift ACCE air command and control element on CC130s. He has experience as a project AFOD Air Force Officer Development director for a variety of electronic-warfare AIREX Air Exercise projects and was a member of the directing C2 command and control staff at the Canadian Forces College for CAD four years. He is currently responsible for Canadian Air Division education and specialty training at the CAOC combined air operations centre Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre. CFAWC Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre CFSAS Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Studies JFACC joint force air component commander OCCC Operations Command and Control Course OODA observe, orient, decide, act RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force TNA training needs analysis

CF Photo: Hope Smith

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Terminolog y Ta l k {Article 5} By Major James Bound, CD, BSc (Hons)

Effects Background

Concise Oxford English Dictionary effect, n. It has been stated by some that the RCAF 1. A change which is the result or has a function-based doctrine framework. consequence of an action or other cause. Others have called it an effects-based doctrine framework. Are either of these Introduction assumptions correct, and if not, what is ilitary forces seek to frame the the RCAF doctrine framework based on? desired outcomes of operations This article will attempt to bridge the gap Mand activities in terms of effects to between how the military concept of effects be created in order to achieve objectives. can be linked to a doctrine framework and According to the schematic that illustrates whether this understanding is compatible the “cycle of life” for the Royal Canadian with that definition which appears in the Air Force (RCAF) functions, only the Act Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COD). function creates effects, and specifically air Do all of the RCAF functions produce effects (see Figure 1). effects? Let’s take a closer look.

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SHIELD

COMMAND Desired State Current State Direct Decide Assess Plan ACT SENSE [SHAPE and MOVE]

SUSTAIN Effects

GENERATE

Figure 1. The RCAF functions

Discussion Record 503 The rationale for focusing on effects is effect based on a perceived necessity to quantify The physical or cognitive consequences of the outcomes of military operations and action. (Department of National Defence activities with measures of effectiveness and to [DND] / Canadian Forces [CF], 2008) categorize them into thematic groupings (the RCAF prefers domains, while the Canadian Record 32281 Army uses planes). With this in mind, the measure of effectiveness quantification and categorization of effects A criterion used to evaluate how well morphed into a new way of thinking about a task has achieved the desired result. how military operations should be conducted. Note: This criterion focuses on the TheDefence Terminology Bank (DTB) contains results or consequences of actions taken, the key terms that illustrate how the concept considering whether the right things are of effects has evolved in a military context, being done to create the desired effects. as follows: (DND/CF, 2009)

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Record 35089 be created without any action at all, or can effects-based approach prevent an action from occurring, such as The way of thinking and specific through positioning an aircraft carrier in an processes, integrated in both the physical area of operations without commencing any and psychological planes that focus on air operations. Indeed, the main goal of an desired outcomes (effects) rather than information operations activity is generally activities to enable both the integration to create an effect without linking it to direct and effectiveness of the military contri- action; such an effect would be defined as bution within a comprehensive approach non-kinetic: “Said of non-destructive means and the realization of operational and to achieve desired effects. DTB( record 43729, strategic outcomes. Chief of the Air Force Staff, 2011)”

Note: The specific processes involve Another problem with the DTB definition the organization of activities to achieve of effect is that the phrase “physical or planned, desired and measurable effects cognitive consequences” does not take into that will realize objectives and ultimately consideration the consequences that a cyber1 meet the mission end state. (Chief of the attack can achieve. In the new age of cyber Land Staff, 2009) warfare, “information consequences” now have to be considered. By either leaving the Record 35105 DTB definition open-ended (i.e., not being effects-based thinking specific as to which consequences are used) Philosophy that deals with the situation as or incorporating information consequences a whole and the changes that need to be explicitly, the DTB definition of effect could made to physical and cognitive elements be revised. However, if the former course of to secure a favourable outcome. (Chief of action is preferred, the COD definition, “a Force Development, 2009) change which is the result or consequence of an action or other cause,” would seem to be United States’ doctrine defineseffect as: a better fit than theDTB definition. In this case, if the COD definition suffices then a 1. The physical or behavioral state of a unique DTB definition is not required. system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. Impact on doctrine TheCOD definition for effect is validated by 2. The result, outcome, or consequence Figure 1 and vice versa. However, if we want of an action. to retain terminological correctness while at the same time preserve the spirit and intent 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or of Figure 1, then the “Effects” step in the degree of freedom. illustration should be renamed “Air-Power Effects.” This minor modification does not Source: (Department of Defense [DoD]) change the fact that only the Act function Joint Publication 3-0, 2011) can create air-power effects.

The COD definition foreffect , “a change Impact on the Aerospace Doctrine which is the result or consequence of an Framework action or other cause,” is inconsistent with the For a doctrine framework to be “effects DTB definition of the term, in that the latter based,” it would have to be organized along may fall short when considering how effects the lines of the domains in which effects can be created in order to achieve specific can be created. In this case, there would outcomes. Specifically, perhaps an effect can be three keystone doctrine categories that

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align with the three effects-based domains of Major James Bound, CD, BSc (Hons), is a physical, psychological and information.2 navigator with 5,200 hours on the CC130 Similarly, if the framework is function-based, Hercules. In addition to two line tours on then it would be organized along the lines of operational search and rescue squadrons, he aerospace functions. As per B-GA-400-000/ has had multiple tours at the Air Mobility FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, operational training unit as a flight instructor the latter structure has been implemented in and aerospace systems evaluator. Major Bound the RCAF, so it can be concluded that the is currently working in the Air Power aerospace doctrine framework is function Knowledge Development Branch at the based. As a point of perspective, the CF joint Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre. doctrine framework is consistent with that His primary duties include the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of air electronic warfare doctrine and policy (NATO), whose doctrine framework is and the coordination of RCAF electronic aligned with the continental staff system.3 The warfare test and evaluation. key finding is that RCAF operational-level doctrine is not effects-based doctrine. Our Abbreviations function-based doctrine describes how the CF Canadian Forces RCAF organizes itself to provide the means COD Concise Oxford English Dictionary to create effects, not the effects themselves. DND Department of National Defence Summary DTB Defence Terminology Bank As a more open-ended definition, the COD NATO North Atlantic Treaty definition foreffect , “a change which is the Organization result or consequence of an action or other RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force cause,” is more accurate than the existing DTB definition. If the latter were to be revised Notes to be more specific to a military context, then 1. Cyber: relating to information technology, it would have to incorporate the concepts of the Internet, and virtual reality. (COD) “information consequences” to an action and that an effect can occur without a direct 2. In recent doctrinal debates, “psychological” action related to military power. However, is becoming accepted as a more suitable term the COD definition foreffect is compatible in place of either “moral” or “cognitive.” with Figure 1 and the aforementioned caveats and confirms the understanding that only 3. Although the joint doctrine framework is the Act function produces air-power effects. consistent, the doctrine itself may not be. NATO Finally, the understanding of what constitutes doctrine is based on a comprehensive approach effects-based thinking reaffirms the fact that to operations, not effects based. Ref: NATO the RCAF doctrine hierarchy is not effects AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine (December based but function based. 2010), paras 0227­–0232.

Terminology Talk ‑­ Article 5 69 PUSHING THE ENVELOPE AIRMINDEDNESS: An Essential Element of Air Power By Brigadier-General Christopher J. Coates, OMM, MSM, CD, MSS Author’s notes: 1. The author would like to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Colonel (Col) Chuck Oliviero (Retired), PhD, and Dr. Randall Wakelam. 2. The term airmindedness continues to be written as a compound word in two manners, both with and without the hyphen. The version without the hyphen will be the standard used in this article; although when quoting others, the original form will be retained. 3. In allied publications, the term “airmen” refers to both men and women serving in the respective air force. The history of mankind is the history of thought—of the gradual ascendancy of mind over matter: the subjugation of brute force by intelligence.1 – B. H. Liddell Hart, 1944 INTRODUCTION role in domestic operations, including search ir power has made significant contributions and rescue, maritime and Arctic surveillance, to most recent military operations and has continental air defence operations and the Acontributed to the full range of Canadian provision of air security for critical national Forces (CF) operations since the late 1980s, events. Air power, including CF air power, coinciding with the end of the cold war and provided significant benefits during disaster the advent of peace-enforcement and other recovery operations at home and in support contemporary operations. Most readers would of international humanitarian assistance be familiar with the contributions of air power, operations, such as those in Haiti after the but in the Balkans alone these have ranged from devastating earthquake in 2010. supporting embargoes on maritime shipping to maintaining critical supply lifelines into In the wake of these important operational Bosnia, to participating in the North Atlantic activities, there is an opportunity to examine Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Kosovo mission. some elements of doctrine to ensure that the CF and RCAF learn from these experiences and are Most recently, throughout the decade of better positioned for the future. The operations operations in Afghanistan, air power has played of the last decade have involved airmen and a significant role. Although initially limited to airwomen in a wide range of operations and air mobility, both inter- and intra-theatre, CF air have presented non-Air Force personnel with power eventually grew over time to encompass robust exposure to air power, in both planning a wider range of air capabilities, including and execution. Canada needs to appropriately the delivery of intelligence, surveillance and prepare members of the RCAF and others to reconnaissance as well as tactical mobility apply air power to achieve the desired effects, and firepower. Canadian combat forces in and that can only happen with a fundamental Afghanistan integrated the full spectrum of understanding and appreciation of its use. In their allied air power into their operations. doctrine, Canada’s allies—the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK)—recognize In addition, the Royal Canadian Air Force the uniqueness of the airman’s expertise, and (RCAF) was a principal contributor of air power in the United States Air Force (USAF), it is to many aspects of NATO’s operations against termed “airmindedness.”2 Canadian doctrine Libya. Furthermore, air power has played a key does not address this notion of airmindedness

70 Airmindedness: An Essential Element of Air Power THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 or the aviator’s particular expertise, but in light aircraft; so airmindedness” and indicated that of the significant recent use of air power, it is it was first used in 1927.4 appropriate and beneficial for both the RCAF and CF to examine the concept of airmindedness. A discussion of the notion of airmindedness and a review of the use of the term airminded This article will provide a critical in English-language print shows that they were examination of airmindedness, both within used predominantly from 1930 to 1950.5 The the RCAF and the greater CF through term airmindedness fell out of common usage four major steps: discussing the notion of after the end of the Second World War (WWII), airmindedness; examining the as many Western populations current state of airmindedness; “INTERESTED IN widely accepted air activity as proposing a Canadian version normal, if not yet common, in of airmindedness; and OR ENTHUSIAS- all its forms. The widespread finally, discussing the formal development of civil aviation, development of airmindedness TIC FOR THE USE which started prior to WWII, in a Canadian context. In AND DEVELOPMENT progressed more rapidly in the addition to my personal years that followed, and thus, experiences, the ideas are the OF AIRCRAFT; SO there was much less need to result of interviews conducted promote airmindedness. The with a wide range of senior, AIRMINDEDNESS” development of air power experienced military personnel as a military capability from Canada as well as our American and accelerated after the end of WWII, and some British allies. It is not a comprehensive academic air forces rekindled the use of the term. examination of the notion of the subject, but it will occasionally refer to others who have In the Western military context, airminded made such an examination. and airmindedness are elements of the formal doctrine of both USAF and the Royal Air Force THE NOTION OF AIRMINDEDNESS (RAF). In its capstone publication, Air Force To them that come after us it may be as Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, USAF presents ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly a section entitled “Airmindedness,” stating into remotest regions, as now a pair of that: “The perspective of Airmen is necessarily boots to ride a journey.3 different; it reflects a unique appreciation of – John Glanville, 1641 air power’s potential, as well as the threats and survival imperatives unique to Airmen.”6 Writers of the 1920s initially coined the AFDD 2, Operations and Organization further term airmindedness as part of the effort to addresses airmindedness as a fundamental promote the development of civil aviation. concept in a section entitled “The Airman’s During that period, civil air capabilities were Perspective.”7 Between AFDD 1 and AFDD 2, introduced, and there was a belief that a society the USAF doctrine attributes particular and that was airminded would better understand the unique perspectives to the airman by virtue potential benefits of air power. An airminded of their operational experience and unique people would be more willing to embrace air viewpoint. The USAF origins of the term transport, would support the development of airmindedness (apparently attributed to one air-related infrastructure and would see their of the iconic leaders of USAF—General (Gen) community advance more quickly and with Henry H. “Hap” Arnold) were explored to help less effort due to the beneficial effects of civil understand its military use. As described in aviation. The Oxford English Dictionary the text box, airmindedness appears to be has defined air-minded as “interested in or an invention of USAF in the 1990s during enthusiastic for the use and development of production of modern written doctrine.

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The RAF also recognizes the airman’s perspective and defines airmindedness in Air Publication USAF Airmindedness (AP) 3000, British Air and Space AFDD 1 states that: “The study of airpower leads to a Power Doctrine as “airmen who particular expertise and a distinctive point of view that understand and appreciate air power, General Henry H. ‘Hap’ Arnold termed ‘airmindedness.’”8 and are able to articulate and advocate it.”13 The airmindedness section of The 2007 version of AFDD 2 attributes Arnold’s citation to AP 3000 provides a description of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Volume 2, Basic Aerospace the principles of war as applied to air Doctrine of the United States Air Force, March 1992.9 This power and emphasizes the benefits of latter book is a collection of essays. The 21st essay, Essay airmindedness to the success of the “U,” starts with the same quotation by Arnold and attributes joint campaign. Unlike its allies, the it to: General Arnold, Third Report of the Commanding CF and RCAF do not use the term General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War airminded or airmindedness and do (Baltimore, MD: Schneiderieth, 12 November 1945), 70.10 not advocate or recognize a particular Arnold used the term “airmindedness” on page 70 of the “airman’s/airwoman’s perspective.” Third Report, but not in the context presented in AFM 1-1 or subsequent USAF doctrine. The RAF and, especially, the USAF views of the airman’s It appears in the Third Report’s “Air Power and the Future” perspective and airmindedness chapter, Section 9, “Civil Aviation.” Arnold says that: “Since demand further scrutiny since they military Air Power depends for its existence upon the aviation imply that the airman’s perspective industry and the air-mindedness of the nation, the Air Force itself leads to some abilities that are must promote the development of American civil Air Power unique to airmen. The USAF view in all of its forms, both commercial and private.” Arnold’s is that airmen think differently than use of airmindedness is focused on marshalling civil aviation other members of the joint team. for the national benefit and is not related to a particular They maintain that airman naturally military perspective or expertise. He does not use the term think spatially and strategically, anywhere else in the Third Report. whereas the thinking of others is more confined or limited.14 The Col Dennis Drew (Ret’d), USAF, oversaw initial efforts USAF Lemay Center for Doctrine to produce AFM 1-1 Vol. 2 and was unable to positively reiterated this most recently when identify the author of Essay “U.” However, he offered that it issued a “USAF Doctrine Update “perhaps the author of the essay … viewed Arnold’s use of on Airmindedness” that emphasized ‘airmindedness’ less literally and much more figuratively the ability of airmen to “think and as applying broadly to both civil and military aviation.”11 act at the tactical, operational, and Dr. Dale Hayden, US Air Force Research Institute, offered strategic levels of war, simultaneously that USAF’s use of Gen Arnold and the term airmindedness if called for.”15 might be a “meta-narrative” that has been accepted, as it served USAF’s interests.12 The USAF perspective on airmindedness promotes a view Despite being “universally accepted” and widely quoted, it that could be interpreted as elitist would appear that Arnold did not use the term airminded or exclusive. In an article discussing to describe the airman’s particular expertise and distinctive airmindedness, Dr. Dale L. Hayden, point of view. Airmindedness, as currently defined by USAF, the Deputy Director of the US Air appears to be a creation of USAF in the 1990s. Force Research Institute, states that: “Airmen are better equipped to exploit the other global commons

72 Airmindedness: An Essential Element of Air Power THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 of space and cyberspace since they view them decade of joint and combined operations, as domains rather than tools,” reinforcing the there is a wealth of experience to help define notion that airmen are specially endowed.16 airmindedness in a manner that would contribute In a 2007 article in the Air & Space Power positively to the application of air power in Journal,17 Major General Charles J. Dunlap all its forms. (Retired), USAF, clothes his vigorous promotion of air power in a layer of airmindedness, AIRMINDEDNESS TODAY but his tone is overly negative towards joint Flying has torn apart the relationship partners. Lieutenant Colonel Buck Elton, of space and time: it uses our old clock USAF, criticizes Dunlap’s 2007 monograph,18 but with new yardsticks.22 which is a longer version of the same argument – Charles A. Lindbergh, presented in the Winter 2007 Air & Space The Spirit of St Louis, 1953 Power Journal article, by noting that Dunlap’s “recommendations only serve to discredit In an effort to better understand ‘air-mindedness’ as unrealistic … .”19 Elton airmindedness, discussions and interviews with provides a strong condemnation of Dunlap’s a wide range of experienced military leaders argument; one which is also reflected in USAF from Canadian, American and British military doctrine, when Elton remarks that “[p]erhaps the forces provided an up-to-date view on both the most disturbing concept discussed by General perspective of air personnel and on airmindedness Dunlap is the statement that only Airmen think itself. There was overall agreement that there strategically or specifically that ‘Airmentend is an identifiable, particular perspective that to reason in strategic terms and Soldiers are could be categorized as “airminded” or that intellectually disposed to favor close combat reflects “airmindedness.” Working definitions and tend to think tactically.’”20 or descriptions of airmindedness provided by those interviewed ranged somewhat widely, In his blog “Building Peace,” although common threads could be detected. Mark Jacobsen, self-identified as a USAF C-17 Airmindedness was described as: pilot, proposes that the term air-mindedness should be jettisoned. He argues that he sees • “Understanding of air power’s unique “no indication that the Air Force by definition contributions across the spectrum of has a more strategic view of war than the conflict, to include joint and coalition, Army.” His view is that the current notion of and understanding the full potential that air-mindedness is “elitist” and contributes to it can bring.”23 “interservice rivalry.”21 • “An understanding of air power writ large.”24 While airmen have an inherent advantage in the understanding of air power (whether one • “The unique perspective and decision is discussing counter-insurgency operations, process used by airmen.”25 conventional combat or even humanitarian assistance operations), by associating • “The effective incorporation of air power airmindedness with superior strategic thinking, into the planning and execution of joint the notion of airmindedness presented in USAF operations.”26 doctrine is exclusive and pretentious and does not encourage joint partners to embrace the use • “The thought process of airmen as they of air power. Nonetheless, it would be productive view problems.”27 to better understand the perspective of air personnel and define airmindedness in a manner • “Understanding of the influence that air that would be beneficial in contemporary, joint power can have in the battlespace and the operations. With the experiences of the last supporting role it plays.”28

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• “How airmen look at problems; their default three-dimensional sense, across a full range position. A broad view of air power, both of operations.”40 tactical and strategic use of air power.”29 • “An understanding of air power’s • “With anything that military forces plan particular capabilities put together in a or execute, always have a view to how an broader picture.”41 airman would view or do that.”30 As listed above, the short definitions of • “A multidimensional perspective, providing airmindedness offered by each of the leaders different ways to influence warfare. A provide an indication of how each viewed graduate-level thinking about warfare.”31 airmindedness but do not completely or fully reflect their views or thoughts on the subject. • “An appreciation of the third dimension. How Each individual provided more extensive it integrates into the other environments. A commentary that addressed both the core and means to an end.”32 the nuances of airmindedness and are addressed in the paragraphs that follow, focusing on the • “A lens that one applies to tactical and elements of Canadian usage of the term. strategic perspective. How to view problems and execute [them] within the While some of the non-USAF leaders three dimensional realm.”33 interviewed had not heard of the term airmindedness, all agreed with the notion that • “A comprehensive understanding of the there exists a manner of thinking or a way of third dimension of the battlespace and the approaching a problem that fits the notion of application of air power to a maximum, being airminded and could be described as even disproportionate, effect.”34 airmindedness. So airmindedness does appear to be real. There were sufficiently similar elements • “An acute awareness of and the ability used to describe airmindedness; therefore, it to rapidly evaluate time and space. The reflects an actual condition and is not just an perception of land and maritime domains arbitrary construct. ‘from a perch’ and the rapid synthesis of and adaptation to options.”35 A large number of those interviewed found the existing USAF definition pejorative, • “The ability to see the battlespace free from “outdated”42 or “archaic.”43 This negative reaction the constraints of terrain-based obstacles.”36 was not limited to USAF’s joint partners, as several very senior USAF officers indicated • “The thought process or concept of that, in their opinion, the USAF definition employment of aviation assets as they was unhelpful. Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) support an overall mission set in the range Michael C. Short (Retired), USAF, described of military operations.”37 it as “chest beating,”44 and Lt Gen Allen G. Peck (Ret’d), USAF, indicated that “the term • “A deep understanding of air power’s ‘airmindedness,’ when used in a better-than-thou strengths and limitations and when it can be context by Airmen, can do more harm than good used independently or as a joint enabler.”38 regarding the perception of the Air Force as a coequal partner at the joint force table.”45 They • “An openmindedness in the approach to offered that the USAF use of airmindedness operations.”39 may have contributed to an alienation of joint partners and has put them “on the defensive.”46 • “Airmindedness is about thinking of This was in fact validated by the comments of a problem [in] a multidimensional, several of the senior non-USAF participants,

74 Airmindedness: An Essential Element of Air Power THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 such as Lieutenant-General (LGen) Charles value of airmindedness in addressing strategic- Bouchard (Retired), RCAF, who suggested that level challenges, he viewed it as a “spectrum the USAF approach to airmindedness “puts a of understanding, beginning at the tactical wedge between the services.”47 level.”49 Somewhat differently, Bouchard saw airmindedness as having meaning at the tactical The USAF definition associates air- level, but that “service-mindedness had no place mindedness with a perspective or a point of at the strategic level,” at which level “what view, and while this was a common element of mattered was jointness, whole-of-government, the leaders’ view of airmindedness, they saw PMESII (political, military, economic, social, airmindedness as much more than simply an infrastructure and information systems).”50 From outlook or a viewpoint. Airmindedness for them the comments provided, an effective Canadian was not only a way of thinking about a problem view of airmindedness must account for the or a situation but also related to the application wide range of tactical and operational challenges of air power. It was based on an extensive and and levels of conflict (strategic, operational and comprehensive knowledge of air power as well tactical) that demand the effective employment as a discerned, applied understanding of how of air power. air power could achieve effects. They saw airmindedness as being of greatest relevance One of the most significant revelations when air power was considered as part of was the leaders’ view that airmindedness was the complete team—national, political, joint, not unique to air force personnel. While air combined or coalition. For them, airmindedness force personnel were expected to possess and related to the application of air power through demonstrate airmindedness, it was also noted that the full range of operations, from tactical to those of other backgrounds could also demonstrate operational to strategic and included air power’s what was understood to be airmindedness. All ability to achieve effects to satisfy a national leaders concurred to a high degree with United objective, both independently or in a supporting States Navy (USN) Rear Admiral Terry B. Kraft’s role. In the end, they believed that an element view that “airmindedness is more natural for of airmindedness was an appreciation that air aviators, but not exclusive to them.”51 As a result power was seldom applied in complete isolation, of their common environment and experience, either from other military capabilities or from airmindedness was expected and largely seen other instruments of national power. The most as innate for operators from the air component. important difference from the USAF doctrinal Non-air force personnel who were sufficiently definition was the emphasis that airmindedness exposed to thinking about air power, who worked must relate to the application of air power to to overcome air power challenges and who shared achieve effects, rather than be seen simply as air power experiences could also develop a degree a perspective. of airmindedness. Possibly due to the more generic nature of airmindedness at higher levels, or Those interviewed saw airmindedness perhaps due to their greater accumulated exposure as being scalable. In addition to the range of to air power, the development of airmindedness operations from tactical to strategic, they saw in non-airmen was more common among those airmindedness as applying to individuals, from at higher ranks and with longer military service. non-commissioned member and officer operators Lt Gen Stanley Clarke III, USAF, provided the and support personnel, to unit, formation and view that Gen John R. Allen, United States force commanders. Major-General (MGen) Marine Corps (USMC) and recent commander Mike Hood, RCAF, reflected a common of NATO’s International Security Assistance perception in his view that airmindedness Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, “understands was “scalable” and that it was “not limited air power very quickly” and is an example of to senior leaders.”48 While LGen André the airmindedness displayed by certain senior Deschamps (Ret’d), RCAF, definitely saw the joint commanders.52

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All of the leaders agreed that airmindedness contemporary operating environment.56 A lack derives from a combination of experience, of airmindedness leads to planning or thinking education, training and culture. AFDD 1 about the use of air power “as an afterthought.”57 describes airmindedness and the perspective of While he viewed airmindedness as expected air personnel but does not explicitly address the in air force officers and air planning staff, source to this particular quality. In their doctrine, MGen Jon Vance, Canadian Army, expressed the RAF indicates that the airman’s perspective a view similar to Brigadier Richard Felton, develops from an “instinctive empathy with scale saying that “airmindedness in other planners and size and ease in operating across the different is critical, as effective planning can’t be the levels of warfare—sometimes on the same air force guy saying after the fact ‘hey, don’t mission.”53 This exposure to the unconstrained forget about air … .’”58 nature of air operations was seen as an aspect of airmindedness, but it could be achieved A range of airmindedness was recognized through a variety of means. All the sources of by some of the leaders interviewed, commonly airmindedness mentioned above—experience, acknowledging a lesser form which could be education, training and culture—were seen as termed “air awareness.”59 It was seen as a less necessary for the development of airmindedness in comprehensive understanding of air power, air personnel and those from other backgrounds. compared to the more fulsome understanding For those from outside the air environment, a equated with airmindedness. Air awareness strong grounding in air power education and was understood to arise from either limited training, accompanied by experience in planning training or education in air power or, perhaps, and executing operations involving significant a limited experience operating with air power, elements of air power, would compensate for without the formal training, education or some of the lack of air environment acculturation. acculturation that would be needed to develop Nonetheless, a sufficient exposure to air culture airmindedness. Air awareness might reflect a remains necessary for the development of limited understanding, either theoretical or airmindedness. practical, of the benefits or effects of a particular class of air power. But air awareness would Airmindedness was viewed as beneficial, as not couple that limited understanding with an effective airmindedness reduced overall risks to appreciation of the limitations or constraints operations and increased all-arms effectiveness. of that class of air power or, more importantly, Air Commodore Andrew Turner of the RAF an understanding of how other aspects of and his UK counterparts noted that a failure to air power could be brought to bear. Moving employ air power effectively during initial UK from air awareness to airmindedness and operations in southern Afghanistan was a result continuing further would lead to the concept of a lack of airmindedness and led to higher- of jointness, and even further, it was a whole- than-necessary losses.54 In the CF, Bouchard of-government perspective. Without doubt, claims that a similar lack of airmindedness airmindedness is one of the essential elements developed over a generation in which there of jointness, but it is beyond the scope of this was little operational interaction between analysis to discuss the contribution, role or the Army and the Air Force and contributed relationship of airmindedness to jointness or to committing to operations in Afghanistan “jointmindedness.” This is an area that merits without adequate air power or mitigation further examination. of the risks.55 Clarke credits airmindedness with the effective coupling of persistent USAF extended the notion of airminded­ surveillance and precision strike in operations ness to the areas of space and cyber, asserting in in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, leading the description of airmindedness that “Airmen to the rapid increase in effectiveness and the also think of power projection from inside the growing use of remotely piloted aircraft in the US to anywhere on the globe in hours (for air

76 Airmindedness: An Essential Element of Air Power THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 operations) and even nanoseconds (for space and in several reports, outside of the Oxford cyberspace operations).”60 The leaders contacted English Dictionary definition, there is a lack for this study did not see airmindedness as of agreement over the actual application of including particular expertise in space or cyber the term. In his defence of airmindedness, activities.61 In the Canadian context, while space Hayden notes that “air-mindedness does not is a physical location, BGen Rick Pitre, CF have a static definition but captures nuances Director General Space, viewed space effects that change over time.”64 In fact, it is somewhat as inter-domain, with space capabilities and natural that the use of the term should morph effects intersecting, enabling and crossing all over time, changing to suit the circumstances. the traditional domains and that airmindedness This indicates that there is some latitude in the was not a specific contributor to space Canadian interpretation of airmindedness, but effectiveness.62 Airmindedness was focused in order for it to be believable, to be accepted, to on the air domain and air power; whereas for encourage usage and to have sufficient resilience the most part, the leaders saw space and cyber to endure, the definition must also retain some as different, unique domains on their own. similarity to the historical or previous uses In describing the complexities and demands of the term. of today’s cyber operations, some contend that the United States “Air Force must start to A CANADIAN DEFINITION OF AIRMINDEDNESS inculcate cyber mindedness rooted in history and We want the air to unite the peoples, heritage,” distinct from airmindedness.63 For the and not to divide them.65 CF, there is little rationale for including space – Lord Swinton, and cyber as part of the Canadian interpretation Chicago Convention on of airmindedness. International Aviation, 1944

A final consideration regarding a modern In the Canadian context, and based on the Canadian definition for “airmindedness” considerations discussed above, an appropriate relates to the immutability, or conversely the CF definition of airmindedness might be: variability, of the term. As has been noted Airmindedness is a comprehensive understanding of air power and its optimal application throughout the operational environment.

This definition is similar in many ways to the RAF description of airmindedness, applying to a range of personnel and the full spectrum of operations. As will be elaborated, a Canadian interpretation of airmindedness would be that in any situation a firmly rooted airmindedness will ensure the tremendous value of air power is employed to maximum effect, wherever and whenever air power can make a contribution. The CF should share with the UK the view that airmindedness is not CF Photo: Cpl Lou Penney restricted to airmen.66 The Canadian

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view of airmindedness needs to reflect that do not directly involve air activities, the absence airmindedness is applicable to all aspects of air of air power should be the result of a considered power, from air superiority and air dominance decision to forgo the use of air—the result of to the delivery of logistics in combat and an airminded decision—not the failure to in domestic humanitarian relief to joint air understand air power. But there is a limit to operations conducted with partners from other airmindedness. For the CF, space and cyber environment or with allies. should be treated as separate domains, like the land and maritime domains. There are especially The Canadian view of airmindedness strong complementary linkages between air requires it to apply to the full spectrum of power and space and cyber capabilities, but military operations. Air power is potent and neither space nor cyber are subordinate to air influential, able to respond with considerable power or airmindedness. Although the CF has speed and flexibility. It is versatile, and the a strong affinity for joint operations, as long as elements of air power can achieve multiple air power is generated separately from the other effects, often at the same time. But air power types of military force, there will be air-power has definite limitations that need to be taken specialists, and it will be beneficial to continue into account during planning and execution. to think of airmindedness apart from other types Modern operations have become “ever more of joint thinking. That said, airmindedness must interdependent across the various domains,”67 be integrated with joint thinking in addition to and air power effects must be delivered in that its value in air-centric operations. cooperative, interdependent environment. In the end, air power can make a significant difference In order to better relate to airmindedness, in all operations, from those that are air-centric it may be beneficial to draw a parallel between and focused on the delivery of air power to airmindedness and airmanship. Airmanship is those with a more minor role for air capabilities. defined “as art, skill, or ability in the practice Airmindedness is the art and the science behind of aerial navigation,”68 but those in aviation air power. It is about bringing air power to bear see it as far more than just skill or ability. with maximum effectiveness in any situation. Chris DeMaria, a certified flying instructor, describes airmanship as “not simply a measure For Canada, airmindedness is not limited of skill or technique, but also a measure of a to particular air personnel, nor is it restricted pilot’s awareness of the aircraft, the environment to a certain rank or organizational level. in which it operates and of his own capabilities. Airmindedness for the CF must be applicable to One of those capabilities is physical skill, all members of the RCAF who must demonstrate but equally important components are wise a comprehensive understanding of air power decision making and an elevated sense of self- writ large and be able to contribute to the discipline.”69 In many ways, that combination of application of air power in a complex, joint art, skill, technique, situational awareness and environment. Airmindedness is also desirable understanding of capabilities and limitations in members of the other environments. Starting also describes the relation of airmindedness as air awareness, the limited understanding to air power. In effect, airmindedness and of air power by joint partners must grow so airmanship are companion bookends supporting that once at the level of joint commanders it the delivery of air capabilities.70 For those resembles airmindedness and ensures powerful familiar with the notion of airmanship, the air capabilities are properly applied. important role of airmindedness is well reflected in the following expression: Airmindedness is a critical element of RCAF air domain operations, but to avoid waste and Airmindedness is to the application of air unnecessary risk, it is also essential even where power as airmanship is to the operation air power plays a lesser role. Where operations of aircraft.

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DEVELOPMENT OF AIRMINDEDNESS FOR THE CF The Commandant of the Canadian Forces A good inter-Service staff officer College, BGen Craig Hilton, Canadian Army, must first be a good officer of his own has observed that aviators or airmen/airwomen Service, and we should lose more than at the rank of major may have a well-developed we gained by merging the identity of understanding of their air-power specialty, but the three Staff Colleges.71 they typically do not exhibit much understanding – John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF or skill in the application of other elements of air power.72 He commented that the termination of While the main objective of this study is to Development Period 2 (DP2) within the RCAF examine a contemporary Canadian interpretation contributed to this separation between the of airmindedness, it is beneficial to offer some RCAF’s air-power communities.73 Regardless of comments on the development of airmindedness whether it is through the renewed DP2 distance in the CF. As discussed above, airmindedness learning curriculum or some other method, to arises from a combination of experience, develop airmindedness beyond the most basic education, training and culture. Aviators in or lowest levels, the RCAF needs to deliberately Canada are well educated in the art and science train and educate its personnel in the application of their particular air power capability (that is of all air power capabilities and the achievement to say, transport, maritime aviation, fighters, of air effects in joint operations. RCAF success tactical aviation, and so on), but for the majority, in this area is currently insufficient to provide there is very limited exposure to formal training the airmindedness needed for the 21st century. or education in the other aspects of air power, outside an individual’s area of expertise. Another aspect that was discussed was the expression of airmindedness by non-airmen, by A first step in the development of non-aviators. As Vance and others indicated, airmindedness for the RCAF and CF would while airmindedness is expected from aviators, be recognition of the term and its incorporation it is very desirable and beneficial from those into doctrine. By defining and adopting from other environments. Canadian Forces airmindedness as an element of RCAF doctrine, College professional development programmes the Air Force would have a foundation upon provide only limited training or education in which to build. Once part of RCAF doctrine, the application of environmental capabilities, it should be possible to target the development including air power—a level that could be of airmindedness. categorized as awareness or familiarization. Currently the CF does not formally train or The formation of airmindedness in the educate the wider aspects of air power across the CF must consider the relation between the joint environments.74 To do so is in the interests development levels of personnel and the of the RCAF, the service with expertise in the levels of application of airmindedness. While application of air power and the responsibility airmindedness is applicable to all levels of the to generate air effects on behalf of the nation. military environment, the airmindedness of It may not be possible to provide sufficient a first-tour pilot would naturally be different training or education in air power to develop and more restricted than the airmindedness of airmindedness across the CF population, but an experienced unit or formation commander. it would be beneficial and might be possible Furthermore, air-power expertise within one’s area to achieve a higher level of air awareness than of specialization may provide a suitable level of currently exists. An increase in air awareness airmindedness for the first-tour pilot, but it would would, in itself, lead to a better application of not be sufficient for an aviator who must apply air power in the joint environment, and doing so the larger spectrum of air-power capabilities. might permit certain joint partners to actually Development of airmindedness in the CF must develop airmindedness. The USMC educates account for the requirements at each level. all of its officers, regardless of specialization,

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in the application of air power. The leadership has been very little tradition or opportunity for of the USMC expects all officers to exhibit the environments of the CF to train together as fundamental levels of airmindedness, and in a joint force. Similar to the benefits of “Fly in doing so they optimize their use of air power.75 Formation” for its impact on development of The CF and RCAF, in particular, should airmindedness in the RCAF, the new JOINTEX implement training and education in order to (Joint Exercise) series will provide an important generate joint air awareness and facilitate the opportunity for combined arms and cross- development of airmindedness. service experience and acculturation. In order to develop airmindedness and comprehensively Experience and culture are the other understand and apply air power’s contribution elements necessary to develop airmindedness, in the joint environment, airmen and airwomen and the CF and the RCAF have both strengths need to be exposed to and train with their joint and weaknesses in this regard. The CF’s joint partners. JOINTEX assists in the development of construct provides some Air personnel with the airmindedness of airmen and airwomen. To the opportunity to work in joint environments, encourage and promote airmindedness in those alongside their Army, Navy and special from the other environments, they need practical operations partners. This is mutually beneficial, exposure to and experience with air power. exposing aviators to joint operations, while JOINTEX addresses this requirement as well. sharing Air experience and culture with non- airmen/airwomen. On the other hand, RCAF CONCLUSION aviators do not typically get much cultural Air power has made significant contributions exposure to or experience in the greater Air to operations in the last decade. The optimum Force, outside their area of specialization. At employment of air power is enhanced by higher ranks, this is changing somewhat, with the airmindedness of those involved in the the introduction of air component commander generation and application of air effects. While (ACC) training and preparation. ACC training is airmindedness is not defined in Canadian focused on the command and control aspects of doctrine, an analysis revealed that the existing air power, and although it does not specifically USAF definition is too limited to meet Canadian address the tactical and operational employment purposes. Airmindedness for the RCAF and of air power, the exercises and employment CF is best defined as: “Airmindedness is a of nascent ACCs necessarily leads to cross- comprehensive understanding of air power and community acculturation and experience. This its optimal application throughout the operational training is beneficial, but the cross-community environment.” Airmindedness is most common experience is limited and circumstantial—it among airmen/airwomen and aviators but is needs to be widely targeted and more deliberate. not, by definition or practice, restricted to this group. Arising from a combination of experience, One of the strongest contributors to education, training and culture, airmindedness development of airmindedness may be the is shared by those from other environments or recent Commander, 1 Canadian Air Division occupations who have accumulated a sufficient initiative to “Fly in Formation.” This effort mixture of the elements of airmindedness and to bring the air power elements of the Air are able to comprehensively understand and Division together to focus on operational and apply air power across the operational spectrum. tactical challenges will result in increased experience and understanding across the RCAF The RCAF should encourage the develop- communities. It will contribute to development ment of airmindedness, but this encouragement of airmindedness among participants. must start with the establishment of a definition for airmindedness and its recognition in Canadian While the CF gained strong joint doctrine. There needs to be formal education operational experience in Afghanistan, there of air power across the RCAF’s communities,

80 Airmindedness: An Essential Element of Air Power THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 3 | NO. 1 WINTER 2014 acculturation and exposure to pan-Air Force ABBREVIATIONS capabilities as well as real joint training and ACC air component commander exercise opportunities. The cross-cultural experi- ence and exposure applies to members of other AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document (USAF) environments who would also improve their operational effectiveness as a result of increased AFM Air Force Manual (US) air awareness. Certain persons, such as some AOC air operations centre senior joint commanders, may develop air- AP Air Publication (UK) mindedness after accumulating sufficient air BGen Brigadier-General (Canada) expertise and knowledge. CF Canadian Forces Col Colonel Airmindedness is focused on the air domain and the application of air power, but DP2 Development Period 2 the airminded would appreciate the intimate Gen General relationship between air, space and cyber JOINTEX Joint Exercise domains and capabilities. The relationship of LGen Lieutenant-General (Canada) airmindedness to jointness should be considered, Lt Gen Lieutenant General (USAF) but as long as the stand-alone notion of “air MGen Major-General (Canada) power” exists, then “airmindedness” will continue to be beneficial. In order to assist MOD Ministry of Defence in the understanding of airmindedness, it NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be useful to consider the expression: NORAD North American Aerospace “Airmindedness is to the application of air power Defence Command as airmanship is to the operation of aircraft.” RAF Royal Air Force RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force Current and future military operations require the close cooperation and synergy of Ret’d retired all elements of military power. The effective UK United Kingdom employment of air power across the operational US United States spectrum requires that those involved develop USAF United States Air Force and express a high degree of airmindedness, USMC United States Marine Corps an essential element of air power. USN United States Navy Brigadier-General Christopher J. Coates WWII Second World War is a tactical helicopter pilot, having flown observation, utility and special operations roles. NOTES He has commanded at flight, squadron and 1. B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War wing levels and was the first commander of (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1944), 9. Canada’s composite air wing in Afghanistan, reintroducing Chinook helicopters to Canadian 2. United States (US), United States Air Force service during that time. He has advised the (USAF), Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff’s staff on Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Air Force employment, and as Director of the Command (n.p.: USAF, 14 October 2011), accessed Air Operations Centre (AOC) in Winnipeg, July 17, 2013, http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspc/ he led North American Aerospace Defence l002/pubs/afdd1.pdf; and United Kingdom (UK), Command (NORAD) responses in Canada’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), Air Publication (AP) th North and initiated the transformation of the 3000, British Air and Space Power Doctrine, 4 ed. AOC. He is currently the Deputy Commander of (Shrivenham, Swindon: Director Defence Studies, the Continental United States NORAD Region. 2009), 25, accessed July 17, 2013, http://www.

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raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_ July 17, 2013, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/ A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf. digital/Doctrine/du-Airmindedness.pdf.

3. James Charlton, ed., The Military 16. Dr. Dale Hayden, “Air-Mindedness,” Air Quotation Book (New York: Thomas Dunne & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008), accessed Books, 2002), 34. July 17, 2013, http://www.airpower.maxwell. af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/win08.htm. 4. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2004), 281. Bold and 17. Major General Charles J. Dunlap, italics in the original. “Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Air & Space 5. Jane Hu, “‘Are You Airminded’ Power Journal (Winter 2007), accessed July 17, The Slang of War,” The Awl, accessed 2013, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ July 17, 2013, http://www.theawl.com/2011/06/ airchronicles/apj/apj07/win07.htm. are-you-airminded-the-slang-of-war. 18. Major General Charles J. Dunlap, 6. US, USAF, AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman’s Doctrine, 18. Assessment of the FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine (Maxwell 7. US, USAF, AFDD 2, Operations and Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2007), Organization (n.p.: USAF, 3 April 2007), 2. accessed July 17, 2013, http://aupress.au.af.mil/ Superseded 6 January 2012. bookinfo.asp?bid=112. 8. US, USAF, AFDD 1, Air Force Basic 19. Lieutenant Colonel Buck Elton, Doctrine, 18. “Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight: 9. US, USAF, AFDD 2, Operations and One Airman’s Assessment of the Airman’s Organization, 2. Assessment,” Small Wars Journal, accessed July 17, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ 10. US, USAF, Air Force Manual (AFM) blog/journal/docs-temp/74-elton.pdf?q=mag/ 1-1, Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the docs-temp/74-elton.pdf. United States Air Force (n.p.: USAF, 14 October 2011), 209 and 216. 20. Ibid. Italics in the original.

11. Colonel Dennis Drew (Retired), 21. Mark Jacobsen, “The Problem with Emeritus Professor, School of Advanced Air Air-Mindedness,” Building Peace, accessed and Space Studies Air University, email message July 17, 2013, http://buildingpeace.net/2010/02/ to author, December 20, 2012. the-problem-with-air-mindedness.html.

12. Dr. Dale Hayden, Deputy Director of 22. Phil Condit, “Civil Aviation: A the US Air Force Research Institute, interview Turning Point,” Boeing, accessed July 17, 2013, with author, December 11, 2012. http://www.boeing.com/news/speeches/2001/ condit_011219.html. 13. UK, MOD, AP 3000, British Air and Space Power, 25. 23. Lieutenant General Allen G. Peck (Retired), pilot USAF, Commander Air University, 14. US, USAF, AFDD 1, Air Force Basic interview with author, October 26, 2012. Doctrine, 18. 24. Lieutenant General Michael C. Short 15. US, USAF, “USAF Doctrine Update (Retired), pilot USAF, Commander 16th Air on Airmindedness” (Maxwell Air Force Base: Force and Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Air University Press, 4 January 2013), accessed interview with author, October 26–27, 2012.

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25. Brigadier General John K. McMullen, to author October 16, 2012 and interview with pilot USAF, Commander 325 Fighter Wing, author, October 24, 2012. interview with author, October 2, 2012. 37. Lieutenant General Steven A. Hummer, 26. Air Commodore Andrew Turner, USMC, interview with author, November 8, 2012. pilot RAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, UK Permanent Joint HQ, interview with author, 38. Group Captain Alistair Byford, pilot RAF, September 28, 2012. Commander 904 Expeditionary Air Wing Kandahar, interview with author, November 15, 2012. 27. Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, pilot RCAF, Commander RCAF, interview with 39. Colonel Robert E. Lee, special forces US Army, interview with author, October 17, 2012. author, September 14, 2012. 40. Major-General Jon Vance, infantry 28. Brigadier General Mark R. Wise, pilot Canadian Army, Commander Joint Task Force USMC, interview with author, November 27, 2012. Afghanistan, Director of Staff / Strategic Joint 29. Major-General Mike Hood, air combat Staff, interview with author, January 28, 2013. systems officer, Deputy Commander RCAF, 41. Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard interview with author, December 10, 2012. (Retired), pilot RCAF, NATO Commander 30. Lieutenant General Stanley Clarke III, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Libya), pilot USAF, Commander, Continental NORAD interview with author, February 19, 2013. Region, 1st Air Force / Air Forces Northern, 42. Kraft. interview with author, December 6, 2012. 43. Wise. 31. Rear Admiral Terry B. Kraft, pilot USN, Commander United States Ship (USS) Ronald 44. Short. Reagan and USS Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, interview with author, December 11, 2012. 45. Peck, October 26, 2012; and Lieutenant General Peck email message to author, March 6, 2013. 32. Brigadier Richard Felton, British Army, Commander Task Force Helmand 2010, interview 46. Peck, October 26, 2012. with author, December 19, 2012. 47. Bouchard. 33. Brigadier General Al Meinzinger, RCAF 48. Hood. pilot, email message to and interview with author, December 19, 2012. 49. Deschamps.

34. Chief Master Sergeant James W. Hotaling, 50. Bouchard. USAF combat-veteran, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) and Command Chief Master 51. Kraft. Sergeant, Continental NORAD Region, 1st Air Force / Air Forces Northern, interview with author, 52. Clarke. January 9, 2013. 53. UK, MOD, AP 3000, British Air and Space Power, 24. 35. Lieutenant-General Alain Parent, pilot RCAF, Deputy Commander NORAD, interview 54. Turner. with author, November 8, 2012. 55. Bouchard. 36. Colonel Chuck Oliviero (Retired), PhD, armour officer Canadian Army, email message 56. Clarke.

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62. Brigadier-General Rick Pitre, discussion 70. Major-General Pierre St-Amand, with author, February 14, 2013. Commander 1 Canadian Air Division, discussion with author, February 26, 2013. 63. Jason Healey, “Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 71. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: 6, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 11–19, accessed July 17, Recollections and Reflections by Marshal of 2013, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/fall/ the Royal Air Force (London: Cassell and fall12.pdf. Company, 1956), 87.

64. Hayden, “Air-Mindedness,” 1. 72. Letter from Commandant Canadian Forces College to Commander Royal Canadian 65. Marion C. Blakey, “Panel Discussion: Air Force, 5076-1 (Cmdt), 16 September 2011, Initiatives, Transitions Programmes—What para 4: “Air Force student’s [sic] knowledge will it take to get there? What is needed of their own environment remained highly from ICAO, industry, etc.” (remarks, ICAO stove piped, such that JCSP 37 Air Force Forum: Integration and Harmonization of candidates had little knowledge of the NextGen and SESAR into the Global ATM capabilities and effects of Air Power outside Framework, September 8, 2008), accessed July their direct classification or sub-specialty.” 17, 2013, http://www.aia-aerospace.org/aianews/ speeches/2008/speech_icao_090808.pdf. 73. Brigadier-General Craig Hilton, Commandant Canadian Forces College, 66. UK, MOD, AP 3000, British Air and discussion with author, February 12, 2013. Space Power, 25–26. 74. Colonel Simon Sukstorf, Director of 67. General Norton A. Schwartz Curriculum at the Canadian Forces College, (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel Teera Tony discussion with author, February 22, 2013. Tunyavongs, “America’s Air Force: Strong, Indispensable, and Ready for the Twenty-First 75. Hummer.

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