Swiss American Historical Society Review

Volume 46 Number 1 Article 4

2-2010

Tue Swiss American Presence at the

H. Dwight Page

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Recommended Citation Page, H. Dwight (2010) "Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh," Swiss American Historical Society Review: Vol. 46 : No. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Swiss American Historical Society Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh

by H. Dwight Page

On Saturday, August 1, 2009, my family and I finally made our long intended visit to Shiloh National Military Park on the River just south of Savannah, Tennessee. Shiloh proved to be well worth the visit. This article appears in this particular journal because of the important role played by Swiss in the Battle of Shiloh. The Battle of Shiloh, -7, 1862, a turning point of the , was one of the largest and most complex battles in history. 1 A General Ulysses S. Grant disaster for the Confederate Cause, it occurred in the wake of a series of military setbacks for the South. On January 19, 1862, General George B. Crittenden 's division had been routed at Mill Springs, . This defeat exposed the right flank of General , the Confederate Commander in the West. , a pro-Union region, was vulnerable to invasion by way of . During the first week of February, a joint Federal army-navy expedition, commanded by Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote, entered northern Tennessee and on February 6th attacked Fort Henry on the . The Confederate fort

1 For a detailed contemporary account of Shiloh and its aftermath, see Tenney W. J. Chapter XV in Military and Naval History of the Rebellion in the : D. Appleton and Company, 1866.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 40 1 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 41 fell after a two hour naval bombardment. The Tennessee River, a vital transportation artery, now lay open to Federal invasion all the way to Florence, Alabama. Hysteria seized many Southern citizens as Union gunboats raided upriver into northern Mississippi and Alabama. By February 12, 1862, , located twelve miles east of Fort Henry on the , had been likewise invested by the Northern Army. After a series of incredible blunders by Confederate generals John B. Floyd and Gideon J. Pillow, the garrison at Fort Donelson surrendered on the sixteenth. More than just a defeat for the Confederacy, the fall of Fort Donelson was a catastrophe. About one­ third of Johnston's forces east of the , almost 15,000 men, had been captured. The vital Confederate heartland of Middle Tennessee and northern Alabama had been pierced. Nashville fell and its terrified citizenry fled in panic before the northern Juggernaut into Mississippi and Alabama. The Mississippi River stronghold of Columbus, Kentucky had to be abandoned. All across Middle and West ""'ennessee, Johnston's forces were reeling south in disorder. The collapse of Southern defenses in Middle Tennessee had Laid bare the state to invasion by a huge Federal Army. On March 11, 1862, President had effected a new command whose mission was to seize all of Tennessee. Union General 's new Department of the Mississippi boasted over 150,000 combat troops arrayed from to eastern Kentucky.2 At the time of the Battle of Shiloh, the reputation of the Confederate Commander Albert Sidney Johnston was at its zenith; superiors and subordinates alike looked upon him as the foremost and ablest officer in the service of the South.3 When chose secession in 1861. Johnston had submitted his

2 Connelly, Thomas L. Civil War Tennessee: Battles and Leaders. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 34. 3 General Grant, for example, admired Johnston Confederate Com­ above all other Confederate strategists and always remembered Shiloh as the ultimate in applied violence. mander Albert Sidney See Catton, Bruce. Grant Takes Command. (Boston: Johnston. Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 204. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 2 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 42 February 2010 SAHS Review

resignation from the as the then Commander of the Department of the Pacific. Making a perilous overland journey from to Virginia, Johnston met with President Davis in Richmond and cast his lot with the South. Davis rewarded his colleague by appointing him a full general with rank second only to Confederate Adjutant and Inspector General , who served in an administrative capacity from the Richmond War Department. As Commander of Department No. 2, Sidney Johnston assumed responsibility for a huge area of the western Confederacy. Despite his fame, Johnston's six month tenure commanding in the West prior to the Battle of Shiloh had not been successful, and now, following the disastrous losses of Forts Henry and Donelson, along with the evacuations of Columbus, Bowling Green and Nashville, the western Commander was bitterly criticized. A confused and exasperated Southern public demanded that Johnston be replaced. With one exception, the entire Tennessee congressional delegation petitioned Davis for Johnston's removal. Nonetheless, President Davis' confidence in Johnston remained unshaken. Indeed, in historical retrospect, we perceive that the Confederate defeat at Shiloh was not the fault of General Johnston at all , and that his contemporary detractors were misinformed. That momentous defeat should rather be attributed to poor judgment on the part of Confederate President Davis himself. Had Davis responded promptly to Johnston's earlier pleas for reinforcements, the disastrous chain of events between February and April, 1862 would not have occurred. As it was, the Confederate President, now in February, 1862 gravely concerned about the Tennessee route of the Union invasion into the Southern heartland, belatedly attempted to repair the damage. Under his orders, the Confederate War Department ordered 5,000 Southern troops under Brigadier General from and a 10,000-man corps from Major General 's Department of Alabama and West to reinforce Johnston in the north. Yet Davis might have done more. Thousands of armed men still sat idle in Florida, along the Atlantic Coast and in Texas. Major General Earl Van Dom's 20,000-man army in Arkansas was not ordered to Johnston's assistance until March 29th, 1862. With the arrival of Van Dom's reinforcements, Johnston made good the loss of over 12,000 Confederates captured at Fort Donelson and amassed the largest army Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 3 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 43 yet organized in the South. Besides more troops and equipment, President Davis also sent Johnston another able general - Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, the popular hero of the South from his prominent role at both Fort Sumter and First Manassas. Unfortunately, Beauregard mived in the West just as Johnston's (entucky defensive line collapsed. ~!armed by the unorganized and weak ;tate of Confederate armed forces in the West, Johnston's talented new second Confederate General Pierre in command was pessimistic about the Gustave Toutant Beauregard worsening situation and even considered returning to Virginia. Nonetheless, immediately upon his arrival in West Tennessee in early February, 1862, General Beauregard immediately began to organize a new Confederate army, and invited Johnston to join it. With Bishop Polk's Columbus garrison as a nucleus, Beauregard began building in February what he labeled as the "Army of the Mississippi Valley." Urgent pleas for support were sent to Western governors, the Confederate War Department, Beauregard's political allies in the Confederate Congress, and commanders of neighboring military departments at Pensacola and New Orleans. Beauregard's ambitions were aided by Albert Sidney Johnston's apparent mental collapse. Grant's unexpected descent on Fort Donelson had shocked Johnston, who by late February appeared confused and unable to make command decisions. It required no West Point education to grasp that concentration of Confederate forces on the western front was essential. Yet by February 12, the disoriented Johnston had informed Beauregard that he was taking Hardee 's troops to Chattanooga, and Johnston began preparing for a retreat southeastward down the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. Had Johnston carried out this strange plan, the two wings of his small army would have been some 300 miles apart, with Grant and Buell in between. Only urgent pleas by Beauregard convinced Johnston to abandon the unwise idea and move instead southwest toward Corinth. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 4 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 44 February 2010 SAHS Review

Indeed, with Federal forces poised to ascend the Tennessee River and carry the war southward into Alabama and Mississippi, despite their differences of opinion, both Johnston and Beauregard saw the critical need to concentrate their divided forces and defend the important Memphis and Charleston Railroad. A vital artery of commerce, this railroad was the only all-weather east-west railroad in the South that linked the Mississippi River to the Atlantic Seaboard. The location selected by the Confederates to collect and organize their converging forces was precisely the strategic railroad junction of Corinth, a small town of about 1,2000 inhabitants located in northeast Mississippi. Using the steam-powered technology of the modern industrial age, the Confederates transported thousands of soldiers and tons of equipment, both on land and water, from every corner of the western Confederacy to Corinth. By the end of March 1862, about 45,000 Confederate troops had been amassed in northern Mississippi and southwest Tennessee. The arriving Confederate forces were reorganized into a new and somewhat unwieldy four-corps structure called the Army of the Mississippi. Majo General Polk commanded the First Corps; Bragg the Second; Hardee, th, Third; and Brigadier General John C. Breckinridge was given commam of Crittenden 's divisions, now designated the Reserve Corps. Thit railroad junction town in northern Mississippi had suddenly become the Confederacy's most important troop center west of Richmond-the place from which General Albert Sidney Johnston would regain all that had been lost and chase the invading Yankees back north to the River. By the time Johnston arrived in Corinth in late March, Beauregard was busy assembling a new army. His success was due in large measure to a combination of weaknesses and strengths in his personality. A propaganda expert was needed both to warn Richmond of the western situation and to talk other commanders into donating men to the cause. The Confederacy had no finer propagandist than Beauregard. For two reasons Beauregard's pleas for assistance were answered speedily. Few officers in the Confederacy possessed such vast influence in both military and political circles. He had strong political and family ties with influential Louisiana politicians. His command at Fort Sumter had made him the proverbial darling of society. Too, Beauregard's range of Confederate service was unmatched. No other officer had commanded the Army of Tennessee, the Army of Northern Virginia, and Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 5 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 45 the Carolina Department. In fact, practically every major Confederate general served somewhere during the war under Beauregard's tutelage. Johnston's decision to concentrate his forces at Corinth was hazardous, and even some of his own officers believed that it might not work. Fortunately for the Confederacy, in March 1862, the Federal army occupying Nashville did not aggressively pursue Johnston's retreating forces in Middle Tennessee, thus postponing the inevitable Confederate defeat at Shiloh the following month.4 In addition, General Johnston was greatly helped by the fact that Union General Halleck was the embodiment of caution. After the fall of Fort Donelson Halleck had sent Grant up the Tennessee but had ordered him to be extremely careful; whatever happened, he was not to stir up a fight until Buell joined him. From the Federal point of view, this was playing it safe; it was also giving General Johnston several priceless weeks of time in which to reorganize his army. Most of Grant's army had reached Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee near Savannah by the end of the third week of March, and if they had moved on Corinth at once they could have tom Johnston's army apart before its diverse elements had fully assembled. Such a Federal advance would, of course, have been a bit risky, and General Halleck would permit no risks. Grant must keep his army in its position at Pittsburg Landing until Euell's men arrived. In the meantime, General Grant's victories on the Cumberland-the twin captures of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson - had won him overnight acclaim in the North, and ten thousand congratulatory cigars were sent to him by his admirers, causing him to take up the habit. President Abraham Lincoln had never met the general, and the administration was somewhat taken aback that such an unknown had gained so significant a victory. In late February 1862, a strange event made a virtual mess of Federal communications and threatened to undermine the Northern advance into the South. While Grant was preparing his army for the projected expedition up the Tennessee River, the Union telegraph operator at Cairo, , later discovered to be a Rebel sympathizer, purposely withheld many of ::irant's dispatches to Union military headquarters in St. Louis. By early tlarch, sitting in his headquarters several hundred miles away from

98 Catton, Bruce. The Centennial History of the Civil War. Vol. 2. Terrible Swift ,wordhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4. (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 218. 6 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 46 February 2010 SAHS Review

the front, an increasingly frustrated General Halleck was not receiving daily reports or answers to his formal inquires from Grant in the field. Halleck angrily demanded that General in Chief George B. McClellan remove Grant from command. In addition to several unofficial charges of neglect of duty and insubordination, Halleck passed on to McClellan an unconfirmed rumor that Grant had resumed his "former habit," a veiled reference to his drinking. McClellan informed Halleck that if it was necessary for the good of the Union, he had the authority to relieve Grant of command. Although not officially relieved, for a full week in early March, a stunned Grant was instructed by Halleck to tum over command of the proposed Tennessee expedition to Brigadier General Charles F. Smith and remain at Fort Henry. Virtually under house arrest, a depressed and bewildered Grant desperately attempted to provide answers to Halleck's damaging official charges. Eventually President Lincoln himself became involved, and the Union War Department in made a thorough investigation of this bizarre situation. The War Department finally got to the bottom of the matter, ascertained the true facts in the case, and officially exonerated General Grant of all wrongdoing. Faced with such opposition, Halleck backed down when reports from Grant provided the tardy information, and General Grant was restored to the full commandership of the Union military operations in Tennessee.

The Federal Advance on Shiloh

In the meantime, General Smith, an Old Army officer and Grant's subordinate, was placed in command of a Tennessee River expeditionary force of 27,000 Federal troops, with more to follow. The initial purpose was to raid the Memphis and Charleston Railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Mississippi. The strategic mission of the Federal Tennessee expedition changed when, on March 11, 1862, Halleck was granted his long-held desire for overall western command. "Old Brains" immediately directed Buell and his to rendezvous with Smith's expedition at the small river town of Savannah, Tennessee, 110 miles southwest of Nashville. Resuming command, Grant proceeded upriver in the wake of his advanced army. Arriving on March 17, he made his headquarters at the large white brick home of William H. Cherry, sitting atop the Savannah Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 7 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 47

,luff. Upon arrival Grant found his army widely dispersed. Retaining ..,ew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing, west of Savannah, he tgreed with General Smith's idea to concentrate the balance of the 1rmy farther upriver at Pittsburg Landing, located eight miles by river muthwest of Savannah. Despite its vulnerability, Pittsburg Landing did offer some advantages. The rolling plateau back from the landing provided ample ~ampground for a large army. Three major watersheds, Snake Creek to the north, Owl Creek to the west, and Lick Creek to the south, all tributaries of the Tennessee, were now out of their banks. Backwatered by the rising river, these flooded bottomlands protected the Federal flanks. The terrain was composed of steep banked ravines, which could be easily defended. Several farms with small fields and orchards dotted the countryside. About two miles southwest from the landing, on the Corinth-Pittsburg road sat a one-room log Methodist church called Shiloh Meeting House. Grant's troop dispersement on the forested plateau was highly questionable. Holding the advance were two untested divisions­ Sherman's on the right astride the Corinth and Hamburg-Purdy Roads and Brigadier General Benjamin M. Prentiss on the left across the Eastern Corinth Road. The three combat-tested veteran divisions, those of Brigadier General John A. McClernand, Stephen A. Hurlbut, and William H. L. Wallace, camped in the rear, closer to the landing. The collective Federal force, nominally called the Army of the Tennessee, numbered just over 48,000 men encamped at Pittsburg Landing. 's division, erecting camps inland from Crump's Landing along the Purdy Road westward for five miles to Adamsville, totaled 7,500 effectives.

The Confederate Advance on Shiloh

Commanding General Sidney Johnston worked frantically to mold '1is growing army in preparation for the impending mighty confrontation, Jut on the night of April 2, 1862 time ran out. Major General Benjamin F. 2heatham, commanding a Confederate division positioned twenty-five niles north of Corinth, at Bethel Station and Purdy, Tennessee, reported '. hat Lew Wallace's division was moving west in force-perhaps to nake another raid on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. In truth, Wallace was https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 8 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 48 February 2010 SAHS Review

only overreacting to an earlier reconnaissance by Cheatham's cavalry. Coupled with this intelligence came troubling news that Buell's army was at last beyond the Duck River and was about to unite with Grant's army. Beauregard advised Johnston: "Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing." Johnston thereupon directed Beauregard to formulate the attack order early on the morning of April 3rd, thereby continuing his policy of allowing Beauregard to direct the army's affairs. Beauregard responded with marching and battle orders totally unsuited to the newness of the Confederate army's organization. Confederate intelligence knew that Grant had moved the bulk of his army from Savannah a few miles upstream to Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee. Five Federal divisions (about 37,000 troops) under the imm~diate command of General Sherman were encamped on the high sandy bluff overlooking the river landing. Four miles downriver, General Lew Wallace's division rested at Crump's Landing. Beauregard's battle plan, drawn on a table-top on the morning of April 3, called for a surprise attack on the bulk of Grant's army at Pittsburg Landing. Marching on parallel roads from Corinth, the three main corps would rendezvous on the night of April 3 at a road junction called Mickey's, seven miles from the river landing. Then the Confederates would deploy into battle line formation and attack at dawn on April 4-time enough for victory before Buell's army arrived. It seemed that this plan would work well enough, but the loose ends of Beauregard's visionary planning on April 3 proved the Confederate Army's undoing. The Special Order Number Eight, which described the march and battle plan, contained grave flaws which became apparent during the next three days. Several routes would be used to move the short distance to Pittsburg Landing-the Ridge, Monterey-Purdy, and Monterey-Savannah Roads. Because the roads often crisscrossed, Johnston's army could reach Mickey's by dawn of April 4 only by the most intricate of timing. Nor did the marching plans consider weather and terrain. It had been raining north of Corinth for several days, and the country was a quagmire of miry roads, flooded swamps and gullies, and soggy, dense forest. Such conditions made it almost impossible to move wagons and artillery. The battle plans were equally unrealistic.According to Beauregard's grand design of April 3, the army was to rendezvous at Mickey's Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 9 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 49 junction sometime that night and would attack Grant's pos1t1on at dawn. The plan of attack, however, promised only confusion. Instead of allotting the three main corps-Polk, Bragg, and Hardee-a portion of the battlefield, Beauregard decided upon an attack by successive corps. Confederate intelligence had placed Grant's army within a three-mile wide region, bounded on the east by Lick Creek and on the west by Owl Creek. Hardee's corps was to attack at dawn, spread along this three­ mile front, and would be followed by successive attacks mounted by Bragg, Polk, and finally the reserve troops under Breckinridge. Such a plan invited only confusion, particularly in the broken, dense terrain surrounding Pittsburg Landing. The corps were to move forward only 1,000 yards apart; it required no seer to predict that soon they would become entangled. Another critical matter was evident in Beauregard's plan of April 3, 1862. What was the purpose of the attack? There is considerable evidence to support the thesis that, in the haste of that day's preparations and the confusion of the next two days, Johnston and Beauregard had in mind different objectives. The battle orders of April 3 (issued under Johnston's name) stated that the objective was to strike hard at Grant's left flank near the Tennessee River, drive his troops away from the river landing, and force them back on Owl Creek. But when Beauregard penned his official report after the battle, he did not mention this aim but described the plan as the opposite-that Grant would be driven back into the Tennessee River. Whatever the real Confederate objective, it was lost in chaos even before the army left Corinth. There would be no morning attack on April 4th. The largest Confederate army ever assembled in the West Nas an unwieldy mass of young, inexperienced troops whose officers Nere little better. The muddy streets were filled with swearing teamsters irging on mules and with confused regimental leaders stalled in a nassive traffic jam. By nightfall of April 3, Bishop Polk's corps was yet :o leave Corinth. Matters became worse on April 4. The roads to Pittsburg Landing )ecame a sea of mud afloat with heavy wagons and cumbersome artillery. 3ecause the several roads crisscrossed, intersection points became mpossible tangles, and whole corps waited for hours for others to clear :he road. Bragg's and Polk's corps became caught in an almost hopeless marl, and the green troops became more nervous. It was raining. So the https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 10 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 50 February 2010 SAHS Review

Purdy road

t N

1/2 I Mile,

The Route of the Confederate Advance prior to the Battle of Shilo!. April 3-5, 1862.

troops, fearing that their gunpowder was wet, decided to test fire their weapons, but Confederate officers frantically begged them to cease firing, lest Grant's men know of their approach. In sum, the movement of an inexperienced army twenty miles in a single day proved impossible. By nightfall of Friday, April 4 , only Hardee's corps had reached the staging area at Mickey's junction, and a frustrated Albert Sidney Johnston, riding to the junction in order tc inspect his troops, found his army far from arrayed. He exclaimed "Thi~ is puerile. This is not war!" There would be no attack on April 4. Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 11 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 51

A grim Johnston rescheduled the attack for Saturday morning, April 5, but that night the heavy rain continued to fall. Men were wading, stumbling and plunging through mud and water a foot deep. More maddening delays occurred on the fifth, as the rain continued until early afternoon.All of Hardee's men were deployed by midmorning of the fifth, but Bragg's corps was still not ready by noon. Somehow the general had lost an entire division. Johnston uncharacteristically exploded and went in search of the missing troops. He found them on the road, miles in the rear, blocked by a confusing traffic snarl involving Polk's wagons and artillery at the Mickey's intersection. It was 4 PM before the clogged intersection was cleared and Bragg's missing division could march four miles eastward to its final attack positions near Shiloh. For a second time since leaving Corinth, the attack had to be postponed. That Saturday night Johnston's army stood poised with General Hardee's forward line of battle positioned a mile south of the front­ line Federal camps. In a Council of War of Generals in the Confederate Camp that evening, General Beauregard openly expressed his concern. The enemy surely had been alerted to their presence, he argued, since several skirmishes had been fought between the Confederate advance and Federal pickets. He warned that the element of surprise had been lost. Also, the men were exhausted from their three-day march and some had used up all their rations. In Beauregard's opinion, the army should retire to Corinth. Bragg concurred in his assessment. Johnston, however, perhaps sensing that the hour of his destiny was at hand, reasoned that the Federals would never meet a more powerful force than his army. "I would fight them if they were a million," he resolutely declared. Still this scenario did not quiet Beauregard's fears. At dawn on Sunday, there was another Council of War at Johnston's headquarters. As the generals huddled around a small fire, Beauregard again insisted that the Confederates should retire to Corinth. Even as the argument continued, skirmish fire broke out on Hardee's front. Now the question was indeed moot. Johnston murmured, "the battle has opened, gentlemen." It was now half past five on the morning of April 6, 1862: the Confederate lines and columns were in motion. Like an alpine avalanche they came, attacking first the left of General Grant, under General Prentiss, who, with two thousand of his men, were soon made prisoners. This attack was in part a surprise. Scarcely had the men time https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 12 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 52 February 2010 SAHS Review

The Confederate Generals' Council of War on the Eve of the Battle of Shiloh. to seize their weapons and form, after knowing of the approach of the Confederates. General Grant himself was at Savannah, Tennessee at the commencement of the engagement, but early reached the raging field.5 Meanwhile General Beauregard had taken over the log church called Shiloh, and from this headquarters he performed for Commanding General Johnston the service the other Johnston had performed for him at Manassas, exercising control of the rear area and forwarding reinforcements to those points where additional strength was needed. Thus Johnston was left free to move up and down the line of battle, encouraging the troops and exhorting them to acts of valor.6 Clearly Beauregard's fears had been unfounded. Never before or again in the American Civil War had an army so completely surprised another. After the war, Grant, Sherman, and others would feebly attempt to explain why the Confederate attack was a surprise. After all, for at least two weeks Union intelligence sources had warned of a concentration at Corinth. And certainly after April 4, Grant and Sherman-his immediate commander at Pittsburg Landing-should have been on guard. On April 5, the picket line of the Seventy-second Ohio Regiment encountered

5 Tenney, 176. 6 Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville. (New York: Random House), 336. Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 13 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 53

The Battlefield at Shiloh.

Rebel cavalry in force and had contact with infantry and artillery units as well. That same afternoon, a Federal warned Sherman that a large enemy force was approaching. An angry, incredulous Sherman only rebuked him strongly. Flush with the successes already gained in Tennessee, Grant and '1is officers had little respect for the Confederates and were totally https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 14 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 54 February 2010 SAHS Review

overconfident. On April 5, the very day that the Southern army drew near to the Shiloh field, Sherman informed Grant that he did not expect to be attacked, and Grant telegraphed the same opinion to Washington. It was early in the morning of Sunday, April 6, 1862, and a bright sun was slowly beginning to dry out the rain-soaked forest around the Tennessee River landing. Many bluecoats were still asleep or lounged in camp, totally unaware that 40,000 Confederates were a half-mile away. There was, however, one officer in Prentiss' division, Colonel Everett Peabody, who was uneasy about the reports of Rebel activity near his lines. So before dawn, Colonel Peabody sent out three companies of Missouri infantry to reconnoiter the roads leading toward Corinth. Shortly after it was light enough to see, the Missouri troops, all new recruits, reached an open field owned by a local farmer named Fraley. At five o'clock in the morning the Missourians encountered the advance of Hardee's corps, and thus began the greatest battle yet fought in North America. To understand the remainder of the story of Shiloh, the reader should visit Shiloh himself. At the entrance to the military park, a large array of impressive, beautiful and exquisitely carved granite, marble and bronze statues and monuments, representing the various States and the military virtues of fortitude, tenacity, courage and valor, greet the eye. It is a most moving sight, and the visitor is awed by these splendid memorials to the glorious dead of American military history. There is a Visitor's Center with knowledgeable guides, and an excellent bookstore specializing in books and memorabilia concerning the era of the American Civil War. An extremely interesting film, recounting the story of the battle and its aftermath, is shown each hour at the Visitor's Center. Especially moving is the scene in the film in which the widows of the fallen Confederate soldiers come to General Beauregard's headquarters at Corinth the day after the battle and, like the bereaved Pryam visiting the tent of Achilles after the death of Hector, beseech General Beauregard to allow them to go to the battlefield at Shiloh and retrieve the bodies of their slain husbands. A true gentlemen of the South, General Beauregard demonstrates great sympathy for their grief and promises to do all in his power to grant their request. Unfortunately, because of the heat and vast number of cadavers, General Grant had already ordered the bodies of all the soldiers slain at Shiloh to be buried in hastily dug trenches. Nonetheless, General Grant did write an eloquent and Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 15 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 55

Federal Colonel Speed S. Fry shoots and kills Confederate Brigadier General at the Battle of Mills Springs, Kentucky. extremely respectful letter to General Beauregard in which he explained the reasons for his inability to accede to the request of the widows of Corinth. Such was the gallantry and chivalry of the age. Of special interest to is the large number of mldiers from Ohio, , Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, , North :)akota, South Dakota and Minnesota who fought and died at Shiloh. v1any of these soldiers were Swiss themselves or of immediate Swiss iescent and remain buried on the field of honor at Shiloh. Indeed, during the American Civil War, 6,000 Swiss American ;oldiers fought in the . Given that all of Tennessee had Jeen heavily colonized during the first half of the nineteenth century by German and Swiss immigrants, attracted to the region by organizations mch as the German-American East Tennessee Colonization Company, md given that most counties of Tennessee contributed many Swiss 1\.merican soldiers to the Confederate Cause, we can affirm that a large number of Confederate soldiers involved in the Tennessee campaigns of the Civil War were Swiss or of Swiss descent as well, with the result that the history of Swiss America illuminates in a specially tragic manne1 https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 16 Page: Tue Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 56 February 2010 SAHS Review

the internecine nature of the Civil War. For example, Confederate Brigadier General Felix Zollicoffer, a descendent of Swiss colonists who had immigrated to in 1710 and a citizen of Maury County, Tennessee, played a major role in the defense of Tennessee during the campaigns of 1861 and 1862 and through his wise military judgments and tactics, delayed for several months the Union capture of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Nashville. In July 1861, understanding that General Zollicoffer was one of the South's most competent officers, Tennessee Governor Isham Harris ordered him and 4,000 troops to Knoxville to suppress the East Tennessee resistance to secession. In September, General Zollicoffer led a force of 5,400 men from Tennessee through the Cumberland Gap along the in an effort to seize central Kentucky and thereby protect Tennessee from invasion. In November 1861 he advanced westward into southeastern Kentucky, found a strong defensive position at Mill Springs and decided to make it his winter quarters. On December 8, 1861, he was superseded by the arrival of Major General George B. Crittenden, who assumed command of the department, but retained Zollicoffer as commander of the 1st Brigade in his army. The following month Union Brigadier General George H. Thomas received orders to drive the Confederates across the Cumberland River and break up Crittenden's army. Two days later, January 19, 1862, he and Brigadier General Albin F. Schoepf attacked Crittenden and Zollicoffer at the . Zollicoffer's men were routed from the field. Some accounts claim that Union Colonel Speed S. Fry shot Zollicoffer as the battle waned. He had inadvertently wandered into the Union position, thinking they were Confederate soldiers with his nearsightedness and the gathering darkness. He was struck several times by enemy bullets and soon died from his wounds. The Federals treated the body of the slain Swiss American Confederate General Zollicoffer with great respect; he was embalmed by a Union surgeon and was eventually returned to Tennessee and finally interred with ceremony in the Old City Cemetery in Nashville. Zollicoffer Park, a Confederate cemetery containing a mass grave of the Confederate fallen and lying just outside of Nancy, Kentucky near the battlefield at Mill Springs, is named in his honor. At the Battle of Shiloh itself, hundreds of Swiss American Confederate soldiers, hailing from the many Swiss settled counties of Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020 17 Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 46 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4 The Swiss American Presence at the Battle of Shiloh 57

Tennessee, courageously defended their homeland. Ironically, on the Union side, hundreds of Swiss American soldiers from the Midwest fought with equal valor, and at certain moments of the battle, some probably fought against their own relatives. Union Brigadier General John Eugene Smith, born in Berne in 1816, distinguished himself at Shiloh, leading his regiment with gallantry. Jacob Ammen, a Colonel of the 24th Ohio and a Commander of the 10th Brigade of the 4th Division of Euell's Army of the Ohio, brought his brigade to the field on the first day of Battle of Shiloh and positioned it just in time to repulse the last Confederate attack of the day. He led his brigade with conspicuous skill and courage during the second day of the b~ttle, Monday, April 7, 1862, successfully protecting the extreme left flank of Euell's army; he was later commended by Major General Buell for his valiant actions and excellent judgment at Shiloh. At that same battle the 32nd Indiana played a critical role on the second day by helping to turn the tide in favor of the Union. praised the Swiss and Germans of this regiment for their efforts on the battlefield that day. While not participating in the Battle of Shiloh itself, the Missouri 15 th Infantry, the renowned "Swiss Rifles," composed of Germans and German-speaking Swiss soldiers from the St. Louis area, did play a vital role in the Shiloh campaign and participated in the shortly thereafter. Shiloh National Military Park does contain a national military cemetery overlooking Pittsburg Landing and the Tennessee River. Those who wish to identify the grave of a Swiss or Swiss American ancestor at Shiloh should consult prior to their visit with one of the administrators at the office at the Visitor's Center or with the Department of the Army in Washington. From the above it should be clear to all that the trip to Shiloh is a most valuable, moving and educational experience. A clearly marked itinerary and map guide the visitor through the park, and it is possible to purchase at the park bookstore a detailed audio car CD to accompany and narrate your driving tour. The author highly recommends a visit to Shiloh National Military Park as a deeply rewarding and inspirational patriotic experience.

Bryan College Dayton, Tennessee https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol46/iss1/4 18