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Iranian Kurds: Consequences of Political Activities in Iran and KRI – Feb. 2020

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Iranian Kurds: Consequences of Political Activities in Iran and KRI – Feb. 2020 COUNTRY REPORT February 2020 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) Iranian Kurds Consequences of political activities in Iran and KRI nyidanmark.dk © 2020 The Danish Immigration Service The Danish Immigration Service Ryesgade 53 2100 Copenhagen Denmark Phone: +45 35 36 66 00 newtodenmark.dk February 2020 All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service. The publication can be downloaded for free at newtodenmark.dk The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source reference. Front page: Private photo from the Iranian province of Kurdistan. IRANIAN KURDS - CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN IRAN AND KRI Contents Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................. 3 Introduction and methodology ............................................................................................................... 4 Abbreviations and definitions used in the report .................................................................................... 6 Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 10 Background .......................................................................................................................................... 11 The Iranian Kurdish political parties ............................................................................................................ 12 Historic overview ......................................................................................................................................... 12 The al Tash refugee camp (1982-2005) ....................................................................................................... 14 Recent developments .................................................................................................................................. 14 1. Activities carried out by Iranian Kurdish political parties in Iran ...................................................... 16 2. Recruitment of new members to the political parties ..................................................................... 16 3. Armed conflicts between Kurdish opposition parties and the Iranian Government ......................... 17 3.1 Recent clashes ................................................................................................................................. 18 4. Conditions of Kurdish activists in Iran ............................................................................................ 19 4.1 Treatment of activists by the Iranian authorities ............................................................................ 19 4.1.1 Targeting of political activists ...................................................................................................... 19 4.1.2 Do the authorities differentiate between members and supporters of the Kurdish parties? .... 20 4.1.3 Monitoring of activists ................................................................................................................. 20 4.1.4 Arrest and detention ................................................................................................................... 22 4.1.5 Torture and punishment.............................................................................................................. 24 4.1.6 Access to fair trial ........................................................................................................................ 25 4.2 Tagetig of atiists fail ees ........................................................................................... 27 4.2.1 Family members of political activists abroad .............................................................................. 28 5 Conditions for Iranian Kurds in KRI ................................................................................................ 28 5.1 Monitoring and targeting by Iranian authorities of Iranian Kurds living in KRI ............................... 28 5.1.1 The monitoring and targeting of political activists and supporters by the Iranian intelligence authoritiesin KRI ....................................................................................................................................... 29 5.2 Residence permits in KRI for Iranian Kurds ..................................................................................... 30 5.2.1 Access to residency in KRI............................................................................................................ 30 5.2.2 Obtaining Iraqi passports as Iranian Kurds .................................................................................. 31 1 IRANIAN KURDS - CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN IRAN AND KRI 6 Returning to Iran ........................................................................................................................... 32 6.1 Seuit Lettes aa-aeh ..................................................................................................... 32 6.1.1 Activists who return ..................................................................................................................... 32 6.1.2 Family members who return ....................................................................................................... 34 6.2 Al-Tash Refugees ............................................................................................................................. 35 6.2.1 Return of refugees from the al-Tash camp ................................................................................. 35 7. Conditions in the border area between Iran and Iraq ..................................................................... 36 7.1 Legal crossings ................................................................................................................................. 36 7.2 Illegal crossings ................................................................................................................................ 36 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 38 Oral sources ................................................................................................................................................. 38 Written sources ........................................................................................................................................... 39 Appendix 1: Meeting minutes ............................................................................................................... 47 Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan - Geneva (KMMK-G) ................................................................ 47 Hengaw Organization for Human Rights ..................................................................................................... 59 Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) .................................................................................... 66 KRG, Ministry of Immigration and Displacement, Directorate of Residency, Erbil Province ...................... 70 KRG, Ministry of Immigration and Displacement, Directorate of Passports, Erbil Province ....................... 73 A journalist in KRI (A) ................................................................................................................................... 74 Written note, Academic Researcher, Hemn Seyedi .................................................................................... 76 A journalist in KRI (B) ................................................................................................................................... 78 Kurdistan Human Rights Network ............................................................................................................... 85 A journalist in KRI (C), Nasser Piroti ............................................................................................................. 92 A journalist in KRI (D) ................................................................................................................................... 99 Appendix 2: Terms of Reference (ToR) ................................................................................................ 102 Map: Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 103 2 IRANIAN KURDS - CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN IRAN AND KRI Disclaimer This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology.1 The report is primarily based on approved minutes from meetings with carefully selected sources; however, written material is used as well. Statements from sources are used in the report and all statements are referenced. This report is not, and does not purport to be a detailed or comprehensive survey of all aspects of the issues addressed in the report and should be weighed against other available country of origin information on conditions for Iranian Kurds, who are in opposition to the Iranian Government in Iran, and in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations or analysis. The information in the report does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service. Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular
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