DOCSLIB.ORG

Chapter 1: Thesis Overview and Methodology

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Chapter 1: Thesis Overview and Methodology Explaining Non-Transitions: The Strategic Behavior of Political Groups in Singapore and Hong Kong Inaugural-Dissertation in der Philosophischen Fakultät und Fachbereich Theologie der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg vorgelegt von Stephan Ortmann (Vor- und Zuname) aus Marburg (Geburtsort) D 29 Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 15. Februar 2008 Dekan: Universitätsprofessor Dr. Jens Kulenkampff. Erstgutachter: Universitätsprofessor Dr. Mark R. Thompson Zweitgutachter: Universitätsprofessor Dr. Thomas Fröhlich Acknowledgments This book is dedicated first and foremost to my mentor, Prof. Mark R. Thompson, who has guided me through this work with dedication and hard work. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Chua Beng Huat, whose comments have helped me tremendously. My thanks also go to Prof. Wang Gungwu, who invited me as a Visiting Scholar to the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore. I also need to mention Guido Haefele, who has kindly proof-read my book and given my helpful advice. Finally, I many thanks go to my wife, Hongzhuan Li, without whose support and strength I would not have been able to finish this book. Table of Contents Index of Tables......................................................................................................8 Illustration Index..................................................................................................8 List of Abbreviations.............................................................................................9 Chapter 1: Thesis Overview and Methodology .......................................................11 1.1 Hypotheses ........................................................................................................12 1.2 Methodology .....................................................................................................16 1.3 Singapore and Hong Kong: Most Similar Cases ..............................................18 1.4 Chapter Outline .................................................................................................21 Chapter 2: Democratization and the Role of Modernization.................................24 2.1 The Modernization Process...............................................................................25 2.2 The Process of Democratization........................................................................29 2.3 Modernization and Democratization.................................................................35 2.4 Modernization and Contentious Politics............................................................39 2.5 Conclusion and Outlook....................................................................................43 Chapter 3: The Political Process Model of Democratization.................................45 3.1. Ruling Elite Groups and Oppositional Groups.................................................46 3.2 Political Groups and Democratization...............................................................49 3.3 Expanding Political Opportunities and the Institutional Structure....................55 3.4 Organizational Strength.....................................................................................58 3.4.1 Members....................................................................................................59 3.4.2 Leaders.......................................................................................................60 3.4.3 The Structure of Incentives........................................................................60 3.4.4 Communication Network...........................................................................61 3.5 Changing Cognitive Perceptions and Legitimacy.............................................62 3.5.1 The “Imperial Image”: Sense of Stability and Powerlessness...................65 3.5.2 The “Colonial Image”: Superiority............................................................66 3.5.3 The Role of Legitimacy.............................................................................67 3.6 The Goals and Tactics of Elite Groups..............................................................72 3.7 The Goals and Tactics of Challenger Groups....................................................74 3.8 Conclusion and Outlook....................................................................................76 Chapter 4: Expanding Political Opportunities and Limiting Institutional Structures in Hong Kong in the 1970s......................................................................80 4.1 Expanding Political Opportunities.....................................................................81 4.1.1 Decolonization without Independence and Democratization....................82 4.1.2 Economic Modernization...........................................................................86 4.1.3 Significance of the 1966 and 1967 Riots ..................................................88 4.2 The Institutional Structure.................................................................................92 1 4.2.1. Hong Kong’s Bureaucratic Regime..........................................................93 4.2.2. Legislative and Executive Councils..........................................................95 4.2.3 Civil Liberties and Restrictions.................................................................97 4.2.4 An Independent Judiciary?.........................................................................99 4.2.5 The Urban Council – Democratic Islet in a Non-Competitive Political System...............................................................................................................102 4.3. Explaining Political Stability..........................................................................105 4.4. Summary and Outlook....................................................................................109 Chapter 5: Expanding Political Opportunities and Limiting Institutional Structures in Singapore............................................................................................111 5.1 Expanding Political Opportunities...................................................................112 5.1.1 The Birth of a Nation and the Fight for Survival.....................................113 5.1.2 Economic Modernization.........................................................................118 5.1.3 The Significance of J.B. Jeyaretnam’s Victory in 1981...........................121 5.2 The Institutional Structure...............................................................................125 5.2.1 Singapore’s Bureaucratic Regime............................................................126 5.2.2 State Corporatism in Singapore...............................................................129 5.2.3 Laws and Regulations – Singapore as a “fine city”.................................135 5.2.4 An Independent Judiciary?.......................................................................139 5.2.5 Elections and Opposition in a Singaporean Democracy..........................143 5.3 Explaining Political Stability...........................................................................146 5.4 Summary and Outlook.....................................................................................150 Chapter 6: The Behavior of Ruling Elite Groups in Hong Kong.........................152 6.1 Ruling Elite Groups in Hong Kong.................................................................153 6.2 Organizational Strength...................................................................................154 6.2.1 Members..................................................................................................154 6.2.2 Leaders.....................................................................................................156 6.2.3 Incentives: Reasons for Group Cohesion.................................................158 6.2.4 Communication Network.........................................................................160 6.3 Cognitive Perceptions and Legitimacy............................................................163 6.3.1 A Sense of Superiority and Self-Confidence...........................................164 6.3.2 Proxy Paternalism and Small Government..............................................168 6.3.3 Performance Legitimacy between Success and Failure...........................170 6.4 Goals................................................................................................................172 6.4.1. Progressive Goals: From Status-Quo to Improving the Society ............172 6.4.2 Conservative Goals: Maintaining the Status Quo....................................175 6.5 Tactics..............................................................................................................177 6.5.1 Moderate Tactics: Co-option of Opposition and Willingness to Compromise......................................................................................................177 6.5.2 Extreme Tactics: Secretive Control of Dissent........................................182 6.6 Conclusion and Outlook..................................................................................186 2 Chapter 7: The Behavior of Ruling Elite Groups in Singapore...........................188 7.1 Ruling Elite Groups in Singapore....................................................................188 7.2 Organizational Strength...................................................................................190 7.2.1
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Why Are Gender Reforms Adopted in Singapore? Party Pragmatism and Electoral Incentives* Netina Tan
    Why Are Gender Reforms Adopted in Singapore? Party Pragmatism and Electoral Incentives* Netina Tan Abstract In Singapore, the percentage of elected female politicians rose from 3.8 percent in 1984 to 22.5 percent after the 2015 general election. After years of exclusion, why were gender reforms adopted and how did they lead to more women in political office? Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, this paper shows that in Singapore party pragmatism rather than international diffusion of gender equality norms, feminist lobbying, or rival party pressures drove gender reforms. It is argued that the ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) strategic and electoral calculations to maintain hegemonic rule drove its policy u-turn to nominate an average of about 17.6 percent female candidates in the last three elections. Similar to the PAP’s bid to capture women voters in the 1959 elections, it had to alter its patriarchal, conservative image to appeal to the younger, progressive electorate in the 2000s. Additionally, Singapore’s electoral system that includes multi-member constituencies based on plurality party bloc vote rule also makes it easier to include women and diversify the party slate. But despite the strategic and electoral incentives, a gender gap remains. Drawing from a range of public opinion data, this paper explains why traditional gender stereotypes, biased social norms, and unequal family responsibilities may hold women back from full political participation. Keywords: gender reforms, party pragmatism, plurality party bloc vote, multi-member constituencies, ethnic quotas, PAP, Singapore DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2016892369 ____________________ Netina Tan is an assistant professor of political science at McMaster University.
    [Show full text]
  • Group Representation Constituencies
    Sembawang Sengkang West SMC GRC Hougang SMC Punggol East SMC Polling Marsiling- Yew Tee GRC Chua Chu Kang Nee Soon Pulau Ubin Pulau GRC GRC Tekong Bukit Holland- Panjang Bukit Timah Ang Mo Kio Pasir Ris- scorecard SMC GRC GRC Punggol GRC Hong Kah Here’s your guide to the polls. North SMC Bishan- Aljunied Tampines Toa Payoh GRC GRC You can ll in the results as they are GRC Jurong East Coast GRC released on www.straitstimes.com/ge2015 GRC and tick the winners as they are announced. West Marine Coast Tanjong Pagar Parade GRC GRC GRC Jalan Mountbatten Fengshan SMC Besar SMC Jurong GRC 6-member GRCs Island Bukit Batok MacPherson 5-member GRCs SMC Pulau Brani SMC Sentosa 4-member GRCs Pioneer SMC Yuhua SMC Radin Mas SMC Potong Pasir SMC SMCs GROUP REPRESENTATION CONSTITUENCIES Aljunied 148,142 voters Ang Mo Kio 187,771 voters Bishan-Toa Payoh 129,975 voters Votes cast Spoilt votes Votes cast Spoilt votes Votes cast Spoilt votes WP No. of votes PAP No. of votes PAP No. of votes Low Thia Khiang, Sylvia Lim, 50 Chen Show Mao, Lee Hsien Loong, 63 Ang Hin Kee, 49 Intan Azura Ng Eng Hen, 56 Josephine Teo, 47 Chong Kee Hiong, 59 54 Mokhtar, 39 49 Muhamad Faisal Pritam Singh, 39 Gan Thiam Poh, 51 Darryl David, 44 Koh Poh Koon, 43 Chee Hong Tat, 41 Saktiandi Supaat, Abdul Manap, 40 41 PAP No. of votes RP No. of votes SPP No. of votes Yeo Guat Kwang, Victor Lye K. Muralidharan M. Ravi, 46 Gilbert Goh Jesse Loo Benjamin Pwee Mohamad Hamim Law Kim Hwee, 55 54 Thiam Fatt, 53 Pillai, 47 Keow Wah, 54 Hoe Bock, 52 Yek Kwan, 47 Aliyas, 51 Chua Eng Leong, Shamsul Kamar, 43 Osman Sulaiman, Roy Ngerng Siva Chandran, 31 Bryan Long Mohamad Abdillah 44 40 Yi Ling, 34 Yaoguang, 37 Zamzuri, 30 • It made history in 2011 as the rst GRC to be won by an opposition party, • Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s constituency had the highest GRC vote • The PAP team here has the largest share of new faces apart from a defeat for the PAP which saw two Cabinet ministers lose their seats.
    [Show full text]
  • Modern Hong Kong
    Modern Hong Kong Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History Modern Hong Kong Steve Tsang Subject: China, Hong Kong, Macao, and/or Taiwan Online Publication Date: Feb 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.280 Abstract and Keywords Hong Kong entered its modern era when it became a British overseas territory in 1841. In its early years as a Crown Colony, it suffered from corruption and racial segregation but grew rapidly as a free port that supported trade with China. It took about two decades before Hong Kong established a genuinely independent judiciary and introduced the Cadet Scheme to select and train senior officials, which dramatically improved the quality of governance. Until the Pacific War (1941–1945), the colonial government focused its attention and resources on the small expatriate community and largely left the overwhelming majority of the population, the Chinese community, to manage themselves, through voluntary organizations such as the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals. The 1940s was a watershed decade in Hong Kong’s history. The fall of Hong Kong and other European colonies to the Japanese at the start of the Pacific War shattered the myth of the superiority of white men and the invincibility of the British Empire. When the war ended the British realized that they could not restore the status quo ante. They thus put an end to racial segregation, removed the glass ceiling that prevented a Chinese person from becoming a Cadet or Administrative Officer or rising to become the Senior Member of the Legislative or the Executive Council, and looked into the possibility of introducing municipal self-government.
    [Show full text]
  • [2020] SGCA 16 Civil Appeal No 99 of 2019 Between Wham Kwok Han
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE [2020] SGCA 16 Civil Appeal No 99 of 2019 Between Wham Kwok Han Jolovan … Appellant And The Attorney-General … Respondent Civil Appeal No 108 of 2019 Between Tan Liang Joo John … Appellant And The Attorney-General … Respondent Civil Appeal No 109 of 2019 Between The Attorney-General … Appellant And Wham Kwok Han Jolovan … Respondent Civil Appeal No 110 of 2019 Between The Attorney-General … Appellant And Tan Liang Joo John … Respondent In the matter of Originating Summons No 510 of 2018 Between The Attorney-General And Wham Kwok Han Jolovan In the matter of Originating Summons No 537 of 2018 Between The Attorney-General And Tan Liang Joo John ii JUDGMENT [Contempt of Court] — [Scandalising the court] [Contempt of Court] — [Sentencing] iii This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Attorney-General and other appeals [2020] SGCA 16 Court of Appeal — Civil Appeals Nos 99, 108, 109 and 110 of 2019 Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, Judith Prakash JA, Tay Yong Kwang JA and Steven Chong JA 22 January 2020 16 March 2020 Judgment reserved. Sundaresh Menon CJ (delivering the judgment of the court): Introduction 1 These appeals arise out of HC/OS 510/2018 (“OS 510”) and HC/OS 537/2018 (“OS 537”), which were initiated by the Attorney-General (“the AG”) to punish Mr Wham Kwok Han Jolovan (“Wham”) and Mr Tan Liang Joo John (“Tan”) respectively for contempt by scandalising the court (“scandalising contempt”) under s 3(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016) (“the AJPA”).
    [Show full text]
  • Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report
    Volume 94 Monday No 21 11 July 2016 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES SINGAPORE OFFICIAL REPORT CONTENTS Written Answers to Questions Page 1. Posting of Job Openings in Public Service on National Jobs Bank (Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan) 1 2. Plans for Wider Use of Automated Vehicle Systems in Transport System (Dr Lim Wee Kiak) 1 3. Statistics on Malaysian Cars Entering and Leaving Singapore and Traffic Offences Committed (Mr Low Thia Khiang) 2 4. Erection of Noise Barriers between Chua Chu Kang and Bukit Gombak MRT Stations (Mr Zaqy Mohamad) 2 5. Need for Pram-friendly Buses (Mr Desmond Choo) 3 6. Review of Need for Inspection of New Cars from Third Year Onwards (Mr Ang Hin Kee) 3 7. Number of Female Bus Captains Employed by Public Bus Operators (Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye) 4 8. Green-Man Plus Scheme at Pedestrian Crossing along Potong Pasir Avenue 1 (Mr Sitoh Yih Pin) 5 9. Determination of COE Quota for Category D Vehicles (Mr Thomas Chua Kee Seng) 5 10. Taxi Stand in Vicinity of Blocks 216 to 222 at Lorong 8 Toa Payoh (Mr Sitoh Yih Pin) 6 11. Cyber Security Measures in Place at Key Installations and Critical Infrastructures (Mr Darryl David) 6 12. Government Expenditure on Advertisements and Sponsored Posts on Online Media Platforms (Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong) 7 13. Regulars, NSmen and NSFs Diagnosed with Mental Health Problems (Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong) 7 14. Involvement of Phone Scam Suspects Arrested Overseas in Phone Scams in Singapore (Mr Gan Thiam Poh) 8 15. Deployment of Auxiliary Police Officers and CCTVs at Liquor Control Zone in Little India (Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye) 9 16.
    [Show full text]
  • 331KB***Administrative and Constitutional
    (2016) 17 SAL Ann Rev Administrative and Constitutional Law 1 1. ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW THIO Li-ann BA (Oxon) (Hons), LLM (Harvard), PhD (Cantab); Barrister (Gray’s Inn, UK); Provost Chair Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. Introduction 1.1 In terms of administrative law, the decided cases showed some insight into the role of courts in relation to: handing over town council management to another political party after a general election, the susceptibility of professional bodies which are vested with statutory powers like the Law Society review committee to judicial review; as well as important observations on substantive legitimate expectations and developments in exceptions to the rule against bias on the basis of necessity, and how this may apply to private as opposed to statutory bodies. Many of the other cases affirmed existing principles of administrative legality and the need for an evidential basis to sustain an argument. For example, a bare allegation of bias without evidence cannot be sustained; allegations of bias cannot arise when a litigant is simply made to follow well-established court procedures.1 1.2 Most constitutional law cases revolved around Art 9 issues. Judicial observations on the nature or scope of specific constitutional powers were made in cases not dealing directly with constitutional arguments. See Kee Oon JC in Karthigeyan M Kailasam v Public Prosecutor2 noted the operation of a presumption of legality and good faith in relation to acts of public officials; the Prosecution, in particular, is presumed “to act in the public interest at all times”, in relation to all prosecuted cases from the first instance to appellate level.
    [Show full text]
  • Institutionalized Leadership: Resilient Hegemonic Party Autocracy in Singapore
    Institutionalized Leadership: Resilient Hegemonic Party Autocracy in Singapore By Netina Tan PhD Candidate Political Science Department University of British Columbia Paper prepared for presentation at CPSA Conference, 28 May 2009 Ottawa, Ontario Work- in-progress, please do not cite without author’s permission. All comments welcomed, please contact author at [email protected] Abstract In the age of democracy, the resilience of Singapore’s hegemonic party autocracy is puzzling. The People’s Action Party (PAP) has defied the “third wave”, withstood economic crises and ruled uninterrupted for more than five decades. Will the PAP remain a deviant case and survive the passing of its founding leader, Lee Kuan Yew? Building on an emerging scholarship on electoral authoritarianism and the concept of institutionalization, this paper argues that the resilience of hegemonic party autocracy depends more on institutions than coercion, charisma or ideological commitment. Institutionalized parties in electoral autocracies have a greater chance of survival, just like those in electoral democracies. With an institutionalized leadership succession system to ensure self-renewal and elite cohesion, this paper contends that PAP will continue to rule Singapore in the post-Lee era. 2 “All parties must institutionalize to a certain extent in order to survive” Angelo Panebianco (1988, 54) Introduction In the age of democracy, the resilience of Singapore’s hegemonic party regime1 is puzzling (Haas 1999). A small island with less than 4.6 million population, Singapore is the wealthiest non-oil producing country in the world that is not a democracy.2 Despite its affluence and ideal socio- economic prerequisites for democracy, the country has been under the rule of one party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) for the last five decades.
    [Show full text]
  • The War on Terrorism and the Internal Security Act of Singapore
    Damien Cheong ____________________________________________________________ Selling Security: The War on Terrorism and the Internal Security Act of Singapore DAMIEN CHEONG Abstract The Internal Security Act (ISA) of Singapore has been transformed from a se- curity law into an effective political instrument of the Singapore government. Although the government's use of the ISA for political purposes elicited negative reactions from the public, it was not prepared to abolish, or make amendments to the Act. In the wake of September 11 and the international campaign against terrorism, the opportunity to (re)legitimize the government's use of the ISA emerged. This paper argues that despite the ISA's seeming importance in the fight against terrorism, the absence of explicit definitions of national security threats, either in the Act itself, or in accompanying legislation, renders the ISA susceptible to political misuse. Keywords: Internal Security Act, War on Terrorism. People's Action Party, Jemaah Islamiyah. Introduction In 2001/2002, the Singapore government arrested and detained several Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operatives under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for engaging in terrorist activities. It was alleged that the detained operatives were planning to attack local and foreign targets in Singa- pore. The arrests outraged human rights groups, as the operation was reminiscent of the government's crackdown on several alleged Marxist conspirators in1987. Human rights advocates were concerned that the current detainees would be dissuaded from seeking legal counsel and subjected to ill treatment during their period of incarceration (Tang 1989: 4-7; Frank et al. 1991: 5-99). Despite these protests, many Singaporeans expressed their strong support for the government's actions.
    [Show full text]
  • Jaclyn L. Neo
    Jaclyn L. Neo NAVIGATING MINORITY INCLUSION AND PERMANENT DIVISION: MINORITIES AND THE DEPOLITICIZATION OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCE* INTRODUCTION dapting the majority principle in electoral systems for the ac- commodation of political minorities is a crucial endeavour if A one desires to prevent the permanent disenfranchisement of those minorities. Such permanent exclusion undermines the maintenance and consolidation of democracy as there is a risk that this could lead to po- litical upheaval should the political minorities start to see the system as op- pressive and eventually revolt against it. These risks are particularly elevat- ed in the case of majoritarian systems, e.g. those relying on simple plurality where the winner is the candidate supported by only a relative majority, i.e. having the highest number of votes compared to other candidates1. Further- more, such a system, while formally equal, could however be considered substantively unequal since formal equality often fails to recognize the es- pecial vulnerabilities of minority groups and therefore can obscure the need to find solutions to address those vulnerabilities. Intervention in strict majoritarian systems is thus sometimes deemed necessary to preserve effective participation of minorities in political life to ensure a more robust democracy. Such intervention has been considered es- pecially important in societies characterized by cleavages such as race/ethnicity, religion, language, and culture, where there is a need to en- sure that minority groups are not permanently excluded from the political process. This could occur when their voting choices almost never produce the outcomes they desire or when, as candidates, they almost never receive the sufficient threshold of support to win elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Sunil Sharma
    Visiting Scholar, Institute for International Economic Policy Elliott School of International Affairs, Suite 502 The George Washington University Washington, DC 20052, USA. Mobile: +(1) 202-600-6345 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] SUNIL SHARMA Education Ph.D. (Economics), Cornell University, USA, 1986. M.A. (Economics), Cornell University, USA, 1983. M.A. (Economics), Delhi School of Economics, India, 1980. B.A. (Honors), St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University, India, 1978. Professional Visiting Scholar, Institute of International Economic Policy, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2018- Experience Assistant Director, Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 2015-2018 . Research on financial market development, regulation, and macro-financial issues. Oversaw and contributed to the review of IMF papers on financial policy issues. Director, IMF-Singapore Regional Training Institute (STI), Singapore, 2006-2014 . Managed STI operations, including curriculum, teaching, administration, budget, IT, personnel, outreach, and liaising with governments in the Asia-Pacific region. Ex officio Secretary of the STI Executive Committee; Coordinate STI operations with the Singapore government (Monetary Authority of Singapore, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), IMF’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Tokyo, and IMF Headquarters in Washington D.C. Co-managed the Finance program of the IMF Institute. Designed and taught a 5-day seminar on Selected Issues in the Evolving Financial Regulatory Framework at the STI (2011-13). Designed and taught a 5-day seminar on Mortgage Markets and Financial Stability at the regional institutes in Vienna (2009-13) and Singapore (2008-13). Organized the First STI Meeting on Training (April 27-28, 2006) in Singapore to start a dialogue on the STI curriculum and training events with the directors of training at central banks and finance ministries in the Asia-Pacific region.
    [Show full text]
  • 12TH ASIAN CHEMICAL CONGRESS (12ACC) 2007 Registration Form
    No. 1 / 2007 ■ Kuwait Chemical Society Symposium on Application of Catalyst in the Industry ■ 2006 Activities and 2007 President Profiles of the Member Societies www.facs-as.org Federation of Asian Chemical Societies Newsletter | No. 1 / 2007 ontents Obituary ■ Dr. Tan Sri B C Sekhar (1929 – 2006) 4 ■ Prof. Hitoshi Ohtaki (1932 – 2006) 6 Special Symposium ■ Kuwait Chemical Society Symposium on Application of Catalyst in the Industry (Fuel, Pollution and Drugs) 9 Biofuels: Emerging Renewable Energy for the Transportation Sector 10 Discrete Physico-Chemical Processes that Characterise Water Pollution 13 Peptide-Cleaving Catalyst as a New Paradigm in Drug Discovery 16 2006 Activities and 2007 President Profiles of the Member Societies ■ Brunei Darussalam Institute of Chemistry 18 ■ Chinese Chemical Society 20 ■ Hong Kong Chemical Society 22 ■ Institut Kimia Malaysia 23 ■ Korean Chemical Society 27 ■ New Zealand Institute of Chemistry 29 ■ Royal Australian Chemical Institute 32 FACS Activities ■ Minutes of the 49th EXCO Meeting 34 ■ FACS Project Reports Asian Chemicla Education Network (ACEN) 41 Asian Network for Environmental chemistry (ANEC) 42 Low-Cost Instrumentation-Microscale Chemistry (LCI-MSC) 47 Meeting Announcement: The 12th Asian Chemical Congress 49 Directories ■ FACS EXCO Members (2005-2007) 55 ■ Member Societies 56 ■ Project Directors (2006-2007) 58 ■ FACS Fellows 59 ■ FACS Life-time Members 60 An electronic version of FACS Newsletter is available at http://www.facs.org. Obituary The Late Academician Dr. Tan Sri B C Sekhar (1929 – 2006) he Late academician Dr. Tan Sri B C Sekhar, born on November 17, 1929 at Sungai Buloh, Malaysia near the 3,400-acre experiment station of the Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM), was fondly known as Mr Natural Rubber for his motivation, passion and commitment to the development of natural rubber industry.
    [Show full text]
  • Major Vote Swing
    BT INFOGRAPHICS GE2015 Major vote swing Bukit Batok Sengkang West SMC SMC Sembawang Punggol East GRC SMC Hougang SMC Marsiling- Nee Soon Yew Tee GRC GRC Chua Chu Kang Ang Mo Kio Holland- GRC GRC Pasir Ris- Bukit Punggol GRC Hong Kah Timah North SMC GRC Aljunied Tampines Bishan- GRC GRC Toa Payoh East Coast GRC GRC West Coast Marine GRC Parade Tanjong Pagar GRC GRC Fengshan SMC MacPherson SMC Mountbatten SMC FOUR-MEMBER GRC Jurong GRC Potong Pasir SMC Chua Chu Kang Registered voters: 119,931; Pioneer Yuhua Bukit Panjang Radin Mas Jalan Besar total votes cast: 110,191; rejected votes: 2,949 SMC SMC SMC SMC SMC 76.89% 23.11% (84,731 votes) (25,460 votes) PEOPLE’S ACTION PARTY (83 SEATS) WORKERS’ PARTY (6 SEATS) PEOPLE’S PEOPLE’S ACTION PARTY POWER PARTY Gan Kim Yong Goh Meng Seng Low Yen Ling Lee Tze Shih SIX-MEMBER GRC Yee Chia Hsing Low Wai Choo Zaqy Mohamad Syafarin Sarif Ang Mo Kio Pasir Ris-Punggol 2011 winner: People’s Action Party (61.20%) Registered voters: 187,771; Registered voters: 187,396; total votes cast: 171,826; rejected votes: 4,887 total votes cast: 171,529; rejected votes: 5,310 East Coast Registered voters: 99,118; 78.63% 21.37% 72.89% 27.11% total votes cast: 90,528; rejected votes: 1,008 (135,115 votes) (36,711 votes) (125,021 votes) (46,508 votes) 60.73% 39.27% (54,981 votes) (35,547 votes) PEOPLE’S THE REFORM PEOPLE’S SINGAPORE ACTION PARTY PARTY ACTION PARTY DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE Ang Hin Kee Gilbert Goh J Puthucheary Abu Mohamed PEOPLE’S WORKERS’ Darryl David Jesse Loo Ng Chee Meng Arthero Lim ACTION PARTY PARTY Gan
    [Show full text]