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Faculty of Arts Department of China Studies Master’s Thesis 2020 Bc. Daria Ishchuk Faculty of Arts Department of China Studies Contemporary Communist Youth League at Zhejiang University: A Case Study Master’s Thesis Bc. Daria Ishchuk Supervisor: Mgr. Bc. Denisa Hilbertová, M.A. Brno 2020 I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and it contains no other materials written or published by any other person except where due ref- erence is made in the text of the thesis. ………..………………………….. The author Brno, January 2020 The thesis was completed within the cooperation framework between the Department of Chinese Studies (Masaryk University) and the Institute of China Studies (Zhejiang University). During my two-semester stay in China, the thesis was supervised by Prof. Zhang Xingkui 张兴奎, Associate Professor at School of International Studies and Assistant Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences at Zhejiang University in China. Acknowledgments This research was conducted during my double degree master’s program at Zhejiang University. The study program is a result of the cooperation with Masaryk University in the Czech Republic where I graduated in the field of Culture Chinese Studies and continued in the same field for the master studies. I would like to warmly thank my home university supervisors Mgr. et Mgr. Dušan Vávra, Ph. D. and Mgr. Bc. Denisa Hilbertová, M.A. for the opportunity of conducting this research during my one- year master studies program at the Zhejiang University and my host university super- visor Prof. Zhang Xingkui for his supervision, guidance, priceless advice and support during the research. I would also like to thank Mr. Wu Hang, the Secretary of Youth League Committee, Tutor for ZJUI for his time, willingness and help during the re- search proceedings. I would like to thank my family and friends for their patience and support whenever it was needed. Abstract This thesis aims to research the regular activities organized by university students who are members of the contemporary Chinese Communist Youth League. The thesis also deals with the members´ interpretations of the activities and provides possible explana- tions. Following the guidance of the Communist Party of China, the Communist Youth League is a mass organization that associates Chinese youth. The contemporary Com- munist Youth League of China follows the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The organization’s setting is to educate Chinese youth and lead them to practice social- ism with Chinese characteristics and political narratives according to the ideology of the CPC. The methods of qualitative field research and thematic analysis are used to research the activities and analyze them. The qualitative field research is used to collect the data about the regular activities organized by the CYL members and their interpretations. Then, the data collected during the interviews, along with analytically selected texts from The Constitution of the Communist Youth League are thematically analyzed and provided with the possible explanations. The research showed that each of the departments of the CYL was regularly hold- ing different types of activities based on their individual agenda. In the analysis, the four patterns were identified: Study, Ideology, Publicity, Competitions. However, signs of competitions were present in most of the researched activities. Thus, the pattern Competitions was evaluated as superior to the rest of the patterns. The research proved that the purpose of the activities is interconnected with the idea of supporting the policy of CPC and that competitions are used as a means to fulfill the purpose. The research showed that supporting the regime was the central purpose of the researched activities. Contents 1 Introduction 11 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 13 2 Methodology and Literature Review 15 2.1 Research Questions 15 2.2 Methods 16 2.2.1 Qualitative Field Research 17 2.2.2 Thematic Analysis 18 2.3 Primary Sources 21 2.3.1 Interviews 21 2.3.2 The Constitution of CYL 24 2.4 Addressing the Context of the Research 26 2.4.1 From the Historical Perspective 27 2.4.2 From the Perspective of Contemporary China 28 2.4.3 Justification of the Research Purposes 29 2.5 Limitations of the Research 29 3 Communist Youth League 32 3.1 Historical Background 32 3.1.1 Milestones in the History of the CYL 34 3.2 Contemporary CYL 41 3.2.1 About the Relationship Between the CPC and CYL 41 3.3 Zhejiang University and its Student Organizations 42 3.4 Key Terms 43 4 Findings 47 4.1 Pattern 1: Study 48 4.2 Pattern 2: Ideology 51 4.3 Pattern 3: Publicity 59 4.4 Pattern 4: Competitions 78 5 Conclusion 81 6 Personal Reflections 86 Appendix 88 References 96 Primary sources 96 Secondary sources 97 Notes on Translation and Mandarin Chinese All translations from Mandarin Chinese in this thesis are the author’s translations with the exception of the specified terms whose official translations exist and are generally used. The unofficial translations are based on the personal translation skills of the au- thor. The Mandarin Chinese used in this diploma thesis is in simplified characters. The phonetic transcription Pinyin is used in this thesis for the Romanization purpose of the terms that are originally in Chinese. Besides the specific names, the terms are trans- lated into English, accompanied by Pinyin and the original Chinese character. The terms are indicated in this format at each occurrence in the text. List of Acronyms CPC: Communist Party of China (Zhongguo Gongchandang, 中国共产党) CCYL: Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo Gongchanzhuyi Qingniantuan, 中国共产主义青年团)1 CYL: Communist Youth League (Gongqingtuan, 共青团) HIC ZJU: Haining International Campus of Zhejiang University (Zhejiang Daxue Haining Guoji Xiaoqu 浙江大学海宁国际校区) KMT: National Party Kuomintang (Guomindang, 国民党) PLA: People’s Liberation Army (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun, 国人民解放军) PRC: People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo, 中华人民共和国) SYL: Socialist Youth League (Shehui Zhuyi Qingniantuan, 社会主义青年团) ZJU: Zhejiang University (Zhejiang Daxue 浙江大学) CMC: Central Military Commission (Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui 中国共产党中央军事委员会) 1 Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) is also known as the Communist Youth League (CYL). For the clarity purposes and unity of the thesis, the text below uses the latter naming and abbreviation. 1 Introduction The aim of this thesis is to research the regular activities of the contemporary Communist Youth League (Gongqingtuan, 共青团), analyze them, and find ex- planations. During the data collection, the research focused on the information about the regular activities of the contemporary Communist Youth League and the CYL members' reflection/interpretation of them. Communist Youth League is one of the most prominent mass organizations in the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo, 中华人民共和国). Some of its members (e.g., Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, or Li Keqiang 李克强) became high-level cadres of the Communist Party of China. These politi- cians were or have been involved in the leading governmental positions of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China. From this perspective, CYL can be considered as an or- ganization that plays a crucial role in the Chinese political environment. However, relevant secondary sources focused on their regular activities are rare in circles of domestic and international politics.2 The thesis addresses the lack of research and hopes to contribute to the mosaic of knowledge regarding the activities of CYL. Since its early beginnings, the Communist Youth League has always played an essential role in social and political life together with the Communist Party of China (Zhongguo Gongchandang, 中国共产党). The purpose and functions of the CYL followed the needs of the CPC. According to Zhang Hua: Functions usually refer to the roles that organizations, institutions, and departments should have and are key to their differences. Overall, despite the great diversity 2 Yunzhe Chen, "Questions on the Study of “The Communist Youth League and China Elite Politics” in Western Circles of Politics," Journal of Politics and Law 11, n.3 (2018): 112-118. 11 among organizations, the functions of the organization must be fully reflected, ac- curately covered and fully supported in the development of the organization. 3 The role of the CYL, as a mass organization, has been changing according to the changing functions of the organization. The thesis shares the perception of the func- tions, as described in the paragraph above. Based on this, the chapter titled Histori- cal Background depicts the development and change of roles of the CYL in the context of the modern history of the PRC. Such theoretical basis contributes to the understanding of the functions of the contemporary CYL. Regardless of any political context, in each country, young people act as a part of society. Scholars Checkoway and Gutierrez characterize the youth´s participation this way: Youth participation is a process of involving young people in the institutions and decisions that affect their lives. It includes initiatives that emphasize educational reform, juvenile justice, environmental quality, and other issues; that involve pop- ulations distinguished by class, race, gender, and other characteristics; and that op- erate in rural areas, small towns, suburbs, and neighborhoods of large cities in de- veloping areas and industrial nations worldwide. Youth participation includes ef- forts by young people to plan programs of their own choosing; by adults to involve young people in their agencies, and by youth to work together in intergenerational partnerships. However, the issue is not whether the effort is youth-led, adult-led, or intergenerational, but rather whether young people have an actual effect.4 The youth plays an important and contributive role in society because they are a part of the social structure.5 According to the Chinese regulations, there are several ways how to become an active member of the Communist Party.
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