University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository Articles Faculty and Deans 2016 Justice Scalia, the Establishment Clause, and Christian Privilege Caroline Mala Corbin University of Miami School of Law,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Caroline Mala Corbin, Justice Scalia, the Establishment Clause, and Christian Privilege, 15 First Amend. L. Rev. 185 (2016). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. JUSTICE SCALIA, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, AND CHRISTIAN PRIVILEGE Caroline Mala Corbin* INTRODUCTION Justice Scalia had an unusual take on the Establishment Clause. From its earliest Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause forbids the government from first, favoring one or some religions over others, and second, favoring religion over secular counterparts.' Although Justice Scalia was not alone in questioning the second principle, he was uniquely vehement in challenging the first. In particular, he maintained that given the history and traditions of this country, the government could, consistent with the Constitution, express a preference for Christianity. Moreover, he tended to dismiss the idea that favoring one religion would undermine a main goal of the Establishment Clause, which is to protect religious minorities.