Militant Jihadism Today and Tomorrow CURRENT ISSUES IN ISLAM Editiorial Board Baderin, Mashood, SOAS, University of London Fadil, Nadia, KU Leuven Goddeeris, Idesbald, KU Leuven Hashemi, Nader, University of Denver Leman, Johan, GCIS, emeritus, KU Leuven Nicaise, Ides, KU Leuven Pang, Ching Lin, University of Antwerp, and KU Leuven Platti, Emilio, emeritus, KU Leuven Tayob, Abdulkader, University of Cape Town Stallaert, Christiane, University of Antwerp, and KU Leuven Toğuşlu, Erkan, GCIS, KU Leuven Zemni, Sami, Universiteit Gent Militant Jihadism Today and Tomorrow Edited by Serafettin Pektas & Johan Leman Leuven University Press Published with the support of the KU Leuven Fund for Fair Open Access Published in 2019 by Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universitaire Pers Leuven. Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium). Selection and editorial matter © Serafettin Pektas & Johan Leman, 2019 Individual chapters © The respective authors, 2019 This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Non-Derivative 4.0 Licence. The license allows you to share, copy, distribute and transmit the work for personal and non- Commercial use providing author and publisher attribution is clearly stated. Attribution should include the following information: Pektas, S and Leman J. 2019. Militant Jihadism: Today and Tomorrow. Leuven, Leuven University Press. (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Further details about Creative Commons licenses are available at http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/ ISBN 978 94 6270 199 1 (Paperback) ISBN 978 94 6166 302 3 (ePDF) ISBN 978 94 6166 303 0 (ePUB) https://doi.org/10.11116/9789461663023 D / 2019/ 1869 /39 NUR: 741 Layout: Coco Bookmedia Cover design: Paul Verrept Contents Note on translation and transliteration 7 Introduction 9 Johan Leman & Serafettin Pektas 1. Salafism, Jihadism and Radicalisation: Between A Common Doctrinal Heritage and The Logics of Empowerment 19 Mohamed-Ali Adraoui 2. The Libyan Jihadist Outlook: Origins, Evolutions and Future Scenarios 41 Arturo Varvelli 3. The “Unreturned”: Dealing with the Foreign Fighters and Their Families who Remain in Syria and Iraq 59 Nadim Houry 4. Cyber Jihadism: Today and Tomorrow 83 Laith Alkhouri 5. The Role of Women in Post-IS Jihadist Transformation and in Countering Extremism 101 Anita Perešin 6. The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same: The Post-Caliphate Jihadist Modus Operandi in Europe 123 Teun van Dongen 7. Jihadists in Belgian Prisons 141 Johan Leman 8. Urban Terrorist Sanctuaries in Europe: The Case of Molenbeek 151 Adolfo Gatti 9. Migrant Smuggling Networks and Jihadist Terrorism 177 Johan Leman & Stef Janssens 10. Prospects for Counter-Theology against Militant Jihadism 187 Serafettin Pektas Concluding Considerations 217 Johan Leman & Serafettin Pektas About the Authors 229 Note on Translation and Transliteration The chapters in this volume examine cases from different countries; they hence include sources from different languages. Non-English sources are translated by the authors themselves if not otherwise stated. This volume is written to address a general audience and not only experts; therefore Arabic words are transliterated without diacritics. The Arabic names of people, who are/were citizens or resident in Europe, are not transliterated but instead left as they appear in the official documents of the country in question. Similarly, some Arabic names of cities and places are left as they appear in English. Introduction Johan Leman and Serafettin Pektas In Western Europe, most countries have been deeply affected by the recent surge in militant jihadism and have been the scene of various terrorist attacks. Every single violent incident, irrespective of the size of its impact, has received broad media attention and reignited and intensified the debate on Islam, among both non-Muslims and Muslims. In the UK, intelligence services estimate that the UK is still home to 23,000 jihadist extremists, among whom 3,000 are judged to pose a threat and 20,000 to be a “residual risk”. At least 850 left the UK for Syria and Iraq (O’Neill et al., 2017). In France, UCLAT (The Unit of Coordination in the Fight Against Terrorism) informs us that there are 11,400 jihadist extremists, among whom 25% are women and 16% minors; 1,800 left for Syria (Dell’Oro, 2015). Also other Western European countries, such as Belgium, Spain, Germany, have a considerable number of jihadist terrorists and sympathisers among their nationals. But even on continents and in societies where one would least expect it, jihadism may be present. In Latin America, a very small country like Trinidad and Tobago, home to only 1,3000,000 inhabitants, saw more than 100 young citizens leave for Syria (Graham-Harrison and Surtees, 2018). Jihadism encompasses a very complex amalgam of people and is itself the result of a myriad of motivations and situations. However, we should remain aware that even if these figures are at first view quite high, we are speaking about 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide (Lipka, 2015:2) and active jihadist extremists among them represent a very small percentage. 10 johan leman and serafettin pektas At the moment that we are writing this Introduction, there is clearly a territorial decline of the so-called Caliphate of the “Islamic State” (IS). But it does not necessarily herald the defeat of either the militant Islamist organisations or the ideology they represent. Both remain present in Iraq and Syria. Many experts (e.g. Orsini, 2018) and observers (e.g. Europol, 2018) highlight that in what seems to be becoming the post-IS period, various militant groups will remain involved in violent attacks and continue to be a threat to global security. IS jihadism is, for instance, currently active in the northern Sinai, in Libya, in West Africa, in South Asia, and al-Qaeda jihadism controls parts of Somalia. Many observers suggest that a transformation is likely to happen. The character, place and strategy of transnational Islamic violent extremism will change, yet not disappear in the next few years. Jihadists will try to employ enhanced and updated tactics in implementing their strategies of organisation, operation, mobilisation and recruitment. Rather than mass mobilisation in a particular territory, they will probably prioritise network building in different countries in order to control small networks of dedicated affiliates from Europe to South Asia. Concurrently, new kinds of ideals, symbols, theological sources, mobilisation, communication techniques and recruitment practices will be generated and put forward. The evolution of global militant Islamism since the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s indicates that jihadist groups are deliberate in maintaining a rational and long-term struggle. They are not driven by a sense of urgency and are thus able to constantly modernise themselves and adapt to changing conditions. One may therefore expect them to follow a similar rational and adaptive modus operandi in the future. We should, however, note that today’s globalised world is fundamentally different from that of the1980s. To understand how jihadism is renewing itself today, it is thus critical to consider the dynamics of globalisation. More concretely this means that among the unfolding jihadist strategies, we will probably witness increasing glocalisation, a more widespread use of cyber tools, and an enhanced exploitation of migration moves. This book will explore various parameters of the prospective transformation of jihadist militancy. Its focus will accordingly be on the future of militant jihadism and not on its history or past developments, areas of inquiry dominating current research. The book aims to find answers to such questions as the following: what is next after IS? How will the jihadist landscape change, particularly in and around Europe, both in rural and urban settings? What does the case of Libya – arguably the most probable candidate for a new jihadist centre after Syria and Iraq – tell us about how the jihadist networks will be reshaped? How about those introduction 11 who are stuck or detained in conflict zones and those who are “unreturned”? How will jihadism work, particularly in cyber space? What will be the role of women both in jihadist circles and in countering violent extremism? What are the challenges and opportunities with regard to the “returned foreign fighters” in Europe? What are the challenges regarding the role prisons in the West play with respect to radicalisation and de-radicalisation? How will jihadism try to organise itself physically in Europe? How may it finance itself? Given that theology does matter in Islamic extremism, what would be the (new) elements to exploit from Islamic theology in reorganising the jihadist movement? How would the Muslim critiques of jihadist ideology affect Islamist militancy? What would their counter-theological strategies look like? In answering these questions, the first three chapters look outside Europe. The first chapter is more conceptual. Mohamed-Ali Adraoui reflects on the common doctrinal heritage between Salafism and Jihadism and observes an increasing conceptual and strategic divergence between the two. He argues that the latter also evolves from a conversion-processed gradual jihadism into an instant jihadism. Some five years ago, it was an aggressivetakfiri (excommunicatory) branch of Salafism that pushed some people to violent jihadism. This is currently changing. One no longer needs the ideological support to turn to violence. Adraoui develops the idea that jihadism as the ideologisation of Salafism has shifted to an instant aversion to society. The observations made by therapists and counsellors throughout European prisons support this notion, as chapter seven will expose. The fact that this volume opens with a chapter on Islam does not mean that we propose to examine the future developments in jihadism with a frame that is principally biased or only understandable by religion. Militant jihadism is the result of a conglomerate of religious, geopolitical, societal, social and personal factors. The impact of religion cannot be denied. We are, however, conscious that geopolitical causes are perhaps more important than religious ones.