DOCSLIB.ORG

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION and REINTEGRATION in SOUTH SUDAN the LIMITS of CONVENTIONAL PEACE and SECURITY TEMPLATES Jairo Munive DIIS REPORT 2013:07 DIIS REPORT

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION and REINTEGRATION in SOUTH SUDAN the LIMITS of CONVENTIONAL PEACE and SECURITY TEMPLATES Jairo Munive DIIS REPORT 2013:07 DIIS REPORT DIIS REPORT 2013:07 DIIS REPORT DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION IN SOUTH SUDAN THE LIMITS OF CONVENTIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY TEMPLATES Jairo Munive DIIS REPORT 2013:07 DIIS REPORT DIIS . DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 © Copenhagen 2013, the author and DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover photo: Sudan People’s Liberation Army Day parade. © Jairo Munive Layout: Allan Lind Jørgensen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN 978-87-7605-553-0 (print) ISBN 978-87-7605-555-4 (pdf ) Price: DKK 50.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk Hardcopies can be ordered at www.diis.dk This publication is part of DIIS’s Defence and Security Studies project which is funded by a grant from the Danish Ministry of Defence. Jairo Munive, PhD, Postdoc [email protected] 2 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 Contents Acronyms 4 Abstract 6 Introduction and background 7 South Sudan’s economic and political context 10 Overview of the economy and the burden of military expenditure 10 Sovereign warriors, violence and politics 2005–2012 12 CPA– DDR: 2005–2012 20 Disarming and reintegrating ‘non-essentials’ 20 DDR in praxis: reality bites 21 Case study: reintegration in Eastern Equatoria state 25 Second phase DDR: downsizing the SPLA 30 DDR: the ‘missing link’ in security sector reform efforts 35 Conclusion 38 References 40 Defence and Security Studies at DIIS 43 3 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 Acronyms BCSSAS Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control CAAFF Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups CBO Community Based Organisations CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DAC Development Assistance Committee DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DFID Department for International Development EES Eastern Equatoria State GIZ German International Cooperation Services GOS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan ICRS Information, Counselling and Referral Services IGP Inspector General of Police IOM International Organisation for Migration IP Implementing Partner LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MoDVA Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs NDDRC National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Council NDDRP National DDR Programme NGO Non Governmental Organisation NSDDRC North Sudan DDDR Commission OAG Other Armed Groups OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development SAF Sudan Armed Forces SAS Small Arms Survey SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SSAF South Sudan Armed Forces SSDDRC South Sudan DDR Commission SSDDT Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Programme SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces SSDM South Sudan Democratic Movement SSLA South Sudan Liberation Army SSLM South Sudan Liberation Movement SSPS South Sudan Police Service SSR Security Sector Reform 4 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 SSUM/A South Sudan Unity Movement/Army UNDP United Nations Development Program UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan UNMISS United Nations Mission to South Sudan USAID United States Agency for International Development WAFF Women associated with armed forces/groups 5 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 Abstract This report explores the DDR programme in South Sudan; in particular how it has evolved, what the major challenges have been to its implementation and, finally, what can realistically be expected from renewed efforts to disarm and reintegrate fighters vis-à-vis security imperatives on the ground. DDR has been identified as a main priority in the Republic of South Sudan and a prerequisite to pave the way for future stability and development. The basic argument presented here is that standard DDR programmes – or rather the conventional peace and security templates that characterise them – are not fit for purpose in a context like South Sudan. This is so because achieving security in the country goes beyond DDR and is not related to the ‘rightsizing’of the South Sudanese Armed Forces/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army nor to the ‘reintegration’ of combatants. Rather, as the report argues, it will depend on a serious engagement with the following twofold task: firstly, to comprehend and eventually change the basic structures and mechanisms of armed mobilisation prevalent in South Sudan and, secondly, to understand and adapt security sector reform to a political environment that is constructed in terms of potential for violence and threats of destabilisation. 6 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 Introduction and background Following decades of civil war Southern Sudan achieved independence from Sudan in mid-2011 as the culmination of a long peace process.1 Both the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and international donors consider a successful Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme a prerequisite for successful stabilisation, peace and development in Africa’s newest nation state. With a projected caseload of some 150,000 participants South Sudan’s DDR will be the world’s largest planned DDR programme. It will be a follow-up to the widely criticised first phase of DDR launched after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (SAS 2011; STHLM 2010). Negotiations to end the war began already in May 2002 and culminated with the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005. The CPA consisted of various protocols, agreements, arrangements and modalities including the ‘Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements’, which mandated a sustainable ceasefire and the disengagement of members of the armed forces and the implementation of a DDR programme. According to the 2005 CPA, the main adversaries, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from the south, should demobilise and reintegrate a considerable percentage of their forces. To this purpose the DDR programme offered financial incentives, vocational and skills training and family assistance to the participants. The DDR programme was an integral part of the CPA and envisaged as an interim security measure facilitating the core challenge of proportional force downsizing, rationalisation and standardisation in the creation/formation of a new ‘unitarian’ national Sudanese Army including both members of the SAF and the SPLA. Furthermore, the CPA granted Southern Sudan greater levels of autonomy and political autonomy within the Republic of Sudan However, the relation between the parties continued to be tense – maybe best described as a no peace–no war environment – and in spite of the importance ascribed to DDR in the CPA the actual implementation faced serious delays, mainly due to a combination of unwillingness by the key actors to begin downsizing their active duty forces and the perils of designing and implementing such a complex exercise. The SPLA was deeply reluctant to reduce its ranks due to a perception that the CPA was merely a ceasefire 1 For purposes of clarification, Southern Sudan is used here as the name of the autonomous territory prior to independence in July 2011. 7 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 rather than a peace agreement. In Southern Sudan this first phase of DDR did not start before 2009 and the pace was slow and the results meagre. By April 2012 only 12,525 combatants had demobilised and even fewer had been supported by sporadic reintegration services. After the acquisition of independence the position of SPLA has changed dramatically and it is seemingly now taking a leading role in planning for a second phase of DDR in the newly independent South Sudan. This report explores the first and the planned second phase of DDR in South Sudan and asks three basic questions: How did the first phase evolve (2005–2012)? What were the major challenges to its implementation? – and finally, what can realistically be expected from the future, second, phase of renewed efforts at disarming and reintegrating fighters vis-à-vis the security imperatives of the SPLA and extremely difficult socio-economic realities on the ground? The basic argument put forward here is that standard DDR programmes, or rather the standard templates that characterise them, are not fit for purpose in a context like South Sudan. This is mainly due to three reasons. Firstly, different perceptions among national power holders, in this case the SPLA, and international actors and donors about what the programme is supposed to achieve amidst continued armed insurrections, inter-communal violence, widespread insecurity and border clashes with Sudan. Secondly, the difficulties in independently verifying and distinguishing combatants from civilians and, thirdly, the politics of patronage and wealth that are central for the survival of the new state and the mobilisation of recruits into the SPLA and other armed groups (both legal and illegal).2 In South Sudanese politics, violence or threats of violence are central to solving political grievances among conflicting parties, and strongmen (ethnic) militias and armed groups are constantly mobilised for political purposes (LeRiche & Arnold 2012; Schomerus & Allen 2010; Young 2012). In spite of the challenges encountered during the first phase of DDR and the meagre results, a second phase DDR for some 150,000 personnel has been planned as a joint exercise between the South Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Originally expected to start in 2012 and run for eight years, it has been postponed several times due 2 This report follows the common practice of using the designation SPLA for both the pre-2005 movement, and that during the CPA phase 2005–2011 as well as in the post-independence period (here interchangeably with South Sudan Armed Forces/SSAF). 8 DIIS REPORT 2013:07 to financial constraints and logistical challenges. The launch of a pilot phase with approximately 500 participants will take place on April 2013 (UNSG 20013).3 The report is based on an extensive desk study of available evaluations, reviews and reports on the CPA–DDR programme 2005–2012.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Submission by P
    MAIN CONTACT PERSON: TILMAN ZUELCH Submission by P. O. Box 2024 Society for Threatened Peoples D-37010 Göttingen a non-governmental organization in special consultative status Phone: +49 (0)551 49906-0 Fax: +49 (0)551 58028 E-Mail: [email protected] Language: English only Universal Periodic Review Eleventh Session 2010-11-01 Sudan The announcement of the first national elections since 20 years, which finally began on April 11, 2010, was welcomed by the international community as a first step to ensure a broader political participation of Sudanese citizens. Elections were marred by human rights violations Nobody expected elections guaranteeing all fundamental democratic standards, but the elections were marred by massive human rights violations and an increasing political repression. Sudanese and international election observers documented hundreds of incidents of intimidation, fraud, incorrect voter lists, faulty ballots, late supply of ballot papers and insufficient registration of voters. In the weeks ahead of the elections international election observers were threatened with expulsion and national observers were intimidated. Electoral fraud in Eastern Sudan, which was documented by internet video footage, has led to the cancellation of these voting results. In Southern Sudan, some 200 incidents of harassment, intimidation or violence at the polling stations were reported by the observers. Journalists and independent candidates were the main target in this campaign of intimidation which was orchestrated by Northern and Southern Sudanese officials. On May 27, 2010, nine journalists Southern Sudanese journalists working for the state-run media were detained for more than a week after they refused to participate in the inauguration of South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir.
    [Show full text]
  • Teacher Information Sheet Genocide in Darfur
    Teacher information sheet Genocide in Darfur Darfur is a region in the west of Sudan, bordering Chad, in north-east Africa. Before the conflict Darfur had an ethnically mixed population of around six million black Africans and Arabs. Darfur’s history Historically Darfur’s many different ethnic groups lived peacefully alongside each other, although conflicts over land-use between the Flag of Sudan, adopted in 1970 black African sedentary farmers and the lighter- skinned nomadic Arab population have arisen over time. The Sudanese Government has been condemned as racist – favouring Arabs over black Africans. They are accused of being complicit in ‘ethnic cleansing’ and enslavement of black Africans. Darfur’s ethnic mix of black Africans and Arabs made it a target for the Sudanese government. Many Sudanese people believe that the country’s border areas, such as Darfur (highlighted in green), have been Sudan neglected and marginalised by the government. Development has been focused on the capital city of Khartoum and the centre of the country. Darfur In February 2003 two Darfuri rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched a rebellion against the government. The majority of the rebels came from black African farming tribes, who accused the government of oppressing Darfur’s non-Arab citizens. The government responded by training, arming and mobilising the Arab-militia, known as the Janjaweed (‘devils on horseback’), to stop the rebellion, causing a civil war. The genocide The civil war has continued in the region since 2003. The Sudanese Government has supported the Janjaweed. Their violence has caused a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur that has been condemned as genocide.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O
    AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O. Box 3243 Telephone: +251 11 551 7700 / +251 11 518 25 58/ Ext 2558 Website: http://www.au.int/en/auciss Original: English FINAL REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON SOUTH SUDAN ADDIS ABABA 15 OCTOBER 2014 1 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... 3 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER I ..................................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 8 CHAPTER II .................................................................................................................. 34 INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN .............................................................................. 34 CHAPTER III ............................................................................................................... 110 EXAMINATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND OTHER ABUSES DURING THE CONFLICT: ACCOUNTABILITY ......................................................................... 111 CHAPTER IV ............................................................................................................... 233 ISSUES ON HEALING AND RECONCILIATION .......................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Unpacking Ethnic Stacking: the Uses and Abuses of Security Force Ethnicity in Sudan
    Unpacking Ethnic Stacking: The Uses and Abuses of Security Force Ethnicity in Sudan Nathaniel Allen National Defense University June 2019 1 Abstract African elites commonly recruit co-ethnic soldiers into state security institutions, a practice known as ethnic stacking. Ethnic stacking has recently received considerable attention from scholars and been linked to an array of outcomes, including repression, high levels of political violence and poor democratization outcomes. This article employs evidence from Sudan under Omar Al Bashir to argue that ethnic stacking is not one coherent tactic but several, and that its effects are mediated by the processes through which security force institutions are ethnically stacked. Within the leadership of state security institutions, ethnic stacking in Sudan served as a coup-proofing measure to ensure that leaders bound by ties of kinship and trust maintain oversight over the most sensitive functions of the security apparatus. In Sudan’s militia groups, ethnic stacking of militia groups and rank-and-file soldiers was used as a means of warfare and repression by altering overall composition of security forces with respect to the civilian population. The militia strategy itself was a product of the failure of the regime’s traditional security forces to function as effective counterinsurgents, and, by keeping the periphery of the country in a near-constant state of conflict, prolonged Bashir’s regime. World Count: 9,816 words Keywords: Ethnicity, Sudan, civil-military relations, civil wars, coups 2 Introduction For thirty years, Sudan was ruled by Al Bashir, an army officer who was the longest serving leader of the longest running regime in Sudanese history.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Report
    SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT MONTHLY JAN 2012 23 December 2011 This report is available online and can beFORECAST viewed together with research studies and Update Reports at www.securitycouncilreport.org. For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please visit or subscribe to our recently launched “What’s In Blue” series at www.whatsinblue.org Overview Contents of This Issue South Africa will preside over the Security Affairs, and on compliance with making UN-AU Strategic Partnership 1 Council in January. President Jacob Zuma required deposits to the compensation In Hindsight: The Working is expected to preside over a high-level fund established under resolution 687 Methods Open Debate 2 debate on the strategic partnership (1991) and the post-Development Fund Sudan/Darfur 5 between the UN and the AU in the area of for Iraq mechanism, most likely by the the maintenance of peace and security. The UN Controller, Maria Eugenia Casar, to South Sudan 7 Secretary-General is likely to brief on his be followed by consultations; Libya 9 report on this matter expected to be pub- n the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur Côte d’Ivoire 12 lished in early January. (UNAMID), probably by the Joint Special UNOWA (West Africa) 14 Representative Ibrahim Gambari, to be An open debate is planned on justice and followed by consultations; Iraq 15 the rule of law, with a possible Arria for- n the UN Office in West Africa UNOWA( ), Yemen 18 mula meeting preceding it. by Special Representative Said Djinnit, to Rule of Law 19 An open debate on the Middle East is be followed by consultations; Status Update since our also expected.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Security in Sudan: the Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission
    Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ottawa, January 2000 Disclaimer: This report was prepared by Mr. John Harker for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The views and opinions contained in this report are not necessarily those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 1 Human Security in Sudan: Executive Summary 1 Introduction On October 26, 1999, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy and the Minister for International Co-operation, Maria Minna, announced several Canadian initiatives to bolster international efforts backing a negotiated settlement to the 43-year civil war in Sudan, including the announcement of an assessment mission to Sudan to examine allegations about human rights abuses, including the practice of slavery. There are few other parts of the world where human security is so lacking, and where the need for peace and security - precursors to sustainable development - is so pronounced. Canada's commitment to human security, particularly the protection of civilians in armed conflict, provides a clear basis for its involvement in Sudan and its support for the peace process. Charm Offensive, or Signs of Progress? Following the visit to Khartoum of an EU Mission, a political dialogue was launched by the European Union on November 11 1999. The EU was of the view that there has been sufficient progress in Sudan to warrant a renewed dialogue. In this view, there has been a positive change, and it is necessary to encourage the Sudanese, and push them further where there is need.
    [Show full text]
  • Abandoning Abyei
    Abandoning Abyei Destruction and Displacement, May 2008 Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-364-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org July 2008 1-56432-364-1 Abandoning Abyei Destruction and Displacement, May 2008 Map of the Abyei Area .............................................................................................. 1 Summary .................................................................................................................2 Methodology ...........................................................................................................5 Recommendations .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan, Country Information
    Sudan, Country Information SUDAN ASSESSMENT April 2003 Country Information and Policy Unit I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT II GEOGRAPHY III HISTORY IV STATE STRUCTURES V HUMAN RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS ANNEX A - CHRONOLOGY ANNEX B - LIST OF MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES ANNEX C - GLOSSARY ANNEX D - THE POPULAR DEFENCE FORCES ACT 1989 ANNEX E - THE NATIONAL SERVICE ACT 1992 ANNEX F - LIST OF THE MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS OF SUDAN ANNEX G - REFERENCES TO SOURCE DOCUMENTS 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. The document does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. 1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. These sources have been checked for accuracy, and as far as can be ascertained, remained relevant and up-to-date at the time the document was issued. 1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum-seeker producing countries in the United Kingdom.
    [Show full text]
  • Vallis Group Limited, Vallis House, 57 Vallis Road, Frome, Somerset, BA11 3EG, England  +44-(0)-1373-453-970 Incorporated in England: Company Registration No
    Sudan SUDAN IS LOCATED IN NORTHEASTERN AFRICA. IT IS THE TENTH LARGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. SUDAN IS BORDERED BY SEVEN COUNTRIES AND THE RED SEA. IT HAS A LONG HISTORY OF CIVIL WARS AS WELL AS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY. Page 1 of 18 Vallis Group Limited, Vallis House, 57 Vallis Road, Frome, Somerset, BA11 3EG, England +44-(0)-1373-453-970 Incorporated in England: Company Registration No. 04524501 | www.vallis-group.com | [email protected] Official Named: Republic of the Sudan (Jumhuriyat Total Population: 42,337,000 people (2019 est.) as-Sudan) Distribution: Urban 35.5% - Rural 64.5% (2019) Location: Northeast African country bordering the Population projection: 59,000,000 (2050) Red Sea to the northeast. • Bordered by Egypt, Libya, Chad, Cameroon, Capital City: Khartoum South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea • The White Nile and the Blue Nile are the two • The Red Sea is the lowest point in Sudan with tributaries of the Nile. They merge at Khartoum, Deriba Caldera being the highest point at an becoming the Nile River before flowing into elevation of 3,042m. Egypt. • The origin of the city name is unknown but is believed to be derived from the Arabic word ‘khartum’ meaning ‘trunk’ due to the narrow strip of land between the Blue and White Niles. • With a hot desert climate, the city is often considered one of the hottest major cities in the world. • Sudan was once the largest and most geographically diverse state in Africa. it was split into two countries in July 2011. It is now the third largest country in Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan Assessment
    SUDAN ASSESSMENT April 2000 Country Information and Policy Unit CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION 1.1 - 1.5 II GEOGRAPHY 2.1 III HISTORY 3.1 - 3.7 The Economy 3.8 - 3.10 IV INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE Political System 4.1 - 4.12 The Judiciary 4.13 - 4.21 The Security Forces 4.22 - 4.24 V HUMAN RIGHTS A Introduction A.1 - A.4 B General Assessment B.1 - B.5 Prison Conditions B.6 Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in B.7 - B.9 Internal Conflicts C Specific Groups Opposition Members C.1 - C.4 Religious Groups C.5 Christians C.6 - C.8 Islamic Sects C.9 - C.13 Ethnicity C.14 - C.18 Women C.19 - C.22 Children C.23 - C.26 Students C.27 - C.30 Conscripts C.31 - C.35 1 D Other Issues Civil War D.1 - D.17 Ceasefire/Peace Negotiations D.18 - D.24 Freedom of Political Association D.25 - D.31 Freedom of Assembly D.32 - D.35 Freedom of Speech and of the Press D.36 - D.45 Freedom of Religion D.46 - D.51 Freedom to Travel/Internal Flight D.52 - D.57 National Service and Popular Defence Forces D.58 - D.62 VI GENERAL ISSUES Foreign Relations 5.1 - 5.16 Attacks on US embassies and US Retaliation 5.17 - 5.23 Bombings 5.24 - 5.26 Assassination Attempts 5.27 Health 5.28 - 5.33 Slavery 5.34 - 5.35 Punishments 5.36 - 5.41 Elections 5.42 - 5.46 Miscellaneous 5.47 - 5.58 VII ANNEXES A MAJOR POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS Pages 45 - 47 B SPLA FACTIONS Pages 48 - 49 C PROMINENT PEOPLE PAST AND PRESENT Pages 50 - 51 D CHRONOLOGY Pages 52 - 67 E BIBLIOGRAPHY Pages 68 - 75 I.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan's Oilfields Burn Again
    AFRICA Briefing Nairobi/Brussels, 10 February 2003 SUDAN’S OILFIELDS BURN AGAIN: BRINKMANSHIP ENDANGERS THE PEACE PROCESS I. OVERVIEW seeing it through to success in the next several months. In the first instance that means insisting on full implementation of the newly agreed Sudan’s peace process survived a major challenge in ceasefire provisions including an active role for the first weeks of the new year. Indeed, signature by the authorised verification team and the the parties of a strengthened cessation of hostilities withdrawal of troops to the positions they agreement on 4 February and a memorandum of occupied before the offensive. Holding the parties understanding codifying points of agreement on publicly accountable for violations will be key in outstanding issues of power and wealth sharing two ensuring their seriousness at the negotiating table. days later indicates that the momentum to end the twenty-year old conflict is strong. However, the The offensive from late December until the crisis produced by a government-sponsored beginning of February was an extension of the offensive in the Western Upper Nile oilfields at the government’s long-time strategy of depopulating oil- end of 2002 and through January raised questions rich areas through indiscriminate attacks on civilians about the Khartoum government’s commitment to in order to clear the way for further development of peace and showed that much more attention needs to infrastructure. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the be paid to pro-government southern militias and the tactics included the abduction of women and commercial and political agendas for which they are children, gang rapes, ground assaults supported by being used.
    [Show full text]
  • SIX MONTHS SINCE 1769 August 2007 – January 2008
    Africa Action Report Released January 2008 An Overview of Conflict in Sudan and the International Failure to Protect SIX MONTHS SINCE 1769 August 2007 – January 2008 Since 2003, the United Nations have passed nineteen Resolutions on Darfur, including Security Council Resolution 1706 , the only instance in history of a UN peacekeeping mission that was authorized and failed to deploy. On July 31, 2007, Security Council Resolution 1769 again authorized a multinational UN-led peacekeeping force for Darfur – the “hybrid” African Union/United Nations operation termed UNAMID. UNAMID officially assumed control of peacekeeping operations in Darfur on December 31, 2007, however, its deployment is well behind the timetable laid out by the Security Council. Force Commander General Martin Agwai and UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno have continued to warn that unless 2008 sees a substantial change in international action, UNAMID risks succumbing to Khartoum’s obstructionism and facing a similar aborted fate as its predecessor mission authorized by Resolution 1706 . UN blue helmets now mark the several thousand peacekeepers stationed in Darfur, but over the past six months the humanitarian situation there has gotten substantially worse than in early 2007. Levels of malnutrition have reached UN-defined emergency levels for the first time since 2004, the Sudanese government has pursued out a brutal campaign to dismantle some of the region’s largest internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and there international aid workers have been forced to dramatically scale back operations. Since Resolution 1769 was passed, the security situation in Darfur has deteriorated. Peacekeepers wearing the green uniforms of the African Union were attacked and killed by Darfuri rebels.
    [Show full text]