Kant on Embodiment: Lessons from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Rachel Siow Robertson Trinity Hall University of Cambridge September 2019 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Declaration This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. Rachel Siow Robertson i ii Abstract Kant on Embodiment: Lessons from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Rachel Siow Robertson My thesis offers an original reading of Kant’s theory of cognition and the body’s role in it. In the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant’s subject is shown to cognize, and be cognized, through embodied activity in the material world. I begin by demonstrating Kant’s rejection of all-mental accounts of cognition. Neglecting the body leads to the dissolution of subjects, objects, and any cognitive relation between them. I show that Kant provides an alternative account in terms of embodied activity, focusing on three cases. First, the unifying structures required for sense perception could not be applied without embodied activity. Second, empirical self-consciousness depends on embodied activity in relation to objects in space. Third, scientific knowledge is made possible only through bodily activity, which reveals the causal forces constituting matter. In all three cases, the body is shown to have an active role in determining experience. I then investigate the implications of my reading, providing a new interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism – the causally active body is a transcendental condition of experience. I show how this contrasts with not only traditional readings of Kantian cognition as conditioned entirely by the structures and activity of the mind, but also less traditional readings which ascribe a cognitive role to the body only by stripping away its material properties. Even many contemporary non-Kantian accounts distinguish between the mind which acts in cognition, and the body which only passively receives causal affects. Developed in tandem with a robust metaphysics of matter as endowed with causal activity, Kant’s account of the active body overcomes this mind-body distinction. Cognition is more thoroughly embodied than is commonly thought. I finish by sketching an approach to Kant’s account of life and freedom. I suggest that the transcendental status of the body in the theoretical realm paves the way towards a freely acting subject in the practical realm. Through casting the body as the actor in cognition, Kant provides the resources for a full characterization of the human subject. iii iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank Angela Breitenbach for her encouragement, support, and invaluable discussion of all the many versions of the material in this thesis. Generous with her time and expertise, she has been a perfect supervisor. I would also like to thank my secondary supervisor, Rae Langton, as well as Richard Holton and Daniel Schneider for their advice and comments on this work. Many thanks are due to Marina Frasca-Spada, for first introducing me to Hume when I was eighteen, and for everything since. I also thank the Gates Cambridge Trust for a generous scholarship. Thanks also to Michael Forster for inviting me to spend a semester at the Universität Bonn. I am especially grateful to Diana, Guofeng, and Sophia for their warm welcome. I learned so much from them. James, Benjamin, Sen, and Samuel were excellent companions in the Kant Reading Group and at all our various workshops. The Serious Metaphysics Group kindly invited me to present material from this thesis twice, and each time provided very helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Zoe, Ruth, Matthew, Li Li, Natasha, Lucy, Murjana, Rebecca, and Hanna for their help and friendship. Extra thanks to Hanna, along with Lorenzo, Benjamin, and Leo for all the food, fun, motivational posters, and end-of-day debriefs during our time as flatmates. All my love and thanks go to my husband Alex, my parents, Lindsay and Jane, and my brother David, for their support and prayers, and for always pointing me back to the beginning of wisdom. Thank you God for making and redeeming bodies, in all their wonderful complexity. v vi Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 2. Kant’s rejection of the immaterial thinker ............................................................... 13 2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 13 2.2. The Paralogisms .................................................................................................... 16 2.2.1. Against knowledge of immaterial substance ................................................. 16 2.2.2. Against immediate knowledge ...................................................................... 19 2.2.3. Kant’s new questions for investigation ......................................................... 23 2.3. Problems for Leibniz and Hume ........................................................................... 26 2.3.1. Leibniz ........................................................................................................... 26 2.3.2. Hume ............................................................................................................. 34 2.3.3. Summary of results from Leibniz and Hume ................................................ 41 2.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 43 3. Embodiment, synthesis, and intentionality ............................................................... 44 3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 44 Part one: The framework for Embodied Synthesis .......................................................... 51 3.2. The mereology of spatio-temporal representation ................................................ 51 3.3. Ruling out sensations and concepts ...................................................................... 53 3.3.1. Sensations ...................................................................................................... 53 3.3.2. Concepts ........................................................................................................ 56 3.4. Bodily activity ....................................................................................................... 59 3.4.1. Synthesis of apprehension: absolute unity..................................................... 59 3.4.2. Synthesis of reproduction: moments in sequence.......................................... 62 3.4.3. Solving the problem of mereology ................................................................ 65 3.5. Rule-governed bodily activity ............................................................................... 67 3.6. A sketch of a solution to the Problem of Intentionality ........................................ 74 Part two: extending Embodied Synthesis ........................................................................ 76 3.7. Thoughts and geometrical cognition ..................................................................... 78 3.8. Spontaneous activity ............................................................................................. 84 3.9. Assessing Kant’s progress .................................................................................... 92 3.9.1. Conceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction ....................................... 94 3.9.2. Non-conceptualism and non-human animals ................................................ 97 3.10. Conclusion and remaining questions ............................................................... 100 4. Embodiment and empirical self-consciousness in the Refutation of Idealism ..... 103 4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 103 4.2. The Embodiment Reading .................................................................................. 106 vii 4.2.1. Substrate-ER ................................................................................................108 4.2.2. Mediator-ER ................................................................................................110 4.3. A Dilemma for ER ..............................................................................................111 4.3.1. Objective Body ............................................................................................112 4.3.2. Subjective