DOCSLIB.ORG

Kant on Embodiment: Lessons from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Kant on Embodiment: Lessons from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant on Embodiment: Lessons from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Rachel Siow Robertson Trinity Hall University of Cambridge September 2019 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Declaration This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. Rachel Siow Robertson i ii Abstract Kant on Embodiment: Lessons from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Rachel Siow Robertson My thesis offers an original reading of Kant’s theory of cognition and the body’s role in it. In the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant’s subject is shown to cognize, and be cognized, through embodied activity in the material world. I begin by demonstrating Kant’s rejection of all-mental accounts of cognition. Neglecting the body leads to the dissolution of subjects, objects, and any cognitive relation between them. I show that Kant provides an alternative account in terms of embodied activity, focusing on three cases. First, the unifying structures required for sense perception could not be applied without embodied activity. Second, empirical self-consciousness depends on embodied activity in relation to objects in space. Third, scientific knowledge is made possible only through bodily activity, which reveals the causal forces constituting matter. In all three cases, the body is shown to have an active role in determining experience. I then investigate the implications of my reading, providing a new interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism – the causally active body is a transcendental condition of experience. I show how this contrasts with not only traditional readings of Kantian cognition as conditioned entirely by the structures and activity of the mind, but also less traditional readings which ascribe a cognitive role to the body only by stripping away its material properties. Even many contemporary non-Kantian accounts distinguish between the mind which acts in cognition, and the body which only passively receives causal affects. Developed in tandem with a robust metaphysics of matter as endowed with causal activity, Kant’s account of the active body overcomes this mind-body distinction. Cognition is more thoroughly embodied than is commonly thought. I finish by sketching an approach to Kant’s account of life and freedom. I suggest that the transcendental status of the body in the theoretical realm paves the way towards a freely acting subject in the practical realm. Through casting the body as the actor in cognition, Kant provides the resources for a full characterization of the human subject. iii iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank Angela Breitenbach for her encouragement, support, and invaluable discussion of all the many versions of the material in this thesis. Generous with her time and expertise, she has been a perfect supervisor. I would also like to thank my secondary supervisor, Rae Langton, as well as Richard Holton and Daniel Schneider for their advice and comments on this work. Many thanks are due to Marina Frasca-Spada, for first introducing me to Hume when I was eighteen, and for everything since. I also thank the Gates Cambridge Trust for a generous scholarship. Thanks also to Michael Forster for inviting me to spend a semester at the Universität Bonn. I am especially grateful to Diana, Guofeng, and Sophia for their warm welcome. I learned so much from them. James, Benjamin, Sen, and Samuel were excellent companions in the Kant Reading Group and at all our various workshops. The Serious Metaphysics Group kindly invited me to present material from this thesis twice, and each time provided very helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Zoe, Ruth, Matthew, Li Li, Natasha, Lucy, Murjana, Rebecca, and Hanna for their help and friendship. Extra thanks to Hanna, along with Lorenzo, Benjamin, and Leo for all the food, fun, motivational posters, and end-of-day debriefs during our time as flatmates. All my love and thanks go to my husband Alex, my parents, Lindsay and Jane, and my brother David, for their support and prayers, and for always pointing me back to the beginning of wisdom. Thank you God for making and redeeming bodies, in all their wonderful complexity. v vi Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 2. Kant’s rejection of the immaterial thinker ............................................................... 13 2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 13 2.2. The Paralogisms .................................................................................................... 16 2.2.1. Against knowledge of immaterial substance ................................................. 16 2.2.2. Against immediate knowledge ...................................................................... 19 2.2.3. Kant’s new questions for investigation ......................................................... 23 2.3. Problems for Leibniz and Hume ........................................................................... 26 2.3.1. Leibniz ........................................................................................................... 26 2.3.2. Hume ............................................................................................................. 34 2.3.3. Summary of results from Leibniz and Hume ................................................ 41 2.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 43 3. Embodiment, synthesis, and intentionality ............................................................... 44 3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 44 Part one: The framework for Embodied Synthesis .......................................................... 51 3.2. The mereology of spatio-temporal representation ................................................ 51 3.3. Ruling out sensations and concepts ...................................................................... 53 3.3.1. Sensations ...................................................................................................... 53 3.3.2. Concepts ........................................................................................................ 56 3.4. Bodily activity ....................................................................................................... 59 3.4.1. Synthesis of apprehension: absolute unity..................................................... 59 3.4.2. Synthesis of reproduction: moments in sequence.......................................... 62 3.4.3. Solving the problem of mereology ................................................................ 65 3.5. Rule-governed bodily activity ............................................................................... 67 3.6. A sketch of a solution to the Problem of Intentionality ........................................ 74 Part two: extending Embodied Synthesis ........................................................................ 76 3.7. Thoughts and geometrical cognition ..................................................................... 78 3.8. Spontaneous activity ............................................................................................. 84 3.9. Assessing Kant’s progress .................................................................................... 92 3.9.1. Conceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction ....................................... 94 3.9.2. Non-conceptualism and non-human animals ................................................ 97 3.10. Conclusion and remaining questions ............................................................... 100 4. Embodiment and empirical self-consciousness in the Refutation of Idealism ..... 103 4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 103 4.2. The Embodiment Reading .................................................................................. 106 vii 4.2.1. Substrate-ER ................................................................................................108 4.2.2. Mediator-ER ................................................................................................110 4.3. A Dilemma for ER ..............................................................................................111 4.3.1. Objective Body ............................................................................................112 4.3.2. Subjective
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Companion to Analytic Philosophy
    A Companion to Analytic Philosophy Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, represent- ing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike. Already published in the series 15. A Companion to Bioethics Edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer 1. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric 16. A Companion to the Philosophers Tsui-James Edited by Robert L. Arrington 2. A Companion to Ethics Edited by Peter Singer 17. A Companion to Business Ethics Edited by Robert E. Frederick 3. A Companion to Aesthetics Edited by David Cooper 18. A Companion to the Philosophy of 4. A Companion to Epistemology Science Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa Edited by W. H. Newton-Smith 5. A Companion to Contemporary Political 19. A Companion to Environmental Philosophy Philosophy Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit Edited by Dale Jamieson 6. A Companion to Philosophy of Mind 20. A Companion to Analytic Philosophy Edited by Samuel Guttenplan Edited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa 7. A Companion to Metaphysics Edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa Forthcoming 8. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and A Companion to Genethics Legal Theory Edited by John Harris and Justine Burley Edited by Dennis Patterson 9. A Companion to Philosophy of Religion A Companion to African-American Edited by Philip L.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophical Theory-Construction and the Self-Image of Philosophy
    Open Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 4, 231-243 Published Online August 2014 in SciRes. http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2014.43031 Philosophical Theory-Construction and the Self-Image of Philosophy Niels Skovgaard Olsen Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany Email: [email protected] Received 25 May 2014; revised 28 June 2014; accepted 10 July 2014 Copyright © 2014 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Abstract This article takes its point of departure in a criticism of the views on meta-philosophy of P.M.S. Hacker for being too dismissive of the possibility of philosophical theory-construction. But its real aim is to put forward an explanatory hypothesis for the lack of a body of established truths and universal research programs in philosophy along with the outline of a positive account of what philosophical theories are and of how to assess them. A corollary of the present account is that it allows us to account for the objective dimension of philosophical discourse without taking re- course to the problematic idea of there being worldly facts that function as truth-makers for phi- losophical claims. Keywords Meta-Philosophy, Hacker, Williamson, Philosophical Theories 1. Introduction The aim of this article is to use a critical discussion of the self-image of philosophy presented by P. M. S. Hacker as a platform for presenting an alternative, which offers an account of how to think about the purpose and cha- racter of philosophical theories.
    [Show full text]
  • Minding the Body Interacting Socially Through Embodied Action
    Linköping Studies in Science and Technology Dissertation No. 1112 Minding the Body Interacting socially through embodied action by Jessica Lindblom Department of Computer and Information Science Linköpings universitet SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden Linköping 2007 © Jessica Lindblom 2007 Cover designed by Christine Olsson ISBN 978-91-85831-48-7 ISSN 0345-7524 Printed by UniTryck, Linköping 2007 Abstract This dissertation clarifies the role and relevance of the body in social interaction and cognition from an embodied cognitive science perspective. Theories of embodied cognition have during the past two decades offered a radical shift in explanations of the human mind, from traditional computationalism which considers cognition in terms of internal symbolic representations and computational processes, to emphasizing the way cognition is shaped by the body and its sensorimotor interaction with the surrounding social and material world. This thesis develops a framework for the embodied nature of social interaction and cognition, which is based on an interdisciplinary approach that ranges historically in time and across different disciplines. It includes work in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, phenomenology, ethology, developmental psychology, neuroscience, social psychology, linguistics, communication, and gesture studies. The theoretical framework presents a thorough and integrated understanding that supports and explains the embodied nature of social interaction and cognition. It is argued that embodiment is the part and parcel of social interaction and cognition in the most general and specific ways, in which dynamically embodied actions themselves have meaning and agency. The framework is illustrated by empirical work that provides some detailed observational fieldwork on embodied actions captured in three different episodes of spontaneous social interaction in situ.
    [Show full text]
  • The Origins and Legacy of Quine's Naturalism
    The Origins and Legacy of Quine’s Naturalism 17-18 December 2019 ABSTRACTS Jansenn-Lauret and Macbride: W.V. Quine and David Lewis: Structural (Epistemological) Humility. In this paper we argue that W.V. Quine and D.K. Lewis, despite their differences and their different receptions, came to a common intellectual destination: epistemological structuralism. We begin by providing an account of Quine’s epistemological structuralism as it came to its mature development in his final works, Pursuit of Truth (1990) and From Stimulus to Science (1995), and we show how this doctrine developed our of his earlier views on explication and the inscrutability of reference. We then turn to the correspondence between Quine and Lewis which sets the scene for Lewis’s adoption of structuralism vis-a-vis set theory in the Appendix to his Parts of Classes (1990). We conclude, drawing further from Lewis’s correspondence, by arguing that Lewis proceeded from there to embrace in one of his own final papers, ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2001), an encompassing form of epistemological structuralism, whilst discharging the doctrine of reference magnetism that had hitherto set Lewis apart from Quine. Rogério Severo: A change in Quine’s reasons for holophrastic indeterminacy of translation Up until the early 1970s Quine argued that the underdetermination of theories by observations is a reason for holophrastic indeterminacy of translation. This is still today thought of as Quine’s main reason for the thesis. Yet, his 1975 formulation of underdetermination renders that argument invalid. This paper explains why. It also indicates Quine’s reasons for holophrastic indeterminacy after 1975, and offers an additional reason for it.
    [Show full text]
  • The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
    THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EMBODIED COGNITION Embodied cognition is one of the foremost areas of study and research in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key philosophers, topics and debates in this exciting subject and essential reading for any student and scholar of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six parts: Historical underpinnings Perspectives on embodied cognition Applied embodied cognition: perception, language, and reasoning Applied embodied cognition: social and moral cognition and emotion Applied embodied cognition: memory, attention, and group cognition Meta-topics. The early chapters of the Handbook cover empirical and philosophical foundations of embodied cognition, focusing on Gibsonian and phenomenological approaches. Subsequent chapters cover additional, important themes common to work in embodied cognition, including embedded, extended and enactive cognition as well as chapters on embodied cognition and empirical research in perception, language, reasoning, social and moral cognition, emotion, consciousness, memory, and learning and development. Lawrence Shapiro is a professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin – Madison, USA. He has authored many articles spanning the range of philosophy of psychology. His most recent book, Embodied Cognition (Routledge, 2011), won the American Philosophical Association’s Joseph B. Gittler award in 2013. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy are state-of-the-art surveys of emerging, newly refreshed, and important fields in philosophy, providing accessible yet thorough assessments of key problems, themes, thinkers, and recent developments in research.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 What to Take Away from Sellars's Kantian Naturalism James R. O
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers What to Take Away from Sellars’s Kantian Naturalism James R. O’Shea, University College Dublin (This is the author’s post-peer reviewed version. For citations, please refer to the published version in: James R. O’Shea, ed., Sellars and His Legacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 130–148.) ABSTRACT: I contend that Sellars defends a uniquely Kantian naturalist outlook both in general and more particularly in relation to the nature and status of what he calls ‘epistemic principles’; and I attempt to show that this remains a plausible and distinctive position even when detached from Sellars’s quasi-Kantian transcendental idealist contention that the perceptible objects of the manifest image strictly speaking do not exist, i.e., as conceived within that common sense framework. I first explain the complex Kant-inspired sense in which Sellars did not take the latter thesis concerning the objects of the manifest image to apply, at least in certain fundamental respects, to persons. In this primary Kantian sense, I suggest, persons as thinkers and agents exist univocally across both the manifest and scientific images, and this in principle would enable an integration of persons within a multi-leveled naturalistic ontology, one that is independent of Sellars’s quasi-Kantian transcendental idealist thesis. Finally, I examine in some detail how this defensible blend of Kantian and naturalist themes turns out to be what is fundamental in Sellars’s complex and controversial views on the nature and status of epistemic principles.
    [Show full text]
  • Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk ROBERT BRANDOM
    MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, XI1 Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk ROBERT BRANDOM his essay offers a rational reconstruction of the career of a certain heroic ap- Tproach to truth-the approach whose leading idea is that the special linguistic roles of truth ascriptions are to be explained in terms of features of the ascribinns of truth, rather than of what is ascrided. The explanatory emphasis placed on the act of calling something true, as opposed to its descriptive content, qualifies theories displaying this sort of strategic commitment as ‘pragmatic’theories of truth, by con- trast to ‘semantic’ ones. The starting point is an articulation of a central insight of the classical pragmatist theories of truth espoused in different versions by James and Dewey. Developing this insight in response to various objections yields a sequence of positions ending in contemporary anaphoric semantics: prosentential theories of ‘true’ and pronominal theories of ‘refers’. These theories articulate an antirealist posi- tion about truth and reference, of the sort here called ‘phenomenalist’.Insofar as the- ories of this sort offer adequate accounts of the phenomena they address, they assert relatively narrow and clearly defined limits to the explanatory ambitions of theories couched in traditional semantic vocabularies. I The popular conception of the theory of truth of classical pragmatism is summed up in the slogan ‘The truth is what works.’ According to this view, the pragmatists were trying to give a theory of truth in the sense of offering necessary and sufficient condi- tions for possession of that property. Their innovation is then seen to consist in tak- ing the possession of this property by a belief to consist in a relation not simply to what is believed, but also to what is desired.
    [Show full text]
  • Levels of Discourse in Leibniz's Metaphysics the Ontological Status of Bodies
    Levels of Discourse in Leibniz's Metaphysics The Ontological Status of Bodies: A Study of the Levels of Discourse in Leibniz's Metaphysics By SCOTT STAPLEFORD, B.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts McMaster University C> Copyright by Scott Stapleford, August 1998 MASTER OF ARTS (1998) McMaster University (Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: The Ontological Status of Bodies: A Study of the Levels of Discourse in Leibniz's Metaphysics AUTHOR: Scott Stapleford, B.A. (Brock University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Wilfrid Waluchow NUMBER OF PAGES: iv, 169 ii Table of Contents Introduction 1 The Problem 2 Collateral Issues 3 Procedure Part I 4 Some Working Deftnitions 5 Phenomenalism 5.1 Linguistic Phenomenalism 5.2 Berkeleian Phenomenalism 6 Leibniz and Phenomenalism 6.1 Macintosh's Interpretation 6.2 Jolley's Interpretation 6.3 Wilson's Interpretation 111 Part II 7 Recapitulation and Procedure 8 Athenian and Darwinian Approaches 8.1 Woolhouse's Interpretation 8.2 Adams' Interpretation 8.3 Hartz's Interpretation 8.4 Loeb's Interpretation 8.5 Rutherford's Interpretation 9 Psychology and Ontology 9.1 Mind and Matter in Descartes and Locke 9.2 Leibniz's Analysis of Mind and Matter 9.2.1 The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction 9.2.2 Physical Considerations 9.2.3 Metaphysical Considerations 9.2.3.1 Substance as Unity 9.2.3.2 Substance as Activity 9.2.3.3 Substance as Subject 9.2.4 Psychological Considerations 10 Levels of Discourse 11 Leibniz's Epistemological Realism 11.1 Requirements of the System 11.2 The Contrary Proposition 11.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition: a Critique of the Language of Thought Amber Sheldon University of San Diego, [email protected]
    University of San Diego Digital USD Keck Undergraduate Humanities Research Fellows Humanities Center Spring 2019 Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition: A Critique of the Language of Thought Amber Sheldon University of San Diego, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/hc-keck Part of the Other Philosophy Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, and the Philosophy of Mind Commons Digital USD Citation Sheldon, Amber, "Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition: A Critique of the Language of Thought" (2019). Keck Undergraduate Humanities Research Fellows. 2. https://digital.sandiego.edu/hc-keck/2 This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Humanities Center at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in Keck Undergraduate Humanities Research Fellows by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sheldon Fall 2018 Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition: A Critique of the Language of Thought Amber Sheldon University of San Diego, 2018 1 Sheldon Fall 2018 Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition: A Critique of the Language of Thought Amber Sheldon University of San Diego, 2018 Introduction The “computer metaphor” views the content of the mind as being akin to software. Our brains are coded using abstract symbols to represent concepts and semantic rules.1 Such models for understanding the relation between mind and body have been popular among cognitive scientists and philosophers.2 Computational Functionalism views the mind/brain like a computer that works according to a system of symbolic inputs and corresponding outputs. The framework of these computational mental representations is the “language of thought.”3 This symbolic mental language is often analogized with the symbolic “language” of a computer.
    [Show full text]
  • From Embodied Cognition to Free Will
    Introduction Agency: From Embodied Cognition to Free Will Duccio Manetti* [email protected] Silvano Zipoli Caiani** [email protected] Traditional theories about experience have always represented the subject as a passive recipient of sensory stimuli, which get processed through successive layers of the brain cortex and culminate in a phenomenal experience, omitting any mention of the role of the personal sense of agency. According to this formulation, experience emerges as a combination of biological and phenomenological descriptions, linking mechanical processes to subjective qualitative reports. Conceptual frameworks provided by neuroscience and phenomenological analysis are alternative descriptive systems originally conceived for alternative explanatory purposes. Here is the origin of many of the theoretical tensions in cognitive science. Today, after years in which dualism and reductionism have been the only games in town, the idea of an embodied dynamicism is emerging in the field of cognitive science with support from substantial empirical evidence. As perceptual experience is shaped by action execution, it seems necessary to assume a theoretical framework within which the interconnection between the perceiving subject’s conscious states, his body and the environment is adequately emphasized. For the phenomenological debate, the notion of embodiment coincides with the rebuttal of what is usually considered the Cartesian dualism, that is, the segregation of any bodily influence from the subjective experiential domain.
    [Show full text]
  • Quantum Chemical Computational Methods Have Proved to Be An
    36940 S. Penchalaiah / Elixir Philosophy 89C (2015) 36940-36943 Available online at www.elixirpublishers.com (Elixir International Journal) Philosophy Elixir Philosophy 89C (2015) 36940-36943 The Philosophy of Phenomenalism with Special References to Sri Narayana Guru and George Berkeley: A Comparative Study S. Penchalaiah Department of Philosophy, Dravidian University, Andhra Pradesh – 517 425. ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Article history: The concept of Phenomenalism is one of the important philosophical problems which are Received: 16 September 2015; agitated in the minds of philosophers and psychologists. Both Indian and Western Received in revised form: Philosophers are enquiry into the essence of the external world. It is a reaction against, 3 December 2015; Realism and Empiricism. It is a meta-physical and epistemological problem. In our day- Accepted: 10 December 2015; to-day life, one directly observes not the physical object as such, but other than some 'thing else. In the instances of ' mistaking a rope for a snake; or 'a shell for silver; or 'a Keywords mirage appears as water pond’. All these instances prove that, one directly observes not Phenomenalism, the physical objects as it is, but something else. This something else is known as an Appearance, 'appearance'. It is also called as Māya or Brama. The contribution of Sri Narayana Guru Perception, and Berkeley, to the concept of phenomenalism, which is focus of the present paper and Cognize of Anirvacaniya, examined. Berkelian philosophy is Immaterialism (Mayavada), it is also called as Indescrimination . Phenomenalism. It is the principle that makes a thing, appear as ‘what it is not'. It is neither real nor unreal nor both.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Science of Embodied Cognition in the 2010S
    This article was downloaded by: [University of California, San Diego] On: 17 October 2011, At: 10:02 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of the Learning Sciences Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hlns20 On the Science of Embodied Cognition in the 2010s: Research Questions, Appropriate Reductionism, and Testable Explanations Rafael Núñez a a Department of Cognitive Science, University of California–San Diego Available online: 02 Sep 2011 To cite this article: Rafael Núñez (2011): On the Science of Embodied Cognition in the 2010s: Research Questions, Appropriate Reductionism, and Testable Explanations, Journal of the Learning Sciences, DOI:10.1080/10508406.2011.614325 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10508406.2011.614325 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
    [Show full text]