The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind
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fpsyg-09-02270 November 21, 2018 Time: 19:51 # 1 ORIGINAL RESEARCH published: 23 November 2018 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02270 The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind Albert Newen* Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e., the no-self position held by Metzinger(2003, 2009) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self (Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008) which is primarily an abstract entity. In contrast to these theories, I argue that we have to presuppose an embodied self, although this is not a metaphysical substance, nor an entity for which stable necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be given. Self-consciousness results from an integration of an embodied, basic affective flow with an intentional object (the self as agent or as center of imagination or thought), where this integration remains anchored in an embodied self. This embodied self is a flexible and variable entity, which we can account for only Edited by: with a pattern theory of the self (in line with Gallagher, 2013). Furthermore, I outline Wanja Wiese, how this pattern theory of the self fits into the predictive coding framework, which also Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany answers the open question whether self-representation is prior to world-representation Reviewed by: or the other way around. The principal organization of a mechanism of building up a self- Philipp Rau, model is such that both types of representations are always activated and developed University of Sheffield, United Kingdom in parallel. Modeling oneself is a process which is always activated when one interacts Cor Baerveldt, with the world – much as a shadow is present when a person walks in the sun. University of Alberta, Canada Keywords: self, embodied self, predictive coding, pattern theory, self-model *Correspondence: Albert Newen [email protected] NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF THE SELF: CONCEPTUAL Specialty section: CLARIFICATIONS AND THE DEBATE ABOUT THE SELF This article was submitted to Theoretical and Philosophical What is the self and how can we best characterize the phenomenon of human self-consciousness? Psychology, Core phenomena of self-consciousness include the perspectivity of our experiences, the sense of a section of the journal ownership of body parts (‘this is my arm’), the sense of agency (‘this is my action’), the sense Frontiers in Psychology of authorship of thoughts (‘this is my thought’) and the transtemporal unification of a plurality Received: 19 March 2018 of self-related information into an autobiography (Synofzik et al., 2008b). As a starting point Accepted: 01 November 2018 for a systematic characterization, the self can be described as the bearer of self-conscious states. Published: 23 November 2018 From a naturalistic point of view, the self is a cognitive system that enjoys some form of self- Citation: consciousness. Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to represent one’s own states as Newen A (2018) The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, one’s own, especially (but not only) mental states, where this self-representation is combined and the Predictive Mind. with a conscious experience (Newen and Vogeley, 2003). In the case of competent speakers, Front. Psychol. 9:2270. this involves an indexical representation typically expressed by the word “I”. Yet even where the doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02270 relevant representation of my own states involves neither language competence nor consciousness, Frontiers in Psychology| www.frontiersin.org 1 November 2018| Volume 9| Article 2270 fpsyg-09-02270 November 21, 2018 Time: 19:51 # 2 Newen The Embodied Self we still have to presuppose a characteristic immediate self- implement the body schema and the sense of agency is a main representation.1 The phenomena to be investigated in principle reason for Metzinger to deny the existence of a self in all include explicit self-consciousness, implicit self-awareness respects: “However, there seems to be no empirical evidence and immediate self-representations not accompanied by any and no truly convincing conceptual argument that supports the conscious experience. These systematic characterizations allow actual existence of ‘a’ self.” The no-self alternative “could be us in principle to ask whether different systems, like animals and simply the default assumption for all rational approaches to robots, enjoy explicit self-consciousness, implicit self-awareness self-consciousness and subjectivity” (Metzinger, 2011, p. 279). or have self-representations. Focusing in this article on humans, He claims that the phenomena of self-consciousness can be the central question is how to naturalize self-consciousness, be it fully explained by presupposing only the brain and its ability explicit (easily consciously accessible) or implicit (partially or not to produce self-models: i.e., self-consciousness is explained as consciously accessible). The paradigmatic cases here are those relying on processes alone. involving immediate self-representations combined with some Against the idea of the self being any kind of entity, Metzinger conscious experiences. The specific aim is to clarify whether a argues that the self cannot be a substance in any of the three clear naturalistic theory of self-consciousness needs to presuppose a metaphysical senses of the term: (1) The self cannot be a spatio- self at all, or whether the implementation basis of self-conscious temporal object because “selves are not to be taken as bodies or states are just processes: the no-self view seeks to explain all the biological organisms simpliciter” (p. 281). (2) The self should not phenomena of self-consciousness by relying only on the brain be identified with a special property of a primitive ‘thisness’ called and its processes without presupposing any entity worthy of haecceitas since the special phenomenological property of self- being called a self. A self is supposed to be superfluous. I argue consciousness does not imply any special metaphysical structure. that this does not work. In addition, we need to presuppose (3) The self should not be understood as a unity of features, where an embodied self as the basis of all cases of everyday implicit this idea of a feature bundle of the self is anchored in Hume’s self-awareness or explicit self-consciousness. Even in special bundle theory of the self. The reason for denying the third option cases like ‘out-of-body-experiences’ there remains at least a weak is simply that it is more parsimonious not to presuppose any embodied self, even though it may be incorrectly experienced in self in such a case, although Metzinger explicitly accepts that several respects, e.g., concerning the spatial location of a touch the classical challenge for how a multitude of features could be experience. integrated into a self can easily be answered in modern cognitive Why do we need a discussion of the embodied self? Isn’t science, e.g. dynamical self-organization in a biological system it by now clear enough that we need to presuppose a self? which realizes a unification of multiple features. There has been quite a lot of work on the role of bodily states I agree that each of the three classical positions on the self as regards the ontogenetic development of the self (Bermúdez, are unacceptable. Nevertheless, the third line of consideration 1998; Neisser, 1998; Newen and Vogeley, 2003; Gallagher, 2005). opens the door for a modern re-interpretation and thus a new But it does not follow from the observation that bodily self- theory of the embodied self. More precisely: self-consciousness representations play a crucial role in ontogenetic development results from an integration of an embodied, basic affective flow with that this remains so in all cases of adults being in a state of an intentional object (the self as agent or as center of perception, implicit self-awareness or explicit self-consciousness. We need imagination or thought) where this integration remains anchored additional systematic arguments to establish this, and indeed in an embodied self. By the ‘basic affective flow in a situation’ there are influential authors who explicitly argue against the I mean the integration of all activated features in a situation existence of a self (Metzinger, 2003, 2009, 2011; Gazzaniga, 2011). which involve a registration of my own bodily or affective Thus we need a clarification of the role of an embodied self processes, where this can involve the registration of homeostatic in experiencing self-awareness and self-consciousness. I focus features (like body temperature and breathing), sensorimotor on a criticism of the work of Metzinger, who marshals the features and affective features, as well as of bodily or affective strongest evidence and has worked out the strongest arguments dispositions or expressions. Some of these registrations are in favor of the no-self position. Reviewing many phenomena typically unconscious (like homeostatic features), and I account including mental disorders, Metzinger(2003) seeks to show that for the case that the integration of all these features can be body ownership or the sense of agency as aspects of the self realized without conscious experiences being involved, e.g., if are constructs of the brain and can rather easily be modified: immediate self-representations could be realized in a robot.2 e.g., in the rubber hand illusion experiment the rubber hand Focusing on human self-consciousness, this integration of self- becomes part of the body schema of a person. He predicted directed features normally involves some conscious experience the existence of an analogous full-body illusion, which was and thus is a basic affective flow, i.e., a basic self-directed bodily then demonstrated in a collaborative study (Lenggenhager et al., or affective experience.