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Home , Adva Center, Ashkenazi Jews, Hiloni, Israelis, Mizrahi Jews, Orient

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Israel on the Road to the ? WP The Cultural and Political Rise of the Mizrahim

Lidia Averbukh S

The Israeli debate sparked by the manslaughter trial of an IDF soldier over an incident in in March 2016 reveals an identity dimension as well as an ethical one. The per- petrator – convicted of shooting a Palestinian assailant in the head when he was already lying motionless on the ground – was an “Oriental” , a so-called Mizrahi, thus insert- ing the event into the context of the internal conflict between Mizrahim and Ashkena- zim, the of European origin. In recent years the pendulum has swung towards the originally highly marginalised Mizrahim – who now assert political and cultural - ship and challenge ’s “Western” identity. Some of them, like the new activist group Tor HaZahav, go as far as openly describing Israel as part of the Middle , although without elaborating what that would mean concretely. The paradigm shift associated with these developments thus remains an intra-societal phenomenon for the time being. Foreign policy implications, for example for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or relations with , are not discernible at this stage.

Almost seventy years after the founding rahi ethno-cultural consciousness only of the state of Israel, the nation is still em- emerged in the course of the confrontation broiled in identity-shaping processes. Today with Israel’s European-influenced society. the Mizrahim play a leading role in these, and increasingly set the country’s cultural and political agenda. Multiple Fields of Conflict The term “Mizrahim” (Hebrew for “East- Israel’s Jewish population is roughly half erners”) is a modern invention of Israeli Mizrahi and half Ashkenazi (48 percent and society. It encompasses all Jews whose ori- 45 percent respectively), alongside smaller gins lie in the and North , groups such as the Ethiopian Jews. For sta- as distinct from the “European” Ashkena- tistical purposes, the growing numbers of zim: Jews from the as well as Per- of mixed Mizrahi/Ashkenazi herit- sian, Yemeni and Iraqi Jews. When they age are recorded by paternal line. On top arrived in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s they of the ethnic divide as such, conflicts based did not yet represent a monolithic ethnic or on socio-economic, cultural and political political formation. In fact, a distinct Miz- differences exist between the two groups.

Lidia Averbukh is Associate in the research project “Israel and its regional and global conflicts: Domestic developments, SWP Comments 9 security issues and foreign affairs”. The project is located within SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division and is funded April 2017 by the German Foreign Office.

1 Socio-economic gap of the population as a whole. Even at the Since they arrived in Israel the Mizrahim universities, which are located largely in have felt socio-economically disadvantaged the centre of the country, they represented compared to the Ashkenazim. Israeli soci- 23 percent of students by 2002. ologists identify three principal factors that Although the education gap has nar- contributed to this situation: geographical rowed quantitatively, qualitative differences remoteness from centres of power, a poor persist. Studies show that the institutions economic starting situation and restricted with the lowest prestige and modest stand- access to education. ards attract the highest proportions of The government deliberately settled Mizrahi students, most of whom still come newly arrived Mizrahim in the structurally from less-educated milieus. With science underdeveloped periphery thus laying the and high-tech courses largely attended by groundwork for their marginal status. Far Ashkenazim and the Israeli labour market from the economic, political and cultural increasingly modern and technological, centre of the Greater , they found the ethnic gap persists in these areas. themselves excluded from full integration. Nonetheless, since the wave of Russian- The arrival of the Mizrahim divided the speaking and Ethiopian immigration in Israeli economy into two ethnically defined the 1990s, the Mizrahim have been less classes. Ashkenazim rose to join the middle obviously socio-economically marginalised. class, while , who often brought As the latest arrivals took their place in the craft skills from the more traditional eco- low-wage sector, a “new Mizrahi middle nomic structures of the Arab states, mostly class” emerged. This is reflected in the find- became manual workers. This divided ings of the , which conducts labour market was perpetuated by the exist- research into equality and social justice in ence of two separate state education sys- Israel: In 2015 the pay of “native Israelis tems. Ashkenazim were able to use secular of Ashkenazi origin” was 31 percent above schools on the Western model as a spring- the average, and that of Mizrahi 14 percent board to higher education, while Mizrahim above average. “Native Israelis from FSU generally took the vocational route. countries” (the former ) earned Dissatisfaction with their situation led to close to average (1 percent above), followed massive protests by the Mizrahim, the best- by Arab workers with two-thirds of the aver- known of which are the riots of age and last of all Ethiopian Israelis earning 1959 and the Black Panther protests of 1971. little more than half the average. In 1997 a group of intellectuals formed Hakeshet Hademokratit Hamizrachit (Miz- rahi Democratic Rainbow Coalition) to Cultural rivalries articulate economic and social demands – The Zionist policy of the equalising “melting for example for jobs, housing and educa- pot”, as Ben Gurion described Israel, set tion – and force politicians to address them. out to create a “new Jew”. ’s goal of The socio-economic divide between uniting the Jewish people in their Biblical Ashkenazim and Mizrahim is less wide in homeland was incompatible with the idea the second and third than of different Jewish identities. So it sub- in the first. The peripheral transit camps sumed them all into the hegemonic have grown into “development towns” with European Zionist concept of Jewishness and proper (albeit improveable) infrastructure left no space for cultural traditions. and better educational opportunities. The In the early years, Israeli society rejected establishment of a large number of new the tending of such specific cultures as colleges increased the proportion of Miz- “sectoralism”. The dominant Ashkenazi rahim going on to study to 42 percent elite with its sophisticated, Europeanised (2002), almost equivalent to their proportion

SWP Comments 9 April 2017

2 culture also viewed Mizrahi culture as ist. Its leaders see themselves as the voice primitive. of the Mizrahim. The Mizrahim arrived in a Western-lean- The spectrum of religious parties con- ing and anti-Arab Israel. The reasons for tains some representing Ashkenazi, and this are to be found in the anti-Arab stance others representing Mizrahi . of the currents that dominated politics , who died in 2013, was spiri- and cultural life and in Israel’s geopolitical tual leader of the ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi situation and ongoing conflict with the and founded the Party in 1984. Arab states. In order to gain acceptance in Although its ideas diverge from those of Israel, first- Mizrahim largely the largely traditionally religious Mizrahi avoided displaying their culture in public. voters, Shas has succeeded in corralling the In fact, many even adopted European- Mizrahi electorate by emphasising their sounding names in order to avoid appear- shared roots. The Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox ing “primitive” and to escape suspicions equivalent is United . Be- of illoyality. And they also sought to avoid cause Mizrahim tend to vote for religious speaking their own language, usually and nationalist parties like Shas and , , and cultivating their traditions they are attributed firm ideological posi- in fields such as food and music. tions opposing the and liberal- The growing hostility exhibited towards ism of left-of-centre parties that tend to be Israel by their countries of origin strength- supported by Ashkenazi voters. There is ened Mizrahi identification with their new statistical support for this assertion. – and now only – home. This geographical Accordingly, in the two central issues proximity to the and culture of Israeli politics – the treatment of religion combined with a simultaneous compulsion and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – most to reject it publicly placed the Mizrahim of the Mizrahim lean towards positions con- in a schizophrenic situation. Work on the trary to those of the majority of the Ashke- history of the Oriental Jews conducted by nazim. In fact, however, it is by no means researchers from the Rainbow Coalition pre- certain that these are entirely substantive pared the ground to address this dilemma differences. Many Mizrahim might poten- of Mizrahi identity. The second and third tially support more moderate positions generations now demanded equality if they did not associate the left-of-centre between the Oriental and parties with the Ashkenazi establishment. the predominant Ashkenazi.

A New Mizrahi Course in Political differences Culture and Politics Mizrahi protests ultimately led to tan- Since the turn of the century the conflict gible political consequences in 1977, with between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim has the victory of Likud over the Labour Party been about more than one ’s (HaAvoda) 1977. The historic election advantages over another. Increasingly, it upset, for which the Hebrew neologism also concerns the country’s future self- “mahapakh” was coined, ended the era of image and as such its political leadership Ashkenazi political hegemony. The Labour and positioning as “Western” or “Eastern”. Party, which had consolidated the privi- The process of “Orientalisation” – or in leged position of the Ashkenazim, was Israeli terms of “Mizrahisation” – is in full blamed for marginalising the Mizrahim in swing, as manifested in the current identity the early decades. The relationship between debates and in popular culture. Political Mizrahi voters and Likud (which has never parties have accommodated the trend by itself in fact been led by Mizrahim), can be gradually granting greater attention to the characterised as paternalistic and clientel- concerns of the Mizrahim. At the same time

SWP Comments 9 April 2017

3 new Mizrahi organisations and networks are students, journalists and other intellectuals. emerging, aiming to become the new elite. They are leaders of the Mizrahim second and third generations, whose socio-eco- Religious attitudes (2014/2015) nomic advancement lends them greater Mizrahim self-confidence than their parents’ gen- 11% don’t believe in God eration. The proponents of the new Mizrahi 32% identify as (secular) activism embed their vision of a “Middle 42% identify as Masorti (traditional) Eastern” Israeli society in what are often 18% identify as Dati (religious) traditionalistic and reactionary ideas. 8% identify as Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) At the same time, the process of “Orien- 49% believe that religion should be talisation” is also driven – in a different separate from government poli- context – by the new generation of Ashke- cies (as do 70% of Ashkenazim) nazi leftists. They welcome the “rediscov- ery” of Judaism’s Oriental roots because Ashkenazim that fits with their ideas of peaceful co- 35% don’t believe in God existence within the Arab . Young 66% identify as Hiloni (secular) Ashkenazim also exhibit solidarity with 15% identify as Masorti (traditional) the Mizrahim. The frame of a post-Zionist 8% identify as Dati (religious) discourse that has jettisoned the idea of 12% identify as Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) the supplies encouragement to anything associated with folklore, Jewish National attitudes (2014/2015) identities and alternative traditions. Ideo- logically, this Ashkenazi “” 55% of Mizrahim say that Jews should remains foreign to most Mizrahim, even remain in Israel, even if it means giving if they undoubtedly benefit from it in the up the good life sense of a general improvement in their (as do 39% of Ashkenazim) situation.

The most striking manifestations of 56% of Mizrahim say that Israeli “Orientalisation” can be observed in popu- should be expelled or transferred from lar culture. In recent years Israeli television Israel has broadcast three successful series ad- (as do 40% of Ashkenazim) dressing discrimination and stereotyping

of the Mizrahim: “Zaguri Imperia” (2014), 48% of Mizrahim say that settlements on “‘Arsim’ and ‘Frechot’: The New Elites” the help Israel’s security (2014) and “Achlu li, Shatu li: The Next (as do 35 % of Ashkenazim) Generation” (2016). They raise issues such as emulation of Ashkenazim and the pejo- Source: Pew Research Center, Israel’s rative terms used to describe Mizrahim Religiously Divided Society, March 8, 2016, (“Ars” and “Frecha” being the male and http://www.pewforum.org/files/2016/03/ female equivalents of “chav”). Oriental Israel-Survey-Full-Report-03-01- music and Mizrahi poetry are also gaining EMBARGO.pdf in popularity. The Mizrahi poetry group “Ars Poetica”, for example, enjoys similar fame to popstars. The cultural “Orientalisa- A general “Orientalisation” in society tion” has reached the Israeli mainstream. A growing societal recognition of Judaism’s Oriental cultural and identity-forming attri- butes can currently be observed. This devel- “Orientalisation” of the political agenda opment is associated with an increasingly The governing coalition of Likud and HaBait active “new Mizrahim”, who include artists, HaYehudi () has added

SWP Comments 9 April 2017

4 Mizrahi issues to its agenda, instrumental- New activism: Tor HaZahav – Torenu ising them for political ends. In June 2016 The contemporary Mizrahi protest move- ordered a new inves- ment’s desire for a “Mizrahisation” of Israel tigation into the , as a whole is illustrated especially clearly in which between 1948 and 1954 children by the group Tor HaZahav (The Golden Age), of Yemeni immigrants are alleged to have which formed in early 2016. For the group’s been kidnapped and adopted by Ashkenazi supporters and activists Israel is neither a families, often childless . European enclave in the Middle East, nor Mizrahi activists assert that the purpose “a villa in the jungle”, as once was to “de-Arabise” the “backward” Oriental put it. Instead, they see their country as Jews. an integral part of the region. In their eyes The accusation is directed at the govern- Israel stands within the natural continuum ment of the time, which was led by the of the region’s . Referencing traditionally Ashkenazi Labour Party. The the legendary medieval Jewish flourishing allegations have been very persistent, and on the , when Jews and form a narrative passed from generation to Arabs coexisted in prosperity, they seek to generation within the Yemeni community. ring in a new “Golden Age”. Whether the new investigation confirms Their assertion that their Zionism is “not that the elites at the time knew what was only the Zionism of the kibbutzim and the occurring, or like earlier probes fails to do Palmach” refers to the elitism shared by so, the discussion does nothing to narrow the “socialist islands” in the desert and the the rift between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim. paramilitary fighting force. Both were his- Any proof of an “Ashkenazi conspiracy” torical manifestations of the European would devastate an already weak opposi- Jewish vision of Israel. “The Zionism of Tor tion and drive votes to Likud. HaZahav is the Zionism of Mizrahi factory Culture Minister has launched and construction workers, whose hands several initiatives to end Ashkenazi hegemo- created Israel’s cities, its prosperity, and its ny in the cultural institutions. One means authentic Israeli culture.” This statement to this end is the diversion of state spend- refers to Mizrahi marginalisation in the ing into Mizrahim cultural projects. labour market and the settlement of Miz- In 2016 Education Minister Naftali rahi Jews in the periphery. Tor HaZahav Bennett established a committee to im- understands “authentic culture” as the prove the representation of Oriental Jewish region’s Oriental culture, in contrast to culture and history in the education sys- the imported and seemingly artificial tem. Chaired by the Mizrahi author Erez European culture. Biton, the committee proposed for example About sixty activists form the core of Tor adding texts by Mizrahi intellectuals such HaZahav. Many of them are already well- as to the school curriculum known as artists or leaders of other Mizrahi and organising school trips to and protest movements. Although they come (like those already running to Po- from the new Mizrahi middle class, they seek land). Oriental Jewish school students whose to reach marginalised groups by stressing ancestors were driven out of Spain to North their Mizrahi identity. The group’s website Africa will be given the opportunity to visit lists a series of demands addressed to Israeli the historical Jewish sites there. At home, politics and society: improving living con- the Mizrahi Jews’ history of and ditions in the periphery in the interests of expulsions is to be given greater weight in equality, full participation in official status the collective consciousness, which has markers (Mizrahim on banknotes, in street until now been defined above all by the suf- names and as recipients of official awards), fering of the . and satisfactory resolution of the Yemenite Children Affair. But the most striking de-

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5 mand is for the immediate “integration possible homeland. For Israelis of European of Israel in the Middle East”, by nurturing origin, who are often also citizens of a Oriental history, language, tradition and Western state and maintain a transnational culture. ethos through socialisation and education, The activists from Tor HaZahav see a con- the bond with Israel is less tight and less nection between the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi exclusive. Consequently it is Mizrahim who constellation within Israel and Israel’s con- today define Israeliness and consciously flict with its neighbours. They believe that and unconsciously invest more in the new the road to peace and normalisation will be Israeli identity. smoother once Israel has recognised itself Social tensions continue to exist between as part of the Middle East and established the two groups. In particular Ashkenazim a traditional – Oriental-rooted – political draw accusations of intra-Jewish racism elite. The suffix “Torenu” in the movement’s when they criticise the rise of the Mizrahi. name (Hebrew for “our turn now”) repre- So instead they do so indirectly, scape- sents a challenge to the Ashkenazi elites. goating the Mizrahim for all the defects of So on the one side the activists are push- Israeli society. Mizrahim in turn complain ing for equality in a hierarchical Ashkenazi- that they still experience structural dis- dominated society and see themselves enter- crimination. ing the ranks of the decision-makers. On Both these perspectives were on display the other, they want to demonstrate that in the debate over the manslaughter pros- the rich history of Mizrahi culture and ecution of Elor Azaria, who shot and killed ideas possesses the potential to create a new a Palestinian assailant – lying motionless ideological foundation for Israeli society. on the ground – in March 2016 in Hebron. However, the rudimentary of their Ashkenazi journalists saw the incident as a political ideas creates an impression that “typical” case of Mizrahi violence and bru- Tor HaZahav is in fact simply riding on a tality, while Mizrahi reporters accused the wave of broader social change. Ashkenazi judiciary and generals of con- ducting a witchhunt against a member of the Mizrahi group. Mizrahim and Ashkena- Conclusions and Outlook zim do not find it easy to argue construc- The “Orientalisation” or “Mizrahisation” tively. At the same time, the incident has of Israeli society is a long-term trend, which made anti-Ashkenazi rhetoric acceptable has been driven by waves of Mizrahi protest among Mizrahi activists. and finally consolidated in recent years. The paradigm shift – turning away from a West- Party politics: The run-up to the next elec- ern orientation and towards Oriental origins tions is highly likely to reveal and reflect – can be recognised in four political fields: the growing significance of the Mizrahim. Left-wing parties can also be expected to Society: The Mizrahim’s transformation give list places to candidates with Mizrahi from marginalised group to central politi- roots and to take up their socio-economic cal force has brought with it a substantial and cultural concerns. In the longer term expansion of their influence. Today they the “Mizrahisation” of party politics could hold the upper hand over the Ashkenazim, endanger the monopoly Shas currently holds as the determining factor for Israel’s iden- over ethnic representation. With the Mizra- tity and cultural . Mizrahim have him demonstrating a new, strengthened self- thus come to dominate the gradual process confidence, the image of the Mizrahi under- of consolidating an overall Israeli identity. dog is no longer a decisive reason to vote Their active participation in this process for a particular political party. is conditioned not least by their stronger Tor HaZahav has not yet the potential ties to the state of Israel, which is their only to become a political party before the next

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6 elections, but its representatives could al- Mizrahi partners over Askenazi. Israel’s ternatively stand as candidates for existing “Orientalisation” or “Mizrahisation” thus parties. Because the group has to date only has no discernible effect on the Middle East spoken concretely about domestic politics conflict, but serves the Mizrahim as a point it can currently – in the tradition of “Israeli of reference for domestic political battles. escapism” – be placed in the centre ground. As such, it would join Yesh and Relations with Europe: To date there is no in avoiding the Middle East conflict in order indication of the “Mizrahisation” of Israel’s to attract voters in the centre ground who political elites interfering with Israeli-Euro- are tired of the problem. In so doing, Tor pean relations. Even in the past, European HaZahav would still be leaving most of the cultural identification with the Ashkenazi Mizrahi voters – who traditionally vote for leadership was no guarantee of political security – to Likud. This would exacerbate consensus. Emphasis on shared values has the fragmentation of the centre and attract generally been more important for Euro- more votes from the left than the right. pean decision-makers than for their Israeli © Stiftung Wissenschaft und counterparts. For the latter, relations with Politik, 2017 Middle East conflict: The Mizrahim/Ashkena- Europe have generally been -driven. All rights reserved zim constellation has not to date had any Here the domestic Israeli paradigm shift is These Comments reflect identifiable effects on the Middle East con- unlikely to cause much change. Economic the author’s views. flict, despite its instrumentalisation in relations – where Europe is Israel’s most SWP domestic power struggles. Ophir Toubul, important trading partner – and security Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik driving force behind Tor HaZahav, explic- cooperation will continue to define the German Institute for itly blames the “white, left-wing Ashkena- relationship. International and Security Affairs zim” for the failure of the peace process. By Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adopting the position of the “outsider” in has recently spoken of a turn towards Arab Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 the Middle East, as secular Europeans in the neighbours seeking large-scale regional 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 , he says, they drove a wedge between cooperation. European decision-makers Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Mizrahim and Arab. In fact, he argues, the should not misinterpret such statements www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] two groups should actually understand as manifestations of domestic “Orientalisa- each other on the basis of their shared tion”, but treat them as realpolitik. ISSN 1861-1761 spirituality and holy sites. These statements Translation by Meredith Dale reflect a widespread Mizrahi belief that the (English version of Ashkenazi elites are to blame for the SWP-Aktuell 16/2017) expulsion of the , the wars, the occupation and the stagnation of the peace process. However, although the “new Mizrahim” present themselves as the better mediators of the Middle East conflict and emphasise the roots they share with the Arabs, they have to date concentrated exclusively on consolidating their own position in Israeli society and on its “Mizrahisation”. The identity discourse thus offers a population weary of conflict a platform to discuss the “Arab” within Judaism, but without forcing them to interact with their immediate Pales- tinian neighbours – nor with the Arab citi- zens of Israel itself. At the same time there is no sign of Palestinian leaders preferring

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