Israel on the Road to the Orient? the Cultural and Political Rise of the Mizrahim
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Israel on the Road to the Orient? WP The Cultural and Political Rise of the Mizrahim Lidia Averbukh S The Israeli debate sparked by the manslaughter trial of an IDF soldier over an incident in Hebron in March 2016 reveals an identity dimension as well as an ethical one. The per- petrator – convicted of shooting a Palestinian assailant in the head when he was already lying motionless on the ground – was an “Oriental” Jew, a so-called Mizrahi, thus insert- ing the event into the context of the internal conflict between Mizrahim and Ashkena- zim, the Jews of European origin. In recent years the pendulum has swung towards the originally highly marginalised Mizrahim – who now assert political and cultural leader- ship and challenge Israel’s “Western” identity. Some of them, like the new activist group Tor HaZahav, go as far as openly describing Israel as part of the Middle East, although without elaborating what that would mean concretely. The paradigm shift associated with these developments thus remains an intra-societal phenomenon for the time being. Foreign policy implications, for example for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or relations with Europe, are not discernible at this stage. Almost seventy years after the founding rahi ethno-cultural consciousness only of the state of Israel, the nation is still em- emerged in the course of the confrontation broiled in identity-shaping processes. Today with Israel’s European-influenced society. the Mizrahim play a leading role in these, and increasingly set the country’s cultural and political agenda. Multiple Fields of Conflict The term “Mizrahim” (Hebrew for “East- Israel’s Jewish population is roughly half erners”) is a modern invention of Israeli Mizrahi and half Ashkenazi (48 percent and society. It encompasses all Jews whose ori- 45 percent respectively), alongside smaller gins lie in the Middle East and North Africa, groups such as the Ethiopian Jews. For sta- as distinct from the “European” Ashkena- tistical purposes, the growing numbers of zim: Jews from the Maghreb as well as Per- Israelis of mixed Mizrahi/Ashkenazi herit- sian, Yemeni and Iraqi Jews. When they age are recorded by paternal line. On top arrived in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s they of the ethnic divide as such, conflicts based did not yet represent a monolithic ethnic or on socio-economic, cultural and political political formation. In fact, a distinct Miz- differences exist between the two groups. Lidia Averbukh is Associate in the research project “Israel and its regional and global conflicts: Domestic developments, SWP Comments 9 security issues and foreign affairs”. The project is located within SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division and is funded April 2017 by the German Foreign Office. 1 Socio-economic gap of the population as a whole. Even at the Since they arrived in Israel the Mizrahim universities, which are located largely in have felt socio-economically disadvantaged the centre of the country, they represented compared to the Ashkenazim. Israeli soci- 23 percent of students by 2002. ologists identify three principal factors that Although the education gap has nar- contributed to this situation: geographical rowed quantitatively, qualitative differences remoteness from centres of power, a poor persist. Studies show that the institutions economic starting situation and restricted with the lowest prestige and modest stand- access to education. ards attract the highest proportions of The government deliberately settled Mizrahi students, most of whom still come newly arrived Mizrahim in the structurally from less-educated milieus. With science underdeveloped periphery thus laying the and high-tech courses largely attended by groundwork for their marginal status. Far Ashkenazim and the Israeli labour market from the economic, political and cultural increasingly modern and technological, centre of the Greater Tel Aviv, they found the ethnic gap persists in these areas. themselves excluded from full integration. Nonetheless, since the wave of Russian- The arrival of the Mizrahim divided the speaking and Ethiopian immigration in Israeli economy into two ethnically defined the 1990s, the Mizrahim have been less classes. Ashkenazim rose to join the middle obviously socio-economically marginalised. class, while Mizrahi Jews, who often brought As the latest arrivals took their place in the craft skills from the more traditional eco- low-wage sector, a “new Mizrahi middle nomic structures of the Arab states, mostly class” emerged. This is reflected in the find- became manual workers. This divided ings of the Adva Center, which conducts labour market was perpetuated by the exist- research into equality and social justice in ence of two separate state education sys- Israel: In 2015 the pay of “native Israelis tems. Ashkenazim were able to use secular of Ashkenazi origin” was 31 percent above schools on the Western model as a spring- the average, and that of Mizrahi 14 percent board to higher education, while Mizrahim above average. “Native Israelis from FSU generally took the vocational route. countries” (the former Soviet Union) earned Dissatisfaction with their situation led to close to average (1 percent above), followed massive protests by the Mizrahim, the best- by Arab workers with two-thirds of the aver- known of which are the Wadi Salib riots of age and last of all Ethiopian Israelis earning 1959 and the Black Panther protests of 1971. little more than half the average. In 1997 a group of intellectuals formed Hakeshet Hademokratit Hamizrachit (Miz- rahi Democratic Rainbow Coalition) to Cultural rivalries articulate economic and social demands – The Zionist policy of the equalising “melting for example for jobs, housing and educa- pot”, as Ben Gurion described Israel, set tion – and force politicians to address them. out to create a “new Jew”. Zionism’s goal of The socio-economic divide between uniting the Jewish people in their Biblical Ashkenazim and Mizrahim is less wide in homeland was incompatible with the idea the second and third generations than of different Jewish identities. So it sub- in the first. The peripheral transit camps sumed them all into the hegemonic have grown into “development towns” with European Zionist concept of Jewishness and proper (albeit improveable) infrastructure left no space for other cultural traditions. and better educational opportunities. The In the early years, Israeli society rejected establishment of a large number of new the tending of such specific cultures as colleges increased the proportion of Miz- “sectoralism”. The dominant Ashkenazi rahim going on to study to 42 percent elite with its sophisticated, Europeanised (2002), almost equivalent to their proportion SWP Comments 9 April 2017 2 culture also viewed Mizrahi culture as ist. Its leaders see themselves as the voice primitive. of the Mizrahim. The Mizrahim arrived in a Western-lean- The spectrum of religious parties con- ing and anti-Arab Israel. The reasons for tains some representing Ashkenazi, and this are to be found in the anti-Arab stance others representing Mizrahi interests. Rabbi of the currents that dominated politics Ovadia Yosef, who died in 2013, was spiri- and cultural life and in Israel’s geopolitical tual leader of the ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi situation and ongoing conflict with the and founded the Shas Party in 1984. Arab states. In order to gain acceptance in Although its ideas diverge from those of Israel, first-generation Mizrahim largely the largely traditionally religious Mizrahi avoided displaying their culture in public. voters, Shas has succeeded in corralling the In fact, many even adopted European- Mizrahi electorate by emphasising their sounding names in order to avoid appear- shared roots. The Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox ing “primitive” and to escape suspicions equivalent is United Torah Judaism. Be- of illoyality. And they also sought to avoid cause Mizrahim tend to vote for religious speaking their own language, usually and nationalist parties like Shas and Likud, Arabic, and cultivating their traditions they are attributed firm ideological posi- in fields such as food and music. tions opposing the secularism and liberal- The growing hostility exhibited towards ism of left-of-centre parties that tend to be Israel by their countries of origin strength- supported by Ashkenazi voters. There is ened Mizrahi identification with their new statistical support for this assertion. – and now only – home. This geographical Accordingly, in the two central issues proximity to the Arab world and culture of Israeli politics – the treatment of religion combined with a simultaneous compulsion and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – most to reject it publicly placed the Mizrahim of the Mizrahim lean towards positions con- in a schizophrenic situation. Work on the trary to those of the majority of the Ashke- history of the Oriental Jews conducted by nazim. In fact, however, it is by no means researchers from the Rainbow Coalition pre- certain that these are entirely substantive pared the ground to address this dilemma differences. Many Mizrahim might poten- of Mizrahi identity. The second and third tially support more moderate positions generations now demanded equality if they did not associate the left-of-centre between the Oriental Jewish culture and parties with the Ashkenazi establishment. the predominant Ashkenazi. A New Mizrahi Course in Political differences Culture and Politics