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1 Salvaging the “Axis of Resistance,” Preserving Strategic Depth 1 Salvaging the “Axis of Resistance,” Preserving Strategic Depth No. 1 November 2014 The Iranian Political Elite and Syria: Parallel Tracks with a Single Objective? Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi Salvaging the “Axis of Resistance,” Preserving Strategic Depth The Iranian Political Elite and Syria: Parallel Tracks with a Single Objective? Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi العدد - )اﻷول( 2 No. 1 November 2014 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone, and do not rep- resent those of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. 3 4 No. 1 November 2014 Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Nasser Mohajer, Dr. Nader Hashemi, Dr. Muhammad Idrees Ahmad who read a preliminary draft of this paper and the research department at KFCRIS. Abstract This paper attempts to describe the public and private positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political elite towards the Assad regime and Syrian civil war since the uprisings of 2011 and in light of more recent developments in the region such as the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. It is divided into three parts and tries to describe the differ- ences, but also complementary efforts and division of labour within and between the Iranian state’s manifold institutions vis-à-vis the Syrian file. Part 1 assesses the diplomatic track focussing on the proposals and views of the Rouhani government and Foreign Ministry. Part 2 discusses a number of the Guardian Jurist Sayyid Ali Khamenei’s public statements, as well as those of his coterie of trusted advisers. Part 3 details the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria and its pivotal role in advising and training pro-Assad forces and how this process relates to the Islamic Republic’s broader regional strategy towards Iraq and the Le- vant, in particular. Ultimately, the paper endeavours to discuss some of the evolving views of these various state institutions and how they collaborate and com- pete in the process of elite consensus building and help clarify the Islamic Republic’s endgame and contingency plans in Syria going into the future. 5 6 No. 1 November 2014 Table of Contents Abstract 5 Introduction 9 Power Centers, Elite Consensus-Building, and the Formulation of Foreign 14 Policy Part 1. The Government and the Foreign Ministry: Advocating a Political 19 Solution? - Elite Disagreement over the Assad Regime’s Use of Chemical Weapons? 22 - Should Tehran be Blocked from Political Participation on the Diplomatic 24 Front? - Zarif’s Qualified Criticisms 25 - Defining the Narrative: Assad’s “Terrorism” Discourse and the Rise of ISIL 27 - The Islamic Republic’s Four-Point Plan: A Way Forward? 33 Part 2. The Guardian Jurist, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, and His Office: 39 “Islamic Awakening” versus “Arab Spring”? - The Feared “Slippery Slope”: From Counterterrorism Campaign to “Regime 43 Change”? - A New Nixon Doctrine without Strings Attached or Entrenched Political 44 Sectarianism? Part 3: The Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force: The Imperative of Strategic 47 Depth - Elusive Regime Consensus: Should Assad Stay or Should He Go? 50 - Is Syria Iran’s Vietnam? 52 - A Cornucopia of Sectarian Militias: Cards to Play in the Balance of Power? 59 - IRGC Frustration with Syrian Military Incompetence? 61 Conclusion 65 About the author 68 7 Introduction Iran and Syria became allies following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and this rela- tionship has proven to be remarkably durable, despite the seem- ing ideological incongruity of an alliance between a Shi’i populist theocracy and a radical Arab nationalist/Ba’athist state.1 Since the inception of the Syrian uprising in the spring of 2011 and its de- President Hojjat al-Islam Ali Khamenei visits Damascus to meet with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in September 1984, Mashreghnews.ir terioration into a full-blown civil conflict, the importance of this key strategic relationship remains undisputed within the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There are different institution- al priorities and agendas governing the views on the Syrian quag- mire in, for example, the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards, but that is to be expected. 1- Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), chap. 1. 9 10 No. 1 November 2014 Over the course of two decades this alliance has been consoli- dated and enshrined as an “axis of resistance” along with the Leb- anese Hezbollah political-paramilitary organization, and it has sought to project itself as an “anti–status quo” and revisionist force opposed to Israel regionally and to American hegemony on the in- ternational scene (as well as the Arab countries that promote the Arab Peace Initiative). In the preceding decades the Islamic Repub- lic and the Assad regime have relied upon both soft and hard power in order to strengthen their ties and regional sway in what has of- ten seemed to many in the Arab world as an “unnatural” or “odd” alliance.2 Despite the efforts by Western states and regional ones such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia to detach Damascus from Tehran, it appears that Syria’s reliance on and cooperation with the Islamic Republic and the Lebanese Hezbollah have only deepened under the presidency of Bashar al-Assad, who acceded to power in July 2000, by all accounts a somewhat awkward and unexpected suc- cessor without the knack for the regional power balancing more dexterously achieved by his father.3 Since the early stages of the Syrian uprising, Iranian and Rus- sian political, economic, logistical, and military support have been indispensable to the Assad regime’s survival and ability to stave off collapse;4 this support has extended and deepened as the conflict 2- See Nadia von Maltzahn, The Syria-Iran Axis: Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), chap. 1. 3- Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (New York: Rout- ledge, 2013), Kindle edition, loc. 1875 of 3617. 4- High-ranking regime officials both within and outside of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have insisted on this point. Whether it is entirely accurate would re- quire an independent investigation. “Moshaver-e rahbari: Agar Iran pa-ye Surieh nemiistad Bashar soqut mikard; jang beh shiveh-ye Basiji ra beh anha yad dadim,” Kalemeh, Febru- ary 25, 2013, http://cutt.us/NxUEt; “Saffar Harandi: Iran pa-ye Surieh nemiistad Bashar soqut mikard,” Entekhab, February 24, 2013, http://cutt.us/t9SX. Hojjat al-Islam Mehdi has ground on.5 Despite the incremental “Alawization” of the Assad regime in the early 1980s and its more overtly sectarian composi- tion (especially in the security apparatus) following the Aleppo Ar- tillery School incident of June 1979 and the infamous Hama mas- sacre of February 1982,6 it would be mistaken to say that this was the key driver of the Iranian-Syrian axis, even if as a result of the ongoing Syrian civil war it has become something of a self-fulfill- ing prophecy. The unconvincing but politically convenient fatwa of the Iranian-born, Lebanese Shi’i cleric Sayyid Musa al-Sadr de- claring Alawis to be Twelver Shi’is7 has come to constitute part of the dominant “common sense” for those analysts who insist on Taʿeb is one such figure. He is the same individual who made the controversial statement calling Syria Iran’s “35th province.” Elaborating, he added, “Syria is the 35th province [of Iran] and a strategic province for us. If the enemy attacks us and wants to appropriate either Syria or Khuzestan [in southern Iran], the priority is that we keep Syria.” Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Head of Ammar Strategic Base: Syria is Iran’s 35th Province; If We Lose Syria We Cannot Keep Tehran,” Al-Monitor: Iran Pulse, February 14, 2013, http:// cutt.us/J2Wfk. 5- Robert Fisk, “Iran to Send 4,000 Troops to Aid President Assad Forces in Syria,” The Independent on Sunday, June 16, 2013, http://cutt.us/kbOHp. 6- It should be added that not all Alawis have benefited from state largesse equally and that both Bashar and Maher al-Assad married into Sunni families. While the enrichment of Assad-affiliated tribes and families, such as the Makhloufs, has certainly taken place and produced a predatory economic liberalization predicated on nepotism, cronyism, and pat- rimonialism, these effects should not be generalized to the entirety of the Alawi sect, since the Aleppo-based Sunni bourgeoisie/mercantile class has also been, at least traditionally, es- sential to the stability of Syria and the preservation of Assad power. Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 2013),73; Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 2004), Kindle edition, loc. 1649 of 4735; Caroline Donati, “The Economics of Authoritarian Upgrading in Syria: Liberalization and the Reconfiguration of Economic Networks,” in Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran, ed. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), loc. 788 of 6213; Charles Glass, “In the Syria We Don’t Know,” New York Review of Books, November 6, 2014, http://cutt.us/ZrA1. 7- Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi‘ism,” Sandbox, http://cutt.us/zoBE5; origi- nally published in Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 237–54. 11 12 No. 1 November 2014 the overriding
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