The Fires Professional

A Joint Publication for U.S. Artillery Professionals May — June 2013 http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. • Headquarters, Department of the Army • PB644-13-3 May - June 2013

Professionalism...More Than Being a Professional 4 By MG Mark McDonald 7 Fires Changes of Command

Live, Virtual, Constructive, Gaming Training Strategy 8 By BG Brian J. McKiernan Setting the Conditions for Mission Command Through the 3-Ts: Time, Trust, Transparency 12 By Professor Gene Kamena and COL Lou Lartigue Back to the Future? An Old German Word Makes a Comeback in New US Doctrine 15 By CPT Thaddeus C. Fox and CPT Jacob N. Hagstrom

Skystrikers Find Inspiration for Their Future by Emphasizing Their Heritage 19 By CPT Will D. Andrews

Joint Electronic Warfare Comes to the Pacific 21 By MSG Jesse Potter Germany’s Air Defense Detachment at the Fires Center of Excellence in the Near Future 22 By German Army Lt. Col. Michael B. Lipka

DISCLAIMER: Fires, a professional bulletin, is published bimonthly by Headquarters, PURPOSE: Founded in 2007, Fires serves as a forum for the professional discussions of all Department of the Army under the auspices of the Fires Center of Excellence Fires professionals, both active and Reserve Component (RC); disseminates professional (Building 652, Hamilton Road), Fort Sill, Okla. The views expressed are those knowledge about progress, developments and best use in campaigns; cultivates a common of the authors and not the Department of Defense or its elements. Fires’ content understanding of the power, limitations and application of joint Fires, both lethal and doesn’t necessarily reflect the U.S. Army’s position or supersede information in other official Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation nonlethal; fosters joint Fires interdependency among the armed services; and promotes of their accuracy nor product endorsements. Fires is printed by Publishers Press, a the understanding of and interoperability between the branches, both active and RC, private firm in no way connected with the Department of the Army. Fires assumes no all of which contribute to the good of Army, joint and combined forces, and our nation. responsibility for any unsolicited material. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: REPRINTS: Fires is pleased to grant permission to reprint; please credit Fires, the Raymond T. Odierno, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff. author(s) and photographers. Official: SUBSCRIPTIONS: Those not eligible for official distribution may subscribe to Fires via the U.S. Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 37154, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Joyce E. Morrow Mark McDonald (1-866-512-1800). Administrative Assistant to the Major General, United States Army OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION: Free copies are sent to USA and USMC FA units: FA/ Secretary of the Army, 1226902 Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla. Fires brigade, brigade combat team (BCT), Stryker cavalry regiment (SCR), FA Marine

2 May - June 2013 • Allons Artillery Battalion Reinvents Itself for Afghanistan Deployment 24 By LTC Christopher W. Wendland and MAJ Lucas R. Connolly

Un-Gendering Service 29 By Professor Gene Kamena Unburdening Culture: Implications for the United States Army Training and Education 31 By COL (Ret.) Eric W. Stanhagen and Daryl K. Liskey, Ph.D. An Open Letter From 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery to Other Field Artillery Units Fielding WIN-T Inc II 41 By MAJ Peter Sittenauer, CPT Joshua Grubbs and CPT John Turner

Utilizing Single-Source Intelligence Disciplines in a Fires Brigade S2 45 By SPC Nicholas J. Hermann World Dynamics are Changing: Everything is Either Growing or Dying - Nothing Stays the Same 51 By CSM Dennis J. Woods Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency: Decisive Victory in Afghanistan Through Targeting and Non-Lethal Operations 54 By CPT Richard M. Ingleby

On the cover: U.S. Soldiers with A Battery, 3rd Battalion, 6th Field Artillery Regiment, conduct live-fire exercises with the M777 towed 155 mm howitzer at Forward Operating Base Arian in Ghazni province, Afghanistan, March 7, 2013. (Photo by SFC Kenneth Foss, U.S. Army)

Regiment and battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) headquarters; 13 per FA/Fires Contact Fires at http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/. battalion/squadron; 3 per fire support element (FSE), Fires and effects cell (FEC), effects POSTMASTER: Fires (USPS 309-010) (ISSN 1935-4096) is published bimonthly; periodical coordination cell (ECC) fire support cell (FSC), and separate battery or detachment; 2 postage paid by Department of the Army at Lawton, OK 73501 and an additional mailing per fire support team (FIST); and 1 per Master Gunner. Free copies to Army ADA units: post office. Send address changes to Fires, P.O. Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. 7 per air and missile defense command (AAMDC) and ADA brigade headquarters; 13 per SUBMISSIONS: E-mail to the Editor, Fires, at [email protected]; mail to P.O. Box ADA battalion; and 3 per air defense airspace management cell (ADAM) and separate 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311; overnight to Building 652, Room 203, Hamilton Road, battery or detachment. The FA and ADA Schools’ departments, directorates and divisions Fort Sill, OK 73503; or call at DSN 639-5121/6806 or commercial (580) 442-5121/6806. each get 2 copies. Other Army branch and US armed services units/organizations and US government agencies that work with FA or ADA personnel, equipment, doctrine, Editor-in-Chief: Shirley Dismuke tactics, training organization or leadership issues may request a free copy—including, Managing Editor: Jennifer McFadden but not limited to—ROTCs, recruiting commands, libraries, attaches, liaison officers, state adjutants general, public affairs offices, military academies, laboratories, arsenals, Art Director: Rickey Paape, Jr. major commands, etc. Assistant Editor: Paul Jiron

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 3 Commanding General’s Forward Professionalism...More Than Being a Professional By MG Mark McDonald Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Okla.

Last month, the chief of staff of the Army held a senior leader conference at West Point. One of the many things we discussed was the profession of arms and being a true professional, deserving of being called a Soldier. The theme for this edition of Fires is “The Fires Profession- al,” which ties directly to the publication of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADPR) Number 1 (draft), The Army Profession, dated September 25, 2012. The most senior Army leaders have officially validated what Soldiers have always known. We are professionals. We are “a unique vocation of experts, certified in the design, generation, support, and ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.” Defining the word ‘professional’ is not a simple task. Webster has several definitions; how- viable, respected, and above all, technically proficient, for ever, there are two which best suit our profes- without proficiency we cannot complete our primary task of protecting the Constitution. While military expertise is sion as Fires Soldiers. “A professional is one important, without the other four essential characteristics of who engages in one of the learned professions the Army profession, the foundation is flawed and will sure- characterized by or conforming to the techni- ly crack or deteriorate. The five essentials for a strong Army cal skill or ethical standards of a profession. A profession are listed in the figure on the opposite page: military expertise, honorable service, trust, esprit de corps, and professional exhibits good judgment, a cour- stewardship of the profession. The most critical of these is the teous, conscientious, and generally business- bridge of trust within the Amy and among the American peo- like manner and professional behavior in the ple. Trust starts at the lowest level: trust between Soldiers is ab- workplace.” As professional Soldiers, society solutely the cement that binds our Fires force. When Soldiers grants us an enormous amount of responsibil- know their peers are accomplishing all of the required tasks at ity. We are the one percent of the population or above standards, and ‘have their backs’ in times of conflict, other levels of trust within our units more easily evolve and who chooses to swear an oath to protect the mature. Ensuring your Soldiers know the history and heri- Constitution of the United States and obey the tage of the unit’s lineage, promotes a desire to ‘live up to the orders of the president. Our service is vital to a standards of those who fought and died’ before them. A sense healthy, free society, yet the same services soci- of belonging, history, and commitment to the unit and the Soldiers of the unit is paramount, as is weeding out those Sol- ety requires of us, most are incapable or unwill- diers who are untrustworthy and detrimental to the morale ing to perform themselves. and very foundation of trust within the unit. Laws and regulations govern our profession; On a popular website, askmen.com, the Army profession was voted as number seven in the top 10 most respected pro- however, each individual retains an inherent fessions in the world. “Every country respects its military, responsibility to keep the profession strong, and there’s always a degree of prestige that comes with the

4 May - June 2013 • NORABLE ESPRIT DE MILITARY HO STEWARDSHIP OF SERVICE TRUST CORPS EXPERTISE THE PROFESSION

CALLING TO THE BEDROCK OOURUR WINNIIN ON OUR NOBLE NINNGG OU THICAL APPLICATI ACRIFICE SP OUR LONG-TERMNG-TERM OUR E SERVICE AND S OF OUR IRITIRIT RE OF LANDPOWER PROFESSION RESPONSIBIONSIBILITYTY Trust between Soldiers Trust between Soldiers and Leaders Trust between Soldiers, their Families and the Army Trust between the Army and the American People

• Personal Courage Ethical Foundation: Legal and Moral

Five essential characteristics of the Army profession. (Illustration courtesy of the U.S. Army) knowledge that a person willingly puts fession and to the American people. We technical abilities they brought to our himself in danger for the sake of ev- are responsible and duty-bound to not team. With tighter budgets, many of eryone else. All those who serve in the only complete today’s missions with the tasks they now complete will revert military, in all its branches and ranks, the resources available, but also those back to Soldiers, specifically those tasks are respected for their service; howev- of the future, to ensure our profession relating to training and programmed er, officers in particular are afforded a is always capable of fulfilling whatev- instruction. Who better to train Soldiers special level of respect, because they are er missions our nation gives us. Our than Soldiers? Professionalism will the ones responsible for everyone else - professional responsibility is to ensure, play a critical role in this transition as they’re educated and experienced, and through our stewardship, the present we move seasoned ‘warriors’ into roles these [Soldiers] who risk life and limb and future effectiveness of the profes- they might perceive as being non-mili- are in their hands.” sion.” Good stewardship comes with tary. At ehow.com, the military profes- ownership of one’s profession. In order In a paper entitled, “A Personal View sion was rated fifth, behind firefighters, for ownership to occur, each individu- of Professionalism,” Ashwin Kini im- doctors, scientists, and teachers. Society al must possess the ‘3Ps:’ passion, per- plies that a true professional sets him- places a huge level of confidence in our sistence, and professionalism. self on a path toward perfection within uniform and the mere fact that we wear Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, a chosen profession. “The path involves the uniform implies we uphold a higher “If a man is called to be a street sweeper, holding high personal standards, com- standard of conduct than the civilians he should sweep streets even as Michel- peting with oneself, constant learning, we defend. When trust between a Sol- angelo painted, or Beethoven composed dedication, and commitment to ex- dier and the country is broken or dam- music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He cellence.” A professional accepts the aged, the level of respect for our profes- should sweep streets so well that all the task they are given, whether sweeping sion suffers. Trust is truly the bedrock hosts of heaven and earth will pause to streets or patrolling them, dedicates of our profession and all other essential say, here lived a great street sweeper themselves to the task and performs characteristics are infinitely bound to who did his job well.” the task to the very best of their abili- keeping that trust. Nothing replaces It is this level of passion for the Fires ty. In other words, earning a badge of trust between Soldiers, their leaders, profession that will see us through professionalism is hard work, not a title their Families and the Army. When all whatever lies ahead. As Fires profes- bestowed upon you because of a chosen levels of trust are intact, trust between sionals, we must take responsibility for career field. We have about 65,000 pro- the Army and the American people will ourselves and take back some of the fessional Fires Soldiers. Do all of them remain strong and deserving. unique responsibilities of our work as wear their professionalism with honor Another characteristic of the Army Fires Soldiers. Over the past decade, our and pride? We have the ability, and the profession I’d like to touch on is the attention has been focused on fighting duty, to shape the path of professional- stewardship of the profession. ADRP 1 battles and winning wars. The force was ism within our force. states, “Stewardship is about our spe- spread very thin, and we relied heavily One distinguishing mark of a true cial responsibilities to the Army pro- on contractors and the experience and professional is an innate ability to see

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 5 beyond self and always ‘do what needs to keep on our team and the develop- we need to stay ahead of the enemy for to be done.’ Professionalism forms the ment of their professional judgment. the foreseeable future. We are also com- foundation for mission command, ap- When leaders share technical knowl- mitted to your professional develop- plying the commander’s intent in the edge and tactical experience, it can pro- ment and will do everything we can to absence of detailed orders. In their arti- vide a baseline on which subordinates maintain the quality and availability of cle, “Setting the Conditions for Mission will judge themselves. Raising the bar the training you need for technical pro- Command through the 3-Ts: Time, Trust on individual professional judgment ficiency. and Transparency,” COL Lou Latrigue and the ability to implement mission In order to ensure our future success, and Professor Gene Kamena underscore command at unit level will improve the the importance of people, personalities very foundation of the Fires force. we must instill a culture of the highest and professional judgment in the suc- We are passionate about what we, as level of professionalism. Demand it cess of mission command. While we a Fires force, bring to the fight. The Fires from yourself…demand it from your can’t do much to change personalities, Center of Excellence will prevail in our Soldiers. we can influence the people we choose battle to ensure the Fires force has what Fires Strong!««

PFC Justin Koehn helps members of the fire direction center convert target data into firing commands for the gun line during a live-fire exercise at Fort Bragg, N.C., April 9, 2013. The exercise was part of an airborne operation to test the readiness of Soldiers with the 319th Field Artillery Regiment to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. Koehn is a Field Artillery automated tactical data systems specialist, assigned to B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. (Photo by SGT Joseph Guenther, U.S. Army)

6 May - June 2013 • Fires Changes of Command

May 1, 2013 June 19, 2013 2nd BN, 5th FA, Fort Sill, Okla. 210th Fires BDE, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea Outgoing: LTC Seth Pilgrim Outgoing: COL Tracy Banister Incoming: LTC Travis Gray Incoming: COL Mike Lawson May 2, 2013 June 20, 2013 3rd BN, 4th ADA, Fort Bragg, N.C. 4th BN, 319th FA, Fort Sill, Okla. Outgoing: LTC Richard Harrison Outgoing: LTC Kelly Webster Incoming: LTC Patrick Costello Incoming: LTC William Kirby May 7, 2013 June 24, 2013 1st BN, 10th FA, Fort Stewart, Ga. 1st BCD, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz. Outgoing: LTC Ed Willard Outgoing: COL David Ell Incoming: LTC Kevin Capra Incoming: COL Shaun Tooke May 16, 2013 June 26, 2013 5th BN, 3rd FA, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. 5th BN, 7th ADA, Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany Outgoing: LTC Joe Hilbert Outgoing: LTC Philip, Labasi Incoming: LTC Ian Bennett Incoming: LTC Lisa Bartel May 17, 2013 June 26, 2013 1st BN, 377th FA, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. Fires SQDN, 3rd CAV REG, Fort Hood, Texas Outgoing: LTC Chuck Roede Outgoing: LTC Lynn Downie Incoming: LTC Alan Wagner Incoming: LTC Alric Francis June 5, 2013 June 28, 2013 2nd BN, 4th FA, Fort Sill, Okla. 214th Fires BDE, Fort Sill, Okla. Outgoing: LTC Mark Schmitt Outgoing: COL Tim Daugherty Incoming: LTC William Burnett Incoming: COL Andy Preston June 6, 2013 July 1, 2013 1st BN, 40th FA, Fort Sill, Okla. 69th ADA BDE, Fort Hood, Texas Outgoing: LTC Willaim Davenport Outgoing: COL Randall McIntire Incoming: LTC Fidel Ruiz Incoming: COL Brian Gibson June 6, 2013 July 10, 2013 5th BN, 5th ADA, Joint Base Lewis McChord, Wash. 10th AAMDC, Fort Bliss, Texas Outgoing: LTC Michael Melito Outgoing: LTC Michael Solis Incoming: LTC Bradley J. (BJ) Herman, Jr. Incoming: LTC Robin Woody June 7, 2013 July 12, 2013 1st BN, 78th FA, Fort Sill, Okla. 2nd BN, 43rd ADA, Fort Bliss, Texas Outgoing: LTC David Lewis Outgoing: LTC Michael Solis Incoming: LTC Michael Mullins Incoming: LTC Robin Woody

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 7 Mud to Space Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy By BG Brian J. McKiernan Chief of the Field Artillery and Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla.

The United States Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) documented a Live, Virtu- al, Constructive and Gaming (LVCG) Training Strategy that supports and complements our Field Artillery (FA) Training Strategy. In a time of declining resources, commanders will need more tools and options to effectively train, ed- ucate and develop agile, adaptive and decisive Soldiers and leaders. This LVCG strategy addresses training opportunities across the three training domains: operational domain, institutional training base (ITB) domain, and the self-development domain. The operational domain is defined by realistic, unit-collective training. Tenets of this domain are dominantly characterized by combined arms training opportunities and blended training approaches which will soon become the Integrated Training Environment (ITE) as development benefit from a comprehensive LVCG strategy. defined in the Army Training Strategy. Read Access to adequate home station training (HST) areas or more about the Army Training Strategy at combat training centers (CTC) will continue to be constrained http://go.usa.gov/2sZC. The institutional train- in the near future. Increased urbanization, competition for training areas, limited money, time and resources will contin- ing base (ITB) domain includes opportunities to ue to exacerbate the problem. Continued creativity in training train fundamental and advanced Field Artillery and leadership development is imperative. skills using emergent technology and immer- While training in the virtual domain isn’t the norm for an FA unit, it can be done and done well through creative plan- sive simulators. The self-development domain ning. LVCG can be leveraged to train everything from gun- covers professional development and certifica- nery to crew drills, reconnaissance, selection, and occupation tions tailored to fit individual needs. of position (RSOP), and leadership and decision making. Lessons Learned from the 210th Fires Brigade. Recently, By providing this LVCG strategy, I establish the 210th Fires Brigade (FiB) conducted an LVCG Fires cul- a blue print that drives and focuses FA train- minating training event where commanders at each echelon ing and education where simulations might be were able to achieve their stated training objectives through the construct and employment of a comprehensive, open leveraged. Training and education in the oper- public local access network (OPLAN)-based training event ational, institutional, and self-development do- that effectively blended the LVCG domains across a robust mains demand the most challenging situations seven-day, externally-evaluated scenario. The 210th FiB Soldiers in the virtual domain were able to be presented. Simulations provide opportuni- execute the brigade support battalion’s log pack and convoy ties that might be too dangerous, expensive, or movements using the reconfiguration vehicle simulation otherwise constrained if executed live. Com- (RVS). Soldiers from the forward support company were able to simulate convoy procedures, battle drills, and ammunition manders, training units, small group instructors resupply in the virtual domain using Virtual Battle Space2 teaching a class, and an individual seeking self- (VBS2).

8 May - June 2013 • Trained and ready Field Artillery (FA) forces enabled by realistic live, virtual and constructive training environments that support progressive training from FA Soldiers to FA Brigade collective-level proficiency

Operating Force Instructional Training Base Individual Leaders Realistic Unit Collective Training Fundamental and Advanced Tactically and Technically Combined arms training FA Skills Competent FA Leaders Blended approach Seamless integration of Reach-back training Gated training (FA/FS tables) simulations Experience Train with maneuver Increased repetitions Guided self-development Train the Fire Support System Improved proficiency Refresher training together Immersive simulators Certifications Fires accurately represented in Precision digital device training Supports critical thinking maneuver situations FA training aids, devices, Support commander’s training simulators and simulations objectives Acquisition Lifecycle Management 2015 Leverage emerging technology Advocate for resources

• Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT) II • Simulation and Stimulation Fires • Joint Land Component Constructive • CFFT II-Plus • Integrated Architecture (SISTIM/FIA) • Training Capability (JLCCTC) • Bradley Desktop Trainer (BDT) • Fire Support Combined Arms Trainer • Live-Virtual-Constructive Integrated • Close Combat Tactical Trainer - • (FSCAT) • Architecture (LVC-IA) • Reconfigurable Vehicle Simulator • Multiple Integrated Laser • Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) • (CCTT-RVS) • Engagement Systems (MILES) • Fire Control Panel Trainer (FCP) • Virtual Battle Space (VBS)-2

The strategy for a trained and ready Field Artillery force. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., information provided by the FA Commandant’s office)

Within the live domain, the Initial on 210th FiB’s LVCG Fires culminating CATT), Close Combat Tactical Trainer Home-station Instrumentation Train- training event at http://go.usa.gov/2sZd. –II (CCTT-II), and Virtual Battle Space ing System (I-HITS) merged with the Defining the Operational Domain. 2 (VBS2) can achieve a section-level Tactical Engagement Simulation System As the 210th FiB has shown, realistic, proficiency concurrently with higher (TESS) helped Soldiers simulate shoot- unit collective training can be done and collective training in a constructive en- ing live rockets from a Multiple Launch done well virtually. Training in the vir- vironment. CCFFT-II can also be used Rocket System (MLRS) firing battery tual realm enables commanders to save, in gaining essential individual certifica- that was actually deployed in the field. not only time but money on munitions, tions like joint forward observer (JFO), Units in the constructive environment fuel, and wear and tear on their equip- and can likewise be used to train criti- were replicated in the Joint Conflict and ment. This type of savings is something cal skills like target mensuration only all units can take advantage of as re- (TMO). Tactical Simulation (J-CATS) and Fires sources and money will continue to be There are many systems available Simulation (Fires Sim) and were helped limited. to accomplish LVCG training, so in or- through a full suite of Army Battle Com- A well-thought-out blended training der to help FA commanders execute mand Systems (ABCS) which incorpo- strategy will enable Mission Essential much needed training prior to their rated the Joint Automated Deep Oper- Task List (METL) training at the most unit’s Mission Command Training Pro- ations Coordination System (JADOCS) efficient cost. Commanders and leaders gram (MCTP) supported warfighter and the Advance Field Artillery Tactical should always look for the best ways to exercise, the USAFAS created the Fires Data System (AFATDS). accurately represent Fires while plan- Brigade Command Post Exercise-Func- Within mission command, the battal- ning training. tional (FiB CPX-F). The FiB CPX-F is ions tactical operation centers (TOCs) The Field Artillery and Combined the FA’s training package that helps and the brigade support battalion, the Arms Training Strategies, as well as commanders outline a constructive ex- domains were completely transparent FA gunnery tables can be effectively ercise, supported by Mission Training and the brigade was able to achieve trained when using a blended approach Complex (MTC), based on assigned its training objectives without actually of LVCG. The use of the Fire Support Headquarters, Department of the Army live-firing. Read the entire white paper Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FS- (HQDA) standardized METL, nested

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 9 with the Decisive Action Training En- with Field Artillery skills can be taught students), 1:12 and 1:4. The 1:12 and 1:4 vironment (DATE), and simulates all through the use of emergent technology system configurations are deployable. assigned Army Battle Command Sys- and immersive simulators. The technol- VBS2Fires includes realistic graphics, tems (ABCS). The FiB CPX-F serves as ogy used in today’s LVCG training envi- comparable to those seen in the vid- the basis for crawl/walk training events ronment, can provide realism in the ITB eo games “Call of Duty” and “Halo.” executable for brigade commanders re- without the expense of live training. VBS2Fires includes a call-for-fire train- lying on little external support. To read The Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT) and ing application which combines the the FiB CPX-F Commander’s Handbook Virtual Battlespace2 Fires (VBS2Fires) flexibility and the visuals of VBS2 with Log on http://go.usa.gov/2sB9. are key virtual training and gaming sys- a highly sophisticated call-for-fire train- I invite all commanders and lead- tems that the FA is using to teach these ing and simulation system. The system ers to download this valuable training skills. simulates exterior and terminal ballis- package, and please do not hesitate to tics to high levels of detail, enabling gun The CFFT is a lightweight, rapidly reach back to the school if additional in- to target visualization of artillery orders deployable, observed fire-training sys- formation is needed. in VBS2. It supports a wide array of mu- tem that provides multiple simulated Institutional Training Base. Just as nitions, fuse types and firing platforms, battlefield environments for instructing in the operational domain, cost-effective allowing instructions to range from ba- fire support specialists, JFOs and Sol- LVCG training can also increase Soldier sic skills to decision making from indi- proficiency through increased repeti- diers at the institutional and operational vidual to battalion level. tion in high-quality, fully-immersive unit level. Modernizing Gunnery. We are also simulations in the ITB. The CFFT is capable of training all leveraging the technology and gaming Through the collaborate efforts of the artillery; Type II and III close air sup- capability of the Training and Doctrine Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), port (CAS), naval gunfire and mortar Command’s (TRADOC’s) Training Fort Benning, Ga., the Aviation Center missions. The system is fielded in multi- Brain Operations Center (TBOC) to de- of Excellence (AvCoE), Fort Rucker, ple continental United States (CONUS) velop training animation and gaming Ala., and the Fires Center of Excellence and outside continental United States technologies to support and augment (FCoE), here at Fort Sill, Okla., ad- (OCONUS) locations in three primary institutional gunnery and ballistic the- vanced combined arms training coupled configurations: 1:30 (one instructor to 30 ory institutional training. To date, 52

Soldiers with A Battery, 3rd Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, conduct a live-fire exercise with the M777 at Forward Operating Base Arian in Ghazni province, Afghanistan. (Photo by SFC Kenneth Foss, U.S. Army)

10 May - June 2013 • animations have been developed to expand self-developmental material for Simulation is an Important Enabler. support our institutional modernization our Soldiers, so when they are in the op- Virtual training will never replace live effort. erational environment or assigned to a training opportunities. However, all FA Using existing technology, such as non-firing mission, they will have the commanders and leaders will continue animations and VBS2 vignettes, we are resources to maintain their individual to face limited time, money, equipment, working to build scenarios that graph- skill proficiency. support personnel and land resources ically display the principles of ballistics We will also continue to leverage new for live training events. Virtual train- and provide situations requiring ap- and improved LVCG systems that are plication of ballistic theory and under- aligned with combined arms training ing offers realistic training opportuni- standing of foundational troubleshoot- strategies in order to give our Soldiers ties, reduces the unit’s training support ing logic to solve the gunnery problem. and leaders the best training possible. burden and helps improve unit readi- In the future, we will provide note- The best is truly yet to come. ness.«« books or tablet devices to Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC), Captains Ca- Illumination rounds from M109A6 Paladins, assigned to C Battery, 1st Battalion, reer Course (CCC) and Warrant Officer 178th Field Artillery, South Carolina U.S. Army National Guard, light up the night- Basic Course (WOBC) students, which time sky over the impact zone during the unit's annual training at Fort Stewart, will make these training applications, Ga. (Photo by SGT Brian Calhoun, U.S. Army) animations and gaming tutorials readily accessible to our students. This will be particularly valuable for our gunnery instruction. Instruction using PowerPoint slides as the primary delivery method will soon be a thing of the past. We have the chance to increase the success of ac- celerated training, mitigating resource constraints, saving time and money, as well as fostering collaborative and dis- tributive learning. There is a potential for Soldiers to dramatically increase the number of repetitions within available training time with less maintenance and fuel costs, less safety related injuries and damage to equipment, using these capabilities. Self-Development Domain. For individual leaders, it is essential to leverage simulations to enhance sustainment and self-development training. We are promoting a life-long learning mindset to ensure our FA leaders and Soldiers are empowered with the tools and resources necessary to continue to learn throughout their careers. Currently, FA Soldiers conduct self-development and refresher training through web sites such as Army Knowl- edge Online (AKO). However, there are no simulations that are in a ‘take away’ medium, such as a CD or DVD that a Soldier can put into their personal computer to conduct reinforcement training and self study. Soldiers need the ability to bring such training with them into operational environments, and not be dependent on limited computer access or limited band width of the internet. So along that note, here at USAFAS we are continuing to explore ways to

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 11 SPC Taylor Sanders (left) and SPC Richard Gunter (right), geospatial engineers assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, work at a Digital Topographic Support System terminal during a mission command systems integration training exercise at Fort Hood, Texas. (Photo by SGT John Couffer, U.S. Army) Setting the Conditions for Mission Command Through the 3-Ts: Time, Trust and Transparency By Professor Gene Kamena and COL Lou Lartigue

Even a cursory look at mission command re- truth acquired through hard knocks, reflective thought and veals a simplistic concept that seems difficult dialogue with those wrestling to implement this concept. The view of these two old colonels is that mission command is, to execute. In fact, the complexities of mission as with all things of importance in the Army, about people, command become more apparent when trans- personalities and professional judgment. ferred from a world of white papers to the real Leaders (people) must connect and communicate with Soldiers and other leaders (people) to get things done. Since world of Soldiers and leaders. Our intent for no two individuals are exactly alike (varying talent, potential writing this short article is not to address the and experience) the concept of mission command cannot de- history of mission command (I cannot even say volve into a ‘one size fits all’ scheme. The amount of latitude offered by leaders, as well as the amount of trust granted by Auftragstaktik), or unpack the litany of profes- Soldiers, will vary greatly. sional articles and commentaries that current- Personality plays into the mix of mission command, be- ly exists on this subject. What we will address cause the mix of personalities often determines the strength is the importance of setting the conditions for of a relationship between people. Even the most competent leader will struggle if their personality puts people off. Per- implementing mission command. Specifically, sonality is a leader’s delivery system for trust and confidence. we will cut to the chase and relate nuggets of An important aspect of professional judgment is the ability

12 May - June 2013 • LESS MORE

Figure 1: The spectrum of trust. (Illustrations by Rick Paape, Jr., information provided by Professor Gene Kamena) to see talent in others not only for today, if it is to work and endure over time (in sion command grows when fertilized but to gauge future potential. This is im- garrison, field, or combat). Three im- with the knowledge of people and per- portant because mission command may portant considerations in bringing the sonal relationships, both are time inten- prove useful not only on the battlefield, practice of mission command into being sive. Understanding that time is always but also in all situations where profes- are: time, trust and transparency. Each a scarce commodity, effort expended sional and leader development resides. is an important aspect of connecting getting to know people and fostering The judicial application of mission com- leaders and Soldiers. meaningful relationships is always well mand can ‘stretch’ a subordinate and Time. Anyway you cut it, imple- spent. If mission command is to become organizations into accomplishing more menting mission command means the way of doing a leader’s business, it than initially thought possible. change. People do not like change and must be practiced in garrison, during When implementing mission com- resist it for countless reasons. Even if training, and taught in the schoolhouse. mand in a unit, particular factors should your leadership style already looks like Operations must not be its exclusive do- be taken into account. Mission com- mission command, now calling it that main. mand will not work if it is directed, or- may telegraph ‘change’ to subordinates. Trust. What is trust? Can it be mea- dered, or imposed on a unit or people. It It takes time to change the way people sured? How does one even know it ex- must be built up slowly and ingrained think and act. More importantly, mis- ists? Again, an apparently simple concept that is extremely difficult to fully A Soldier from 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division uses a Common Tactical Vision grasp and gauge. There are a few things system during the Army's fourth Network Integration Evaluation exercise. The that we do know about trust, it can flow touch screen-based tool is used for mission command planning at various echelons in many directions, up, down, laterally; across the brigade combat team. (Photo by Claire Heininger, U.S. Army) it takes time to establish and build; it is fragile and can be undercut with one lapse of judgment or irrational outburst. It is tangible to the extent that one can feel it for someone, or knows when it is offered from someone. Yet, it is also intangible as it is not prescribed how to trust, or how much to trust another person. No two relationships will ever establish the exact kind and level of trust, because it exists in the eye and the heart of the beholder. Our experience informs us that with regard to the military there are three discernible levels of trust: respect, confidence, and commitment. 1. Respect. Soldiers render respect to superiors for many reasons, initially because they are trained to do so, but usually over time, respect becomes something offered willingly (understanding that it is also earned). All things being equal, leaders receive respect because of their rank, position, education, experience, and personal demeanor. Once given, respect becomes the basis upon which trust is built. Furthermore, as is with all

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 13 sive; however, trust does not just hap- pen…it must be established and then consistently reinforced. Without time spent building trust and transparency, mission command will remain a mere concept in a white paper.««

Professor Gene C. Kamena, is a seventh year faculty member at the Air War College; he serves as the course director for the Joint Strategic Leadership Course in the Leader- ship and Warfighting Department. He retired from the Army as a colonel of infantry and holds a B.A. in history from Auburn University, Ala., and MMAS degree from Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Past assignments include: commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st AD; chief of staff for the 1st Infantry Divi- sion; director of staff of U.S. Space Com- mand; and the deputy chief of staff for U.S. Northern Command. In 2004, he served as Figure 2: Building the base for mission control. (Illustrations by Rick Paape, Jr., information director for all Iraqi security forces. In 2005, provided by Professor Gene Kamena) he recruited, trained, and led an Iraqi special commando border brigade in the Al Anbar province along the Iraq-Syrian border. His aspects of trust, respect can be lost leaders never garner the total com- last active duty assignment was as the se- much faster than it is earned. mitment of their people. Again, time nior Army advisor to the Air University at 2. Confidence. Over time, follow- and energy are required in order to Maxwell, AFB. He is a well-published au- ers gain confidence in their leaders earn the unreserved commitment of thor in the areas of leadership and ethics. through personal knowledge of past others. decisions, competencies and relation- Transparency. Personal and profes- ships. Likewise, leaders gain trust in sional transparency is an accelerator in Colonel Lou Lartigue is currently an their subordinates based on the same the trust building process. Transparen- instructor at the Air War College in the factors. Confidence is a belief that a cy is a byproduct of trust, as is trust a Department of Leadership and Warfight- leader or followers will do the right byproduct of transparency. For exam- ing. Previously, he served as chief of staff thing in the absence of supervision. ple, once a modicum of trust is estab- for the Maneuver Center of Excellence at It also begins to allow a communica- lished, leaders and followers tend to be Fort Benning, Ga. He was the commander tion of intent within less prescriptive more open in their dealings. It becomes of the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, boundaries. That is, confidence that more obvious who they really are, what 3rd Infantry Division from 2009-2011; the your subordinates can make deci- they expect, and what motivates them. brigade deployed to Anbar province, Iraq, as sions and take action given a wide The trust-transparency cycle is the es- an advise and assist brigade in 2010-2011. ‘range fan’ instead of a well-defined sential environmental-relational ingre- His previous assignments include command ‘box,’ goes to building trust. dient needed to establish a climate right of 2nd Squadron, 9th Cavalry in the 4th In- 3. Commitment. Personal commitment for mission command to flourish. fantry Division (OIF 05-07) and duty in the to one’s leaders, people, mission, Mission command is the exercise National Military Command Center at the and the organization is a lot to ask, of authority and direction by the com- Pentagon. Lartigue was commissioned from yet in the Army, it occurs every day. mander using mission orders to en- the U.S. Military Academy, holds masters We intentionally do not use the term able disciplined initiative within the degrees from the University of Central Flor- ‘loyalty’ to a leader, because personal commander’s intent to empower agile ida and the Marine Corps Command and loyalty, in the wrong circumstance, and adaptive leaders in the conduct of Staff College, and completed an Army War carries with it inherent risk of blind unified land operations. For mission College, National Security Fellowship at the spots with regard to objectivity. Re- command to work, one must create an Massachusetts Institute of Technology. quired to make mission command environment and climate in a unit that work are leaders committed to their allows mission command to be possible. Author’s Note: The authors wish to people, the mission, and subordi- Implementing a ‘3-T’ approach to mis- thank BG (Ret.) Dr. Lance Betros, John Kot- nates committed to the vision their sion command that leverages time, trust zman, Dr. Adam Silverman, Dr. Hugh Lew- leaders offer and to mission -accom and transparency, sets the conditions, is, Dr. Thomas Blau and several anonymous plishment. To gain the commitment enables and empowers decision making reviewers for their comments and contribu- of others, one must be relevant in for right action. Indeed, investing in ‘3- tions which much improved this paper. Any the lives of those very people. Some T,’ as defined above, is resource inten- errors are those of the authors.

14 May - June 2013 • Back To The Future? An Old German Word Makes a Comeback in New US Doctrine By CPT Thaddeus C. Fox and CPT Jacob N. Hagstrom “If you would understand any- The rest of the reference work makes no further mention of the German roots of mission command. In fact, the only other thing, observe its beginning and its historic example of mission command listed in any 6-0 series manual is a short excerpt from the papers of GEN Ulysses S. development.” Grant. Clearly, we would have to search elsewhere to under- - Aristotle stand the development of mission command. What are the origins of Auftragstaktik? Why did U.S. Army In September 2012, LTG David Perkins, the leaders appropriate this term in their most recent doctrine? And what are the practical consequences of adhering to a commanding general of the Combined Arms command philosophy based on Auftragstaktik? Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kan., ad- The Origins of Auftragstaktik. Auftragstaktik is a German dressed the students of the Field Artillery Cap- word that translates literally to ‘task tactic.’ It is more commonly rendered in English as ‘mission orders,’ ‘mission tac- tains Career Course, Fort Sill, Okla. Recognizing tics,’ or ‘mission command.’ In today’s military parlance, it that the career course is a potential tool for im- is used to denote a philosophy of command in which com- plementing new doctrine, he told students that manders issue mission-type orders. A commander focuses on his intent and then allows subordinates to fulfill the end state he was charging them to be the standard bear- as they see fit. A commander employing Auftragstaktik tells ers of a marked doctrinal shift under the head- his subordinates what to do, but not how to do it. ing of ‘mission command.’ Perkins’ description It is essential to point out that the historic Germans most credited with employing mission command rarely, if ever, of a more decentralized approach to command used the term itself. The word Auftragstaktik gained popu- was appealing to junior captains, many of them larity only after World War II, as historians and staff officers sought to explain the seemingly unlikely operational success still chafed from recent deployments, in which of past Prussian and German military operations. centralized rules of engagement and top-heavy The roots of Auftragstaktik can be found in the social struc- guidance seemed to hamper initiative and in- ture of the Prussian state. Prussian officers were culled from the ranks of the noble landed class known as Junkers. By the dependent decision making. Where did the mid-17th century, the Junkers had achieved a level of power concept of ‘mission command’ originate? We and independence perhaps unrivaled in the rest of Europe. decided to look at the 6-0 series manuals to Just as the king of Prussia allowed the Junkers autonomy on their land, so he allowed them autonomy on the battlefield. see how this term came to be the guiding phi- To meddle in the specifics of a military operation would have losophy of the U.S. Army. The introduction to been a breach not only of military propriety, but of Prussian Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) law, custom and culture. The problems facing the Prussian and German armies 6-0, Mission Command, contains an intriguing during the 19th and 20th centuries also contributed to the de- passage: velopment of Auftragstaktik. The nation was surrounded by [Mission Command] traces its roots back to numerically superior enemies. This geo-political fact could (and did) result in a protracted war on two fronts – a fate that the German concept of Auftragstaktik, which was to be avoided at all costs. The only hope for Prussia or translates roughly to mission-type tactics. Auf- Germany was a ‘short and lively’ war. Waiting for detailed tragstaktik held all German commissioned and orders at each decision point would be too slow. German commanders would have to be aggressive to defeat their ene- noncommissioned officers duty-bound to do mies rapidly and in succession. Speed and decisiveness were whatever the situation required, as they per- essential to any successful German operation. It was only in this manner, operating in a decentralized, initiative-based sonally saw it. Understanding and achieving way, that a German commander could hope for a grand op- the broader purpose of a task was the central erational maneuver that would destroy his enemy’s fighting idea behind this style of command. Command- capability. Another element in the development of Auftragstaktik was ers expected subordinates to act when opportu- the theory of influential Germans. Carl von Clausewitz fa- nities arose. mously described the ‘fog of war,’ one element of a philoso-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 15 in 1874, “The commander, who in our days no longer leads a closed phalanx but different armies in different theaters, cannot manage without the independent action of his subordinate commanders.” In fact, Moltke’s phrase “independent action” may be more apt than Auftragstaktik. As opposed to abid- ing by ‘mission-type orders,’ German commanders were virtual free agents on the battlefield, operating on only the broadest of commander’s intent: destroy the enemy. Moltke often repeated a story to illustrate this point. Prince Freder- ick Charles was berating a major for a poor tactical decision. When the major protested that he was following orders from a superior, the Red Prince fired back, “His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders!” It was often German aggression and insouciance towards operations orders which produced stunning tactical victories. Auftragstaktik in the U.S. The combination of experience in the Vietnam War, observation of tank battles in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and a reassess- ment of Soviet capabilities caused the U.S. to rethink their doctrine. Planners were driven by the serious worry that U.S. Soldiers might have to fight against a numerically superior Union of So- viet Socialist Republic (USSR) force in one massive European campaign. Ear- ly attempts to plan an ‘active defense’ gained little institutional traction and were soon abandoned in favor of a more offensive, maneuver-based response to the Soviet threat. The result was airland battle doctrine, which embraced the U.S. approximation of Auftragstaktik. The 1980’s editions of FM 100-5, Operations, emphasized “flexibility and speed, mission-type orders, initiative among commanders at all levels, and the spirit of the offense,” in clear homage to what Ulysses S. Grant, 18th President of the United States. Army Doctrine Publication many considered successful German 6.0, Mission Command, references Grant’s use of the term ‘mission command’ in a techniques that had already been prov- short excerpt from military documents. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress) en successful against overwhelming enemy numbers, and against the Russians in particular. phy that saw war-fighting as inherently would be better to employ a decentral- Airland battle gave way to full spec- uncertain – more an art than a science. ized command structure, with aggres- trum operations, which recently has Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, a stu- sive subordinate leaders ready to take yielded to unified land operations. dent of Clausewitz and long-serving the initiative when appropriate. Throughout these changes in terminolo- chief of the German general staff, ad- Moreover, the growing scope of the gy, elements of mission command have hered to the notion that war was too battlefield to include entire ’theaters‘of remained in U.S. doctrine, but never so chaotic and unpredictable to be cap- war in the 19th century made Auftrag- prominently or explicitly as in the most tured in neat, tidy operation orders. It staktik more attractive. Moltke wrote recent editions.

16 May - June 2013 • The introduction of ADRP 6-0 states illustrates the unlikelihood of the U.S. lems involved with a Prussian-style op- matter-of-factly that “the nature of op- military having to fight at a material erational flank maneuver. Auftragstaktik erations and the patterns of military his- disadvantage. One of the main reasons clearly had salutary effects on industrial tory point to the advantages of mission for resurgence in popularity for Auf- age German operations, but it is unclear command,” the principles of which are: tragstaktik in the 1980s was its perceived whether or not this system has retained 1. Build cohesive teams through mutu- utility in fighting the numerically supe- its relevance. al trust rior Soviet Union army. This paradigm, Army Culture and National Culture. 2. Create shared understanding it should go without saying, no longer Auftragstaktik grew out of the Prussian 3. Provide a clear commander’s intent exists. The Prussian and German armies army culture. For most of Prussia’s and 4. Exercise disciplined initiative frequently had to contend with fighting Imperial Germany’s history, regimental 5. Use mission orders at a disadvantage in numbers and fire- commanders retained approval over the 6. Accept prudent risk power. This quantitative disadvantage selection of officers in their units. This It is not difficult to see the influence was a major impetus for the German al- differs greatly from the current U.S. sys- of Auftragstaktik in these six principles. lowance of independent commanders to tem, in which officers are selected upon Mutual trust and shared understand- attack at nearly any odds. German op- completion of nationally monitored ing are prerequisites for subordinates to erational-level commanders needed to commissioning programs. It seems like- have some semblance of independence conclude conflicts before the economic ly that the deep level of trust needed for on the battlefield. Providing a clear and manpower resources of rivals could mission command would be more easi- commander’s intent and using mission be brought to bear. ly attained in the former system than in orders harkens back to the German con- Furthermore, the German use of mis- the latter. In addition, once officers were cept of telling subordinates what to do sion command evolved under different selected by a German regimental com- but not how to do it. Finally, exercising strategic realities. For Prussians of the mander, they were trained in a unique initiative and accepting risk are hall- 19th century and Germans of the early way. Through staff rides, field exercis- marks of the bold, aggressive style of 20th, the ultimate goal was to seek de- es, and war games, officers were drilled German operations. cisive battlefield victory, usually in the in critical thinking and analysis. ‘Ap- It is interesting to note that ‘mission form of the destruction of an enemy proved solutions’ were seen as limiting command’ is designated by the 6-0 doc- army or the occupation of an enemy creativity and initiative – as such, they trine series as both a philosophy of com- capital. Recently, however, U.S. stra- were avoided at all costs. Again, this mand, as well as a ‘warfighting func- tegic interests have mostly involved system is different from the typical U.S. tion.’ That is to say, in addition to being maintaining global hegemony and en- approach, which places a higher value shorthand for the six principles outlined gaging in selective regime change. The on standardized classes and examina- above, ‘mission command’ also refers means to achieve these interests could tions, as well as a tendency to demon- to the specific tasks that a commander involve low-intensity conflict (such as in strate ‘what right looks like.’ does in the course of commanding and Vietnam and later stages of Afghanistan Furthermore, society in Prussia and interacting with his staff. It replaces the and Iraq) or high-intensity conflict (such Imperial Germany accommodated Auf- former doctrinal warfighting function as in Korea and the Persian Gulf War). tragstaktik in a way that the modern U.S. of ‘command and control (C2).’ Current unified land doctrine is explic- never could. There was never a power- Is Auftragstaktik Appropriate for itly meant to apply in both cases. ful electorate or an independent media the U.S. Army? There are several im- However, our current strategy does in pre-World War II Germany to the de- portant differences between the Prus- not center on a decisive battle or the sei- gree they exist in the U.S. today. ADP sian-German army that developed Auf- zure of an enemy capital. Therefore, our 6-0 embraces “accepting prudent risk” tragstaktik and the U.S. Army currently military aims do not seem to depend on as one of its six principles of mission trying to codify and emplace the con- a high degree of operational level suc- command. Prudent risk is defined as cept in support of new FM 3-0, Doctrine cess, especially if such success requires “a deliberate exposure to potential inju- of Unified Land Operations. Any answer significant tactical sacrifices. In fact, the ry or loss when the commander judges to the question “should the U.S. Army U.S. military fared extremely well in the outcome in terms of mission accom- adopt mission command?” should the opening (operational) phases of the plishment as worth the cost.” Allowing assess differences in capabilities and Iraq and Afghanistan wars, in which subordinate commanders to engage in threats, culture and technology. firepower (mostly airpower) destroyed risky (even ‘prudently’ risky) opera- U.S. Army Capabilities and Pres- enemy forces. These initial battlefield tions implies a tolerance for substantial ent Threats. The U.S. Army is currently successes did not immediately trans- loss in human life. the most powerful land force on Earth. late into the achievement of strategic Granting subordinates more inde- The current Pentagon budget (at the goals. It is unlikely that a greater focus pendence surely increases the speed, time this was written) hovers around on mission command, especially as the flexibility, and initiative of junior lead- $700 billion per year, more than defense Germans understood it, would have ers. But it also results in a loss of control, budgets for the rest of the world com- changed these developments. The prob- the results of which could (and often did bined. While this budget includes far lems involved with deterrence, counter- for Germans) lead to catastrophic losses more than just Army expenditures, the insurgency, regime change, and the em- in small units. The battlefield losses that Army fights in close concert with other ployment of massive amounts of air and mission tactics brought about simply branches of service. The figure simply naval fire are not the same as the prob- would not be tolerated by the U.S. For

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 17 example, episodes such as the Tet Of- modern ground force is severely ham- recently published an article in Army fensive and the Battle of Wanat became pered by its dependence on air assets Magazine, which he questioned whether memorable incidents in the U.S. media for fire support. Should the U.S. Army or not mission command is appropriate due to loss of U.S. Soldiers. Popular ever find itself fighting an enemy that for the U.S. Army. He correctly points sentiment typically did not focus on the possessed an air force, they would be out that more “decentralization would fact that in both of these cases, the U.S. doubly hampered by the requirement to require leaders to accept the fact that held their ground and inflicted far more maneuver within protection provided they will be consciously abdicating the casualties than they absorbed. Prussian by air defense systems. responsibility of the outcome to subor- commanders did not view risk-taking or The U.S. Army could very well bene- dinates.” Any real embrace of mission loss of life in the same way we do today. fit from a more decentralized approach command will lead to a decrease of or- In fact, they probably would have been to command. However, to call upon der and control. It will also require ju- encouraged by the results of a Tet- or Auftragstaktik as the historical basis for nior leaders who are deserving of a high Wanat-like outcome in their own force. modern doctrine is to do a disservice level of trust. How often are junior lead- Less control over tactical units also both to history and to the current state ers tested in scenarios involving trust, increases the likelihood of tactics det- of the U.S. military. The U.S. Army creativity, or initiative under command- rimental to strategic goals. The unat- probably should not want to base its er’s intent? The current prerequisite for tributed Vietnam-era quote, “It became command ideals on a Prussian-German command seems to be less demonstra- necessary to destroy the town to save it” model. If it does, the Army would do tion of critical thinking and more a case comes to mind. While this type of think- well to study the conditions from which of serving time and avoiding egregious ing is not inevitable, it represents the mission command sprung and the re- mistakes. Auftragstaktik, its historical or- danger of mission command when un- sults that it produced. The 6-0 series igins, development, and consequences, accompanied by robust leader training ought to address the issues of historical should be reevaluated not only by writ- and trustworthy junior leaders. applicability, at the very least in a sec- ers of Army doctrine, but by anyone Technology. Finally, changes in tech- tion of the reference publication. The who considers himself a member of the nology have made mission command readers of ADRP 6-0 are assured that «« less relevant today. In fact, one could “the patterns of military history point to Army profession. make the argument that Auftragstaktik the advantages of mission command.” was really an operational solution to a One assumes that this is shorthand Captain Jake Hagstrom is a 2009 gradu- historic problem of communications. for Prussian and German operational ate of the United States Military Academy. When orders had to be transmitted by success from 1866-1942. However, this He previously served as a fire support offi- telegraph, motorcar, or horse courier, it can only be an assumption because no cer, fire direction officer, and platoon leader made more sense to simply allow sub- historical patterns are discussed. If the in 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. He ordinates to take initiative under broad authors of Army doctrine want to in- was deployed from April 2011 until April commander’s intent. Today, these prob- clude Auftragstaktik in official literature 2012 to Kunar, Afghanistan, in support of lems are rare, if they ever occur. Already (which they have explicitly done), it de- Operation Enduring Freedom. He will be during World War II, improvements in serves more than an isolated, superficial serving next in the Combat Aviation Bri- radio communications and air support mention. gade at Camp Humphreys, Korea. had taken its toll on the ability of Ger- Beyond this apparent omission in mans to operate on their own under historical justification, U.S. doctrine Captain Thaddeus Fox is a 2009 gradu- commander’s intent. Long range radios writers need to explain the tactical and ate of the United States Military Academy allowed German high command the ir- strategic trade-offs caused by advocat- Military History department. He previ- resistible temptation to receive instan- ing mission command. It is natural for taneous updates from the front. These the Army, like every organization, to ously served as a reconnaissance troop fire increased reports led to more prescrip- seek junior leaders who are aggressive, support officer, platoon leader, and battery tive commands in battle. The necessity take initiative, and accomplish the mis- executive officer in 2nd Cavalry Regiment, to stay within friendly air support and sion. However, the more these attributes Vilseck, Germany. He was deployed from avoid enemy air strikes simultaneously are cultivated, the less control will be June 2010-May 2011 to Kandahar, Afghan- made German commanders more reli- retained by the organization. Does the istan, in support of Operation Enduring ant on higher levels of command and Army really want to encourage more Freedom. He will be serving next in the 8th unable to maneuver freely around ene- risk in a lethal system that is intensely Army Headquarters at Yongsan, Korea. my formations. This technological situ- scrutinized and materially superior to ation has only become more prevalent all potential challengers? The answer Editor’s Note: Fires is a professional today, with helicopters, satellite and very well may be ‘yes,’ but that answer journal and a forum for open discussion on digital communications, video surveil- should not come from a one-sided and topics of interest or importance to the Fires lance platforms, and Blue Force Track- misappropriated reading of history. force. We do not voice an opinion; simply ers greatly expanding the mobility and Doctrine is surely important, but it present the argument as written by the au- oversight of top-level commanders. is not as important as leaders and the thor. We would very much like to hear your Furthermore, firepower has expanded way they act. In other words, doctrine opinion on this and other topics discussed in most potently in Army aviation and can only be effective when it is properly the magazine. Send comments and/or arti- Air Force assets. The independence of a applied by Soldiers. COL Tom Guthrie cles to [email protected].

18 May - June 2013 • Today’s Skystriker leaders planted the regiment’s current colors next to the location where its ancestors gave their last full measure at Gettysburg. (Photo courtesy of CPT Will Andrews) Skystrikers Find Inspiration for Their Future by Emphasizing Their Heritage By CPT Will D. Andrews

The 3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery rich history of the 4th Artillery Regiment at Gettysburg. On the way back from a leader professional development event (ADA) has a history unlike any other. With on the reset and recap operations of Letterkenny Army Depot, more battle streamers than any other Air De- in Chambersburg, Pa., the battalion coordinated for a local ex- fense Artillery battalion in the Army, 3-4 ADA pert to test the knowledge of its leaders during a complete tour of Gettysburg. The Skystrikers’ knowledge of this battle places an emphasis on teaching its Soldiers greatly contributed to the professional discussion of mission about its rich heritage. The training begins command, leadership and munitions capabilities during the upon reception into the unit, when leaders ex- two-hour tour. The group of Skystrikers discussed the important concept of commander’s intent, and how not providing a plain to new Soldiers the relationship between clear and concise ‘end state,’ in terms of the enemy, terrain, the fish hook and bundled wheat on the 4th and civil considerations can lead to failure during battle. They Regiment’s crest, and the unique shape of the saw firsthand how elements of the Union and Confederate Armies struggled to achieve their mission because their lead- Union’s line at Gettysburg and the courageous ers had no common ‘end state’ to work toward when lines of fight to survive and win on the deadly wheat communication were broken. fields of Gettysburg. The 4th Artillery Regiment had elements supporting maneuver forces throughout the Union’s line during the Recently, 21 leaders of the Skystriker Battal- battle. This historical precedence of providing fire sup- ion had a unique opportunity to fully grasp the port is indicative of the current relationship that Skystrikers

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 19 burg, are memorialized in the 3-4 ADA battalion conference room and throughout the battalion headquarters. The conference room, appropriately named Gettysburg Hall, is filled with all 55 battle streamers, pictures from the unit’s multiple deployments, and the current regimental chain of command. “This is why we chose to capture our unit’s history in our headquarters, in order to train our new Soldiers on what it means to be a part of this unit. Sky- strikers have fought in just about every battle this nation has been in, and it’s important that our Soldiers understand the role they play in carrying our predecessors’ sacrifices forward,” Williams said during the after action review of the group’s trip. The lessons learned at Gettysburg are part of the tenets of inspiration that Sky- striker leaders use to motivate their Sol- diers to continue to uphold the highest standards and achieve superior results. Whether it be on the hallowed ground as part of the Union’s line at Gettys- The memorial where members of C Battery, 4th Artillery Regiment fought along the burg, or somewhere in the Middle East, Union line at Gettysburg. (Photo courtesy of CPT Will Andrews) 3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment Soldiers know what it means to be a part of the most decorated Air have with maneuver forces today. Gettysburg culminated near the Penn- Defense Artillery unit in the Army and Members of E Battery, 3-4 ADA, the sylvania State Monument. A nearby will continue to add streamers to the Army’s only airborne Air Defense Ar- plaque marked the contributions of C battalion’s colors whenever the nation tillery battery, provide support to the Battery, 4th Artillery Regiment. The calls on it to fight.«« global response force of the prestigious Skystriker leaders planted today’s bat- 82nd Airborne Division. These airborne talion colors near the very point where air defense paratroopers can provide their artillery predecessors gave their Captain Will Andrews enlisted in the air defense coverage as far forward as last full measure. The event cemented Idaho Army National Guard in January of the 82nd Airborne Division needs, and the principles LTC Richard Harrison, 2002. He served in multiple positions as a serve as a game-changing, combat mul- commander of 3-4 ADA, and CSM Paris full-time service member in the Army Na- tiplier to the supported maneuver forc- Williams, command sergeant major of tional Guard from 2002-2008. During his es. 3-4 ADA, seek to instill in every Skystrik- enlisted service he deployed in support of While the 4th Artillery Regiment did er: pride in unit, foundational knowl- Operation Iraqi Freedom III from Novem- have several units dispersed across the edge of the unit’s rich heritage, and the ber 2004 – October 2005. In 2008, Andrews battlefield, the regiment also maintained courage and audacity to carry the unit graduated Officer Candidate School at Fort a battery-sized element in proximity to to new victories and success. Benning, Ga., and was commissioned a sec- GEN Ulysses S. Grant’s headquarters. “This is why I stress the importance of ond lieutenant. He went on to serve in 2nd C Battery, 4th Artillery Regiment pro- continuing the legacy of what it means Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery, from vided defensive Fires in support of the to be a Skystriker,” Harrison said during May 2009 – December 2011. During his defense of Grant’s headquarters. This the group’s stop on top of Little Round time in the Strike Fear Battalion, he served defensive capability correlates with 3-4 Top. “These brave warriors didn’t fight as an Avenger platoon leader, executive of- ADA’s current ability to provide air and die for political reasons; they fought ficer, and assistant S-3 Officer. Andrews defense coverage with its Patriot units. for each other so they could go home to also served as a site commander in Eastern Equipped with a Headquarters and their families. Their motivations were Afghanistan training several thousand Af- Headquarters Battery, four Patriot bat- very similar to the ones we fight for to- ghan National Police for NATO’s Training teries, and a Service Battery, 3-4 ADA day, which is why understanding their Mission Afghanistan. Andrews currently can provide unmatched, self-sustaining, sacrifices is so important,” Harrison serves as the 3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense air defense coverage to critical assets in continued. Artillery Regiment logistics officer and is any environment. The regiment’s contributions to our scheduled to take command of a Patriot bat- The Skystrikers’ study of the battle at nation, including its heroics at Gettys- tery in the summer of 2013.

20 May - June 2013 • Joint Electronic Warfare Comes to the Pacific By MSG Jesse Potter

The 25th Infantry Division recently hosted cyber operation planning, and national EW asset integration. the Joint Electronic Warfare Theater Opera- “One of the best briefs throughout the JEWTOC Course was the joint EW reach-back,” said CW3 Richard Fincher, tions Course (JEWTOC), graduating more an EW technician with the 25th Infantry Division. This brief than 30 noncommissioned officers (NCOs) was designed to provide Soldiers with an understanding and officers. It was the first time this course of the reach-back capabilities of the JEWC and other joint was conducted through a mobile training organizations. The instructor, Mr. Desmond Savage, emphasized the importance of networking and how essential it is team (MTT) and it was a first for Pacific to know these organizations exist solely to provide modeling Command (PACOM). JEWTOC is normally and support to Soldiers.” held quarterly at the Joint Electronic War- The JEWTOC is the only joint certified electronic warfare course in the Department of Defense (DoD). With significant fare Center (JEWC), Lackland Air Force coordination from the 25th ID EW elements and the Joint Base, Texas. Electronic Warfare Center, they were able to develop and fa- This course brought together the electron- cilitate the first MTT to be taught throughout the DoD. The ic warfare (EW), spectrum managers, infor- JEWC tailored the course for the PACOM by incorporating guest instructors from many of the joint units in Hawaii, to in- mation office planners, and tactical opera- clude PACOM, Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), tions officers from every major command United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), and Special Opera- and service, to include the 2nd Infantry Di- tions Command Pacific (SOCPAC). “The division saved more than $250,000 dollars by bring- vision, for two weeks of intensive training. ing the course as a MTT, but the real benefit was being able to The knowledge gained from the course train younger NCOs and spectrum managers, who would not greatly increased the graduate’s knowledge normally receive the training until much later in their career and level of responsibility,” said MSG Jesse Potter, the 25th in preparation for 2nd and 3rd Brigade Com- Infantry Division electronic warfare NCO in charge. bat Team’s (BCT) upcoming deployments. “This is the first time the class was Army centric so they ap- “There are currently shortfalls in the joint proached the concepts and scenarios from a land perspective, integration of electronic warfare,” said MAJ a first for us,” said Mr. Jim Bray, the JEWTOC course manag- er. “The student‘s insights and perspectives will enable us to Gary Lyke, 25th electronic warfare officer incorporate more Army and Marine focused EW material into with the 25th Infantry Division. “Instead the course.” of compartmentalizing efforts, we learned The MTT was such a success that many other Army divisions and corps are now requesting the course be brought to how to synchronize efforts beyond our ser- their installations. “The development of this MTT with the vice or community.” 25th ID, the course’s positive feedback, and growing demand The JEWTOC course develops the fun- will allow us to develop more MTTs tailored to the various combatant commands and their components. MTTs will also damental EW planning, coordination, and allow us to train more warfighters in joint electronic warfare operations skills for personnel providing and electromagnetic spectrum operations for the joint force direct operational-level electronic war- commander, giving him joint trained EW force multipliers,” fare support to Unified Combatants Com- said MAJ Michael Woodruff, the JEWTOC branch chief. mand (COCOM) and theater units. The Master Sergeant Jesse Potter currently serves as the 25th Infan- instruction focused on joint EW doctrine, try Division Electronic Warfare NCOIC. MSG Potter is the senior Electronic Warfare Coordination Center EW NCO for the army and one of the first NCO’s authorized to and service component EW structures, re-class into the EW Career Field in 2009. He previously served as the RC-North EW NCO during his last deployment in Afghanistan joint EW targeting processes, spectrum with the 10th Mountain Division in 2010. He will be departing management planning and coordination, Hawaii to take over as the EW Proponent NCO later this summer.

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 21 First surface-to-air missile (SAM) wing "Schleswig-Holstein" muster after integration of army air defense units. As of April 1, 2013, they command all German air defense units. (Photo courtesy of Lt. Col. Michael B. Lipka, German Army) Germany’s Air Defense Detachment at the Fires Center of Excellence in the Near Future By German Army Lt. Col. Michael B. Lipka

The German Bundeswehr is undergoing a Luftwaffe’s command and control organization. The number major restructuring process, affecting all ser- of command staffs will be reduced from nine to four. The Ger- man air force chief of staff is the advisor on all operational vices of the German military. One of the most aspects of air and space and on the deployment of air forces. fundamental changes is that the German Luft- The highest ranking air Defender is Lt. Gen. Dieter Naskrent, waffe (air force) has assumed responsibility the vice chief of staff of the German air force. Together with the subordinate units and military agencies, for all tasks regarding air and missile defense. the German Air Force Operational Forces Command makes As a result, the German army handed over air up the core of the operational Luftwaffe. In order to ensure defense weapons systems to the air force (i.e., the preparation and provision of operationally ready forces the administrative and technical control of all operational counter-rocket, artillery, mortar, (C-RAM), units is consolidated in this command, including weapon sys- MANTIS, surveillance sensor LUER and Light tem-specific, technical training and further development. AD System OZELOT). Consequently several For the first time in the history of the Bundeswehr, one service command, the Luftwaffe, will be entirely responsible for soldiers decided to become airmen. all aspects of air defense and air space/space control. This im- The restructuring process has also affected the plies unique challenges but also unique opportunities.

22 May - June 2013 • All air force air defense forces, in- plans to establish a small unit to super- All-in-all, the German Air Force air cluding missile defense are consolidat- vise and manage the German student defense is looking forward to being inte- ed under the Operational Forces Com- population. grated into the directorates of the Fires mand Ground Capabilities Directorate. With this new approach, German air Center of Excellence and becoming an As of April 1st, all German air de- force air defense is very confident both active partner of Team Sill.«« fense units, the schoolhouse and the nations will benefit from this new level detachment at Fort Sill, Okla., will be of integration. Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Lipka is commanded by the 1st Surface-to-Air The permanent exchange of vision, from the State of Nordrhein Westfalen, Ger- Missile (SAM) Wing 1, ‘Schleswig-Hol- strategy and doctrines combined with a many. He enlisted in the German Bunde- stein.’ chance to synchronize the ongoing mod- swehr in 1981, and completed officers’ basic While closing the German Air Force ernization of both countries’ ADA forc- training, artillery basic training and leader- Air Defense Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, es will enable interoperability, leader/ ship training in 1982. Lipka has held a va- Germany’s intent is to find a solution, in user mind sets, technical characteristics, riety of staff positions, several of which ex- close cooperation with the Fires Center sensor fusion, fire control systems and posed him to a joint and combined training of Excellence (FCoE), for how to fos- the tactical and operational attributes environment with allied nations. He also has ter and intensify the relationship with of air defense. This new communality commanded several units, including the Ar- the United States Air Defense Artillery would be based on common training mored Infantry Brigade, 19th Independent (ADA) and to ensure interoperability in standards, common exercises and sim- Company and 4th Army Air Defense Rocket a broad sense with U.S. forces. ulations. In the long run, this new meth- Battery. He is currently assigned as the Ger- In order to achieve these goals, the od will result in a decreased cost and an man Liaison Officer at the U.S. Army Air Luftwaffe needs to maintain a physical increase in effectiveness. Defense Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla. representation in continental U.S. (CO- NUS) and to expand their presence at Fort Sill. The current plan is to integrate Lt. Gen. Dieter Naskrent, Vice Chief of Staff German Air Force, is the highest rank- German staff officers, officers and non- ing air defense officer in the Bundeswehr. (Photo courtesy of Lt. Col. Michael B. Lipka, Ger- commissioned officers (NCOs) as mili- man Army) tary personnel exchange into Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), capabilities managers for Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAM- DC) and ADA brigades, Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI), United States Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH), and the Fires Battle Lab. Furthermore, it is intended to set up and link the Ger- man Air Defense Simulation System (SAAPES) with the Fires Battle Lab at Fort Sill. The intent is to enable both German and U.S. ADA forces to train together, run tests and experimentations in a simulated environment and to generate future training scenarios. In addition, SAAPES provides connectivity to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) simulation exercises and access to theater missile defense (TMD) simulation exercises. Germany will send students to attend Patriot operator and maintainer courses, Patriot related courses and ADA leadership courses at Fort Sill. The mid and long-term expectation is that the air defense philosophies, operations, techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) between the two nations, will become more and more harmonized. To support the growing student load, Germany

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 23 Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, await a fire mission with their M777A2 during a live-fire training exercise at Fort Drum, N.Y. (Photo by Mark A. Moore II, U.S. Army) Allons Artillery Battalion Reinvents Itself for Afghanistan Deployment By LTC Christopher W. Wendland and MAJ Lucas R. Connolly

The 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery,Allons JRTC trainer/mentors by the conclusion of the rotation. How- Battalion, organic to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, ever, in late May, the battalion received word that it might deploy to Afghanistan and upon further research on artillery 10th Mountain Division, deployed to the Joint configurations in Afghanistan, the Allons Battalion would Readiness Training Center (JRTC), at Fort Polk, need to drastically reconfigure and in a very short span of La., in March 2012, configured as a standard time. The Allons Battalion leadership decided to reconfigure direct support artillery battalion, comprised of the battalion into ‘decentralized hybrid firing platoons’ pri- two howitzer batteries, each with two platoons or to their mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the National consisting of a fire direction center (FDC) and Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif., rotation in Octo- ber 2012. ‘Decentralized’ would require each firing platoon four M119A2 (105 mm) howitzer sections, for to no longer take fire orders from the Allons Battalion FDC; a battalion total of four FDCs and 16 howitzer instead it would require each artillery platoon to embed di- sections. The battalion controlled all Fires in rectly within a maneuver unit and take commands directly from that maneuver battalion. Firing platoon leadership (lieu- what is termed as ‘centralized control’ where tenants/sergeants first class) would no longer have the direct each of the batteries’ FDC receives their orders mentorship and oversight from the battalion leadership (artil- to fire artillery from the battalion FDC. The lery major/captain/master sergeant), who previously worked at the platoon level and traditionally managed the gunline, Allons Battalion performed exceptionally well FDC standard and ammunition management across each of and were ‘ready for war’ in the eyes of our the platoons within a battalion/battery, but would now need

24 May - June 2013 • to manage all artillery related items on battery comprised of D30 howitzers. would be embedded with a different their own. This task was previously accomplished maneuver battalion and they wanted The ‘hybrid’ portion of ‘decentralized by NATO Training Mission-Afghan- to ensure the maneuver battalions were hybrid firing platoons’ would require istan Operational Mentors/Liaison familiar with their respective platoon. each of the firing platoons to certify and Teams (NTM-A OMLTs) with support To achieve this goal, the Allons Battalion qualify on two different howitzer sys- from the full strength artillery battalion developed a three-month training pro- tems: the traditional light howitzer, the- deployed in sector with the full support gram that gradually improved Soldier M119A2 and the towed M777A2 how- of the commander of the International proficiency on both weapons systems, itzer. The intent would be for a firing Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint as well as gradually transitioning them platoon to manage both howitzer sys- Command (COMIJC) who made de- from centralized to decentralized con- tems simultaneously. The FDC would veloping ANA Fires capabilities a top trol, all while ensuring maneuver bat- process the requests and send data priority. With a limit to the number of talion and company fire support officers down to the gunline, and the howitzer Soldiers it could deploy, the Allons Bat- (FSOs)increased their understanding of sections would need to be proficient on talion met this requirement by hand-se- the decentralized firing platoon soon to both howitzer systems. The Allons Bat- lecting the best and brightest Redlegs be at their disposal. talion leadership wanted to ensure the in the formation to support this critical June 2012. M119A2 Certification/ battalion would be prepared for any mission. Qualification Completed; all howitzer mission or contingency. With the cur- Hybrid Training. The Allons Battal- section chiefs, and FDC section chiefs, rent force cap requirements continuing ion leadership intended to bring three ‘Big 3’ completed certifications and to decrease in Afghanistan, leadership decentralized hybrid platoons to NTC qualification on M119A2s; four FDCs was uncertain if some forward operat- for their MRE. Each firing platoon and eight howitzers. ing base/combat outpost (FOB/COP) locations established as artillery pure (all Artillerymen from 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, M777A2 or all M119A2) would require 10th Mountain Division, load an 155 mm artillery round in to the M777A2 during a a hybrid configuration to maximize live-fire exercise at Fort Drum, N.Y. (Photo by Mark A. Moore II, U.S. Army) maneuver commander options on the ground. The Allon’s leadership did not want to certify sections in combat on a system that they did not train on exten- sively in peacetime and did not want to delay combat operation support to maneuver commanders due to either manpower or equipment shortfalls. The Allons Battalion also identified that they would need to field two security force advise and assist teams (SFAAT) as part of the requirement to improve the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) ability to deliver critical enablers, such as artillery Fires. The battalion would field one team to advise and assist the combat support battalion, a battalion within the ANA brigade made up of three subordinate units, an artillery battery, an engineer company and a reconnaissance company. This SFAAT would provide advice on how to employ and sustain the brigade’s combat enablers and was a perfect fit for an artillery battalion S3 to lead. The team received experts from the brigade’s special troops battalion for the necessary engineer experience and also received experts from the brigade’s reconnaissance, surveillances, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron for reconnaissance experience. The Allons Battalion also created a specialized artillery team, subordinate to the combat support battalion SFAAT, to specifically advise and assist the Afghan artillery

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 25 Digital and Voice Communications II FDC - Fire Direction Center Digital Communications FO - Fires O cer FSE - Fire Support Element TAC - Tactical Action Center TAC 2-15 FA LCMR - Lightweight Counter-mortar Radar MET/SURVEY - Meteorlogical Survey

FO FO LCMR FO

AN/TPQ-53

FSE 2-14 INF FSE 4-31 INF FSE 1-89 CAV

MET/SURVEY

1 x 10-man FDC 1 x 10-man FDC 2 x 10-man FDC

1st PLT, A BTRY 2nd PLT, A BTRY 1st and 2nd PLT, B BTRY

Figure 1: Task organization for phase 1 full sensor-to-shooter digital rehearsal validation. Communications architecture employed to validate the sensor-to-shooter links during Operation Allons Fusion. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., information from CPT B. Gatrell, 2nd BN, 15th FA)

July 2012. M777A2 New Equipment August. Three-Week Allons Fusion AFATDS to gunline gun display unit Training / New Equipment Fielding. Operational Concept. (GDU) (either M777A2 or M119A2) • Three FDCs and six howitzer crews Week One. Certify Howitzer Crews • Included in COMMEX; maneuver (formed from two M119A2 crews) and Conduct Brigade-Wide Digital battalion mortar systems; radars; completed their necessary three- COMMEX. lightweight counter-mortar radars week training and conducted their • Three FDCs and six howitzer crews (LCMRs); meteorological section completed M777A2 section Table VI Week 2. M777A2 Live-Fire Exercise live-fire • Digital COMMEX with all artillery (LFX) Familiarization, Digital Sensor to • Rebuild platoon FDCs each with two equipment and all brigade fire sup- Shooter, FDC/FSEs co-located. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical port teams from sensor to shooter; • Three FDCs and six howitzers com- Data System (AFATDS), two CEN- forward observer (FO) (MARK VII) pleted M777A2 live-fire familiariza- TAURS, and two charts (one per to company fire support officer (FSO) tion; one FDC for two howitzers with howitzer type); inventory all brigade Precision Forward Entry Device(P- maneuver company fire support of- digital Fires equipment for commu- FED) to battalion fire support ele- ficers (FSOs) conducting call for fire nication exercise (COMMEX) ment (FSE) AFATDS to platoon FDC, (CFF) to their respective maneuver

26 May - June 2013 • II Ø Ø

TAC 2-15 FA II I MET/Survey AN/TPQ-53 I

FSE 1-89 CAV

II A BTRY, 2-15 FA II B BTRY, 2-15 FA ••• ••• ••• •••

2-14 INF 4-31 INF

1st PLT, A BTRY 2nd PLT, A BTRY 1st PLT, A BTRY 2nd PLT, A BTRY

2 x 10-man sections 2 x 10-man sections 2 x 10-man sections 2 x 10-man sections

1 x 10-man FDC 1 x 10-man FDC 1 x 10-man FDC 1 x 10-man FDC

Figure 2: Initial task organization developed for Operation Allons Fusion, the reorganization of 2-25 FA BN for decentralized hybrid platoon operations. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., information from MAJ Lucas R. Connolly, 2nd BN, 25th FA)

battalion FSE co-located with their tralized ammunition management, es- base on the artillery aspect of the mis- respective firing platoon. pecially with two different howitzers sion, each of the D30 team members at- • All CFFs sent digitally sensor to systems and multiple ammunition lots. tended two additional courses; one was shooter The firing platoon leader and platoon held at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., and con- Week 3. Capstone Events; M119A2/ sergeant also learned about their added sisted of a two-day basic familiarization M777A2 Fires. role of maintenance and sustainment in on the D30 howitzer. The second was • Company FO sends mission requests a decentralized role. Normally a battery held at the Joint Maneuver Readiness to battalion FSEs/firing platoons to commander and first sergeant over- Center (JMRC) in Hoenfels, Germany, gunline digitally and request either see the logistical functions of the firing consisting of a 10-day, D30 certification M777A2 or M119A2 battery, but in the decentralized mode, course. With the advisor basics covered • Gunlines rotate from M119A2 and the platoon leadership had to become by JRTC, and the D30 specifics covered M777A2 employment and conducts extremely proactive in communicating by Picatinny and JMRC, the battalion coordinated illumination utilizing their requirements to the maneuver tested the team’s temperament under both M777A2 (illumination) and commander and keeping their organ- realistic conditions at NTC. In an ef- M119A2 (high explosive). ic artillery headquarters routinely in- fort to allow the team to understand Upon conclusion of Allons Fusion, formed. the mundane aspect of their new func- the battalion deployed to the NTC for SFAAT Training. To ensure the tion while deployed, the team taught its mission rehearsal MRE. Each platoon SFAATS were adequately prepared and advised non-13B Soldiers ‘Afghan FDC worked inside their respective for their wartime mission, all available role-players’ on how to fire a M119A2 maneuver battalion alongside the FSE. training options were explored. Each howitzer during their 14 days in the The fire direction officer controlled two SFAAT member attended the SFAAT ‘box’ and trained fire direction Soldiers M119A2 howitzers and one M777A2 Academy at JRTC, which provided the (also Afghan role players) on manual howitzer during the rotation and quick- necessary advise and assist baseline gunnery. The capstone event was a suc- ly learned the importance of decen- knowledge. To increase this knowledge cessful M119A2 live-fire executed en-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 27 •• Team Mushawar Tobchee D30 Training Team Mission: The 2nd BN, 15th FA D30 SFAT advises, assists Possible Manning SFAT D30 FDC and trains 201st Corps Afghan National Army Field Artillery 13A O4 Team Leader elements in the art and science of the delivery of close Fires 13Z E8 Team NCO in charge •• in support of combat operations. 13A O3 Team Executive Officer/S3 Key Tasks: 13A O2 Fire Support Officer Trainer SFAT D30 Guns • Reinforce conventional force (CF) partnership activities 13A O2 Fire Direction Center • Train Afghan cannoneers, fire support teams (FIST) and Trainer •• • fire direction centers (FDC) 13A O2 Platoon Trainer • Advise Kandak leadership on techniques, tactics and 13B E7 Platoon Trainer • procedures for artillery employment 13F E7 Fire Support Element 13D E6 Fire Direction Center SFAT D30 Leaders • Assist Kandak and Corps leadership in the development of • a sustainable Fires capability in a post transition Trainer • environment 13B E6 Fire Support Team •• • Advise CF leadership on the KDK’s level of readiness and Trainer 25B E5 Signal Trainer • provide recommendations for integration into joint 68W E5 Medical Traininer • combined combat operations SFAT FIST 63B E1-4 Maintenance Trainer

Figure 3: Initial concept for D30 Security Force Advise and Assist Teams (SFAAT) fielding. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., information from LTC Christoper Wendland) tirely by the ANA on the last day of the noncommissioned officers and officers NTC rotation. helped staff the remaining SFAATs as Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Deployment to Afghanistan. Fol- Fires advisors spread throughout the Wendland graduated from the United States lowing the battalion’s rapid transfor- remainder of the infantry battalions Military Academy in 1994, and was com- mation, reorganization and retraining it deployed across Paktika province to missioned as a second lieutenant in the Field deployed to Paktika province in south- develop the ANA’s ability to employ Artillery. Wendland’s academic degrees in- eastern Afghanistan. Artillery advisors artillery, as well as mortar Fires. As of clude a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical from the Red Team reached their des- March 2013, one would be hard pressed Engineering (Aerospace) from the United tination FOBs and COPs on Paktika’s to travel to a COP, FOB or outpost in States Military Academy, 1994; Master of eastern-most frontier, where they began Paktika province without encountering Science in Space Operations Management mentoring and training the D30 cannon an Allons Redleg hard at work firing, sur- from Webster University, 2005; and Master crews of the Afghan army’s 4th Battal- veying, teaching, training, mentoring or ion, 2nd Brigade 203rd Corps. Their engaging, embedded with or alongside of Science in Joint Campaign Planning and training helped them immensely, some an Afghan army counterpart. Strategy from National Defense University, even commenting that the Afghans they The Allons Battalion completely re- 2009. He is currently the commander of the were training were more competent invented itself in more than 180 days in 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 2nd Se- than the role players at NTC, whose preparation for deployment to Afghan- curity Force Assistance Brigade, deployed to complete inexperience and deliber- istan. It became completely decentral- Paktika province, Afghanistan. ate malingering was near maddening. ized and hybrid capable, with platoons Howitzer crews from the battalion de- trained to operate independently and Major Lucas R. Connolly graduated ployed to the same location and were work alongside maneuver battalion from the University of New Hampshire in not unpacked for long before they faced FSEs. Howitzer crews became certified 1997, and was commissioned as a second enemy rocket fire, which they answered to fire either M777A2 or M119A2 how- lieutenant in the Field Artillery. Connolly’s in kind with 155 mm and 105 mm count- itzers dependant solely on their respec- academic degrees include a Bachelor of Arts er-fire. Green Team advisors moved to tive maneuver commander’s mission a camp called Super FOB, where they and intent. It fielded two SFAAT teams in Sociology from the University of New immediately began working with the prepared to advise and assist Afghan Hampshire, 1997; Master of Arts in Man- remainder of the 4th Battalion coaching, National Army counterparts on Fires agement and Leadership from Webster Uni- teaching and mentoring the senior lead- employment, as well as D30 howitzer versity, 2009. He is currently an SFAAT ers of the battalion along with the leader- sustainment and ammunition manage- team leader, Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, ship of the engineer and reconnaissance ment. The Allons Battalion remains de- 15th Field Artillery, deployed to Paktika companies. Allons Battalion fire support ployed at this time. Allons!«« province, Afghanistan.

28 May - June 2013 • 1LT Audrey Griffith (left) and SPC Heidi Gerke, both with the 92nd Engineer Battalion, stand guard during a force protection exercise at Forward Operating Base Hadrian in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, March 18, 2013. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army) Un-Gendering Service By Professor Gene Kamena

Any commentary offered by a man to wom- Wrong Lessons. Our recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will define, for this and the next generation, perceptions of en regarding their military service is suspect. A what combat is and what it is not. For the most part, the term commentary written by a retired infantryman ‘frontline’ in Iraq and much of Afghanistan has little mean- expressly for women, who desire to serve in the ing. There were and are, noted exceptions; the battles of Najaf, Fallujah, and the fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan, infantry, or any direct combat position, is very offer glimpses into the world of the infantry. Conditions are suspect. My sergeant major once admonished, severe. However, after the initial assault into each theater of “Sir, talk about only what you know.” Thirty operation, the ‘frontline,’ more often than not, devolved into the front gate of one’s forward operating base (FOB.) Once years in the infantry, two wars, multiple de- outside the relative safety of the FOB, all were equally vulner- ployments, and time to reflect, strengthens my able to attack. thoughts and my desire to “talk about what I Women certainly did their part and did it well. On today’s counterinsurgency battlefield, women were, and are killed, know.” My motives are pure, but reader beware, wounded, and taken prisoner alongside their brothers-in- this work may fall outside of the restricting arms. More than that, women made significant contributions boundaries of political correctness from time to to the mission at hand. No one questions, least of all this author, their intelligence, bravery, and patriotism. I have seen time. That is okay; in the infantry talk is plain what women can do in combat, and respect their abilities. and direct. Never-the-less, service rendered by women in Iraq and Af-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 29 sults matter. On the battlefield, only results matter. Create More Paths To The Top. There is increased emphasis to have the military mirror civil society. That is a nice thought, but when less than one percent of the nation risks all to defend the other 99 percent, that is a tall order. Yes, we should try, within reason, but never at the expense of capability or talent. More important than mirroring society is to ensure that the best people, male and female, within the ranks have multiple paths to the top of the military profession. Mere service in any job or specialty should not guarantee a pre- determined outcome. Talent and potential, fairly gauged, must be the keys to upward mobility. All services can and must do more to open paths to the top 1LT Krista Searle, an intelligence officer with 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery, 17th for the best people, regardless of gen- Fires Brigade, before she attends the selection for the U.S. Army Cultural Support der. Program, March 7, 2013. If selected, Searle will join a Cultural Support Team, an Finally, a personal word for wom- all-female element that conducts missions with Special Forces units in Afghanistan. en who want, really want, to join the (Photo by SPC Nathan Goodall, U.S. Army) infantry. Be strong, never give up, do your best, and know that if you meet all standards and do your job, you will be ghanistan, exceptional as it was and is, der-barriers. The physical requirements accepted. Life in the infantry is primal does not equate to being in the infantry. for becoming an infantryman are mere- and severe; but it is also fair. We must take care not to carry our ly the price of admission; battle always Now is the time to ‘un-gender’ mil- current view of combat with us into the exacts a higher payment. The women itary service by allowing the standard next war. No one knows what the fu- with whom I served would not want to be the standard, understanding that ture holds; the next fight might not be a the standards diluted. They want to acceptance cannot be mandated, that it counterinsurgency fight among the peo- make it on their own. Remember, there must be earned.«« ple. Extended periods of time in remote are many men who cannot qualify, and areas under harsh conditions is the stan- achieving physical standards is no guar- dard against which all frontline troops antee for success. Common standards Professor Gene C. Kamena, is a seventh must train. also go a long way to ensure social co- year faculty member at the Air War College; Our Enemies Do Not Care. Our cur- hesion. There must be one standard for he serves as the course director for the Joint rent and future enemies might find in- all, it must be reasonable, published and Strategic Leadership Course in the Leader- teresting the fact that we, as a nation, fairly enforced. ship and Warfighting Department. He re- believe in diversity and act on it, but What Matters. Heart and desire mat- tired from the Army as a colonel of infantry they really do not care. For them it is ter…a lot. The unwritten dictum of the and holds a B.A. in history from Auburn all about winning and losing. So it must infantry is “stick together, never give University, Ala., and MMAS degree from be with us. Whatever actions we under- up, and always take the fight to the en- Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Past assignments take, the outcome must be a better mil- include: commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st itary, more capable and deadlier. The emy.” Women want to become part of AD; chief of staff for the 1st Infantry Divi- purpose of the military is to protect our the infantry for a myriad of reasons. sion; director of staff of U.S. Space Com- nation’s interests, to deter our enemies, Some women seek a different or more and if need be, to fight and win our na- challenging venue for their service. As mand; and the deputy chief of staff for U.S. tion’s wars. My experience informs me with my infantry brothers, women do Northern Command. In 2004, he served as that diversity has a place in making the not like being told that they cannot do director for all Iraqi security forces. In 2005, force better, but diversity must never something. However, activists need not he recruited, trained, and led an Iraqi special become the single measure of merit or apply. The impure motives are a dis- commando border brigade in the Al Anbar the ultimate objective. traction. People in the infantry could province along the Iraq-Syrian border. His Enforce Standards, Not Gender not care less who the first female will be last active duty assignment was as the se- Barriers. Present day standards for the to break the gender-barrier, what mat- nior Army advisor to the Air University at infantry work, but we must watch the ters is if she can do the job, take care of Maxwell, AFB. He is a well-published au- temptation to wield standards as gen- herself, and accomplish the mission--re- thor in the areas of leadership and ethics.

30 May - June 2013 • Chris Geurtsen (left), a field program officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. Navy Lt. j.g. Matthew Stroup (third from left), public affairs officer for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Farah, meet with Farah Direc- tor of Information and Culture, Farid Ahmad Ayubi (right) during a key-leader engagment at the director's office in Farah City, Oct. 30. PRT Farah's mision is to train, advise, and assist Afghan government leaders at the municipal, district, and provincial levels in Farah province Afghanistan. Their civil military team is comprised of members of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State and USAID. (Photo by Lt. Benjamin Addison, U.S. Navy) Unburdening Culture: Implications for the United States Army Training and Education By COL (Ret.) Eric W. Stanhagen and Daryl K. Liskey, Ph.D.

Experience from Operation Iraqi Freedom education outcomes for the GPF to date have been mixed. (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) This, in part, is because there is a lack of a common understanding of what culture is and how it concretely adds to made clear the importance of cultural compe- warfighter outcomes. Culture is a phenomenon we all recog- tence for successful mission execution. In 2009, nize but have difficulty precisely defining. Frequently, itis the U.S. Army subsequently published the defined by stringing together different and sometimes incom- patible concepts, which metaphorically defines the swamp Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy but obscures the key terrain. As commonly used in the Army, to organize cultural training and education for culture is an over-burdened term. By meaning too much, it the general purpose forces (GPF). The Army to- means very little that is operationally relevant. Multiple and unclear understandings of culture have contributed to ambig- day confronts how best to institutionalize cul- uous learning objectives, conflicting lines of effort, and dis- tural training and education in an austere fiscal agreements about curricula content. A common understand- environment while drawing down in Afghan- ing of culture relevant for warfighter outcomes is needed for istan. Looking forward, cultural competence culture to be a useful conceptual tool for military operations, training and education. will remain a key enabler for an adaptive, ex- This paper advances an argument for an academically peditionary, and regionally aligned force that grounded, narrow understanding of culture that can be in- is capable of operating as part of the joint force tegrated into military methodologies. While these views are contested among academics, we seek to highlight the impor- globally in the 21st century. tance of this debate for military cultural training and educa- In our judgment, Army cultural training and tion. We then discuss the implications of our understanding

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 31 of culture for training and education in the GPF. We argue that learning about be augmented with knowledge from the U.S. Army. We conclude with a set of culture is necessary to understand the other social science disciplines and his- recommendations on a way forward for human dimension of the operational en- tory. institutionalizing cultural training for vironment, but is not sufficient. It must Unburdening Culture. The word ‘culture’ originally comes from the Lat- in word ‘cultura’ meaning ‘cultivation.’ SGT William Russell, a security force team member for Provincial Reconstruction From this origin, we inherited two basic Team Farah (left), pulls security during a key-leader engagement at Farah City traditions for understanding culture. In Hospital. (Photo by Chief Petty Officer Josh Ives, U.S. Navy) German, ‘kultur’ originally referred to a process of becoming civilized. Towards the middle of the 19th century, ‘kultur’ came to mean a mental state shared among a people. The second tradition is inherited from the British where culture is understood as civilization (e.g., West- ern civilization and American culture). According to Edward B. Tylor, widely regarded as the founder of British social anthropology, “Culture or civilization… is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” These two understandings of culture—shared mental activity and the complex whole—are current in Amer- ican academia and influence different understandings of culture in the U.S. Army. Complex Whole. The challenge in applying a Tylor-inspired concept of culture for military training and education is that an understanding of the ‘complex whole’ of human activity can rarely be achieved and is analytically in- tractable for existing military methodologies. To be clear, the holistic approach made important and useful contributions. Anthropologists established the importance of belief (symbolic) systems, a native perspective, affiliation patterns (like kinship and patron-client relationships), status structure, social functions, non-state societies, detailed field work and linguistic competency, to name but a few. Their goal is to develop a holistic understanding about the activities of a people. While such a holistic methodology is helpful as an academic approach, it is unlikely to be a useful approach for the training and education of Soldiers beyond perhaps a few highly educated specialists. The standard methodology for cultural research requires specialized advanced education and long, unobtrusive participant-observation. Sol- diers rarely stay among a foreign people for long, and they are not unobtrusive observers; they are noticed and impact

32 May - June 2013 • • Hardware Software

Structures and Culture Physical Institutions Environment Cognitions Shared Political Behavioral Scripts Among a Terrain Military Affect Dynamics Group Weather Economic Social Infrastructure Information Material

Brain & Individual Environment Body Psychology Behavior

Figure 1: Cultural hardware and software. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., information provided by COL (Ret.) Eric W. Stanhagen and Daryl K. Liskey, Ph.D.)

substantially what they observe. Addi- anthropologist Clifford Geertz in The • ‘Affect’ is the shared feelings of what tionally, time is not available for the sig- Interpretation of Cultures writes: is significant nificant amount of training, education “Culture is best seen not as complex- • ‘Learned’ is what is acquired that is and experience necessary to achieve es of concrete behavior patterns—cus- not a biological inheritance such a capability, particularly for the toms, usages, traditions, habits, clus- • ‘Inherited’ is what is received from general force. ters—as has, by and large, been the other people across time Further, holistic cultural judgments case up to now, but as a set of control By analog, and as shorthand, culture are simply not achievable using existing mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, in- is the shared ‘software’ that is learned military analytical methods. Military structions (what computer engineers and inherited; the programs (cogni- analysis is performed by functional staff call ‘programs’)—for the governing of tions, behavior scripts, and affect) that elements, manned by generalists not behavior.” direct responses to people and the en- specialists, and consists of using doc- According to Hofstede, culture is not vironment. This statement is subject to trinal approaches that can be learned behaviors per se, but shared software two important clarifications. What is quickly. Knowledge must be immedi- that programs behaviors. Shared behav- 'shared’ is not fully the same as individ- ately accessible and comprehensible, it ual psychology. Culture includes belief iors, like common material artifacts, are must exist in a form that can be clearly systems that evolve ‘outside the head.’ the outcome of shared programs—i.e., communicated, and it is usually con- And not all learned software is based on culture. Based on Hofstede’s under- strained to the immediate situation at ‘inheritance.’ Software in the present is standing of culture as shared programs, hand. While suitable for its intended based on universal responses and the culture is understood to be: “the pattern purpose, it is unreasonable to expect the subject of study for most of the social of shared cognitions, behavioral scripts, military analytical methodology to pro- sciences. duce insight at the level of a realization and affects that is learned and inherited The shared software of culture is run of the whole of human activity suitable by a people.” The component elements on the hardware of environmental vari- to inform a judgment. stated briefly are: ables; similar to the software of psychol- Useful Understanding. On the other • ‘Pattern’ is regular interconnected ogy which is run on the hardware of the hand, culture defined as a shared mental elements brain, endocrine and nervous systems state of a people in the German tradition • ‘Shared’ is what is held in common of the body. Environmental variables can be incorporated into military meth- by a group of people are observable entities, institutions and odologies, similar to the disciplines of • ‘Cognitions’ refers to values, beliefs, behaviors, many of which the military history, politics and economics. and ways to think: perceptions, un- traditionally includes in analyzing the In his book, Cultures and Organiza- derstanding, and protocols for mak- operational environment; however, of- tions: Software of the Mind, Geert Hof- ing decisions ten missing is the ‘software’ of culture. stede explains his understanding of • ‘Behavior scripts’ refers to mental Cognitive psychologists have robustly culture with the analogy of ‘shared models for behaving (norms) and demonstrated that knowledge of soft- software’ among a people. Similarly, communicating ware is essential to understand outputs

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 33 or actions. The same hardware with as a holistic understanding contributed al friction with foreign populations different software can lead to different to unrealistic expectations for what cul- among which we operate. outputs. tural education and training could con- 2. Skills (Leader/Influence). Increases How output or action differs among tribute to the military. Culture is only operational effectiveness when oper- foreign populations was identified as a one of a number of factors important ating with partners across the joint, gap in understanding the operational for developing competence and it may interagency, intergovernmental, and environment during OEF and OIF. To not always be the most important. For multinational (JIIM) or populations not consider cultural software implic- example, engagement with members of with different cultural backgrounds. itly assumes people respond to their foreign populations requires individu- 3. Knowledge (Regional). Fills gaps in environment similarly – an assumption al-level skills, an area where psychology understanding of the operational en- often proven through hard experience may contribute more than culture. vironment and improve course of ac- to be false. Understanding culture as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tion (COA) development, execution, shared software that is inherited and Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01A, Language and assessment of effects achieved. learned allows us to better assess the and Regional Expertise Capability Identifi- Clearly identifying how culture con- motivations of foreign populations that cation and Planning, provides guidance tributes to the 12 regional expertise differ from our own. for the identification and evaluation of and cultural competencies is critical to Implications for Army Military Cul- proficiency for foreign language, re- developing a balanced education and tural Education and Training. Defining gional expertise and cultural competen- training program. Mapped out below is what culture, defined as shared soft- culture as a pattern of shared cognitions, cies. The instruction identifies 12 region- ware learned and inherited, contributes behavioral scripts, and affect learned al expertise and cultural competencies in relation to other capabilities needed and inherited by a people reduces the and groups them into three categories: to achieve the military outcomes for scope of what culture contributes to core, leader/influence, and regional/ each competency category. the warfighter, and it illuminates the technical. These competency categories Awareness (Core): Decreasing Fric- greater need for the other social science contribute to military outcomes on the tion When Operating Among Foreign disciplines in U.S. Army education and battlefield as follows: Populations. Cultural self-awareness is training. In our view, defining culture 1. Awareness (Core). Decreases cultur- the comprehension of one’s own cultural biases and appreciation of how cul- Figure 2: Culture and competencies. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., information provided by tures differ from one’s own. Cultural COL (Ret.) Eric W. Stanhagen and Daryl K. Liskey, Ph.D.) self-awareness education and training includes the four competencies that CJCSI 3126.01A refers to as ‘Core:’ understanding culture, applying organizational awareness, cultural perspective taking, and cultural adaptability. Dif- ferences in cultural software between Awareness Knowledge American and foreign populations can (Core) (Regional) lead to frustration, prejudice, and ani- Cultural Culture as a mosity when cultural self-awareness is lacking. Self-awareness of our and their Self-Awareness dimension of the cultures, the cultural stress cycle (cul- Operating ture shock), and valuing self-discipline, Environment mission, and respect can help moderate or suppress behaviors that contribute to friction, particularly among those with personalities that are not naturally open and respectful. Much of the friction between U.S. troops and foreign populations is rooted in individual personality factors, rather than cultural ones. While person- Skills ality factors may be the most important, (Leadership/Inﬂuence) cultural self-awareness training can Culture as context for contribute to reducing friction and pro- engaging foreign vides an effective tool with fewer ram- populations ifications than screening personalities and reassigning those who are at great- est risk for creating incidents. Cultural self-awareness training should be part of Army-wide charac-

34 May - June 2013 • ter and leadership training to enable culture practices and beliefs for the tar- skills should be integrated as part of effective operations globally and with get country are emphasized. human dynamics training, rather than JIIM partners. Such training should be Skills (Leader/Influence): Opera- taught as stand-alone, cross-cultural on par with other core Army training tional Effectiveness Among Foreign skills training, similar to the practice at programs for character, such as equal Populations. Skills for operating effec- the U.S. Army John F. Kenedy Special opportunity or sexual harassment pre- tively among foreign populations and Warfare Center and School (SWCS), vention. In fact, training in these areas partners include the CJCSI 3126.01A, Fort Bragg, N.C. Psychology likely con- can be positively reinforcing in shaping ‘leader/influence’ competencies of tributes more that is central for train- the Army’s culture. In addition to Ar- building strategic networks, cross-cul- ing individual-level warfighter skills, my-wide training, cultural self-aware- tural influence, organizational compe- while cultural considerations largely ness training should continue as part of tence, and utilizing interpreters. are supporting. For example, effective pre-deployment training where specific Foreign population engagement techniques for negotiating are similar

SPC Hussein Farhadikia, an interpreter/translator, assigned to 51st Translator Interpreter Company, takes notes during a mock regional medical meeting at Fort Irwin, Calif. His company provides host nation translation and culture advice to units during their training at the National Training Center to prepare them for their missions prior to deployment. (Photo by SSG Antwaun Parrish, U.S. Army)

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 35 book, “The Social System,” Talcott Par- sons identifies several critical human activities or operations: • Political – power and decision making • Military – employment of physical force • Economic – production and distribution of resources • Social – solidarity and polarization • Information – communication • Infrastructure – macro engineering and management systems In common military practice, these operational variables are often used to classify institutions (rather than effects), which conflate explanation (causal analysis) and description. (For example, a religious organization may fit in multiple explanatory categories depending on the analytical objectives.) An institution, as commonly used by social scientists, is routinized behavior or practice such as ringing a bell to start a class, a law, or an organization. Institutions are ‘behaviors’ or hardware (see Geertz’s view above). As noted, outcomes or effects are the result of the interaction between hardware and software. That is, culture is a dimension that crosses the PMES operational variables—it is present and provides independent explanation across these operational variables. Soldiers participating in Yama Sakura 63 at Camp Sendai, Japan, learn about cal- Both components of software—uni- ligraphy in a recent cultural exchange. (Photo by SGT William Jones, U.S. Army) versal responses (drawing from the social sciences) and cultural inheritance across cultures. A poor negotiator can eign populations need little training on (drawing from anthropology and histo- fail regardless of the amount of cultural cultural factors. At the other extreme, ry)—are important for analyzing effects. training. However, culture does contrib- MOSs that involve operations immersed Inclusion of both provides an analysis ute an understanding of a wider array among a foreign population or that spe- of similar responses given the situa- of possible behaviors and ways of think- cialize in directly influencing foreign tion and institutions, and differences ing that are not common in one’s own populations require intensive training in response given cultural inheritance. culture. Understanding cultural differ- in relevant skills and related cultural Reality usually is mixed and it is the ences can provide an edge: a better in- considerations. Each branch or func- interaction between environmental and sight into the opponent, possible tactics tional proponent should identify tasks cultural factors that provide critical in- to employ that are not common in one’s and required skills, and related cultural sights into population motivations and own culture, how they communicate, considerations for training and educa- behaviors. and their expectations. Incorporating tion programs under their cognizance. The importance of culture across the cultural considerations, as part of train- Knowledge (Regional): Operational PMES in academia is evidenced in the ing only for specific military tasks where Environment. Culture, understood as establishment of the sub-disciplines of it matters will, have a positive impact on inherited software, is a dimension for political culture (which includes mili- developing capabilities, while reducing each of the military operational vari- tary culture), cultural economics, and the chance that it will be ignored based ables: political, military, economic, and cultural sociology. These sub-disci- on a perception that cultural impact is social (PMES). Before explaining this plines identify important cultural fac- over emphasized. claim, it should be mentioned these mil- tors—such as legitimacy, cultural based The requirement to address cultural itary operational variables are also dis- ways of war, and subsistence economic considerations in military engagement ciplines within the social sciences. These beliefs—as related to institutional struc- skills training varies across military oc- disciplines were established around ex- tures. cupational specialties (MOSs). MOSs planatory goals for directing research Not including culture in the analy- that involve little engagement with for- on critical human activities. In his 1951 sis of the operating environment risks

36 May - June 2013 • creating gaps in the analysis as a result of not systematically considering differences in factors motivating separate Specific Area Knowledge General Principles groups. For example, legitimacy often is Regional Expertise Social Science Expertise considered to be derived from the rule – Critical for tactical operations – Guidance on what is important of law (rational-legal institution), a view and decision making to know that misses what Max Weber referred to – Critical for operational and as traditional and charismatic (cultural) strategic decision making sources of legitimacy, such as may exist among tribes. Additionally, risk increas- Culture-Specific Culture-General es for introducing error and ethnocen- Awareness Awareness tric bias where explanation of differenc- Skills Skills es is left to common sense inferences Cultural Knowledge Cultural Knowledge rather than systemic analysis. Region-Specific Region-General CJCSI 3126.01A Regional/Technical Geography Geography competencies include understanding Political Political cultural considerations and other re- Military Military gional factors. Culture should be taught Economic Economic in military education as a dimension for Social Social describing and analyzing the operation- Information Information al variables—culture as the inherited Infrastructure Infrastructure software dimension for PMES. When cultural instruction is taught separate- ly it is not always clear to students how culture relates to the PMES variables; Figure 3: Specific area knowledge and general principles. (Illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., students are left to draw these infer- information provided by COL (Ret.) Eric W. Stanhagen and Daryl K. Liskey, Ph.D.) ences by themselves or may dismiss culture altogether. vides a framework to organize training ry after another,’ each lesson learned be- Specific and General Knowledge. for culture-specific, intellectual agility, ing idiosyncratic. Thinking is limited to Recognition that cultural and regional and ‘system thinking.’ Each specific each specific historical instance, which knowledge can be general or specific is culture is complex and requires a long may build intuitive judgments but adds important for organizing culture and re- time to master, longer than most Sol- little for generalized knowledge that en- gional education. diers will have during a deployment. ables systems thinking. Culture-general, like principles of Culture-general identifies what is most Like cultural knowledge, regional military operations, can be understood important. It does not substitute for the knowledge can also be region-general in terms of general principles—such as hard work of learning about a specific or region-specific. ‘Region’ can be un- belief systems, high/low context, status culture but does provide guidelines to derstood to refer to a large geographic structure, legitimacy, or dynamics of organize and focus on what is more crit- area often including multiple countries, historical threat perceptions. General ical from what is less important to en- or it can be understood to refer to an principles are derived from understand- able rapid adaptation. ‘area’ that may be a continent, a sub-di- ing commonalities across multiple spe- Further, culture-general knowledge vision of a continent, a country, or a cific cultures similar to deriving military is important to develop intellectual operational principles drawn from mul- village. Here, ‘region’ is understood as tiple specific engagements. agility for operating amongst foreign to refer to a specific ‘area.’ Observa- Culture-specific refers to the cul- populations. Generalizations enable tions about cultural knowledge above ture of a specific group: their specific considerations beyond the immediate also apply to regional knowledge. Re- customs, values, beliefs, rituals, ways situation. Intellectual agility requires gion-general refers to knowledge gener- to express them etc. Culture-specific is not only thinking ‘outside the box,’ but alizable across any area. Region-gener- detailed knowledge of a specific culture an understanding of the range of possi- al knowledge is usually the goal of the that can vary greatly between countries ble ways to think and act. social sciences. Given that culture is a and even villages. For example, in Ja- Culture-general knowledge also en- dimension of regional knowledge, cul- pan, it is customary for men to exit an ables ‘system thinking.’ System thinking ture-general knowledge is a component elevator first, while in the United States, includes understanding how cause and of region-general as cultural-specific is women customarily exit first—which effect percolate across units. This is done a component of region-specific knowl- is culture-specific. From a culture-gen- by identifying common causes, effects, edge. eral point of view, gender appropriate and units across the system to enable The implication for military edu- behavior can vary and such knowledge analysis as a system, such as the struc- cation and training is that there are is important to not cause offense or mis- ture of power or resource flows, and two orders of knowledge; specific and understanding. system-of-systems analysis. Otherwise, general. Specific knowledge is unique Culture-general knowledge pro- analysis is mired in learning ‘one histo- to each operational environment and

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 37 critical for concrete knowledge of the cation is that culture, with the exception of the operational environment. War environment. Because specific knowl- of cultural self-awareness, should be is at the core a human activity; under- edge, like learning a foreign language, integrated into existing training and ed- standing cultures, using our definition, is information intensive, unique to the ucation only where it serves to increase only offers a partial understanding of area, and memory fades over time, it is understanding of the human dimension the range of human nature that Soldiers most economically provided to Soldiers of the operational environment and im- and leaders must understand. Based on when deployment to a specific area is proves individual and unit performance this view, the following recommenda- clear. General knowledge is useful re- of military missions. Understanding of tions are made for organizing cultural gardless of the specific area to be de- culture must also be combined with training for the GPF in the U.S. Army: ployed. As mentioned, it enables rapid history and the other social science 1. Awareness. Cultural self-awareness learning of specific knowledge, intel- disciplines in education and training training and education lessons and lectual agility, and systems thinking. In intended to develop a more complete materials Should be developed by settings where deployment to a specific understanding of the human dimension an academically qualified cadre, de- area is uncertain, such as during professional military education courses, general knowledge should be taught. Prior to deployment, such as during pre-deployment training or among regionally aligned forces, specific knowledge is needed to be effective in that particular environment. For culture-general and region-general knowledge to be useful, understanding must be focused on military missions and grounded in specific knowledge, as well as the converse. A holistic understanding of culture obscures the importance of specific and general knowledge, as well as what is the central focus for military missions. In a military context, we're interested in increasing awareness of what social science, history, and culture has to offer for military missions, how to use it, and what not to expect from it. There needs to be a clear understanding of what is useful for military operations, as distinct from what is useful for social science research or civilian missions. Where the military supports civilian agencies, relevant culture and social science knowledge for policy development or planning and executing civilian missions should be sought from the agency or agencies supported, both for effi- ciency and consistency. An appreciation for this dynamic and knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of civilian agencies is a necessary part of professional military education for senior and field grade officers. Recommendations for Army Cultur- al Education and Training for the Gen- eral Purpose Forces (GPF). This paper proposes an understanding of culture as a discrete dimension—the pattern of shared cognitions, behavioral scripts, and affects that is learned and inherited by a people. A central implication of this view for military training and edu-

38 May - June 2013 • livered Army-wide, with oversight foreign populations, and to enable training programs must be based upon from HQDA or HQ TRADOC. Cul- the U.S. Army to operate effective- a sound academic understanding of the tural self-awareness should be part of ly and globally in the 21st century. concepts involved. Cultural self-aware- the Army’s character-building effort. Such awareness is required across ness should be nested within a larger Cultural self-awareness is critical the Army. context of character training; for exam- to minimize cultural friction when To ensure quality, effectiveness, and ple equal opportunity and sexual ha- operating with foreign forces and consistency, cultural education and rassment prevention, since each of these

Leader of 3rd Platoon, B Company, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, 2LT Matthew Domenech meets with one of the village elders for the first time during a patrol conducted by his platoon. The patrol is the company’s first to the village of Shinkai since moving to Forward Operating Base Sweeney, Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of the 2nd Infantry Div.)

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 39 reinforce the others through the under- has been for the foreign area officer ers in a JIIM environment. As part of the lying theme of respect for others. As is (FAO) community. As a result the joint force and as ‘America’s Army’ in the case with most training and edu- Army faces an educational challenge all that we offer, we guarantee the agil- cation within the Army, establishing a in developing foreign language, re- ity, versatility and depth to ‘Prevent, single proponent organization would gional expertise and culture (LREC) Shape and Win’ (Army Strategic Plan- provide the consistency and quality competencies beyond a very basic ning Guidance 2013). necessary to ensure effectiveness and level of proficiency. Increased par- The Army Strategic Planning Guid- minimize risk. To reduce duplication ticipation in operations and activities ance 2013 envisions a force to prevent, of effort, existing social science faculties conducted under the current Nation- shape, and win conflicts. Prevent entails should be engaged for this work, under al Security Strategy tenet of ‘shap- a globally deployable force; ‘shaped to the direction of either HQDA G-3 or ing’ will place increased demands on influence human behavior;’ and win TRADOC. regionally aligned Army forces for through ‘robust capacity, expert and 2. Skills. Continue research to devel- competence in the full range of LREC agile capabilities and total force read- op greater understanding of the re- competencies described in CJCSI iness.’ Cultural self-awareness, en- quirements for understanding cul- 3126.01A. gagement skills, and knowledge of the tural considerations that are inherent Selected members of the faculties cultural dimension of the operational in military skills and tasks. Skills of the United States Military Academy environment will be important enablers to engage foreign populations and (USMA), Command and General Staff for achieving a globally responsive and partners are individual level compe- College (CGSC) and the United States regionally engaged force. tencies for which culture is largely a War College (USAWC) who possess Our efforts to institutionalize cultural context. Training of such skills must advanced degrees in the social sciences training and education have been hin- be grounded in rigorous research and history are uniquely well qualified dered by multiple and overburdened and be validated rather than derived to serve as the faculty, organized as an definitions of culture. A holistic under- from popular understandings. Given enterprise facilitated by virtual collab- standing of culture has led to unreal- the current state of the art further re- oration. Training for understanding istic expectations of what culture can search is needed to develop reliable the operational environment must be offer. By understanding culture more training that will be effective on the grounded in rigorous academic research narrowly, we can better understand battlefield. as opposed to popular understandings. what culture can and cannot offer for The Army Research Institute’s Although improving cultural ed- military training and education and (ARI’s) research in this field has con- ucation and training will have many better align resources. Such training tributed to a better understanding for benefits for the Army and the Soldiers must be more rigorously grounded in training and should be continued. Such receiving the instruction, it will not be academic research than has previously research should support the skills train- possible to develop deep subject matter been the case. By shifting resources to ing needs of TRADOC and FORSCOM. expertise in more than a few uniformed an Army-wide cultural awareness pro- 3. Knowledge. Establish, as an enter- personnel. Units conducting activities gram, providing skills training based on prise, a regional studies and social and operations in culturally complex rigorous research, and establishing au- science (RS3) faculty, to support operational environments will need to thoritative knowledge of the operation- training and education, and conduct be augmented with small numbers of al environment for training under an or guide research into the operational experts to improve the effectiveness of enterprise RS3 faculty, we can deliver variables (PMES). Faculty members their planning, operations, and assess- training and education that better adds would provide subject matter exper- ments. Drawing expertise from the RS3 to warfighter capabilities needed for the tise for training and education on the faculty will have the additional benefit 21st Century.«« operating environment conducted of rapidly transferring the experience throughout the PME system, and also gained in the field to the classroom. Un- Author’s Note: We wish to thank Dr. provide operational support to bri- der the guidance of the RS3 enterprise, Lance Betros, retired brigadier general, Dr. gade and higher echelon units while a training and information unit may be Adam Silverman, John Kotzman, Dr. Hugh undergoing combat training center established to develop and disseminate Lewis, Dr. Thomas Blau and anonymous rotations and conducting operations academically-grounded training and in- reviewers for their comments and contribu- in support of the global combatant formation for PME and the operational tions which much improved the paper. commands. When implemented, forces. Such an enterprise will provide educational instruction in cultural authoritative guidance for training and knowledge for the GPF should be education on the operational environ- Eric Stanhagen is TRADOC G-3 GPF integrated with instruction on the ment for the development of our future LREC SME and former deputy director of operational variables and cover both leaders who are capable of effectively the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. general (social science) and specific operating globally across U.S. Army (area) knowledge. Developing cul- PME institutions. Daryl Liskey is the Culture and Foreign tural understanding and social sci- The Army is globally responsive and Language Advisor at the U.S. Army Field ence knowledge has not been a goal regionally engaged; it is an indispens- Artillery School and a socio-cultural ana- of a systematic education program able partner and provider of a full range lyst, most recently for Special Operations for the Army’s GPF any more than it of capabilities to combatant command- Command, Pacific.

40 May - June 2013 • During Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 12.2, 1LT Chance Panter leads his advanced party and prepares the landing zone for his platoon's occupation during an air assault artillery raid. (Photo SGT Sean Harriman, U.S. Army) An Open Letter From 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery to Other Field Artillery Units Fielding WIN-T Inc II By MAJ Peter Sittenauer, CPT Joshua Grubbs and CPT John Turner

In the May-June 2012 and July-August 2012 brigade combat team (BCT) on a brigade-level attack with editions of Fires, MAJ D.J. Hurt authored two an assigned area of operations (AO) that is 70 kilometers in length and 50 kilometers in width. Each of the firing platoons articles which list beyond-line-of-sight com- are beyond the range of each other’s weapon systems, but are munication as a “capability gap” we must close connected to each other with satellite based, secure internet “…to win the next fight.” We agree with him protocol router (SIPR) connectivity with on-the-move (OTM) capability. The maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron fire whole-heartedly and share his vision. Imagine support elements (FSEs) are also interlinked with OTM SIPR a direct support Fires battalion supporting its connectivity with the brigade fire support elements, Fires bat-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 41 A Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle equipped with a Soldier Network Extension (SNE) assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment uses the limited foliage of McGregor Range, Fort Bliss, Texas, during the Network Integration Evaluation 12.2, May 10, 2012. (Photo by SGT Robert Larson, U.S. Army) talion fire direction center (FDC), and 4-27 FA was able to meet and exceed the Battalion, the NIE is a six-week field ex- each firing platoon FDC. After a suc- vision depicted above. ercise, similar in nature to an extended cessful attack on three different objec- As a part of the Army’s Capability Set combat training center (CTC) rotation. tives, the BCT transitions to a wide area 13, the battalion tested various compo- Our units conduct operations as we security mission and the firing platoons nents of Increment II of the WIN-T Inc would normally, in support of the 2nd are spread out over 150 kilometers from II. WIN-T Inc II is designed to provide ABCT while integrating new hardware each other within the BCT AO. units with on the move (OTM) SIPR or software into our formation to gain The reality is, the technology is here, connectivity, as well as its associated doctrine, organization, training, mate- and it is likely coming very soon to an applications. The purpose of this article riel, leadership and education, person- installation near you. is to provide an early assessment of the nel and facilities (DOTMLPF) feedback The 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery impacts that WIN-T Inc II has on a bri- from a standard unit prior to it being gade Fires’ and a direct support battal- fielded to deploying units or other ele- Regiment, recently completed Network ion’s operations. The intent is to advise ments of the operating force. Integration Evaluation (NIE) 12.2 as the first BCTs and FA battalions who are 4-27 FA consists of two batteries of the direct support Field Artillery (FA) fielding WIN-T Inc II during fiscal year eight M109A6 Paladins by the modified battalion for the 2nd Armored Brigade 2013. table of organization and equipment Combat Team (ABCT), of the 1st Ar- The NIE is the final evaluation of (MTOE). We have a Q-36 and Q-37 sec- mored Division. During this exercise, systems identified to fill critical gaps tion, Profiler, two Improved Position the battalion supported a brigade attack identified by the Training and Doctrine and Azimuth Determining Systems (IP- covering 70 kilometers from the line Command (TRADOC) for use by the ADS), and our combat observation and of departure to the objectives. As the force in the near-term. This process is lasing teams (COLT) operate the M1200 2nd ABCT transitioned to a wide area now known as the ‘agile process.’ With system with the Fire Support Sensor security mission, the battalion’s two the expected progression of the objec- System (FS3). To support the NIE mis- M109A6 platoons and two M777A2 pla- tive network to fielding, there may be a sion, B Battery placed its Paladins in toons were spread out over 150 kilome- change in the name of these exercises to low usage and operates six M777A2 ters. Utilizing the Warfighter Informa- the Capabilities Integration Evaluation. howitzers, in two of three platoons. tion Network – Tactical (WIN-T Inc II), For the artillerymen of the Iron Thunder Combined, the brigade’s fire support

42 May - June 2013 • elements employ four different types communications with the battalion of the VWP’s benefits is its immediate of Fire Support Vehicles (FISTV) in or- FDC. In addition to transmitting firing use as a work station while the TCN der to support the brigade’s current test data, the SNE provides SIPR access to is on the move or while establishing mission. These FISTVs are comprised of the platoon. This capability could allow the TOC. Unfortunately however, the M3A3 Bradleys, M1240 MATVs, M1200 the FDC to pull its own meteorological VWP’s connectivity is restricted to its Knights, and a Stryker FSV. data in the event that the Profiler is un- parent TCN and cannot connect to other WIN-T Inc II Platforms. Just as the able to do so. During this NIE, we es- units’ TCN. brigade has various FISTV variants, it tablished communications between all FA Capabilities. During NIE 12.2, also employed several different mobile four platoon FDCs and the battalion at 4-27 FA discovered several advantages WIN-T Inc. II ‘nodes.’ First, there was a distances in excess of 150 kilometers. with the addition of WIN-T Inc II at the tactical communications node (TCN) at However, all satellite communications firing platoons and battalion level FSEs. each battalion headquarters, as well as are subject to degraded performance 1. TOC/TAC control: With the use of the brigade. With its telescoping anten- in poor weather conditions, such as the SNEs and a PoP, the battalion TAC nae, the TCN provided mobile SIPR con- dust storms of Fort Bliss, Texas. While CP has the capability of running AF- nectivity for local subscribers within the this is a beneficial capability it should ATDS via SIPR, as well as utilizing headquarters, as well as an improved not be the only solution as degraded several other Army Battle Command bandwidth in a static configuration weather continues to be an excellent System (ABCS) from anywhere in the with the employment of a satellite tac- time to conduct offensive operations; brigade’s AO. This means that when tical terminal (STT). Each battalion level not being able to provide Fires at these the TAC has control of the battalion’s headquarters had the military all terrain times is unacceptable. operations, there is very little degra- vehicle (MATV) Mounted Vehicle Wire- Battalion and Squadron FSEs. FSEs dation of digital capabilities. less Package (VWP,) which were vir- at the battalion level were provided the 2. Platoon FDCs as an alternate battal- tually tethered to the TCN for connec- VWP mounted on a MATV as a possi- ion command post: As tested during tivity. Select leaders in the brigade and ble WIN-T solution for mid-tier Fires NIE 12.2, if needed, the SNE provides battalion had a Point of Presence (PoP) communications. This solution provid- platoon FDC’s the ability to control vehicle while key mission command ed FSEs with both static and OTM SIPR the battalion’s Fires as a battalion nodes had the Soldier Network Exten- connectivity; however, VWP’s require FDC. This provides the Fires battal- sion (SNE). The VWP, SNE, and PoP are users to operate within close proximity ion another option to consider in al- all currently mounted only on MATVs to the headquarters TCN. The range of ternate CP considerations. or HMMWVs. This limitation is one of this particular system made it difficult 3. RETRANS: With increased use of sat- the top considerations with which FSEs to properly execute digital Fires threads ellite based communications (WIN-T and FA battalions should be concerned. during the evaluation because the capa- Inc II and BFT), there is less of a need Fire Direction. For NIE 12.2, our bilities of the battalion commander’s ve- to employ RETRANS to support line FDCs were augmented by a SNE, which hicle far exceeded the capabilities of the of sight communications. brings the WIN-T network to the troop/ battalion fire support officers (FSO’s). 4. Meteorological (MET): With the ad- battery/company level and below. Cur- For example, the battalion FSO, typically vantages of the Profiler, a battalion’s rently the SNE can be mounted on a positioned near or simultaneously with MET station can be located anywhere MATV or HMMWV; our platoons used the battalion commander, was forced in the operational environment with the MATV version. Unfortunately, nei- to either lose visibility of his AFATDS the TOC or TAC and provide specif- ther vehicle’s physical configuration operator by leaving them at the tactical ic MET for each firing unit location supports FDC operations by itself. operations center (TOC) or to sacrifice (mortars and radars included) as of- Therefore, each platoon FDC requires any digital connectivity by pulling them ten as the mission requires. either a physical cable from the SNE forward with the tactical command post 5. Firing platoon task organization flex- vehicle to the Advanced Field Artil- (TAC CP). As a result, it has become ibility: With connectivity to the bri- lery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) quite clear that for digital firing capa- gade’s WIN-T Inc II network, firing in the M1068 for A Battery, or the Cai- bility to exist the battalion FSEs need a platoons have greater flexibility and man-MRAP for B Battery. This solution mid-tier WIN-T platform comparable to can now support non-standard pla- does not allow for use of the WIN-T on that of a commander or S3. toon missions in a direct support role the move, an expectation for WIN-T in- Addressing this capability gap, 1-35 to maneuver battalions with greater crement 2. Alternatively, to overcome Armored Regiment FSE implemented ease. this issue, an AN/PRC-117G mid-tier a solution by integrating their AFATDS Recommendations - Near Future networking radio using the ANW2 IP operator with the S3 PoP vehicle when (1-2 years). In order to take full advan- based waveform was placed in both deployed forward with battalion TAC tage of WIN-T Inc II’s OTM capability, vehicles with one plugged into the AF- CP. By doing so, the battalion FSO was platoon FDC and battalion FSEs re- ATDS and the other into the SNE. able to effectively control and monitor quire PoPs or a similarly capable device Providing satellite communications digital Fires with the brigade FSE, while mountable on the FDC’s primary vehi- at the platoon FDC level through the use remaining co-located with the battalion cles. In its current configuration, pla- of the SNE, allows the firing platoons to commander. The VWP was not without toon FDC’s radio based work-around increase their range of mobility, without usefulness; it still possesses potential for (between the SNE and the primary FDC concerns of maintaining line-of-sight any battalion TOC if properly used. One vehicle) creates greater risk for connec-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 43 The Soldiers of B Battery, 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment, prepare to fire upon opposing force anti-air weaponry during an air assault artillery raid May 20, at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. The operation, just one of many held during the course of the eight-week Network Integration Evaluation, allows the Soldiers an opportunity to use and provide feedback on current and future network capabilities. (Photo SGT Sean Harriman, U.S. Army) tivity errors, as well as increased laten- node that is designed for air assault op- officer in 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artil- cy in transmissions. Similarly, battalion erations. This would allow a brigade to lery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, level FSE’s benefit very little from their employ its towed howitzers on a ‘deep 1st Armored Division. He is a 2006 grad- VWP equipped MATVs and require a strike’ operation and still maintain its uate of the United States Military Acade- direct link into the WIN-T Inc II network connectivity to digitally control Fires my. Grubbs served as a fire support officer anywhere within a unit’s operational and adjust fire plans.«« for C Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor environment and require a PoP or SNE Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th to fully benefit from the advantages of Major Peter Sittenauer is the executive Infantry Division, in support of Operation WIN-T Inc IIs OTM capability. officer of 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Iraqi Freedom and as the battery commander Future Capabilities (3-5 years). As a Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery composite artillery battalion, we have Armored Division. His previous assign- and A Battery, 4-27 FA. quickly learned the benefits of employ- ments include Field Artillery Captains Ca- ing both M109A6s and M777A2s. The reer Course small group instructor, Joint Captain John Turner is currently serving M109A6s provide rapid maneuver and Readiness Training Center observer/con- as the battery commander for A Battery, 4th firing capability that an armored force troller, commander of B Battery, 1st Bat- Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment, needs, while the M777A2s provide the talion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment, and 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored air mobility that a brigade requires when various positions in 2nd Battalion, 320th Division. He is a 2007 graduate of the Unit- assigned to a large operational environ- Field Artillery Regiment, 101st Airborne ed States Military Academy with a Bache- ment. Similarly, a composite, towed, Division at Fort Campbell, Ky. He has two lor of Science in Electronic and Information or light battalion requires WIN-T Inc II deployments to Iraq and one to Kosovo. He Technology Systems. Turner served as the equipment that is just as agile and flex- holds a Master’s in Administration from company fire support officer for C Company, ible as its weapon systems. As a lesson Central Michigan University, a Master’s of 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 2nd Brigade learned from NIE 12.2, B Battery’s pla- Military Arts and Sciences from the Com- Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (L), toons lost their WIN-T Inc II connectivi- mand and General Staff College, and a Bach- as well as a platoon leader and battery ex- ty when conducting air assault artillery elor of Arts from the University of Kansas. ecutive officer for A Battery, 2nd Battalion, raids. In the future, towed battalions 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 10th Moun- could increase their capabilities with a Captain Joshua Grubbs is currently tain Division in support of Operation Iraqi lightweight man-portable WIN-T Inc II serving as a battalion assistant operations Freedom.

44 May - June 2013 • SSG James Barnes, with the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, provides security during a checkpoint assessment at Afghan Border Police checkpoint in Spin Boldak district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. (Photo by SSG Shane Hamann, U.S. Army) Utilizing Single-Source Intelligence Disciplines in a Fires Brigade S2 By SPC Nicholas J. Hermann

The transformation of corps artillery, division traditional artillery tasks, or how intelligence supports a stan- artillery, and Field Artillery brigades into Fires dard artillery mission. Among the items requiring attention by intelligence professionals is how Fires brigade S2s will brigades is among the most significant struc- exploit single-source intelligence disciplines in future oper- tural changes undertaken by the U.S. Army as ations, primarily to locate potential targets on a battlefield. part of its post-9/11 transformation. Army in- Intelligence professionals, from experienced staff officers telligence and Fires professionals must address to junior enlisted analysts assigned to artillery units, can quickly become dismayed by the absence of a robust supply how intelligence support to artillery operations of organic intelligence collection assets available for task- has changed, as a result of this transformation. ing. This lack of assets often results in S2 personnel feeling The difficulty of this task is compounded by the their mission is less important than missions of other units. fact many Army Field Artillery units have not Though Fires brigades do not enjoy operational control over many collection assets, it is the S2s incumbent responsibility been conducting standard artillery missions, to proactively exploit single-source intelligence disciplines to during their frequent deployments to the Af- satisfy intelligence gaps and information requirements to bet- ghanistan and Iraq theaters of operation over ter support the artillery commander’s mission. Fires brigade the last decade. Consequently, intelligence S2s must capitalize on their time in garrison to plan for utilizing these disciplines on a battlefield and should record their professionals in artillery units, along with plan in the intelligence chapter of their unit’s tactical standard their Redleg counterparts, have not focused on operating procedures. Planning for the use of single-source

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 45 LTC Dean Somers, the senior intelligence adviser assigned to 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Rakkasans, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), calls on an Afghan National Army intelligence officer to answer a question during a class on military intelligence on Camp Parsa, Khowst province, Afghanistan. The class will help enable Afghan National Army intelligence officer’s plan missions and anticipate enemy actions. (Photo by SGT Kimberly Trumbull , U.S. Army) intelligence disciplines on a battlefield is the Fires brigade S2 staff officer is the telligence activities...” Interestingly, the essential for Fires brigade S2s, as these principle authority for CI activities in only Army doctrine addressing CI ac- disciplines assist them in satisfying one the brigade, Fires brigades themselves tivities in artillery units was published of their core tasks, identifying targets. retain no control over any strictly CI as- more than 60 years ago. Field Manual Single-source intelligence disciplines sets, though some CI organizations on 6-130, Field Artillery Intelligence, (dated are used as part of a unit’s intelligence a battlefield may identify targets for the June 1948 and is no longer available) collection plan to fulfill intelligence gaps artillery in the course of their work. This listed CI measures tailored to the needs and information requirements to aid the lack of CI assets does not restrict the S2 of artillery units with the intent of ensur- commander in executing the unit’s mis- from proactively establishing CI mea- ing the integrity of information, person- sion. The primary role of single-source sures for the brigade. Unlike the other nel and physical security, and protect- intelligence is to collect intelligence in- single-source intelligence disciplines, ing artillery positions from detection. formation, while the primary role of all- which collect information on threat The measures listed would be familiar source intelligence is to analyze and dis- forces, the role of CI is to prevent threat to intelligence and Fires professionals seminate the collected information. As intelligence collectors from collecting today and included such cautionary with nearly everything the artillery S2 intelligence information on friendly procedures as ensuring secrecy disci- does, planning for single-source intelli- forces. pline by restricting careless talk, the ef- gence exploitation should be conducted Joint Publication 1-02, Department fective use of cover and concealment by with a targeting mindset. of Defense Dictionary of Military and As- batteries, to mask their positions from Counter-intelligence (CI) might seem sociated Terms, defines CI as, “informa- enemy observation, and properly han- among the less likely single-source dis- tion gathered and activities conducted dling classified materials. ciplines available for Fires brigade S2s to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or Though Fires brigades can use CI on to use. This is mostly correct. While protect against espionage, or other in- the battlefield, S2s can be proactive by

46 May - June 2013 • brainstorming potential CI measures to an interrogation report which pieced to- (assets with full motion video capabili- implement on deployment better safe- gether interrogations and interviews of ties, such as unmanned aerial systems, guarding their unit from threat intel- EPWs, as well as other military and ci- would be much more practical). That ligence collectors. A good practice for vilian personnel, which was used in the does not make GEONT irrelevant to the garrison-based S2s is to develop a list of study of North Korean artillery tactics, targeting process in a Fires brigade. This artillery-specific CI measures for their organization and equipment. discipline’s usefulness is presented in unit, which can be recorded in the in- For modern Fires brigade S2s, devel- its ability to assist in post-firing mission telligence section of their unit’s tactical oping a survey of artillery-specific ques- battle damage assessments and muni- standard operating procedures (TAC- tions for EPWs is one way to proactively tions effectiveness assessments. SOP) or in the execution paragraph of use this discipline. The questionnaire In a Fires brigade, GEOINT assists a template for Appendix 2 (Counterin- can be written in garrison as a tab to Ap- intelligence analysts and geospatial en- telligence) to Annex B (Intelligence), for pendix 4 (Human Intelligence) to Annex gineers in conducting terrain analysis operation plans or orders. Upon deploy- B for OPLANs/OPORDs and refined during planning, aiding them in begin- ment, the S2 should revisit its list to add when the S2’s unit is activated for de- ning to visualize the terrain prior to a de- or detract, as necessary, CI measures ployment. When completed, the S2 can ployment. GEOINT helps identify key applicable to its unit’s mission. Some CI forward the survey to its higher head- terrain features presenting themselves measures may be included in other in- quarters (division or corps) G2X to pass as optimal areas for positioning artillery formation, personnel, or physical secu- along to the appropriate military intel- by friendly or enemy forces, such as re- rity documents, like a security SOP for ligence unit, providing HUMINT col- verse slopes offering range to kill zones, operating in a tactical operations center. lectors at interrogation and internment including those that arise from shifting Human intelligence (HUMINT), facilities on the battlefield. Fires brigade terrain features (particularly in a des- which is derived from information col- S2s should coordinate with their respec- ert environment). Similarly, current lected and provided by human sources, tive division or corps G2X while in gar- GEOINT products depict up-to-date is another single-source discipline many rison to refine this process. civilian infrastructure (e.g., areas which intelligence, and Fires personnel would JP 1-02 describes geospatial intel- are either growing urban zones or sim- suspect as not being highly exploitable ligence (GEOINT), for which the Na- ply within national borders which pre- by a Fires brigade S2. This belief is likely tional Geospatial-Intelligence Agency clude easy travel, such as Iran or Syr- rooted in the fact that, as with CI, Fires is the proponent intelligence organiza- ia). Identifying civilian infrastructure brigades do not retain operational con- tion, as “the exploitation and analysis constructed since mapping occurred trol (OPCON) over any HUMINT col- of imagery and geospatial information can help prevent unexpected collateral lection assets. Artillery S2s may discov- to describe, assess, and visually depict damage and may influence the devel- er some targets on a battlefield through physical features and geographically opment of no-Fires areas. Also during human sources, but there are opportu- referenced activities on the Earth.” The planning, the S2 may identify some en- nities for them to proactively utilize this contemporary use of imagery provided emy defenses and unit locations, partic- discipline as well. by space-based satellites is the latest ex- ularly for artillery batteries. For a Fires For a considerably dated publication, ample of how aerial assets have assist- brigade S2, GEOINT, and its subdisci- FM 6-130 again reveals its usefulness by ed intelligence professionals and their pline imagery intelligence (IMINT), can highlighting the benefit of exploiting commanders in military planning. Pre- be of great assistance when conducting human sources, particularly enemy pris- vious examples included photographs a garrison study of the terrain of a fu- oners of war, as well as local civilians, to taken from reconnaissance aircraft, a ture area of operations, leading to the obtain intelligence information valuable practice going back to at least World development of a modified combined to the artillery mission. The FM advises War I, and similar operations conduct- obstacle overlay clearly depicting possi- artillery S2s to provide HUMINT col- ed by balloon in the American Civil War ble position areas for artillery and other lectors with a list of artillery-specific and Spanish-American War. GEOINT brigade assets (radars, TOC, etc.). questions to ask enemy prisoners of war thus has a history of being valuable to During operations, GEOINT assists (EPWs) and provides examples in an artillery intelligence personnel, and that the S2 in identifying enemy unit loca- appendix. Specific questions are written usefulness has only been enhanced with tions, possibly revealing the locations to ask enemy military personnel both in the passage of time. of some high-value or high-payoff tar- and out of the artillery branch. For in- While GEOINT can support target- gets. By exploiting imagery, the S2 may stance, an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) ing, this would likely occur at a higher ascertain enemy artillery movement not assigned to an artillery unit, might echelon than a Fires brigade, such as the patterns, what artillery equipment is be asked a question such as, “Were there combatant command level, and would being employed, and the strength of any guns in the area where you were support missions like the one target- threat batteries. Also during operations, captured?” Enemy artillery personnel ing Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. if applicable, the S2 should be able to might be asked more specific questions This discipline is actually employed in determine the effectiveness of friendly of artillery activities, such as, “Does your target vetting processes at the nation- batteries’ attempts to achieve cover and battery conduct counter-fire missions?” al and theater levels. GEOINT may concealment by exploiting terrain fea- Here is an example of how HUMINT not be suitable to support targeting in tures to mask themselves from enemy has directly supported artillery: in 1951, Fires brigades due to the rapidity with observation. Additionally, unclassified the U.S. Far East Command published which missions will likely be conducted imagery can help orient EPWs or civil-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 47 ians unfamiliar with map reading or teams and other trends in threat indi- various nations will fight. OSINT can military symbology when interrogated rect fire (IDF) team activity. While the provide insight into how each nation or interviewed for information. S2 is responsible for producing the tar- will tailor Russian doctrine to its needs. Being perhaps the most obscure of get acquisition tab and associated radar Despite OSINT’s usefulness in garrison, the single-source intelligence disci- deployment orders for the Fires annex S2s may not have much time to consult plines to many intelligence and Fires (Annex D), the projected use of these this resource on deployment since they personnel, it has likely been overlooked radars should also be highlighted in the may be instead occupied with receiving that measurement and signature intelli- Fires brigade’s reconnaissance and sur- and analyzing intelligence information gence (MASINT) is the most used, and veillance (R&S) plan. through more traditional reporting among the most valuable, single-source Army intelligence professionals are channels, such as spot reports. intelligence disciplines in Army artillery responsible for maintaining their sit- The popular discipline of signals in- units. MASINT is intelligence obtained uational awareness of overseas events telligence (SIGINT), defined as “intel- by quantitative and qualitative analysis relating to their threat area of study (ar- ligence derived from communications, of data derived from specific technical tillery for analysts in artillery units, air electronic, and foreign instrumentation sensors, and is a highly exploitable dis- defense for analysts in aviation units, signals,” has a long tradition of support- cipline whose use goes back to World etc.). Open source intelligence (OSINT) War I. is among the most valuable disciplines As a junior officer in the British available for meeting this requirement. Army, William Lawrence Bragg, who OSINT, which is “information of poten- won the Nobel Prize for physics with tial intelligence value that is available to his father in 1915, was a leading scien- the general public,” and is widely and tific mind in developing techniques to readily available for artillery S2s to use locate enemy artillery batteries on the in garrison. Despite the consistently battlefield. Bragg’s procedure consisted highlighted value of OSINT in our re- of recording the sound of firing artillery cent engagements in Afghanistan and with a series of emplaced microphones, Iraq, this discipline remains a disturb- a method known as sound-ranging. ingly under-utilized resource by Army Bragg was approached by superior of- intelligence professionals, especially ficers in the summer of 1915, to advance those assigned to brigade and battalion sound-ranging methods already start- S2s, who do not easily see the asset’s ed by the French. He and his team en- value. joyed their first success in November For artillery intelligence personnel, 1915. His method was also employed OSINT presents its value by reporting by the British to provide more accu- on such items as, which overseas na- rate counter-fire. As with single-source tions are acquiring new artillery sys- intelligence disciplines today, it was at tems and advancing artillery-related that time desirable to confirm these sci- technologies. OSINT can potentially re- entific results with other reconnaissance veal enemy artillery tactics, techniques and surveillance methods, such as aerial and procedures. The best example of photography or forward observers. this is the ongoing situation in Syria, Today, the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/ where the Syrian army’s artillery as- TPQ-37 Firesfinder radars fall under sets have played a central role in the the MASINT-radar umbrella. These ra- conflict. In one open source report, sea- dars, essentially being the only intelli- soned journalist Robert Young Pelton gence collection assets organic to Fires revealed Syria’s apparent employment brigades, are particularly useful on the of electronic warfare assets to locate tar- battlefield where they detect projectiles gets (usually civilians and journalists) launched from enemy indirect Fires in cities for their artillery. Syria likely systems and adjust friendly Fires to learned this tactic from its Russian advi- direct counter-battery missions. For in- sors who have employed similar tactics telligence analysts, data retrieved from against Chechynan rebels in the North these radars greatly assists in predictive Caucasus since the 1990s. analysis to determine the position ar- S2s should monitor OSINT reporting eas and movements of enemy artillery for such information since, while the units. The use of these radars is not lim- fighting styles of many potential threat ited to a linear battlefield. On a non-lin- nations have been influenced by the ear battlefield, like the ones experienced military doctrine of the former Soviet by the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Union (which has also formed the ba- Iraq, the radars assist analysts in pre- sis for the U.S. Army’s OPFOR guides), dicting movements of enemy mortar that doctrine does not dictate how those

48 May - June 2013 • ing targeting of enemy artillery systems my artillery to support counter-fire op- operations in hybrid threat conflicts. going back to World War I. In that war, erations. Since that war, SIGINT meth- Used properly, SIGINT, for which the U.S. Army LTC Frank Moorman led a ods, such as traffic analysis, have been National Security Agency is the propo- group which developed traffic analysis invaluable in revealing the movement nent national intelligence organization, techniques to locate German army radio of artillery units and piecing together can be an invaluable asset for targeting. stations and reconnaissance aircraft sup- the order of battle of enemy artillery or- Technical intelligence (TECHINT), porting artillery units. The information ganizations. The SIGINT sub-discipline “intelligence derived from the collec- provided by Moorman’s group assisted electronic intelligence (ELINT) may also tion, processing, analysis, and exploita- U.S. and French troops in finding ene- be used to hinder enemy counterbattery tion of data and information pertaining

Leaders of the newly organized Intelligence Academy, CPT David Miller (left), analysis control element chief, and SFC Brian Gardner, senior intelligence sergeant, both with the 7th Infantry Division, demonstrate a few teaching methods they use while giving a class. The Intelligence Academy was developed in an effort to standardize intelligence training and introduce incoming Soldiers to the Pacific Command area of responsibility. (Photo by Austin Owen, U.S. Army)

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 49 R&S synchronization, and writing artillery-focused intelligence estimates. These subjects could be addressed in the upcoming or future version of Army Training Publication 3-09.24, Techniques for the Fires Brigade. It would also be beneficial for the Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., to develop new doctrine addressing intelligence support to warfighting functions other than maneuver. Concerning targeting, the Army artillery branches are doctrinally well-equipped to readdress how intelligence supports targeting in artillery units. Refocusing on operations on a linear battlefield will help rebuild the connection between the artillery and intelligence branches. Meanwhile, Fires brigade S2s should develop plans for the utilization of all single-source intelligence disciplines to better support their unit’s mission.««

Editor’s Note: This article is part of the author’s attempt to revitalize the study of artillery intelligence practices, given the need for this topic to be updated, in light of the transformation of the U.S. Army Field SFC Nathaniel Young (right), a military intelligence mentor with the 109th Military Artillery branch and the withdrawal of U.S. Intelligence Company, 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Combined Joint Task troops from Iraq. More information on ‘ar- Force - 1, explains how to conduct low-level voice interception to Afghan National tillerized’ intelligence products and process- Army soldiers from the 2nd Military Intelligence Company, 203rd Thunder Corps, at es can be found on the Intellipedia-U page Paktia province, Afghanistan. (Photo by SGT Aaron Ricca, U.S. Army) Intelligence Support to Fires Operations at http://go.usa.gov/TjZC. to foreign equipment and material…,” to monitor brigade support area securi- is another single-source discipline avail- ty and will not serve in an intelligence Specialist Nicholas Jack Herrmann is an able to Fires brigade S2s, but while its collection role aside from observing intelligence analyst in the 115th Fires Bri- usefulness is usually highlighted as any rear area threat activity. Anoth- gade, Wyoming U.S. Army National Guard. being limited to the battlefield, it of- er opportunity for Fires brigade S2s to He is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom fers much to garrison-stationed units monitor possible threat activity in rear with more than five years experience as a as well. TECHINT is useful to the artil- areas is ensuring brigade support bat- U.S. Army intelligence analyst. During the lery S2 as it provides such information talion (BSB) convoys are effectively de- 115th Fires Brigade’s 2012 Annual Train- as the capabilities, limitations, and vul- briefed by the BSB S2. This practice is ing exercise, he served as the acting brigade nerabilities of threat IDF systems. Many applicable to operations conducted on S2 intelligence staff officer and recognized artillery systems employed by countries linear and non-linear battlefields. On a the need to address the topics covered by this posing a potential threat to the U.S. are linear battlefield, Soldiers in firing bat- article. More information on his intelligence of Russian lineage, and unclassified teries should report suspect activities background can be found on his Intellipe- TECHINT information is readily avail- witnessed in the vicinity of their posi- dia-U user page at https://www.intelink. able on these systems. For Army intelli- tion areas to their battalion S2. Brigade gov/wiki/User:Nicholas.j.herrmann. gence and Fires personnel, the Training and battalion S2s should develop SOPs and Doctrine Command G2-produced, for these ‘every Soldier a sensor’ related Author’s Note: I’d like to thank COL Worldwide Equipment Guide, which is activities while in garrison. (Ret) John R. Kreye, former commander, the most suitable resource for the study How Fires brigade S2s will utilize 34th Infantry Division Artillery, 2LT John of threat artillery equipment. single-source intelligence disciplines in C. Farris, military intelligence Basic Officer The Q-36/-37 radars are currently the future is one of several issues con- Leadership Course trainee, CW3 Brian H. the only organic intelligence collection cerning artillery intelligence practices Harris, North Central Army Reserve Intel- assets in Fires brigades. It is possible that must be addressed by the Army; ligence Support Center training officer, and they may receive the Raven Unmanned other items include ‘artillerizing’ the CW2 Chris M. Peterson, 115th Fires Bri- Aircraft System (UAS) in the future; military decision making process, in- gade S2 targeting officer, for aiding me in however, this system may only be used telligence preparation of the battlefield, ensuring this article’s accuracy.

50 May - June 2013 • World Dynamics are Changing: Everything is Either Growing or Dying – Nothing Stays the Same By CSM Dennis J. Woods

World dynamics are changing, in fact, they are always changing. It is this artilleryman’s opinion though that, as a combat arms branch we have not kept pace with that change; in fact many of us long for a grand and glorious massed fire past. A past based on maneuver warfare and mass killing that no longer applies to today’s counterinsurgency fight. Make no mistake though; high intensity maneuver warfare has its place in the kick-off game or invasion. However, as most future world population growth will be in urban areas, insurgency warfare among the populace is here to stay. In order to remain relevant as a combat arms branch we must adapt to meet this change head on. At one point in time, we, as a career field, were innovators. Over time we became caretak- ers, and may eventually become undertakers. If we as a combat arms branch continue to cling to a grand and glorious mass fire past, we will unquestionably atrophy and die. (Illustration courtesy of CSM Dennis J. Woods) In order to develop the emotional energy required for change, one needs only to follow the peace on urban terrain through the application of accurate example set forth by God in nature. In nature scalable destruction, which others may then turn into a pos- everything is either growing or dying, nothing itive peace. Our current tool set developed for open warfare does not lend itself well to the current fight on restricted ter- stays exactly the same, nor should the Field Ar- rain. tillery. In order to address this need for change, Suggestions for an Interim Tool Set: I propose the branch develops not only preci- 1. Employ the low-cost indirect training round (LITR), commonly referred to as the SMERF bullet due to its blue col- sion strike artillery munitions, but munitions or, as a less lethal method of adjusting fire on restricted that tailor the amount of force applied. terrain. If you’re going to take the time to fire large- 2. Base the ‘no fire exclusion areas’ on actual range and prob- bore weapons at someone, they should die. able error as opposed to a one size fits all methodology. No-fire exclusion areas eventually become part of the en- However, we should also be able to tailor the emy’s avoidance strategy. As range and probable error amount of force delivered to meet current changes with distance and types of fire, enemy forces will needs. experience difficulty determining our exclusionary ‘no-fire areas.’ Viewing artillery systems and their various 3. Reduce the range and probable error factor with the ad- munitions as a tool set, it is a fair assessment to dition of precision guidance kits for ballistically matched state that we have the tools for maneuver war- training and high explosive rounds. fare’s mass killing, tools that allow us to crush Suggestions for Near-Term Development: 1. Develop less lethal artillery munitions to capture the ‘holy all who would oppose us. What we lack are grail of fire support,’ long-range, low-cost, near-precision the tools that will allow us to create a negative to precision accuracy, with tailored effects that range from

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 51 Soldiers assigned to B Battery, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, fire a round from an M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzer during the direct fire portion of Table VI team qualifica- tions at Udairi Range in Camp Buehring, Kuwait. (Photo by SPC Andrew Ingram, U.S. Army)

death-dealing force, to what might artillery round. The M107 is a NATO is no change in operations. For the fire equal an artillery-launched hand gre- standard artillery round and is the most direction officer or noncommissioned nade. widely used of all 155 mm rounds. The officer (NCO), it represents a mental 2. Take action now to address the above M804A1 is a ballistic match for the M107 shift to ‘just do it.’ The forward observer needs, reducing the cost of a typical that is internally and externally similar is the only one in the fire support loop fire mission and expediting use of in every aspect with the exception of who needs to be alert for the smaller re- less lethal training munitions in com- effects on target. It stores, transports, port of an M804A1, as compared to that bat. loads, fires and flies to the target exact- of an HE M107. In Afghanistan, on dry Why the SMERF Round? The ly like its live high explosive twin, the rocky terrain under ideal conditions, the M804A1 LITR round, aka, SMERF, is a M107. For the average logistician, gun observed visual differences between the cast iron replica of the HE M107 155 mm crew, and fire direction operator there two impacts are barely discernible.

52 May - June 2013 • ality by avoiding unnecessary civilian death. In this current war, when fighting on restricted terrain among local citizens, our actions to avoid intentional damage is the moral lever against which history will judge us. Secondly, reducing collateral damage reduces the cost of a long war, enabling leaders to distribute limited resources elsewhere. Third, as a combat arms branch we are viewed internally and externally as a mass killing area fire weapon. If this image persists we will most certainly be reduced in future budgets. As a branch we must become applicable across the entire range of conflict. This breadth of utility across all spectrums of conflict as artillerymen must also be heavily ad- vertised. If future budget cuts are too extensive, we may not be available for the next invasion, where massed Fires could be a requirement. In this war, we have done everyone else’s job, but no one has done ours. No Soldier from another career field has been given an operator’s manual and a howitzer, and then informed that they had to certify in 14 days or be fired. As a combat arms branch in this current conflict, we have been quite successful at everyone else’s job. The price of our success at other endeavors, coupled with our lack of adaptation to the current fight, may be our undoing during the next drawdown. World dynamics are changing, as they always have. Adapt, or fade into irrelevance.««

Command Sergeant Major Dennis J. Woods is the CSM for 191 Infantry Brigade, First Army, SFAT Team 7, Afghanistan. Note: The aforementioned also applies to fire mission, and then switched out for Some of his previous deployments include: the more accurate (HE) M795 and M1122 the HE M107 in the fire-for-effect phase. Grenada, 1983, 82nd Airborne Division; less lethal training round. These rounds also Whether one is firing in a training Desert Shield/Storm, 1990-91, 82nd Air- feature a smaller probable error, but keep in mission or in support of troops in con- borne Division; Hurricane Andrew, 1992, 82nd Airborne Division; Operation Desert mind that initial runs of the M1122 are de- tact, the effects are the same. The target Fox, 1998, 5th Group Support; Operation milled steel M795 HE rounds, and will be is neutralized, suppressed or destroyed, using less actual high explosives, all Enduring Freedom, 2002, 82nd Airborne recoverable as opposed to the less survivable while lowering cost, and unnecessary Division; Operation Iraqi Freedom I, 2003- iron version of the M804A1. environmental contamination. NOTE: 04, 1st Armor Division; Operation Iraqi How the SMERF is Employed in When lethal and less lethal munitions of Freedom VI extension into the Iraq surge, Combat Today. In the current conflict, differing weight zones are employed, a 2006-07, 1st Armor Division; Operation incidents of civilian death and unnec- data inference is required between the Enduring Freedom X into the Afghan essary collateral damage have occurred adjust fire and fire-for-effect phases. surge, 2009-10, 173rd Airborne; Operation due to the effects of artillery fire. In order What We Gain By Reducing Collat- Enduring Freedom XII, 2012-13. Woods to avoid this, less lethal M804A1 rounds eral Damage. First, we sustain our core has a Masters Degree from North Central are used in the adjustment phase of a principles that support U.S. exception- Arizona.

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 53 CPT Andrew Jenkins, commander of B Troop, 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Air- borne Division (Air Assault), and 1LT Joseph Anglin, the fire support officer for B Troop, take cover and observe an explosion in the Shamul district in Khost province, Afghanistan. (Photo by SPC Brian Smith-Dutton, U.S. Army) Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency: Decisive Victory in Afghanistan Through Targeting and Non-Lethal Operations By CPT Richard M. Ingleby

In 1981, COL Harry G. Summers published, the result of failing to appreciate basic military theory and strategy laid out by 18th century author Carl von Clausewitz. “On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context,” a Specifically, the failure to properly identify and focus all ef- U.S. Army War College study designed to study forts toward what Clausewitz termed an enemy’s center of the strategic lessons learned from the (then) gravity. The result, Summers claimed, was “the exhaustion of the [U.S.] Army against a secondary guerrilla force and the less than a decade-old Vietnam conflict. Sum- ultimate failure of military strategy to support the national mers broke from many of the contemporary policy of containment of communist expansion [in Vietnam].” arguments, many that still subsist in strategic On the 11th anniversary of the conflict, the Army is making the same error in Afghanistan today. and academic environments today, and argued In “On War,” Clausewitz stated, “a certain centre of grav- that American failure in Vietnam was directly ity, a centre of power and movement, will form itself, on

54 May - June 2013 • SPC Christopher Pearsall, a cannon crew member, with B Battery, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, uses a 50-foot lanyard to fire the first round from an M109A6 Paladin, during Table VI Certifications at Udairi Range in Camp Buehring, Kuwait. (Photo by SPC Andrew Ingram, U.S. Army) which everything depends; and against I was deployed as part of the ‘surge’ in fectively brought to bear on the enemy this centre of gravity of the enemy, the support of Operation Enduring Free- during engagements, the country of Af- concentrated blow of all the forces must dom VII to Forward Operating Base ghanistan had not changed much since be directed.” As a graduate student in (FOB) Blessing in the border region of the first time I stepped foot in theater Norwich University’s military histo- N2KL, Regional Command (RC)-East years before. ry Master’s program, we had studied in Northeast Afghanistan. Isolated and Looking to change this mold, I be- Clausewitz in depth several semesters firing complex combat missions in sup- gan to ask myself, “What is the center before and this most prescient, yet un- port of troops in contact several times of gravity for this area of operations derstudied passage repeatedly came to a day throughout the majority of the (AO)? What do these people want? mind as I worked as a targeting officer deployment, my platoon became ex- What makes them really tick?” Over the and assistant S3 in Afghanistan. Below is perts in our trade and were able to see course of several weeks I began to ana- a short synopsis of how my group went firsthand the life and death impact that lyze the area along these lines. The fur- through the targeting process, effective- the effective use of artillery Fires could ther I studied these questions I realized ly applying Clausewitz’s axiom along make on the battlefield. An artilleryman that, like any American at home, what the way. My hope here is that it will could not have had a more rewarding the people really desired was a roof over serve to improve the focus and effort of and choice deployment. their head, some food on the table and current and future leaders in Afghani- After completing the Field Artillery an opportunity for their children. Not stan toward non-lethal operations, and Captains Career Course, 10 months lat- massive amounts of riches and wealth possibly serve as a model in improving er in June 2009, I was back in N2KL at (although I am sure none would have our performance therein. Failure to un- FOB Kalagush with 2nd Battalion, 77th turned it down), but financial stability derstand the principles laid out in this Field Artillery, 4th Brigade Combat enough to provide for opportunity in article and adjust our mindsets accord- Team, 4th Infantry Division. Only a few the future. The center of gravity in AO ingly may have grave consequences for FOBs away from where I was deployed Steel therefore, was economic, and the our Army, and our nation. In light of previously, this time I found myself local economy was agricultural. I knew 9-11, such a failure is unacceptable. working as a plans officer and assistant exactly where we needed to target. Assigned to B Battery, 4th Battalion, S3 in charge of our battalion’s targeting One of the other issues I had noticed 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regi- operations in our area of operations. was how it seemed that the majori- ment, and attached to 2nd Battalion, After a few months of the familiar op- ty of non-lethal operations conducted 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, erations as before, it began to dawn on in Eastern Afghanistan were quick, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, me that no matter how much fire we ef- short-term projects that did not require

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 55 pro-coalition support once the funds cultural development team (ADT) in the our non-lethal targets. In short, their as- had been disseminated or the project neighboring province. They brought us sistance was invaluable. completed. For example, the construc- in and showed us their local operations We brought the ADT up for several tion of a water pump, sports complex or and capabilities, then gave recommen- days and conducted multiple recon- even hiring temporary labor to clean up dations on how we should proceed in naissance patrols through the area to a certain area were common operations. our area. determine lines of effort for our future Recipients of such projects could easily The process that I am about to de- economic development initiative, now put on a smile for a picture, shake some scribe took months, but our first step in termed ‘long-term economic projects’ hands, then turn and do the same to an- building a strong and self-supporting (LTEP). We traveled throughout the ti-Afghan forces or criminals the second agriculturally-based economy from al- area observing agriculture and horticul- we left their village. Even the insurgents most non-existence was to hire through ture and spoke with many of the farm- themselves could sometimes benefit the United States Department of Agri- ers regarding their practices and diffi- from these projects. Bottom line, sacred culture, several permanent, bi-lingual, culties. Through this process we found tax dollars were being thrown at quick and most importantly, trustworthy several key locations that showed some projects that had no lasting impact on agricultural ‘interns’ from the Kabul potential promise for future targeted area stability the second they were com- University agricultural program. These operations. pleted. Our non-lethal efforts needed to gentlemen were educated and under- Most importantly, we visited the lo- be long-term, projects that required con- stood the culture and agricultural envi- cal market in the area and conducted a tinued coalition involvement and there- ronment far better than we could, and market analysis. After conversing and fore required solely unilateral support. advised us accordingly. They also could inquiring with many of the vendors, we Fortunately my battalion S3, MAJ Bil- travel without escort, and therefore discovered that of the handful of fruits ly Siekman, and battalion commander, could inspect our projects at will, gath- and vegetables sold there, only one then LTC Michael Forsyth, were sup- ering vital intelligence that would have crop was grown locally, cauliflower. All portive and began to increasingly direct been impossible to gain ourselves. It other produce sold was imported from battalion focus toward this developing also gave an Afghan face to our efforts, Pakistan and sold at a rate significantly effort. Our first step was to reach out legitimizing the Afghan government in higher. and make contact with the closest agri- the eyes of the populace as we executed This finding proved decisive in shap-

Artillerymen of B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Di- vision conduct a fire mission at Normandy Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, N.C., during a live-fire exercise. The exercise, which was the conclusion of an airborne operation, tested the readiness of the Black Falcons to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. (SGT Joseph Guenther, U.S. Army)

56 May - June 2013 • ing our lines of effort. In our discussions parative sense for Afghanistan), and nam, not the United States that emerged afterward, we realized that if we could the only village we found that actually victorious.” get farmers to grow these same import- corralled their animals. The village was Summers goes on to cite commentary ed crops locally, prices in the market in another key area and was one of our from Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, the ed- would drop significantly, putting more more pro-coalition villages. However, itor of the British military journal of the money into the pockets of the area pop- in order to start, we found that we need- Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), ulace. This additional money circulat- ed to find local farmers to convert their wherein he argued against the prevail- ing would in return generate increased annual crop growth to growing special- ing belief that the Vietnam War had sales for the vendors. All around, being ized feed for dairy cows. Once done, never been a “winnable” conflict in the able to grow crops in demand locally we planned to purchase quality dairy first place. "All this...would have been would stimulate the economy for the cows (not the ‘all-purpose’ cows roam- avoided," he stated, "by adopting the long-term. We realized that this was the ing freely throughout most if not all of classical principles of war by cutting off exact line of effort that we needed to tar- Afghanistan) and eventually equipment the trouble at the root... If this was not get to effectively engage our area’s true for the processing and production of politically realistic, then the war should center of gravity. dairy products. This naturally would be not have been fought at all." With this target now in mind, we a significant boost to the local economy, Both Summers and Bidwell believed then picked out strategically located even expanding the economy to now al- that the North Vietnamese center of villages that we wanted to target, and low for exports. gravity was North Vietnam itself. He with our interns found approximately At this point I was reassigned to bat- argued that military action in the coun- 20 farmers from those areas that were tery command for the final few months try, specifically its invasion and occu- competent and trustworthy. We invited of our deployment. I was able to return pation, would have rapidly caused the them to a two-day agriculture and hor- once and see the results of the green- pro-communist government to com- ticulture seminar that we put togeth- houses and farmer training, and they pletely collapse and its support-base er on our FOB. The ADT sent several were producing crops never before to disintegrate. Undoubtedly such a representatives out and assisted with produced in the area, and abundantly. course of action would have at a min- our seminar, wherein we conducted More importantly, the areas we invest- imum severely disrupted the North hands-on instruction with these farm- ed in were significantly more stable for Vietnamese, buying time to stabilize its ers in areas such as proper fertilization, at least the time remaining on the de- counterpart to the south. In retrospect, seed placement, and crop cycling, along ployment. Whether or not our replace- such actions may have had a better re- with instruction on animal care, nutri- ments finished the dairy or sustained sult than what actually occurred. In the tion and vaccination. This training was our LTEP plans is unknown; however, end however, politicians and military also designed to assist us in identifying for the time being, there was perma- leaders were unwilling to clearly identi- and selecting farmers we felt were com- nent, measurable and most importantly, fy and target the North Vietnamese cen- petent and trustworthy enough to work effective progress made in our area of ter of gravity. Conversely, and to their with on the projects we were planning operations. ultimate success, the North Vietnamese in the future. The intent with the above narrative did not make the same mistake in iden- Upon ‘graduation’ from our course, was not to give a recount of a personal tifying and targeting ours. As a result, we selected two farmers who lived in story, however. It was given to describe the United States withdrew in defeat, our two largest population centers, an example of a targeting process from and notably its first major counter-in- near and along the main road that led the ground up: a from-scratch step ac- surgency conflict. into the area market, and negotiated tion drill on how to effectively identify a Fortunately for Summers, he had the a deal to assist in growing the above center of gravity, and then fully engage benefit of writing in retrospect, years mentioned crops locally. Working with it. Herein lies a significant issue with after the conflict had concluded. We do village elders, we offered to build each current military doctrine, thinking and not have the same prerogative in Af- of these farmers a large, quality-built operations in regards to our conflict in ghanistan today; another failure in the and therefore permanent, greenhouse Afghanistan today, and is one of the still-recent wake of Vietnam will have and watering system. We further prom- primary reasons that after 11 years of a significantly detrimental effect on the ised to assist initially with fertilizer and conflict, we are still struggling to make Army and this nation. Yet both of these seeds. In exchange, we required a writ- headway, both with the population and conflicts are remarkably similar, espe- ten security promise and to allow our against the insurgency. cially in regard to our failure to identify interns to come and inspect their crop In “On Strategy,” Summers states: and decisively engage our opponent’s growth, and to conduct further agri- “One of the most frustrating aspects of center of gravity. Current military strat- cultural training on-site in the future. the Vietnam War from the Army's point egists and leaders, therefore should Naturally, both the village elders and of view is that as far as logistics and tac- comparatively study the example of the farmers were more than willing to tics were concerned, we succeeded in Vietnam, then unemotionally analyze accept these terms. everything we set out to do… In engage- our performance in this war, especially Our next, and in my case final, ini- ment after engagement the forces of the our most recent performance. tiative was to build a dairy. During our Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese As Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsur- patrols, we found a village that had Army were thrown back with terrible gency, states, “The stability a nation en- somewhat healthy livestock (in a com- losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Viet- joys is often related to its people’s eco-

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 57 Soldiers assigned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment prepare for a fire mission with an M777A2 towed 155 mm howitzer during the regiment’s mission rehearsal exercise at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, in Grafenwoehr, Germany, on March 12, 2013. The rehearsal exercises develop combat skills, counterinsurgency tactics and interoperability between military forces of the U.S. and its partner nations before a scheduled deployment. (Photo by Gertrud Zach, U.S. Army) nomic situation.” This is absolutely the even today, for most combat-arms lead- where we find ourselves in the current case in Afghanistan. If we are then to en- ers this is a go-ahead ticket to continue conflict today, and we simply cannot gage this true center of gravity a prop- to allocate a significant amount of focus win this conflict following this line of er balance in focus and effort between on more appealing combat and civil se- operations. lethal and non-lethal operations in ef- curity operations. Naturally, they will As Summers argued with Vietnam, fective counterinsurgency operations argue, and to a degree correctly, if a the more we focus on security operations should lie somewhere around a 20 to 80 population cannot be protected from in- or anything else that distracts from what percent ratio respectively, area depen- surgent violence, no other line of effort should be our main effort, the more we dant. Using this as a guide, we should should be overly pursued in an area. are not fully focusing and targeting the then ask ourselves, has 80 percent of all Although such logic is to a degree true, enemy and the local populace’s center of focus and effort actually been given to “The military forces that successfully gravity, and we are therefore acting in- non-lethal operations, particularly in re- defeat insurgencies,” the FM 3-24 states decisively. As a result, the conflict then gard to area economic stability, during “are usually those able to overcome becomes more protracted, which in turn the course of a deployment? Upon leav- their institutional inclination to wage begins to conversely attack our center of ing a battle-space, do physical improve- conventional war against insurgents.” gravity and success is put in jeopardy as ments on the ground in agriculture and Leaders must recognize that effec- a result. Again, ‘the dangers,’ as Thom- other areas of economic security reflect tively securing the populace will most as Hammes argues in The Sling and the such an 80 percent effort? Most likely likely never be achieved. Pursuing such Stone: On War in the 21st Century, “lay in they do not. security is a slippery slope and plays ex- our thinking in conventional terms and Naturally, counterinsurgency (COIN) actly into what the insurgents desire: to seeking to dominate that battlefield at has many lines of effort (five according extend the war long enough to wear out the expense of being prepared to fight to the FM 3-24), requiring balanced at- the resolve of the American populace; on other fields,” or lines of effort. tention in other areas. But in all honesty, our center of gravity. This is exactly Assuming risk to security is not easy

58 May - June 2013 • The six-man gun team of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division demonstrate the actions involved with receiving and executing a fire mission, March 26, as part of SMA Raymond F. Chandler III's visit to Forward Operating Base Frontenac, Afghanistan. Chandler visited with Soldiers and leaders to gauge the effectiveness of the Army during the retrograde process. (SGT Uriah Walker, U.S. Army) to do. Having the personal responsibil- civil security in operations conducted a necessary line of effort. However, the ity for U.S. Soldiers as a commander in in Afghanistan, still. And the effects on intent behind this strategy undercuts its a combat environment is extremely dif- the ground are proof. In more than a de- strategic logic: to allow the Afghans to ficult. To assume risk on American sub- cade, nowhere near an 80 percent worth eventually carry the majority of the bur- ordinates that we know and live with of effort in economic development has den of their own self defense in order to in order to focus the majority of effort been achieved. We have failed to ag- allow the U.S. to transition out. against the enemy’s center of gravity, is gressively target and decisively attack Our true intent is written clearly in an extremely difficult decision to make. the enemy’s center of gravity. We have the vision statement: not to successful- However, as FM 3-24 states, “Soldiers failed to adjust our mindset, to what ly and decisively defeat the insurgency, and Marines may also have to accept Summer’s says, “overcome [our] insti- but to withdraw from the battlefield. more risk to maintain involvement with tutional inclination to wage convention- Afghan self-security is undoubtedly a the people.” Like wars in the past, effec- al war.” It is no wonder, therefore, on necessary action. However, much like tive military leaders must see the big- the 11th anniversary of the outset of this the ‘Vietnamization’ policy of the ear- ger picture and accept risk in order to conflict, we are still struggling to find ly 1970s, action along this line of effort accomplish their over-arching mission success. does not constrain or destroy the insur- successfully: to stay focused on deci- Although the focus in effort has gency; the insurgency will still be there sively attacking the enemy’s center of evolved somewhat in recent years, the – if not strengthened – at the end of the gravity. Higher echelons should like- priorities in RC-East still reflect an in- day. And more importantly, the still not wise recognize this need and fully sup- clination toward security operations. won-over populace will likely not have port and shield subordinates in their Currently, as with the majority of oper- the will to resist. Security in Afghani- subsequent decision to do so. ations in theater, the focus is empower- stan, therefore, will not be sustainable, The truth of the matter is there is ment and transition to the Afghan mil- and we will have failed. dominance in focus toward combat and itary. Let me be clear, this is naturally Recently, Foreign Policy, a political

sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ • Fires Professional 59 60 May - June 2013 • and economic journal, published an of the mark: it does not target the ene- us at identifying the most decisive tar- online article by Gordon Lubold de- my’s center of gravity. It therefore does get on the battlefield, then engaging and tailing an interview with the current not attempt to successfully defeat the exploiting it. the International Security Assistance insurgency, and it does not attempt to The artillery is undoubtedly still the Force (ISAF) commander, USMC Gen. decisively win the war. Like the strategy King of Battle, even in the ever-evolv- John Allen, titled, “Are We Winning in of ‘Vietnamization’ in the early 1970s, ing warfare faced at present, including Afghanistan?” Most of the interview we are surrendering complete victory particularly the counterinsurgency con- focuses on gains in Afghan military so we can withdraw. These are not the transition; however, it devotes a signif- results we as an Army should see as ac- flict that requires an emphasis on the icant portion to commentary regarding ceptable. We should of course continue non-lethal that we have been called on recent local uprisings against insurgents to significantly develop and empower to face today. We artillerymen have had in places like Andar, Wardek and Cam- the Afghan military. But that is just one a sacred trust and special responsibility desh. After discussing the need for the critical line of effort. What we must do placed upon our shoulders by our na- Afghan government and military to is show strength in the face of adver- tion to salvage this struggling conflict take the lead on supporting these up- sity and focus primarily on decisively and turn it into a real victory. This re- risings, Allen shows he understands the attacking the enemy’s center of gravity sponsibility of saving lives and deci- need for more-critical, non-lethal opera- with as much time as we have left and sively shaping battlefields is one that we tions in conjunction to exploit the gains. defeat this insurgency completely. are used to; it is one at which we have [The Afghan government] has to be Make no mistake about it, this war sensitive to why [these uprisings] start- is still winnable. Much more difficult always excelled, time and again in our ed and how conceivably [they] can help counterinsurgency conflicts have been history. We can do it again in Afghani- the people. They ought to want to help successfully won, and won decisively. stan today.«« the people. And how they might help Decisive warfare requires attacking the the people is going to be different in center of gravity with maximum effort. Captain Richard Ingleby was commis- each place. It could be about local em- This is essential if we are to succeed in sioned from the University of Utah ROTC ployment. It could be about a school. It this conflict or in any COIN conflict in with a BA in History in 2006. He earned could be about a clinic. It could be about the future. Our enemy’s center of grav- a MA in Military History from Norwich fresh water. Just a little bit of help gives ity is the populace. As soon as the local the people in that village, or cluster of populace decides it is worthwhile to University in 2011. He has served as a fire villages, a choice for the first time, be- cut the insurgents off completely, this direction officer for B Battery, 4th Battalion, cause right now their only choice is conflict will be over; for both us and the 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, fighting the Taliban or being repressed Afghans. The center of gravity for the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, by the Taliban. populace therefore should be our pri- where he deployed for 15 months to N2KL The question is do current subor- mary target. And in the agrarian nation Afghanistan in support of OEF VII-VIII, dinate leaders fully understand this of Afghanistan, the populace’s center of attached to both 2nd Battalion, 503rd Para- same concept as Allen does? Further, is gravity is long-term economic, and pri- chute Infantry Regiment and 1-91 CAV, it understood to be decisive in perma- marily agricultural, development along where he fired more than 4,500 155 mm nently exploiting these uprisings, and the lines outlined above. This should be rounds in support of combat operations. In- therefore requiring the majority of focus our primary focus and line of effort, and gleby then served as a battalion fire direction and effort? Or is the focus primarily on it is not too late to implement. Afghan transition and response? Again, As historian Brian McAllister Linn officer, assistant S3 and targeting officer this strategy of transition is a needed states in his study of the U.S. Army in with Headquarters and Headquarters Bat- line of effort, but not the paramount The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, tery 2nd Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Reg- one. If current leadership fully grasps “As the Army entered the 21st centu- iment, 4th Brigade combat Team, 4th Infan- and embraces this, then we may have ry, it faced an almost insurmountable try Division, where he again deployed for 12 a huge opportunity and potentially a problem. It had to overcome its own months to N2KL Afghanistan in support of turning point for victory in these ‘awak- past, and its own mythology about that OEF XI-X, where he developed and executed enings.’ If they do not, however, this po- past, if it was to prepare for the future.” the Long-Term Economic Projects (LTEP) tential opportunity will likely come and As artillerymen, we are uniquely posi- initiative described in this article. During go, and the U.S. will have to satisfy itself tioned by both our expertise in target- this deployment he also took command of with our current outlook of an overall ing and our infusion throughout every marginal campaign performance at best echelon in combat units to do just this, B Battery, 2-77 FAR, 4/4ID, serving for 18 as we transition and exit the country. to make the changes necessary to deci- months in both N2KL Afghanistan and at Although it will allow our exit, pri- sively impact the direction of our oper- Fort Carson, Colo. He is currently serving mary focus towards combat operations, ations at every level. No other branch as a recruiting company commander in the to include Afghan transition, falls short contains the leaders that are as expert as Vancouver, Wash. Recruiting Company.

Left: MSG Juan Gonzales fires a D-30 howitzer at Kabul Military Training Center, Afghanistan. These test fires are the final step for this refurbished artillery weapon. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Joseph B. Prouse, U.S. Air Force)

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A Stinger missile is fired from the Avenger weapon system at an aerial target off the coast on Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, N.C., March 15, 2013. The target scale is one-fifth the size of an actual aircraft, giving units a realistic target with which to train. The training allowed the 2nd Battalion, 263rd Air Defense Artillery to set up in a deployment formation versus the usual static formation at other smaller training sites. (Photo by Cpl. Austin Long, U.S. Marine Corps)

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