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To Whom Go the Spoils?: Explaining 4,000 Years of Battlefield Victory & Defeat

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To Whom Go the Spoils?: Explaining 4,000 Years of Battlefield Victory & Defeat TO WHOM GO THE SPOILS?: EXPLAINING 4,000 YEARS OF BATTLEFIELD VICTORY & DEFEAT by Sean Michel Clark Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia September 2011 © Copyright by Sean Michel Clark, 2011 DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE The undersigned hereby certify that they have read and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled “TO WHOM GO THE SPOILS?: EXPLAINING 4,000 YEARS OF BATTLEFIELD VICTORY & DEFEAT” by Sean Michel Clark in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Dated: September 7, 2011 External Examiner: _________________________________ Research Supervisor: _________________________________ Examining Committee: _________________________________ _________________________________ Departmental Representative: _________________________________ ii DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY DATE: September 7, 2011 AUTHOR: Sean Michel Clark TITLE: To Whom Go the Spoils?: Explaining 4,000 Years of Battlefield Victory & Defeat DEPARTMENT OR SCHOOL: Department of Political Science DEGREE: PhD CONVOCATION: May YEAR: 2012 Permission is herewith granted to Dalhousie University to circulate and to have copied for non- commercial purposes, at its discretion, the above title upon the request of individuals or institutions. I understand that my thesis will be electronically available to the public. The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s written permission. The author attests that permission has been obtained for the use of any copyrighted material appearing in the thesis (other than the brief excerpts requiring only proper acknowledgement in scholarly writing), and that all such use is clearly acknowledged. _______________________________ Signature of Author iii To Victor Fleuter, soldier of the Great War, and survivor of the most horrible thing anyone in my family has ever had to endure. And to Emma, Lucas, Abby, and Brodie, in the hope that their generation will learn from those previous and leave behind the violent struggles that have accompanied humanity’s long existence. “At Verdun, the combatant fought…in a landscape dismembered by explosives…[where] it was impossible to tell French from German; all were the color of soil.” Eric Leed1 “Only the dead have seen the end of war.” Plato 1 Cited in Robert O’Connell, in both Of Arms and Men, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p255. iv Table of Contents List of Tables List of Figures Abstract List of Abbreviations Used Acknowledgements Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Project Rationale The Neglected Causes of Victory Lonely Theories in Need of Testing 1.2 Methodological Approach Why Battles? Dataset Construction How Accurate Are Historical Statistics? Data Validity Problems Conclusion 1.3 Dissertation Plan Chapter 2: Testing Preponderance Theory v Abstract 2.1 Literature Review: Preponderance Theory Economic Preponderance Troop Preponderance Attrition as Causal Mechanism 2.2 Research Design Hypothesis Formulation & Operationalization Reliability and Validity of Measures The Sample 2.3 Data Analysis H(P)1 (‘troop preponderance’) H(P)2a (‘economic preponderance’: population) H(P)2b (‘economic preponderance’: GDP) An Interesting—But Confounding—Anomaly.................................................................................... 79 2.4 Conclusions Summary & Review The Problem with Preponderance Chapter 3: Testing Technology Theory Abstract 3.1 Literature Review: Technology Theory vi What Constitutes the ‘Balance’? So What ‘Balance’ Is It? Dyadic vs Systemic Theory 3.2 Research Design Operationalizing Technology Theory: Concepts, Hypotheses, and Validity Testing Dyadic Technology Testing Systemic Technology Theory The Current Model and Its Failings: Mobile Offence and Defensive Firepower .............................. 118 Tracking Technology’s Effect ........................................................................................................... 123 3.3 Data Analysis H(T)d (‘dyadic’ technology) Hypothesis H(T)s (‘systemic technology’) -500 BC to 1500 AD .......................................................................................................................... 134 1300s to 2006..................................................................................................................................... 137 Alternative Periodizations.................................................................................................................. 140 3.4 Conclusions Chapter Findings Technology as False Idol Chapter 4: Testing Proficiency Theory Abstract vii 4.1 Literature Review: Proficiency Theory Barriers to a Theory of Proficiency 4.2 Research Design Methodological Scope Operationalizing Proficiency: Concepts, Hypotheses, and Validity Hypothesis 4.3 Data Analysis Results Why Do the Gifted Lose? An Alternative Needed: What of a Combination of Proficiency and Preponderance? 4.4 Conclusions Proficiency Matters Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion Abstract 5.1 Summary of Study Results The Three Theories in Review 5.2 Empirical and Methodological Implications 5.3 Theoretical Implications The Matter of Mobilization (How Some Erode the Proficiency of Others) ...................................... 218 The Malleability of Proficiency viii 5.3 Policy Implications Proficiency in an Age of Great Power Rivalry 5.4 Final Thoughts Caveat: Battle Victory is Not Peace Victory A Final Plea Appendix: Additional Tables ix List of Tables Table 1.1 A Sample Biogeographical Constraint (population density, by ag type)......32 Table 2.1 Dataset Structure (IV: force strength, DV: battle victory).............................63 Table 2.2 Preponderance Success (numerically superior belligerent, by period). .........65 Table 2.3 Economic Preponderance (economically superior belligerent; population).. 71 Table 2.4 Economic Preponderance (economically superior belligerent; GDP)... ........76 Table 2.5 Lethality Trends of Ground Armies (Dupuy’s TLI).....................................82 Table 2.6 Preponderance Results (% preponderant victorious, by hypothesis).............83 Table 3.1 Dyadic Explanatory Efficacy (by interval). .................................................128 Table 3.2 Systemic Technology: -500 to 1500 AD (500 year intervals).......................136 Table 3.2 Systemic Technology: 1300-2006 (100 year intervals).................................138 Table 4.1 Proficiency & Victory Over Time (casualty scores vs RTL).......................172 Table 4.2 Both Preponderance & Superior Proficiency (numbers & RLT). .............189 Table 4.3 Either Preponderant or Proficient (numerical strength & RLT figures)....190 Table 5.1 Preponderance Results (%preponderant won, by hypothesis).....................204 Table 5.2 Dyadic Explanatory Efficacy (by interval). .................................................205 Table 5.3 Systemic Technology: 1300-2006 (100-yr intervals)....................................208 Table 5.4 Proficiency & Victory Over Time (casualty scores vs RTL).......................211 Table 5.5 Either Preponderant or Proficient (numerical strength & RLT figures)....213 x List of Figures Figure 1.1 Peak Battle Deployment, over time (belligerent A:B)..................................25 Figure 2.1 Victor-Vanquished Preponderance Ratio (by relative troop strength).......67 Figure 2.2 Victor-Vanquished (Population) Ratio (by economic size/population)......73 Figure 2.3 Inter-Epochal Comparisons (% preponderant wins, by metric). .................84 Figure 3.1 Dyadic Technology Theory Performance (balance vs battle success). .....133 Figure 3.2 Systemic Theory Performance (attacker: defender casualty balance). ......139 Figure 4.1 Proficiency Gap over Time (RTL discrepancy, chronologically ordered). 180 Figure 4.2 German Proficiency, Eastern Front (RTL, by battle). ..............................182 Figure 4.3 Proficiency vs Preponderance Over Time (Napoleon RLT average). ......185 Figure 4.4 Germany’s WWII Performance (RLT). ....................................................199 Figure 5.1 Dyadic Technology Theory Performance (balance vs relative success). ..207 Figure 5.2 Systemic Theory Performance (attacker: defender casualty balance). ......210 xi Abstract The cruel nature of war gives reason for its study. A crucial component of this research aims to uncover the reasons behind victory and defeat. Winning, after all, is the central attraction of organized violence. Unfortunately, political science efforts in this direction have been rare, and the few theories on offer (numerical preponderance, technology theory, and proficiency) are infrequently tested against the empirical record. This dissertation therefore not only subjected the main theories of battlefield victory to a systematic test against the historical record, but also did so with a dataset more comprehensive and with greater chronological breadth than any other in the political science literature. The range of battles included runs from Megiddo (1469 BC) to Wanat (2008). Such a historically ambitious undertaking is unfortunately fraught with a series of methodological concerns. However, fears regarding the reliability of these historical statistics are best allayed by the assortment of historiographical techniques that have been used to
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