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Untversl^ Micrdrilms Intemadcsnal aOON.ZMbFtowl AnnArtxir,MI48106

8225564

HOSTETTER, PHILIP ALAN

THE INTERPRETATION OF FASCISM BY AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

The American University PH.D. 1982

University Microfilms internstional »>N.z«i>Rii.d.Aiii>Aibo>.Mi«iK

Copyright by HOSTETTER, PHILIP ALAN Ail Rights Reserved

THE INTERPRETATION OP FASCISM BY AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

by Philip A. HOBtetter

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University In Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Sociology

Signatures mmlt Chairmant

Dean of the college 3 ^ ^ / / / ^ . . Date

1982 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

JffliiitBiciH w n s B s m i i B B m THE INTERPRETATION OF FASCISM

BY AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

BY Philip A. Hostetter

ABSTRACT

The intent of this dissertation is to systematically investigate the body of social scientific research on Euro­ pean fascism that has been produced in America. The

project's organization grows out of the author's perception that emigre scholars seem to have produced more significant

studies of fascism than have their American-born contempo­ raries. Explanation for the apparent paucity of contribu­

tions from American social scientists Is sought In the American “conditions of Intellectual production,“ thus

making the dissertation an exercise in the sociology of

knowledge. of conditions in the American academic environment likely to affect research on fascism, social scientific

specialization was singled out as a focal point. It was hypothesized (a) that each of five disciplines— psychology, economics, political science, history, and sociology— would tend to generate a unique approach to the interpretation of

11 fasclsmr and (b) that within each discipline the interpreta­ tions of American-born “mainstream" scholars would differ from those of émigrés and dissenting (“radical") Americans. A "test" of these hypotheses was undertaken using a method of qualitative content analysis. Works on fascism were compared in the areas of analytical scope, methodology, and research conclusions.

The first hypothesis was well supported. Only main­ stream historians failed to exhibit a marked tendency to interpret fascism in a manner peculiar to their discipline. The second hypothesis, however, was strongly supported only within the disciplines of psychology and sociology, where mainstream scholars tended to produce much more limited, one-sided interpretations than did emigres or dissenting Americans. Expectations were confounded in part by the pleasantly surprising discovery that many excellent studies of fascism were generated in the 1930s and 1940s by main­ stream American social scientists, some of whom conducted research in Italy and Germany. These works deserve more attention from contemporary scholars. It seems that specialization has adversely affected American scholarship on fascism, although this disserta­ tion's research design could not fully demonstrate it. The effect is probably greater at the level of problem selection than in the actual interpretation of fascism. Once fascism is chosen as a topic, social scientists are usually forced to shed their disciplinai blinders in order to understand it.

ill To Mom and Dad— Paul R. and Almeda W. Hostetter ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people I wish to thank for their roles in bringing this dissertation to fruition. Foremost is my wife, Stephanie, who deserves much credit for putting up with the unforgiveably long duration of my graduate education. My four-year-old daughter, Jena, constantly competed (usually successfully) for my time and helped me keep all things in perspective. My committee, Samih Farsoun, Gert Mueller, and Jurg Siegenthaler, deserves praise for remaining intact all these years. Written communications from Arno J. Mayer and Walter Goldfrank were helpful. Finally, thanks are due my

typist, Jo Thornton, for returning to my dissertation so quickly after a serious automobile accident; and to my old friend, Larry Cornish, for helping me survive Viet Nam in one piece. I adhered in this dissertation to a policy of allowing the publications analyzed to speak for themselves as much as possible. I am grateful to those persons or publishers con­ trolling copyrights who have allowed me to include quotations.

iv CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. FASCISM AND AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE . . . 1 CHAPTER II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FASCISM RESEARCH ...... 8

CHAPTER III. PSYCHOLOGY ...... 26

CHAPTER IV. ECONOMICS...... 65 CHAPTER V. POLITICAL SCIENCE ...... 137 CHAPTER VI. HISTORY ...... 230

CHAPTER VII. SOCIOLOGY...... 332 CHAPTER VIII. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS...... 403 CHAPTER IX. TOWARD A SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF F A S C I S M ...... 416

CHAPTER X. CONCLUSION ...... 459 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 463 CHAPTER 1

FASCISM AND AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

A. The Problem

Some of the moet difficult intellectual challenges of this or any other century are posed by the phenomenon gener­ ally known as "fascism." What was it? Why did it come about? How did the fascist movements achieve power? Such questions must inevitably be addressed as part of any

attempt to understand the flow of history since 1900. Yet

social scientists, who presume to have the expertise to deal with such matters, to this day have not produced a satisfac­

tory general theory or model of fascism as a unique social and political form. This fact is bemoaned in the introduc­

tions to countless recent volumes on fascism.^ Seeming­ ly, the only point of agreement shared by the authors and editors of these works is that fascism is an important problem.

Topical examples include A. James Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism (Morristovm, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974) / p. H i ; Henry A. Turner, Jr., ed., Reappraisals of Fascism (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), p. X; and S. J . Woolf, ed.. yie Nature of Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 3-T^ Many persons today no doubt believe that fascism is dead— that Intellectuals are misdirecting their energies in trying to understand it. However, there are at least two reasons vAiy it deserves our continued interest. First, fascism merits our attention as a purely historical problem. Even if we conclude that it has now disappeared as a real entity, fascism must still be treated as an important key to the genesis of our present world political-economic situa­ tion. Second, and more importantly, fascism may justifiably be viewed as a particular expression of a longer term poli­ tical trend having implications for the future. Those persons %Aio are concerned to avoid the recurrence of simi­ larly inhumane regimes will be well served by serious inquiries into the nature of "classical" fascism. The subject of this dissertation is not fascism itself but the attempts of social science to interpret it. The author, an American sociologist interested in the problem of fascism, came to consider the following questions* How did American social scientists analyze the phenomenon of fascism during the years of its international ascendance? Was there a uniquely American contribution to its understanding? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the various American analyses? Upon searching through the Dissertation Abstracts it was discovered that no American sociologist (or any social scientist, for that matter) has produced a doctoral dissertation dealing with fascism as a generic phenome- 2 non. It would seem that sociology in particular, in terms of both its own self-image and long practice, la the best equipped of the social sciences to provide a general analysis of the origin, structure, and dynamics of fascist social formations. Yet sociologists have been perhaps the

least interested of all social scientists in this quintes- sentially sociological problem. The paucity of sociological dissertations on fascism is merely one aspect of an overall scarcity of sociological investigations into fascism. The present inquiry seeks to explore the limited number of

studies of fascism Which have been produced by Americans.

It is hoped that by the mere fact of having done this, the dissertation will provide a groundwork for later studies and a contribution to the development of a general theory of fascism. Indeed, the concluding chapter will attempt to suggest directions in which the theory of fascism must develop before it can approach adequacy. If in any of its aspects this inquiry proves stimulative to further work, it will have accomplished its fundamental purpose.

2 There are, of course, numerous studies (usually by historians) of the specific aspects of fascist social systems— ideology, economy, terror, leaders, etc. This dissertation is concerned only with social scientific studies Which attempt to answer questions about the "roots," "causes," "essence,” "meaning," etc., of fascism— in short, with generalizing approaches. B. Research Objectives The goal of this dissertation, then, is to examine systematically the interpretation of European fascism by

American sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, historians, and economists. "European fascism" will be considered to cover a time span from its inception prior to 1920 until the demise of its active manifestations by

1 9 4 5 The only true, full-fledged fascist regimes in Europe will be considered to have been Italy and Germany, although fascist movements existed in a majority of the

European countries during the era under consideration. Even though the question of a definition of fascism is a major source of contention with vrtiich this study will deal, a minimal definition will be necessary at this point to help delineate our subject matter. Let us therefore define fascism (in its most developed form) as a political system of one-party rule vdiich is established on the basis of mass support for its Ideology of anti-liberalism and anti­ socialism. By this formula fascism can be distinguished from military dictatorships, traditional aristocracies, and

3 The question of whether there are other deserving candidates for the label (for example, "Japanese fascism") will be addressed in the final chapter of this dissertation. 4 The cut-off date of 1945 indicates not that reac­ tionary or "totalitarian" regimes ceased to exist thereaf­ ter, but only that political systems Which may be labeled “fascist" were brought to an end by that time. other varieties of the authoritarian regime. Further dis­ tinctions will become manifest as we proceed. there are two secondary goals beyond the objective examination of American analyses of fascism just described. The first arises from the author's interest in developments toward a general theory of fascism. Theory building is a cumulative process of vrtiich the first step is a thorough digestion and synthesis of previous work relevant to the theoretical problem. Thus our first auxiliary task is to search for and evaluate studies of fascism produced in America and to bring these contributions, according to their merit, into an area of research developed predominantly by Europeans. In the process of this effort we hope to draw the principal outlines of a theory of fascism. A further secondary goal of this dissertation arises from the puzzling fact that American social science, and especially American sociology (a generalizing and model-building social sci­ ence), has failed to produce a general theory of fascism. It is therefore our task to examine the conditions underly­ ing intellectual production in the United States which may be responsible for the character of research on fascism. Specifically, we will explore the effect of the social organization of the social sciences upon intellectual pro­ duction in an attempt to test contentions that the extreme specialization of these disciplines in America has been detrimental to the study of problems of world-historical Blgniflcance* Margaret Mead has eloquently voiced this criticiem

. . . that the social sciences , . , have been guilty of the sin of separateness; each has lived within a %#alled garden, projecting a particular way of looking at human behavi­ or upon the behavior itself. So we have such pieces of nonsense as "economic man,” an unreal creature constructed to behave in accordance with economic law. We have non­ sensical controversies between the role of heredity and the role of environment, as if two scientific approaches to the study of human behavior could get inside of a human being and have a fist fight for dominance. And in addition to this tendency to put their ideas inside the material. Instead of recognizing that while there is an economic view, a cultural view, a psychological view of human behavior there is no such thing as economic behavior or psychiatric behavior, the human sciences have tended to be most intolerant of each other. 5

S. J. Woolf applies this point to inquiries into fascism;

"The complex realities of fascism make nonsense of the arti- ficial divisions set up by academics, and forces them . . . to extend the scope of their researches in an interdisci­ plinary manner.By comparing fascism research performed by those social scientists closely tied to the specialized disciplines with work by those more influenced by the European scholarly tradition, we should be able to

Margaret Head, "Introduction" to Richard M. Brickner, Is G e r mny Incurable? (Philadelphia; J. B. LippincottT i943'7, pT ^ .

^Woolf, "Introduction” to his The Nature of Fascism, p. 5. gauge the effect of social scientific specialization on at least this one variety of scholarship.

In summary, the present investigation aims to (1) analyze the content of American social scientific studies of fascism, (2) shed light on at least one of the conditions (social scientific specialization) which may explain why the content of the studies is vdiat it is, and (3) make sugges­ tions contributing to a general theory of fascism. CHAPTER II

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OP FASCISM RESEARCH

A. Theoretical Framework

To the extent that this study is to be categorized, its domain is primarily the sociology of knowledge. It is con­ cerned not only with the content of research on fascism but with the reasons why the content has assumed certain forms.

According to Karl Mannheim's classic statement In Ideology and Utopia, the sociology of knowledge is concerned with one central question: " . * * how it is possible that identical thought processes concerned with the same world produce divergent conceptions of that world.Mannheim's theory, of course, points to the social conditions underly­ ing "mental production" as the source of these divergences. Our study will be a some%diat limited research project in the sociology of knowledge, but only to the extent that it will be unable to consists the required chain of proof by demon­ strating enqpirically the connection between knowledge and social existence. It will be descriptive rather than

Karl Mannheim, Idylogy and Utopia, trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward £jh£ls (New Yorxt Harvest Books, 1936), p. 9. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.

8 explanatory in seeking to establish the uniqueness of the "native" American social scientific interpretations of fascism vis-à-vis those of authors associated with the

European intellectual tradition* Moreover, only one of the possible reasons for this uniqueness will be explored in depth— the disciplinai specialisation of American social science. In terms of an appropriate analytical framework, our project will seek to answer questions of the type posed in the second of five problem areas suggested by Robert Merton's "paradigm for the sociology of knowledge":

What mental productions are being sociological­ ly analysed? a. spheras of: moral beliefs, ideologies, ideas, the categories of thought, philo­ sophy, religious beliefs, social norms, positive science, etc. b, %#hich aspects are analysed: their selec- tion (foci of attention), level of ab­ straction, presuppositions (what is taken as "data" and what is "problematical"), conceptual content, models of verifica­ tion, objectives of intellectual activi­ ty, etc.®

In addition to the mental productions (social scientific studies of fascism), we will also be looking at their producers. Louis Wirth saw the study of intellectuals as a proper concern of the sociology of knowledge:

Q Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge, " Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 111,: The Free Press^, 1&Ï9), pp. 221-22. 10

In every society there are individuals whose special function it is to accumulate, pre­ serve, reformulate and disseminate the intellectual heritage of the group. The composition of this group, their social derivation and the method by «Aiich they are recruited, their organisation, their class affiliation, the rewards and prestige they receive, their participation in other spheres of social life, constitute some of the more crucial questions to which the sociology of knowledge seeks answers. ®

The central theoretical assumption underlying this dis­

sertation is that American social scientists' orientations toward fascism were conditioned by a peculiarly American in­ tellectual situation, which was in turn conditioned by the American social structure. More specifically, the intellec­ tuals' social situation served to limit their scope by

selectively "filtering out" key elements required for a full understanding of fascism. (As an aside, the same point could be made about the social situation's effects on the

interpretations of other groups of fascism-watchers around the world— for example, doctrinaire Communists. ) The

9 Louis Wirth, "Preface" to Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. XXX.

^^We cannot here deal with the European and Ameri­ can Communist or socialist parties* theories of fascism ex­ cept in a peripheral manner* Nor can we examine the writ­ ings of non-academic intellectuals (of any political color) unless they were tied to academia through frequent contacts or research positions. See John Cammett, "Communist Theo­ ries of Fascism, 1920-1935," Science and Society, XXXI (Spring 1967), pp. 149-63, for a critique of the Communist line. See John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism; The View from America (Princeton; Princeton University Press, i?72), for information on the reactions of American non-academic conservative, liberal, and socialist intellectuals. Diggins' study, incidentally, seems to be the only attempt other than the present dissertation to survey, although not in depth, the interpretations of fascism by American social scientists. 11

social environment affects intellectuals with varying degrees of immediacy. At a very general level, for

instance, most social scientists are of necessity dependent upon the American economic eystem— if only because this system generates the funds for their jobs. He would not be

surprised, therefore, to find evidence of some resultant biases having crept into some of their analyses of fascism. The strictly empirical section of this dissertation will

not, however, attempt to uncover such evidence as a primary

goal. At a lower level of abstraction, where we will be operating, the fact that most social scientists are affiliated with academic institutions will presumably also have an effect on their scholarly interpretations. As Wirth tells us:

One of the primary obligations of the socio­ logy of knowledge consists , . . in a sys­ tematic analysis of the institutional organ­ ization within the framework of vrtiich intel­ lectual activity is carried on. This in­ volves, among other items, the study of schools, universities, academies, learned societies, museums, libraries, research institutes and laboratories, foundations, and publishing facilities. It is important to know how and by whom these institutions are supported, the types of activity they carry on, their policies, their internal organization and interrelations, and their place in the social organization as a whole.11

^^Wirth in Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. xxix. 12

The sociology of knowledge thus claims that the social context of academic work affects the content of that %*ork. Value-free social science is a myth. But what is the mechanism by Which context and content are connected? It

«K)uld appear to operate through theoretical assumptions. All research into socio-historical problems necessarily presupposes certain untestable, taken-for-granted value 12 choices. The findings of any particular investiga­ tion are always contaminated by the arbitrary and relative nature of such aspects of the research enterprise as problem selection, data collection, and interpretive analysis. Thus there is much room for the intrusion of values into social science, no matter how "empirical" the methodology employed. When social science confronts a topic as politically sensi­ tive as fascism, the investigator is more likely than usual to allow the entrance of hidden assumptions into his or her work. Franz Neumann years ago pointed out the part played by values in the study of power:

Consciously or unconsciously, every student of politics has a specific attitude toward power. It is this attitude Which determines one's approach to all the prob­ lems of political science. The valuative

Values" are here considered in their broadest sense as any beliefs held by individuals Which motivate choices of action in situations Where "purely objective" decisions based on sense data are impossible. Choices between interesting and uninteresting, good or bad, right or wrong, etc., are examples. 13

premises must be made clear so that objec­ tive analysis may be possible.

Unfortunately, few social scientists dealing with political

phenomena have followed Neumann’s advice. They often infuse their interpretations with culturally conditioned assump­

tions about how a political system should operate. Because they have not addressed this problem, their scientific work suffers.

One type of value assumption is most important for the purposes of this dissertation. It is what Alvin Gouldner calls the "domain assumption"— an "unpostulated and un­

labeled" belief about phenomena vdiich can be shown to under­ lie any and every social scientific theory. It is a speci­ fic kind of background assumption applied to the members of a domain of phenomena. Gouldner finds that "... the trork of sociologists, as of others, is influenced by a sub- theoretical set of beliefs, for that is what background assumptions are: beliefs about all members of symbolically constituted domains.In sociology and the other social sciences, these domain assumptions find expression within the theoretical perspectives which become dominant at various times in the history of the disciplines. Every

Frans Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political Power," Political Science Quarterly, LKV (June 1950), 163. 14 Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970, p. 32. 14

social theory has what Gouldner terms an "infrastructure" of

domain assumptions and sentiments Which reflect both the larger culture and society as well as the group context in

which the theory is produced. The primary focus of the

present study is on the latter of these two realms. Gouldner stresses that "theory-work" is group-work:

The individuality of theory-work is, in part, a socially sanctioned illusion. For there are the assistants who have helped the theorist to his research and writing; there are the colleagues and the students, the friends and the lovers, on whom he has in­ formally "tested" his ideas; there are those front whom he has learned and taken and those Whom he opposes. All theory is not merely influenced but actually produced by a group.15

The group setting from Which theory emerges is not actually a separate realm, cut off from its social surround­

ings. Rather, it mediates between the society and the indi­ vidual theorist. Of the many contextual conditions affect­

ing the group process of social scientific theory-building

in America, the highly developed departmental specialization

in our academic community is certainly one of the most important. It is this factor Which we will explore in relationship to the interpretations of fascism by practi­ tioners of the various disciplines. Of course, all social sciences in the United States will share certain common assumptions of a general nature %diich are rooted in the

15 Ibid., p. 46. 15

larger social structure. And the very fact of extreme dis­

ciplinai specialisation may itself be a result of more general forces. But these less direct Influences are beyond the realm of empirical testability. We will speculate about

them later in this study, but our primary goal is to test the effects of the tangible fact of specialisation on fascism research. Our initial theoretical guide here will

be C. Wright Mills, Who stressed the need for a social theory of perception as part of the sociology of knowledge.

Every specialised discipline begins to propagate its own terminology vAtich acts as a limit on the individual social scientist:

In acquiring a technical vocabulary with its terms and classifications, the thinker is acquiring, as it were, a set of colored spectacles. He sees a world of objects that are technically tinted and patternized. A specialized language constitutes a veritable a priori form of perception and cognition

Carrying this point further, the specialized theoreti­ cal frameworks of each discipline will be expected to have an even greater limiting effect on the social scientists. Each social science, operating within the limitations of its social and cultural background, affords theorists the oppor­

tunity to work more or less exclusively on developing the

C. Wright Mills, "Methodological Consequenes of the Sociology of Knowledge," in his Power, Politics and People, ed. Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Ballantlne Books, 1963), p. 459, 16 logic and expanding the ecope of particular theoriae. Often one or more such theorise may become enshrined as "para­ digms" in a given discipline. This means they become the accepted way of framing analyses.The paradigm to a large extent determines What is studied, how it is studied, and how research data are interpreted. The operation of theoretical paradigms, then, is yet another biasing process Which must be addressed in this sociology of the sociology of fascism. However, it is isortant to remember that these paradigms, while often related to the dominant ideology of a society, are also at least potentially independent of ideo­ logy in any society Which provides a degree of academic freedom. For this reason we must maintain an analytical separation between ideology and paradigm as we proceed through this dissertation. In summary, the general theoretical framework of this study is provided by the sociology of knowledge, but we have limited ourselves to certain aspects of that framework. We have settled on the social scientific division of labor as one important social condition whose effects on knowledge are "testable." We are focusing more specifically on the operation of (1) unstated assumptions and (2) theoretical

The paradigm concept was developed by Thomas S. Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (2nd ed. Chicago! The University 6^ düicago Press, 1970), While Kuhn focused on the physical sciences, Robert W. Friedrichs demonstrated the applicability of this concept to the social sciences in A Sociology of Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1970). 17

paradigms as the most important conduits between the social

context and the content of research and theory. The immedi­ ate setting in Which these two factors have their effects is provided by the group nature of social scientific endeavors. We are using this framework to examine one historically

specific social scientific enterprise— American attempts to understand fascism. This dissertation concentrates on one kind of knowledge producer (the social scientist) and one type of knowledge (fascism studies) in one particular

intellectual setting (the United States from 1920 to the present). Further, only one aspect of that intellectual

setting (the extreme departmental specialization) is being investigated in depth. Because of the complexity of the topic, it is quite necessary for our study to be so delimi­ ted at this stage of research. In a recent book, Bjbrn Eriksson has in fact pointed to the need for more such studies: "The sociology of knowledge lacks empirical inves­

tigations of specific ideas in specific social settings. Which means that its basic theme has not been developed into 18 a more substantial theory. " Eriksson attempts to develop a research strategy which begins with the data of the history of ideas and from these extracts cases where the development or nondevelopment of knowledge over time cannot simply be explained discursively (i.e., according to its own

18 Bj5rn Eriksson, Problems of Empirical Sociology of Knowledge (Uppsala, Swedent Uppsala University, 1975), p. 5. 18

Internal logic). These cases he sees as demonstrating

'* . • * the fundamental problem of the sociology of know­ ledge: How is it that all cognitive change is not ideal?

How is it that our knowledge, our attempts to be conscious

of the world, ourselves and our place in the world, can develop in anomalous, unnatural or unideal direc­

tions?"^* By identifying specific manifestations of "unideal" developments of knowledge and then exploring the background social and historical factors, we can begin to

test various hypotheses of the sociology of knowledge which have thus far been presented only in unsubstantiated form. This dissertation exemplifies the kind of approach called

for by Eriksson. As such, besides being a useful summary and codification of American social scientists' contribu­ tions to the understanding of fascism, it will also be a valuable starting point for later investigations into more ccxnplex factors of the American intellectual climate.

B. Steps of Research

This investigation will proceed in three steps. The first and most substantive section (comprised of the follow­ ing five chapters) will be designed as a test of two working hypotheses. Its goal will be to demonstrate that the different social sciences do in fact lead their proponents to produce markedly different images of fascism. Our first

l*Ibid., p. 153. 19

hypothesis, then, is that there will he identifiable differ­ ences among the fascism studies of the five social sciences being examined with regard to analytical scope and methodo­ logies, and that this will lead to differences in research conclusions. By "analytical scope" is meant the range of factors or elements of fascism with which the individual authors deal. "Methodologies" are ways in Which data are processed to yield information, as in content analysis or various forms of statistical analysis. The "research con­ clusions" are scientific findings, logical deductions, or interpretations offered by the social scientists as attempts to explain fascism or an aspect of it. These conclusions are the most important data of the present investigation.

While it may sound like a "painful elaboration of the obvious" to show that the analytical frameworks and methodo­ logies will vary according to the social scientist's place in the specialized disciplines; and while the legitimacy of partial or limited studies of fascism is beyond question; an all to frequent occurrence is the social scientist's subse­ quent elevation of his or her research conclusions to a position of causal primacy among all possible factors involved. The de-emphasis or total exclusion of factors outside the researcher's scope of analysis can lead to severely deficient descriptions of fascism. We will target such errors for criticism. 20

A second hypothesis to be tested in this first phase of our analysis is that we will find differences in the above criteria within each American discipline, between those closely attached to the dominant paradigms and those who are more closely identified with the European intellectual tradition. European social scientific thought has been much more concerned with holistic and historical analysis, exem­ plified by the work of Marx, Tocqueville, and Weber, than has been the case in America. In our country the extreme departmental specialization and the emphasis on "empirical" (i.e., "quantifiable") research has in the past tended to hamper our ability to come to grips with phenomena as com­ plex as fascism. To test the aforegoing hypotheses, a comparative metho­ dology will be employed. First, the approaches of the dif­ ferent disciplines will be compared. Second, within each discipline the views of the "mainstream" practitioners will be contrasted with those of two other groups. One of these consists of dmigrd scholars such as Franz Neumann, Erich Fromm, and Gaetano Salvemini, who produced studies of fascism while in the United States. Their inclusion will serve to represent the "European intellectual tradition" in contrast to American social science and will enable us to 20 better evaluate the work of the Americans. A smaller

The idea that dmigrrf scholars produced the most useful contributions in America to the understanding of fascism has been suggested by Diggins in his seminal Musso­ lini and Fascism, especially pp. 480-90. H. Stuart Hughes argues this point more fully in The Sea Change (New York; Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 125-33. 21

group, «ftilch w# may call "dissenters," is made up of Ameri­ can social scientists like Robert Brady and Paul Sweezy, who were clearly not attached to the established social sciences but were much more influenced by the classical European tradition. We will further require that any scholar classi­ fied as a dissenter has been to some degree vocal in rejec­ ting the dominant trends in his or her discipline.

The second step in our overall plan will be to summa­ rize the results of the above comparative analysis and to frame these findings in more general terms of the sociology of knowledge by speculating on the relationship between the

American "conditions of intellectual production" and America's social structure. By ccxaparing conditions in the

United States with those in Europe, we may be able to detect possible concluding links in the chain of logic which con­ nects social structure on the one hand with mental products on the other. There may be something in the structure of American social life which could plausibly explain why the social scientific division of labor developed so elaborately here. Whatever we do find, the chief value of these specu­ lations will lie in their suggestiveness for more research projects which could further substantiate the theoretical viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge. During the third and final phase of this dissertation another base of comparison will be brought into play against the American studies of fascism. Here more recent develop- 22

mante toward a general theory of fascism will be employed as

a standard by vAiich to evaluate the American and émigré scholars* accomplishments. The problem is to convincingly

argue that the American fascism studies have in fact been deficient. To show that they are different from those of scholars under a European influence does not prove that they are any less adequate. A standard of comparison is required

to make this point. It will be derived from some modern endeavors (mostly European and produced since 1960} to deve­

lop a comprehensive theory of fascism. A model will be presented consisting of minimal categories required for a holistic perspective on fascism— a perspective Which would take into account all the manifestations of fascism in Europe, including the various failed movements. In light of this model we will re-evaluate the American analyses in an

effort to highlight their strengths and weaknesses.

In an ancillary part of this third phase, the disserta­

tion will conclude by suggesting needed contributions toward

the development of a general theory of fascism. We will attempt to make at least one step in that direction by demonstrating the inadequacy of merely listing a multipli­

city of necessary conditions. Instead, the concept of a hierarchy of conditions will be discussed. In addition, the

usefulness of the concept of "fascism" to describe non-

European reactionary regimes will be challenged, as will the

usefulness of "fascism” to describe any modern-day regimes. 23

The concept of "counterrevolution” will be scrutinized as a possible alternative which would allow for both historical and regional differentiation among rightist regimes-- fascism, military dictatorship, traditional autocracy, Peronism, etc.

C. Methodology The first and third phases of this dissertation consti­ tute an application of qualitative content analysis. Such an analysis aims to discover the presence or absence of attributes in the content rather than the degree of pres- 21 ence. In our case these attributes are the potential elements of a general theory of fascism* The initial step in the hypothesis-testing procedure involves reading and categorizing the American materials according to mainstream or dissenter/emigre status. We will rely mostly on second­ ary accounts of the histories and personalities of the five social sciences in order to classify the authors. Any ambi­ guous cases will be briefly discussed. The materials will then be compared according to the criteria of analytical scope, methodologies, and conclusions. These results will be used to accept or reject the hypotheses about differences

2l See Bernard Berelson, "Content Analysis," in Gardner Lindzey, ed.. Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954}, ppl 512, 517; and Ole R. Holsti, "Content Analysis," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds.. Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II (2nd ed.j Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954, 1968), pp. 598—600, 603—06. 24 in fascism studies among and within the American disci­ plines. In the third phase of the analysis, after we have examined the American material based on its own merits, and after we have drawn our conclusions relative to the socio­ logy of knowledge, we will subject it to further analysis with respect to the standard of comparison derived from post-1960 attempts to produce a general theory of fascism. The standard of comparison will be used to suggest what is desirable in any fascism study in terms of the criteria of scope, methods, and conclusions. Since our universe of content is limited to social scientific interpretations of fascism, the usual problems of content analysis— specification of the ccnnmunicator's "real" intent; determination of the "meaning" of words, phrases, or the content as a whole; establishing that a "common universe of discourse" exists between communicator and audience; 22 etc.— do not appear to be hindrances. Furthermore, the problem of inter-coder reliability will not exist, although the major difficulty does perhaps relate to the author being the only "coder." His biases could easily affect his placement of people or their writings into categories, and he will have to be especially careful in making explicit his ovm interpolations into the model to be used as a standard of comparison. An openness about the

22 See Aaron Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 146-56, for a concise discussion of these problems. 25 logical choices made in constructing the theoretical model will be the best defense against the author's intrusion. The sources to be used as the subject matter of the first phase of this study will include articles in the rele­ vant social scientific journals, papers presented at scholarly conclaves, full-length books, and articles by social scientists in nevwpapers. magazines, and non-academic journals. In other words, the widest possible range of publications will be explored in order to support the argu­ ments contained herein. It seems possible that nearly the entire universe of such documents by American social scien­ tists on fascism will be included in our investigation.

Sampling will therefore not pose a roethodoligical problem. CHAPTER III

PSYCHOLOGY

The German group— as a collective force, not necessarily as individuals— both feels para­ noid and displays a remarkable number of the classical paranoid synptoms. — Richard M. Brickner

The pressures generated by contemporary civilization produce in many individuals a latent aggressiveness lAiich, when captured by nihilistic philosophies, may be led into channels of racialism and aggressive nation­ alism. -Max Horkheimsr

A. State of the Discipline The boundaries of the field of psychology will need to be widened for the purposes of this dissertation. Very few psychologists have chosen to deal with the problem of fascism. In fact, the Cumulated Index to the Psychological Abstracts lists fewer than twenty articles on fascism or "totalitarianism" from 1927 to 1950, and absolutely none after the year 1950. Moreover, most of the existing studies have concentrated on "fascist attitudes" in various

26 27

population groupa rather than on fasciam itaelf.^ Thus the strictly psychological literature is not directly

relevant to the focus of the present research. In order to broaden the group of "psychological" studies of fascism, we

will therefore include in this category works more properly

labeled psychiatric, psychoanalytic, or social psychological in orientation. The one continuing focus of American psychology which

is of interest to students of fascism is research on the closely related problems of the "authoritarian personality," dogmatism, "obedience to authority," etc., as psychological 2 preconditions of fascism. However, since these studies have not demonstrated that such propensities were any stronger in fascist than non-fascist countries, their

explanatory value is rather limited. This dissertation will include in its analysis only the classic study of Adorno and his associates--still unmatched in its attempt to transcend

a simplistic psychology. In fact (to anticipate somewhat

For example, see Ross Stagner, "Fascist Atti­ tudes: An Exploratory Study," Journal of Social Psychology, VII (August 1936), 309-19; Stagner, "Fascist Attitudes: Their Determining Conditions," ibid. (November 1936), 436-54; and Stagner and E. T. Katsoff, "Fascist Attitudes : Factor Analysis of Item Correlations," ibid. (August 1942), 3-9. 2 On the authoritarian personality, see the discus­ sion of Adorno et al. below. On dogmatism, see the works of Milton Rokeach, especially The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). See also, Stanley Milgram's controversial Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 28 the conclusion of this chapter), the type of approach required to solve the mystery of fascism's rise to power is necessarily social-psychological. If certain personality factors are to be shown as unique preconditions for fascism, they must be linked to particular social settings. But, as we shall see, ” . * . no American undertook a thorough examination of Fascism from the point of view of social psychology. Such a study vrauld have to await the arrival of anti-Fascist émigrés. Let us examine the narrow confines of American academic psychology in order to understand why the subject of fascism was so little explored by psychologists. The roots of American psychology are found in German experimental psychology. At the beginning of the present century, E. B.

Titchsner, a disciple of Wilhelm Wundt, was the dominant force, and structuralism the dominant movement, in American psychology. But by 1930 structuralism had been replaced.

During the first quarter of the century, behaviorism under the leadership of John B. Watson not only challenged the philosophical traditions prevalent in the non-experimenta1 departments, it also overwhelmed experimen­ tal psychology that depended on introspec- tionist evidence, and subverted the func­ tionalist school, which was indebted to John Dewey . . . .'

^Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, p. 480. 4 Jean Matter Handler and George Handler, "The Diaspora of Experimental Psychology: The Gestaltists and Others," in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds.. The Intellectual Migration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 374. Also helpful is Conrad 6. Mueller, "Some Origins of Psychology as a Science, " Annual Review of Psychology, XXX (1979), 9-29. 29

The dominance of behavlorlam. In alliance with functionalism and modified by the Influence of British empiricism and

Pavlovian conditioning theory,

* • . helped to create in America an experi­ mental psychology %Aich not only rejected introspective evidence as an empirical basis for scientific psychology, but also empha­ sized comparative (animal) research, and reinstated a naive empiricism and associa- tioniam which had already been rejected by some of the more sophisticated association- ists in England and Germany .... In addition, or as a result of these tenden­ cies, the investigation of complex human thought and perception was postponed. What was in fact an actual rejection was fre­ quently presented as a postponement, with the claim that the investigation of complex human mental events must be relegated to the future when the basic elements of behavior, i.e., the conditioned reflex, and other simple responses in simple animals would be understood.5

With the rise of Hitler, a large number of German and Austrian scholars became forcibly or voluntarily exiled. In

the late 1930s the American Psychological Association, after an initial coolness to the plight of the refugees, began to aid them in finding teaching or research positions in this country. The total number so placed was about one hundred. Two influential schools of thought arrived in this wave. The Gestaltists (especially Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kbhler,

Kurt Koffka, and Kurt Lewin) as a group had at least two

^Ibid. 30 impactsOn the one hand, they affirmed "naive experience" as the basic source of data rather than merely measurable responses to stimuli. On the other hand, they stressed the primacy of the organised Whole (Gestalt) in which local or elemental events are experienced. But While this outlook improved upon simplistic stimulus-response theory by opening up social phenomena to psychological investigation, neither the Gestaltists themselves nor the later "field theorists" contributed significantly to our knowledge of fascism. A second school of psychological thought which arrived with full force in America on the shoulders of émigré scholars was psychoanalysis. In fact, Freudian thought and practice have had greater success in America than anywhere in the world.^ Jerome Schneck views this success in light of the affinity between psychoanalysis and psychiatry, which had an American tradition reaching back to the revolutionary and physician Benjamin Rush.

Among the forces operating on behalf of psychoanalysis were the rapid growth of private practice of psychiatry in the United States and the flow of psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists to this country for

^Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krause, Theories in Social Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 14-23. ^For a discussion, see Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek, Freud in America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966). 31

social and political reasons, as develop­ ments in Europe presied on to the outbreak of World War II.»

Psychoanalysis went on to become one of the most powerful forces in American psychiatry due to the fact that "... its proponents gradually obtained a strong hold on the

psychiatric educational structure through independent

institutes and many medical schools throughout the Q country." By contrast, the Freudian tradition was quietly absorbed into the field of psychiatry in Europe. Marie Jahoda takes a broader view in her assessment of

the successful adaptation of the psychoanalysts to America.

The sect-like character of the psychoanaly­ tic movement which has so often been ascribed to Freud's character was undoubted­ ly a response to the hostile climate of opinion that surrounded it. They had, as it were, experienced premature training in the psychological condition of being emigres and this must have stood them in good stead when they had to beccxne émigrés in the full sense of the term. In addition, to their American colleagues they were no strangers; in the decades prior to immigration the interna­ tional congresses of the psychoanalytic movement had brought people from all over the globe together. And finally, the psychoanalysts presented no financial problems to their hosts. Psychoanalysis is an urban profession; in the great American cities the demand for practitioners of the

Q Jerome M. Schneck, "United States of America," in John G. H o w l Is, ed,. World History of Psychiatry (New York Brunner/Mazel, 1975), p . 453.

*Ibid., p. 454 32

art was high among people who could afford to pay the inevitably high costs of psycho­ analytic treatment.ID

Jahoda also relates the triumph of psychoanalysis to the

American myth of the "affluent society" in which success is available to all those who will but strive*

Such a society, geared in tiroes of good fortune and bad to individual self apprai­ sal, to the search for understanding of one's fate, and no longer fully supported by the faith of its puritan forefathers, is ready for any system of thought that ex­ plains man to himself. Psychoanalysis affected American society generally not because of the originality and power of its scientific structure, but because it filled that need.

Finally, Jahoda tries to account for the interest that psychoanalysis generated among some academic psychologists* For our purposes, the most important of the attractions she

lists is " . . . the impressive temerity of psychoanalysis

in dealing with problems that are clearly psychological in nature but not easily encompassed by academic psychology -12 The academics were reluctant to address

Marie Jahoda, "The Migration of Psychoanalysis* Its Impact on American Psychology," in Fleming and Bailyn, The Intellectual Migration, pp. 429-30.

^^Ibid., p. 433.

^^Ibid., p. 435. 33 problems «Aiich could not be translated Into experimental variables. Psychoanalysis was free of this limitation:

Methods had to be devised to fit the prob­ lems, and not vice versa* The problems of psychoanalysis arose concretely out of the medical problems it faced . . . ; the Ameri­ can psychologists wanted to create a science, and inevitably their work became method-oriented.

Although both the Gestaltists and psychoanalysts made inroads into American psychology, the "scientific" preoccu­ pation noted by Jahoda is still dominant— modern "radical" 14 and "humanistic" psychologists notwithstanding. Duane Schultz argues that "... contemporary American psychology is primarily behavioristic in nature and defini­ tion. Prom this statement it follows that the methods of psychology are characterized by ope rational ism and objec­ tivity."^* What is also notable about modern psycho­ logy is an almost unbelievable development of sub-special­ ization, perhaps beat evidenced by the structure of

^*Ibid., p. 438. On humanistic psychology, see the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, especially an article by Heinz L. Ansbacher, "Alfred Adler and Humanistic Psychology, " XI (Spring 1971), 53-63. In a later issue, see Walter Nord, "J Marxist Critique of Humanistic Psychology, " XVII (Winter 1977), 75-83. And for a masterful and maliciously humorous critique, see Sigmund Koch's comments in "Psychology as a Science," in S. C. Brown, ed., Philosophy of Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 33-38.

^*Duane Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology (2nd ed. 7 New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 358. 34

categories employed in the Psychological Abstracts.

Yet (and perhaps not surprisingly) there is virtually no category of officially recognised psychological endeavor under which %rould fit an investigation of fascism.

B. Mainstream Interpretations of Fascism All three of the "mainstream" American attempts to understand fascism psychologically which satisfy the condi­ tions of our research come from the ranks of psychiatry. We begin with Walter Van Clute's "How Fascism Thwarts the Life

Instinct," a speculative application of psychiatric theory to fascist regimes* Van Clute finds one fact most fundamen­ tal: "Fascism stands for the repression of such life impulses to demand a healthful diet, freedom of speech and action, and elevation in the standard of living.

Sigmund Koch concludes in his damaging critique of "Psychology as Science" (p. 21) that "... psychology cannot be a coherent science, or indeed a coherent field of scholarship, in any specifiable sense of coherence that can bear upon a field of inquiry." A more recent and wide- ranging indictment is Seymour B. Sarason's Psychology Mis­ directed (New York: The Free Press, 1981). Sarason employs what might be called a "sociology-of-psychology" approach emphasizing two main points (p. 15): "... first, that psychology has based itself almost exclusively on a psychology of the individual organism, and, second, that psychologists, by no means a random collection of people, never have been able to confront directly that the substance of their theories cannot be independent of who and where psychologists are in the society into which they have been socialized."

^^Walter Van Clute, "How Fascism Thwarts the Life Instinct," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XII (April 1942), 335. 35

For these are substituted, among other "ideals," the nobil­ ity of war, the duty of subservience to the state, and the virtue of self-denial.

How did fascism impose these "ideals" on the people? Although not necessarily con­ scious of it, fascism took advantage of the psychological tendency of many people to look upon any powerful and paternalistic authority as a benevolent father or parent. As children, we are completely dependent upon our parents for the gratification of most of our physical and emotional needs. These parents are also the authority whose command or guidance we accept, since we fear that not to obey would result in the loss of their love and protection. As adults, many persons substitute the authority of the State, the employer, or the authority of the State, the employ.IB political leader for the parent.1*

Van Clute believes that the people of any society are susceptible to the fascist appeal and are, in times of crisis, likely to turn to the authoritarian state for a solution. As a preventative measure for the non-fascist countries. Van Clute suggests the extension of democracy. He assumes that only a populace skilled in dealing politic­ ally with its problems will be able to resist the appeal of fascism. Neuro-psychiatrist Richard M. Brickner, in Is Germany

Incurable? draws on a particular aspect of psychiatric

18 Ibid., p. 36. For a more developed version of this viewpoint, see Peter Nathan, The Psychology of Fascism (London: Faber, 1943), esp. pp. 1-23. 36 theory. It is his belief that fascism can be understood as a group manifestation of paranoia. "The German group— -as a collective force, not necessarily as individuals— both 'feels' paranoid and displays a remarkable number of the 19 classical paranoid symptoms. " Brickner sees in the Germans such symptoms as megalomania, mysticism, a sense of mission and a "persecution complex." The issue is not whether Hitler or his minions are mental cases. Rather, "... Hitler, Goering, the Nazi party, the German army, are important here only as their behavior meshes with the characteristic behavior of the German nation as a group 20 which tends to bring paranoid types to the top.”

Thus the paranoia is institutionalized as part of German culture. While admitting that the institutionalization of para­ noia is a historical process, Brickner sees psychological conditions as a more basic determinant of German aggres­ sion;

Recognition of the importance of economics and history— the equivalent of the strictly physical factors that may be present in a psychiatric case— is taken for granted from now on. But neither can we longer afford to ignore the behavioral aspect of the German case, regarding it solely in terras of

19 Richard M. Brickner, Is Germany Incurable? (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1943), p. 31.

^°lbid., p. 33. 37

inadequate access to raw materials, popula­ tion pressures, late maturity as a nation or geographical "encirclement." To advance any or all such causes as Wholly accounting for Germany's pecular notions is to omit two irreconcilable fundamentals: one, the human origin of much environmental influence; and two, the wide variety of possible human reactions to any given environmental situ­ ation. ^1

Although Brickner pays lip service to "environmental factors," these are in fact ignored in his actual analysis. His book reveals itself to be a mere argument by analogy in

Which social facts are Interpreted in terms of psychology. It is therefore not surprising that in the end Brickner should call for a psychatric solution to the problem. After an Allied military victory, another step must be taken:

Anthropology, psychiatry and sociology are probably well enough advanced by now to make "treatment" conceivable. Admittedly it will be a difficult job and the victors may have to pay part of the cost of putting it into effect. But it will not be so diffi­ cult as coping with the results of allowing paranoia to flourish unabated inside Germany nor so expensive as preparing for the Third Paranoid War we shall have to fight if it does.22

A third and final "mainstream" contribution consists of two articles by Leo Alexander, a former officer in the U.S.

Army Medical Corps who spent part of his duty on the

^^Ibid., p. 34. Z^Ibid., p. 45. 38

American staff at the Nuremberg trials. His concern is not

to explain fascism per se, but the violence perpetrated by Nazis and their collaborators* His data consist of interviews and testimony of Nuremberg defendants. In "War Crimes and Their Motivation," Alexander analyzes atrocities as group crimes:

The individual criminal as well as the criminal organization commits crimes for the purpose of gaining selfish ends by criminal means. But in addition the criminal organi­ zation also commits crimes for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing the continued adherence and group loyalty of its members since it is vital to the criminal organiza­ tion to insure against desertion by its members.23

If an SS member's loyalty came into question, an act of murder was often required to serve as "blood cement"

(Blutkitt) or proof of fidelity. In "Destructive and Self-Destructive Trends in Criminalized Society" Alexander attempts to reach deeper into the causes of war crimes. He posits an attitude adjustment made by the people involved in carrying out SS activities:

This eruption of aggressive-destructive activity brought about, probably as a means of psychologies1 defense, a fundamental perversion of death into a heathen concept.

23 Leo Alexander, "War Crimes and Their Motiva­ tion, " Journal of CrimiMl Law and Criminology, XXXIX (September-October 1948), 299. 39

which 1 should like to call "idolatrous delight ig death, " or more briefly, thana- tolatry.2*

Alexander sees this "delight in death" as a throwback to primitive human instinctst

The cause of this perverted thanatola- trous attitude toward death must be looked for indeed in a tremendous destructive- aggressive attitude and preoccupation of the Nazi movement and particularly of its driving core, the SS. Like so many other concepts of National Socialism, it also barkens back to primitive destructive atti­ tudes and to the attitude of primitive peoples. It is a primitive destructive drive coupled with magic thinking which is so prevalent in small children and primitive people. This concept is contrary to reality and therefore during normal development it becomes repressed, rejected, sublimated, and surpassed by the mature individual and the mature social group.2*

Even as a limited explanation of war atrocities, the afore­ going is less than satisfying. As an aid to understanding fascism in general it is virtually useless, for the crucial question of why fascism happened in Germany remains un­ answered. The three writers we have just discussed employ a similar overall approach to the problem of fascism. The

2A Alexander, "Destructive and Self-Destructive Trends in Criminalized Society, " ibid. (January-February 1949), 553.

^^Ibid., 557-8. 40 fundamental root is always to be found in human nature. Van

Clute cites the dependency on authority figures. Brickner sees the "German problem" as one of human nature gone awry— that is, in pay chops tho logical terms. Alexander points to a primitive destructive drive. Conversely, all three either ignore or downplay the role of environmental factors. Thus the analytical scope of the three studies is similarly limited and one-sided. The pieces are also basically specu­ lative. (Although Alexander does use Nuremberg documents and personal Interviews, he exceeds their limits when he concludes that "thanatolatry" was at work in the SS. ) In summary, these attempts to analyze fascism are psychological in the narrowest sense. Let us see if others associated with the discipline perform any differently. c. Atypical Views The small dissident faction of American psychologists has produced no significant studies of fascism. The dissi­ dents seem to concentrate most of their efforts on the discipline itself, attempting to introduce social concerns into the discourse of psychology. They have been less successful at applying their "humanistic" frameworks to real social-psychological problems.

D. Emigré Perspectives Europeans who blend Freudian and Marxian theories have been most productive of studies of fascism. An early 41 example la Wilhelm Reich’s The Maea Psychology of Fascism» originally published in 1933. Reich's book# a precursor of the fascism studies produced by émigré scholars in America# was written shortly before he escaped Germany and almost certain death at the hands of the Nazis. By the time Reich reached America in 1939 his interests had begun to shift away from fascism as an object of study# although he did publish an enlarged and revised edition of his book in 1946. We are therefore justified in our inclusion of The Mass

Psychology of Fascism in this dissertation if we note in passing that it was not entirely produced in America.

Most noteworthy about Reich's early writings is his attempt to reconcile Marxian and Freudian theories. (Ironi­ cally. this endeavor earned him banishment from both the

Communist Party and the Psychoanalytic Society in Germany.)

The Mass Psychology of Fascism amply demonstrates the fusion its author was trying to achieve. Reich begins by noting that the success of fascism in various countries has brought Marxism into question as a scientific doctrine. Having abandoned truly dialectical methods for a vulgar material­ ism# the Marxists "... failed to take into account the character structure of the masses and the social effect of mysticism." Dogmatic Marxists were unable to

Vilhelm Reich# The Mass Psychology of Fascism# trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (New York; Farrar# Straus & Giroux# 1970)# p. 5. Copyright e 1970 by Mary Boyd Higgins as trustee of the Wilhelm Reich Infant Trust. By permission of Farrar# Straus and Giroux# Inc. 42 explain why# In a potentially revolutionary situation, the opposite of revolution had come about. For Reich# "... the line of questioning of mass psychology begins precisely at the point Where the immediate socioeconomic explanation hits wide of the mark. In Freudian theory lies the key to solving the Marxist dilemma. Psychoanalytical inves­ tigation reveals that sexual suppression is the central element in the authoritarian family, vdiich in turn is the central institution in reproducing the authoritarian state. During the first four or five years in the authoritarian family the child is prepared for a lifetime of obedience to authority.

The moral inhibition of the child's natural sexuality# the last stage of Which is the severe impairment of the child's genital sexuality# makes the child afraid, shy# fearful of authority# obedient, "good#" and "docile" in the authoritarian sense of the words. It has a crippling effect on man's rebellious forces because every vital 11fe- impulse is now burdened with severe fear and since sex is a forbidden subject# thought in general and man's critical facul­ ty also become inhibited. In short, moral­ ity's aim is to produce acquiescent subjects Who# despite distress and humiliation, are adjusted to the authoritarian order,28

Sexual suppression leads to "conservatism, fear of freedom, in a word, reactionary thinking." Moreover, repressed

^^Ibid.. p. 20. ^^Ibid.# p. 30, 43 sexuality "seeks various kinds of substitute gratifies- tions." National Socialism appeals to reactionaries

While at the same time offering them an outlet for alterna­ tives like sadism, masochism, and exhibitionistic militar­ ism.

Reich is adamant in his rejection of the idea that

Hitler himself, through deception, mind control, charisma, or other personal abilities was the sine qua non of Nazi successes* Rather, Hitler should be viewed as representa­ tive of, and a mobilizing force for, the mass psychology prevalent in Germany. "Only When the structure of the führer*a personality is in harmony with the structures of broad groups can a ' führer* make history. The key social group is seen to be the lower middle class. The question, then, is Why this class turned to National Social­ ism. Reich takes a wide-ranging view of the conditions predisposing the lower middle class toward fascism. He first notes the position of this class in the capitalist production processi

The rapid development of capitalist economy in the nineteenth century, the con­ tinuous and rapid mechanization of produc-" tion, the amalgamation of the various branches of production in monopolistic syn­ dicates and trusts, form the basis of the

^*Ibid., p. 31. ^^Ibid., p. 35. 44

progressive pauperisation of the lower middle-class merchants and t r a d e s m e n . 31

However, the competition among these small businessmen

reduces the possibility of their uniting against the capi­ talists. Second, Reich points to the fact that a large number of lower middle class members are public or private officials who typically identify strongly with the authority of the state, nation, or firm. The ideology of these

officials becomes a "material force" which is more influen­

tial than their economic situation in conditioning their

behavior. Third, Reich sees the family structure of the

lower midle class as one which duplicates in miniature the authoritarian state. The father enforces an Ideology of honor and duty in a process of "the strictest sexual repres­

sion of the women and children. " For Reich,

. . . the sexual inhibitions and debilita­ tions that constitute the most important prerequisites for the existence of the ' authoritarian family and are the most essen­ tial ground work of the structural formation of the lower middle-class man are compassed with the help of religious fears Which are infused with sexual-guilt feelings and deep­ ly embedded in the emotions.32

The suppression of sexuality leads ultimately to a propen­

sity for mystical thinking which is fertile soil for the

Sllbid., p. 44.

^^Ibid., p. 54. 45

Nazi appeals to racial and national honor.

In a most Interesting summation of the role which the "sex—economic" approach needs to play, Reich states that

. . . the establishment of economic freedom goes hand in hand with the dissolution of old institutions (particularly those govern­ ing sexual policies), to Which the reaction­ ary man and also the industrial worker, in­ sofar as he is a reactionary, are not imme­ diately equal. More than anything else it is the fear of "sexual freedom," conceived of as sexual chaos and sexual dissipation in the mind of the reactionary thinker, vAiich has a retarding effect upon the yearning to be free of the yoke of economic exploita­ tion. This will be the case only as long as this misconception of sexual freedom prevails. And it can continue to prevail only in consequence of the lack of clarity surrounding these very decisive questions in masses of people. It is precisely for this reason that sex-econxxny must play an essen­ tial role in the ordering of social rela­ tions. 3 3

The implication here is that political revolution is incomplete if it does not lead to a "sexual revolution"

Which will allow human beings to free themselves from the need for mysticism. (Indeed, Reich applies this thought to the Soviet Union in a book of 1945, The Sexual Revolution.) Because of this emphasis in his work, Reich is generally labeled a "left-Freudian" rather than a Marxist. Clearly, however, his "psychological" analysis is far broader than

^^Ibid., p. 60. 46 any almpllstic application of Freudian theory to the problem of fascism. We turn next to a 1942 article by Erik Erikson on 34 "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth." Erikson places most emphasis on the role of the authoritarian family and the stages of identity formation in predisposing people toward fascism, ^ e father was the most important actor in the German family drama— the absolute master of the house­ hold. But while this fact was true in most Western nations of the time, Erikson sees a uniqueness in the German situa- tioni "I think the difference lies in the German father's essential lack of true inner authority— that authority which

results from an integration of cultural ideal and education- 3S al method." This deficiency is a result of the fact that Germany had not undergone a true bourgeois-democratic

revolution in the pattern of most other Western nations. The German middle-class father reflects an absence of self- confidence that permeates the entire German bourgeoisie.

The average German father's dominance and harshness was not blended with the tender­ ness and dignity vAiich comes from participa­ tion in an integrating cause. Rather, the

Erik H, Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," Psychiatry, V (November 1942), 475-93. This article was later included in a slightly revised form entitled "The Legend of Hitler's Childhood," in Erikson's Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), from %Âiich we shall quote hare.

^^Ibid., p. 290. 47

average father, either habitually or in decisive moments, came to represent the habits and the ethics of the German top sergeant and petty official who— "dress'd in a little brief authority"— would never be more but was In constant danger of becoming less; and who had sold the birthright of a free man for an official title or a life pension.3®

A son growing up in the German family notices the con­ tradiction between the father's absolute mastery of the household and his meek subservience to others outside the home. He notes also an "excessive sentimentality" when his father drinks and sings with his friends.

All this, of course, exists concurrently with respect and love. During the storms of adolescence, however, When the bey's identi­ ty must settle things with his father image, it leads to that severe German Pubertat which is such a strange mixture of open rebellion and "secret sin," cynical delin­ quency and submissive obedience, romanticism and despondency. Which is apt to break the boy's spirit, once and for all.3'

Erikson sees puberty as a stage of rebellion against the emasculated image of the middle-class Bürger. The old custom of the Wanderschaft, in which boys left home at this age to become apprentices, was replaced in the pre-Hitler era by variations of defiance of the father coupled with

Ibid., p. 291. Cf. Reich's discussion of the "social consciousness of the official" in his Mass Psycholo­ gy, pp. 46-47.

3?Ibid., p. 290. 48

the adherence to some mystical-romantic entity:

Mature, Fatherland, Art, Essence, etc., which were clear images of a pure mother, one who would not betray the 3B rebellious boy to that ogre, the father. " But all

this was useless fantasy:

At this stage, the German boy would rather have died than be aware of the fact that this misguided, this aimless initative in the direction of utter impracticality would arouse deep-seated guilt and lead to stunned exhaustion. The identification with the father which in spite of everything had been well established in early childhood would come to the fore. In intricate ways treacherous Fate (= reality) would finally make a Burger out of the boy— a "mere citi­ zen" with an eternal sense of sin for having sacrificed genius for Mammon and for the mere wife and mere children Whom anyone can have.39

The years following the war defeat and revolution of 1918 broke the previous pattern of inherited subservience by exacerbating the psychological conflict of the middle classes:

Their servility toward the upper class, which had lost the war, was not suddenly robbed of any resenüalanee to a meaningful subordination. The inflation endangered pensions. On the other hand, the groping masses were not prepared to anticipate or usurp either the role of free citizens or that of class-conscious workers. It is clear that only under such conditions could

Ibid., p. 292. ^^Ibid., p. 293. 49

Hitler's image immediately convince so many— and paralyse so many m o r e . ^8

Erikson Is careful to point out, however, that the crisis of authority to which he devotes most of his article is an insufficient explanation for the rise of Nazism, One must also look at " . . . the way in which historical and geogra­ phical reality an^lify familial patterns and to What extent, in turn, these patterns influence a people's interpretation

of reality. For example, Erikson sees the Lebens- raum ideology as resulting from the fact of Germany's cen­ tral position in Europe and the perceived threat of military and cultural invasion. He also cites the vindictiveness

embodied in the Versailles treaty as providing Hitler with grist for his propaganda mill. Finally, he traces the rise of anti-Semitism to the particular social and economic position of the Jews, which again lent Hitler's propaganda a seeming credibility. Overall, although Erikson's article is somewhat disjointed and repetitive of ideas first voiced by others, his approach certainly transcends mere psychological reductionism. In Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom we encounter yet another blending of psychoanlysis and Marxism in an attempt to account for the rise of fascism. Although he does not

*°Ibid., p. 294. *llbid., p. 302. 50

cite Reich's Mass Psychology, there are several parallels

between the two works. Perhaps most striking is the simi­

larity between Reich's conception of the "fear of sexual freedom" and the title of Fr

the Reforsmtion has fostered a process of "individuation" Whereby human beings have been emerging from "a state of oneness with the natural world" into an increasing self-

awareness. Individuation consists In the breaking of "primary ties" between humans and the surrounding world— "... the ties that connect the child with its mother, the member of a primitive community with his clan and nature, or

the medieval man with the Church and his social caste. The breakdown of primary ties in the modern world leads to

an increasing aloneness accompanied by feelings of power­ lessness and anxiety. Thus the development of freedom from

the constructions of nature and "primary ties" is "an ambiguous gift." On the one hand it is a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings. But on the other hand this growing individuation means growing isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt concerning one' a own role in the universe, the meaning of one's

42 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1965), p. 46. Copyright c 1943 by Erich Fromm. Reproduced by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, CBS College Publishing. Copyright e 1941, 1969 by Erich Fromm. Reprinted by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Publishers. 51

life, and with all that a growing feeling of one*a own powerleeeneee and insignificance as an individual.*3

There are two possible modes of dealing with the dilemma posed by individuation, one productive and one regressive:

There is only one possible, productive solu­ tion for the relationship of the individual­ ized man with the world: his active solid­ arity with all men and his spontaneous acti­ vity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent individual.

But if "economic, social, and political conditions" do not offer a basis for the realisation of this ideal state of affairs, an alternative means may be chosen by those suffer­ ing the tensions of individuation. "Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom.The specific forms assumed by this escapism are conditioned by the capitalist economic system. Fromm discusses the religious movements of Luther and Calvin as the earliest organized attempts to flee

*3lbid., p. 51. **Ibid., p. 52. ^®lbid. 52

from the new individual freedom brought about by capitalism.

He emphasizes that these movements ware aimed particularly at "the urban middle class, the poor in the cities, and the peasants•" The role of ideas in history is not autonomous. "Only if the idea answers powerful psychological needs of certain social groups will it become a potent force in hiet o r y . For example, Luther's concept of faith in God served to assuage the doubt experienced by the "indivi­ duated" masses, "Luther's faith was the conviction of being loved upon the condition of surrender, a solution which has much in common with the principle of complete submission of the individual to the state and the 'leader'Calvin's doctrine of predestination performed essentially the same function of eliminating doubt, albeit in a different manner.

Thus Lutheranism and Calvinism are important as early forms of "solution" of doubt in the middle class and allied groups and are therefore conceived as precursors of fascism. The psychological mechanism which encouraged individu­ als to escape into fascism Fromm calls the "authoritarian character." This is essentially a combination of sadistic and masochistic tendencies in the individual who seeks relief from the conflicts of modern freedom and is especial­ ly "typical of lower middle-class persons." Fromm relates

^®Ibld., p. 83.

^^Ibid., p. 100. 53 an increase in lower middle-class authoritarianism to the war defeat, inflation, depression, the break-up of the monarchy and the family; and to the increased power and status of the working class, on the one side, and monopoly capital on the other.For him the problem is clearly social-psychological. The authoritarian character is a social character, which Fromm defines as a " • . . dynamic adaptation of human nature to the structure of eocie- 49 ty." In stressing the dynamic nature of social character, Fromm paves the way for one final point in his analysis of the success of Nazism, If the adaptation was purely passive, the middle class might soon have realized that once in power, " . . , although Nazism proved to be economically detrimental to all other classes, it fostered the interests of the most powerful groups of German industry,Lower middle-class support for the Nazis might than have fallen off or been transformed into resistance. However, Fromm sees the mainly psychic satisfactions achieved by the members of this class as compensating for the scarcity of real economic gains.

What mattered was that hundreds of thousands of petty bourgeois, who in the normal course of development had little chance to gain

^^Ibid.. pp. 238-40, ^®Ibld., p. 326. ^°Ibid., p. 243. 54

money or power, as members of the Nazi bureaucracy now got a large slice of the wealth and prestige they forced the upper classes to share with them* Others who were not members of the Nazi machine were given the jobs taken away from Jews and political enemies; and as for the rest, although they did not get more bread, they got "circuses. " The emotional satisfaction afforded by sadistic spectacles and by an ideology vrtiich gave them a feeling of superiority over the rest of mankind was able to compensate them— for a time at least— for the fact that their lives had been impoverished, economic­ ally and culturally,

Thus, in Fromm's opinion, the authoritarian character played an independent role in the rise of Nazism in that it could be exploited physically and ideologically by the Nazis in spite of the fact that real Nazi policies did not serve the class which epitomized this character. If psychological analyses of fascism rest on a single basic premise, surely this last point is it. The autonomy of psychological factors must be demonstrated if the psychological approach is to have any value. Reich, Erikson and Fromm contributed to a theory of the authoritarian character. Next it needed to be verified. The final émigré work on fascism is The Authoritarian Personality by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel

^^Ibid., p. 245. 55

52 J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. The research Which led to the publication of this book was a product of the Frankfurt School/institute of Social Research's encoun­ ter with American social science methodology. It was influ­ enced by the earlier speculative writings of Fromm, Reich, Erikson, and others. " % e central theme of the work is a relatively new concept— the rise of an 'anthropological' species we call the authoritarian type of man.An attempt is made to attack the general. International problem with a wide range of social scientific tools. "Experts in the fields of social theory and depth psychology, content analysis, clinical psychology, political sociology, and projective testing pooled their experiences and findings.The overall goal was to Identify and study "potentially fascist" individuals in order that future fascist movements might be more effectively contested by "progressive" and "democratic" forces. Early in the book the authors make quite clear their conception of the relationship between social and

52 T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Person­ ality (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969). While Levinson and Sanford are Americans, the overall spirit and direction of this work emanated very definitely from A d o m o — and from his colleague Max Horkheimer. On this point, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston: Little, Brown fit Company, 1973), pp. 238-9. ^^Ibid., p. ix.

^*Ibid., pp. x-xi. 56

psychological factors. After describing the concept of "personality structure" on Which their research rests, they place it in a social context:

It has been stated that the personality structure may be such as to render the indi­ vidual susceptible to antidemocratic propa­ ganda. It may now be asked what are the conditions under which such propaganda would increase in pitch and volume and come to dcnninate in press and radio to the exclusion of contrary ideological stimuli, so that vAiat is now potential would become actively manifest. The answer must be sought not in any single personality nor in personality factors found in the mass of people, but in processes at work in society itself. It seems well understood today that Whether or not antidemocratic propaganda is to become a dominant force in this country depends primarily upon the situation of the most powerful economic interests, upon whether they, by conscious design or not, make use of this device for maintaining their domi­ nant status.95

At the same time the authors were eager to avoid being labeled "economic determlniats.“ In their opinion, "... it is becoming increasingly plain that people very frequent­ ly do not behave in such a way as to further their material

Ibid., p. 7. Later Adorno reiterated this posi­ tion, saying that "... we never questioned the primacy of objective factors over psychological." But studies of the objective factors involved in fascism had already gone far in increasing our knowledge. "The book was simply trying, according to a famous formula of Freud's, to add something new and complementary to what is already known." ("Scienti­ fic Experiences of a European Scholar in America," in Fleming and Bailyn, The Intellectual Migration, pp. 256 and 257.) 57

interests, even when it is clear to them what their interests are,When people act irrationally (against their interests), a purely socio-economic explana­ tion of their behavior is inadequate.

The objective situation of the individual seems an unlikely source of such irrational­ ity; rather we should seek where psychology has already found the sources of dreams, fantasies, and misinterpretations of the world— that is, in deep-lying needs of the personality.97

The researchers chose two complementary methodologies. Clinical studies were used to study individuals, and questionnaires were administered to groups.

When the individual was in the focus of attention, the aim was to describe in detail his pattern of opinions, attitudes and values and to understand the dynamic factors underlying it, and on this basis to design significant questions for use with groups of subjects. When the group was in the focus of attention, the aim was to discover what opinions, attitudes, and values commonly go together and what patterns of factors in the life histories and in the contemporary situ­ ations of the subjects were commonly associ­ ated with each ideological constellation;

^^Ibid., p. e.

^^Ibid., p. 9. 58

this afforded a basis on which to select individuals for more intensive study . . . .98

As for the people studied, with few exceptions, "... the

subjects were drawn almost exclusively from the middle eg socioeconomic class.In addition Jews, "non- vdiites, " and foreign-bom people were excluded from the final sample of 2099. Thus the findings could not be generalized to the entire American population.

The most celebrated outcome of the authoritarian

personality project is the "F-Scale," a combination of questions designed to indirectly test three dimensions of

authoritarianism— anti-Semitism, ethocentrism, and political

and economic conservatism. In fact, the first 279 pages of this lengthy book are largely devoted to a description of

the evolution of the "F-Scale." The desire was to have

items vrtiich yielded "a valid estimate of antidemocratic

58 Ibid., p. 12. "The categories that underlay the quantitative researches vrare themselves of a qualitative character and derived from an analytical characterology. Furthermore, we had intended from the beginning to compen­ sate for the danger of the mechanistic element in quantita­ tive investigations by supplementary qualitative case studies The deadlock that purely quantitative determina­ tions seldon arrive at the genetical depth mechanisms. Whereas qualitative results can easily be accused of being incapable of generalizations and thereby lose their objec­ tive sociological value, we sought to surmount by employing an entire series of different techniques, vrtiich we only related to one another in terms of the underlying catego­ ries." (Adorno, "Scientific Experiences," p. 359.)

^^Ibid., p. 22 59 tendencies at the personality level." That is, the authors assumed the existence of "deep-lying personality needs" at the root of fascist potential in individuals.

The task then was to formulate scale items vAiich, though they were statements of opin­ ions and attitudes and had the same form as those appearing in ordinary opinion-attitude questionnaires, would actually serve as "give-aways" of underlying antidemocratic trends in the personality,80

From the clinical studies and other research in vrtiich the authors had been involved were derived nine variables thought to represent trends in the authoritarian personality

— conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intreception, superstition and stereotypy, power and "toughness," destructiveness and cynicism, projec- tivity, and sexThese variables were thought of as going together to form a single syndrome, a more or less enduring structure in the person that renders him receptive 62 to antidemocratic propaganda." The F-Scale proved to be sufficiently powerful an Instrument to generate groups of

"high" and "low" scorers (authoritarian and anti-authoritar­ ian subjects, respectively) vrtio differed significantly in follow-up interviews and tests designed to explore

^°Ibid. p. 223. ^^Ibid., pp. 227-41

^^Ibid., p. 228. 60 prejudice, religion, politics, economics, and other Issues.

(The specific findings— detailing relationships between F-Scale scores and socio-economic variables— need not concern us here because of the unrepresentative nature of the research sample.)

The authors conclude that their most "crucial" result is the discovery of a " . . . close correspondence in the type of approach and outlook a subject is likely to have in a great variety of areas, ranging from the most Intimate features of family and sex adjustment through relationships to other people in general, to religion and to social and political philosophy."®^ This is actually the only conclusion vrtiich the authors present without qualification* While they insist that there exist at least two different patterns— authoritarian and democratic— the authors avoid specificity about the content of these patterns. They vmrn that

. . . the tvra opposite types of outlook must by no means be regarded as absolutes. They emerge as a result of statistical analysis and thus have to be considered as syndromes of correlating and dynamically related fac­ tors. They consist in accumulations of symptoms frequently found together but they leave plenty of room for variations of specific f e a t u r e s . 84

®^lbid., p. 971. ®^Ibid., pp. 971-2, 61

In fact, Adomo and associates seem to claim no higher than

"pilot study" status for their work. They urge that a broader study ( "on a statistical basis comparable to that of nationwide opinion polls") be carried out.

Broadening of the factual basis in this res­ pect undoubtedly will lead to reformulation of many specific questionnaire items and technical revisions. Actually, only in a truly representative study would it become possible to appraise quantitatively the amount of prejudice in our culture, to determine the general validity of the personality correlates outlined in this volume and to assess the various possibili­ ties of a mutual overlapping of the two major patterns that we have d e s c r i b e d . 85

Finally, the authors reflect on the policy implications of their work. This point interests us because the broad scope of the research is again made clear:

It seems obvious . . . that the modifica­ tion of the potentially fascist structure cannot be achieved by psychological means alone. The task is comparable to that of eliminating neurosis, or delinquency, or nationalism from the world. These are products of the total organization of

®®lbid., p. 973 62

society and are to be changed only as that society is c h a n g e d . 8 6

It is fitting that we conclude our discussion of émigré psychological studies of fascism on this note. It has been demonstrated here that the work of Reich, Erikson, Fromm, and Ado mo and his associates is markedly different from the American studies vrtiich we examined. Each of the four is explicit about the proper place of the psychological approach to fascism, showing that psychological factors must alvrays be studied in relation to the surrounding social environment.®^ To be sure, each can be criticized. Reich gives too much emphasis to sex among the psychological factors. Erikson*s thoughts are presented In a manner which

Ibid., p. 975. Max Horkheimer later reiterated this point in Hadley Cantril, ed., Tensions that Cause Wars (Urbanat University of Illinois Press, 1950), p. 227t "The pressures generated by contemporary civilization produce in many individuals a latent aggressiveness vrtiich, when captured by nihilistic philosophies, may be led into channels of racialism and aggressive nationalism. Such psychological mechanisms played their part in inducing the German people to first accept National Socialism passively and than to be dravm into the community of guilt. We must learn to understand them, against the social and economic background in vrtiich they operated, even though we are convinced that pedagogical or psychological reforms alone will not prevent a recurrence of outbursts of chauvinism in the future."

^^A. James Gregor, in an attempt to dismiss the vfork of Reich, Fromm, Adorno, and the Englishman Peter Nathan, fails to make this point clear. In Interpretations of Fascism (Morristovm, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974)., p. 77, he is thus able to reject these attempts "to interpret Fascism as the exclusive product of peculiar personality types" as "hopelessly flawed." 63

leaves unclear his beliefs about the relative importance of psychological factors and social factors Fromm is too philosophical, not explicit enough about the case studies vrtiich were supposed to have been his empirical base. The

Adorno study has perhaps received more critical attention 68 than the other three combined* Various methodologi­ cal errors have been found, and the exclusive concentration on right-wing authoritarianism has been challenged. But the fact remains that the analytical scope and conclusions

reached by the four émigré studies are far more wide-ranging than is the case in the studies by Americans. And of all the studies we have examined in this chapter. The Authori­ tarian Personality is the only one which comes close to being an empirical analysis of fascism. We may argue, then, that it took the influence of the émigré scholars to bring about the application of American social science's highly refined methodological tools to the study of fascism. No single fact is more illustrative of this chapter's main point.

Having said this, one basic problem remains with all the psychological studies— they lack an international dimen­ sion. The argument that the authoritarian personality is a

Most notable is the volume edited by Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoei The Free Press, 1954). Martin Jay reviews the major critiques in Tlie Dialectical Imagination, pp. 244-50. 64 precondition of faecism becomes powerful only if it can be demonstrated that authoritarianism was more prevalent in countries where fascism succeeded. The relative in^ortance of psychological factors is greatly reduced if they are not unique (or uniquely strong) in the affected countries. Up to the present time it remains to be shown that psychologi­ cal authoritarianism was more prevalent in Germany and Italy

(or in any right-wing regime since "the era of fascism") than in other countries.

®®Cf. Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism, pp. 73-77. CHAPTER IV

ECONOMICS

An economic system geared for wealth has been supplanted by an economic system geared for power, and power only. — Prank Munk

Fascism arises under certain specific his­ torical conditions which are in turn the product of the inqiact of imperialist wars of redivision on the economic and social struc­ ture of advanced capitalist nations. — Paul H. Sweezy

A. State of the Discipline Perhaps the antithesis of the psychological approach to fascism is one vrtiich views the "causes" of fascism as ulti­ mately traceable to the economic structure and well-being of the countries affected. The presumption here would be that economic conditions at the very least set the stage upon vrtiich the drama of fascism is acted out. In its most extreme version, however, an economic "explanation" might go so far as to posit certain economic developments as suffi­ cient to cause fascism. The psychological and socio­ political elements of fascism would then be treated as "derivations" of the economic circumstances. This chapter will review studies of fascism by American and émigré

65 66

•cononiats In an effort to find tdiat differences exist between their respective treatments of the subject matter. We begin by trying to grasp the essence of American academic economics in this century. The situation can be sketched rather clearly:

For more than a quarter of a century, think­ ing about economic issues and policies in the United States has been dominated by a blend of the macroeconomic analysis of the late English economist John Maynard Keynes and his followers and the microeconomic ana­ lysis found in the central tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith through English neoclassical economist Alfred Marshall and his followers.^

Daniel Fusfeld calls this the "post Keynesian synthesis" and

sees Paul Samuelson as its "principal professional expo- nent." Host of what is done by m o d e m American econo­ mists falls under one of t%ro basic categories. Microecono­ mics deals with "... the functioning of the market system 3 and its role as an allocator of resources." Attention

is focused on individual decision-making units— consumers, households, firms— and how their decisions interact to affect factors of production and prices of goods. Hacro-

John E. Elliot and John Cownie, eds., Competing Philosophies in American Political Economics (Pacific Palisades, California! Goodyear Publishing Company, 1975), p. 115. 2 Daniel R. Fusfeld, Economics (2d ed.; Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), pp. 3-5. ^William J. Barber, A History of Economic Thought (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 164. 67 economics deals (not surprisingly) with economies as wholes*

Its data are those pertaining to economic aggregates— national income, the quantity of money, and the level of

enqiloyraent, to name three of the most in^rtant.

Prior to the Great Depression, despite critiques by Thorstein Veblen and a few Marxists, American economics was dominated by the micro-outlook. Its chief spokesman was probably John Bates Clark of Columbia University. The ascendancy of the microeconomic viewpoint is understandable

in the context of America's basically boom economy during the first thirty years of this century. The reason for this dominance lies not in the scientific power of microeconomics but in the macro-economic assumptions which undergird it.

It assumes that the forces of supply and demand will automatically bring equilibrium adjustments in all prices and values, full utilisation of the factors of production, and an equilibrium price for each. Devia­ tions from these levels caused by cyclical disturbances were regarded as temporary. In general, earlier price and value analysis rested upon assumptions of laisses faire and the application of such a theory implied a laissez-faire policy and perfect mobility of factors within a self-regulating econ­ omy.*

In short, microeconomics will only work perfectly in a sys­ tem characterized by perfect competition, perfect equilibri­ um, and full use of all productive factors. In a booming econ

John Fred Bell, A History of Economic Thought (2nd ed.; New York: Ronald Press company, 1967), p. 60s. 66

The crash of 1929, however, was to precipitate challenges to all these assumptions. By far the most effective challenger was John Maynard Keynes.

While essentially accepting neoclassical microeconomics, Keynes sharply dissented fraa orthodox views concerning macroecono­ mics, notably the idea that through reliance upon flexible prices in labor, goods, and money narkets, the economy normally tends toward stable equilibrium at full employ­ ment . 5

Keynes' impact was not immediate, however. In America the

Hew Deal programs were largely a practical response to the depression. "These daring experiments were refreshing departures from the conventional wisd

In the end Keynesian doctrine did have an explicit effect upon public policy, but this effect was postponed until the end of World War II. In the 1930s the Keynesian influ­ ence tAS more considerable among economists and relatively junior public officials than it was among politicians and the heads of the important public agencies.'

’Elliot and Cownie, Competing Philosophies, p. 115. Keynes* major w r k is The General Theory of Employ­ ment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan Company, 1936). ^Barber, A History of Economic Thought, p. 225.

^Robert Lekachman, The Age of Keynes (Mew York: Random House, 1966), p. 113. 69

0£ course, it is the economists in Whom we are here inter­ ested, and we may conclude that a najrority of them were "converted" to Keynesianism by the 1950s. The earliest major expositor of Keynes' theories in America was Alvin H. Hansen at Harvard, whose most influential successor is John

K. Galbraith. Among the economists ttot won over by Keynesianism, most O adhere to either "new left" or "old right" viewpoints. The old right is represented by the Chicago and Virginia "schools" and offers a variety of "laisses-faire libertari­ anism" in opposition to the Keynesian viewpoint. Milton

Friedman is the best known proponent of the rightist posi­ tion. The leftist position is difficult to categoriae in general terms, but the central concern seems to be a return to political economics. Those advocating this approach declare that the economy is not an isolated, autonomous realm operating in accordance with scientific laws; rather it is subject to the willful actions of human groups. A new economics must reflect this fact. "Orthodox economics tries to show that markets allocate scarce resources according to relative efficiency; political economics tries to show that

o For a view from the center of the two "extremes," see Mancur Olson and Christopher K. Clague, "Dissent in Economics# The Convergence of Extremes," Gocial Research, XXXVIII (Autumn 1971), 751-76. 70

a markets distribute income according to relative power, **

One of the most eloquent critics of mainstream economics is Robert L. Heilbroner, who views the orthodox paradigm based on the "scientific method" as "irrelevant."

The difficulty . . . is that this para­ digm, applied to the field of social prob­ lems, tends to rule out of bounds those kinds of issues that resist accurate measurement, or that lend themselves only awkwardly or not at all to mathematical representation, or that contain a central and irrepressible value consideration. In a word, it tends to rule out most "political" matters.10

The orientation of modern economics has been toward building

"models" of production processes and of the behavior of consumers, workers, and entrepreneurs. In Heilbroner s opinion, "... economists have striven for a picture of society in which the interaction of laws of production and

9 Edward Nell, "Economicst The Revival of Politi­ cal Economy," in Robin Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science (New York* Vintage Books, 1973), p. M (emphasis removed).

Robert Heilbroner, "On the Possibility of a Political Economics, " Journal of Economic Issues, IV (Decem­ ber 1970), 3-4. Heilbroner has written voluminously on the need for a new economics. Particularly noteworthy are "Economics as a 'Value-Free' Science," Social Research, XL (Spring 1973), 129-43; and the "Political Economics" section of his Between Capitalism and Socialism (Now York* Random House, 1970), pp. 115-210. On the issue of value-freedom one should also consult Jon D. Hisman, "Toward a Humanist Reconstruction of Economic Science," Journal of Economic Issues, XIII (March 1979), 19-48; and Timothy J. Brennan, "Toward a Humanist Reconstruction of Economic Science* Comment," Journal of Economic Issues, XIV (December 1980), 1019-25. 71 bshavtor . « , would describe the major economic events of the social system much as if it were a branch of phys­ ics. Although the models are impressive to behold, however, they reflect only approximately the actual produc­ tion processes and human behavior they purport to describe. The most important reason for the irrelevance of these models is " . . , that the social universe . . . is not and cannot be adequately described by functional relationships alone, but must also and simultaneously be described as a 12 system of privilege." Thus the question: "Is it possible to construct a system that is at one and the same time a portrayal of functional relationships and of privi­ lege?" Heilbroner answers that the basic outline for such a system already exists in Marxian economics, which could be combined with useful aspects of neoclassical economics

"... to produce an economic theory that is both elegant and consistent as a model and freighted with meaning as a theory of society.Daniel R. Fusfeld offers a

^^Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism, pp. 118-19. 12 Ibid., p. 122 (emphasis removed). Compare Heilbroner*s views with those of J. Ron Stanfield in "Phenomena and Epiphenomena in Economics, " Journal of Economic Issues, XIII (December 1979), 885-96. Stanfield is critical of orthodox economics* narrow treatment of power as "market power," and of its ignorance of the "social and ecological context" of human actions. "The utilitarianism and extreme individualism which are typical of the main­ stream neglect the fundamental sociality of human exis­ tence." (889)

^^Ibid., p. 124. 72

«maWhat more general solution to the problems cited by

Heilbroner. Fusfeld suggests a jettisoning of formal models based on logical empiricism in favor of %diat he calls

"pattern models." Derived from Gestalt psychology, pattern models in economics vfould be historically relative and methodologically diverse attempts to understand the totality of relationships in an economic system. These would be more productive than the formal models designed primarily to generate empirically testable hypotheses. As logical

empiricism once played a progressive role in an era when it aided in the defeat of theories of divine origins and

authority and in the justification of individual and academic freedom, so now "... pattern models, with their subjectivity, relativity, and tentative conclusions, fit

into a world view that stresses chance, indeterminacy, and a flexible view of human motivations and behavior. For our immediate concerns, the point to be taken from the

critiques by Fusfeld, Heilbroner, and others is that a problem like fascism does not lend itself to the kinds of

empirical techniques dominant in the field of economics.

Having briefly surveyed the condition of economics and political economy in America during this century, our task is to investigate the consequences of this state of affairs

^*Daniel R. Fusfeld, "The Conceptual Framework of Modern Economics," Journal of Economic Issues, XIV (March 1980), 43. 73 for the study of fascism by aconomlsts. If our analysis is correct, we would expect to find very few treatments of fascism by mainstream economists. Those that we do find we would expect to deal with specific aspects of fascist economies or to attempt to explain fascism on the basis of narrow economic "causes," Studies of a broader scope we will predict to be the products of scholars critical of, or peripheral to, academic economics r or of emigre scholars influenced by the Marxian or other European traditions. Let us now see whether our expectations are borne out.

B. . Mainstream Interpretations of Fascism The American-born orthodox economists as a group have produced remarkably few studies of fascism. In fact, we can find not a single study treating fascism in general, and only one which aims at a general understanding of a particu­ lar fascist regime. That one study was published by Calvin B. Hoover of the Duke University economics department in 1933. Although Hoover, who died in 1974, considered himself somewhat of a rebel, his entire career is an illustrious exan^ple of mainstream academic economics.After serving in the American artillery in World War X, Hoover went on to earn a doctorate at Wisconsin. He landed a

For an account of his career, see Calvin B. Hoover's Memoirs of Capitalism, Cwnmunism, and Nazism (Dur­ ham, N.C.l Duke University Press, 1665). 74 position at Duke and in 1929 went to the Soviet Union with a research grant from the Social Science Research Council.

Upon leaving Russia he met J. H. Keynes in England, Who helped him arrange with the Macmillan Company to publish a book based on his Russian research. An account of his meeting with Keynes provides insight into Hoover's theoretical and political orientation*

Besides our discussion of the Soviet economy, we talked over the core of the ideas he was later to put forward in his General % e o r y . He was pleased to hear that Ï planiieà a tneoretical work along the same lines. I regret to say that my involvement with the New Deal diverted me from this project. I continued to work in the area, but I never published a major work in this field. I was, however, to have a part in getting Keynesian policies adopted by the Roosevelt administration.^^

The success of Hoover's book on Russia, in addition to a sabbatical leave from Duke, allowed him to finance a trip to Germany for a research project on the rise of National Socialism. From this came his second book, Germany Enters the Third Reich, about Which he wrote in 1965t "Reading it now, I am astonished to find how very little of it I would change if I were to write it today. Upon Hoover's return to America he became actively involved in the New

Deal. In World War II and again during the Korean conflict

l*Ibid., p. 125

l?Ibid., p. 135 (note) 75 he served with the Office of Strategic Services. In books of 1937 and 1959, Hoover developed a conception of "totali­ tarianism, " stressing that the similarities between Commu- IS nist and fascist regimes outweigh their differences.

These books are not very well thought out and add nothing to Hoover's earlier analysis of German fascism. His final book, the Memoirs, is most useful as an aid to understanding

the man and his beliefs and actions. We may now address ourselves to Germany Enters the

Third Reich. Unfortunately for the hypotheses of this dissertation, it must be said that Hoover's analysis of

Nazism, considering its date of publication, is one of the more insightful pieces ever written on the subject— although it seems to be little known among contemporary scholars.

Looking back on the book's impact, the author believes that its most important effect was to destroy certain common cliches about Nazism.

My book made it clear that Hitler was some­ thing far more dangerous than a puppet of German reactionary capitalists, that he was likely to succeed in rearming Germany with­ out starving the population, that his plans for German territorial expansion must be taken with utmost seriousness, and finally that the Nazi regime was an immediate danger

18 Hoover, Dictators and Democracies (New York: Macmillan, 1937ÿ and The Economy, Liberty and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959). 76

to International peace and a grave portent of world catastrophe.^*

Hoover begins with a survey of the economic syst«a in

Germany before National Socialism. In spite of the fact that the Weimar Republic was operated by Social Democrats', the government, "... up to the time of the National Socialist victory, had not yet modified the existing capita- 20 listic system in any fundamental way." Even though many industries were owned or controlled by the state', the class control of industry was not changed. In fact, the state was subsidising the industrial owners by furnishing capital and covering certain losses. Hoover next examines the attitude of the German people toward the economic system. He presents this in the form of a class analysis. The proletariat became increasingly dis­ satisfied with the Weimar economy after 1928, losing faith in the Social Democrats' claim that capitalism vrould gradu­ ally evolve into socialism. "On the other hand, the domina­ tion of the German Communist Party by Moscow prevented it from following any policy based upon realities and conse­ quently from exploiting effectively the growing desperation

19 Hoover, Memoirs, p. 147. Unfortunately, Hoover's warnings were not heeded by the leaders who had to formulate policy regarding Hitler's Germany. Hoover, Germany Ente» the Third Reich (New York I Macmillan Com^ny, 1933), p. 10 77

Of the proletariat."^^ An additional factor gravitat­ ing against worker unity was the large number and variety of worker unions. As for the peasantry, its position %ms better in 1932 than in 1913. "It is true, nevertheless, that the situation of German agriculture had changed materi­ ally for the worse during the year immediately preceding the 22 triumph of the National socialist Party." In

Hoover's opinion, the key issue for the peasantry was tariffs on agricultural products from other countries. The peasants, of course, favored high tariffs, but the industri­ alists fought against such tariffs because they interfered with the selling of their products abroad. "The result of this opposition %AS to complete the conquest of peasant opinion by the National Socialists. Another group vAiich supported the Nazis for the same reason was the Junkers. The middle class, on the other hand, was alienated from participation in the economy because owners of stocks and bonds had come to have very little voice in controlling corporate enterprises. This disenfranchised class had little reason to defend bourgeois democracy. German students are also treated by Hoover as a separate "class." Due to the depression and to overcrowding of the universities, few students could count on finding

21lbid., p. 13.

S^Ibid., pp. 16-17,

^^Itaid., p. 20. 78 employment In their chosen professions after graduation* Thus: "It was students and unemployed graduates Who furnished numbers, leaders, enthusiasm and fanaticism to the National Socialist fighting organisations*"^^ Finally, the industrialists were confident of their ability to control the left from their experience with the Social Democrats. They were not driven by a fear of revolution to support the Nazis. In fact, few capitalists aligned them­ selves with Hitler before he came to power. Hoover believes that anti-Semitism and the potential for violence were abhorrent to most businessmen. Further, the "left" wing of the Nazi movement was a cause for grave concern among these men. Their hope, then, v a s to wait out the economic crisis and try to preserve German capitalism. From the above it is clear that Hoover sees the prole­ tariat as the only class Which could possibly have turned back the National Socialist tide. The failure to do so is attributed to poor leadership by the Socialists and Commu­ nists. Once the proletarian obstacle was removed. Hitler was free to out-maneuver the representatives of the bour­ geoisie and achieve absolute power by March, 1933, with the passage of the Enabling Act. Hoover provides excellent accounts of the breakdovm of the Marxist parties and of the political process by Which Hitler consolidated his position.

Ibid., p. 26. 79

Subsequent developments occurred after the book's publication. To complete his analysis, he attempts to provide some insight into National Socialism as an ideology and as a mass movement. Commenting on the party's Ideology, Hoover focuses on the central role of anti-Semitism. He insists that there are social-structural roots Which made the anti-Semitic doctrine so effective a propaganda weapon.

The National Socialists charged that in laW, the press, music, art, the theatre, educa­ tion, banking and in retail and wholesale trade, the Jews occupied a position Which was completely out of proportion to the ratio of the Jewish population and the "Aryan" population of Germany. Now this charge was mainly t r u e .

Due to discrimination in certain areas of German life, Jews did tend to concentrate in particular professions. The Nazis easily convinced many people that this meant an Inordinate role for the Jews in determining the content of culture. More important, they could label the Jews as

"profiteers" perpetrating economic crimes against the Volk. For examples

The National Socialists charge that Jews actually benefitted frtxn the depression just as they had benefitted from the inflationary period. There is a certain truth to this

2 S Ibid., p. 172. For verification of this and following points, see Peter G. J. Puiser, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (New Yorks John Wiley & Sons, 1964). 80

Charge. During either periods of inflation or deflation there are extraordinary oppor­ tunities for persons who are particularly skillful in financial affairs to benefit at the expense of those who are not. Likewise in such periods there are special opportuni­ ties for persons to profit Who do not permit themselves to be influenced by public opinion or patriotic propaganda,26

The Nazis were the first mass party to successfully exploit the pre-existing anti-Semitic sentiment in Germany. "To the National Socialists must be assigned the responsibility for choosing the Jew as the personal Devil upon whom the blame for all the troubles of Germany might be saddled." 2 7 Hoover predicts (in 1933) that this fact may have conse­ quences in the future. "Up to the present time . . . no real pogroms have taken place, although such is the hatred against the Jews that it is quite possible that they might 28 occur at any time." Discussing the party as a mass movement. Hoover stresses that the Nazis were not simply a small group of fanatics around Hitler. "The masses Which gave weight to the movement were the ruined aristocracy, the over-burdened lower middle class, the discontented peasants, and the youth of the universities, inflamed against a world vdiich offered

2*ibid.

27lbid., p. 174. 2*Ibid. 81

29 them no future." Further, the movement was not simply an eplphenomenon concealing the "real" class support behind the scenes.

It has been too hastily assumed that Nation­ al Socialism is slnyply the demagogic form given to the desire of reactionary capital­ ists to defend themselves against Communism, while at the same time destroying the inde­ pendence of the worker and of the labor unions which have protected that indepen­ dence. 30

The evidence adduced is of three kinds. First, Hoover's interviews and conversations with German businessmen led him to conclude that they feared the Nazis more than they did the Communists. Second, the early policy moves of the Hitler government were "... a sufficient proof that an effective will to change the previously existing capitalis­ tic system in a fundamental way actually exists. The Nazis, it seamed to Hoover in 1933, were working toward a new form of "corporative" state. "The National Socialists hit upon the ingenious idea of retaining the form of private

corporate ownership while taking over the function of appointing or at least confirming the directorates of corporations by the party." 32 The mass base of the new state will be maintained by virtue of the fact that "...

^°Ibid., p. 185. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 188. 82 everyone engaged in carrying out an economic function shall belong to an association which represents his calling or profession,Third, the left wing of the Party was still a strong force at the time Hoover wrote. Thus he notes that "... astonishment has been great When the labor organizations Which are under National Socialist guidance have in many ways shown themselves more militant than the old Socialist unions."3* Hoover sees a small but real chance that a new, stable economic system will be instituted by the Nazis, but he believes it more likely that the violence and turmoil of the new regime will lead to its eventual downfall. Specifically, he predicts (basing himself on Hitler's Mein Kampf) that Germany will become warlike. "Hitler now says that Germany desires no territory inhabited by foreign populations, yet it is hard to believe in the sincerity of such statements."3^ Hoover, as we have seen, desired that his book would alert the Western nations to the danger represented by Hitler,3* but he is not optimistic about the future.

33ibid., p. 189.

3 * I b i d ., p. 203.

35lbid., p. 220. 3*He does entertain, however, the typically Western hope that Hitler might turn his energies tovnrd Russia, thereby lessening the threat to "the democracies. Ibid., pp. 226-7. 83

It does not appear likely that the enemies of Germany will resort to preventa­ tive war, since the stateamen of these countries can hardly be expected to possess the requisite ruthlessness. Consequently, if min^num demands of Germany are not peace­ fully granted and if, in the meantimS, the Disarmament Conference has succeeded in abolishing offensive weapons, the world will probably witness a test of lAiether defensive weapons are in fact effectively such,3?

Germany Enters the Third Reich was certainly one of the most prescient early books on fascism. That it was the

product of an American makes it an even greater accomplish­ ment. One year of life in Germany imbued Hoover with an

extraordinarily broad understanding of the political situa­

tion there. But an important question for us is: To %diat extent did Hoover's training in economics influence his work? Very little, it would seem. The argument Which holds

his book together is a standard class analysis of the Marxian variety. Yet Hoover never considered himself a Marxist, and he even intended Germany Enters the Third Reich

to be in part a refutation of the Marxist theory of fascism. The paradox is explained vdien we realize that Hoover was in fact refuting the vulgar Marxist analysis of fascism, and

that he perhaps unwittingly substituted for it an analysis mi)ch more in the tradition of Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. It is not surprising that Hoover would

3^Ibid., p. 228. 84 have had only a superficial knowledge of the classical

Marxian writings and that his understanding would have been greatly colored by the simplified and dogmatized version propagated by the Soviet Union. He deserves much credit for seeing through the vulgarity into the vital core of Marx's ideas. Hoover's scope of analysis takes in the wide range of economic, social, and political phenomena needed to compre­ hend fascism in one country. The international aspect of fascism, however, is touched upon only briefly. The data include German economic and social statistics and personal interviews, but the overall methodology might be called "participant observation" for lack of a better term. The real value of the book derives mostly from an essentially journalistic talent of the author to take a wide variety of his own sense impressions and put them together in a mean­ ingful Wiole. Hoover's accuracy has been supported by numerous later studies as well as by the historical realiza­ tion of many of his predictions* Germany Enters the Third Reich is a «rorthy benchmark by which to evaluate the investigations carried out by other economists. An interesting contrast to Hoover's book is provided by the few later studies of fascism by mainstream economists. Actually these are not investigations of fascism per se but limit themselves to describing the economic workings of specific fascist regimes, which are treated as given. Two 85 studies will illustre te. They deal with the important ques­ tion of Germany's war economy and just how efficient and war-ready it was. Burton H. Klein published Germany's Economic Preparation for War in 1959. At the time he was employed by the Rand Corporation, although he is currently a professor of economics at the California Institute of Tech­ nology. Dr. Klein was one of the first persons to systema­ tically challenge the idea that Germany had devoted a large portion of its public expenditures to war preparations. For examplef, he asserts that "... in the prewar years large- scale public borrowing was not undertaken. Until 1938, the total budget of the Reich, states and municipalities, was substantially in balance." The Nazi leadership did not understand that deficit financing could be used to produce vAiatever was needed. In addition. Hitler under­ estimated what was needed for war because of his firm faith in the Blitzkrieg strategy:

The fundamental reason why large war prepara­ tions were not undertaken is simply that Hitler's concept of warfare did not require them. Documentary evidence and Interrogation of his confidants indicate that for the ful­ fillment of his territorial desires. Hitler did not expect to fight a protracted war against a coalition of major powers. Rather he planned to solve Germany's living-space problem in piecemeal fashion— by a series of small wars. 3*

38 Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparation for War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959], p. 8 3*Ibid., pp. 25-26. 86

Klein devotee a major portion of his book to refuting the claim that there were material restrictions Which hampered Germany's war effort. He argues to the contrary that short­ ages of raw materials or labor or industrial equipment did not exist. Rather, these resources were not used as effici­ ently as they might have been if a real effort had been exerted by the Nazi leaders. The only reason that Germany was at all prepared for war was a general recovery of the national economy from the depression of the early 1930s. Only after the defeat at Stalingrad was a significantly greater proportion of resources devoted to the war. By then it was too late. A second book in this tradition is Berenice A. Carroll's Design for Total War. Dr. Carroll, currently at the University of Illinois, earned her Ph.D. at Brovm University with the research that led to this book. Her argument revolves around the career of General Georg Thomas, who throughout his career fought for a total mobilization of the German economy in the war effort. Carroll disputes Klein's work on a number of points. She views Hitler as an exponent of total war, but one who held to a different design. The Blitzkrieg strategy was well thought out and very nearly triumphant. "In all. Hitler's policies were shaped with better logic, and better information, than his critics allowed; and they were rewarded with many incredible 87 successes."*^ (Of course, Hitler failed to foresee the extent of English and Russian resistance to his agenda.) Further, Carroll sees a more gradual evolution from peace­ time to tartime econcxny than does Klein.

In 1933 the economy of the Third Reich vns still "peace oriented." From 1934 on it was moving in the direction of a war economy, but in that and the following year, it was still quite some distance from the objec­ tive. Beginning in 1936, Germany's economy was "dominated" in certain key respects (namely investments and government expendi­ tures) by armaments, but still should not be called a "war economy." Prom 1938 on, how­ ever, that designation can legitimately be used, and from 1942 on, even the designation "total war economy."*^

In Carroll's view, the German war effort failed not through a lack of commitment to total war, but mainly because the effort was so poorly organized and lacked central direction.

General Thomas might have succeeded in alleviating these problems had he been able to make himself heard. If Carroll is correct, we may all feel fortunate that ihomas failed.

Since Calvin B. Hoover's path-breaking book, mainstream

American economists have generally not concerned themselves with the problem of fascism; and ^ e n they have, as exempli­ fied above, they have treated narrowly economic aspects of

*°Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague* Mouton, 1968), p. 104. *llbid., pp. 189-90. 88

particular regime#. These are certainly valid concerns, but vftiy has no one since Hoover attempted to go beyond them? Our thesis is that this state of affairs must be a reflec­

tion of the specialized nature of "economics" as currently defined by academicians. Now we must see vdiether those

American economists outside the mainstream performed any differently.

C. Atypical Views Among those outside orthodox economics, professor

Robert A. Brady of the University of California produced the first systematic interpretation of fascism. In doing so he built on his early interest in the "rationalization move­ ment" in Germany. Rationalization essentially refers to the application of scientific principles to industry, trade, and commerce. Additional emphasis is placed on the expansion of

individual businesses "vertically" from production into the search for raw materials and into distribution of finished products. Brady's thesis in The Rationalization Movement in German Industry is

. . . that the development of rationaliza­ tion in Germany has shown more or less clearly the possibilities and the direction­ al drives inherent in the movement, and that, among men intimately acquainted with its history, there is sufficient apprecia­ tion of the shortcomings of rationalization as carried out to justify the rather signi­ 89

ficant sub-title of this study, "A Study in the Evolution of Economic Planning,

This rationalization, vAiich arose out of "the historical

congruence of certain fundamental tendencies in machine production and capitalistic economic organization," creates

conditions vrttich call for "economic planning" (an apparent synonym for socialism) as a solution. In Germany, the economic collapse of the late 1920s demonstrated that rationalization does not solve the cyclical problems of capitalism. On the contrary, crises are exacerbated when elements of rationalization such as labor-saving technology are applied in particular industries without there being an effective plan for the entire economic system. However, there is an even greater difficulty in the fact that Germany as a whole is not self-sufficient.

In no way is she a self-contained economic unit. Unified plans, to be effective, must be international in scope. Here, conse­ quently, lies the supreme paradox of the German rationalization movement. To be effective in salvaging the economic life of the country, rationalization must be carried out in the higher organizational sphere. But the unit of organization is larger in nearly every case— in nearly every respect— than Germany.*3

42 Robert A. Brady, The Rationalization Movement in Gennani9syr,'p. Industry XXi. (Berkeley: University of California Press, ^3Ibid., p. 324. 90

Brady seas the situation in post-war Germany as con­ ditioned by the world-wide spread of rationalization:

Since (a) present and prospective profits dominate productive schedules in capitalis­ tically organized society, (b) the number and Importance of industries sensitive to world price are steadily increasing, and (c) all economic processes are, under modern conditions, so closely tied together by tech­ nological, marketing, and financial bonds that any major induise emanating from any sector of the economic system will affect all other sectors, it necessarily holds that world price fluctuations introduce elements of uncertainty into all phases of national economic life.**

Within the confines of the nation, organized interest groups

try to deal with this uncertainty by fighting for their own guarantees of a certain standard of living. Businessmen

form cartels and trade associations, workers form unions, etc. All groups contest for influence in, or control of, the state. "Victory to capital means a type of industrial, and perhaps nationally unified Fascism. Victory to labor means some system of socialistic or communistic planned and integrated economy. But the German situation was one of stalemate between the various contending groups* Although the Social Democrats were nominally in power, they

^*lbid., pp. 357-58. 45 Ibid., p. 395. Brady develops his ideas about the political impact of rationalization in his Business as a System of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), a comparative study of "bureaucratic centralism" in six countries. 91 had no unified plan for moving toward socialism. Their split with the Communists drove them to seek support from middle-class parties by becoming even less socialistic. The political impasse, when later heightened by the economic crisis, eventually led to Hitler's coming to power shortly before the publication of Brady's book* In his preface, Brady notes that the new regime represents the victory of forces opposed to a socialist solution of the crisis brought on in part by rationalisation. It is a " . . . dictatorship by joint action of the middle class and 'big business' as the economic, political, and cultural expression of an emer­ gent (decadent?) age of monopoly capitalism."*^ Thus Brady seems to interpret National Socialism at its beginning as a momentary setback in the process of rationalization— a result of Germany's national limitations. His hope is that this interlude will be followed by an international social­ ist revolution which will at last allow economic planning to become a reality. In Brady's 1937 work. The Spirit and Structure of

German Fascism, he takes a more detailed look at the evolv­ ing Nazi regime. He begins by outlining the left-right polarization of Germany in the late 1920s. The key to which of the two sides would emerge victorious lay in "the great mass of the middle-class population." "Whichever wing could

**Ibid., p. viii. 92

win the larger number of recruits from the middle group 47 stood to gain all." In Brady's opinion, the advan­ tage belonged to the left— if only the Social Democrats and Communists would join forces. But the left chose not to

unite, perhaps believing that time and economic forces were working in its favor. The right took the initiative when "... the Junkers and the large industrial and financial

interests saw the uses to which the Nazi Party could be put."*^ The Party could draw those badly needed middle-class recruits to the right.

The real significance of the Nazi Party lay in the fact that it had a certain following amongst the amorphous and hesitant central mass, and that it reflected in its confused platform the very state of mind in which the bulk of the citizens found themselves. Ideal for the purposes to which it was to be put, there was a plank in the Nazi platform to meet the prejudices of nearly every group to be appealed to, and it conducted its cam­ paigns so as to combine a proper degree of idea-dulling fanaticism with further confu­ sion of the issues.49 Therefore, "... beginning seriously as early as 1928, a series of conferences were held between Hitler and various

industrial and financial leaders in the Rhineland.

47 Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism (New York: Citadel Press, 1971T» p* 19. Copyright e 1937 by Robert A. Brady. By permission of Viking Penguin, Inc.

**Ibid., p. 20.

**Ibid. ®^Ibid. 93

Hitler enjoyed the open or eurreptitioue support of

organized business from then on. Well-financed, well

organized, and supported by influential businessmen and Junkers, the Nazi fortunes began to rise. When the left (and especially the Social Democrats, Who controlled the state) failed to move against the Nazis, the future was all but determined.

Brady defines the Nazi regime as a " . . . dictatorship of monopoly capitalism. Its 'fascism* is that of business

enterprise organized on a monopoly basis, and in full command of all the military, police, legal, and propaganda power of the state.

The Nazi system represents', in short, nothing more than an extension to the nation at large of the rules, the behavior pat­ terns, and the points of view of the ordin­ ary autocratically governed business enter­ prise, nothing more— with this exception, that it adds thereto power to enforce com­ plete conformity with its point of view on the part of all members of the community, regardless of class, station, or inter­ est.52

The largest portion of the book is descriptive, as Brady attempts to demonstrate how the National Socialist regime is

organized in the service of big business. He discusses the control of science', the use of arts and education as tools

^^Ibid., p. 22 (emphasis removed). S^lbid., p. 23. 94

of propaganda, the subjugation of labor, and the redefini­ tion of women's role in a section on the "co-ordination of spirit" in Nazi Germany. Under the "co-ordination of struc­ ture," Brady outlines the policies designed to keep peasants and members of other rural groups from moving into the large

cities; then he analyzes "Nazi economics"— based on the principle that "businessmen, the born elite, should rule." The stated desire of the Hitler regime was to make business

serve the national interest. To that purpose, bureaucratic machinery was established to control business in Germany. Brady dismisses the controlling mechanisms as tools of busi­

ness rather than of government* For the time in which he was writing, it was in fact still basically true that

"... in the main the changes have been well along the

major lines of development «dtich have characterized German monopoly-tending business growth over the past three- quarters of a century."

In his final chapter, Brady takes a broad view of "the looming shadow of fascism over the world." Here for the

first time he treats fascism as an international problem. His argument is similar to that contained in his earlier book on the rationalization movement. Fascism is part of a larger "debate" about capitalism.

S*ibid., p. 295. 95

Knowledge of the facts hnd a little re­ flection will show that the issue does not turn on "fascism" per se, but on that form of capitalism of %mich it is no more than the politically conscious phase. For better or %rorse, the deeper issue now being square­ ly faced is whether capitalism as a coercive political and econom'ic system should be allowed any longer to survive, 54

The capitalist system is being challenged all over the world by its victims. Fascism is a reaction against such chal­ lenges.

It is not "capitalism" as a turn of phrase that is at stake, but the effects, the in­ tent, and the results of capitalism. It was widespread poverty and mass privation, lead­ ing to mass revolutionary action, which caused Italian financial and industrial interests to underwrite Mussolini's bought- and-paid-for Fascism. It was mounting unem­ ployment and decline in standards of living which led to steady growth of the revolu­ tionary left, and caused German capital to strike its bargain with Hitler. It was an attempt to recover lost property and class privileges Which provoked the union of the right— fascist--forces in Spain against the growing strength of the champions of peasant and worker claims. And it is the challenge of the poverty-stricken laborers and farmers of England, France, and the United States , which is activating the consolidation of fascist forces within their own fron­ tiers.

Brady here approximates the dogmatic "Marxist" line of in­ terpretation put forvmrd by the Soviet Union's Party

®*Ibld., p. 362. ^^Ibid., pp. 363-64. 96

ideologues* He also subscribes to the idea that the capi­ talist system has irretrievably broken down, and the fascism can only be a temporary reprieve in the face of socialist

revolution. Another %#orld war— Which is almost inevitable— will be the catalyst for revolution.

It is probably safe to say that no important statesman in any of the capitals of Europe today believes that a major war could pos­ sibly last for more than a year without an internal smash-up in the form of revolution in one or more of the belligerent countries. Should fascist countries, combining against non-fascist— the Soviet Union and Prance, for example— lose, revolution from their own ranks is certain to follow,5*

Clearly, Brady errs seriously in his predictions of the future. But they do not follow from any facts presented in his book, appearing rather to reflect Brady's own hopes for the future. A more basic error lies in his interpretation of National Socialism as a "business dictatorship." Events

from 1936 onward (after the time of Brady's research) made clear the weakness of business once Hitler had consolidated his power. One wonders how a man of Brady's obvious intel­ ligence could have allowed himself to accept the Soviet line on fascism so uncritically. Even with such faults, however,

Brady must be given credit for producing one of the earliest American analyses of fascism as an international phenomenon

S*Ibid., p. 399. 97

While at the same time providing specific insights into its operation in a particular nation. A second example of the dissenting viewpoint among

American economists is Maxine Sweezy Woolston's The Struc­ ture of the Nazi Economy. This book is an expansion of the author's dissertation at Radcliffe College. (She held a position as instructor in economics at Vassar College at the time of her book's publication.) Categorizing Woolston is difficult, but it seems that she was at the time of her doctoral studies and in her early teaching somewAiat of a "radical"— perhaps most influenced by the theories of Thorstein Veblen. For this reason we feel justified in placing her in our dissenting group. Woolston's study investigates the structure of the Nazi economy, as the title indicates, but it also asks Important questions about the relationship between the economy and social structure. In her first chapter Woolston characterises the Nazi economy as one whose success derived from the rearmament program begun in 1934. But the success was more apparent than real:

Although an armament program increases employment and profits in the short run, from the longer point of view any system of economic planning \rtiich revolves about an armament axis must be classified as restric­ tive rather than expansive. The goal of capital accumulation and continuation of profits is carried out through imperialist conquest rather than by the solution of the 98

the basic problems from which the depression grew. 57

Woolston next takes up %diat seems to be her central inter­ est, the relationship between government and business in the Third Reich* She begins with the pre-Nazi situation*

As a result of the economic strain of the post-war period and the world crisis, the state threatened to dominate the economy. Thus, permanent control over the government appeared as a life and death matter to the propertied classes. Two powerful groups, especially, were politically united in their desire for an autocratic regime over which they had control: the steel and coal indus­ trialists on the Rhine and the Ruhr, and the land-owning aristocracy of the east.5“

As did Brady, Woolston assigns a significant role to the financial support of such groups in bringing Hitler to power. In return, the proposed regulation of business by government became in the end business "self-regulation. "

Woolston and Brady are in almost complete agreement on the basic functioning of the Nazi economy, although Woolston does not go so far as to call the new regime a "business dictatorship."

Maxine Y. Sweezy (Woolston), The Structure of the Nazi Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ïÿ41T/ P* 24. (Professor Woolston was married to Paul M. Siveazy at the time of this book's publication.) ^°Ibid., p. 27. 99

Perhaps the most significant part of Woolston's work is the attempt in her final chapter to ascertain how the rela­ tive position of works re, farmers , and businessmen in the division of national income has changed since the Nasi take­ over. "The most striking change is the increased share going to property and the decreased share represented by go earned incwne. " She finds that a most important reason for this lies in the fact that after Hitler, "... wage rates were about 22 percent less on the average than at their previous peak.Thus the National "Socialists" have in fact increased economic inequality rather than decreased it. Finally, Woolston draws some comparisons between Nazism and Fascism which indicate a latent general theory of fascism in her thinking. Ihis theory is based on the idea that the "Great War" and post-vrar economic difficulties brought about an increased collaboration between business and the state in almost all nations. In some cases this led to fascism.

Despite wide divergence in the character of their natural resources, as well as in extent of industrialization'. Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany have striking similarities. Business in Italy also accep­ ted the "strong man," if with misgivings.

S*lbid., p. 207. *°Ibid., p. 209. 100

And for a time Mussolini did pleasant things for business— suppressed independent trade unions and prohibited strikes. The substan­ tial interventions of the fascist state in the business economy took the form of finan­ cial aids and subsidies to big business. The state arranged higher protective tariffs to benefit special interests; facilitated the merger of corporations, especially to save weak concerns from going to the wall; created public institutes to take over the shares of bankrupt companies until they were again in a healthy condition; forbade the erection of new factories likely to cut profits for those already in existence; relieved business from the painful and difficult operation of cutting wages; spent huge sums for military purposes, thus providing profitable "business" for the heavy industries.61

As for "causal factors," Woolston cites the facts that both nations achieved unification late and at the hands of mili­ tary aristocracies, both suffered as a result of the world

%#ar, and some businessmen in both were quick to lend their support to anti-democratic forces. In short, this study clearly transcends the boundaries of pure economics, provid­ ing a reasonably broad picture of fascism in Germany. But Woolston shares with Brady an inability to see the qualita­ tive changes in the German economy after 1936 (somevdiat less excusable in her case, given the later publication date). She improves on Brady's work by eschewing polemics and allowing the statistics to speak for themselves. It is remarkable that she was able to produce such an indictment

*^Ibid., p. 231 101 of the German eyetem using mostly German official statis­ tics. The third and final dissenting %rork is Paul M. Sweeny's chapter on fascism in his The Theory of Capitalist Develop­ ment. Sweezy is, of course, a Marxist, and his treatment of fascism draws heavily on the ideas of Marx and Lenin. He frames his analysis within the Leninist theory of imperial­ ism: "Fascism arises under certain specific historical conditions which are in turn the product of the impact of imperialist wars of redivision on the economic and social 62 structure of advanced capitalist nations." In the nations which lose or are otherwise devastated by such wars, class struggle is likely to be heightened. If, in one of these nations, a clear victory is not won by the left or the right, the nation may

. . . enter upon a period of class equili­ brium on the basis of capitalist relations of production. Under such conditions, the intensification of the contradictions of capitalism leads to a severe internal crisis which cannot be "solved" by resort to the normal methods of imperialist expansion. This is, so to speak, the soil in which fascism takes root and grows.63

Within a nation, it is the middle classes who provide the mass base of the fascist movement. Hurt severely by

62 Paul M. Sweezy, The yieory of Capitalist Devel­ opment (New York: Monthly Review Press, IscëlT p. 3?9. Copyright « 1942, 1970 by Paul M. Sweezy. Reprinted by permission of Monthly Review Press.

G^Ibid., p. 332. 102 inflation and the growth of large-scale business enter­ prises, the middle classes turn to a party which promises to revolutionize society for the benefit of these classes and to the detriment of organized labor, on the one hand, and monopoly capital on the other. As the movement grows it begins to attract members from other social groups. More Importantly, it gains some support from capitalists, who were at first distrustful of the ultimate goals of the fascists. The capitalists'

. . . position is a difficult one, caught as they are between the demands of the organ­ ized working class and the "encirclement" of rival capitalist powers. Ordinarily under such circumstances the capitalist class would make use of the state power to curb the workers and to improve its own interna­ tional position, but now this course is not open to it. The state is weak and the work­ ers share in its control. Consequently fascism, once it has proven its right to be taken seriously, comes to be looked upon as a potentially valuable ally against the capitalists' two worst enemies, the workers of their o w n country and ^ e capitalists of foreign countries . . . .64

When the fascist movement achieves power it establishes the

"strong state," destroys independent working-class organiza­ tions, and begins preparation for war. The capitalist ruling class, too, is somewhat altered under the fascist regime. Some capitalists are disenfranchised for "racial" or political reasons, and some fascist political leaders use

**Ibid., p. 334 103 their positions to acquire economic power. But the ruling class remains dedicated to the preservation and expansion of capital, thus remaining a capitalist ruling class* An inno­ vation in favor of the capitalists is the increased use of the state to "regulate" business activities. In fact, this actually consists of the "absorption of the organs of mono­ poly capital into the state apparatus." In light of the massive state intervention into the econcmty, Sweezy asks: "Can fascism eliminate the contradic­ tions of capitalism?" (This question is of utmost impor­ tance for Marxists, since an affirmative answer would seriously countsrvene their hopes for socialism.) Sweezy*s conclusion is no surprise.

Fascism has given no evidence of ability to overcome stagnation and unemployment through the use of material and human resources for the expansion of use values for the mass of the people, on the contrary, it has from the beginning devoted all the resources it has at its disposal to the preparation and waging of an imperialist war of red!vi­ sion. *5

Even if the fascist powers win the world war, there are limits to the exploitability of the conquered territories.

Only if the expansion of capital would be abandoned as the central goal of the economy could the need for further wars be eliminated. But then the very nature of the fascist

^^Ibid., p. 343. 104

economy and society would have to be transformed in the

direction of state socialism. In conclusion, Sweezy asks the question: "Is fascism inevitable?" Many Marxists of the Soviet persuasion were at

the time arguing that fascism is the inevitable result when, in a period of capitalist crisis, the working classes choose the path of reform rather than revolution.This

viewpoint was further simplified by some interpreters to a declaration that fascism is a definite stage of capitalist development. Sweezy rejects this latter version and accepts the former with certain qualifications. He replaces law­

like statements of inevitability with a conditional mode of

analysis. Thus, one of the conditions necessary for fascism to arise is an "approximate class equilibrium" %diich

prevents either the bourgeoisie or proletariat from dominat­ ing the political arena. To this he adds the necessity of severe economic crisis. But for Sweezy there is yet another proviso. "So far as history allows us to judge . . . a prolonged and 'unsuccessful* war is the only social phenome­ non sufficiently catastrophic in its effects to set in train

this particular chain of events.In brief, fascism is a possibility in capitalist countries with social and

The classic presentation of this position is R. Palme Dutt's Fascism and Social Revolution (New York: Interna tiona1 Publishers, 1934}. ®^Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, p. 346. 105 economic structures devastated by war, and it is not likely to appear where these conditions are not met. Such an interpretation is a far cry from the mechanistic "Marxist" explanations of fascism which predominated until well after World War 11. Straesy relies much more on history than on abstract theory* He assigns real importance and autonomy to the fascist movement rather than viewing it as a tool in the hands of big business, but he also shows how the capitalist class benefitted When Hitler opted in favor of maintaining capitalism. Hence, Sweezy's theory of fascism is one of the earliest applications of non-deterministic Marxism to the problem. The %fork of the aforegoing dissenting American econo­ mists, despite shortcomings, displays an analytical breadth absent from the studies by most of their more orthodox counterparts. On the other hand, neither Brady, Woolston, nor Sweezy can match Calvin B. Hoover's visionary study of

1933 for a wide-ranging depiction of National Socialism. Where they do surpass Hoover is in developing the interna­ tional theory of fascism. All three relate German and

Italian fascism to the world-wide development of capitalism and to the contemporary condition of the international capitalist system. As to sources of data, Brady and Woolston depend on published statistics, mostly produced by the German government. Sweezy d r a w mostly on secondary accounts and is concerned with a theoretical interpretation 106

of fascism as a whole. His is probably the best theoretical piece by an American or emigre economist. The conclusions reached are «rtiat set apart Brady, Woolston, Sweezy, and (to a degree) Hoover from contemporary mainstream economists.

Klein, Carroll, and others have attempted to solve key questions regarding particular aspects of fascism, but they fail to even speculate about the consequences or meaning of their findings for a more general diagnosis of fascism. The dissidents we have just examined, however, all try to relate their results to the larger theoretical issues, and specifi­ cally to the class nature of the fascist movement and regime. We shall now examine our group of émigré economists to determine Wiether the same holds true for them.

D. Émigre Perspectives The earliest study of fascism produced in this country by an economist immigrant is Michael T. Florinsky's Fascism and National Socialism. It is not particularly good. The author was b o m in Russia and emigrated after the Bolshevik takeover. He declares the Soviet Union to be his major academic "specialty," but he finds fascism to be of related interest.

In spite of the open hostility that exists between the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany, on the other, there are striking similarities between them; similarities that 107

lie perhaps not so much in the principles as in the methods of the two antagonistic systems.6°

Plorinsky is indeed one of the earliest writers to speak in terms of totalitarianism when looking at fascism and author­ itarian socialism— he characterizes his book as "a study of

the economic and social policies of the totalitarian state, "

But since he does not develop this concept much further than the labeling stage, we shall reserve discussion of totali­

tarianism until our chapter dealing with political scien­ tists. Plorinsky claims that his knowledge of Fascism and

Nazism derive from lengthy visits to Italy and Germany during the years 1919 to 1935, but his book cites mostly secondary sources in the footnotes. He does not provide any

new facts, nor does he supply any new interpretation of previously available facts. Although anti-fascist, he gives too much credence to fascist propaganda. This leads him to accept as legitimate the "rights" and "needs" of the fascist countries for expansion due to population and economic

growth. Plorinsky in fact seems to assign causal primacy for the rise of fascism to the weak international position of Germany and Italy after the first World War. This weak­

ness (attributed to the unjust Versailles settlement) was

6fi Michael T, Plorinsky, Fascism and National Socialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), p. v. CopyrlgHt © by The Macmillan Company. 108 responsible for the countries' economic difficulties, which were in turn the catalyst for fascist success* In the case of Germany, Hitler's good intentions toward the working class were stymied : "If National Socialism has thus far failed to improve the économie position of the masses of German labor it is largely due to the general economic dif- 69 ficulties experienced by the country," Plorinsky predicts that Germany and Italy will be forced to become warlike unless the international comunity moves toward a "... redistribution of colonial mandates among those Po w r s who feel that the limited area of their national territory is a real bar to their progress and develop­ ment."^® In Plorinsky we encounter a clear contradiction to the thesis advanced in this dissertation. Although he sees the similarities between National Socialism and Fascism and seems to analyze them from a broad and general viewpoint, he concludes by reducing the genesis of "totalitarianism" to a question of the international balance of access to colonies and other economic assets. Such reductionism lends a certain legitimacy to fascism and must have served well the advocates of appeasement. Plorinsky can also be criticized for the basically derivative nature of his "study" and for

*®Ibid., p. 151. ^®Ibid., p. 271. 109 a heavy doae of conjecture without an explicit theoretical position behind it. Even considering the comparatively early appearance of this book, it must be judged virtually worthless as an academic contribution, Frank Munk is another Eastern European immigrant who sought to understand fascism. Munk left his native Czecho­ slovakia in the 1930s and eventually came to teach economics in America, first at Reed College (Oregon) and then at the University of California. He produced two essentially theoretical vKirks, the first being The Economics of Force (1940). Early in his preface. Hunk lays out the book's major premiset

Unnoticed by the average observer, over­ looked by the student of the new despotism, underestimated by many an expert, a new econcHaic order has swept the old world and threatens to engulf the new. An economic system geared for wealth has been supplanted by an economic system geared for power, and power only.71

Munk takes a rather odd position for an economist, charac­ terizing the Fascist and Nazi regimes as "anti-economic." The "values" of "power, prestige', and domination" somehow replace the "value" of economic well-being as the primary societal goal. Free enterprise capitalism is replaced.

"The state is everything; therefore', the state can be the

^^Frank Munk, The Economics of Force (New York: George W. Stewart, 1^40), p. x , 110 one and only capitalist* We may say, then, that the economy of force means the victory of state capitalism as opposed to private capitalism." 7 2 In much the same manner as Plorinsky, Munk stresses the similarity of methods between fascism and communism. He does not, however, develop this line of thought into a dis­ cussion of totalitarianism. Instead, he argues that the communist movement is an essential precursor of fascism. "So far, there has developed no Fascism in any country where

Communism has not been more or less influential." 73 Communism is the "pace-maker" of fascism, "... spreading disillusion of existing institutions by over-stressing criticism of the social order, by fostering discontent among youth, and by undermining the faith in Democracy."^*

But Munk apparently considers this political phenomenon to be less fundamental in the causation of fascism than the fact that capitalism is undergoing change through the process of concentration.

The crux of the economic problem today lies in the relation of large-scale business to government, in the combination of econo­ mic power, and the combination of political power. Democracy originally came into being as a government of farmers and artisans.

^^Ibid., p. 32.

^^Ibid., p. 41. ^*Ibid. Ill

Economic institutions have been changing faster than political institutions and the machinery of representative government* Many countries have continued Steam Age politic*. Wills their economy has moved into the Age of Electricity and the Airplane. It is easy to give up all efforts to adapt democratic government to the emergency. That is What Fascism and Nazism have done.75

With the concentration came a second feature of the new capitalism— the separation of ownership from control of capital— of Which fascism can be seen as the "logical out­ growth . "

Fascism has taken the last step by expropri­ ating the control of business and placing it in the hands of a small group of political leaders. This is the ultimate act in the process of the divorce of ownership from control, not only control over the large corporation but control over the small busi­ ness as well. Even control over private property. Including consumption', has been monopolized by a group of politicians.76

Just at the point vdiere Munk seems to be developing a plausible theory of the economic base of fascianf, however, he turns in another direction— beginning with an apparent rejection of Florinsky's "theory."

^®Ibid., p. 32.

7*Ibid., pp. 57-58, 112

It la a fallacy to assuma that the war was brought about merely, or even primarily, by an inequitable distribution of raw materials or markets. Nobody will claim that the economic balance of the world was ideal. There was much tAiich needed to be reformed. The war, however, would have broken out Whatever the distribution of raw materials might have been, and probably even earlier if the totalitarians had had a more adequate supply. It is not a question of raw materials but a question of philosophy. Raw materials, like everything else, are a means to an end, which in this case is power itself.77

Thus Florinsky's territorial determinism is replaced with an even less tenable ideological determinism by Munk. He attempts to show in the remainder of his book how the power- hungry fascists instituted control of their home countries and foreign territories, and he argues that the democracies must unite now to defeat fascism. The final chapters are almost purely polemical. In the last analysis we must rate Hunk's contribution to the debate about fascism as almost negligible. His is a basically monocausal account built around a supposed lust for power with which the fascist leaders are afflicted. The more interesting segments, such as the discussion of the changing nature of capitalism, are treated by Munk as asides and are not integrated into the larger framework. As in Florinsky's case, we find no new data or conclusions. This is even more true for Hunk's

^^Ibid., pp. 84-85, 113

7ft second book. The Legacy of Nsxlsrt, Which adds nothing significant to his earlier work. We would do beat at this point to allow Hunk to return to obscurity. The next study in this category was published by

William 0. Walk, then a professor of economics at the College of St. Thomas in Minnesota, later a private consul­ tant. The research was carried out as part of a Harvard Ph.D. dissertation. Walk's study, Fascist Economic Policy, was prompted by an interest in his native country, Italy.

We note immediately the effect of Keynesianism on Walk's «fork. His doctoral program coincided in time with the triumphal arrival of Keynesian theory to American academic economics. Walk begins by citing Keynes' challenge to build an efficient and just socio-economic order. This problem is far from being historically resolved, but Walk believes there is hope:

During the last t«fo decades three unusually interesting attempts at a solution have been made: one by Russian Communism, another by Italian and German Fascism, and a third by our own "New Deal." Differing greatly in their general creed and philoso­ phy, these three attempts at reform nevertheless have one fundamental aim in common: The creation of a better social order, the realization of a new scheme for the social and economic advancement of the people.79

78 Hunk, The Legacy of Nazism (New York: Macmillan, 194j). 79 William G. Welk, Fascist Economic Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938) , p. xix. 114

Later in the book it becomes clear that Welk fully accepts

Keynesianism and wishes to evaluate Fascism in light of the facts of economic life according to Keynes.

On our otm continent and in Europe faith in traditional economic individualism has of late been severely shaken. Although during the last century a prodigious revolution occurred in the circumstances of existence, there has been as yet little change in our basic rules of social and economic life. Only slowly are we beginning to realize that some reorientation of our traditional theories of social and economic organization is needed, that economic individualism is not in itself sufficient for the attainment of lasting economic progress, and that the social group as a whole must be called upon to control and supervise intelligently certain fundamental economic functions if a minimum, at least, of economic security and justice is to be achieved.

Welk rejects socialism (for no explicit reason) but sees Fascism as a possible model.

If economic self-government under the aegis of the state were ever to become a possible pattern for the organization of a democratic capitalist society, the Italian corporate experiment, though developed in a political atmosphere displeasing to most of us, may have some interesting suggestions to offer.

Here we see epitomized the open-minded approach to fascism Which we shall find to be common among American academics writing in the 1930s. Welk's desire is to "objectively

®°Ibid., p. 154. Bllbid., p. 155. 115 analyse" the new Italian economic system in order to deter­ mine its effectiveness as a solution to the problems of capitalism noted by Keynes. Ultimately Welk rejects Fascism because it is not democratic and has not raised the standard of living for Italians, but he continues to see some promise in the "corporative state" concept.

Let us now look in more detail at Walk's analysis of Fascism. In his first chapter he alludes to Fascism's social roots:

The popular movement which forced Italy's entry into the World War marks, in a sense, the beginning of Italian Fascism* Although not called Fascist, the interventionist movement inspired the mass of the Italian people with a new national ideal, and taught them how, even against the will of Parlia­ ment, national goals could be achieved under the leadership of a few determined men.

Unfortunately, Welk provides no deeper insights into the background of the participants in this movement until his concluding chapter. Here, without any empirical support,

Welk reports that "... Fascism arose as a movement of reaction among the Italian middle classes against the bitter aftermath of the World War, the ineptitude of post-war political regimes, and the dangers of a socialist and 63 communist coup d'etat." Although this contention

°^Ibid.f, p. 8. ®^Ibid., p. 243, 116 about the middle-class origin of Fascism may be correct.

Walk's own research provides no basis for it. The strength of Walk's work lies in his analysis of the organisation of the Fascist economy and its effects on employment, prices, wages, and the standard of living in Italy. Using mostly Italian government statistics, he is able to demonstrate that although the economy as a whole seemed to have been Improved by the fascists, the improve­ ments were made at the expense of the populace.

The Italian nation. Fascists contend, must be made "strong" and "powerful"i for power the essential prerequisites, they assert, are population growth and economic indepen­ dence. The attainment of the former is sought through the Fascist "Battle of Births" ; that of the latter through the stupendous Fascist program of land reclama­ tion, the imposing "Battle of Wheat," an intensely nationalistic monetary policy, and the recent successful attempt to expand the country's colonial domain and to lay the foundations for a vast colonial e m p i r e . *4

But these programs are largely superficialt

While • . . the leading economic policies adopted by the Fascist regime may have served to increase the country's economic independence and political prestige, they cannot be said, so far at least, to have contributed to her economic advancement or to an increase in the economic well-being of the Italian people. Population growth, eco­ nomic independence, and colonial expansion are being paid for by the mass of Italians through a lowered standard of living.*5

84lbid., p. 243.

®®IWd., p. 249. 117

Yet WeIk notes the mass popularity of Fascismt "After

careful inquiries during several visits to Italy, I am convinced that the mass of Italians sympathize with Fascism 86 and, on the %diole, support the regime." The Italian people have somehow "been made to feel that Fascism is * thei r ' gove mm e n t . "

Moreover, during the first years of the regime most Italians felt that important changes for the better were being made. For the democratic political regimes of the past, which had plainly shown their inade­ quacy during the Immediate post-war period, there was established a strong national government based upon the ideals of national unity and solidarity. Dirt, thievery, the maffia, the lazzaroni, the old-time dolce far niante tended to disappear, and cleanli­ ness, order, and efficiency were established in their place. Industry and trade were expanded, splendid new roads were built, millions of square miles of marsh-land were reclaimed, and an imposing commercial fleet • . . %ns made to carry the Italian flag to the four corners of the globe.

Thus, in Walk's opinion. Fascist policies had a positive psychological effect vdiich was at least initially sufficient to override the individual economic interests of the Italian

masses. Although we must fault this study for giving too much credence to Fascism as an honest attempt to better the lot

of the Italian people, in the end Walk presents a reasonably accurate portrait of Fascism as an economic system. Despite

G^ibid., p. 245. lie brief social and psychological insights, the actual scope of analysis of the study is limited to the economic reorganiza­ tion of Fascist Italy and its effects on the nation and its citizens. Fascism is clearly identified as a phenomenon of capitalist society, but its origins as a mass movement are not probed. Welk should be given credit, however, for the original analysis of Fascist economic data which makes up the heart of his book. In this accomplishment he far sur­ passes the impressionistic work of Florinsky and Hunk. An even more satisfying effort by an émigré economist is Melchior Palyi's "Economic Foundations of the German Totalitarian State.” Palyi held various academic, consult­ ing, and advisory positions in his native Germany before coming to America in the 1930s. His main motivation for writing this article seems to have been his unhappiness with accounts of "totalitarianism" which Ignore economic vari­ ables. "Perhaps a reaction against the primitive economism of Marx is responsible for the prevalent trend to seek the foundations of totalitarian power in psychological or socio- logical analogies." Palyi dissents from this trendi "The present approach to the 'foundations' of a dictatorship assumes that economic interests are the primary driving

88 Melchior Palyi, "Economic Foundations of the German Totalitarian State," American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (January 1941), 469. Copyright e 1941 by the University of Chicago. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press. (Here we see again the use of a vulgarized interpretation of Marx as a "straw man.") 119

force of its political mechanism.The German situa­ tion illustrates this point.

The fundamental fact to face is this: the ma^or part of the German people had been convinced of the futility to continue or restore the economic system Which seemed to go to pieces in the 1930-33 catastrophe. Ihe thoroughly dissatisfied strata included the farm population (about thirteen mil­ lions), the unemployed and their families (fourteen to eighteen millions), and the millions of "disinherited" middle classes, broad sections of small and "large" busi­ nessmen, many if not most professionals, etc.

The "economic psychology and political temper" of Germany were, by 1932, "well prepared for a social revolution." It was "economic expectations" which led the people to bring

National Socialism to power. "The basic loyalty which since supports it is also economic in the underlying expectations, enhanced, of course, by the 'chance of violence, * to use Max

Weber's term; by ethical rationalizations; by appeal to 91 historical sentimentalities and traditions, etc."

Palyi thus hints at a hierarchy of factors involved in bringing about fascism, with econanic interests most funda­ mental.

**Ibid., 470. ®°Ibid., 472.

*llbid. 120 » Much of Palyi's article is devoted to tracing the economic history of the Weimar and Nazi governments. After the war Germany was left with a huge public debt, and "... the Republic resorted to the printing press until the end of 1923 to overcome the post-war difficul- 92 ties." The resulting inflation destroyed confidence in the capitalist economy, especially among the middle classes. From 1923 to 1925 came a "stabilization crisis"— a period of high interest rates and scarce credit. This problem was solved through the Dawes Plan, which allowed foreign credits into Germany.

The years 1925-30 were for the Germans a New Deal period of government expenditure for so-called social purposes including swimming pools, public parks, "uneconomic" housing, and similar projects Which amounted to large-scale subsidies. It coincided with a new era of speculative capital expansion on the part of industrialists and banksrs.^^

Then came the "Great Crisis.

Three depression years of unemployment and wild political strife, the breakdown of international credit and trader, the bank- nptcy of one customer-country after the other, the defeatism of a profitless capi­ talistic system, the virtuosity of "plan­ ning" propaganda, and, above all, a nation's longing for security and stability at almost any price after several consecutive

®^lbid., 475.

®^Ibid., 476. 121

financial catastrophes— all these circum­ stances have to be visualised to understand the success of an apparently "irrational" demagogy.*4

If Palyi views the economic events just described as the foundation of National Socialist victory, he is also aware that other factors played an essential secondary role. Among these were the poorly developed state of German agriculture, articles abetting reaction in the Weimar constitution, fear of communist revolution, and the split between the Social Democrats and Communists. On the other hand, Palyi rejects such alleged causes as the "unjust" Versailles treaty.

In reality, "Versailles" had little to do with Germany's post-war maladjustments. It may suffice to mention that between 1924 and 1931 Germany transferred barely more than one million (gold) dollars in reparations while she received six and one-half millions in credits; that for five years she enjoyed a "boom, " raised the living standards of the masses, replenished inventories and gold and foreign exchange reserves, expanded and "rationalised" plants in a seigneurial fashion, and gave over a billion marks in credits to Russia— all in the face of repar­ ations, the payments on vdiich actually ceased the summer of 1931, while the Ger­ mans' fury against Versailles artificially fanned by the Nazis, raged,**

^^Ibid., 477.

®®Ibid., 473. 122

Palyi also reacts negatively to the Idea that Nazism is yet another manifestation of Prussianism* Instead he argues that the Germans adhere to no set political philosophy* "Their philosophical cycles fluctuate according to What appears to be their interest' at each time." In his article Palyi produces the first more or less successful attempt among émigré econcmiists to comprehend "totalitarianism" as it developed in one nation. He presents support for a theory of fascism Which assigns primacy to "economic factors” but takes into account a wide variety of other conditions shaping the movement and regime. Although it is only intended as a theoretical study, how­ ever, Palyi's article would benefit frcxn statistical docu­ mentation of at least his key arguments. Without references to real data we are asked to accept Palyi's claims on the basis of a presumed expertise gained from his experience in Weimar Germany. This detracts from the value of his con­ clusions, which are forced to await later verification. We next encounter two articles by economist members of the Institute for Social Research (formerly the "Frankfurt School”). Both articles delve into the economic nature of fascism. A. R. L, Gurland, in "Technological Trends and

Economic structure under National Socialism,” takes the position that the Nazi economy remains one of monopoly

**Ibid., 480. 123

capitalism* The differences between Nazi and other capital­ isms lie in the technologica1 development of the German economy since the beginning of the Weimar Republic. The chemical industry is at the center of this transformation, "Chemical synthesis has become the paramount trait of industrial technology in well-nigh every sphere of produc- 97 tion." This is because of Germany's limited access to foreign raw materials following World War I. The predo­ minance of "polymerization" in the German economy leads in turn to changes in the relationship between government and industry.

Not only are huge Investments involved but at the same time risks are multiplied because of the unpredictability of the poly­ meric synthesis. When the experiment is put to test without the government guaranteeing the capital affected, it must needs be confined to mere laboratory processes, handled with caution and timidity, and stretched over a long time in order to lessen the risks and financial responsibi­ lity of the investor. The situation can be reversed at once Where the government guar­ antees or subsidizes the production.*8

Polymerization also encourages industrial concentration. Large combines involved in diversified production are better

97 A. R. L* Gurland, "Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, IX (1941), 233. ®®Ibid. 124 able to off-eet loseee, if a particular project fails, by profits from another production area. Along with government subsidies comes an increase in government controls over industry. "Business activities of the individual enterprises are being coordinated 'from without, * and their decisions as to %diat ought to happen QO within the enterprise are subject to restrictions." But, Gurland argues, the profit motive has not been abolishedt

Since the main interest of the government is maximum efficiency and maximum produc­ tion, preferential treatment is most easily obtained where there is maximum expansion of enterprise. On the other hand, expansion of enterprise improves the ccxapetitive position and thus provides for more profit.100

The economic power of subsidized concerns is thus enhanced by government intervention into the economy. "Internal financing makes them almost independent and necessarily checks the government's interventionist tendencies and volitions. Government measures are thus limited by the workings of the market, although a fascist regime is better equipped to predict market developments and take appropriate actions than is a democratic regime.

**Ibid/, 247. ^0®lbid.i, 248.

^°^lbid., 250. 125

Gurland rejects two arguments which have asserted that National Socialism is a new economic order. First is the idea that the separation o£ ownership and control in mod e m industry changes the nature of capitalism. "Those who control the means of production are the actual capitalists, 102 Whatever they may be called." In fact, the new managers are even more efficient proponents of capital accumulation because they cut into profit-hoarding by stock owners. A second claim about the Nazi "new order" is that the economy is shaped by the needs of the war machine. Gurland views the war-making of Germany as a separate issue. It is the technological development of German capitalism Which shapes the war machine, and not vice versa. On a final point, Gurland looks at the Nazy party, addressing the apparent contradiction between the middle- class nature of the party and the fact that big business derived the greatest benefits from Nazi rule. This result is understandable, he says, when we consider the middle- class party members as people in search of security.

Government control is identified with secur­ ity. It makes no difference that in the end security widens the gulf between the rich and the poor and finally changes previously independent producers and traders into salaried employees. Where there is full employment, there is a chance for "economic

^®^Ibid., 261. 126

men" to become successful. To the "little fellow, " generalisation of totalitarian controls means equalisation of c h a n c e s , 1^3

The distinction between the Nasi movement and the Nazi regime is an important one, and Gurland here provides at least a plausible explanation for the difference between the rhetoric of the movement and the reality of the regime. Another Frankfurt School economist, Frederick Pollock, held a view of fascism quite opposite that of Gurland. Pollock answers the question "Is National Socialism a New Order?" in the affirmative. He sees changes in several areas. The ruling class has evolved from one based on property to one based on "social function. " The new ruling class includes four groups— big business, the army, the party, and the state bureaucracy. Compromises among these four elements decide the direction and content of produc­ tion. In the economy, profits are no longer an incentive, production is for use, and the market is controlled. Government is no longer based on law but on a one-sided "technical rationality" geared to the needs of the rulers. Society is breaking down due to the disintegration of its key element, the family. Individuals are regarded "... only as the ultimate source of that energy on which

^°®Ibid., 242. 127 the gigantic apparatus of domination and expansion feeds."10* If National Socialism ^ a new ordef, what should we call it? Pollock suggests "state capitalism" Which

. . . describes better than any other term four properties of the new system: (1) That the new order is the successor of private capitalism, (2) that the state assumes important functions of the private capital­ ist, (3) that capitalistic institutions like the sale of labof, or profits, still play a significant role, and (4) that it is not socialism.105

Pollock finds that the "meaning" of the new system is aptly expressed by the Nazi appellation "command economy.” Con­ trary to Gurland and others, he believes that the Nazi economy has staying power not possessed by democratic capi­ talism. The production program " . . . is enforced by state power and nothing essential is left to the functioning of laws of the market or other economic "laws." The primacy of politics over economics, so much disputed under democracy, is clearly established."^®* There is no internal

^®*Frederick Pollock, "Is National Socialism a New Order?" Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, IX (1941),

^®*Ibid., 450.

^®*Ibid., 453. Another émigré economist, Ludwig Hamburger, later produced a study for the Brookings Institu­ tion designed to illustrate the total control of business by the party. It is too simplistic to warrant inclusion here. See Hamburger's How Nazi Germany Has Controlled Business (Washington, D .C. t ijie Brookings Institution, 1943). 128

reason for the Nazi regime to collapse. It guarantees economic security to all because it maintains a full employ­ ment economy. Only military defeat, in Pollock's opinion, will bring the demise of National Socialism. In the aforegoing two articles we again encounter limited perspectives on the problem of fascism. Gurland and Pollock are both convinced that the economic structure of Nazi Germany holds the key to its future. Gurland is nearly guilty of technological determinism, so great is his empha­ sis on the chemical industry. He downplays the role of the party in an effort to magnify the role of big business in bringing Hitler to power. Pollock fares somewhat better in stressing the "primacy of politics" and the changed composi­ tion of the ruling class, but he reifies the "command economy" into a seemingly eternal social form— one lacking an internal dynamic, Both men thus simplify the analysis of German fascism in an impermissible way. In other words, their analytical scope is rather narrow. The two articles are interpretive but contain few references to empirical data. We may assume that both are based on roughly the same published statistics and a few of the Institute's studies vAiich had been carried out in Germany. The difference lies in the conclusions drawn from the data, and these conclu­ sions reflect more than anything else the differing theore­ tical frameworks employed by Gurland and Pollock, In the 129 end, the articles are more exercises in political economic theory than in the theory of fascism*

Perhaps more can be expected from the work of Otto Nathan, another émigré German and professor of economics at Vassar College* He notes in his preface that his research was first suggested by Calvin Hoover, who also advised him throughout the project. But we see from the outset that

Nathan takes a narrowly "economics" viewpoint. He describes his volume as " . . . a study in Comparative Economics, an analysis of the first attempt in history to impose a co­ ordinated system of economic planning upon a capitalist economy in which the institutions of private property and private profit were modified but not abandoned. His basic concern is the description of the German fascist economy* Only in the first chapter does Nathan address the origins of Nazism.

The victory of Fascism in Germany early in 1933 was a victory of forces united by two major political objectives* the exploitation of fanatical nationalism in pursuit of an aggressive imperialistic foreign policy, and the maintenance and, if possible, extension of the power and privileges that go hand in hand with the extreme maldistribution of wealth and income in capitalist society. It was a victory of counterrevolution* a victory of those groups in German society which could hope to regain

Otto Nathan (with the collaboration of Hilton Fried), The Nazi Econc^c System; Germany's Preparation for War (Durham, N.C.* Duke University Pressi 1944;, pp. v-vi. Copyright * 1944, Duke University Press (Durham, North Carolina). 130

their former political and economic eminence only by destroying the nmin achievements of the revolution of 1918.10*

Nathan regards the Nazi government's policies as "... in harmony with the basic philosophy and objectives of the large capital-oiming classes in industry and agriculture, the upper strata of the armed forces, and the bureaucracy in 109 public administration." These groups all agreed on the objective of a military economy aimed at territorial expansion, within the framework of a repressive political system to keep the masses in check. Nathan has little more to say about the general aspects of National Socialism. His basic goal is to describe the ways in which the government controls the economy, and this he does adequately. However, Nathan contributes no new information or interpretations to the debate about Nazi regulation of the economy. In his concluding chapter he returns to the by then well-trodden issue of the economic nature of National Socialism. His "solution" is that Nazism is neither capitalism nor socialism, but "... a combination of some of the characteristics of capitalism and a highly planned economy. To this he adds the fact

^®®Ibid., p. 3. ^°®Ibid., p. 11. ^^®Ibid., p. 367 131

that aociaty warn "dominated by a ruthless political dicta­ torship. " But this definition does not give us a particu­ larly incisive understanding of German fascism* Nathan's analytical scope is too narrow to allow us to distinguish fascism from other varieties of dictatorship on a capitalist base. His main accomplishment is to demonstrate through the analysis of published statistics, as others have done before him, that Hitler's regime remains fundamentally capitalist. Our final émigré economist is also a German, Arthur

Schweitzer of Indiana University. The title of Schweitzer's book. Big Business in the Third Reich, belies the actual scope of his study. His desire is to apply Max Weber's typological "social economics" (in our terms, "political economy") to the problem of Nazism* The Keynesian model is inadequate because it ” . . . implies an institutional set­ ting that is diametrically different from the one that prevailed during the Nazi regime.Using the broad­ er political economic approach, Schweitzer becomes the first scholar to make the distinction between two periods in Nazi German history separated by the year 1936. In this year there was a change "... not only . . . in the economic goals of the rulers but also in the type of political and economic organization, in the distribution of economic

^^^Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington* Indiana University Press, 1964], p. x. 132

112 power, and in the principle* of market operation." For hie study, Schweitzer concentrates on the changes brought about during the first period of Nazi rule. As have Pollock and Nathan, he sees the new ruling class as composed of four parts— although his list differs. The party, big business, the military, and small business were equal partners in an unstable coalition. Because the balance of power could have swung in favor of industry and the military during these early years, Schweitzer refers to this period as one of "partial fascism."

If the evidence on partial fascism is accepted, our thesis calls for a revision of the current political theory of fascism. On the one hand, total fascism is only one phase of a fascist regime, requiring as an antecedent a phase of partial fascism. It is only in this preliminary period that there can arise the conditions for the pos- sible--but not inevitable— evolution toward total fascism. On the other hand, the evidence on the specific features of partial fascism casts doubt on the thesis that fascism must necessarily be postdemoo ratio and postindustrial.113

Writing nearly twenty years after the war, Schweitzer is privy to a large mass of data from various Nazi files and other previously unavailable sources. These are carefully marshalled in defense of the "partial fascism" thesis. The

^^^Ibid., p. 2. ^^®Ibid., p. 7. 133 central proposition is that the German upper class (personi­ fied by leaders of the military and big business) coalesced with the Nazi leadership in the first period of Nazi rule to defeat the middle-class radicalism embodied in the paramili­ tary S.A. Hitler sacrificed the S.A. in order to hold the support of big business and the military in moving toward certain shared objectives. "The main goals of the coali­ tion, vrtiich included military equality with other powers, political and economic self-determination, military and economic rearmament, the suppression of trade unions, and the invigoration of capitalist institutions, had been large- 114 ly or fully achieved by the end of 1936." The next question, of course, is Why the successful coalition dis­ solved in 1936.

The answer is that an external limitation imposed itself upon the policy of rearma­ ment, with the result that each of the part­ ners deliberately tried to modify the dual power structure in his favor. Tho interac­ tion of these causes produced a split within big business, an estrangement between gener­ als and business leaders, and a re-aIlianee among the party leaders, the generals, and a new group of business collaborators. ^^5

The "external limitation" consisted of a shortage of foreign exchange, which became critical when the agricultural crop of 1935 turned out to be a poor one. The Nazi "solution" to

^^*Ibid., p. 504. ^^*Ibid., p. 537. 134

this problem, territorial expansion, prevailed because

"neither big business nor the military acted as an effective power bloc" in offering alternative solutions* The old

alliance thus collapsed and the party became at last all- powerful. In Schweitzer's opinion, evidence does not support the thesis that either business or the military were in actuality politically weaker than the party. Rather, he attributes their failure to a lack of leadership.

The widely held opinion that every par­ tial fascism must necessarily turn into a full fascism is not supported by our find­ ings. Such a development arises only when the military and economic groups that are still allied with the fascists do not bring forth leaders of wisdom and fortitude, when these groups fall into ideological disputes and organizational disunity. These three defects undoubtedly turned out to be the fatal characteristics of the German upper class, and also of some segments of the upper class in other European c o u n t r i e s .

Schweitzer's book is a landmark in modern fascism scholarship. Although he focuses on the German version, his work has international ramifications. His distinction between partial and full fascism is suggestive for those interested in a general theory of fascism and counterrevolu­ tion. He is also one of the first persons to attack the "totalitarianism" thesis on the basis of historical data.

^^*lbid., p. 555.

^^^Ibid., especially p. 507, 135

Particularly important is his emphasis on the process of emerging fascism as compared to accounts which project hypo- statised typifications of "fascism," Schweitzer's scope of analysis is broader than that of most of the economists whom we have examined* Rather than concentrating on the abstract character of the economic system, he tries to understand the concrete class relations behind the Nazi regime. He treats the ideologies of various groups as indicators of the groups' interests, and as such worthy of analysis. In the end, however, Schweitzer seems to over-emphasize the factor of leadership. To reduce the failure of the military and business sectors of the German alliance to a lack of leader­ ship is just too simplistic.Such a conclusion can­ not be supported by Schweitzer's data. Despite this major shortcoming, Schweitzer's study must still be considered an excellent example of a theoretically relevant empirical study shedding much new light on fascism. Reviewing the work of the émigré economists, their performance, with a few exceptions, roust be rated as disap­ pointing* The hypotheses of this dissertation would not be strongly supported on the basis of the economists whose studies of fascism we have examined. On the contrary, the tendency to concentrate on strictly economic aspects of

118 Schweitzer in a later article stresses the "charisma" of Hitler as central to Nazi success. See "Ideo­ logical Crisis and Fascism," Societas, II (Winter 1972), 1-25. 136 fascism seems to be equally apportioned among our three groups. Similarly, there is no identifiable pattern of differences in methodology chosen, data employed, or conclu­ sions reached. Two differences do stand out. One is that the emigres and dissenting Americans are more likely to place their analyses within larger theoretical frameworks than are the mainstream Americans; although this advantage did not produce markedly more fruitful studies among the ernigr6s or diseenters. Another difference is that the main­ stream economists tend to concentrate on more specific problems— too specific, in fact, to be relevant to this dissertation. Excepting Hoover, every other orthodox econo­ mist who has worked with data from the fascist countries has chosen a research topic of little direct connection to the countries' fascism. As with mainstream psychology, we must conclude that the specialisation of economics as a disci­ pline produces a climate within %Aiich the larger socio­ political issues become invisible. Our next chapter explores the situation with American political science, where a better performance might be expected in addressing the ultimately political problem of fascism. CHAPTER V

POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Fascist State is the creation of a poli­ tical movement reflecting the neuroses of a lower middle class and a peasantry reduced to desperation by social insecurity and impoverishment. It is also the product of the determination of business and agrarian élites to safeguard their social positions by destroying the power of other groups Who challenge or undermine their privileges. — F rede rick L . Schuma n [F]ascist and Conmunist totalitarian society are basically alike, that is to say are more alike to each other than to any other systems of government and society .... — Ca rl ■ J. Fried rich

A. State of the Discipline American political science is largely a product of the twentieth century. Dwight Waldo, an early observer of its growth, notes a recent change from political science's original focus on exposés and practical reform at the local

level to empirical analyses of national level phenomena. This transition was effected by the unifying impact of the depression and World Wars on political opinion. The new scientific approach came to be Known as behavioral ism and is very much the product of a new political consensus.

137 138

Th« very fact that there could be widespread agreement on the possibility and desirabi­ lity of reducing the study of politics to the single level of a "science" signifies a large amount of basic agreement as to poli­ tical ends. American political science has not been characterised by m r k s seeking either to justify or to controvert the poli­ tical order. Rather, the political order has been "accepted," and distinctive Ameri­ can "political theory" has tended to be con­ cerned with means rather than ends.i

Behavioralism is not a theoretical paradigm. It is a methodological paradigm. Waldo sees Harold Lasswell as "the acknowledged leader of the political behavior movement," although Lasswell never explicitly presented a behavioral methodology in his writings. That task was taken up by others— perhaps most notably David Easton, who also attempted to introduce theoretical concerns into the new 2 political science. Easton distinguishes between

"behaviorism" (J. B. Watson's stimulus-response psychology)

^Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p. 17. 2 The following points are drawn from David Easton, "Introduction: The Current Meaning of Behavioralism in Political Science," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (Philadelphia: The iÜDerican Academy of PoïlticâïTand Social Science, 1962), pp. 1-20. For Easton's theoretical contributions, see his The Political System (2nd ed. ; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19Î1). A remarkable recent statement of faith in behavior­ al ism is John C. Wahlke's "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science, " American Political Science Review, LXXIII (March 1979), 9-3Ï1 Wahlke indicates his dissatisfaction with the progress of behavioralism due to inadequate theory and a faulty conception of human nature. His answer to the crisis is for political scientists to apply the findings of the "biobehavioral sciences" to their discipline. 139 and "behavioralism" (an "intellectual tendency" and "acade­ mic movement" stressing the scientific study of "political behavior"). Some basic tenets of the behavioral movement assert that regularities exist in political behavior, that generalizations about these regularities are testable, that quantification and the scientific method are the preferred means of uncovering laws of political behavior, and that facts and values are to be kept separate. (Thus "science" has become the major determinant of What can and cannot be the subject matter of political inquiry.) To be fair, there have been several other trends in political science running parallel to the development of behavioralism. Alan C. Isaak combines in a category of "traditional" approaches three of these less favored strains.® The "historical" approach produces narrative accounts of political events. The "legalistic" approach (having its primary roots in the German universities) concentrates on "the study of constitutions and legal codes." The "institutional" school of thought views law­ making and law-enforcement bodies as the proper subject matter of political science. (One might reasonably expect each of these three trends to be more productive of insights into the more general problems addressed by political

Alan C. Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, (Rev. ed.; Homewood, 111.i The Dorsey Press, 1975), pp. 32-36. 140 science— 'Such as fascism.} Political philosophy is consi­ dered by Isaak, and no doubt most other political scien­ tists, to be a normative (or pre-scientific) enterprise outside the limits of their discipline. And finally, some­ where between the mainstream and philosophy, there has developed a miniscule faction of political scientists best described as "humanistic" in orientation Who have in various ways attempted to argue for a political science aimed at solving human social problems rather than producing "scien- 4 tific" knowledge for its own sake. Even within the mainstream little agreement exists among political scientists on theoretical and methodological issues. The confusion is apparent in Robert A. Dahl's

Modern Political Analysis* Only in the third edition (thir­ teen years after the appearance of the first edition) did the author add a chapter purporting to answer the question "What Is Political Analysis?" Dahl sees political analysis as having four "orientations. " Empirical analysis "seeks to discover empirical relationships among elements in the real world"; normative analysis "seeks to discover norms, or criteria, to judge alternative policies"; policy analysis

One strain of humanistic political science is based on the theory of human needs initiated by the psycho­ logist Abraham Mas low. See the volume edited by Ross Fitzgerald, Human Needs and Politics (Australia: Pergamon Press, 1977). A more lonely endeavor is Hwa Yol Jung's advocacy of a phenomenological perspective for political inquiry in his The Crisis of Political Unde rata ndinq (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979). 141

"searches for policies or actions to close scxne of the gap between the existing state of affairs and a possible future that would be better"; and semantic analysis "tries to clarify meaning, particularly the meaning of key con­ cepts."^ Political theory, which is not discussed, possibly evolves as "empirical relationships" are discovered and arranged into a meaningful whole. Or perhaps Dahl perceives of theory as a list of "key concepts." Whatever the case, his lack of concern with theory is a good reflec­ tion of the current state of affairs in academic political science. Host members of the discipline engage in very specialized research with few references to general theore­ tical guidelines.* Charles A. McCoy and John Playford edited in 1967 a collection of essays critical of behavioralism under the title Apolitical Politics. They affirm the dominance of behavioralism in political sciencet "It would not be

*Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.t Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 12-17.

*A recent suggestion for the reconciliation of behavioralism with theory (or "paradigmatic thinking") is found in David E . Apter's Introduction to Political Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.t Winthrop Publishers, 1977). Apter's advocacy of a "hermeneutic," or interpretive, viewpoint results from a dual dissatisfactiont "In nv view the danger of the behavioral position, with its emphasis on quantita­ tive detail, specialization, and fine applications, is that it will engage small minds on small issues, while the para- digmist position with its emphasis on grand solutions will engineer empty architectural plans for buildings that can never be built," (p. 537) 142

unwarranted to speak of the behavlorallsta as members of an

'establishment* within the discipline."^ But this establishment is distinguished by its avoidance of major political theoretical issues.

As the title of this volume implies, it is the failure of the behavioraliste to address themselves to genuinely significant politi­ cal matters that concerns us most. By establishing methodology as the most rele­ vant criterion for research they turn their students of politics into political eu­ nuchs .

The substantive issues raised in the essays of Apolitical Politics need not detain us here. The individual authors take to task behavioralists (V. O. Key, David B. Truman, Herbert A. Simon, Gabriel A. Almond, as well as Lasswell,

Easton, and Dahl, to name some of the best-known of their targets) for their emphasis on equilibrium, "pluralism," and individualism; and for their concept of a new (indirect) kind of democracy in modern "mass society." The important point for us to note is the authors' general agreement that behavioralism has tended toward conservatism by virtue of

its concentration on contemporary American political

Charles A McCoy and John Playford, eds., Apoli­ tical Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 19é7), p. 2. See also Alan Wolfe's account of one attempt to reform poli­ tical science, "Unthinking about the Thinkable: Reflections on the Failure of the Caucus for a New Political Science," Politics and Society, I (May 1971), 393-406. Q McCoy and Playford, Apolitical Politics, p. 9. 143

Institutions and "behavior." In such an atmosphere it is understandable that a problem like fascism might easily become irrelevant.

Many of the above-mentioned criticisms are repeated by Philip H. Melanson in Political Science and Political Know­ ledge , but Melanson focuses on the professionalization of political science as a source of the discipline's problems.

The "knowledge" that scientific professions impart to consumers is, in a very real sense, shaped by professionally dominant epistemologies. The scientific philosophy (or epistemic preferences) of political science must be examined in order to disco­ ver how it determines which of its inquiries deserve to be thought of as "knowledge, " and thus deserve serious consideration by clients and publics.*

Melanson employs a modified sociology-of-knowledge analysis:

"The sociology of knowledge is most fruitfully viewed as the analysis of bias in inquiry. And one class of biases particularly relevant to the concerns of this disser­ tation contains those of a conceptual nature. Such biases are a most direct reflection of professional "epistemic preferences" at the level of individual scholarship. For example, the concept of "totalitarianism" has been preferred

9 Philip H. Melanson, Political Science and Politi­ cal Knowledge (Washington, D.C.i Public Affairs Press, 1975), p. lu.

^*Ibid., p. 46* A related analysis worth consult­ ing is Philip L, Beardsley's Redefining Rigor (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 19So), devoted^soTely to the effects of ideology on political inquiry. 144

to the concept of "fascism," even though the latter is much more productive of insights into certain regimes. This may be the result of one frequent source of bias suggested by Melanson:

Behind seemingly rigorous formulations involving much quantification and classifi­ cation lie the intuitive and/or normatively preferential ideas that there is some inher­ ent developmental sequence in the political process: that systems confront political crises in some irreversible ordef, and that a teleology exists by vdiich Western repre­ sentative democracy is the ultimate stage of political evolution.il

Melanson believes that the professionalization of poli­ tical science plays a great role in creating conditions in

Which conceptual biases flourish. Every profession needs a "repute system" in order to exist, "Externally, an occupa­ tional group must command a minimum of lay deference in 12 order to lay claim to professional status," Internal­ ly, repute is " . . . the principle mechanism by Which the occupational peer group distributes rewards and sanc­ tions."^^ It is the "means and substance" of the professional status of individuals. Now, it has come about that science, although "more a goal than a realization" of political science, has become the foundation of its repute system.

^^Melanson, Political Science, p. 48, l^ibid., p. 95 l^Ibid. 145

Scientism and repute may not be inherently synonymous, but given the public affect for professional science in America, the path of least resistance and source of greatest reward encourage a professional organisation toward a "scientific" posture whenever possible.14

However, because of the near absence of "hard" science in political science, "... the profession is forced to rely heavily on peer group perceptions to determine which scholars, works, and methodologies will legitimately claim 'scientific' status."^* Hence the achievement of professional standing depends to a high degree upon an aspirant's acceptance of the currently favored methods and conceptual definitions. The preceding pages lead us to tvro expectations about

American political scientists' investigations of fascism. First, the emphasis on scientific method would lead scholars to produce studies of very narrow scope based on empirical analysis of specific data. Second, those studies of fascism %diich do take a general viewpoint would tend to be colored by conceptual frameworks established within the discipline for dealing with "undemocratic" regimes. Of course, the concept of "totalitarianism" is foremost among these.

l*Ibid., p. 96. l^ibid/, p. 97. 146

B. Mainstream Interpretations of Fascism

Two of the earliest American studies of fascism were produced by Carmen Haider, Who received her Ph.D. from Columbia University and later joined The Brookings Institu­ tion. Her dissertation vns developed into her first book in 1930, Capital and Labor Under Fascism. The author carried out her research in Italy, Where she managed to interview Mussolini, Turati, Rocco, Rossoni, Gentile, Magrini, Volpi,

Nitti, and many other Italians in and put of the regime. She approached fascism with "a sympathetic attitude," attempting "... to Interpret fascism frmn the Italian point of view, being guided by considerations coming from within the national life, and not by objections which persons of other intellectual backgrounds make to the system."^* Haider begins her analysis of Fascism by putting it into the context of the world-wide "labor problem." The tendency, since the industrial revolution, has been for labor to become increasingly discontented and international- istic. At the outbreak of World War 1 the Italian social­ ists took a stand in favor of absolute neutrality. Workers, they believed, should not fight one another for the benefit of bourgeois national governments. Mussolini and others

^*Carmen Haider, Capital and Labor Under Fascism (New York* Columbia University Press, 1930}, ^ 147 broke with the Socialiste on this question, later forming the nucleus of the Fascist movement. (Fascism portrayed itself as a nationalistic radicalism working for a national solution to the labor problem.) Italy finally entered the war on the winning side, but It gained almost nothing in return from the Versailles settlement. The Socialists' position on the war seemingly vindicated, they came out of the war as a strong contender for control of the Italian government. Indeed, some observers believe they might have been able to seize power had they taken the initiative in 1920 when workers occupied the factories on a mass scale.

But Haider is skeptical. She believes that

, . . the Importance and danger of the occu­ pation of the factories had been greatly over-estimated. The political leaders of socialism realized that it would be impos­ sible for the wage-eamere to run the factories, as they possessed neither the businessman's ability nor the training of the technician. Moreover, the leaders did not believe the movement strong enough to cause an overthrow of the Government. As agitation died down they ordered the labor representatives to draw up and sign a collective contract. However, although the movement did not bring the socialists to power, the bourgeois were frightened by it e » # ^ '

After the Socialists' failure, conditions were ripe for the rise of fascist groups. Haider touches only briefly on the origins of these groups, pointing to their early base

l?Ibid., pp. 27-28. 148 among war veterans and in rural areas* She devotes only a few pages to the process by vAilch Fascism came to power, preferring to describe Fascism after it was established. Her description is couched mostly in terms of the movement's

ideology--Paseism is seen as anti-liberal and anti- materialist, favoring instead traditional values. It insists on the primacy of the nation over the interests of individual classes. Haider assigns some importance to the Fascist concept of "integral syndicalism," wherein the proletariat is replaced by the nation in the previously revolutionary doctrine developed by Georges Sorel. "Accept­ ing . . . not only capitalism, but the capitalist, as useful and necessary for efficient production, private activity is encouraged as being the best driving force for the increase Ifi and improvement of production*" Under this national syndicalism, workers and employers are to be represented equally in a confederation of syndicates.

The legally recognized associations, representing before the law all the workers of the same group, may bind them by collec­ tive contracts, and possess the exclusive right to designate representatives to state or other public organizations. Whether ad­ ministrative, technical or political.1*

l*Ibid., p. 37. l*Ibid., pp. 99-100. 149

But Haider ehowe in a detailed account of the development of

the syndicate organization that the worker syndicates have

little real power.

Where collective contracts exist, they are frequently not respected. Provisions for the assistance of workers Which are laid down in the charter of labor, in particular, are not applied, and the workers refrain from denouncing any infractions because they fear to lose their jobs.20

Moreover, the eight-hour day is ignored, workers are not paid at a higher rate for overtime', and there are no minimum wages. Strikes are forbidden. The Labor Court was estab­

lished to "impartially" mediate disputes between labor and

management. Despite the anti-labor bias built into the Fascist system, Haider finds that the workers are not totally sub­

jugated.

Perhaps it is because of the mentality that has been developed and accentuated for a hundred years and more, perhaps it is because it lies in the nature of things, that the class struggle, the struggle of the property-holding classes against those who can offer only their labor in the productive process^ again springs up in the fascist regime

^*Ibid., pp. 116-117.

Zllbid., p. 209. 150

Thera ara many former socialists and revolutionary syndical­

ists in the party ranks Who attempt to represent the inter­ ests of workers, and there still are occasional strikes and slow-downs in the factories* Dissatisfaction also exists among other Fascistsi

Even persons in rather advanced syndicate positions, in discussing the policies of the Government with an outsider, diligently oppose whatever criticisms are advanced as long as a third person is in the room, only to say, as soon as they are under the out­ sider's eye alone, that they agree perfectly with the objections, and that they them­ selves do not approve of the Government, but that they could not say so before, because it might have been h e a r d . 22

Haider sees in worker discontent the potential downfall of the Fascist system, which is now held together by Musso­ lini's leadership. The system can only last if workers are allowed to participate in "directing and modifying"

Fascism. In her final evaluation, Haider attempts to look at both the "pros and cons" of Fascism. On the one hand, it has created a much needed "national consciousness" with its emphasis on class collaboration. "At the same time fascism, with a strong hand, has disciplined the Italians, who by nature present a more turbulent element than the northern

22ibid., p. 227 151

25 races . . , Advances have also been made in social welfare and popular education. On the other hand, the preponderance of bureaucracy and lack of democracy could be fatal to the regime. Haider judges the Italian situation in 1930 as one of great flux which could develop in many different directions.

Four years later, in Do We Want Fascism?, Haider con­ siderably broadens her analysis of fascism and becomes decidedly anti-fascist. She begins this book with short histories of the rise to power of the Fascist and Nazi regimes. Then, in a chapter on the "fundamentals of fascism," she sketches a general theoretical viewpoint.

Haider rejects at the outset one popular "cause" of fascism*

From a narrative account of how Fascism came into being in Europe, it might appear that it grew out of the conditions laid down in the peace treaty of Versailles. Such an interpretation, however, would be based on a superficial analysis of the fundamental factors involved. The fact is that the peace treaties were themselves a logical outcome of what preceded them. Few persons today believe the last war was fought for the sake of establishing democracy in the world. We have come to realize that under- lying the idealistic expressions of both the Allies and the Central Powers, there was desperate struggle for economic world superiority and domination. 24

^^Ibid., p. 274. ^^Halder, Do We Want Fascism? (New York* John Day Company, 1934), p. 74. 152

The contest revolved around markets and raw materials. Aggressive nationalism stood against defensive nationalism in the vrorld war, but both were essentially "imperialist" in nature* Nations will in the future continue to go to war because of economic differences. In this line of thought Haider seems to have been influenced by Marxism (or at least Leninism) • Indeed, the entirety of her account seems to lean on Marxian thought. For example, one of her concerns is the role of the middle class. Given the world-wide competition for resources and markets, some nations will experience internal difficulties due to their poor interna­ tional position. The bourgeoisie favors the establishment of a strong state to deal with these problems, but the key group in bringing it to fruition is the middle class. Haider finds

• . • that the entire middle class in its outlook and aspirations identifies itself with the big bourgeoisie, but that the economic reality of class conditions fails to provide a satisfactory basis for their attitude. As a result of this discrepancy there is a fundamental maladjustment in the lives of the members of this group which, when accentuated in tiroes of economic stress, may develop into open militancy on their part.25

Condemned to an inferior econ

^^Ibld.', p. 86. 153

Haider believes the violence of fascist movements to be the central fact which must be confronted*

A militia such as Fascist parties create for themselves usurping the right of the state to intervene in domestic conflicts, is distinctly an extralegal organization and as such represents violence against the exist­ ing state power. This, however, to the mind of the Fascists, is not inconsistent, since they regard only a Fascist government as representing the nation. Violence, there­ fore, is used for the establishment of a national Fascist state. It is in the fail­ ure to recognize this essential reliance of Fascist parties on violence for their effort to capture the state that the error of Socialists and liberals lies. Not parlia­ mentary proceedings, but only a determined and active extra-parliamentary resistance can cope with violence. By holding the workers back from this struggle, the Social­ ists have directly enhanced the chances for Fascism to come to power.

During times of crisis, the struggle of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat can only be resolved through violence.

Theoretically either of the opponents might proceed to the attack, which must necessarily involve the use of violence. It must be either the violence of a workers' revolution or the violence by Which that revolution is prevented, that is, the violence of counter-revolution. Thus revo­ lution and counter-revolution are interde­ pendent phenomena Which condition one another. 2 7

^*Ibid., p. 89. 2?Ibid., p. 102. 154

In this passage Haider sounds curiously like a dogmatic Marxist, although she gives no explicit indication of being influenced by any Marxist writer. Haider next takes up the issue of economic planning under fascism. The explicit goal of such planning is to preserve capitalism. "Under its own terms, the test for Fascism and the corporate state machinery lies in the question of whether it has been instrumental in increasing national production and in improving living condi- 28 tions." After eleven years of Fascist rule in Italy, however: (1) "The volume of Italian national production has not substantially increased. National economic planning hae not been introduced." (2) "The level of Italian real wages has fallen below the 1914 level. For Haider, plan­

ning was merely an ideological offering to the Fascist "left."

The attempt to introduce planning, although this is fundamentally in conflict with the private profit motive of capitalism, was made under the pressure of economic deadlock and the consequent unrest. After a scheme has been elaborated Wiich will prevent the dissatisfaction of the people from finding expression, the need for planning is greatly diminished.20

^*Ibid., p. 106. ^^Ibid. (Haider does not indicate a source for these statistics.) ^°Ibid., p. 114. 155

Thus fascist planning will inevitably give way to suppres­ sion of the workers. In her final five chapters Haider applies her general understanding of fascism to the United States of the 1930s. She sees fascism as unlikely here but believes that if the New Deal would flounder, either the NRA itself or a violent revolt of farmers could present itself as the road to an American fascism. She decries the lack of class conscious­ ness among %rorkers in this country, asserting that proleta­ rian consciousness is the only defense against fascism. Again, Haider employs a classical Marxian argument. Overall, Haider provides us with an analysis of fascism far better than we might have expected. The fact that she traveled and lived in Europe exposed her to a wide variety of intellectual perspectives on the problem of fascism. There is an obvious tendency toward a more leftist viewpoint in her second book, and this is accompanied by a transition to an international conceptualization of fascism. However, Haider's knowledge of the Italian situation is her strong point. Do We Want Fascism? adheres to an unsophisticated

(If not explicit) Marxian framework into which she plugs her Italian information along with information from secondary sources on National Socialism. Although such a general analysis is unusual among American academics, Haider adds nothing new to work previously produced by European scholars. Her earlier book on "capital and labor under 156

Fascism" remains her most significant contribution, despite a certain amount of ethnic stereotyping. The next significant study by an American is Frederick L. Schuman's The Nazi Dictatorship. It is a remarkable piece of work, on par with that of the economist Calvin Hoover. Schuman, who taught at The University of Chicago and later moved to Williams College and afterwards Portland State College, attempted to produce the first "comprehensive and definitive analysis of both the NationsIsocialist move­ ment and the new Nazi State." His research was carried put during an eight-month period in 1933 on an American Academy fellowship. Schuman begins by placing his study within the concep­ tual framework of political science. Which he proceeds to define in a manner not typical of mainstream scholars.

A realistic Political Science must concern itself with the social contexts of power relationships, with the established proce­ dures for the distribution of material and psychic values in society, and with the value hierarchies Which emerge and persist in the body politic. It must likewise endeavor . . . to disclose the effects of economic change upon social deprivations and insecurities for the invention and propaga­ tion of political symbolisms. Institutions of power are meaningful only against the background of these underlying configura­ tions. The processes of politics, in the narrower sense, can be dealt with intelli­ gently only in terms of the struggle for power between social groups and in terms of the basic weapons of power in all cultures* violent and non-violent coercion; emotional 157

conditioning or conversion through propaganda; and the wise and masterful distribution of material emoluments.2i

Schuman seems to have been on the fringe of the mainstream for most of his scholarly career, taking a general approach to international political phenomena and achieving superior 32 results. Perhaps his greatest achievement is The Nazi Dictatorship, which he begins with a detailed analysis of Hitler's rise to power. Schuman appears to assign fundamental importance in this to the genius of Hitler himself, but he is careful to delineate the social roots of Hitler's capabilities.

Because his own personality difficulties had counterparts by millions in the society in which he lived, he was to found a new poli­ tical religion giving solace to its disci­ ples. Because of his special talents as an actor, an orator, and a synbo 1-artist, he was able to become the Messiah of this religion* Der Führer.23

In addition, "... the constantly deepening crisis of the Reich created a growing market for Hitler's panaceas and weakened the prestige of the republic sufficiently to offer

31 Frederick L. Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), pp. vli-viii. Copyright © 1935 by Frederick L. Schuman. This book was the first of a trilogy also including Europe on the Eve (Knopf, 1939) and Night over Europe (KnopT^ 1941 ). 32See his The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, l462) and his magnum opus International Politics (7th ed. ; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, 1969). 158 hop* of success for a well-planned revolt, with the colla- boration of other reactionaries." Hitler's greatest feat was his manipulation of various elements of the German class structure through a carefully crafted program of political promises.

Labour and the more radical KleinbUrqertum ware promised socialism. The peasantry was promised an end of "interest slavery" and the partition of the great estates* The mass of the KleinbU rqertum was promised dissolution of trusts, municipalization of department stores, and acon<»nic security* The upper bourgeoisie was promised salvation from Marxism and the destruction of trade unionism*25

But Hitler did not consider the support of each class group to be equally significant.

Peasants, burgherS, and workers could supply only the mass following. Power could be won only by converting the élite— or by causing it to support the movement for its own ends. Power lay with the industrialists, the financiers, the feudal military casts, and the aristocracy of money— the very groups most bitterly assailed by the Marxists and by the "socialists" of the NSDAP. In every crisis within the party ranks between the socialistic radicals and the conservatives Hitler was to side with the latter— out of preference, out of conviction, and out of long-wn considerations of political expedi­ ency. 26

^*Ibid., pp. 32-33. ^®Ibid., p. 53. ^®Ibld., pp. 53-54, 159

Shuman emphasizes the contribution of the upper class to the financial well-being of the party. In the absence of data, he guesses that fron one-third to one-half of the party funds came from sources other than dues and small donations.

The party went to the upper strata of the German wea1th-and-income pyramid, to the already reactionary and anti-republican d'litat to the bourgeois aristocracy of money, to the Junker aristocracy of land, to business men, employers, bankers, industri­ alists, landowners, and all others possessed of fortunes. These groups, in Germany as elsewhere, contributed to all parties save the Communists. Their donations want parti­ cularly to the German People's Party and to the Nationalists. They tended to view the NSDAP as a useful t w l with Which to win the masses to r e a c t i o n . 27

This view on Nazi funding has been supported by m o d e m historical research (see Chapter VI) and is an effective refutation of the vulgar Marxist view which implies that large numbers of wealthy reactionaries supported the Nazis exclusively. Schuman next discusses the role played by National Socialist ideology. Ha bases his comments on a theoretical principle (perhaps a central one in his thinking) that posits human behavior as fundamentally emotional and irra­ tional. "All collective action is by definition emotionally motivated. All human societies are held together by shared

37%bid., p. 87. 160

emotions, by common glandular and muscular responses to 38 collective symbols, not by abstract intellect." In addition, social groups share certain interests based on their economic positions. The role of ideology is to give emotional content to economic Interests. "'Interests' are never the basis of collective action until they are dramatized and emotionalized into symbols playing a ma^or

role in the transfer of private motives into public objects." The question, theh, is clean

What . . . were the elements in the situa­ tion of the German post-war Kleinbürgertum which led to the emergence within it of the gospel of the NSDAP and predisposed its members in large numbers to organize them­ selves emotionally around the symbols and slogans of Nationalsocialism?4^

Schuman initiates his answer by pointing to the fact that the lower middle class has (contrary to some earlier predic­ tions) actually been expanding in size in twentieth-century industrial societies.

In Germany, even long before the war, the proportion of gainfully occupied persons in the ranks of the proletariat has slowly

**Ibid., p. 98. 39 Ibid. Schuman is explicit about the debt to "economic determinism" and psychoanalysis in his thoughts on ideology. 40lbid., p. 100. 161

declined in relation to salaried employees, officials, salesmen, etc. By 1925 almost half of the total of the gainfully occupied persons consisted not of industrial vmge- eamers, but of small traders, professional people, salaried employees, officials, handicraft workers, and middle and small peasants.41

However, the economic position of this aggregation was weak:

Even before the war its income and social position were declining (relatively) as it increased in numbers. It was becoming "pro­ le ta rianised" and was casting about for %#ays and means of maintaining its sense of supe­ riority over manual workers. It probably suffered more heavily, psychologically and materially, from the post-war inflation than any other single g r o u p . 42

The depression was the final contributory condition to middle-class rebellion. The workers "had trade unions and public unemployment insurance to keep them from starvation."

The wealthy "could afford heavy losses without deprivation." The middle class, however, had very little protection from econcMnic disaster. Schuman*s emphasis is on the psychological deprivation of the middle class, but he becanes increasingly speculative as he attempts to develop this line of thinking. He does little more than hypothesize that: "Material deprivation

^^Ibid., p. 101. ^^Ibid., pop. 101-02, 162

«ma leas galling than the ubiquitous sense of social degra­ dation."*^ Thus: "The Kleinburqerturn yearned for what was hard, well armoured, even brutal— to disguise and forget 44 its own weakness." The "deep hunger for militarist mysticism in the turgid depths of the German soul" is an additional factor. "The war years left unhealed wounds. The millions who saw blood and death in the trenches did not return as pacifists. The forbidden but sanctified pleasures of mass murder were too keenly relished."*^ Having (to his own satisfaction) established the mass psychological basis of German fascism, Schuman discusses next the ideology which was designed to answer the Germans' psychological needs. He follows Reich and others in his belief that anti- Semitism "was genetically the foundation of the %#hole ideo­ logical superstructure of NationsIsocialisro." The function of anti-semltism was to bring about a "race consciousness" to counteract the class consciousness preached by Marxism. A second major component of fascist ideology— the affirma­ tion of socialism— is also aimed against Marxism.

In German, as in Italian, Fascism the new "socialism" meant only the destruction of Marxism and the suppression of the indepen­ dent trade unions, along with the integration

*^Ibid., p. 105.

**lbid., p. 108. *®Ibid. 163

of professional and business associations into some semblance of a "St&ndestaat" or "Corporative State." The real social and economic significance of Nationalsocialism lay in its widely heralded abolition of class conflict.4v

Schuman next takes up the question of how Hitler actu­ ally achieved power. His approach is to ask tdiy the politi­ cal organizations of the proletariat failed to stop the Nazis. The rivalry between the Socialists and Communists is singled out as the primary hindrance.

Collaboration between the Communists and Social Democrats was unthinkable. Each accused the other of playing into the hands of the Fascists. Each was so hypnotized by its own ideology that it preferred to die separately rather than to live by coopera­ tion. Social democracy, with its still intact and apparently impressive machinery of party and trade-union organizations, was a hollow shell. It could not fight because it %fould crumble to dust at the first blow. After July 20 [1932] Communist contempt for Social Democratic cowardice and treachery t#as unqualified. But neither could the KPD fight. It was not prepared for revolution­ ary action, nor did the existing balance of power, for all its instability, offer an opportunity for proletarian revolt. Moscow, moreover, vetoed revolution. The exigencies of the Five Year Plan and the need for peace forbade international conflict— and without Soviet military intervention no Communist revolution in Germany could succeed.*'

**Ibld., p. 119. *^Ibid., p. 183. 164

One* established in power, Hitler had only to purge the

"leftist* elements of the party— %Atich he did in one night with the notorious murder of Rohm and scores of others* The role of terror in Nasi Germany is examined from a perspective of mass psychopathology. Schuman does not believe Hitler needed terror to cement his rule', because there was little physical opposition. "The terror, there­

fore, was less a political weapon against foes than a channel for the discharge of the long-accumulated aggres­ sions of the many botched and bungled personalities who had 48 flocked to the s%#astika banner." Shuman does recog­ nise that terror actually functioned to discourage opposi­ tion, but he sees the psychic satisfactions as more signifi­

cant. However, he believes that he sees (in 1934) a move­ ment away from terrorism totnard a more generalised persecu­

tion of scapegoats.

Terrorism, even on a mass scale, affords a channel for the discharge of aggressions for only a few members of the vrtiole community. The remainder is merely frightened or left unmoved. In neither case is loyalty to the regime promoted. In the persecution of minorities, however, the entire community (excepting only the victims) can participate in one way or another. Fear of government is transmuted into detestation of those branded by government as public enemies.**

**Ibid., p. 289. **Ibid., p. 312. 165

Thus one effect of scapegoating is to provide a ready focal point for the resentments of those not benefitting from the status quo* But there is a further effect:

The creation of a pariah caste, singled out for discrimination and contempt, serves another function useful to every ruling class. It affords to those disgruntled strata near the bottom of the social hierar­ chy the emotional satisfaction of being able to "look down upon" a group which is still lower in the social scale.50

(This idea has been developed in more recent times by social scientists as the concept of "relative deprivation.") Another aspect of Nazism Which serves multiple func­ tions is "the dramatization of external threats." At the level of mass psychology: "Hatred of the out-group creates unity of the in-group. Ethnocentrism and xenophobia are opposite sides of the same coin."^^ At the level of international relations, Germany needed to build popular support for an "inevitable" war:

The most elementary considerations of diplo­ macy and strategy demand that those entrust­ ed with the formation of German foreign policy strive to recover equality of statue, freedom of action, an equilibrium of arma­ ment*, and a restoration of a balance of power between the victors and the vanquished of 1918.52

S°Ibid. Sllbid., p. 345. S*Ibid., p. 350. 166

Moreover, xenophobia is an efficient tool for the reduction of class struggle*

Militarism is indispansible for the amuse­ ment of the masses* It is equally indispen- sible for the satisfaction of the classes whose interests the NSOAP has always served. For the Junkers it means military career^, glory, and lands in the east. For industri­ alists it means orders for guns', planes, tanks, and artillery, as well as new sources of raw material, new markets for goods', new fields for lucrative investment, all to be won by the sword. In his final two chapters Schuman develops What is almost a general theory of fascism. The predominant influ­ ence seems to be Marxism, although no claim is made to this effect. Schuman begins with some general propositions about politics*

The ultimate technique of politics is the apportionment of material benefits among the major strata of the social hierarchy in such a fashion as to ensure acquiescence in the status quo and loyalty to those wielding government power. This technique is "ulti­ mate" in the sense that the Whole political process may be regarded as a product of com­ petition and conflict among social groups for material and psychic satisfactions. Property and money are but two means toward satisfactions, but since they command all the others, the competition for possession of them is not only the focal point of eco­ nomic motivations and activities, but is likewise the most basic incentive to politi­ cal behaviour. Save for the Soviet Union, all kno%m civilised societies and all cul­ tures have conformed to this pattern.5*

S^Ibid., p. 352.

®*Ibid., p. 387. 167 Each social group competes for control or partial control of the state in order to attain Its ends, although no group can achieve and maintain power without also fulfilling the chief interests of other powerful groups in the nation.

Where goods and services are increasingly abundant, the competition among groups for a larger share of the total is less keen, less embittered, less significant for politics than in societies afflicted with famine and impoverishment* In the contracting and impecunious economies of the post-war world this competition has frequently been inten­ sified to the point of open conflict. The State must arbitrate, intervene, and regu­ late the agencies and procedures of distri­ bution which were once "private" and uncon­ trolled. Ruling classes and revolutionists must again protect and promote their inter­ ests by "political" means in the narrower sense* The dictatorial, totalitarian "cor­ porative" State is the end-point of this development in the increasingly monopolistic economies of the twentieth-century imperial­ isms. 55

Schuman recognizes the difference between the fascist movement and the fascist regime, thus avoiding the vulgar Marxists* greatest error of interpretation.

The Fascist State is the creation of a political movement reflecting the neuroses of a lower middle class and a peasantry reduced to desperation by social insecurity and impoverishment. It is also the product of the determination of business and agrari­ an élites to safeguard their social posi­ tions by destroying the power of other groups who challenge or undermine their

SSibid., p. 388. 168

privileges. The HSDAP grew out of the social and spiritual sickness of the Klein- btfrgertum. It became the tool of the estab- lished ruling classes against their ene­ mies.**

The economic system of Nazi Germany continued to be capitalism, although in a modified form* "The new capital­ ism differed from the old in that free competition in a free market was largely displaced by governmentally protected monopolies subjected to State regulation of prices, wages, 57 and marketing." But Schuman is convinced that the old ruling class, with some changes, is still in control* "Nazi leaders propose, but capitalists and aristocrats dispose* That they could find means of disposing of Hitler should he ever cross them in fundamentals has been clearer eg to no one than to Der Führer himself* " Schuman's over-estimation of the power of the old ruling class in the new Germany is certainly a product of the time in which he is writing* He is, however, closer to the mark when discus­ sing the position of labor under the Hitler regime. He shows that claims of the reduction of unemployment are

S*ibid. S?lbid*, p. 392.

Ibid*, p. 412* In the introduction to the third work of his trilogy on National Socialism, Schuman rejects his earlier position and asserts instead that all Germany is dominated by "a new and revolutionary political élite." (Night over Europe, p. vii.) 169 little more than "statistical trickery,” citing the use of such devices as substitute employment, emergency work, labor service, and the replacement of women by men. Moreover, the real wages of workers are on the decline.

In short, German labour is already ex­ periencing that decline of living standards, even in the face of business "recovery, ” Which Italian labour has been suffering ever since 1922. Money wages are falling and may be expected to fall further as the rates for the old employed workers and the new re- employed workers tend to be equalized. Prices, taxes, and party collections are rising. The extent of decline in real wages is difficult to estimate, but has been at least fifteen percent.**

Schuman places fascism in its most general context by sketching an essentially Leninist vision of twentieth- century capitalism*

The econcxnic dilemma of Fascist Germany is not fundamentally different from that of western capitalism in general in the epoch of monopoly and imperia liant, save that it is intensified by Nazi policies and is rendered more desperate by the paucity of the Reich's resources. The dilemma can be stated quite simply. Capitalistic production tends to outrun mass consumption because of the profit incentive to productive efficiency and because of the meagre participation of the masses, relative to the classes, in the fruits of industry. The glutting of the market makes ccxnpetition destructive and leads to combinations, cartels, and trusts to restrict competition. It also leads to the accumulation of vast surpluses of goods and capital for Which there is no profitable

**Ibid,, p. 406. 170

home market. Temporary relief is available so long as populations grow, wages rise, and the state of the market permits a continued expansion of production. Foreign markets, however, soon become indispensible, as does the protection of the domestic market from foreign competition. Free trade gives way to protective tariffs, and economic self- sufficiency to commercial and financial ex­ pansion. Imperialism, protectionism, high- pressure advertising, and installment pur­ chasing are all aspects of the quest for the vanishing market. Free competition and laissez-faire are displaced by monopolies. State intervention, and "economic plan­ ning."®'*

The crisis can be temporarily relieved through exploitation of the labor and resources of "backward areas," but "compet­ ing imperialisms" are likely to end up at war, as happened in 1914.

Fascism is one type of response to the crisis of capi­ talism, but it is "an aggravating symptom rather than a cure of the malady." In Schuman*s mind the direction in Which fascism is currently leading Germany is unmistakable.

Out of this situation will probably emerge a new era of imperialistic war. Autarchy spells extinction for such a State as Germany .... New markets must somehow be conquered .... Imperialism is an eco­ nomic necessity for Thyssen, Krupp, Siemens, Schacht, and the remainder of the German business elite* General world recovery, accompanied by a partial restoration of foreign markets and international trade, may afford relief and postpone the day of

®°Ibid., p. 416. 171

reckoning until the next major economic crisis. But Der Tag must come. Cartels, Oleichschaltung, price-fixing, and exchange manipulation as a means toward the recovery of markets will then give way to marching armies, poison gas, heavy artillery, and bombing planes. For such is Fascism's "sal­ vation" for the ruling classes of a social order sick beyond hope of recovery.®^

Thus Schuman, with explicit reference to Marxists R. Palma Dutt and John Strachey, interprets fascism as " , . . the social philosophy and the State-form of the bourgeoisie in 62 the monopolistic epoch of late capitalism." But he adds the important qualification that it appears in late­ comers to world imperialism Who are shut off from markets and raw materials. "It is worthy of note, moreover, that Fascism appears first not only in 'marginal' nations, but in 'marginal' classes and marginal' industries. It is nurtur­ ed by the social groups which are affected first and most severely by the maladjustments of a diseased economy.

On a final point, Schuman again takes a Marxist position. There is, he believes, one possible way in Which fascism might be toppled before war breaks out.

Only a social revolution can destroy the Fascist State. Only an upheaval in Which

*^Ibid., p. 419. ®^Ibid., p. 480. ^^Ibid., p. 481. 172

the pornr of the ruling classee is perma­ nently broken by a naee revolt from below can offer hope of weakening the grip upon the sources of pornr of the totalitarian dictatorship. The new abolutism is the only possible form for the plutocracy and the aristocracy in the age of monopoly, since it protects their interests far better than any imaginable alternative. The Fascist State can therefore be destroyed only by a politi­ cal movement aiming at the destruction of the classes Which called it into being. Such a movement can probably come only from the ranks of the least-privileged class in the community--that is, the proletariat.®^

Unlike the Marxists, however, Schuman sees very little like­ lihood that a revolution will come about. In Schuman we encounter yet another contradiction to the main hypothesis of this dissertation. He has produced a wide-ranging and often original analysis of German fascism. His scope of analysis could not be much broader, encompass­ ing as it does factors from the psychological to the econo­ mic, from the national to the international. Schuman's methodology would seem to place him someWhere between "his­ torical political science" and political economy. And finally, most of Schuman's conclusions have withstood the test of ten years of development of the Nazi regime subse­ quent to his original research. Another interesting American work is that by Harold Lasswell on "The Psychology of Hitlerism." Lasswell is a

^*Xbid., p. 403. 173 sort of Renaissance scholar Who produced, among a variety of other things, a number of works cast in the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis with a touch of Marxism. As were the mainstream psychological studies in our Chapter III, Lasswell's is speculative in nature. But there is a difference; fascism is here related to the psychological insecurities of the lower middle classes at the end of the nineteenth century.

Materially speaking, it is not necessary to assume that the small shopkeepers, teachers, preachers, lawyers, doctors, farmers and craftsmen were worse off at the end than they had been in the middle of the century. Psychologically speaking, however, the lower middle class was increasingly overshadowed by the workers and the upper bourgeoisie, vrtiose unions, cartels and parties took the center of the stage. The psychological im­ poverishment of the lower middle class pre­ cipitated emotional insecurities within the personalities of its members, thus fertiliz­ ing the ground for the various movements of mass protest through which the middle clas­ ses might revenge themselves.®* Lasswell finds the psychological preconditions of fascism not in psychological factors themselves but in the real life situation of the group most instrumental in facism's coming to power. He further relates the ideological appeals of Nazism to that real situation*

Harold D. Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitler­ ism," in Lasswell, On Political Sociology, ed. and with an intro, by Dwaine MarvlcK (Chicago* University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 295. Copyright ® 1977 by The University of Chicago. Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press. This is slightly abridged from Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," Political Quarterly, XV (July-September 1933), 373-84. 174

Nationalism and anti-ssmitism were pecu­ liarly fitted to the emotional necessities of the lower bourgeoisie. Rebuffed by a world which accorded them diminished defer­ ence, limited in the opportunities afforded by economic reality, the members of this class needed new objects of devotion and new targets of aggression. The rising cult of nationalism furnished a substitute for the fading appeal of institutionalized religion in a secularizing world. Anti-seraitism provided a target for the discharge of the resentments arising from damaged self­ esteem; and since the scapegoat was connect­ ed with the older Christian tradition, guilt feelings arising from the lack of personal piety could be expiated by attacking the Jew.*®

Postering a pre-existing German anti-Semitism, the Nazis were able to sketch a plausible relationship between the

Jews and all the ills of German society. Lasswell is careful to point out that the Jews occupied distinctive socio-economic positions in German society vAiich had the effect of reinforcing anti-Semitism. Jews were Identified with almost all the modernizing trends which threatened the petty bourgeoisie. On the one hand, Jews were dispropor­ tionately represented in commerce and finance; they could easily be cited for "profiteering" at the expense of the lovrer classes. On the other hand, Jews were prominent in the proletarian socialist movement vdiich threatened the petty bourgeoisie from another angle.

®®Ibid., pp. 295-96. 175

Lasswell supplements this standard class analysis by describing the operation of anti-Semitism in intellectual and professional circles. It is a fact that Weimar Germany was producing far more educated people than it was producing fi7 jobs for them to fill* There was an intense competi­ tion for the existing positions. "The prominence of the Jew in law, medicine, acting, literature, journalism (indeed, in all branches of the intellectual arts) contributed to his vulnerability as an object of mass attack led by rival intellectuals, with or without the aid of other social 68 classes." This atmosphere of hate certainly contri­ buted to the spread of racial theories within the academic community as vrell as to the growth of the Nasi movement among students.

At a more abstract level, Jews came to be identified with challenges to conventional morality as a result of their intellectual prominence.

Modern urban culture is fatal to the simple prescriptions of the rural and pro­ vincial conscience; to the moralists of the hinterland the cities defy the laws of God and man. The middle class code of sexual abstinence, thrift, work and piety crumbles before the blandishments and concealments of the city. The vulnerability of the conven­ tional code provokes heroic acts in its

®^Cf. Calvin B. Hoover, Germany Enters the Third Reich (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. ?5-26. ^^Lasswall, "Psychology of Hitlerism, " p. 298. 176

defense. Today the resentments of the threatened provincial conscience have been adroitly turned against "cultural Bolshe­ vism," %Aich means the uj^h, intellectual, Marxist, syndicated Jew.®*

Hitler portrayed himself as the "articulate conscience of the bourgeoisie." He deliberately put forward a public image of "absinence from wine, women and excess." And Lasswll, in the most speculative section of this article, sees Hitler playing a maternal role for many Germans in two ways. First:

His incessant moralizing is that of the anxious mother who is totally preoccupied with the physical, intellectual and ethical development of her children. He discourses in public, as he has written in his autobi­ ography, on all manner of pedagogical prob­ lems, from the beat form of history teaching to the ways of reducing the ravages of social disease. His constant preoccupation with "purity" is consistent with these interests; he alludes constantly to the "purity of the racial stock" and often to the code of personal abstinence or modera­ tion."®

Second, Hitler eased the "daze, shock and humiliation" of the German middle classes %diich followed their defeat in the World War. He did this by redirecting their aggressive

Ibid., p. 299. This theme was later developed by the Danish sociologist Svend Ranulf in his Moral Indigna­ tion and Middle Class Psychology (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), first published in 19^8. ^°Ibid., p. 300. 177

impulses (vrttich after the war were turned against them­ selves, often leading to "suicide, melancholia, and other mental disorders") to new targets:

Hitler %#as able to say, in effect, "You are not to blame for the disaster to your personality involved in the loss of the war. You were betrayed by alien enemies in our midst." The self-accusations Which signify that aggressive impulses are turned against the self are no longer necessary; not the "sacred egO, " but the Jews are to blame.

Lastly, Lasswell discusses how the political forces in the Weimar coalition failed to act against the National Socialist threat because of their preoccupation with Commu­ nism. The Social Democratic party and trade unions coal­ esced with their "class enemies" in an attempt to eliminate the Communists as a rival for power. Lasswell seems to attribute the Social Democratic attitude largely to the influence of bureaucracy: "The bureaucratizing tendency of the labor movement in Germany has long been notorious; a job in the union or in the party transformed the fervent agita­ tor into a model bourgeois, anxious to keep his job by preserving discipline among the masses." 72 The other major Weimar force, the bourgeoisie, had "never fought and bled for republican Institutions," and therefore had little conunitment to democracy. Capitalists saw the Nazis as

^^Ibid., p. 301.

^^Ibid., p. 302. 178

contributing to the unification of Germany and the taming of the proletariat.

Las swellattitude toward the Communists is particu­ larly striking and sets him apart fran most American acade­ micians. He seems to attach no blame to them for the split with the Social Democrats. We see no mention, for example, of the infamous "social fascist" label the Communists applied to their leftist rivals. On the contrary, Lasswell believes that*

. . . it is sound tactics to preserve the integrity of the term "Communist" by refus­ ing to associate it with its near rivals. Small disciplined bands of revolutionaries may one day use the uncontaminated symbol and the technique of the coup d'etat to ride the waves of mass discontent to the seats of power.

Lasswell did assert, however, that a prolonged war or out­ right military defeat would be necessary to produce the conditions for a Communist victory in Germany. In adding this proviso, he was obviously thinking of the Bolshevik Revolution as a model.

73 Ibid., p. 303. For a more general application of Lasswell's early theoretical framework, see his World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York* McGraw-Hill, 1935). Two of his other studies are relevant: "The Garrison State, " American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (Janu­ ary 1941), 455-68; and "Governmental and Party Leaders in Fascist Italy, " ^erican Political Science Review, XXXI (October 1937), )l4-29 (co-authored with Renzo âereno)■ 179

Lasswell is a prototypical model of a kind of American scholar overlooked as this dissertation took shape. The account of Dwaine Marvick highlights Lasswell's career, which was from an early point marked by extensive travel in Europe and elsewhere* Lasswell exploited every opportunity during his travels to meet with leading exponents of most major variants of social scientific and political 74 thought. He seems, in fact, to have been overwhelmed by his desire to integrate all these Intellectual currents into his own work. Thus many have criticised Lasswell for being too "eclectic." But on the positive side Lasswell can be considered an innovator in numerous sub-disciplines of political science, especially in the area of research metho­ dologies. And from our perspective Lasswell*s eclecticism is a blessing which prevents him from pure psychologizing in "The Psychology of Hitlerism." He is too aware of all the "contextual" factors involved in fascism for him to commit the kinds of errors we had expected from mainstream American scholars. Another factor that should be taken into account is that Haider, Schuman, and Lasswell all wrote on fascism well before the ascendancy of behavioralisra to paradigmatic

Dwaine Marvick, "Introduction to Lasswell, On Political Sociology, pp. 23-33. The role of the Social ÿcfence kesearch Council in financing research abroad by Americans deserves independent study. Lasswell, Hoover, S. M. Lipset, and others covered in this dissertation were recipients of such aid, and their overseas research general­ ly produced superior results. 180 status In political science. And finally, the concept of totalitarianism had not been elaborated fully at the time. Haider, Schuman, and Lasswell had no choice but to look at Germany and Italy as examples of fascism. "Totalitarianism* has so dominated m o d e m American political science that no major theoretical attempt has been made within the discipline to propose a theory of fascism in opposition to it.^^ However, there have been several empirical studies of German or Italian fascism focusing on particular points of interest, some of %diich challenge 76 aspects of the fa so ism-a s -1 ota 1 i ta rla ni sm approach. One recent book does attempt to categorize the variety of perspectives %Aich have been applied to the problem. Concentrating on studies of Italian Fascism, A. James Gregor finds "... six reasonably distinct discursive theories of 'fascism'." These are "fascism" ast

1. the product of "moral crisis" 2. psychological disabilities 3. the intrusion into history of "amorphous masses" 4. "class struggle” 5. a function of a special stage of economic development

75 Because this line of thinking was originated by Europeans, we shall reserve a fuller discussion for later in this chapter. ^®Por example, Edward N. Peterson's The Limits of Hitler's Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, based on documentary analysis and interviews, argues that "... Hitler's power was not complete but limited in some way by most of the people with %rtiom he had to deal directly or indirectly . . . ." (p. xiv) 181

6. as "totalitarianism."7?

With varying degrees of effectiveness Gregor critiques each of the six theoretical types. One generalization applicable to each of the six is the tendency of the theorists involved to elevate their own special perspectives to the status of causal explanations of fascism. Thus most of this theoreti­ cal work has been inadequate, leaving us, according to G regor, without

. . . a compelling theory of Fascism, much less a compelling interpretation of "fas­ cism" or "totalitarianism." We have some considerable body of hard data about a variety of revolutionary mass-mobilizing movements, some significant biographical and historical accounts, and a catalog of dis­ cursive and literary treatments of entire sequences. What we do not have is a body of viabl^gtheory to give support to all of

Gregor himself is of no help in alleviating our theoretical difficulties. He sees social science as a "collaborative enterprise" in which specialists will continue to work on particular aspects of fascism and fascist regimes. Presum­ ably in the future a Great Synthesizer will at last produce the adequate theory of fascism. In the meantimet

77 A. James Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism (Morristown, N.J.* Generai Learning PresS, 1974), p. 22. ^®Ibid., p. 261. 182

W# will have to be content with plausibili­ ties and detailed historical accounts* The best efforts will be "eclectic," attempting to weave together the most defensible of plausibilities into a narrative in which we can invest some confidence.'*

Looking at the recent works on fascism by American-born mainstream political scientists, we would have to conclude that Gregor's analysis is on the mark. Significantly, how­ ever, there is no msntion anytAiere in his book of the pioneering studies by Haider and Schuman. Their inclusion might have suggested to him that, at least among American political scientists, the kinds of "eclectic" analyses

Gregor suggests for the future were in fact produced nearly fifty years ago. Only afterward did the current inadequa­ cies develop. But let us emphasize that many of the more limited studies of fascist regimes are of great value. For example, Timothy Alan Tilton has examined the West German

National Democratic Party (NPD) in an effort to determine whether it could become a modern reincarnation of National Socialism. Using Rudolph Heberle's (see Chapter VII) statistical and analytical materials on Schleswig-Holstein in the Nazi era, Tilton searches for the reasons %Ay the NPD has done so poorly in the areas Where Hitler had his earli­ est successes. He finds that rural population decline, the modernization of agriculture, an influx of East German

^®Ibid. 183 refugees, and the overall strength of the West German econo­ my, among other factors, have made the region less suscept­ ible to Nasi-style political movements* He concludes that " . • . the era of raral-baeed Fascism has come to an end in 80 West Germany." Tilton's %fork, despite certain defi­ ciencies, is a good example of a specialised study with relevance for the theory of fascism as m i l as for contemporary events. Nonetheless, while many more studies of this type and this caliber would be a welcome addition to the literature on fascism, they alone would not be sufficient. % e great need now is for a general theory of fascism. There can be no substitute for this. c. Dissenting Opinions

American political science has become so much a part of the status quo that there have been few dissenting voices, especially among native-born scholars. Not a single large- scale work has been produced by an American to counter the totalitarianism "theory" with a theory of fascism. In fact', were Schuman and Haider not so clearly attached to the main­ stream we would have to consider their work as part of a dissident tradition When comparing it with the writings on fascism and "totalitarianism" by mainstreamers* Thus the

SO Timothy Alan Tilton, Nazisiri, Neo-Nazism, and the Peasantry (Bloomington: Indiana University PresS, 1975), 184

lack of dissident writings on fascism is merely the result of the virtual non-existence of a dissident tradition within

American political science*

D. The Immigrants

The earliest study of fascism by an émigré political scientist is Fritz Ermarth's 1936 work on The New Germany* Erroarth, according to the "Introduction" by Ernest S.

Griffith, had served in some unspecified capacity in the Weimar government before Hitler achieved power. He then emigrated and earned his S.J.D. at Harvard. At the time of his book's publication Ermarth was a "Lecturer in Interna­ tional Affairs" at The American University. Griffith prepares American readers for the fact that

Ermarth's analysis is "different" from the American norm.

Over and above [Ermarth's] special know­ ledge of the German scene, there is present in this book a sense that the unfolding drama, the forces operative, are for the most part not dissimilar to those in the other industrial nations. Thus, though Dr. Ermarth would perhaps go farther in the direction of economic determinism than most of us, we cannot fail to admit the essential politico-economic unity of the post-«ar world which by implication lies back of many of hie assumptions.

Ernest S. Griffith, "Introduction" to Fritz Exmath, The New Germany (Washington, D.C.t Digest Press, American University Graduate School, 1936), p. IX. 185

The decline of political and parliamentary liberalism is

manifest everywhere, begins Ermarth, but Germany developed this trend to its greatest extreme. Hitler, however, cannot be given full credit for his own success, as Ermarth points out on the first page of his study.

It is commonly said that Hitler has des­ troyed democracy in Germany. But forces far stronger than any political movement had prepared the way. A process of social evo­ lution had undermined democracy before Hitler's advent to power and had rendered the "totalitarian' state an historic neces­ sity.

Democracy rests upon the shared idea in different ethnic, social and religious groups that they all depend on one another within the "organic whole" of the nation. Socio­ economic processes such as capital concentration, proletari­ anization, and middle-class expansion have destroyed the consensus. "In post-war Germany the proper functioning of

the democratic mechanism was rendered impossible because the growing class differences and growing class consciousness 83 had destroyed the uniform basis of will of the nation." The structure of German politics consisted of a diversity of parties devoted to different economic interests, each party

fighting to gain control of the state.

82 Ermarth, ibid., p. 1. ®*Ibid., p. 7. 186

The Increased importance of holding state power is due to several factors. Industrial capitalism demands an expanded state to create the social conditions for industri­ al efficiency. The development of bureaucracy and the increased role of "expertise" made the state an absolutely irreplaceable element of German society. Further, recent

history demonstrated the real potential of the "strong" state. The World War showed it to be indispensible for victory, and the economic strains of the post-war world seemed resolvable only through state intervention.

Although the "socialistic" principles that had been written into the second part of the Weimar Constitution were never realized, the post-war condition of the country pushed the government further towards economic regimen­ tation and social control. Quite often, particularly in matters of social legisla­ tion and social insurance, government inter­ ference in the economic field was brought about by the political pressure of the labor unions or labor parties. The entrepreneurs too, however, were frequently eager to have the "neutral" power of the government inter­ fere in order to alleviate their situation through subsidies, cartel-regulations, or other measures.84

When the left failed to exploit its post-war gains, the forces of reaction seized the initiative. Ermarth attri­ butes their ultimate success to the conjuncture of the financial base (represented by the Rhine and Ruhr industri­ alists and the Junkers) with Hitler's mass movement.

®^Ibid., pp. 16-17, 187

Without the mas# movement the right could not have won. But

Ermarth is careful to avoid the vulgar Marxist trap: "The National Socialist movement is not a "creation* of the

capitalists, as is so often said, but after it had attained

considerable strength, it attracted the attention of the men who had control of the means of production." While the conduct of the industrialists and Junkers is accepted as

"normal," Ermarth is compelled to explain the growth of the mass movement. The binding force here is anti-Semitism, an

already existing prejudice Which Hitler made "respectable." In addition to attributing most of Germany's problems to the Jews, Hitler also proposed to solve these problems through specific measures geared to particular interest groups. That such measures were often contradictory seems not to have been noticed by most people. After describing the "constitutional structure" of the Third Reich, Ermarth seeks to discover the relationship

between the state and the economy. He sees the overall trend toward Nazi control of the economy and hypothesizes about its roots t

It was possible for the state to invade the economic field to such an extent in 1933 because the demands of the politically victorious National Socialist movement for an all-embracing totalitarian state met with

®®Ibid.f, p. 42, 188

the needs for planning and regimentation Which arose from the structural transforma­ tion of the German national econcxny.®®

Within the government Hitler concentrated virtually all the

power to formulate and enforce national economic policies into the hands of himself and his cabinet. This reflects

the ideological primacy of the "leadership principle." One aspect of Nazi economic control related to industry.

The government's chief problem with regard to industry was . . . t o harmonize the highly organized industrial and banking interests of weaker groups (for instance, "outsiders, " not participating in cartel agreements) , and to direct their policies towards the "common good" by subjecting them to a stricter public control.*'

Direct control of industry was ruled out, as was direct

control of industrial organizations dealing with price and production control. The Nazis chose instead to strengthen government control over cartels and similar industrial organizations.

The most important aspect of the regime's economic policy is its control of labor, the desire for Which became a commonplace among entrepreneurs by the late 1920s. Hitler's wish to maintain the support of industrialists was evidenced by the fact that

®®Ibid., pp. 80-81.

®^Ibid., pp. 109-110. 189

. . . it was one of the first undertakings of the National Socialists in 1933 to occupy the trade union centers, jail the union officials, and entrust the administration of the unions* property to a government commis­ sioner. The workers were assured that the action was not directed against them, but only against their leaders Who were pictured as political traitors, and who, they said, had misused the workers' funds. No resis­ tance was offered to the National Socialists anywhere.

Ermarth seems surprised by the lack of worker resistance to the obvious program of labor control undertaken by the Nazis. The intent of the new Deutsche Arbeitsfront laws was clear. "The National Socialist labor legislation rests upon three principles* the unity of employer and employees as integral parts of the enterprise . . . ; the leadership of the entrepreneur; and the rigid state control over labor relations."®® Yet*

The workers accepted the new legislation with the same indifference with which they accepted the destruction of their labor unions in 1933* The remarkable patience exhibited by the German workers Which caused so much surprise among foreign observers may be explained by several reasons. It is due partly to the deep disillusionment of many workers with the leadership of their unions and the political parties which made one compromise after another with the bourgeoi­ sie during the depression, partly to the bitter struggling among the communists.

®®Ibid., pp. 133-34. *®Ibid., p. 134. 190

socialists, and "Christians," and partly to the inner weakness of the labor union lead­ ers vdio were brought up in the determinis-

The Nazi government was now free to develop Its "labor plan­

ning" schemS, Which Ermarth likens to a system of "compul­

sory placement." Part of the plan was to Increase employ­ ment, and this was accomplished through public works programs and through pressure brought to bear upon employers of all kinds to hire workers. But While employment has been increased, wages have not been allowed to rise. The result has been a lower standard of living for the workers'. While profits, on the other hand, have risen. Most unfortunate of all, however, is the fact that this labor planning is in

actuality merely part of a larger overall plan for war, as Ermarth notes with great foresight. In his concluding chapter, Ermarth predicts "the future

of the totalitarian state." He first considers the general nature of the totalitarian state:

The totalitarian state represents the supreme effort to organize all political, social, cultural, and economic forces of the nation into one all-embracing unit, the State. Ihe totalitarian state is to replace or reconstruct the collective will of the nation that economic and political conflicts

90 "ibid., p. 139. 191 destroying

were destroying under the democratic form of government."^

The totalitarian form of the state is not inherently evil. Its ultimate evaluation rests on the use to Which it is put.

In the case of Germany: "Two roads lie ahead: the one leading to social reorganization and redistribution of wealth# the other towards economic and political expansion* The totalitarian state is a mechanism# a tool, which may be

used for either p u r p o s e , Already, howevef, Germany's

probable direction seems clear.

Regardless of numerous radical utterances of government and party leaders and pro­ nouncements to show the "revolutionary" or "working man" character of the National Socialist movement, the history of the first three years of the Hitler dictatorship shows that the influence of the propertied inter­ ests over the government is Increasing rather than decreasing.*3

Warfare is made even more likely by the Versailles treaty's punitive nature, which Ermarth seems to regard as a

significant cause of Germany's problems. "If the other European capitalist powers refuse to grant an expanding Germany her 'place in the sun,' the totalitarian state may 94 transform itself into a gigantic war-mechanism. "

91lbid., p. 174.

*2ibid., p, 183. *3lbid., p. 179.

**Ibid., p, 184. 192

Professor Enosrth's account of the first years of the "new Germany" is most remarkable for its prescience about the regime's future path and for Ermarth's early development of "totalitarianism" as a viable social scientific concept. According to our comparative criteria, Ermarth's work measures up well. His scope of analysis is broad, especial­ ly due to his inclusion of international economic variables and of social-psychological factors. His methodology consists of integrating personal experience and economic statistics within a loosely Marxian theoretical framework. The strength of his conclusions is measured by the way they have withstood the test of time. The basic weakness of the study, on the other hand, is the lack of statistical data to back up many of Ermarth's conclusions, which at the time of the book's publication would have been necessary to make it convincing to an American audience. The next significant contribution by an emigre politi­ cal scientist is William Ebenstein's The Nazi state, pub­ lished in 1943. As the title suggests, this book is much more narrowly political-scientific than Ermarth's. This may reflect the fact that Ebensteln became better integrated into the American political science establishment after coming here from Austria in the 1930s. He earned his Ph.D. at Wisconsin and taught there and at the University of California. Yet Ebenstein is not content to merely describe the National Socialist state apparatus. Rather, he wishes 193 to portray "... the cultural, social, economic, and international ideaa and institutions Which give life and meaning to the administrative and legal framework of a 95 system of state and society." Although much of the book is purely descriptive, Ebenstein does attempt to explain Why Nazi Germany came to be. For him the key is to be found in the historical role of the German state relative to the economy. In brief, the Prussian state and its successors were never seriously challenged by a democratic movement Which might have freed the economy from state controls. The state's traditional dominance was reinforced by the late arrival of industrial­ ization to Germany.

When modem industrialism reached Germany in the second third of the nineteenth cen­ tury, its technological structure and economic scale had changed considerably. The large-scale type of enterprise increas­ ingly replaced the older and smaller units. The initial requirements in the outlay of capital goods and long-term overhead costs had risen enormously. In many cases the state alone could supply the necessary funds. In other cases it considered itself impelled to control the vast private funds needed for the establishment of the new large-scale type of enterprise. Technolo­ gically, this lateness of Germany was in many respects an advantage. She could avoid the piece-meal methods of trial and error and the resulting obsolescences of the industrial structures of those nations that

*®William Ebenstein, The Nazi State (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943), p. vii. 193

to portray "... the cultural, social, economic, and international ideas and institutions which give life and meaning to the administrative and legal framework of a system of state and society. Although much of the book is purely descriptive, Ebenstein does attempt to explain why Nazi Germany came to be. For him the key is to be found in the historical role of the German state relative to the economy. In brief, the Prussian state and its successors were never seriously challenged by a democratic movement which might have freed the economy from state controls. The state's traditional dominance was reinforced by the late arrival of industrial­

ization to Germany.

When modern industrialism reached Germany in the second third of the nineteenth cen­ tury, its technological structure and economic scale had changed considerably. The large-scale type of enterprise increas­ ingly replaced the older and smaller units. The initial requirements in the outlay of capital goods and long-term overhead costs had risen enormously. In many cases the state alone could supply the necessary funds. In other cases it considered itself iiq>elled to control the vast private funds needed for the establishment of the new large-scale type of enterprise. Technolo­ gically, this lateness of Germany was in many respects an advantage. She could avoid the piece-meal methods of trial and error and the resulting obsolescences of the industrial structures of those nations that

William Ebenstein, The Nazi State (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943), p. viiV Copyright « 1943 by William Ebenstein. Reproduced by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Publishers. 194

had pioneered in the development of the machine economy. All this tended to in­ crease the area of public control in Germany.**

The traditions of militarism and authoritarian bureaucracy also penetrated the economy due to its subservient position.

There never developed in Germany any significant trend toward economic liberalism. For over two hundred years the German national economy was viewed primarily as an instru­ ment of military policy. But there was a side effect: "The traditionally authoritarian and militaristic character of German capitalism also explains why no advanced industrial nation developed anticapitalistic attitudes and mass move- 97 ments which were as strong as those in Germany. " National Socialism is a blending of ruling class Prussianism with the anticapitalism of the masses. It came to power through a mass movement fueled (at least in part) by anticapitalist rhetoric, but it is in the long run a new expression of classical German militarism. This is not to say that there have been no socio-economic transformations with the arrival of the Nazis.

The permanent war economy of Nazism can­ not be defined in terms of socialism or capitalism because its basic social and

**Ibid., pp. 229-30.

*?Ibid., p. 231. 195

political assumptions are different from those of either socialism or capitalism. Whereas the common objective of the both is human welfare through economic means, the objective of the permanent war economy of Nazism is military strength and aggressive striking power rega^less of the sacrifice of human happiness.**

Here Ebenstein momentarily contradicts his basic argument. He refers to the economic system prior to National Socialism as capitalism and in several places specifically calls the new regime an extension of the old system, and yet he insists that the economy is now something other than capi­ talism. After this aberration, however, Ebenstein returns to documenting the role which Hitler's regime played in preserving capitalism. This is especially evident in his chapter on "the position of labor." The class basis of National Socialist power is manifest in the regime's policies.

The complete change of personnel in the trade unions in 1933, as well as the later abolition of labor organizations of any shape or form, shows that the Nazi regime mistrusts the German workers because it knows that they have never, as a mass, fully accepted it. Ihe retention of the employers organizations, including the old personnel, demonstrates that the Nazis know that the German employers, as a class, do not consti­ tute a dangerous element of instability for the regime.**

**Ibid., p. 239. **Ibid., p. 275. 196

Workers have lost much ground In the new Germany. "The position of wage earners In Germany has been changed into that of industrial serfs.But "full employment" under the Nazis has had a powerful muting effect on worker rebelliousness. Now only an Allied victory in the war can possibly overthrow the Hitler regime. Two years after The Nazi State, Ebenstein published another book, The German Record. Here he expands his com­ mentary on the pervasiveness of militarism in German society and its subsequent contribution to the rise of Nazism. He also develops a new line of thought about the role of the Versailles settlement in conditioning later events. Eben­ stein rejects the popular line of thought which sees the settlement as unjustly punitive. "Whatever opinion one holds with regard to the Versailles Treaty, there is no doubt that it was incomparably more lenient than the treaties which Germany herself had imposed on defeated

Russia and vanquished Rumania in the spring of 1918."^^^ In Ebenstein's opinion the Germans' militaristic pride was hurt. "Not the severity of the Versailles Treaty burned in the hearts of the fanatical nationalists who fell for Nazi propaganda, but the sheer fact of German defeat— after a long succession of overwhelming military victories in the

l°°Ibid., p. 283, Ebenstein, The German Record: A Political Portrait (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1945), p . 227. Copyright o 1945 by William Ebenstein. Reproduced by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Publishers. 197

102 nineteenth century." Thus one of the main failures of post-World War 1 "Wilsonian theory" was that it did not give "... due credit to the historical background of German militarism as one of the main aspects of German ideas and institutions.The Wilsonian thesis erred in another respect: "The thesis also failed to relate the problem of German militarism and imperialism to its social foundations, the large Junker estates in Prussia, and the industrial supercartels of heavy industry in western Germany owned and controlled by a few thousand families. Measures could have been taken following the war to break up the social base of reaction.

The first and most obvious step toward a solution of the problem of German militarism in the defeated Germany of the fall of 1918, as, indeed, ever since, would have been the radical solution of the German land problem, particularly in Prussia. The nationaliza­ tion of the large estates and the division of those estates among the land-hungry rural laborers would have broken the economic back of the army leaders and the feudal Junker class. Similarly, the breaking up of the mammoth cartels in heavy industry, possibly their internationalization, would have eli­ minated another basic economic element in the structure of German militarism. Expro­ priation and division of the Junker estates among the land-starved laborers would have created in Prussia a class of independent farmers with new social and cultural aspira­ tions. Such a solid class of potentially

^°^Ibid. ^°^Ibid., p. 194 198

progressive farmers would no longer remain subject to the domination of the Junkers, landlords in peace and officers in war,

Ebenstein catalogs other historically possible preven­ ta tives against National Socialism Which never came into play* Hitler might have been stopped if the working class had been united, if the left parties had not seen each other as the main enemies, if the executive and judiciary branches of the Weimar government had not been carried over Intact from the previous regime, if the German army had been struc­ tured differently, if Parliament had not been based on proportional representation, etc. The value of such second- guessing is questionable in and of itself, but it does give us an indirect understanding of the process which led to the triumph of Nazism. The German Record, especially When coupled with Ebenstein's earlier book, paints a variegated portrait of Germany's embracement of National Socialism. We are again presented with an analytical scope which the European-trained scholars of fascism seem more capable of attaining. Ebenstein touches upon national and internation­ al economic factors, social organizational factors, and even some mass psychological aspects of the Nazi victory. This methodology is a combination of historical narrative and institutional political science informed by political

lOSlbid., p. 195. 199 economic theory. The problem is that secondary sources predominate. Statistical data are few and far between. The result is that Ebenstein's work is essentially interpretive writing with little social scientific persuasiveness. As was the case with Ermarth's conclusions, only later history lent them substantial credibility. The weaknesses of Ebenstein's books become even more pronounced in comparison to Franz Neumann ' s Behemoth. Although the first edition of Neumann's book predated Ebenstein's The Nazi State, and the second edition predated The German Record, Behemoth's achievement can be better appreciated after we have examined a less adequate effort. Thus our chronological reversal. All that Ebenstein wrote in his two books had previously been covered by Neumann in much greater detail and with far more documentary and statistical support.We can here provide only the barest outline of Behemoth, with the primary goal of demon­ strating the comprehensiveness of Neumann's analysis. Franz Neumann was born in Poland and educated in Germany, where he became active in the Social Democratic party. When Hitler came to power Neumann was arrested, but he soon thereafter managed to escape the country. He earned a doctorate in political science at Oxford and came to

It is curious that Ebenstein makes no mention anywhere in his two books of Neumann's work. One suspects that the oversight is deliberate. 200

America in 1936, aattling into Horkhaimar*■ Institute for Social Research at Columbia University. Here he carried out most of the research for Behemoth. The book begins with an introduction on "the collapse of the Weimar Republic." Neumann covers all the familiar themes, but with an insight that reflects his personal involvement in the events. His overall conclusion is that the Weimar Republic's democratic constitution was never translated into an everyday reality.

The crisis of 1932 demonstrated that political democracy alone without a fuller utilisation of the potentialities inherent in Germany's industrial system, that is, without the abolition of unemployment and an improvement in living standards, remained a hollow shell.107

Neumann enters the substance of his book with a section of nearly two hundred pages devoted to "the political pattern of National Socialism." The discussion is organized around various aspects of Nazi ideology. "The immediate and oppor­ tunistic connection between National Socialist doctrine and

Franz Neumann, Behemoth* The Structure and Practice of National Socialism/ Ï533-1944 (New York* Harper and Row, 196é), p. Ï4. Copyright e 1942, 1944 by Oxford University Press. Compare this to Ebenstein* s comment written a year later* "The effective answer to employment in a permanent war economy is not a social system which offers to the worker political freedom and chronic mass unemployment, as happened in Germany before 1933, and in democratic nations since 1929. Likewise the German worker will not be convinced by this argument that Nazi employment is no miracle, because it is based on a permanent war econosy. The most effective answer, therefore, to employment without freedom is enployment and freedom." (The Nazi State., p. 297.) 201 reality makea a detailed study of the ideology essen­ tial* He seems to believe, first, that the ideology, no matter how self-contradictory and opportunis­ tic, is one way of getting at "the truth" about Hitler's policy objectives; and, second, that shifts in the ideology will reflect Nazi attempts to attract the support of popula­ tion strata unsympathetic to the regime. Neumann discusses five ideological elements— the totalitarian state, the "movement state," the charismatic leader, the "racial people," and Lebensraum. In his discussion of Nazi racial "theory," Neumann attempts to demonstrate his first belief, that the doctrine is indicative of Hitler's real goals. Although racism had a long history in Germany, it was in intellectual circles mainly manifested by those who wished to legitimate German expansion. Germans, as a superior race, were most fit to assume world leadership, it was taught. But the masses did not embrace such teachings.

Spontaneous, popular Anti-Semitism is still weak in Germany. This assertion cannot be proved directly, but it is significant that despite the incessant propaganda to which the German people have been subjected for many years, there is no record of a single spontaneous anti-Jewish attack committed by persons not belonging to the Nazi party.

^°^Behemoth, p. 37. 202

The writer's personal conviction, paradoxi­ cal as it may seem, is that the German people are the least Anti-Semitic of all.10*

Hot for its own sake, but for other motives was anti- Semitism propagated by the Nazis. The Jews were an easy target for the resentments felt by middle-class Germans disenfranchised by inflation. Jews could also be blamed for the loss of the World War, thus assuaging the guilty con­ science about this blow to the German national honor. Beyond the psychological benefits of anti-Semitism, Neumann finds three more specific functions. "First, racism and Anti-Semitism are substitutes for the class struggle. The officially established peoples* community superseding the class struggle needs an integrating element. Second, eastern expansion of the Reich could be justified as a freeing of Germans in the Slavic countries from "the foreign yoke." The cooperation of some members of the Slavic populations could also be gained by giving them certain privileges not granted the lowly Jews. "Finally,

Anti-Semitism in Germany is an expression of the rejection of Christianity and all it stands f o r . O n e of

109 Ibid.', p. 121. Neumann has been taken to task for his naive assessment of the ordinary German's feelings about Jews. See H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 108. ^^^Behemoth., p. 125. llllbid., p. 127. 203

Hitler's major desires was to free the Germans from the fetters of Christian morality. This he thought he could accomplish by pointing to the Semitic origin of Christ* In his discussion of the ideology of "racial imperial­ ism, " Neumann seeks to show that the shape eventually taken by this doctrine was dictated by Hitler's attempt to win over members of the working class. Traditional German imperialism had not needed mass support in order to be effective. In World War I mass support was partially attained through the Social Democrats' coopexatioh, based on their beliefs that the war was defensive and that a victory would release Russia from Czarist tyranny. But German workers never fell fully into step behind the wat, and they were even less supportive of the Nazis When they came to power. To overcome this resistance Hitler launched an ideological offensive calculated to turn the Marxian theories he so despised to his own advantage. "Racial proletarian imperialism,"as Neumann calls it, is the new justification for war. "The essence of the theory is relatively simple, Germany and Italy are proletarian races, surrounded by a world of hostile plutocratic-capitalistic- Jewish democracies. The war is thus a war of proletarianism 112 against capitalism." Hitler's intent with this doctrine is clear, as is his conviction of the overwhelming

^^^Ibid., p. 187. 204 influence of Marxian concepts on the working-class mind.

Neumann is convinced that Hitler failed, that

. . . the doctrine of proletarian racism • • • has failed to gain a complete hold over the masses. The old party and trade- union bureaucracy does not collaborate with the regime. The large majority of trade unionists and Social Democrats are not National Socialists. Throughout their history they have resisted the seductive theory of social imperialism; there is no reason to believe that they support it today. The repressive social policy of the National Socialist regime gives additional substance to our contention.

Only Nazi terror assures that there is little open hostility from amongst the Social Democrats and trade unionists. And of the numerically large population strata, only the "up­ rooted middle classes" accept the social imperialist doc­ trine without the need for terrorization. The second part of Behemoth investigates the economic structure of Nazi Germany. Neumann's initial goal is to debunk the theories emanating from both inside and outside Germany Which pronounce the end of capitalist society and its replacement by the rule of managerial bureaucracy.

This school of thought believes that there are no longer entrepreneurs in Germany, but only managers ; that there is no freedom of trade and contract; no freedom of invest­ ment; that the market has been abolished, and with it, the laws of the market. Prices

^^^Ibid.', pp. 215-16. 205

ara therefore administrative prices, wages only administrative wages. Consequently, the law of value is no longer operative. Values are use values throughout and no longer exchange values. Classes, if their existence is admitted, are no longer the outcome of production. The power to Which the worker is subjected is not an economic power. His exploitation is political and is no longer a result of his position within the productive process. The appropriation of his labor is a political act, not econo­ mic. The new economy is, therefore, one without economics.

While one approach to the refutation of such a theory might be to deduce its logical impossibility, Neumann chooses instead to "detail the structure and operation of the German economy." He begins with the organization of business. Which he finds relatively unchanged by the Nazis from vrtiat existed before their accession to power. The big difference is that the state has added "coordinating" bodies to the top of the previously existing hierarchy. "In theory, the state has unlimited power. It could legally do almost anything: it could expropriate anybody. Only an examination of the actual functioning of "the monopolistic economy" will

reveal the extent of state Interference therein. For Neumann, state intervention in the economy is a necessity in recent history. Virtually all groups in

Ibid., p. 222. Two of the most well-known Western exponents of this view were Peter Drucker and James Burnham. ^^®Ibid.', p. 254. 206 society demand that the state advance, or at least protect, their econmnic positions. The question, then, is Who most benefits from the state's policies.

The possession of the state machinery is thus the pivotal position around Which everything else revolves. This is the only possible meaning of primacy of politics over econo­ mics. Shall the state crush monopolistic possessions, shall it restrict them for the sake of the masses, or shall Interference be used to strengthen the monopolistic posi­ tion, to aid in the complete incorporation of all business activities into the network of industrial organizations?^^*

In a democracy the latter outcome would be almost impossible to achieve, because the state can be used by all powerful groups to maintain their positions. In Germany the undemo­ cratic alternative. National Socialism, prevailed. Neumann chooses the phrase "Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism" to characterize the new economy. "It is a private capitalistic economy, regimented by the totalitarian state." 1 1 7 The bulk of the second part of Behemoth is devoted to showing that this is the German economic reality. Neumann begins by examining German policy toward cartels in the periods before and after Hitler's coming to power. Under the Btuning,

Papen, and Schleicher "semi-dictatorships," there w a s a failure to face In a realistic way the price problems caused

ll*Ibid., p. 260. ll?Ibid., p. 261. 207 by existing cartel arrangements. There was one price reduc­ tion of ten per cent in January of 1931, but the cartels themselves were never weakened. "The National Socialist regime came to povrer 30 January 1933 and at once initiated a cartel policy that satisfied all the requirements of the 1 1 8 industrial combines." Under the guise of saving the national economy, the Nazis removed existing limitations on the cartels and even instituted a compulsory cartellization policy " . . . t o prevent the closing down of plants and the slashing of prices, to preserve such enterprises and such industries that are endangered by competition because they 1 1 9 are overcapitalized and have excess capacity."

As the cartels have grown in importance, so has inter­ nal control of the cartels by monopolies. Monopolization has been stimulated by a variety of factorst "Aryaniza- tiori, " "Germanizatioh, " the elimination of small business, German corporate laws', and, above all, technological changes. These monopolies are clearly capitalist enter­ prises, many of which have developed solely under the Nazi regime. Individual capitalists like Flick, Quandt, Wolff, and Krupp remain powerful forces not subordinated to abso­ lute state control. To demonstrate this last point, Neumann undertakes an analysis of "the command economy"— the

l^*Ibid., pp. 263-64. ^^^Ibld., p. 266. 208 apparatus of state control. He first asks: "Has the com­ mand economy really superseded competition and monopoly?" More specifically, have the Nazis embarked upon a program of business nationalization? Neumann demonstrates that the opposite is actually the case. There has been a slight trend toward the return of previously nationalized enter­ prises into private hands. One development which seems to contradict Neumann's position, however, is the appearance of

Party-controlled economic entities, chief of which is the

Hermann Goring works. But Neumann sees such developments, though an annoyment to capitalists, as little more than an effort to provide an economic base for party rule. "The establishment of a party economy follows the familiar pat­ tern of American gangsters, whO, after having accumulated money by blackmail and 'protection, ' realize their dreams of becoming honorable by entering into legitimate busi­ ness.

Neumann next takes up the question of price controls. The claim has been advanced that the market is now replaced by such controls and that the nature of the economy has therefore been changed. Neumann finds, however, that price controls, besides being ineffective, merely intensify the process of monopolization. Price controls reward those who

^^°Ibid., pp. 298-99. 209

have already achieved a competitive advantage. The same is

largely true about the effects of controls over profits and investments* Neumann maintains that there are no real con­ trols on profits, and that the larger industries are to a degree immune from investment controls by virtue of their ability to "self-finance" their growth. Such controls, in consequence, do not change the nature of the German monopo­ listic capitalist economy. On the other hand, the most effective of economic controls are, of course, those which are placed on German labor. "Labor has been delivered to 121 authoritarian control, as completely as possible." The immediate goals of this regimentation are fuller use of manpower and an increase in the average productivity of labor. The larger goal, to which all economic controls are designed to contribute, is aggressive warfare.

Neumann concludes his discussion of the command economy by reiterating his conviction that the Nazi mechanism of economic control is fully subservient to the needs of the monopoly economy.

It is the aggressive', imperialist, expansionist spirit of German big business unhampered by considerations for small competitors, for the middle classes, free from control by the banks, delivered from the pressure of trade unions. Which is the motivating force of the economic system.

l^libid., p. 349. 210

Profits and more profits are the motive power.

The Nazis have thus been allowed to seize power in order that monopoly capitalism might thrive. It is Important to note, however, that Neumann does not ascribe to the capital­ ist class an absolute control over the party. Rather, he sees these two entities, along with the army and the bureau­ cracy, as partners in power.

Having laid the economic foundation, Neumann proceeds into an analysis of the structure of "the new society." He succinctly summarizes his findings as follows :

The essence of National Socialist social policy consists in the acceptance and strengthening of the prevailing class character of German society, in the attempt­ ed consolidation of its ruling class, in the atomization of the subordinate strata through the destruction of every autonomous group mediating between them and the state, in the creation of a system of autocratic bureaucracies interfering in all human rela­ t i o n s . ^ 7 3

Neumann sees six major sections of the ruling class. The ministerial bureaucracy is a closed and privileged political caste which eagerly serves the new regime. The party is a separate bureaucracy charged with translating Hitler's will into political policy. The lower civil servants (officials.

l^^ibid., p. 354. 123ibid., p. 366. 211

teachers, etc*) are totally dominated by the party. The armed forces constitute a separate base of power but seem to have few misgivings about Hitler's leadership. The indus­ trial leadership exercises its political power through the

"economic chambers" in seventeen provinces and through the National Economic Chamber. Finally, the agrarian leader­

ship * s loyalty has been retained by policies which promote the interests of the malthy peasants and large estate owners. These six groups do have divergent interests, and the ruling coalition is therefore potentially unstable.

"Nothing holds them together but the reign of terror and their fear lest the collapse of the regime destroy them all."^^* In the meantime', the party is attempting to

"renew" the ruling class by bringing loyal party members

(generally having been recruited from the lower classes) into positions of power. The goal is to make the machinery of state more exclusively responsible to party aims. To complete the portrait of Nazi German social

structure Neumann turns to the ruled classes. He cites five "National Socialist principles of organization" relating to the masses. First: "The pluralistic principle is replaced 12S by a monistic, total, authoritarian organization." All bodies with any semblance of autonomy must be

l**Ibid., p. 396. ^^^Ibid., p. 400. 212

transformed Into official administrative agencies in order to eliminate the possibility of them becoming centers of dissent. The second principle is "the atomization of the individual."

The natural structure of society is dis­ solved and replaced by an abstract "people's community," which hides the complete deper­ sonalization of human relations and the isolation of man from man. In terms of m o d e m analytical social psychology, one could say that National Socialism is out to create a uniformly sado-masochistic charac­ ter, who is driven by this very fact into a collective body Where he shares in the power and glory of the medium of which he has become a part.^26

A third principle involves the creation of a series of elites within the masses (Hitler Youth, Labor Front, S.A., S.S., etc.) given privileges and social status in exchange

for their performance of social control functions. Fourth, propaganda must be used to create a permanent state of tension in the minds of individuals. And fifth, propaganda must be supplemented by terror to assure absolute regimenta­ tion of the masses. Neumann uses the example of the working class to Illustrate the application of these principles, but we need not elaborate here. Neumann summarizes his 1942 edition with "an interpre­ tation of the decisive aspects of National Socialism." He poses and answers three questions. "Has Germany a political

p. 402, 213

theory?" Neumann believes not* "No known absolutlstic or

counter-revolutionary theory fits National Socialism, because National Socialism has traits that radically separate it from them and because it has no theory of 127 society," Nor can Nazism be identified with relativism, positivism, or pragmatism* Rather, the Nazis borrow elements from virtually all philosophies, but "...

they are merely used as devices to establish and to extend power and to carry on propaganda." 1 2 8 Hitler attempts

no political legitimation of his "new order" because it is

merely an extension of the previous social order through force. Neumann asks a second question* "Is Germany a

state?" He again answers in the negative. The state is most essentially a system of rule by law, but there is no unified, universal legal system in Germany. "I venture to suggest that we are confronted with a form of society in

Which the ruling groups control the rest of the population directly, without the mediation of that rational though 129 coercive apparatus hitherto known as the state." Finally Neumann asks* "What are the developmental trends in this structure?" He points to conflicts among the ruling groups and between the rulers and ruled Which could

^^^Ibid., p. 462. ^^^ Ib id . ^^^Ibid., p. 470. 214 potentially cause the doumfall of the regime, but he seems to expect that an Allied military victory is the most likely means by Which the Nazis will be ousted. He suggests that more than a military defeat will be necessary, however. The monopoly economy must be dismantled, and a democratic poli­ tical ideology will have to be established in the minds of the people. The mistakes made at Versailles must not be repeated.

In 1945 Neumann updated his book with an extensive appendix. It aims to fill in details missing in the first edition, especially regarding the administration and police', the party structure, the "theory and practice of military government," and economic controls. The details are not Important to us here, but there are a few comments on the evolving social structure Which should be mentioned. Within the ruling class, "... the power of the high civil ser­ vice has steadily declined and can be completely ruled out of the picture.The monopolists, party, and army remain cooperative yet independent of one another. The middle classes have been drastically reduced as small enter­ prises have been forced out of business or swallowed by the large combines. The dispossessed members of these classes have generally been proletarians, although some have joined the ranks of "the practitioners of violence" or various

^^°Ibld., p. 632, 215

"parasitic" social groups. The workers are treated as

totally subjugated. Neumann has given up any hope for an anti-Hitler offensive emanating from the working class. Behemoth continues to rank as one of the very finest

studies of a fascist regime. The scope of analysis is almost all-encompassing. From the economic to the psycholo­ gical, it seems that not an angle has been missed. Neumann's methods include those of the political economist, the "legalistic" political scientist, and the content analyst. His documentation is perhaps the most striking aspect of the study— there are over 900 notes attached to the 476-page first edition. Acquiring and digesting the German source materials must have required an enormous investment of time. Lastly, Neumann's conclusions have on the whole been verified by later investigators and later history. Neumann caught in Behemoth the essence of the

National Socialist system because he brought to bear upon it a wide variety of individual intellectual perspectives which alone would have yielded many different and incomplete

pictures of the regime. His work is one of the strongest supports for this dissertation's hypotheses. With the beginning of the Cold War came a new phase in political thinking revolving around the concept of "totali­

tarianism.” This "new" approach was also the product of displaced Europeans, but the results have been far less distinguished than those of Neumann, Ermarth, and others. 216

In fact, wa shall argua later that Neumann's use of the concept as a small part of his analysis was far more fruit­

ful than others' use of "totalitarianism" as a pivotal sourcs of explanation. This latter trend was Initiated, of course, by Hannah Arendt, to Whom we now turn. Her 1951

book on The Origins of Totalitarianism was probably the work most responsible for bringing the concept into vogue. However, because the book is closer to political philosophy

than political science, we will discuss it solely as an introduction to our topic. Arendt sees modern totalitarianism as the product of two earlier trends. The first of these is anti-Semitism.

Jews were not merely a convenient scapegoat for groups dissatisfied with their lot in society. Rather, the Jews occupied a special relationship to the rising nation-states of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. The nobili­ ty called upon Jews experienced in financial matters to aid them in nation-building. In return, the Jews as a group acquired special privileges and protections from the state. In Arendt*s opinion, the Jews* special connection to the

state prevented their assimilation into the class structures of their countries.Later, when the bourgeoisie came into its own and gained control of the state, the Jews were cut off.

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 11-13. Copyright « 1951, 1958, 1966 by Hnnah Arendt; renewed 1979 by Mary McCarthy West. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 217

As a group. Western Jewry disintegrated together with the nation-state during the decades preceding the outbreak of the first World War. The rapid decline of Europe after the war found them already deprived of their former power, atomized into a herd of wealthy individuals. In an imperialist age, Jewish wealth had become insignificant; to a Europe with no sense of balance of power between its nations and of inter-European solidarity, the non-national, inter-European Jewish element became an object of universal hatred because of its useless wealth, and of contempt because of its lack of power.

The second trend in the development of totalitarianism,

then, is the imperialism of the bourgeoisie. This expan­ sionism was dictated by excess capital and idle workers.

"The new fact in the imperialist era is that these two superfluous forces, superfluous capital and superfluous working power, joined hands and left the country toge- 133 ther. " Such is the economic basis for a new "alli­ ance between the mob and capital." The ideological manifes­

tation of this coalition is in various forms of racism or

"tribal nationalism." Totalitarianism is the culmination of previous anti- Semitic and racist-imperialist movements. The major new development in the twentieth century is the replacement of smaller mob movements with mass movements arising out of the

increasing numbers of declassed and disorganized persons.

l^^Ibid., p. 15. 13*Ibid., p. 150. 218

Modern mess men are "atomized and isolated" to the point

Where they seek only to merge with something larger than themselves* The old class movements have (somehow) broken down and cannot satisfy mass needs. Through skillful use of propaganda, the totalitarian movement attracts a mass membership. Propaganda provides a new and better world for the masses to escape into. It also furnishes a scapegoat group responsible for the present world's ills. Upon seizure of power a new kind of political regime is estab­ lished, a combination of "permanent revolution* and an "officially recognized headquarters" for the movement.

Totalitarianism in power uses the state administration for its long-range goal of world conquest and for the direction of the branches of the movement; it establishes the secret police as the executioners and guar­ dians of its domestic experiment in con­ stantly transforming reality into fiction; and it finally erects concentration camps as special laboratories to carry through its experiment in total domination.

Arendt accepts the most extreme claims about the abso­ lute power wielded by totalitarian governments. She is thus very pessimistic about the future of the world, referring in the preface to her anticipation of a third World War. As time has passed. The Origins of Totalitarianism has been thoroughly criticized. Perhaps H. Stuart Hughes has best

^^^Ibid., p. 392. 219 summarized the criticisms* He questions the foundations of Arendt*s interpretation of anti-Semitism, the relevance of her discussion of British imperialism, and her "slurring over or belittling the differences" between National Social­ ism and Soviet Communism. "Obviously Arendt knew more about Germany than about Russia, and she frequently seemed to be 135 extrapolating from Hitlerian to Soviet experience." At the root of these problems is the fact that her book is "almost entirely innocent of economics." Arendt focuses

" . . . on techniques of control— the horrifying surface of life--rather than on underlying social realities, This deficiency is generally applicable to those who followed in Arendt's footsteps. The first significant contribution to the political scientific study of totalitarianism is Totalitarian Dicta­ torship and Autocracy by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K.

Brzezinski. First published in 1956 and revised by Friedrich in 1967, this book still stands as the key source on totalitarianism* Friedrich and Brzezinski abandon

Arendt*a speculations about the historical antecedents of totalitarianism and focus on describing this political form and constructing a "model" of it. The heart of Friedrich's

Hughes, "nie Sea Change, p. 124. On the specific issue of anti-Semitism, see the excellent analysis in Peter G. J. Pulzer's The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

^^^Ibid., p. 125. 220 contribution is a list of six characteristics applicable to all totalitarian regimes. In its most recent formulation, this list includest (1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully deve­ loped secret police; and three kinds of monopoly or, more precisely, monopolistic controlI namely that of (a) mass communica­ tions, (b) operational weapons;

Carl J. Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes," in Friedrich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspec­ tive i Three Views (New York* Praeger Publishers, p. T331 Copyright e 1969 by Praeger Publishers, a division of Holt Rinehart and Winston. Reproduced by permission of Holt Rinehart and Winston, CBS College Publishing. Worthy of note here is the fact that Luigi Sturzo, in an article not cited by Friedrich, listed four characteristics of totalitarian states which match loosely with four of Friedrich's features. See Sturzo's "The Totalitarian state," Social Research, III (May 1936), pp. 231-33. 138 Z. K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, (Rev. ed.; New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), p . 47. 221

But the key word In Brzezinski'e definition is "arbitrary," which immediately rules out any thought that some of the present or past "totalitarian" regimes might have some rational roots. Thus all such regimes could be said to represent "revolution for the hell of it," in the words of an American "radical" of the 1960s. Brzezinski's qualifica­ tion of Friedrich's conceptual model is therefore not very useful. The conceptual definition of totalitarianism is, unfor­ tunately, the high point of achievement in the vast writings on this subject. Most of the remaining work is devoted to fitting various regimes into the conceptual framework, thus "proving" the concept's usefulness. All this has nothing to do with political theory, which attempts to explain why political events happen. Friedrich himself has admitted that as of yet "... no satisfactory general genetic the­ ory which would truly explain why totalitarianism appeared in the twentieth century has been put forward. What good, then, has the concept been? What purpose has it served? Many critics have suggested that it is purely ideological.^*^ A strong argument can certainly be made that the totalitarianism thesis has found its greatest

139 Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory," p. 139. 140 For example, see Herbert Spiro and Benjamin Barber, "Counter-Ideological Uses of Totalitarianism," Politics and Society, I (November 1970), 3-22. 222 utility in the hands of ideologists.^*^ A. James Gregor lamely defends this school of thought against such charges :

The concept "totalitarianism" was a summary of the judgments contained in the bulk of literature devoted to Fascism, National Socialism, and Bolshevism. In effect, the concept "totalitarianism" was not minted to serve "counter-ideological" purposes (how­ ever the concept was used by those who attempted to exploit it). It was articula­ ted primarily as a storage convenience, a mnemonic aid, and a pedagogical tool. As a consequence it reflected antecedent w o r k . 3-42

But Gregor presents few examples of great intellectual accomplishments by those using the concept as a "storage convenience, mnemonic aid, or pedagogical tool."

To conclude our discussion of totalitarianism it will be instructive to review the scholarly career of Friedrich relative to the subject. It began in 1937 with an article on "the agricultural basis of emotional nationalism. " Here Friedrich analyzed the vote in a 1929 German referendum on the Young Plan for easing the punitive aspects of the Versailles treaty. The referendum called for a complete end to reparations and a full withdrawal of armed forces from German territory, in contrast to the more modest Young Plan.

This measure failed, but Friedrich was able to demonstrate

A particularly blatant ideological approach is exemplified by Richard Vetterli and William B. Fort, Jr., The Socialist Base of Modern Totalitarianism (Berkeley* McCutchan Publishing, 1968). 142Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism, p. 234. 223 a positive correlation between the extent of agriculture in German states and the number of favorable votes in the referendum* He concluded that " * . . all available evi­ dence points to the conclusion that the rural population constitutes the compact mass tdiich stands behind the uncom- 143 promising, emotional nationalism." That is %diy movements like Nazism and Fascism "are first of all sup­ ported by the peasants." Friedrich's next significant contribution was his editing of papers presented at a 1953 conference on totali­ tarianism, This multi-disciplinary conference produced a variety of perspectives on the new concept never since matched in any single source* Most of the accounts are flawed by simplistic reductionisnf, the authors trying to ex­ plain totalitarianism using one or two factors. Friedrich, however, argues for a continued multi-disciplinary, general­ izing approach to the phenomenon; and his article is the cornerstone of the book* Here he sketches out five of his later six distinguishing characteristics of totalitarianism and speculates about "causal" conditions. As have others,

Friedrich assigns supremacy to m o d e m technology as a neces­ sary condition for the rise of totalitarianism. Mass demo­ cracy and Christianity (which "established a broad

143 Friedrich, "The Agricultural Basis of Emotional Nationalism," Public Opinion Quarterly, I (April 1937)', p. 60. 224 predilection for convictional certainty") are also singled out as contributory factors. Because of the existence of these and other "unique" conditions, Friedrich concludes (thus legitimising his intellectual endeavors) that "... (a) fascist and Communist totalitarian society are basically alike, that is to say are more nearly alike to each other than to any other systems of government and society, and (b) totalitarian society is historically unique and sui generis."^** Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy is little more than an extension of the aforegoing article. It adds nothing significant to the discussion of the nature of, or the necessary conditions for, totalitarianism and is most concerned with providing examples to demonstrate the con­ cept's validity. In fact, this latter task seems to com­ prise the bulk of Friedrich's work in this area since he began in 1953. His other job has been to "fine-tune" the concept in response to criticisms or "misinterpretations." In his most recent article on totalitarianism, Friedrich adds at the very end that "... perhaps the most important change in the theory and practice of totalitarianism . . . is the realisation that totalitarian dictatorship, like

las Friedrich, "The Unique Character of Totalitari­ an Society," in Friedrich, ed., ^talitarianisro; Proceedings of a Conference Held at <^e /ynericarTAcademy of Arts and Sciences, Merci: 1954 (Cambridge* Harvard University Press', 1954), p. 47 :------225 other political phenomena, is a relative rather than an absolute category* Thus there are totalitarian feature# in many non-totalitarian nations, and it is possible to identify totalitarian trends in various nations at various times in their histories* This great theoretical advance may bring the concept closer to reality, but it re­ mains quite distant from the real problems addressed by this dissertation* We are here interested in the development of a theory of fascism. But totalitarianism is, in the first place, only a concept. Those who have employed it have not often worried about the historical roots or the socio­ economic structure undergirding this m o d e m autocratic form. Second, even at the conceptual level totalitarianism (as it has been used by Friedrich and most others) lacks precision. It seems to refer to anything vrtiich differs from liberal democracy. This characteristic just happens to make it a potent ideological weapon, but it has the unfortunate effect in the realm of political science to discourage investiga­ tions into important aspects of fascism and communism.

There is an interesting twist, relative to the hypothe­ ses of this dissertation, in the use of totalitarianism. We have argued that mainstream American social scientists have typically avoided the larger theoretical issues of fascism by carrying out research on very limited aspects of

^*®Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory," p. 153. 226

particular regimes. The "theory of totalitarianism does the opposite— it tries to absorb fascism into an even more general conceptual category. The effect, however, is the samS, and that is to obfuscate major areas of importance to a theory of fascism. Note well that this new concept (so closely identified with American political science) is the product of European scholars— SturzO, Arendt, Friedrich, Brzezinski, etc. The Americanization of totalitarianism

A refreshing recent study by Peter H. Nerkl', Political Violence under the Swastika (Princeton* Princeton University Press, 1975), illustratesthe possibility of doing very specific yet theoretically relevant research on fascism. Merkl analyzes 581 contest essays (aimed at yield­ ing "the best personal life history of an adherent of the Hitler movement") collected by Theodore Abel (see Chapter VII, this dissertation) for his 1933 research on the Nazi movement. His goal is to investigate the middle echelons of the party. "Anyone can understand the motives of a Nazi leader. But %rtiy did the little Nazis act as they did, and nAiat could have been their motives long before Hitler won power?" (p. ix). The problem of representativeness of the "sample" is readily apparent, and Merkl thoroughly discusses all the biases involved, rejecting any possibility of generalizing from the results. He seems to consider his work a tentative testing (through a long series of cross- tabulations) of some of the assumptions about the Nazi move­ ment «rtiich have been fostered since the war. Indeed, his findings are a serious challenge to one-sided, simplistic interpretations of the movement's composition or of the motivation of its individual members. On the other hand, strong support is presented for earlier accounts emphasizing the importance of anti-Semitism and the "deficient childhood socialization" of party members. But Merkl is limited by his data from making any new contributions to a general theory of fascism. He offers instead powerful suggestions for refining generalizing approaches, and he suggests many new angles for more research into the operation of the fascist movement. We should in concluding point out that Merkl was born in Germany in 1932. 227 consists in removing its historical and theoretical content, as Friedrich's career illustrates* Finally, let us return to our earlier coiunent that Neumann used the concept in a much more fertile ray* This is because he does not separate it from history and theory.

We have already seen how Neumann gives totalitarianism sub­ stance in his Behemoth. In a later manuscript (unfinished at his death) he attempts to provide some guidelines for a systematic study of dictatorship. Writing at almost the same time as Friedrich, he sketches a picture of totalitari­ an dictatorship similar to Friedrich's concept. "A fully developed totalitarian dictatorship is the form an industri­ al society may adopt if it should become necessary to maxi­ mize its repressive elements and eliminate its liberal ones."^*^ There are five "essential factors" in Neumann's version— a police state, concentration of power, a monopolistic state party, far-reaching social controls, and a reliance on terror* But unlike Friedrich, Neumann makes no absolute condemnation of totalitarianism, saying that

. . . we are forced to conclude that the usual confrontation of liberal democracy vs. dictatorship as an antithesis of good and evil, cannot be maintained from a historical point of view. Moralizing about political

Neumann, "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship, " in his The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (New York* The Free Press, 1957), p. 246. 228

systems makes It difficult to understand their functions,14°

While dictatorships are often the negation of democracy, they may just as easily be an implementation of, or prepara­ tion foC, democracy. But totalitarianism cannot be fully understood from the standpoint of its relationship to demo­ cracy. The "social function of dictatorship" could only be discovered through a comprehensive analysis of the histori­ cally relevant economic system, class relationships, and "personality structure." The contrast between Neumann's and Friedrich's formulae for the study of totalitarianism clearly reflects the diver­ gent aims of the two men, Friedrich wishes to accentuate the similarities between modern dictatorships of the left and right. Neumann acknowledges the similarities but finds more significance in the differences. Thus Neumann's short, unfinished article is far broader, and contains far more suggestions for social scientific research, than Friedrich's full-length book. Yet Friedrich's work has been enshrined while Neumann's has been ignored or curtly dismissed. Can there be any explanations for this fact other than either ideological considerations or the professionally specialized organization of the American social sciences?

l**Ibid., p. 248, 149 Fritz Ermarth's thoughts on totalitarianism can be contrasted to Friedrich's with similar results. See The New Germany, pp. 178-84. 229

Our examination of American and émigré political ecien- tiate' studies of fascism provides minimal support for our two hypotheses. The political scientists do have a unique perspective on fascism as embodied in the pseudo-theory of totalitarianism. But this has nothing to do with academic specialisation. Rather, it was adapted (along with some of its proponents) from the European conservative tradition. The dominance of behavioral ism has had an effect, but this effect has been to discourage the choice of fascism as a subject of study. Hence we do not see the development of a distinctly political scientific interpretation of fascism because behavioralism does not cultivate the study of fascism. CHAPTER VI

HISTORY

The conservative' motives of so many of the ostensible revolutionaries make the Third Reich a novelty among revolutions since 1789, but a revolution nonetheless, united by a community of enemies and supported by representatives of every social group. Destruction alone was a common goal after all others . . . had eliminated one another in a process of mutual cancellation. — David schoenbaum

Fascism cannot be understood if it is viewed as a revolution. It was a counterrevolu­ tion. Its purpose was to prevent the liberalization and radicalisation of Italy and Germany. Property and income distribu­ tion and the traditional class structure remained roughly the same under fascist rule. — John Weiss

A. State of the Discipline History as a discipline is one of the most difficult of all to characterize. This is because historians themselves cannot agree on the most basic principles governing their profession. One debate, for example, is whether history is a social science or one of the "humanities." David S. Landes, Charles Tilly, and their colleagues on the History

230 231

Panel of the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee of the National Academy of Sciences have suggested two

"ideal types" Which illustrate this difference of opin­ ion.^ Those who see history as humanistic stress the uniqueness and complexity of the subject matter, see the method as artistic, reject quantification, and consider written history as literature (the so-called "narrative" form). The champions of social scientific history see it as the study of the general and the abstract, prefer systematic methods, strive to quantify, and promote the use of statis­ tics and scientific language in the presentation of find­ ings. Landes and Tilly believe that most historians would locate their own work somewhere between these two extremes. In most cases the historical problem will be a chief deter­ minant of what approach and method will be most productive. Still, however, Landes and Tilly advocate the incursion of social science methods into most historical research, and their book is largely a plea for interdisciplinary coopera­ tion.

The opposite side of this debate is presented well by 2 Jacques Barxun in his Clio and the Doctors. Barrun

^David s. Landes and Charles Tilly, eds.. History as Social Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 9^1?, 2 Jacques Barxun, Clio and the Doctors: Psycho- History, Quanto-History, and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), For a positive evaluation of psycho-history, see Lloyd deMause, ed.. The New Psycho- history (New York: Psychohistory Press, 1975). 232

attack* "psycho-history" for being more attached to Freudian theory than to accessible historical facts, thereby becoming immune from verification by other historians* "Quanto-

history" comes under fire for its reduction of the complex­ ity of historical events into neat statistics and its resultant movement toward mechanistic determinism. Barzun affirms his allegiance to "traditional, conventional history, " which may at times draw upon other disciplines and methods but in the end always becomes narrative. Gertrude Himmelfarb is in basic agreement with Barzun but is a bit more kind to the quantitative historians, saying that " . . . it is important to notice that there are self-styled

quantitative historians who do not make an ideology out of the method."^ Himmelfarb believes, however, that the proper forum for quanto-history is the historical monograph focusing on particular, specialized problems. She is angered by young "true believers" in the profession who are "cashing in on a good thing" with the new methods, but she is even more displeased with older historians who attempt to "re-tool" their methods in order to be in fashion.

I also find it ironic that many histori­ ans should be redefining their traditionally humanistic discipline in "scientific" terms just when many young sociologists, disillu­ sioned with "social science," are demanding

^Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The 'New History'," Commen­ tary, LI (January 1975), p. 77. 233

that sociology assume a more humanistic aspect. It may turn out that the latest innovations in historical methods are already an anachronism.4

Despite the objections of "traditional" historians, the social scientific approach has by now made great and probab­ ly irreversible inroads into the domain of history. One reason may well be that (as Landes and Tilly have demon­ strated^) funding is much more available for research in the social sciences than in history. Historians have found that their survival in these days of budget-cutting may depend on adapting themselves to the prevailing funding climate. But, of course, there have been those historians who, since the early days of established social science in this country, have called for an application of the new perspectives to history.* It will be useful to briefly survey the reasoning of some social science advocates. Richard Hofstadter sees in the social sciences an answer to the lack of new methodological and theoretical developments in the field of history.

*Ibid., p. 78.

*Landes and Tilly, History as Social Science, pp. 24-25.

*Two examples are James Harvey Robinson, who wrote The New History (New York* The Macmillan Conpany, 1912); and his student Harry Elmer Barnes, author of The New History and the Social Sciences (New York: The Century Company, 1925). 234

Perhaps the most important function which the social sciences can perform for the historian is that they provide means, in some cases indispensible means, by which he can be brought into working relationship with certain aspects of the modern intellec­ tual climate. They bring to him a fresh store of ideas with which to disturb the excessively settled routines of his thought; but they also serve a catalytic function for him: they show him how he may adapt for his own purposes certain modern insights into human behavior and character which he can­ not, on his own, immediately and directly appropriate.'

But Hofstadter seems to hold to the traditional narrative form as most suited to the historian's needs. He rejects formal social science methods in historical research but advocates drawing on the "substantive findings," the "intel­ lectual concerns," and the "professional perspectives" of social scientists. These add to the "speculative richness" of history. "The more the historian learns from the social sciences, the more variables he is likely to take account Q of, the more complex his task becomes." The result is "greater range and depth” in the historian's work.

Richard Hofstadter, "History and the Social Sciences," in Frits Stern, ed., The Varieties of History (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 363. Historians continue to look to the social sciences for fresh ideas. See Victoria E. Bonnell, "The Uses of Theory, Concepts, and conparison in Historical Sociology," Comparative Studies in Society and History. XXII (1980), 156-73. ®Ibid., p. 364. 235

Robert F. Berkhofer goes further than Hofstadter, urging adoption of social scientific methods themselves. In his outline of "a behavioral approach to historical analy­

sis" Berkhofer calls for history to become more scientific. "Behavioralism not only means the recent advances in data collection and analysis but also the significant develop­ ments in theory formulation and testing as well as a new orientation to the study of man's behavior." Berk­ hofer believes that since behavioral techniques are already

being borrowed by historians on a wide scale, what is now needed is a "paradigm" for behavioral analysis in history. Drawing on stimulus-response theory, the "situational approach," Verstehen, structural-functional ism, and other social science perspectives, he produces an analytical framework which he believes will enable historians to move beyond mere "multi-causal analysis" to an analysis bringing out a "dynamic interrelationship of factors."

What the historian ought to combine in his synthesis in order to achieve the holistic study of human behavior in past time as advocated in this book can be sorted into four basic classes. 1. General laws of behavior. 2. Social and cultural arrangements. 3. Statements of singular causation.

A Robert P. Berkhofer, Jr., A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 236

4. Specific statement* of fact.^° The particular data under study will determine how far up the analytical ladder the researcher is able to proceed. Samuel P. Hays' review article on some recent books about historical social research emphasises the positive impact of social scientific concepts on history. The new approach does not merely substitute "an overload of quantitative data for an overload of qualitative data." It offers, through comparative methods, an opportunity for "conceptual reconstruction" and "theory development." The more fundamental moving forces of history may thereby be uncovered.

The tragedy of conventional approaches to history which still dominate the profession is a preoccupation with dramatic personali­ ties and events, top-level national happen­ ings, uniformities in national culture, the ideas expressed by major "thinkers," and a potpourri of fractured segments of human endeavor which have constantly divorced his­ torians from a systematic understanding of human life. Rarely capturing the imagina­ tion of historians are such questions as patterns, shared by many people and persist­ ing over time, of perception, mobility, family life and kinship ties, community and/or segmental relationships, religious perspectives within and across denomina­ tions, geographical ranges in human rela­ tionships, inequalities in economic condi­ tion and political power, or dominant- dependent relationships between geographical areas at different stages of economic deve­ lopment.

^°Ibid., p. 293. Samuel P. Hays, "Historical Social Research: Concept, Method, and Technique,” Journal of Interdisciplin­ ary History, IV (Winter 1974), p. 481. By permission of the Journal or Interdisciplinary History and the HIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 237

The above historian# and others favorable to the social scientific approach agree on some basic points— that this type of history should concentrate on collective (social) phenomena, should be guided by concepts and theories, should generally employ a comparative method, and should base itself on verifiable data. There are differences of opinion over which theoretical models and technical procedures are appropriate, but such disagreements are found in all the social sciences. However, since social science advocates among historians have always been a minority, the discipline as a whole remains divided over issues not problematic to the social scientific minority. The most basic clash pits those who would limit themselves to the consideration of "facts" against those who would press for generalisations (theory). The "factual" approach dates back to the "Scien­ tific School" of American historians of the late 1800s, which in turn rests on the work of the German Leopold von Ranke. Americans like Andrew White, Daniel Gilman, and Henry Adams established a tradition stressing accuracy of documentation through concentration on "primary sources." Their belief was that any "meaning" of the facts would reveal itself without the historian's interference. David H. Potter sees this trend as having continued to the present: 238

Thus the problem of causation has been left to the philosophers; the problem of human motivation has been left to the psycholo­ gists; the problem of social organization has been left to the sociologists. Histori­ ans dealt every day with questions involving causation, motivation, and social organiza­ tion, and often by virtue of their qualities of personal sagacity they handled these topics extremely well. But the anomalous fact remained that the chief problem which historians recognized in their method wae validation of the data, while the chief problem which they actually encountered in their daily work was the interpretation of the data.12 Outside of the philosophy of history there were few serious efforts toward generalization until the social sciences began to have an impact on American historians. A book by the British historian Edward Hallett Carr called What Is History? seems to have played a central role in focusing this impact. For C a m "The study of history is a

study of causes.History must be scientific in the sense that it must search for knowledge in the "process of interaction between principles and facts, between theory and practice," Knowledge of causes is the only useful product

12 David M. Potter, "Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions in Historical Study," in Louis Gottschalk, ed., Generalization in the Writing of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 178-79. Copyright © 1963 by The University of Chicago. Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press.

^^Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 1131 t w o later and more sophisticated philosophical efforts are Adam Schaff, History and Truth (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976), and Leon J. Soldstein, Historical Knowing (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976T1 239 of progressive historiography. A purely factual history, besides being a technical impossibility, would be totally divorced from the present and future and would yield no practical knowledge. Two years after Carr's book there appeared the first significant American work dedicated to "generalisation in the writing of history," edited by Louis Gottschalk, chairman of the Committee on Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council. Articles by Gottschalk, William O. Aydelotte, David M. Potter and others address themselves to the levels, types, sources, and subjects of generalization in historical inquiry. Gottschalk provides in his summary a consensual, overall position of the book ' : authors.

The Committee shares the attitude of those authors who are more friendly to generalization in historical research. Its line of reasoning runs somewhat as followst Historians borrow ready-made generaliza­ tions, whether they know it or not. If they were to borrow them knowingly, they might then undertake to assay and refine their borrowed generalizations by whatever means— definition, qualification, reservation, conformity to known facts, logic, psycholo­ gy, statistics, matched comparisons, genealogical endurance, or other tests— might be most appropriate and, avoiding the more untried or unverifiable ones, make good use of those found valid* Perhaps in this process, if sufficiently motivated and properly trained, they might originate and advance some restricted, tentatively accept­ able generalizations of their own. At the very least, the professional training of historians ought to include systematic 240

instruction in how to deal with the other­ wise stultifying ubiquity of generalisation in the writing of history.1*

Most historians writing about their craft since the books of Carr and Oottschalk seem to favor the growth of historical generalization. Given this evident consensus, Jurgen Herbst attempted in 1967 to determine just how far the emphasis on historical theory has penetrated into the actual teaching of history at the university level. He found that while nine of ten universities responding to his questionnaire offered some courses relevant to the theoreti­ cal concerns of the discipline, most of these schools had only a "vaguely defined and variously constituted mixture of historical, philosophical, and methodological elements." He discovered a gap between historians' stated interests and what was actually being offered to studentst

Concern with the theory of history in one form or another is well-nigh universal among American historians. Yet the way in which this concern expresses itself in the in­ structional program of history departments across the country is less impressive than the quantity of these expressions may lead one to expect. It does not attest to a very highly developed and sophisticated level of self-consciousness or self-awareness among historians. It expresses rather a vaguely felt appreciation for the desirability and a

^^Gottschalk, Generalisation, pp. 208-09 241

vaguely felt lack of the presence of such self-awareness.15

Thus it seems that history lags far behind the modern social sciences in the development and teaching of general theory. Another Indication of this fact may be found in a review of journal articles carried out by Landes and Tilly. They

found the bulk of articles in the main American historical journal to consist of either "narration of a sequence of events or description of persons or circumstances."

A survey of articles published in the Ameri­ can Historical Review at intervals from 1901 to 1963 shows almost two thirds to be of this type, and while this proportion would be lower in some of the more specialized journals . . . , it would be higher in local and regional periodicals. By comparison, only about 10 percent took the form of systematic analyses or explanations of historical method and critiques of research,

While these percentages also seem to hold true for later years of the American Historical Review, there have recently arisen at least two newer journals publishing more analyti­ cal and theoretical articles, namely the Journal of Inter­ disciplinary History and History and Theory. These,

^^Jurgen Herbst, "Theoretical Work in History in American University Curricula," History and Theory, VII (1968), p. 348. ^*Landes and Tilly, History as Social Science, p. 8. 242 however, are far lee# likely to be standard reading matter for mainstream historians. Clearly the overwhelming majority of What historians write and what they read must be classified as "purely factual" accounts of people and events with no stated analytical or theoretical relevance. Another factor influencing the output of historical researchers (beyond the methodological and theoretical disputes we have discussed) is the extreme specialization within the discipline. Historians have long stressed the need for a broad analytical scope if historiography is to present an approximately complete picture of any given slice of historical reality. Dexter Perkins, writing as the chairman of the Committee on Graduate Education of the American Historical Association, fervently expresses this point of view:

No other subject, except possibly philoso­ phy, embraces the whole story of man. While, in the nature of the case, the his­ torian must confine his special research to a restricted area, he is at times under a special compulsion to see life whole. If he is equal to the demands of his high calling, he must, as he studies the past, relate one area of activity to another, for example, the history of the business cycle to the movements of politics, the story of religion to the cultural media in which it finds expression. If he becomes too narrow a specialist, he misses some of the fundamen­ tal values of his profession.1?

Dexter Perkins, "Introduction: As Seen by the Chairman," in Dexter Perkins, John L. Snell, et al.. The Education of Historians in the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 1-2. Copyright « 1962 by McGraw- Hill Book Company. Used with permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company. 243

Perkins' warning, unfortunately, has had little effect. The "division of labor" in the production of history has contin­ ued to develop without a noticeable parallel development of

holistic approaches. R. J. Shafer summarizes the current state of affairs.

The growth of history as a discipline has witnessed an increasing tendency toward specialization in subject matter. The professional historian may still write a general history of the world or of a parti­ cular civilization, but this work is most often prepared for use as a textbook. In­ creasingly, he tends to think of himself not merely as a student of medieval history, modern European history, or United States history, but also as a social, economic, or intellectual historian.!*

This condition is compounded by some historians * rigid adherence to the new specialized methods of inquiry such as "quanto-history" or "psycho-history." The result of all

this is a tendency in many historians to carve out for themselves one or more areas of expertise in which they are

looked to for their full command of the "facts" about a given era or event, or for their mastery of particular

methods of inquiry. Such specialization is not in itself

R. J. Shafer, ed., A Guide to Historical Method (Rev. ed.f Homewood, Illinois* The Dorsey Press, 1974), p. 22. Both Geoff Eley, "Some Recent Tendencies in Social History," and Laurence Veysey, "The United States," in Georg G. Iggers and Harold T. Parker, eds., International Handbook of Historical Studies (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, T9^79), pp. 55-70 and 157-73, indicate their disappointment that the recent emphasis on social history has actually increased specialization rather than generalization in historical writing. 244 to b« condemned. The problem arises because it is not accompanied b y theoretical frameworks which tie the various specialties together.

Finally, one objection to mainstream historiography, the leftist critique, cuts across many of the disputes we have just examined. Howard Zinn is a forceful spokesman for this point of view. In "History as a Private Enterprise" Zinn calls for a more activist historical profession dedi­ cated to ending social evils like war, poverty, and racism.

Whether a historical work is "narrative" or "interpretive" is not as important as the subject matter chosen for study. But the professional organization of history makes it likely that controversial topics will be avoided.

There is more than a fifty-fifty chance that the academic historian will lose what vital organs of social concern he has in the process of acquiring a doctorate, where the primary requirement of finding an untouched decade or person or topic almost assures that several years of intense labor will end in some monstrous irrelevancy. And after that, the considerations of rank, tenure, and salary, while not absolutely excluding either personal activism or socially pertinent scholarship, tend to discourage either.!*

For Zinn, most history writing is motivated by the desire for personal profit ("promotion, prestige, and even a bit

19 Howard Zinn, "History as Private Enterprise," in Kurt H. Wolf and Barrington Moore, Jr., eds.. The Critical Spirit (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967, pp. 172-73. 245 of money"). The enlargement of the "social sector" of history production must be encouraged within the discipline by Whatever means available. His implication is, however, that only a radically changed society would permit such a change in history-writing to occur. If the aforegoing pages have portrayed with reasonable accuracy the current state of the discipline of history, we might expect certain ramifications for the study of fascism by historians. The Americans should have produced few accounts of fascism as a general phenomenon. The overwhelm­ ing number of studies should be found to be very explicit inquiries into particular aspects of particular regimes.

Any general studies should prove to have been produced by historians more inclined toward the social scientific point of view. A special case eunong this latter group— the

Marxists— should, in their representation among émigré and dissenting scholars, provide support for the more general hypotheses of this dissertation.

B. Mainstream Interpretations of Fascism Several early efforts to explain fascism are found in a 1935 volume edited by Guy Stanton Ford of the University of

Minnesota. There are several articles by immigrants and several articles irrelevant to the present focus for one reason or another, but one piece by an American is of some interest. Harold C. Deutsch, formerly of the University of 246

Minnesota and now at the U.S. Army War College, undertakes to examine "The Origins of Dictatorship in Germany." Deutsch almost totally ascribes the Nazi victory to the failure of the Social Democratic leadership. The socialists and their allies only supported the formation of a republic after various revolutionary measures were carried out by the workers. "Their action was now less the climax of their struggle against semi-autocratic monarchy than a move to 20 forestall a soviet dictatorship." After the republic was established, the socialists failed further in not cut­ ting Germany's ties to the past. The new regime sought rather to legitimate the republic with the traditional imperial emblems.

Wherever they did not clash too sharply with the new institutions it sought to link it­ self with the national tradition. As the verdict of Versailles, by striking at the aro^ and navy, had again endeared these in­ struments of imperial power to the German people, the republican regime sensed the danger of dissociating itself from them.

The army should have been transformed into "a Republican Guard," a proletarian force— but in 1926 fifteen of the twenty-six highest ranking officers were aristocrats. "Thus

Harold C. Deutsch, "The Origins of Dictatorship in Germany," in Guy Stanton Ford, ed., Dictatorship in the Modern World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1936}, p. 116. ^^Ibid., p. 117. 247 the German Republic had permitted the preservation of a bridge to the past over which a counter-attack could soon be expected. " In addition, the ideology of the republi­ can parties was a hindrance to the exercise of their power.

To begin with, the Weimar Constitution had been largely determined by the sentiment that it must recognize and fortify all those rights and liberties which had been lacking in the Old Reich and which the former oppo­ sition parties had supported as "democratic" and in conformity with the spirit of modern liberalism. In bondage to their own ideolo­ gy, socialists and bourgeois liberals felt compelled to demonstrate the sincerity and truth of their convictions. And so their constitution was made to provide guarantees for every conceivable liberty, particularly for such freedom of political agitation as was scarce to be found in the most settled and secure of parliamentary s t a t e s .

But the greatest failure of the Weimar regime was its incapacity to maintain the loyalty of its early supporters.

Without the continued support of the tradi­ tional champions of democracy and liberal­ ism, such as the artisan class, the small merchants, the white-collar workers, the professional people, and the students, its eventual doom was certain. Yet these were in large part the very elements that were now suffered to be dealt the most staggering blows of fortune. One can even say some­ thing in support of the claim that the Republic exploited them for the benefit of organized labor and organized capital,2*

22ibid.. p. 118. ^^Ibid.

^*Ibid., p. 120. 248

The inflation and depression were the final blow for the middle classes. The loss of their support rendered the government powerless to effect a compromise solution to the economic crisis. The way was left open for the bourgeoisie to move.

The only way out for capital was a general reduction of wages, but so long as the pre­ vailing political alignment endured, such a drastic downward revision was out of the question. So the big business men were made to realize that the only way in which they could hope to rehabilitate themselves would be to secure a more direct control over the state. After the war they had to come to terms with the workers at the expense of the middle class. They now conceived the possi­ bility of reversing the process by forming an alliance with the latter. Such a course would have the added advantage of making it possible to dispense with socialist assis­ tance in fighting the Communists, whose agitation had naturally increased in vio­ lence and popular appeal because of the general economic misery.25

Deutsch sees Hitler as a modern replacement for Bismark, fulfilling a longing in the German middle-class mind, and ultimately brought to power through the support of capital­ ists and other ruling class elements. In Deutsch*s mind, then, the National Socialist triumph boils down to an abdication of power by the socialists and the subsequent seizure of the state by capitalists through the Nazi party. Any "vulgar" Marxist would have been proud

^®Ibid., pp. 123-24. 249

of this Minnesota professor's interpretation, but we must be a bit more critical. The scope of analysis is far too narrowly political. The article is not really as much an exercise in research as it is an inpressionistic interpreta­ tion with no roots in real data and no footnotes. Deutsch'a conclusions are therefore virtually worthless. While such an over-simplifying format is not unexpected among American scholars, the one oddity is that the content is virtually identical to communist Party dogma on the rise of National Socialism. Deutsch has long since abandoned speculating about the "origins of dictatorship in Germany," preferring instead such safe and "factual" topics as "Hitler and his generals" and the "conspiracy against Hitler in the twilight war.

In 1957 Andrew G. Whiteside of Columbia University set out to summarize current viewpoints on "the nature and origins of National Socialism. " His article clearly demon­ strates the unwillingness of American historians to look at fascism in a general way. Of the various scholars cited in his discussion, not one is an American-born historian. In fact, until wall into the 1960s all serious analytical

26 Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolist University of Minnesota Press, 1968), and Hitler and His Generals? The Hidden Crisis, January-June, l638 (University of Minnesota Press, 1974). An up-dating of his earlier article in the 1939 edition of Dictatorshiprsnip in the Modern World adds nothing of substance to the origioriginal. 250 thinking warn produced by émigrés. But the late 1960s brought an international upsurge of interest in fascism, and American historians took part in this. A significant early contributor %#as David Schoenbaum, then of the University of Iowa. Schoenbaum defines his book (which grew out of a dissertation written at Oxford University) as "the social history of a revolution," and he focuses on the social changes brought about in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1939. Schoenbaum*8 inquiry is guided by Hermann Rauschning's concept of the "revolution of nihilism," which Schoenbaum finds to be the "best formula of all" for understanding National Socialism. Hitler's regime carried out a revolu­ tion of destruction which paved the way for a new, democra­ tic (West) Germany after the war. It soon becomes evident that Schoenbaum*B conception of revolution differs from that of most scholars. "The revolution led to neither the expul­ sion of a colonial regime, a declaration of rights, nor the 27 introduction of new relations of production." In fact, the meaning of the word "revolution" is never clari­ fied— a significant oversight in a work where it is actually the key concept. All that we can be certain of is that Hitler * s "revolution," according to Schoenbaum, was one of destruction.

27 David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolutioni Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1963-1939 (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. zxi. Copyright'• 1966 by David Schoenbaum. Reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc. 251

Schoenbaum begins his analysis by examining "the Third Reich and its social promises*" He characterises Germany after 1918 as a "sick society," afflicted by a "malaise" common to all Western industrial societies. But "special historical factors" heightened the German crisis:

a non-competitive, highly concentra­ ted, high-priced industrial economy, the disproportionate influence of a small class of large land-owners, a high birthrate until World War i, too many rural smallholders, an inflated urban petite bourgeoisie.2*

The situation was further complicated by "the by-products of defeat":

. . . a "lost generation" of demobilized soldiers; a floating population of eastern refugees, many of them aristocrats; the liquidation of millions of war loans floated with middle-class savings; and a large dis­ proportion in the demographic relationship of women to men. Finally, there were the consequences of the war: reparations, loss of export markets, exhaustion of both plant and raw materials, and inflation.29

Drawing upon a large number of German social scientific studies, Schoenbaum builds as complete an inventory of German ills as existed anywhere at the time of the book's publication. He then focuses on changes in the German class structure as the most significant factor involved in the

28lbid., p. 2.

29.Ibid., pp. 2-3. 252

rise of fascism. The burgeoning "service" or white-collar sector occupies most of Schoenbaum*s attention. This group tended to organize in non-social 1st unions and bargain for different things than blue-collar workers. White-collar unions ware preoccupied with "salaries instead of wages, long-term contracts, and pensions; " and they worked to preserve special social status for their members. The psychological emphasis on status meant that unemployment hit the middle-class workers much harder than it hit proletari­ ans. The other major social group, farmers, suffered gener­ ally because the rural population was too large and the average holdings were too small for efficient production. The Republic offered no real solutions to the problems of these population strata. Thus the door was left open for

Nazi propagandists. Schoenbaum sees the central ideological strategy of "promising something to everybody" as the key element in Hitler's successful canpaign to accede to power. Once Hitler held power, be began to transform Nazi ideology to suit the new needs of "metamorphosis from opposition to establishment." In order for National Socialism to become a unifying force in the nation it had to win over the workers and other groups which had resisted the new regime. Schoen­ baum regards the Nazi attempt to create a Volksgemeinschaft as "the real triumph of National Socialism, " but he offers in support of this contention only the assertation that "... there is plausible testimony that 'National 253

Socialism * as an idea impressed at least some Germans as something more than an invention of their propaganda ministry . . . In a chapter on "the Third Reich and labor," Schoenbaum takes a more detailed look at the fate of the German working class. The Nazis had no real labor policy in the sense of a consistent program aimed at the problems of the working class. As a supplement, almost as a substitute for a labor policy, the Third Reich offered a labor ideology, combining simultaneous and roughly equal appeals to the pride, patriot­ ism, idealism, enlightened self-interest, and, finally, urge to self-aggrandizement of those exposed to it.3!

There was also a concerted effort to wipe out the "status" distinctions between different occupations— to promote a spiritual, if not economic, "equality." But Schoenbaum argues that there were certain benefits enjoyed by at least some of the workers. Unemployment was low, the eight-hour day was enforced, and working conditions were improved. At the national level the "Strength through Joy" recreational program was established. These and other advantages enjoyed by labor were meant to offset for the workers their fixed wages and the destruction of their trade unions. Schoenbaum believes that these measures achieved the desired effect.

^°Ibid., p. 71.

^!lbid., p. 75. 254

He does not seem to assign much importance to Nazi terror in disciplining the work force. In his discussion of "the Third Reich and business," Schoenbaum paints their relationship as " . . . a social contract between unequal partners, in which submission was the condition for success, but even then, in the case of thousands of small businessmen, no guarantee of it,"32 During the early years of the regime the party was still under the influence of its "revolutionary," anti-capitalist, corporativist wing. But as it no longer needed its small business allies once its control of the state was firmly established, the party could afford to be more realistic, economically speaking. Thus

. . . the honeymoon was relatively short, as small business proved the most vulnerable to the advancing labor shortage, increased industrial goals, and the consumer needs of a population whose artificially low wages demanded some kind of consideration. By 1935 official support for small business found its modest expression in hortatory but questionably effective appeals to customers to pay their craftsmen in c a s h . 33

The larger the enterprise, the greater were its chances to prosper under Nazi rule— provided its leaders submitted to

Nazi economic planning. "As a general rule, business, particularly big business, declined or flourished in direct

3*Ibid., p. 116. S^Ibid., p. 130. 255

proportion to its willingness to collaborate*Busi­ ness gave up much of its managerial autonomy to the state in return for the state's suppression of labor unions. Profits were protected and in fact increased while wages remained stable or fell, as Schoenbaum well illustrates using the Nazis' own statistics. German agriculture provides Schoenbaum with another good example of Hitler's willingness to sacrifice ideological principles in order to achieve his larger aims. The glorification of rural life and rural people as the backbone of German society was one of the major facets of Nazi ideology, and at least some elements in the party looked forward to the creation of an essentially agrarian state under the new regime. But the demands of the industrial economy were the determining factor of the shape of agricultural policy.

The legislative substructure of the Nazi farm program was based on three premises* total control of markets and prices; the stabilization of land ownership in the form of entailed property (Reichserbhofqesetz) and credit provisions to bail farmers out of their debt; and a land-planning scheme intended to redistribute population. Only the first was applied with consistency.35

^*Ibid., p. 150. ^^Ibid.. p. 156. 256

Schoenbaum cites an impressive variety of statistics (most from secondary sources) on population, income, living stan­ dards, length of the workday, etc., to show a steady decline

in the rural economy. In essence, the countryside was bled in support of the industrial war machine.

The position of women in the Third Reich again illus­ trates the sacrifice of ideological principles. "Ideally* women would have been reserved for breeding and homemaking tasks, and for certain kinds of work "consistent with %fomen's natural inclinations." Women were systematically excluded from many social institutions, especially at execu­

tive levels. "But while the institutional limits on women remained more or less constant, the range of economic possi­ bilities widened spectacularly under the impact of full 36 en^loyment. " Schoenbaum cites no definitive statis­ tics, but he agreeingly cites other opinions that the percentage of women in the labor force actually increased. Overall, he concludes that "... the Third Reich did

little to change the status of German women. The intended conservative revolution failed here as it had failed in small business, agriculture, and the attempt to stop urban growth.

3*Ibid., p. 182.

S^Ibid., p. 190. 257

In spit* of the aforegoing we may remember that Schoenbaum does consider the Nazis to have accomplished a social revolution. He finally begins to unveil the logic behind this conviction in his discussion of "the Third Reich and social opportunity." The downfall of Weimar is attri­ buted to a lack of consensus in the country about its future direction. Schoenbaum*s view of how Hitler overcame this conflict requires quoting at length.

The success of the Third Reich was a reflection of the extent to which this con­ sensus was restored. In part ideologically, in part pragmatically. Hitler succeeded, where the Weimar Republic had failed, in desociologizing politics. Neither patronage for his followers, rapprochement with the old economic, military or civil service elites, nor economic recovery was the single key to his success, although all of them were factors. All of them had had their equivalents in the Weimar Republic. But the unique climate of the Third Reich, its ideo­ logical euphoria, expanding opportunities, distribution of both advantages and disad­ vantages among all social groups, created an unstable but unmistakable social equilibri­ um. Since the Third Reich involved all classes, since it brought both benefits and disadvantages to all classes, both loyalty and hostility largely ceased to be matters of class, and perhaps for the first time, Germany achieved a certain identity between leaders— or Leader— and followers. Unlike 1919-33, the political revolution coincided with the inherited social revolution.38

Schoenbaum rejects Franz Neumann*s conclusion that National Socialism "strengthened the prevailing class character of

^°Ibid., p. 244. 258

German society," saying that Neumann's position is "general­

ly accurate" but "misleading" because it ignores Nazism's double revolution— " . . . a revolution of class and a revo- lut ion of status at the same time. " The "revolution of class" refers to increased job opportunities, while the "revolution of status" consists in a "triumph of egalitari­ anism" in a spiritual sense of individual belongingness and self-worth in the volteisch movement. But in his final chapter on "the Third Reich and society," Schoenbaum begins by refuting what he wrote just pages before. "The German house was no less divided in 1939 or 1945 than it was in 1933 when Hitler took possession of it"^^ Although the vblkisch ideology gratified the desperate masses, "... real Gemeinschaft was no closer to realization in practice at the end of Nazi rule than it was 4 1 at the beginning." Class struggle was not really eliminated. A true economic recovery solving Germany's basic social problems was not even begun. In other words, the "revolutions of class and status" had no reality. What, then, constitutes "Hitler's social revolution?" Again, a lengthy quotation is called for.

3*Ibid., p. 272. *®Ibid., p. 275. *^Ibid. 259

The basic problem was not political or economic, but social, the problem of an arrested bourgeois-industrial society, con­ vinced by its guilt feelings and its impo­ tence of its own superfluousness, and pre­ pared to destroy itself with the means of the very bourgeois-industrial society it aimed to destroy. The "conservative" mo­ tives of so many of the ostensible revolu­ tionaries make the Third Reich a novelty among revolutions since 1789, but a revolu­ tion nonetheless, united by a community of enemies and supported by representatives of every social group. Destruction alone was a common goal after all others— "beamtenstaat" and Volksgemeinschaft, "back to the land" and back to the boundaries of 1918, the sal­ vation of private property and the achieve­ ment of "national socialism"— had eliminated one another in a process of mutual cancella­ tion. In the end, with the achievement of each partial goal, the destruction of unions and aristocracy, of Jews, of the Rights of Man and of bourgeois society, destruction was all that was left.*2

Schoenbaum has thus turned here to Rauschning's The Revolution of Nihilism to save his argument. It seems that Schoenbaum*8 hidden agenda throughout his book has been to refute Neumann's work. But Neumann's analysis is upheld on all major points, leaving Schoenbaum to lamely append to it the totally undemonstreble "revolution of destruction" thesis. However, despite the book's essential uselessness, we must evaluate it in terms of our criteria. Schoenbaum's analytical scope is commendably broad, probably due to the influence of his graduate studies in Bonn and London, and to

*^Ibid., pp. 287-88, 260

the fact he is building his argument in reference to the

studies of Neumann, Rauschning, and others. He employs many data taken from original Nazi statistics, but it seems that

at almost all crucial points of his argument he draws on secondary sources. Through a general comparative method he reaches conclusions which, unfortunately, support Neumann's views more effectively than his own. Thus Schoenbaum is forced in the end to abandon his data and substitute the highly impressionistic "destruction" theory of Rauschning. What in general could have been an effective, if repetitive, study of National Socialism is largely ruined by a simplis­ tic, reductionist conclusion. John Weiss's book, published the same year as Schoen­ baum* s, is a rejection of monocausal theories of fascism. Weiss sees such inadequate approaches as definitely on the wane.

It is fortunate . . . that few attempt any longer to explain the origins of fascism and national socialism by reference to the sup­ posed unique and collective guilt of the German people, or the alleged demonic irra­ tionalism of modern man, or the gangsterism of a handful of nihilistic leaders committed to power and power a l o n e . *3

The new trend in scholarship is exemplified in Weiss's presentation of a general framework designed to subsume

43 John Weiss, The Fascist Tradition (New York: Harper and Row, 1967}, p. 2. 261 fascism and other "conservativa" regimes under a broader heading.

The radical right thrives in societies Where older but still powerful conservative clas­ ses are threatened by rapid and modernising social change; change which creates or gives strength to liberal and radical classes and groups antagonistic to "the old ways." Thus, in the twentieth century, the minority of revolutionary conservatives always present in Europe became the needed counter- reaction and the defenders of conservatism in extremis. Any study of fascism which centers too narrowly on the Fascists and Nazis alone may miss the true significance of right-wing extremism. For without neces­ sarily becoming party members or accepting the entire range of party principles them­ selves, aristocratic landlords, army offi­ cers, government and civil service offici­ als, and important industrialists in Italy and Germany helped bring Fascists and Nazis to power.44

Weiss is one of the first modern scholars to present an alternative to the excessive specificity of most historical studies of fascist regimes and to the excessive generality of the "theory" of totalitarianism.

Weiss begins his analysis by looking into "the ideology of the radical right. " His central claim is that " the radical right found a ready-made alliance between racism and conservatism which it only had to exploit."*^ Des­ pite the revolutionary pretensions of Mussolini, Hitler, and

**Ibid., p. 4.

^^Ibid., pp. 19-20, 262

Other movement leaders, they were driven by the need for

financial support from big business to mute the anticapital- istic leanings of their mass following.

The European radical right promised to pro­ tect small businessmen from "destructive" competition by regulation and subsidy. Hitler, meanwhile, assured his industrialist backers that good, constructive, Teutonic industrial capital would have its profits and power guaranteed through autarchy and German market monopolies as Germany's armed might increased. This famous and false dis­ tinction between "destructive" and "con­ structive" capitalism, enabled the Nazis to channel the anticapitalism of the lower- middle class into ultranationalism, militar­ ism, and anti-Semitism. Nothing shows Hitler's intellectual and political sensiti­ vity better than this ideological gambit.**

Hitler's genius lay in his ability to unite all the classes threatened "by the steady advance of liberalism, radicalism, and socialism" through the use of a conspiracy theory of history. It was easier for such groups to believe their woes the result of an "international Jewish-Liberal- Bolshevik conspiracy" than to face the fact of their social obsolescence in an era of change. In addition (and here

Weiss cites the work of George L. Mosse^^}, the "intellectual" grounds for the conspiracy theory were well established in the German mind by earlier historians such

^®Ibid., p. 18. 47 George L- Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology* Intellectual Origins of the T^ird Reich (New York* The Universal Library, 1964). 263

as Treitschka and by the overwhelmingly conservative elementary and high school teachers.

In successive chapters Weiss next looks at the seizure of power in Italy and Germany* His goal is to demonstrate his fundamental hypothesis about fascism* "The radical right seems to flourish best where there is a dialectical polarity between the forces of conservatism and those of 48 modernism." Weiss's undocumented account stresses the indispensible role of traditional conservatives in the victories of Mussolini and Hitler. To further demonstrate the validity of his hypothesis, Weiss devotes a chapter to the failure of fascism in Spain, England, and Hungary. These countries and others exemplify two types of immunity against fascism.

England and France both teach us that the disappearance of strong semifeudal groups combined with the more or less thorough liberalisation of social classes and insti­ tutions makes it unlikely that significant numbers will find revolutionary conservatism overwhelmingly appealing even during times of acute social crisis. From Hungary, Spain, and Rumania, on the contrary, one finds that where mobilization has not occur­ red, older conservative elites may be strong enough to rule without the need of fascist totalitarianism, terror, and imperialism.**

48Weiss, The Fascist Tradition, p. 31. **Ibid., pp. 65-66. 264

In his specific discussion of Spain, England, and Hungary,

Weiss argues effectively for his viewpoint; but we cannot reproduce the particulars here. Having dispensed with the problem of fascist acquisi­ tion of power, Weiss moves to discuss "the radical right in power: totalitarianism and social policy in Italy and Germany. " The right is driven to the methods of "revolu­ tionary conservatism" because "... the cautious gradu­ alism of traditional conservative theory is incapable of defending conservatism in swiftly modernizing socie­ ties."^^ There are just too many disaffected groups whose "spontaneous and critical observation of social experience" could create a political consciousness counter to the goals of conservatism. Thus Mussolini invented the first version of the totalitarian state to "control, guide, and give content to the cultural and educational experience" of the Italian people. Overall, fascist policy represents the combination of conservatism and militarism. "In practice, the Fascist corporate state or the Nazi * third way* meant policies of low wages, high profits, autarchy, rearmament, and imperial­ ism."^^ Weiss assigns much importance to the "eradica­ tion" of unemployment, especially in Germany, as a force in

^°Ibid., p. 92. ^^Ibid., p. 101 265

muting any possible working-class rebellion. Those still inclined to fight fascism internally were further discour­ aged through the use of terror. "Fascist states substitute

internal terror for otherwise unavoidable liberal and radical reforms which would damage conservative 52 interests." In return for disciplining the work force the Nazis and Fascists exacted from business the

decision-making and planning function in order that they might better prepare for war. Weiss argues in the following chapter that imperialism was the "unavoidable consequence"

of the fascist regimes' rejection of domestic reforms. Only one possible route remained which might secure for the fascists their "thousand-year Reich"— the subjection of

surrounding nations, the rape of their natural resources, and the enslavement of their workforces. Any other arrange­ ment would have necessitated a major structural transforma­ tion of fascism itself.

In his "concluding speculations," Weiss carries his analysis into the future. He regards fascism in the United

States as an unlikely possibility because of the firm estab­ lishment of a "liberalized consensus" here. Instead he sees the greatest potential for fascism "... in the dialectical polarities even now increasing in non-Western or underdeve­ loped societies,Idi Amin and others seem to have

S^lbid., p. 105. S^lbid., p. 129, 266

borne Weiee out on this point. He states in closing that the study of fascism must have as a major goal the cotribat­ ting of fascism in the world— lest Hitler's wish to "pull

the West down with him in defeat" be ultimately fulfilled.

This call for an engaged history epitomizes Weiss's appeal as a scholar who stands out amongst his mainstream contem­ poraries. While not a dissenter, his approach to fascism certainly draws upon Marxist insights and theoretical prin­ ciples.^* Although he adds nothing particularly inno­ vative to the study of fascism, Weiss provides a valuable beginning point for American students interested in the subject. (The Fascist Tradition was written as part of a Harper and Row series on "major traditions of world civili­ zation" designed for college use.) Host important from our perspective is the fact that Weiss's theoretical perspective is a major break with the American mainstream academic way of interpreting fascism. He draws on a wide variety of secondary sources and argues (especially in his annotated

54 In 1976 this writer attended the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, B.C. In his commentary on three papers alleged to be contributing "toward a definition of fascism, " Weiss at one point, in the midst of defending certain Marxian hypotheses about fascism, felt it necessary to assert that he was not a Marxist. The three papers presented ("Italo Balbot Prom Radical Republi­ can to Princely Dissident," "Guisseppe Bottai and the Fail­ ure of the Fascist Political Class/" and "Italian Industri­ alists and the Threat of Radical-Dissident Fascism") were so specific and biographical as to contribute in no way to generalization in the manner prescribed by Weiss in his book. 267 bibliography) that none of these works is in itself suffi­

ciently broad in scope to comprehend more than a few limited aspects of fascism. He is explicit about the speculative

nature of his own work but is at the same time adamant in his belief that a general, international theory of fascism must be our ultimate goal* Weiss can be credited for hie

early advocacy of this point of view among contemporary American scholars. Another important mainstream contributor to the study of fascism is Henry A. Turner, who wrote an article on "big business and the rise of Hitler" in 1969. "Crucial to the subject of this inquiry is the question of whether the un­ mistakably mounting discontent of big business led it to

support Hitler and his movement during the last phases of 55 the republic." In an obvious attack on Marxist writers. Turner sets out to show that the answer to this question is ("on the whole”) no. Fritz Thyssen and others were the exception rather than the rule, and those who did contribute gave relatively small amounts and spread their money among numerous right-opposition parties. Turner ques­

tions the reliability of sources (in particular Thyssen*s ^ Paid Hitler) which have been cited in the past to show the extent of big business contributions. Turner prefers to

55 Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler," American Historical Review, LXXV (October 1969), 59. 268 accept the testimony of Qoebbels* diary and "other sources" that the Nazis suffered financially until Hitler was appointed Chancellor. Afterward, a great deal of business money was extracted by the party. "These contributions unquestionably aided Hitler significantly. But they aided him in the consolidation of his power, not in its acquisi­ tion."^^ Only small businessmen supported Hitler strongly from the early days.

Therefore, unless one is willing to accept the simplistic cui bono approach, according to which the eventual economic beneficiaries of Hitler's acquisition of power must neces­ sarily have supported him beforehand, or the sophistic distinction between subjective and objective roles in history that is so popu­ lar in Marxist circles, it must be concluded that during its rise to power National Socialism was, in socioeconomic terms, primarily a movement not of winners in the capitalist struggle for survival but of losers and those who feared becoming losers.57

As in the case of other would-be critics of Marxism,

Turner has here set up a "Marxist" theory of fascism in its most "vulgar" possible form and has then proceeded to demolish it. But the question of direct big business finan­ cing of the party, while important, is not the keystone of a sophisticated Marxist interpretation of fascism. Turner seems to be aware of this fact, for on the final two pages

S*ibid., p. 68.

S^Ibid., p. 69. 269 of hi# article he attempts to dismiss a more apt Marxist approach.

It can, of course, be argued that even if the big businessmen did not support Hitler, National Socialism was nevertheless a product of capitalism. Certainly the depri­ vation and anxiety occasioned by the down­ ward turn of the capitalist economic cycle after 1929 heightened the susceptibility of many Germans to the panaceas offered by the Nazis. The country's capitalist economic system also fostered and exacerbated the class animosities that the Nazis exploited and promised to eliminate. It spawned as well the other long-term economic and social problems to which Nazism was in large measure a response, although a response that offered mainly quack remedies and flights from reality rather than real solutions. National Socialism was thus undeniably a child of the capitalist order. Still, cars must be taken not to attach undue signifi­ cance to that fact. Only a few capitalist societies have produced phenomena comparable to Nazism* on the other hand, the latter shares its capitalist parentage with every other political movement that has emerged from modern Europe, including liberal demo­ cracy and Communism.58

Here Turner rightly declares that Marxism (as a general theory of capitalist society) is inadequate to explain fascism, but he fails to take into account the many special­ ized studies of fascism based on the broader Marxian theory. Such an oversight conveniently allows Turner to endorse a blanket dismissal of all Marxist attempts to understand fascism.

**Ibid., pp. 69-70. 270

In 1975 Turner became more blatantly anti-Marxlet in his introduction to a collection of essays "reappraising" fascism. Noting the lack of a Marxist essay in his collec­ tion, Turner asserts that it was for him "... impossible to find even one interpretation from that point of view of a quality comparable to that of the contributions published here. Although he makes a distinction between the work of "orthodox" and "non-orthodox" Marxists and sees "hope" in the "relaxation of ideological controls" on the orthodox scholars. Turner finds the writings of both groups to " . . . suffer . . . from over-reliance on questionable, if not fraudulent scholarship, and from egregious misrepre­ sentation of factual information. Until the Marxists "... acquaint themselves with the most recent findings of empirical scholarship and develop more scrupulous habits in their use of factual data, they cannot expect their position to receive a full hearing in the forum of international scholarship. We are directed in a footnote to works by Nicos Poulantzas, Ernest Mande1, Reinhard KUhnl, and Manfred Clemenz as examples of sloppy Marxist scholarship. It is our fortune to have been provided in this volume with an article on "fascism and modernization" by Turner to

^^Turner, "Preface" to Turner, ed., Reappraisals of Fascism (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), p. x.

^^Ibid., p. xi. G^Ibid. 271 which we may now turn for a more sophisticated analysis. Turner believes that a new frame of reference may be needed to replace earlier, inadequate concepts and categories.

Such a frame of reference may possibly be provided by the theory of modernisation, which, in general outlines at least, has gained wide acceptance among social scien­ tists. According to this theory, the one underlying development of recent history is the displacement of traditional societies by an unprecedentedly thorough and rapid process of change, basically similar every­ where, involving industrialisation, urbani­ sation, secularisation and rationalisa­ tion. 62

Turner proposes to apply this theory to fascism in an explo­ ratory way that might be suggestive for more detailed later efforts. Looking at Germany and Italy, he finds in the ideologies of both National Socialism and (to a lesser extent) Fascism a central core of "utopian anti-modernism." Had the outcome of World War II been reversed. Turner specu­ lates, the victorious fascists would have moved to reorgan­ ize society according to some pre-industrial model.

Perhaps sensing the weaknesses of this "theory," Turner qualifies his argument in several ways in a concluding section. First, if further research would demonstrate Italian Fascism "to have been predominantly pro-modernist," then the generic category of "fascism" might have to be

62 Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in Re­ appraisals of Fascism, pp. 117-18. 272 considered groundless (at least in relationship to moderni­ zation) . Second, the generic concept of fascism is further challenged by " . , , the frequency with which writers who begin by assuming they are dealing with a unitary phenomenon end up with several more-or-less discrete subcatego­ ries, Third, the concept's origins are suspect.

"It was coined not in the serenity of the scholar's study but in the heat of political battle."^* And, what is worse, its "principal authors" were Marxists. Scholars then

"uncritically adopted" the concept after it had been "hardened into print by the mass media." Perhaps, concludes

Turner, the concept of fascism should be abandoned altoge­ ther in favor of some more "meaningful" way of classifying the regimes heretofore labeled fascist*

One possibly illuminating criterion, though by no means the only one, is the relation­ ship of these putative fascisms to the process of modernization. For if the essence of what has hitherto been described as fascism should be found to lie in the extreme revolt against the modern industrial world and an attempt to recapture a distant, mythic past, it should be kept in mind that there is no guarantee that such movements may not rise again. It would be indeed unfortunate if, in our vigilance against a rebirth of the familiar forms of what has been thought of as fascism, we should be led to overlook the emergence of new varieties

G^Ibid., p. 132. **Ibid., p. 133. 273

of utopian anti-modernism quite different in appearance from earlier o n e s . 65

These final sentences save an otherwise expendable article from being entirely useless. Turner points to the real danger of becoming ahistorical in our thinking about fascism. As this dissertation asserts, fascism is best treated as a European phenomenon of which only Italy and Germany are full-fledged examples. We shall have more to say later about how more recent or even future reactionary regimes should be labeled, but we feel certain that "utopian anti-modernism" is not the answer. In his haste to elimi­ nate all Marxian influences from his interpretation of fascism, Turner treats a single aspect of fascist ideology as the essence of fascism— this in spite of the fact that neither Germany nor Italy even began implementation of the anti-modern principles they espoused. On the contrary, as Schoenbaum demonstrated for Germany, modernization was actually enhanced by the Nazis. Fascism has in fact been interpreted by others as a way of accelerating industriali­ zation in countries shut off by one means or another from the standard methods. But the deeper problem with the use of modernization "theory" to categorize fascism is that the concept of modernization defines away any need to consider the economic and social structures of developing countries.

®®Ibid., pp. 133-34. 274

these structures might prove to be a far better guide to the categorisation of societies as capitalist, communist, fascist, etc. "Modernisation" serves for some historians the same function that "totalitarianism" serves for some political scientists— -it deprives fascism of its historical importance by subsuming it under a broader category. In doing so it has the same obfuscating effect on our ability to foresee future fascisms that Turner earlier decried in historians' hypostatisation of "fascism" based on the Italian and German versions.

We may summarise Turner's contribution to the analysis of fascism as miniscule and muddled. His obsession with anti-Marxism leads him to take some ill-considered positions and then defend them weakly. In his first article he is concerned with the overly specific question of funding, and in his second he moves toward a general "theory" of moderni­ zation which lessens the significance of that particular social form known as fascism. His scope of analysis thus proceeds from an initial extreme narrowness to a final excessive generality. His methods range from pure documen­ tary research to pure speculation. He makes his strongest contribution in the first article's calling into question of some of the data sources on Hitler's funding which had been used uncritically in the past, but his research conclusions

(about the value of the Marxian perspective) far exceed the 275

limits of his findings. The conclusions presented in the second article are virtually useless.

Another contributor to Turner's collection of "reap­ praisals" of fascism is William Sheridan Allen, who attempts to relate fascism to "the problem of national disintegra­ tion." Allen begins his line of reasoning with the French Revolution, which spawned the concept of "pluralistic inte­ gration." This refers to " . . . the quest for national unity via a political market in which the separate interests of various elements are presumably reconciled, usually in a parliament . . . . " Pluralistic integration was justified by Liberal theory but was needed for practical purposes of power— modern mass armies require an integrated, patriotic, involved population as a recruiting base. In

Britain and France this integration developed slowly over time, with individual citizens acquiring such rights as equal justice, suffrage, and economic freedom. In most of the remainder of Europe, the dominant elites sought to build national integration after the Anglo-French model, but with­ out evolving the concomitant rights of citizenship.

World War I was the final proof that national integra­ tion is the modern key to military success, as demonstrated

William Sheridan Allen, "The Appeal of Fascism and the Problem of National Disintegration, " in Turner. Reappraisals of Fascism, p. 46. 276 by the victory of the Western democracies. But World War I also spawned "new options for integration":

On the one hand the extravagant attrition of technological warfare demanded mass armies of total commitment, plus an all-embracing mobilization of the home front. On the other hand the war introduced to each coun­ try new methods for achieving this. Autho­ ritarian direction, though mainly based on common consent, replaced political brokerage even in internal affairs. When extended into the economic sphere, such methods blasted the whole liberal assumption about the efficiency of free roarkets— economic or political. And when censorship and propa­ ganda were added, the lesson became clear: involvement need not be spontaneous* it could now be manipulated from a b o v e . 6'

The war produced intense feelings of national solidarity in all countries; but in Italy and Germany and other previously "unintegrated" countries, such nationalism was purely emotional rather than founded on political consensus. After the war, the legacy of Germany's defeat and Italy's "muti­ lated victory," coupled with economic and political crises in both countries, led segments of the two populations to seek a "new integrative system." Mussolini and Hitler answered the call. "They proposed to exalt national power by building a dictatorially integrated national community on the model of methods and moods familiar from World War .68 I.

*?Ibid., p. 48.

**Ibid., p. 51. 277

Allen further refines his thesis by arguing that the real content of failed integration is seen in the formation of distinct sub-communities within the nation which command more loyalty than the nation as a whole. This situation demands that one particular sub-community, the fascist party, achieves the power to enforce integration upon the remaining sub-communities. This can only be accomplished in a climate of international con^etition amongst states which allows the fascists to employ the all-important tool of xenophobic propaganda. Thus "sub-community chauvinism" and inter-state rivalry are two necessary conditions for fascism, according to Allen.

On the surface, Allen's article appears to take the kind of broad approach to fascism that this dissertation esteems. The author uses an international conceptualization and attempts to explain the rise of fascism in socio­ economic terms. The problem, however, is that the causal focus is limited to only two variables— pluralistic integra­ tion and international competition. Both of these are largely expressions of the political realm of reality and presuppose a number of more fundamental economic and social factors which are merely mentioned in passing. As the author himself demonstrated, the cases of Spain and the Netherlands, both highly unintegrated and both in the same European environment, indicate that the variables under consideration are not sufficient predictors of fascism. 278

Allen's scheme is just too simplistic to be useful. Thus an

apparently broad scope of analysis is shown upon closer inspection to be rather narrow. The otherwise laudable use of a comparative method is rendered impotent because the wrong things are conqpared. The author does not employ any data in this impressionistic study, perhaps because his conceptualization of integration is lacking in the specifi­ city which would make the use of data possible. Finally, due to the aforegoing flaws, the conclusions have little more utility than to serve as suggestions for some more

solid research projects. Charles F. Delzell of Vanderbilt University, a special­ ist in Italian history, edited in 1970 a book of documents relating to "Mediterranean fascism. " His introductory comments to this volume contain some worthwhile thoughts on fascism in general, which he calls a "radicalism of the

right." More specifically, fascism was "... a militantly ultranationalist ideology that emerged as a reaction to the threat (real or Imagined) of Communism, the frustrations of

the war and peace settlement, the economic dislocation, and the political breakdown of liberal parliamentary govern­ ment."^^ Fascism is distinguished from "old-style royalist or military regimes" by a number of characteris­ tics. Of these, Delzell places particular emphasis on the

Charles P. Delzell, Mediterranean Fascism, 1919- 1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. *i. 279 ones relating to fascism* s roots in the conditions of modern mass society: the fascists' success depended upon the mobilization of a mass movement, the formulation of a "post­ liberal" ideology, and the exploitation of a fear of "left- wing revolution." Delzell restricts himself to a considera­ tion of fascism in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, stressing that of these only Italy developed a full-fledged version. He offers the interesting argument that Italy is "the country par excellence of authentic fascism." By contrast. Hitler's Germany is seen as a brutal aberration. "In none of the Mediterranean countries did fascism become 'totali­ tarian, ' despite the fact that Mussolini coined the term.But, as Delzell admits, the strength of the Church, the House of Savoy, and other traditional elements may have tempered Mussolini's totalitarian aspirations. Delzell outlines "three more or less 'standard* interpreta­ tions of fascism" which have been dominant among intellec­ tuals:

(1) the rather dogmatic assertion of Communist spokesmen in the 1920s and early 1930s that fascism was the inevitable and final stage of a dying capitalism; (2) the contention of liberal-conservatives (e.g., Benedetto Croce and Friedrich Meinecke) that fascism was a moral sickness that suddenly afflicted an essentially healthy body politic and, once cured, would not likely

^^Ibid., p. xvii 280

recur; and (3) the democratic-radical thesis (set forth by Luigi Salvatorelli, Angelo Tasca, and others) that fascism should be considered as one of several possible forms of political and social organisation that may emerge in modern mass society at a certain stage in its development and under certain crisis conditions.71

Of these he finds the "democratic-radical" thesis most compelling, but he is "unwilling to restrict himself to any single-track approach" to fascism. And, of course, his book is not concerned with interpreting fascism, but only with representing it through documents. Delzell has not since written anything to indicate that he is truly interested in a general theory of fascism. While it is encouraging to see in an American the awareness of fascism as an international problem, it is unfortunate that this awareness is not translated into a theoretical contribution. 72 Delzell seems content to leave this job to others. It is in fact atypical of mainstream historians to have discussed at all the international aspects of fascism; we should therefore at least give Delzell credit for a "higher consciousness."

^^Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii. 72 Another American historian, Edward R. Tannenbaum, begins his book on The Fascist Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1972) in much the same way as Delzell, with a discus­ sion of general theoretical issues. His study, however, is purely descriptive, attempting to "describe and explain what life was like in certain respects under Fascist rule." It is an excellent introduction to Italian Fascism, but is not the type of study we are interested in. 281

The point cannot be too often reiterated in this dis­ sertation that many American scholars have made contribu­ tions to the study of fascism in general and of particular regimes, in specialized, non-analytical books and articles. The aforementioned William Sheridan Allen, for example, has shown in The Nazi Seizure of Power how effectively Hitler's party organized at the local level for the eventual victory. Allen studied one German city ("Thalburg") through documents and interviews and concluded that:

Thalburg's Nazis created their own image by their own initiative, vigor, and propaganda. They knew exactly what needed to be done to effect the transfer of power to themselves in the spring of 1933, and they did it ap­ parently without more than generalized directions from above.'3

In so demonstrating, Allen points to a usually ignored as­ pect of fascism which is nonetheless of significant impor­ tance. Another example of a useful empirical study is Max Kele's Nazis and Workers, in which the author attempts to assess the Nazi success in attracting labor support.^*

But perhaps the most significant work of this type, from our point of view, is that of Stanley Payne on Spain. As interest in a general theory of fascism has been rekindled,

^^William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), p. 274. ^*Max H. Kele, Nazis and Workers; National Social­ ist Appeals to German Labor, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972). 282

Payne has attempted to Integrate hie earlier studies of the Falange into a more general perspective. He points to some compelling similarities between the experiences of Spain and

Italy, but in the final analysis he concludes that the label "Spanish fascism" can only be legitimately applied "... to the Falange, and more precisely to the Falangist movement in its historical and ideological heyday, from 1931 to 1937, and more tenuously to 1 9 4 2 . Facism failed to trans­ cend the movement stage in any Western European country. To recapitulate, our mainstream historians have per­ formed slightly better than we expected. Weiss's work is quite successful, given its textbook aspirations. Schoen­ baum disappoints us only when he abandons his research in favor of unsubstantiated and extraneous conclusions. Deutsch fails, but at least he does it in an unusual way by imitating a Communist interpretation. Allen finds a unique perspective but then fails to place it in a broader context. Only Turner's failure approaches absoluteness, largely due to his ideological blinders. The more serious level of mainstream historians' failure lies in the fact that so few have come close to seeing fascism as a general problem— even with the renewed interest in generalization within the discipline.

Stanley 0. Payne, "Fascism in Western Europe," in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism: A Reader's Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1976), p « 304 * 283

C. Dissenter# As in the cases of psychology and political science, it has been impossible to locate a single major work on fascism by a native-born American historian clearly outside the scholarly mainstream. The small but growing group of

"left-wing" historians has been dominated by European-born scholars to such a degree that the Americans in this group may not feel competent to challenge the emigres * views of fascism. Let us now see what the tfmlgrrfs have produced.

D. The Immigrants European-born historians were early contributors to the debate on fascism in this country. We shall omit the impressionistic articles of Russian-born Max Lerner and the

Czech Hans Kohn in the book edited by Guy Stanton Pord.^* We begin instead with Gaetano Salvemini's The Origins of Fascism in Italy. Salvemini, a socialist and active anti-fascist, escaped Italy in 1925. Prom 1934 to 1948 he taught at Harvard, after which he returned to Italy. Although written in 1942, Origins was not published in Salvemini*s lifetime. Yet this book was Salvemini's most analytical work, the culmination of his thinking about

Max Lerner, "The Pattern of Dictatorship, " and Hans Kohn, "Communist and Fascist Dictatorship: A Compara­ tive Study," in Ford, Dictatorship, pp. 1-23, 143-60. 284

Fascism. Roberto Vivarelli, who edited and published an Italian version in 1961 and an English translation in 1973, speculates that Salvemini*s great concern for the future of Italy after Mussolini consumed all the energies which might have been directed to readying this and other manuscripts

for publication. Salvemini begins with a historical survey from 1871 to 1919. He outlines the economic difficulties brought on by the war, but he stresses that these were no greater than those of most other European nations. On top of the econo­ mic problems, however, Salvemini finds the key to Italy's national crisis in the psychological blow suffered under the post-war treaty settlement. Italy had been promised in the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) a long list of territorial acquisitions in return for entering the war. Fewer than half of these were actually awarded at Versailles, owing at least in part to Italian diplomatic blunders. The Italian intelligentsia, still yearning for a restoration of Roman imperial grandeur, was outraged; and this group made its feelings known. Thus Salvemini concludes:

Whoever wishes to understand the unrest of the postwar years in Italy must keep in mind not only the physical exhaustion pro­ duced by three and one-half years of suffer­ ing, but also and above all the poisonous defeatist propaganda to which the Italian people were subjected in 1919. The history of Italy and of its social unrest and poli­ tical disturbances in the postwar period appears in its true light only when it is 285

set against the psychological background of "mutilated victory."?'

Salvemini's argument is further strengthened by his demonstration of an Italian economic recovery from 1919 to 1922. A variety of indicators and observers are cited to show that Italy was well on the way toward economic restabi­ lisation. Moreover, he argues, the real losses at Versailles were inconsequential.

It is true that at the peace conference the Italian delegates piled blunder upon blunder. But, after all, neither their blunders nor the bad faith of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, nor the lack of understand­ ing on Wilson's part, actually inflicted any mortal wound upon the essential interests of the Italian nation.?*

Salvemini examines each "lost" territory and finds little or no subsequent adverse effect on Italy. On the contrary,

Italy's position in Europe was one of great economic and military security. Why, then, did Italy opt for fascism? Salvemini dismisses all explanations which conjure up a national "character" or "instinct." "Any lasy mind, as soon as there is somewhere a hole in our knowledge of causes, can

7T Gaetano Salvemini, The Origins of Fascism in Italy, ed. Roberto Vivarelli (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 19731, pp. 25-26. ^®Ibld., p. 38. 286

7 0 stop that hols by one of these words." - What is required presents a more difficult intellectual challengei

If one wants to understand why democratic institutions collapsed in Italy or in France and are in jeopardy everywhere, one has to set aside a priori schemes and empty slogans and must ascertain why and how the Fascist movement arose in a given country, what social groups contributed to it, why and how the struggle between Fascists and anti- Fascists developed, and why and how the Fascists overcame their f o e s . *8

Beginning with "the political setup in 1914," Salvemini outlines the relationships within and between the various parties. Power lay in a coalition of "reformist” socialists and bourgeois "liberal" parties led by Giovanni Qiolitti. Mussolini began his road to power as an anti-war, "left" socialist party leader and newspaper editor. As World War I developed, he gradually shifted to an interventionist stance— a transformation which soon led to his expulsion by

the revolutionary socialists. Mussolini soon founded (probably with French funds) a new interventionist newspaper which played a central role in turning the minority inter­ ventionist view into the policy of the nation. When the war lasted much longer than had been foreseen, and the promised spoils were not delivered to Italy, the Italian masses were, Salvemini believes, overwhelmingly in favor of progressive

^*Ibid., p. 68 ®®Ibid, 287

social and economic reforms and against the center and right forces which had been aligned with interventionism. But no leftist party seised the opportunity. And vrtiile the left was napping, Mussolini was busy forming the first "fighting fascio" in Milan in early 1919. He found a ready base for recruitment.

The process of demobilization was throwing into the labor market some 160,000 dis­ charged officers. The better elements among these went quietly back to their homes and sought work like the anonymous masses of demobilized workmen and peasants. But for some of them it was not easy to find a live­ lihood. They originated from the semi­ intellectual and lower middle classes. Before the war they had been clerks, profes­ sional men in a small way, or petty shop­ keepers, and had risen to the rank of offi­ cers during the war, or they had been called to the colors at an age of nineteen or twenty and had learned no craft but that of commanding men. They had grown accustomed to having a fair amount of money to spend and had acquired a taste for command and for a life of adventure. If they had not found other men to regiment, they would have been obliged to come back to low clerical jobs or to manual labor. Of that they had not the slightest intention.81

As Mussolini's movement grew, the best hope of defeat­ ing it lay with the socialists. But the socialists (and other leftist groups) were severely split over the choice between revolution and reform. "Each revolutionist hated

®^Ibid., p. 128. 288

his revolutionary neighbors more than he hated 'capital- 82 ism.'" The result was a grossly ineffective series of small, uncoordinated revolts.

There was never any agreement among the different revolutionary groups for any com­ mon action. Strikes or riots never develop­ ed according to any well-knit plan. A strike declared by one group often was not supported by other groups. When a strike on a considerable scale broke out in some private industry, or when political riots spread over any large part of the country, the public services did not strike. When a great public service went out on strike, the private industries remained quiet. The postal employees* strike ceased when the railwaymen's began. The towns struck while the country remained quiet. Strikes spread in the country when towns were free of them. Southern Italy had few large-scale strikes, while in northern and central Italy they were a daily occurrence. Everyone talked about impending revolution. No one tried seriously to bring it about. Mussolini had good grounds, therefore, when he scorned the would-be revolutionaries as being buonl a nulla, ineffectual t a l k e r s . * 5

In April of 1919 several "general strikes" proved failures in Rome and Milan. Their most significant effect was to galvanize the forces of the right to even bolder acts of resistance against the left— counter-demonstrations, propa­ ganda, and, perhaps most significantly, the burning of the offices of Avanti, the socialist newspaper. At the same

®^Ibid., p. 170. ®^Ibid., pp. 170-71. 289

time a resentment was growing In the normally tolerant white-collar sectors of Italian society.

The working classes, by means of strikes, succeeded in obtaining wage increases to meet the rising cost of living. But the teachers in elementary and secondary schools and in universities, the judges, the police­ men, and all other civil and military offi­ cials who had to live on fixed incomes had no means of reestablishing the balance between revenue and expenditure. If they had gone out on strike, nobody would have been afraid of them.84

The workers and their political organizations thus became

increasingly isolated. And Salvemini seems to believe that the most significant aspect of this isolation was the dif­

ferential treatment accorded the leftists and rightists in the streets. The police nearly always allowed the various

right-wing groups a free hand, while left-wing demonstra­ tions were brutally broken up at the slightest provocation. In this and other ways the supposedly neutral state gave

succor to the forces of reaction. Salvemini narrates in great detail the events which culminated in the collapse of the republic. Strikes increased but never precipitated a major economic crisis.

Meanwhile, spokesmen for the right succeeded in painting

such actions as manifestations of "bolshevism," thus creat­ ing a focal point for the frustrations of industrialists.

®*Ibld., pp. 181-82. 290 landowners, shopkeepers, tradesmen, public servants, etc. One final "revolutionary scare" was needed to set the "anti- bolshevist reaction" into motion. Salvemini identifies this as the factory occupations of September 1920, in which about one-half million workers took part. But this was not in reality a serious threat to those in power.

As a matter of fact, the workers, in shut­ ting themselves up in the factories, had walked into a trap. Had they really been revolutionaries, they would have seized not the workshops, but the government offices, the telegraph and telephone services, and the railroads. As long as they remained in the factories, the government could afford to sit still and wait until they got tired.*5

The socialists and communists failed to give direction to the strikers or to make the strike part of a larger offen­ sive. After about three weeks the workers, having failed in their attempt to operate some of the factories themselves, returned control to their employers. The workers received in exchange a few token concessions. In the aftermath of the workers' failure, Mussolini made his move:

As long as social revolution had seemed possible, he had attacked from the left the Socialists and Communists, charging them with being inefficient revolutionaries. When social revolution proved to be in^os- sible, he began to attack the Socialists

®®Ibid,, p. 270. 291

and Communist# from the right, charging them with being responsible for strikes and political disorder. He scented the new direction of the wind and adapted his tactics to the changed situation. Now that Mussolini's "revolution" was openly directed, not against capitalist society, but against the Socialist movement, the Italian industrialists and big landowners generalized the method of subsidies.**

In the spring of 1921 a new campaign of terror against "bol- shevists" was launched by the Fascists all over Italy. Financed by industrialists and landowners, armed by the military, and abetted by the police and juciciary, the

Fascists grew quickly into an overwhelming force. Workers' organizations often responded with violence, which provided an excuse for even greater savagery from the Fascists. Salvemini estimtes about 300 Fascists were killed in 1921 and 1922, but that the Fascists' victims numbered about 3000. Concurrent with the violence, however, an even more important development was unfolding. Mussolini, sensing that his movement was in itself going nowhere and that it was being infiltrated by traditional conservatives, began to consolidate the heretofore predominantly local Fascist groups into a unified political organization. By late 1922 he had control of a national party which combined the early, lower middle-class Fascists ("old revolutionists,"

®^Ibid., p. 292 292

«x-BOldiecs, and "young men of the intellectual claeeee") with "... a new social element, the officers of the regular army and the agents of the industrialists and the landowners.

The Fascist movement was no longer merely a patriotic reaction, more or less convulsed, against the political action of the Social­ ists and Communists i It became the instru­ ment of a methodical capitalistic reaction, which aimed at demolishing all the economic institutions which the Italian working classes had built up for their defense and betterment during the half-century of the free regime.*®

It is interesting to note that immediately following this strong statement Salvemini adds a disclaimer to differenti­ ate himself from "the Marxists." The Fascists and anti- Fascists both, he insists, draw members from all social classes. "Political history is made not by social classes, but by political parties, which consist of men who come from different social strata but are knit together by a common QQ aim* the conquest of political power." Even when a party purports to represent the interests of one class, it remains separate from the class itself. With this in mind, Salvemini succinctly recapitulates his thoughts on the origins of Fascism*

°?Ibid., p. 338, ®*Ibid. **Ibid. 293

No doubt capitalists were to be found in the Fascist movement. If capitalists had not supported the movement with their money, the movement would have exhausted itself in inefficient clamors. On the other hand, if they had been left to themselves, the Fas­ cists and the capitalists might at most have created a new political party— one among many others, and their rapid overwhelming victory would remain a miracle, an unfathom­ able systery. This victory is to bo ex­ plained by the fact that the army chiefs equipped the movement with weapons and leadership, and a section of the Italian public officials— the police and the judici­ ary— gave it the privilege of immunity. Big business— or, as the Marxists call it, "capitalism"— occupied, and still occupies, a prominent place in the Fascist structure. But if one ignores the other factors of that structure: the middle and lower middle class elements who provided the rank and file, the army chiefs, the Nationalist lead­ ers, the police, and the judges, one is unable to understand the working of the whole system.90

Thus Salvemini's characterization of the social composition of the Italian Fascist movement is almost identical with Neumann's portrait of the Nazis, oddly enough, however, Salvemini makes no reference to Neumann's work; and neither does Neumann ever refer to Salvemini*s earlier works. The Origins of Fascism in Italy concludes with a detailed account of the "march on Rome," in which particular emphasis is placed on the complicity of the police and armed forces. This is followed by a discussion of the murder of Hatteotti, after which Mussolini was able to irrevocably

®®Ibid. 294 consolidate his power in the wake of the general failure of democratic forces to make Mussolini pay for this crime. Salvemini concludes with a brief critique of the Fascist 91 governmental structure and institutions. Although Origins remains one of the finest available works on Fascism, there are some weaknesses. First, many of the factual statements are not sufficiently documented. One reason for this is that Salvemini writes of many events from personal experience. He is also hindered in the area of documentation because of his exile from Italy. A second weakness lies in Salvemini's failure to draw comparisons between the Italian and German varieties of fascism, thus neglecting the international dimension. Third, Salvemini's polemicism, although often pungently insightful, raises questions about the author's biases. And finally, Salvemini is too much a political historian, not paying enough atten­ tion to the links between the political and the socio­ economic. Thus the scope of analysis of Origins is narrower than would be expected given our hypotheses. The method, too, is rather limited, in that it is basically traditional historical narration. Therefore Salvemini*s conclusions are strictly descriptive and provide little insight into the

The brevity of this section is probably due to the extensive critique of the structure of Fascism contained in an earlier book. Under the Axe of Fascism (New York* The Viking Press, 1936), in which Salvemini devotes special attention to debunking the anti-capitalist pretensions of Mussolini and his followers. 295

future of the regime. Overall, Origin# approaches excel­ lence as historical narrative; but it is not in itself a contribution to the task of developing a general theory of

fascism. Two dmigrf historians, Hans Kohn and Koppel Pinson, should be mentioned here briefly, although they did not develop full-fledged analyses of fascism. Both attempted to place National Socialism into the broader context of German history. Pinson sees Hitler's success as due to " . . . the

fatal weakness in Germany of all the trends that made for progress in the countries of the West— liberalism, democra- 92 cy, popular rights, and so on." When the economic collapse came, and when the social democrats failed to use their leadership potential. Hitler's victory became a possi­

bility. Yet in referring to the years of Nazi rule as

"Germany gone berserk," Pinson refuses to place Nazism truly inside the stream of German history. "The phenomenon of 93 Hitler is one that defies all rational analysis."

Pinson then falls back on Rauschning"s "nihilistic destruc- tionism" thesis to "explain" how Nazism could have happened, Hans Kohn is more successful at adhering to a rational explanation. His is largely a study in intellectual his­ tory, and causal primacy is thus assigned to ideas;

92 Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany (New York; The Macmillan Con^any, 1954), p. 11. *3lbid., p. 481. 296

Hitler's claim to represent the true interests of the German people could find credence because he appealed to sentiments deeply rooted both in the educated classes and in the people. His was not the only country in which such sentiments existed, but in Germany they were not held in check by the liberal-humanitarian considerations Western Europe inherited from the Enlighten­ ment. Hitler was especially successful in appealing to what the Germans regarded as deep and idealistic in their past and their minds. He knew that the best way to lead Germans was by invoking a metaphysical sys­ tem that would confer on their political actions and on their national desires the consecration of history and divine guid­ ance.**

The examples of Pinson and Kohn demonstrate the difficulty of trying to fit an analysis of fascism into a more general historical work. Both authors would have done better to simply remain at the descriptive level rather than indulge in causal speculations. It is unfortunate that no histori­ ans writing in America in the post-war period and through the 1950s seem to have come any closer than Pinson and Kohn to producing solid analytical accounts of fascism.

The rebirth of American historical scholarship on fascism began in 1964 with a contribution from Eugen Weber, who was born in Rumania in 1925 and is now professor of history at UCLA. Weber combines an analytical discussion with a selection of fascist documents. Writing at a time

**Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (New York: Harper and Row, 19601, p. 9 297 when academic interest in fascism was finally being renewed,

Weber felt a need to provide guidance to those whom he hoped would continue in this line of investigation.

Fascism and National Socialism have to be analyzed and defined so as to establish in what they are alike and in what they differ, to discover what makes them start and what makes them tick, to understand to whom they appeal, why, and by what means.®’

A key element in fascism is "antiliberalism," that is, opposition to laissez-faire economics and competitive indi­ vidualism. This first arose out of the resentments of the growing class of wage-earners created by industrialization, but it soon appeared among middle-class elements who were threatened by big business and big labor. Antiliberalism was embodied in a variety of collectivist movements. A second element of fascism is nationalism. Modern national­ istic doctrines originated in Jacobin thought, which stressed that the nation is the common property of its citizens and represents the highest good. The Interests of the nation must therefore have priority over individual interests. As modern national economies developed, nationalism was a progressive forcer but as a world economy began emerging, nationalism tended to retard its develop­ ment. In the late nineteenth century the advocates of

95 Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1964), p. 9. 296

socialism were the chief spokespersons for internationalism, whereas the formerly revolutionary middle classes now clung to nationalism as a defensive ideology of the status quo. But soon there arose what Weber calls a "conjunction of right and left," in the form of radical nationalism.

Men like Maurice Barrés in France des­ cribed themselves as National Socialists. They realized that national unity implied social justice, that national power implied the planned use of national resources, that national harmony might mean the equalization or the redistribution of wealth and oppor­ tunity and economic power. Being doctin- aire, they were willing to be ruthless. Being intellectuals, they did not feel the need to maintain the established order at all costs.®*

Benito Mussolini was the first to translate radical collectivism into reality in the form of Fascism, in a brief discussion Weber emphasizes the opportunism of Mussolini and the essentially negative character of the movement:

Mussolini's movement and Mussolini's order . . . appear as the prototype of modern Fascism, which is in effect an oppor­ tunistic activism inspired by dissatisfac­ tion with the existing order, but unwilling or unable to proclaim a precise doctrine of its own and emphasizing rather the idea of change, as such, and the seizure of power.97

**Ibid., p. 25. *?Ibid., p. 28. 299

Weber explores the "dynamics of Fascism" largely by examin­ ing some aspects of fascist ideology. His main focus is on the various irrational appeals of such movements. Weber discusses in a rather sketchy and unorganized manner the topics of violence, the cult of the leader, totalitarianism, romanticism, "elitist democracy," and the organic society.

Weber proceeds to a discussion of socialism versus national socialism. He begins by rejecting the Marxist interpretations of fascism put forward by John Strachey and

R. Palme Dutt. While Strachey and Dutt both emphasized that fascism is a repressive system for the maintenance of capitalism, Weber accuses "Communism" (i.e., the Soviet Union) of serving the same purpose— except for the fact that "Communism" is more a state capitalism as opposed to fascism's state control of capitalism. For Weber the two major differences are the fascist characteristics of nation­ alism and class collaboration, but he sees in modern social­ ist and social-democratic states an attempt to develop both these elements as well. Thus Weber arrives at a position in which there are not necessarily any differences between fascism and socialism. His discussion of the treatment of property is a good example:

Socialists held, and non-Socialists seem to have shared this particular impression, that property was the touchstone of Socialism; and all the theorists of Fascism and Nation­ al Socialism declared that private property would be respected. They added, however, that property of social significance must 300

conform to the nation*a needs and that it would be controlled and directed to this purpose by the state.**

But Weber fails to discuss the distribution of property and profits amongst the people, a question on which fascism and socialism differ greatly. Weber also blurs the distinction between private, individual possessions and private property in the means of production, as we see in his allegation that modern proletarians are becoming more conservative*

While many small producers and businessmen are eliminated by modern economic develop­ ments, others find in them the reason for their being. And the factory worker with a house, garden, and car— or the possibility of acquiring them— is as much of a petty bourgeois as Mr. Kipps.*9

Weber does briefly address the problem of the social compo­ sition or recruiting base of fascist groups, which he locates in the social strata not addressed by established parties.

The petty bourgeoisie of labor, the declining middle classes, the rural small­ holders, the agricultural laborers, were all largely ignored by conventional parties and doctrines. Neither liberalism nor conserva­ tism, neither social-democracy nor

*®Ibid., p. 49.

**Ibid., p. 58. 301

traditionalist reaction, responded to the issues and needs of these sections of the public.100

Here, again, the opportunistic nature of fascist movements is underscored. Weber's next topic is "the red herring of racialism." His basic point is that racism is not a necessary part of

fascism but happened to be a conveniently available means for promoting national unity.

It appears, above all, as the classic red herring which— with the suggestion of ob­ scure malevolent intrigues on the part of powerful and hidden plotters— can turn from its course a social analysis that threatens to pierce through the nonsense curtain of press and pretense.1*1

Fund-raising is thus made more practicable among economical* ly powerful groups who might otherwise be the object of fascist propaganda attacks. It seems, then, that although racism is not absolutely necessary to fascism, it or some other form of scapegoating is an almost indispensible part of any strategy which aims at pulling together the various constituencies required for a fascist victory. Concluding his general remarks, Weber goes on to discuss fascism or fascist movements as they appeared in

l°°Ibid., p. 59. lO^Ibid,, pp. 66-67. 302 eight countriest Italy, Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, and France. These sections are impressionistic outlines, serving only as limited introduc­ tions to the events in each country. Finally, in a four- page conclusion, Weber opines that; "Twentieth-century

Fascism is a by-product of disintegrating liberal democra­ cy. "1*^ Out of the resulting hopelessness and "dis­ gust" comes the "revolutionary" fascist movement aimed toward "catastrophic action" intended to resolve the crisis, Weber's central claim is that fascism is not a form of reaction. Even though both exalt violence, reactionaries "want settled order and security" while fascists "want to destroy the settled order.And unless the reac­ tionaries are defeated or otherwise eliminated as a foe, a fascist party cannot achieve power.

Fascist and National Socialist movements were fated to remain minoritarian and (while their doctrine often incorporated measures we should call progressive) to win only by violence or to disappear. Alternately, a Fascist movement whose revolutionary and "social" character made it popular enough to attain power by legal means might be sup­ pressed, as in Romania, by conservative forces, suspected and kept at arm's length as in Hungary, or used and then crushed as in Spain. In any case, the identification

102 Ibid., p. 139. Ibid., p. 140. Exactly what social classes are most likely to be "reactionary" or fascist, a potentially enlightening point, is not discussed by Weber. 303

between Faeclsm and reaction is widely off the mark.1**

Almost as an afterthought Weber notes a basic difference between Fascism and National Socialism, the former being "pragmatically activist" and the latter more "theoretically motivated."

Both aim to conquer power and that center of power which is the modern state. But in one case the power will be wielded pragmatically and piecemeal, simply for its own sake, while the party which has been its instru­ ment may gradually be abandoned. In the other, power will be used to realize an an­ terior plan or a series of plans inspired by the original doctrine; and then the party may become a Church— a Church and a dynamo.1*®

The point of all this is not made clear. Is National Socialism not a form of fascism? Or is it fascism in an extreme form? Appending this comparison to the conclusion detracts from an already less than satisfying "analysis" of fascism.

104 Ibid., p. 141. Weber further develops the idea of the misidentification of fascism and reaction in an article, "Revolution? Counterrevolution" What Revolution?" in Walter Laqueur, ed.. Fascism: A Reader's Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1976). Raising legitimate questions about the meaning of "revolu­ tion” in scholarly debate, Weber then suggests that fascism and communism are really rival revolutions, both of which can become an "accelerator of evolution towards develop­ ment." (p. 457)

^^^Ibid., p. 143. 304

Weber's book la too schematic to be of much use to a contemporary student of fascism. Although he begins with a

promising general, international scope of analysis, Weber spends more energy highlighting the differences between

various movements and regimes than bringing to light their similarities. His comparative approach also suffers from the underdevelopment of a comparative framework or standard by which to judge the experiences of different countries. The reader is left to do all the work. But the reader is further hampered by Weber's eschewal of footnotes and his very subjective and often unclear verbiage. He depends heavily upon the published pronouncements of fascist leaders; therefore his text does not take us much beyond the readings which make up the final section of the book. Finally, Weber's most significant conclusion is that more research is needed. Nowhere does he even attempt a general definition of fascism based on his investigation. At least in terms of this dissertation's concerns. Varieties of Fas- cim is a major disappointment. Weber seems to be well habilitated to his new American intellectual environment, as indicated by his usage of the concepts of "totalitarianism" and "development. " Yet, in comparison to the work of other American historians in 1964, Weber's attempt to discuss fascism as a general concept is innovative. His European background may well be a factor underlying his choice of subject matter. 305

A far more aucceaaful generalizing approach is found in Wolfgang Sauer's "National Socialism* Totalitarianism or

Fascism?" which first appeared in 1967. Sauer, born in

Germany and now teaching at the University of California, wishes to place National Socialism into a larger framework.

He first surveys the past efforts of interpretation and places them into three periods.

In the first period, prior to 1939, scholars tended to explain National Socialism in terms of fascism. Adolf Hitler seemed mere­ ly a German variant of Benito Mussolini, and both appeared, during the Great Depression and the popular front, to be but varieties of the agony of capitalism. Many writers were strongly influenced by socialist thought and, what is more, by socialist hopes.1**

Franz Neumann is mentioned as the outstanding exemplar of this approach. He and others understood fascism as "a mere manipulation by big business." A second period began during World War II. A. J. P. Taylor, Friedrich Meinecke, Ludwig Dehio, and others tended to view National Socialism " . . .as Germanism, that is, some particularly German form of social disease. Scholars with this viewpoint tended to emphasize the special historical roots of Nazism and often analyzed these in

Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism* Totali­ tarianism or Fascism?" in Turner, Reappraisals of Fascism, pp. 93-94. l*?Ibid., p. 94 306

terms of Intellectual history. The third period, coinciding with the Cold War, shifted the focus to totalitarianism. "Nazism now appeared as but one form of a more general I OR disease of modern society similar to Communism. "

Writers such as Arendt and Friedrich had a pessimistic view of the future, stressing "the omnipotence and the monolithic structure of totalitarian regimes." Sauer sees the totalitarianism approach, now beginning to decline, as having created an "imbalance" in the study of Nazism. "While we have an abundance of studies on the Nazi terror system, on military and war history, and on the history of the resistance, we know little or nothing about the problems of Nazi domestic politics and social history after 1934." Thus, although totalitarianism as an aspect of fascist regimes should be retained, "a revision of the existing conceptual framework is needed." For Sauer, the concept of fascism, despite being "damaged" in its "Narxist-Leninist" version, remains the most viable inter­ pretive tool for the study of Nazism. Indeed, he sees a return to this approach already coming about in the work of William Sheridan Allen, Alan S. Hilward, Arthur Schweitzer, and others. Sauer finds two points of agreement in these recent studies.

10*Ibid. 10*Ibid., p. 96 307

First, the authors agree that fascism is not, as the Marxist interpretation holds, merely a manipulation by monopoly capital­ ists t it is a mass movement with a charac­ ter and aim of its own, indicating a major crisis in liberal democracy and capitalism. Whether or not this crisis is temporary remains controversial* Second, it is now established beyond doubt that the lower middle classes, both rural and urban, were at least one of the major social components of fascist movements.il*

After discussing a few points of disagreement among these writers, Sauer looks at Ernst Nolte's Three Faces of Fascism to determine whether its approach is adequate to the task. It is not, concludes Sauer. Nolte fails because his "phenomenological" methodology is flawed— his analysis con­ centrates too heavily on the ideas of Maurras, Mussolini, and Hitler. His generalization that fascism is essentially a revolt against socio-economic modernization is therefore not substantiated in his text. The challenge remains, then,

to build a "non-Marxist theory of fascism with a socio­ economic dimension." For this Sauer turns to recent theories of "economic development," which, he believes, include the economic factor while avoiding "the Marxist trap of economic determinism." He finds the work of two men— Alexander Gershenkron and W. W. Rostow— particularly useful and even complementary to one another. "Gerschenkron's theory of 'relative backwardness* provides a model of

^^®Ibid., p. 99, 308

historical differentiation missing in Rostov's 'stage' theory, and the latter offers a model for periodization not developed by Gerschenkron.After discussing some

necessary modifications to the theory of economic develop­ ment, Sauer hypothesizes that:

. . . fascism can be defined as a revolt of those who lost— directly or indirectly, temporarily or permanently— by industriali­ zation. Fascism is a revolt of the déclas­ sés. The workers and industrialists do not fall under this definition; it applies mainly to most of the lower middle class . . .— peasants who opposed the urbanizing aspects of industrialism; small businessmen and those engaged in the traditional crafts and trades that opposed mechanization or concentration; white-collar workers (at least as long as they felt the loss of economic independence); lower levels of the professions, especially the teaching profes­ sion, which opposed changing social values; and so forth.112

Other groups tend to ally with the fascist movement, hoping to exploit it for their own ends. Fascism becomes "neobarbarism" because it bucks the

laws of economic development, "Since the process of industrialization as a whole is irresistable, the existence of civilization is inextricably bound to it. Fascist revolt against industrialization must, therefore, eventually turn

ll^Ibid., p. 106. ll*Ibid., pp. 106-07. 309 against civilization t o o . ^hs degree of radicalism increases with the degree of industrialization in a country — thus Germany gave birth to the most radical of the fascist movements, of course, whether fascism takes hold in any nation is determined not simply by economic conditions but by "specific national, social, and cultural traditions" accompanying industrialization.

Finally, Sauer addresses the question of " . . . why fascism emerged rather simultaneously throughout Europe though the countries affected were on different levels of economic growth, Why, in other words, does fascism seem to have had its own historical epoch and geographical limits? Sauer thinks that World War I was the pivotal event* "Only after total war had militarized European societies and had created large military interests were the conditions required for fascism complete.After the war only the victorious and industrialized nations were equipped to return to stable, peaceful production. The losers and industrially underdeveloped were the most vulner­ able to fascist appeals* A further determinant of which countries were most likely to spawn fascist movements seems to lie in the strength of ancient and medieval traditions

llSlbid.. p. 107.

ll^Ibid.. p. 110. llSlbid. 310

Which could be glorified in fascist propaganda. For Sauer, the strongest such traditions were located precisely in the areas where fascism had its greatest successes— " . . . the Mediterranean coast; the regions of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe; and Germany.In addition, each of these three areas developed its own particular sub-type of fascism. Sauer concludes by expressing his doubt that fascism in the "classical" sense is highly unlikely to appear again, either in the industrialized or underdeveloped nations. The constellation of conditions which brought about the original phenomenon simply does not exist anywhere in the present world. There are several criticisms which may be directed at Sauer. His anti-Marxism is of a surprisingly blind nature, apparently based on ideological considerations rather than a detailed examination of the wide range of Marxist writings.

Sauer's suggestion that the "theory" of economic development be substituted for Marxism to give an economic dimension to the theory of fascism is a move which effectively removes the necessity to consider the overall role of capitalism in the genesis of fascism. On another point, Sauer does not attempt to put fascism into a more general category of rightist regimes; thus his conclusion that classical fascism is no longer possible, while probably correct, does not

^^^Ibid., p. Ill 311 leave the reader with sufficient warning that many other equally dangerous possibilities for the future exist. But these criticisms are relatively minor. Sauer has produced one of the seminal writings in the new movement toward a general theory of fascism. His scope of analysis is extreme­ ly broad, both in its internationalism and in its multi­ factor approach at the national level. His theorizing is based on a comparative historical methodology with refer­ ences to a wide variety of secondary sources. Sauer's conclusions are for the most part supported by the logic of his argument and are therefore compelling. Perhaps his most important achievement is in making a discussion of the economic dimension of fascism more palatable to American scholars. The work of Roland Sarti demonstrates that younger émigré historians may not be so likely to fit the pattern hypothesized in this dissertation. Sarti was born in Italy in 1937 and is currently a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts. His writings, while an impor­ tant contribution to the study of Italian Fascism, are almost entirely descriptive rather than analytical. Sarti's one theoretical motivation is to demonstrate the inappropri­ ateness of the term "totalitarianism" for the Mussolini regime. This he does in an article of 1970, "Fascist Modernization in Italy: Traditional or Revolutionary?" Sarti disagrees with the predominant historical evaluation 312

of Fascism as "anti-modarnist." Rather, the movement combined factions Which were in favor of modernization with some that were against it. In addition, the Fascists inter­ acted with outside interest groups. "These vested inter­ ests, particularly the monarchy. Parliament, the army, the Church, and big business, while politically extraneous to Fascism, managed to operate within it and around it with the intention of deflecting Fascist efforts from their stated goals. "^^7 Although Fascism was in the end a conserva­ tive regime, it might under different circumstances have carried out reforms. But in the end:

Economic interests accepted the political leadership of Fascism, while Fascism made only half-hearted efforts at economic management. The technocracy originally promised turned out to be little more than the personnel of the old business associa­ tions now operating in a new capacity that was neither entirely public nor entirely private. Business enjoyed the benefits of public support without having to accept the onus of effective public control. The facade was totalitarian; the reality atomis­ tic.H®

^^^Roland Sarti, "Fascist Modernization in Italy: Traditional or Revolutionary?" American Historical Review, LXXV (April 1970), 1031. ll*Ibid., 1044-45. 313

Sarti effectively documenta the aforegoing arguments in a I IQ book published in 1971. Although Sarti * s work is of high quality, he operates on a very specific level that is typical of mainstream American historians. Indeed, Sarti arrived in America while still a youth and received all his academic training in this country. This suggests that our émigré category should perhaps be limited to those who were educated in Europe. Another example of a younger emigre would seem to con­ firm this point. Peter Loewenberg was born in Germany in 1933 but received his academic training in history and psychoanalysis in America. His article on "The Psychohis- torical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort" is a study in "psychoanalytical history" which seeks to postulate that:

. . . the relationship between the period from 1914 to 1920 and the rise and triumph of National Socialism from 1929 to 1935 is specifically generational. The war and postwar experiences of the small children and youth of World War I explicitly condi­ tioned the nature and success of National Socialism.^20

Loewenberg believes that certain experiences were particu­ larly significant to the "Nazi cohort.”

119 Sarti, Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy 1919-1940 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universityof California Press, 1971). 120 Peter Loewenberg, "The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort," American Historical Review, LXXVl (December 1971), 1458. 314

The specific factors that conditioned this generation include the prolonged absence of the parents, the return of the father in defeat, extreme hunger and privation, a national defeat in war, which meant the loss of the prevailing political authority and left no viable replacement with which to identify.121

Although Loewenberg notes that other factors (politi­ cal, intellectual, social, diplomatic, military, economic,

and leadership) are important and cannot be ignored in the study of National Socialism; he implies that the study of

irrational elements in the behavior of Nazi adherents is of utmost importance, since "... only the smallest part of 122 human thought and conduct is rational." This philoso­ phical foundation being established, Loewenberg proceeds to build his case upon Freud's theories of fixation and regres­ sion and Karl Mannheim's sociological work on "generations. "

A wide variety of statistical and clinical studies and other reports is cited to show that post-war deprivation was great for the children of the Nazi cohort, but attempts to link

these deprivations to actual psychic effects or damage require a substantial leap of faith. Yet such a leap is at the heart of Loewenberg*s conclusion:

122 Ibid., 1460. 315

The anticipation of weakened character structure manifested in aggression, defenses of projection and displacement, and inner rage that may be mobilised by a renewed anxiety-inducing trauma in adulthood is validated in the subsequent political con­ duct of this cohort during the Great Depres­ sion when they joined extremist paramilitary and youth organisations and political par­ ties. In view of these two bodies of data for which a psychoanalytic understanding of personality provides the essential linkage, it is postulated that a direct relationship existed between the deprivation German chil­ dren experienced in World War I and the res­ ponse of these children and adolescents to the anxieties aroused by the Great Depres­ sion of the early 1 9 3 0 s.123

This is all apparently logical but, unfortunately,beyond the realm of empirical testing. It is an excellent illus­ tration of what results when a scholar takes the tools with which he is trained and seeks with them exclusively the answer to a given problem. Thus Loewenberg's work is in perfect accord with the expectations we have for that of

American-educated social scientists dealing with fascism. We come, finally to the Princeton historian Arno J. Mayer, born in Luxembourg in 1922. In 1971 Mayer published a book on the Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870- 1956. Subtitled An Analytic Framework, this book is a highly unusual and extremely general approach to the study

Ibid., 1501. For a further definition of "psychohistory" and a review of such studies applied to German history, see Loewenberg, "Psychohistorical Perspec­ tives on Modern German History," Journal of Modern History, XLVII {June 1975), 229-79. 316 of fascist and other right-wing regimes. In a sense it takes up where most other analyses of fascism leave off. Mayer makes quite clear his political and theoretical biases from the beginning, as he decries the lack of scholarly attention to the concept of counterrevolution.

The writer of this essay is a confirmed leftist critic of those Allied and American policies, both foreign and domestic, that condoned or advanced, intentionally or unin­ tentionally, the counterrevolutionary side in the era of the communist revolution. As such, he believes that the harm of continu­ ing Ignorance, contrived silence, or speci­ ous neutrality about counterrevolution by far exceeds the danger of squarely facing up to its problématique.^24

As a student of European history, Mayer sought a coherent framework for the analysis of all the repressions of European left-wing movements beginning with the Paris Commune and carrying through to 1956. The communist revolution is "the central event of this era.” Thus the foreign policies of non-communist nations are in large part shaped by the simple fact that the communist regimes exist. Full-blown counterrevolution is only possible with the initial blessing of traditional conservative and reactionary elements who are fearful of potential revolutionary changes.

But the "excesses” of fascism have taught these

124 Arno J. Mayer, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1879-1956 (New York* Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 1. 317

traditionalists that fascism is at least as undesirable as

communism. With this realisation fresh in their minds, bourgeois intellectuals developed the "theory” of totalita­ rianism after World War II. This mode of thought, which conveniently teaches that the extremes of fascism and com­ munism are basically the same, constitutes the highest "theoretical” manifestation to date of counterrevolutionary ideology. Mayer provides an excellent critique of totali­

tarianism which we need not blueprint here. Mayer finds that only Marx and Engels provide some elementary guidance toward the construction of a theory of

counterrevolution.

Still, it must be said that Marx and Engels did not distinguish, systematically, between conservatives, reactionaries, and counterrevolutionaries. They failed to methodically differentiate the socioeconomic roots of these factionsf their political objectives, styles, and methods; and their ties to incumbent political, military, and ecclesiastic institutions *^25

Where Marx and Engels were more incisive was in describing the class background of the followers of such groups.

Over and over they stressed that the politi­ cal carriers of opposition to revolution came from the economically and socially uprooted strata of the major classes* Class as such was not decisive, but rather the

^^^Ibid., p. 41 318

extent to Which segment# of different clas­ ses experienced or ware apprehensive about déclassement, defunctionalixation, or alien- S t l o n ' î » ---

There was one such group, however. Which Marx and Engels considered to be pivotal in many revolutionary situations— the petite bourgeoisie, or lower middle class. This group

falls between the capitalist class and working class on the social ladder and feels threatened by both. Although the

members of this class are highly unorganized, they tend to

rally to the support of the status quo in times of crisis* "In the Marxist perspective, the petite bourgeoisie ulti­ mately preferred gradual erosion by advancing industrial capitalism to sudden supersedure by the revolutionary prole­ tariat. Mayer reviews the few earlier writings on counterrevo­ lution and then moves toward his own conceptualization. His

first step, logically, is to establish a "tentative concep­ tual definition" of revolution*

It is a violent, fundamental, and abrupt change of incumbent elites, status and class relations, institutions, values, symbols, and myths. This radical change is initiated

^^®Ibid. 127 Ibid., p. 42. For an in-depth analysis of the counterrevolutionary role of the lower middle class, see Mayer's "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem," Journal of Modern History, XLVII (September 1975), 409-36. 319

and implemented by militant political actors sworn to a nurtured and internally coherent doctrine of Innovation and not of cyclic recurrence. The revolutionary ideology guides the formulation of concrete programs, restricts the scope for compromise and opportunism, and sets limits to the incon­ sistencies of appeals that are designed to make converts and to neutralise o p p o n e n t s . ^28

Opposed to most revolutions one can identify an "anti­ revolutionary triad" of reactionaries, conservatives, and true counterrevolutionaries. One of Mayer's key theoretical contributions is to distinguish between these three ele­ ments. Reactionaries are representatives of dying social groups, the landed nobility being a prime example. On the whole, these groups play the role of isolated social critics. "They reject the world about them for being 129 decayed, corrupt, pernicious, and repugnant." They distrust all agents of innovation. "Their hostility seems motivated by a combination of guilt, hate, and mistrust that is nourished by the fear that their and their children's life chances are condemned to continuing deterioration if 130 history stays on its present course." Although they separate themselves from the everyday world of politics during normal times, reactionaries are quick to lend

^28ibid., pp. 47-48,

^^^Ibid., p. 48. l^Oibid. 320 whatever support they can to the forces of order during periods of crisis, hoping to use the crisis "... to reclaim part of their lost paradise or to reinforce the political pillars necessary to uphold their superannuated economic and social position. Conservatives are those persons whose wealth and status are derived from the particular way in which a society and economy are currently organised. Their defense of the status quo during periods of stability is carried out large­ ly by means of an all-pervasive but subtle Ideology. Under crisis conditions this ideology becomes much more open and explicit. Conservatives tend to use their various powers and influences within the established political framework to "manage" dangerous situations. But when a social breakdown has reached such proportions that standard methods are no longer effective, conservatives tend to ally themselves with elements of the radical right— hoping to use these forces to their own ultimate advantage.

The "true" counterrevolutionaries are described in the process of Mayer's unveiling of his "heuristic concept" of counterrevolution. When a social crisis develops beyond the limits under which traditional authorities are able to con­ trol it, both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary move­ ments are likely to develop* Counterrevolutionary leaders

l*llbid., p. 49. 321

tend to arise from the same social groups as their follow­

ers— the "poor gentry," the petite bourgeoisie, and the "new middle classes." The basic skill of these leaders lies in "... mobilising the crisis strata by inflaming and mani­ pulating their resentment of those above them, their fear of

those below them, and their estrangement from the real world about them." 132 But the counterrevolutionary movement

is not built around a coherent, systematic ideology. Rather, the "theory" develops according to pragmatic needs, rationalising and justifying whatever actions seem necessary

for the seizure of power. "Counterrevolution is essentially

a praxis." 133 What general themes there are in coun­ terrevolutionary appeals are borrowed largely from the

traditional right. "The counterrevolutionary clarion call is for order, hierarchy, authority, discipline, obedience, tradition, loyalty, courage, sacrifice, and national­ ism. "^24 "doctrinal foundations" of these appeals are also a product of conservatism and reaction*

. . . a pessimistic view of human nature; the derogation of reason and rationality; the negation of equality; the precedence of community over the individual; the suspicion

IS^Ibid., p. 61. 223ibid., p. 62. ^^^Ibid., p. 65. 322

of novelty and innovation; and a Hobbesian conception of the international environ­ ment.135

There is one element, however, that is "essential and pecu­

liar to the counterrevolutionary formula." This consists in "... combining the glorification of traditional attitudes and behavior patterns with the charge that these are being

corrupted, subverted, and defiled by conspiratorial agents and influences." This is perhaps the key to under­ standing the success of the counterrevolutionary appeal.

Such a conspiratorial rather than criti­ cal-analytic view of history serves any number of purposes* it provides semiedu­ cated publics with an uncomplicated, coher­ ent, and plausible explanation of an other­ wise confusing crisis; it enables the members of the crisis strata to explain away their own superannuation, inadequacy, and powerlessness; it helps humiliated individu­ als salvage their self-esteem by attributing their predicament to a plot; and it furn­ ishes overwrought persons and groups with proximate, tangible targets on which to vent their frustrations and hatreds.137

Another important aspect of counterrevolution is its reliance on the mass media. Although the appeals are "suffused with archaisms," their delivery is effected in the most modern manner. The national scope and mass base of

^^^Ibid.

13*Ibid. ^^^Ibid., p. 66. 323

such movements make the modern media an absolute necessity. At the local level, counterrevolution is most readily iden­ tified by its violence. The first step of its followers is to win control of the streets. Their aim is to portray themselves as defenders of order in the face of revolution­ ary threats. In this lies their allurement for traditional

conservatives who, as social crisis deepens, are increasing­ ly willing to "use" the counterrevolutionaries to attain their own ends. The counterrevolutionaries' strategy is to encourage this sort of thinking, thus seducing conservatives into a fatal cooperation. Who wins the struggle amongst the forces of the right after the left has been vanquished will determine the ultimate shape of the new regime. Mayer identifies seven varieties of counterrevolution arising out of different kinds of national socio-economic conditions. A pre-emptive counterrevolution is one that is launched in order to prevent future revolution. It takes place in countries which have experienced an abortive revo­ lution, a successful reform effort, or "protracted govern­

mental instability." The actual revolutionary threat may be more imaginary than real, but the key point is the ability of propagandists to make it real. Although Mayer does not provide examples for each of his types, both the Fascist and Nazi regimes would clearly fall into this category. A second type is called posterior counterrevolution. "It develops in response to a successful yet still contested 324

I3S revolution*" The revolution may control the entire country or at little as a single city. Because of the importance of the military in posterior counterrevolutions, the old conservatives and reactionaries are able to maintain their control over the true counterrevolutionaries and establish a traditional military dictatorship. Here Mayer seems to be thinking of Spain. He describes five other types of counterrevolution— accessory, disguised, anticipa­ tory, externally licensed, and externally imposed— which we need not detail. Each is drawn from the experience of unspecified European nations, yet each has a readily appar­ ent applicability (with only minor modifications) to the current history of "third world" nations. Having detailed all the evident subtypes of counter­ revolution, Mayer derives a broad definition:

see counterrevolution is a sectarian levée en masse within unstable but legitimate authority systems, with the complicity of frightened reactionaries and conservatives, against massive enemies at home and abroad, and for the monopolistic control of the ^tate and government by a new political elite. Any such levée en masse requires a supreme leader; needs stirringpropaganda appeals; is regimented by new cadres; deve­ lops an internal camaraderie with equalita- rian overtones; and displays an élan that is characteristic of embattled communities of either old or new believers.^39

13*Ibid., p. 93.

13*ibid., p. 115. 325

He then devotee a chapter to outlining a research design for the study of counterrevolution. This design is based on

clearly Marxist theoretical presuppositions* "The form and Intensity of counterrevolutionary movements and regimes are a function of the structural conditions and conjunctural developments, national and international, that impinge upon them."^*^ For Mayer, every country has some latent

counterrevolutionary capacity. "This potential is rooted in arrested, ailing, neglected, or artificially bolstered economic sectors, geographic areas, and cultural minori­ ties."^*^ Thus, even before any counterrevolutionary movement appears, one could study the potential for it to happen. The actual movement is triggered by "sudden and acute economic, diplomatic, and military exigencies," which in varying combinations can come to play upon the potential­ ly counterrevolutionary strata. The destructive events aggravate not only the "material conditions and prospects" of such groups but their "psychological distempers" as well — and Mayer indicates that both types of effects must be studied in depth. These "intense conjunctural exigencies" also stimulate the social groups with revolutionary pros­ pects, and the appearance of revolutionary movements has a further excitatory effect on the counterrevolutionaries.

^*°Ibid., p. 119. l*llbid. 326

Ideas play an important role in both the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements. But whereas revolution­ aries have been Identified with a rational plan to transcend the existing polity, counterrevolutionaries have been found to embrace totally irrational propaganda systems. Mayer points out, however, that "... directors of counterrevo­ lutionary thought and action . . . act and think in func- 142 tionally rational ways." Although their ideas do not form a logical system, each component is carefully calculated to arouse the "fears, frustrations, prejudices, and aggressive impulses of the crisis strata." Mayer advocates that the role of all sorts of purveyors of the ideas of counterrevolution (artists, novelists, editors, reviewers, humorists, etc.) be investigated. The next step is to study the "concrete organizational forms" assumed by counterrevolutionary ideas. "The new outlook and formula begin to resonate through literary, cultural, religious, and fraternal societies; through interest and political associ­ ations; and through a separate daily, weekly, and periodical press."^*3

The next stage of Mayer's research design involves studying the actual counterrevolutionary movement.

^*^Ibid., p. 121. ^*3ibid., pp. 123-24 327

The study of the physiognomy of the ascen­ dant counterelite should reveal the differ­ ential characteristics of political leaders, propagandists, organizers, administrators, and coercers. Refinements should also sharpen the social profile of the rank and file.144

As the movement grows, a more specific study of its ideology is called for* "What, then, are the dominant ideological and doctrinal themes, and which of them achieve and maintain greatest constancy in each of the major phases of political mobilization?"^*^ At the local level, it is necessary to identify the specific programmatic appeals aimed at particular audiences. Host difficult of all is the study of the finances of the counterrevolutionary movement, mostly due to "sparse and doctored records." But when records are available, they can provide real insight into the contacts between the new movement and the old elites.

This leads us to the critical area of general support for the counterrevolutionaries by the society as a whole. "Each nation has its own pattern of indulgence, complicity, and restraint with regard to counterrevolutionary movements and actions."^*^ This is largely determined by economic and political events. But Mayer attaches great importance

^**Ibid., p. 124. ^*^Ibid., p. 125. ^*^Ibid., p. 127. 328 to the study of individual leaders as links between movement and society. "Individual conjunctures must be approached with the conventional questions and tools of narrative poli­ tical history. It is in specific historical situations that discrete political actors make compromises and alliances that have a certain logic of their own.The social roots of leaders and their constituencies do not explain all their behavior.

Although such political actors cannot afford to disregard these socioeconomic constraints altogether, they nevertheless claim and secure the discretion to shape policy and make decisions. Heedless to say, the more elitist or authoritarian the ideology and structure of political organizations, the greater this l e e w a y . 148

Because antirevolutionary leaders have considerable latitude in their actions, historians must pay close attention to their actions when attempting to reconstruct "critical turning points." Finally Mayer suggests that the role of terrorism and war in counterrevolution needs much more exploration. Terror is an integral part of the whole project, and one can usually identify three types of specialists in terror— "directors, executioners, and rationalizers." A key point to be studied is the attitude and behavior toward "white "

l*?Ibid. l**Ibid. 329

terror by "reactionary and conservative collaborationists."

Clearly, any incumbent regime has the power to curb terror, especially in its earliest stages. Failure to do so can be one of the most significant factors in an eventually

successful counterrevolution. Although the reactionaries and conservatives tend to ignore the radicals' use of terror, they generally (but privately) continue to abhor it; and this causes some friction between the radicals and traditionals. External war is another case. All three partners favor it, thus making it a powerful cohesive force. Mayer devotes an entire chapter, his final one, to "internal causes and purposes of war in Europe, 1870-1956," wherein he forcefully challenges studies of war which concentrate on

"the aggressive drives of modern man" or "the harsh reali­ ties of international life in a world of multiple sovereign states." Mayer's book stands as one of the foremost contribu­ tions to the study of fascism. We will return to his ideas

in a later chapter outlining a theoretical framework derived

from the materials dealt with in this dissertation* Here we can offer a brief critique. If there is a single problem

that stands out, it is that of a definition of revolution.

Mayer accepts without analysis a conception of "the era of communist revolution"— a world trend which is almost 330

inevitably leading toward a future socialist world sys­ tem.^** The possibility of another type of revolution of non-Marxist but still "progressive" inspiration is not considered. Of course, given the limitations of "Europe, 1870-1956," one would be hard pressed to find an example of such a revolution* But Mayer might well have at least discussed the more general question of the ultimate social aims of revolutions in order to clarify his own position for readers. Another difficulty of the book is Mayer's use of "counterrevolution" to describe both a specific movement and a more general political struggle. Some of his types of counterrevolution involve "true" counterrevolutionaries only in an auxiliary role. Perhaps a better scheme would attach to the counterrevolutionaries the label "fascist," thus making fascism a sub-type of counterrevolution in which the mass movement wins ultimate power. These criticisms aside, however. Dynamics of Counterrevolution remains a masterwork. Its scope of analysis, despite its geographical and temporal limits, is maximally broad. This breadth is particularly

149 Eugen Weber makes this point in his "Revolu­ tion? Counterrevolution? What Revolution?" (Laqueur, Fascism). But Weber goes too far, suggesting that fascism and communism are rival revolutions, both of which have the function of stimulating a lagging economic development. He argues that the Nazis' control of capitalist production is just as "revolutionary" an achievement as the transformation of the relations of production under communism. Weber also sees anti-communism as only one aspect of many rightist movements, not as a sine qua non. Mayer and other writers are far more convincing in arguing just the opposite. 331 evident in the proposed research design. And although Mayer wisely limits his discussion to Europe in a certain time frame, his generalisations could easily serve as a basis for research in other places and other times. Mayer builds his model of counterrevolution using a con^arative methodology and drawing on secondary sources. (He appends a 22-page bibliography to the book. ) The model does not transcend the limits set by his sources. In short, we have in Mayer's work a perfect example of scholarly work in the European tradition.

The aforegoing historians have provided some support for our hypotheses. Amongst the mainstream Americans, the overall tendency (especially prior to the late 1960s) was toward the production of very specialised studies of parti­ cular fascist regimes. Even later, when the idea of a general concept of fascism became acceptable, the Americans tended to fall into single-factor ( "nihilism, " development, non-integration, etc. ) analyses. The one clear exception to this pattern is John Weiss. The immigrants did significant­ ly better, both before and after the 1960s, although there are many disappointing performances— especially those of Kohn, Pinson, Weber, Sarti, and Loewenberg. These less satisfying studies by immigrants do seem, however, to be related to the fact that their authors received most of their education in America. CHAPTER VII

SOCIOLOGY

Data from a number of countries demonstrate that classic fascism is a movement of the propertied middle classes, who for the most part normally support liberalism .... — Seymour M. Lipset In Germany, where fascist aims sufficiently coincided with those of the conservative right and important groupings of capital, the fascist breakthrough was achieved. — Walter Goldfrank

A. State of the Discipline Sociology as an academic discipline is truly an American product. It is so because the seminal European contributors to the sociological tradition were generally unsuccessful at institutionalizing their work, as Edward Shils points out in an Important article.^ Only Durkheim had some success (based on his retention of regular collaborators and students, and on his establishment of the journal L'Annee Sociologique); but sociology failed to

Edward Shils, "Tradition, Ecology, and Institu­ tion in the History of Sociology," Daedalus, IC (Fall 1970), 760-825.

332 333

become a permanent fixture in enough univereities to provide careers toward which potential students could aspire. French sociology virtually died with Durkheim in 1917. At

this very time, however, sociology was arising anew in

America. Its American roots lie in the Progressive movement and the various Christian reform movements which flourished around the turn of the century, and in the writings and teaching of William Graham Sumner, Lester Ward, Edward Ross and others who were largely influenced by Herbert Spencer. The earliest sociologists adhered to a social reformist perspective which, as Lewis Coser puts it, "... helped give their newfangled calling a legitimation which it might 2 otherwise have lacked." In short, the early American sociologists devoted themselves to the identification and solution of "social problems." Coser contends that there are additional reasons for the ultimate success of sociology in America:

In spite of the strong appeal of Chris­ tian moralism and Progressive reform, socio­ logy would not have been anchored in Ameri­ can society without a material basis. This was provided by the unprecedented growth of

2 Lewis A. Coser, "American Trends," in Tom Bottomore and Robert A. Nisbet, eds., A History of Sociolo­ gical Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 289. Another useful survey is Robert M. Frumkin's "Contemporary Sociology in the United States," in Raj P. Mohan and Don Martindale, eds., Handbook of Contemporary Developments in World Sociology (Westport, Conn : Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. X3Ï—57. 334

the eyetern of higher education beginning around the turn of the century and by the receptivity of that system to the upstart discipline. The reason why sociology was known for many years all over the world as the "American science" is largely to be sought in its early institutionalisation in a mushrooming American academy. 3

And one school in particular, the University of Chicago, played the central role in making sociology what it is today. At Chicago, predominantly through the efforts of W. 1. Thomas and Robert Park, the character of the discipline shifted from rural and reformist to urban and professional- scientific. Institutionalised sociology settled into a pattern which still exists— standard textbooks with standard principles and concepts, graduate studies, close supervision of research, journals, financial support for research, public recognition, employment opportunities, professional organisations, etc. As Coser puts it, " . . . for roughly twenty years, from the first world war to the mid-1930s, the history of sociology in America can largely be written as

the history of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago."* The next stage of sociology's development began with the publication of Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social

Action in 1937. Until the appearance of this book, the one

^Ibid., p. 291. *Ibid., p. 311. 335

thing lacking in American sociology was a theory of truly societal scope. Parsons earned his Ph.D. from the Univer­

sity of Heidelberg, his dissertation dealing with the treat­ ment of capitalism by Weber and Sombart, He returned to America and taught economics at Harvard until joining the newly formed sociology department there In 1931. Drawing on his studies of Sombart, Weber, Durkheim, Marshall, Pareto, Tonnies, and others, Parsons promulgated a "new" theoretical system which soon eclipsed in importance the theory of his department chairman, Pitirim Sorokin. Alvin Gouldner notes the timeliness of Parsons' efforts;

Parsons' theory emerged in a period when the previous American tradition of the study of isolated social problems was manifestly incompetent to deal with social strains that obviously ramified through all institutions and social strata, and when the only other established large-scale social theory well known to many intellectuals was a Marxism that was being stultified by Stalinism. It was also a time when many other European theoretical traditions— which had never recovered from the devastations of World War 1— seemed to have spent their creative impulse and were floundering.5

Until well into the 1960s, structural functionalism was the theoretical paradigm for sociology. A majority of sociologists, while perhaps not identified as structural- functionalists, would certainly have agreed that this

®Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York; Basic Books, 1970), p. 17*7. 336 theoretical eyetern warn one which integrated, or provided a general framework for, all the varied activities performed by sociologists. Other theoretical constructions— social exchange theory, conflict theory, phenomenology, and symbo­ lic interactionism— arose as specialized minor competitors against, or supplements to, the more general functionalism.

In the 1960s there began a devastating critique of "Parsonsianism" led by C. Wright Mills, Tom Bottomore, Gouldner, and others. The major criticisms are summed up nicely by Irving M. Zeitlini

Traditional functionalism:

1. exaggerates the unity, stability, and harmony of social systems; 2. imputes a predominantly positive character to all social institutions; 3. is a nonhistorical approach to social systems; 4. tends to regard existing institutions as necessary and indispensible and therefore entails a conservative bias; 5. fails to account for social change.*

These criticisms and others are now as commonly affirmed among sociologists as was functionalism itself in an earlier day. However, no theoretical viewpoint has arisen to replace the former dominant view. Or as Robert W.

Irving H. Zeitlin, Rethinking Sociology (Engle­ wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. IS. But for yet another defense of functionalism, see Wilbert E. Moore's "Functionalism" in Bottomore and Nisbet, A History of Sociological Analysis, pp. 321-61. 337

Friedrichs puts it, no other theory has gained acceptance as the new "paradigm" for sociology.^ The lack of a paradigm, however, is probably not viewed as a serious problem by a majority of sociologists. This is because of a second trend which has been steadily developing within the discipline— • the move toward "abstracted empiri­ cism. " The term is C. Wright Mills', and it was he who first saw in its development a cause for alarm. He noticed that a large number of sociologists were simply involved in collecting data by means of the new survey methods available to them, identifying relationships among "variables," and then publishing assertions about the data analyzed. The predominant early focus was on "public opinion" and "voting behavior, " and the chief spokesman and practitioner of

"abstracted empiricism" was without doubt Paul F. Lazarsfeld, a contemporary of Mills at Columbia University and founder of the Bureau of Applied Social Research. Mills portrays Lazacsfeld as the would-be mid-wife for a new empirical social science free of the constrictions of philo­ sophy. (Theory would, however, eventually be constructed on the basis of concepts discovered by survey analysis.) Mills notes a tendency toward psychologism in limiting the subject matter of sociology to that which is amenable to survey

^Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology (New York* The Free Press, 1^70), especially Chapter 2. 338

g analysis. What is actually needed is "a sense of real problems, as they arise out of history," only after the sociologist's problem selection should come a concern with the methods of analysis; and the single guiding principle is that "... we should work on such problems as carefully 9 and as exactly as we can. " Perhaps thinking of fas­ cism, Mills asserts that "... surely it is evident that an empiricism as cautious and as rigid as abstracted empiri­ cism eliminates the great social problems and human issues of our time from inquiry. Unfortunately, Mills' warning seems not to have been heeded by sociologists. Abstracted empiricism remains the best descriptive term for most of what goes on in sociology today. This is probably due to a development of which Mills was among the first to recognize the implications— the growing use of social scientists in the bureaucracy.

This apparatus has now become large scale, and many signs point to its becoming more widespread and influential. The intellec­ tual administrator and the research techni­ cian— both quite new types of professional

g The centrality of survey analysis to Lazarsfeld's thinking is amply demonstrated in a report written for UNESCO in 1970, later published as Qu'est-ce que la socio­ logy? {Paris: Gallimard, 1971).

^C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 19&9), p. f2. l*Ibid., p. 273. 339

men— now compete with the more usual kinds of professors and scholars.11

At present a majority of sociologists find employment out­ side academia, and the discipline has responded by placing increased emphasis on specialized fields and technical skills. The impact of the hyper-specialization of sociology, expecially when combined with theoretical disorder, has been devastating. And future prospects are grim if we accept the analyses of two participants in a recent issue of Society devoted to the "crisis in social science." Howard S. Becker believes that because of the theoretical incoherence and acute disorganization of sociology, "... most sociolo­ gists experience in their daily work lives a series of

insoluble problems, complications, and vexations which they approach (like any nonsociologist) as practical matters, to be dealt with piecemeal and, usually, with a heavy moral 13 concern." Sociology is a "discipline in name only,"

^^Ibid., p. 55. 12 Evidence of the growth of specialization may be seen in the increased number of sociological organizations and journals devoted to particular subject areas or theore­ tical views. The American Sociological Association has also increased its number of special sections to compete with these new rivals. And the Sociological Abstracts (the very need for which indicates the growing variety andbulk of published material) has expanded from 19 categories for abstracted articles in 1953 to 63 in 1979.

^^Howard S. Becker, "What's Happening to Sociolo­ gy?" Society, XVI (July/August 1979), 19. 340 according to Becker* "Rather, what we have is a loosely connected network of specialty aubworlds, which operate and 14 work together mostly at the departmental level * . . * " And as for the future i "Sociology will fragment into a large number of smaller fields, each with its own status system, organizations, publications, and the like*"^^ Becker's prediction is echoed by Karl Schuessler, who, however, does not look upon such developments with disfavor. "In the year 2000 sociology will be more empirical, less a priori; more specific, less general; more practical, less academic.What Mills and Becker consider to be the ultimate danger to sociology, bureaucratic co-optation, Schuessler heralds as sociology's ultimate future*

The importance of sociology will be judged more by its cost-effectiveness than by its theoretical insights and understand­ ings. As sociology becomes more funded, it will be more conscious of its social utili­ ties. Sociology will find itself on the circular path of making plausible claims for getting money and giving plausible accounts of its expenditure.17

Sociologists will no longer worry much about the nature of their discipline but instead "... will be content to

l*Ibid., 24. l^ibid. ^*Karl Schuessler, "Sociology toward the Year 2000," Society, ibid., 31.

l^ibid., 33. 341

IS produce bits and pieces of reliable factual knowledge." Lazarsfald himself could not have hoped for a more glorious future. Given the preceding discussion of the current state of mainstream academic sociology, we will not anticipate that American sociologists have produced any remarkable studies of fascism. The lack of theoretical guidance added to the blindness of "abstracted empiricism" would be more than sufficient reason for our low expectations. Let us see how the sociologists actually performed.

B. Mainstream Interpretations The earliest major sociological treatment of fascism by an American is a chapter devoted to the Italian experience in Jerome Davis' 1930 book Contemporary Social Movements. Davis, at the time a professor of sociology at Yale University, labels his book "The first textbook on modern social movements to be published in America." Social movements are defined as revolutionary "... reactions on the part of individuals and groups to unsatisfactory I Û conditions in the social life." A phenomenology of social movements is developed whereby change is viewed as a process of transformations effected over time by newly

^®Ibid., 35. 19 Jerome’---- Davis, Contemporary"— ------Social Movements (New YorkI The Century Company, 1930), p- BT 342 arising movements which all follow a seven-step cycle of development. But Davis goes further, because in discussing each of a variety of movements he looks closely at the material conditions for their success or failure. In the case of Fascism, he begins with the group of returning soldiers from the World War who provided fighting manpower for the first fasci de combatimiento. He also correctly identifies the geographical setting for the birth of Fascism as the agricultural region of the lower Po valley, where union organising among agricultural proletarians threatened the position of estate owners. Davis traces the growth of the movement to a national party representing "the revolt of the middle classes." He seems to almost admire Mussolini: "All will have to recognise the extraordinary magnetism of the man and his great ability to organize and control. No man could be admired by so many without having good qualities. It soon becomes clear, however, that Davis strongly disapproves of the Fascist regime.

In a new form, adapted to modern indus­ trial economy, the Fascist Corporative State merely reproduces the absolute organization of power which prevailed in all European countries before the introduction of repre­ sentative systems of government. The will of the Dictator, and that of the limited oligarchy of his partisans, form the only

2°ibid., p. 448,

^^Ibid., p. 477. 343

Again, not# Davis* specific linking of Fascism to a

particular economic precondition. Further on he becomes even more specific. In noting Americans' generally friendly disposition toward Fascism at the time of his writing, Davis traces it to the fact that "Fascism more closely resembles America as she now is" than does Bolshevism, which Americans abhor. "Fascism is a bulwark of capitalism. It protects

private property and champions profits.Finally, Davis discusses the potential for an American fascism. He considers the Ku Klux Klan the closest thing to a nascent

fascism, but he sees our "universal free education" as a powerful safeguard against the formation of a full-blown national movement.

This sociological interpretation of Fascism, while not

a fully developed analysis, contains the seeds of a truly useful study. Unfortunately, Davis never carried his thinking any further. In fact, he soon withdrew from academic sociology, devoting his later writing primarily to the quest for international peace and disarmament, and to the study of the Soviet Union. 23 Classifying Davis as a mainstream sociologist is rather questionable in light of his later development, but at the time he published

22lbid., pp. 518-19.

^*See Davis' appropriately-titled A Life Adventure for Peace (New York: Citadel Press, 1967) for an account of his remarkable life. 344

Contemporary Social Movements he seems to have been fairly orthodox. He had received his Ph.D. from Columbia Univer­ sity and taught at Dartmouth for three years before joining the faculty of Yale Divinity School. Only in 1935, with the publication of hie strongly pro-labor Capitalism and Its Culture, did a position of what might be called Christian socialism find expression in his work.^^ In 1937 Davis' heresies led to his dismissal from the Divinity School. In sum, he appears to have been a throwback to the early reformist days of sociology, reacting against the increasing emphasis on science and the resultant narrowing of problems deemed accessible to sociologists. But whether we consider him a mainstream or dissenting sociologist,

Davis' work is not of sufficient depth to be considered a major contribution to the study of fascism. It is perhaps best treated as a hopeful introduction to our consideration

of the work of later sociologists. Appropriately, some of the first truly significant writing on fascism by an American sociologist was produced

Davis Capitalism and Its Culture (Rev. ed.; New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935, 1^41). 345

In the early 1940a by Talcott Parsons.The articles we will consider are so unusual (for Parsons, at least) that Irving Zeitlin was provoked to ask, "Is there a second Talcott Parsons?" Zeitlin (and others) have noted that "... when Parsons turns his attention to empirical phenomena he also turns his back on his general analytical scheme.” In "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre- Nasi Germany" Parsons clearly reverses his consensus-based- on- common- va lues approach in favor of a scheme of class analysis. In addition, his method is comparative as he

looks to the structural similarities and differences between Germany and the United States for clues to why Germany turned to fascism.

Parsons begins by pointing to the common high develop­ ment of industry through large capitalistic enterprises in both countries* With this come other shared features— the concentration of authority and control of industry, the creation of a large and propertyless working class, the

25 Early pieces by other sociologists are interest­ ing but much too narrow to be discussed fully here. For example, E. Y. Hartshorns of Harvard's sociology department analyzed the effects of Nazism on the German educational system in The German Universities and National Socialism (Cambridgel Harvard University Press, 1937V and German Youth and the Dream of Nazi Victory (New York: Farrar 4 Rinehart, 1941). And Daniel Bell warns of the dangers of cartelization and monopoly and stresses the need for democratic controls on the economy in "Monopoly Can Lead to Fascism," Common Sense, X (September 1941), 267-69, 280.

^^Zeitlin Rethinking Sociology, p. 35, 346

Inclusion of the vast majority of the people in the money

economy, etc. Parsons also mentions the separation of ownership from political authority or other social statuses, which is an essential part of the personal freedom and mobility of resources associated with the "liberal” type of

industrial economy. But it is the differences between the two countries which account for their divergent paths. For one, Germany had an old regime dominated by the Junkers vrtiich continued to shape the nation politically and cultur­ ally. The army remained a feudal institution because of the influence of the nobility in the officer corps and the fact that the army had been constitutionally responsible to the Kaiser rather than the civil administration. The civilian bureaucracy itself was powerfully influenced by the ideology of "Prussian conservatism," which Parsons characterises as "... a combination of a patriarchal type of authoritari- 2 7 anism with a highly developed formal legalism. ” This ideology was practically expressed as an extreme "devotion to duty” and "... a strong sense of prerogative and authority which would not brook the 'democratic* type of control by persons without authority . . , Finally, Lutheranism played a significant role in bolstering

27 Talcott Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," in his Essays in Sociological Theory (Rev. ed. » New York: Free Press, 1964), p. ÏÔ91 Copyright e 1954 and 1949 by The Free Press.

^®Ibid. 347

and legitimating the regime with its concept of "the devine ordination of government and princes." Parsons sees a relationship between these authoritarian tendencies and the failure of parliamentary governmentt

This situation would seem to have a good deal to do with the tendency of German parliamentarianism, certainly more conspicu­ ously than in either England or the United States, to become structured as a system of representation of rather specific interest groups such as agrarian interests, big busi­ ness, labor unions, the Catholic Church, a tendency which came to full flower under the Weimar Republic and had a good deal to do with its instability.29

The state's central role in economic development prevented "economic individualism" from evolving. Economic organiza­ tions as much as other institutions in Germany tended to

reflect the pattern of government bureaucracy. (Parsons notes "a peculiar tendency towards the formalization of status in Germany" as an indicator of this. He offers a particularly interesting discussion of masculine superiority within the German family.)

Parsons next takes up the question of external influ­ ences*

There can be no doubt that various kinds of external factors such as the treatment of Germany by the Allies after the last war.

2*lbid., p. 110. 348

economic difficulties both in international trade and finance and internally to Germany and the like, played an Important part. Perhaps these factors were even decisive in the sense that a more favorable set of circumstances in these respects would have tipped the total balance of forces so as to permit the democratic trend of evolution to continue uninterrupted.20

However, Parsons insists that the particular conditions which gave shape to the "revolutionary" Nazi movement are structural in nature. At this point he indicates an aware­ ness that his own theoretical system is not relevant to the problems he is considering:

In our common-sense thinking about social matters we probably tend greatly to exagger­ ate the integration of social systems, to think of them as neatly exemplifying a pat­ tern type. For purposes of sheer compara­ tive structural study this need not lead to serious difficulty, but when dynamic prob­ lems of directions and processes of change are at issue, it is essential to give speci­ fic attention to the elements of malintegra- tion, tension and strain in the social structure.21

Lastly, Parsons discusses the role of rationalization. In all societies this advancement of science, technology, and bureaucracy brings forth amongst certain alienated popula­ tion elements a tendency toward romanticism ( "the dissocia­ tion of the strongest emotional values from established life

^°lbid., p. 116, ^^Ibid., p. 117. 349

situations"). In Germany the traditions of conservativism, national glory, and militarism were so closely bound to the social structure that a fascist movement had a comparatively greater chance for success. In "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Move­ ments," Parsons concedes that Marxism is correct in relating fascism "to fundamental and generalised aspects of Western Society." He also agrees that fascism may be adequately characterized as the "radicalism of the right." But most of this article is devoted to an expansion of hie earlier dis­ cussion of the effect of the rationalization process on people. Parsons cites anomie (" . . . the state where large numbers of individuals are to a serious degree lacking in the kind of integration with stable institutional patterns which is essential to their own personal stability and to 32 the smooth functioning of the social system." } as the most general result. The movements of the left do not appeal to the anomic masses because they retain the "positi- vistic" and "utilitarian" aspects of bourgeois thought. The chances of a fascist movement depend most heavily on the disposition of "the relatively traditionalized elements of the society" (i.e., those not integrated into modern society).

32 Parsons, "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movements," in Parsons, Essays., p. 125. 350

One other article should be mentioned. In "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change," Parsons addresses the question of how German aggressiveness might be eliminated after the war. His solution lies in eliminating, or at least suppressing, "vested interest groups" which have supported the Nasi regime. Although his major theoretical writings would lead one to infer that German values might be changed simply through a process of re-indoctrination. Parsons here indicates the need to work with groups in a position of power which could be helpful in bringing about value changes. Of each potential ally in this process we must ask: "Is it in a sufficiently strategic position to

exert an important influence in the right direction? At an even more fundamental level, Parsons speaks of the need to work through the "economic-occupational structure."

On the one hand, industrial recovery must be encouraged; on the other, the value of individual "functional achievement" must gradually replace hierarchy, authority, and formalism as the dominant value. When the new industrial classes have grown at the expense of the peasantry, the old Mittelstand, and the old elites, the desired social change will have been finalised.

Parsons' writings on fascism are important not for their new insights but for their own sake. They testify to

33 Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled Institution­ al Change," in Parsons, Essays, p. 262. 351 the utter useleseneae of Parsons' larger body of work for the analysis of fascism and similar problems. To answer Zeitlin*s query, there is not a second Talcott Parsons— there is just one. But that one is intelligent enough to at least write something sensible about a problem with which he is confronted— *even if it means adopting theoretical assump­ tions antithetical to his own. Parsons in these three articles demonstrates a scope of analysis which is remarkab­ ly broad, from the economic to the psychological to the ideological, and, what is more, addresses different levels of phenomena in the correct order of importance. He employs a comparative method of analysis, setting the German developments off against those in America or other coun­ tries. Unfortunately, Parsons does not dabble in any real data; and this fact renders his conclusions leas useful. Still, when compared to our expectations, his performance seems to destroy our hypotheses. The very executor of the dominant paradigm is shown to be able to transcend it. There are, however, some possible explanations. Perhaps most important is the fact that Parsons received his Ph.D. from the University of Heidelberg. His years of study in Germany would certainly have injected a touch of reality into Parsons* thinking about National Socialism. Another influence could have been the ideological climate of the "market" for which Parsons was writing in the 1940s. In 352 this pre-Cold War period the scholar was not under pressure to force an analysis of fascism into the conceptual frame­ work of "totalitarianism. " Instead, the need was for practical information about the workings of fascism and about how the fascist nations might be successfully reformed after the war. Parsons could only respond to this need by abandoning his grand theory. When he later returned to theoretical writing, it is not surprising that his interest in the problem of fascism waned. Two other sociologiets attacked the problem of Nazism from the perspective of rural sociology, one of the earliest specialized sub-fielde of the American discipline. Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan fieegle investigated the rural roots of Nazism^^ using data from the post-war United States 35 strategic Bombing Survey. Guided by Toennies' con­ cept of Geroeinschaft, Loomis and Beegle set up three hypo­ theses:

(1) Elements of Nazism became entrenched among those rural, middle-class-controlled areas whose residents were suffering most acutely from economic insecurity and anxiety accompanying loss of social solidarity;

Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," American Sociolo­ gical Review, XI (December 1946), 724-34. "These findings are based upon nearly 4,000 interviews taken from some 34 cities and communities with varying bombing experience, size and cultural characteris­ tics." (Ibid., 724) 353

(2) individuals with limited experience and obligations as active menbers of dynamic large-scale political or religious social structures were more prone to become Nazis than others; and (3) during the periods of rapid change, Nazism made its greatest inroads into the groups whose basic value orientation and organizational experience had been of a Gemeinschaft . . . nature and whose formal, contractual, bureaucratic obligations and affiliations had been insignificant.26

Because the social structure of certain rural districts in Germany was well known to exhibit extremes of the relevant economic and religious variables, Loomis and Beegle had only to analyze the Bombing Survey data on voting in these dis­ tricts to test their hypotheses. All three were supported. Rural middle-class areas were shown to have been generally pro-Hitler, but areas among these with strong Catholic or

labor union organizations showed strong resistance to Nazism. The authors conclude: "... it appears that in the provinces studied, Nazism was espoused and firmly sup- 37 ported by the Protestant, middle-class rural element." The Loomis and Beegle study is most useful as a confir­ mation and generalization of the work of Rudolf Heberle, which we shall be examining later in this chapter. Loomis and Beegle fail to provide a real theoretical background for

their study. Rather, they cite isolated relationships which

**Ibid., 725. 3?Ibid., 734. 354 others have previously demonstrated* An explicit discussion of the class analysis which is implicit in their work is sorely needed. Lacking this, the study confirms the expected pattern for American sociologists. The scope of analysis is so narrow that by itself the research would generate no insight into the phenomenon of Nazism. Not enough information is provided about the methods and data for us to properly evaluate them, and the conclusions are therefore suspect. As we have witnessed in other American disciplines, a strange quietness about the problem of fascism characterized the post-war years. In sociology, the virtual silence was not broken until Seymour M. Lipset published his essay "'Fascism'— Left, Right, and Center" in 1959. Lipset sought to re-establish a scholarly emphasis on the social roots of fascism. "While an analysis of the actual behavior of parties in office is crucial to an understanding of their functional significance, the social base and ideology of any movement must also be analyzed if it is to be truly under­ stood."^® Lipset*8 theoretical framework, if it can be called that, is "conflict theory." All societies have, according to this model, evolved into class systems; and the political shape of a society is determined by struggle amongst its classes. Only under a system of democracy.

3S Seymour Martin Lipset, "'Fascism'— Left, Right, and Center," in his Political Man (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 127. 355

however, can the struggle continue. Extremist governments arising from the victory of any particular class are likely to retard social progress by eliminating democracy. Fascism is an extremism of the middle class. It dif­ fers from the working class extremism called communism and from the extremism of the traditional right known as reac­ tion. Fascism arises in countries where the middle class is the one most "displaced" by economic developments. The movement is supported by those elements of the middle class which are least educated and most isolated from "varied experiences." The hostility of these persons is turned equally against big business and labor. Fascists seek many of the same things that right-wing extremists seek, but they advocate "revolutionary" methods.

The aforegoing is, in a nutshell, Lipset's "theory" of fascism, or, more accurately, fascist movements. The remainder of this article aims to " . . . bring together available data for different countries which indicate the sharp difference between the social roots of classic fascism 39 and populism and those of right-wing movements. " For Germany Lipset looks at voting statistics for 1928 to 1933.

His key finding:

^®Ibid., p. 137 356

Am the Nasia grew, the liberal bourgeois center parties, based on the less traditional elements of German society— primarily small business and white-collar workers— conqpletely collapsed. Between 1928 and 1932 these parties lost almost 80 per cent of their vote, and their proportion of the total vote dropped from a quarter to less than 3 percent.*^

Lipset uses his data to challenge the findings of Theodore Geiger, Reinhard Bendix, and others who "... concluded that the Nazis derived their early backing from traditional nonvoters ..." based on the fact that "... the overall election figures . . . showed an enormous increase of Nazi votes simultaneous with the sudden participation of over 41 four million previous nonvoters. On the contrary, concludes Lipset,

. . . when the changes in the rates of nonvoting and of the Nazi vote are broken down by districts, we actually find a small negative rank order correlation of -.2 between the per cent Increase in the Nazi vote and the Increase in the proportion of the eligible electorate v o t i n g . ^2

These data are offered as support for the contention that German fascism was primarily a movement of economically independent elements of the middle class.

*®Ibid., p. 150. ^^Ibid. 357

Lipset next looks at Austrian voting patterns and finds the Nazis supported by the same petty bourgeois elements.

But here the conservative Christian Social party was power­ ful enough to withstand Nazi competition until the Germans invaded in 1938. In 1950s France the Poujadist movement, which for a time challenged the conservative Gaulliste, also drew its support from the petty bourgeoisie. The case of Italian Fascism is "difficult to analyze" because it began as a "neo-socialist party" and eventually, in power, became ”... a coalition between antidemocratic traditionalism and middle-class populist authoritarianism directed against the leftist revolutionary sectors of the urban and rural populations."*^ Lipset cites the opinions of other writers (but no statistics) that Fascism had its origins in the lower middle class. When he looks at the post-war, neofascist Hovimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), however, Lipset finds that Italian survey data indicate no particular class basis for the new movement. The lack of support among small proprietors for the MSI is attributed to " . . , the fact that the Fascist regime did not help the self-employed strata, but came to terms with big business, large 44 landlords, and the Church."

*^Ibid., p. 165. **Ibid.. p. 168. 358

Lipset next examines American McCarthyism, another example of populist extremism. Although it was not a true movement, at least two studies have shown that small busi­

nessmen were "more likely to be McCarthy supporters than any other occupational stratum." He concludes that McCarthyism, Poujadism, German and Austrian Nazism, and Fascism have in common an origin in "the insoluble frustration of those who feel cut off from the main trends of modern society."

Not only were these five national movements disproportionately backed by the small inde­ pendents, but in each country they secured much more support from those living on farms or in provincial small towns and cities. Here are the declining "liberal" classes living in declining areas,*5

As a contrast to the preceding movements Lipset offers Peronism— "the fascism of the lower class." Despite its many similarities to Nazism and Fascism, Peronism "... differs from the other movements . . . in its orientation toward the workers, the trade unions, and the class struggle."*® Peron (as Vargas did later in Brazil) propagated an odd alliance. "In some measure his regime was a coalition between the nationalist officers of an under­ developed country and its lower classes oriented against

*®lbid., p. 172. *®lbid., p. 173. 359

47 foreign impérialiste and local bourgeois 'renegades.'" Why the workers were drawn to Peron is not made clear. Lipset does try to show that they were the "most vulnerable' population group— which would seem to be necessary in light of his earlier "theorizing" about nationalistic extremism. Lipset'a work on fascism has been attacked on several fronts* The most interesting from our point of view is the brief critique by Ernst Nolte, who accuses Lipset of over­ simplifying matters with his three-class, two-action model of modern history. Host of what is important about fascism and its origins lies outside the purview of Lipset's scheme.

What needs to be explained is not that the Nazi Party consisted predominantly of mem­ bers of the middle class (a group whose upper and lower boundaries have never been established with any accuracy) but rather that the party attracted so many workers and noteworthy figures from the upper c l a s s . *8

Moreover, other factors, such as region, religion, sex, generation, and the general post-World War climate, might prove to be of even greater importance than pure class interests. Thus what Nolte is saying, at least in part, seems to be that Lipset has come to the problem of fascism with a particular sociological perspective which becomes a

*^Ibid., p. 175.

*®Ernst Nolte, "The Problem of Fascism in Recent Scholarship," in Turner, Reappraisals of Fascism, pp. 29-30. 360

limitation when it im not placed within a broader scope of analysis. (This conforms to the expectations of the present

study.) The otherwise praiae«rorthy use of a comparative method is therefore undercut. When we deal with Lipset*s data, yet other problems arise. In the first place, Lipset actually provides suffi­ cient data only for the case of Germany. Second, his inter­ pretation of these data may be seriously flawed. Karl O'Lessker, upon re-examining the data, has concluded that new voters and former Nationalists may in fact have been more responsible for Nazi voting gains than were Lipset's formerly "liberal" voters. Of course, were one able to determine the previous non-voters' class positions, the results might lend more support to Lipset ' s position as opposed to O'Lessker's. Lipset is likely to be correct about the middle-class nature of the Nazi movement, and his position has gained wide acceptance among scholars. But his data do not (and cannot) support Lipset's general conclu­ sion; and the conclusion itself, even if correct, does not constitute a theory of fascism.

A more likely source for a general theory of fascism is Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and

Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler? A New Look at the Class Basis of Nazism, " American Journal of Sociology, LXXIV (July 1968), 63-69. See also Allan Schnaiberg, "A Critique of Karl O'Lessker's 'Who Voted for Hitler?' " and O'Leaaker's "The Author Replies, " American Journal of Sociology, LXXIV (May 1969), 732-35. 361

Democracy, published in 1966. Moore, a sociologist at

Harvard's Russian Research Center, seems to lie somewhere between the mainstream and dissident segments of academia.

We have considered him part of the mainstream because he has not been a particularly vocal critic of the academic status

quo, although his writings are in themselves a less than subtle indictment. Sub-titled "lord and peasant in the making of the modern world," Moore's study is an effort

"... to explain the varied political roles played by the

landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies (defined simply as states where a

large majority of the population lives off the land) to modern industrial ones."®® Devoting particular atten­ tion to England, France, the United States, China, Japan,

and India, Moore identifies "three main historical routes from the preindustrial to the modern world." First are "bourgeois revolutions" (England, France, United States), in

«ftiich "the trading and manufacturing classes in the cities," together with their allies, attack "obstacles to a democra­ tic version of capitalism." Second are "revolutions from above," in which

. . . sections of a relatively weak commer­ cial and industrial class relied on dissi­ dent elements in the older and still

^®Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dicta­ torship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. xi. Copyright « 1966 by Barrington Moore, Jr. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press. 362

dominant ruling classas, mainly recruited from the land, to put through the political and economic changes required for a modern industrial society, under the auspices of a semi-parliamentary regime.51

In these cases (Japan) rapid industrialization leads to an eventual instability ending in fascism. The third route is communism (China), where the peasantry performs the revolu­ tionary function and brings about its own destruction. (India, Moore's sixth focus of attention, has not yet found a suitable route to modernization.) Of interest to us, of course, is Moore's theory of fascism. This does not begin to emerge until his chapter on Japan, in which he attempts to justify labeling the World War II regime fascist. Using Nazi Germany as a basis for comparison, Moore first highlights the differences between the two. In the first place, Japanese "fascism" was imposed from above after a series of small peasant rebellions. "National mobilization was decreed, radicals were arrested, political parties were dissolved and replaced by the Imperi­ al Rule Assistance Association, a rather unsuccessful copy of a Western totalitarian party." 5 2 Trade unions were dissolved and replaced by a government-sponsored workers' association. Thus, although via a different route, "

®^Ibld.. p. xvi,

®^lbid.. p. 301. 363 by the end of 1940 Japan displayed the principal external 5 3 traits of European fascism," There are still other differences between the German and Japanese "fascisms," The peasantry as a whole was far less actively involved in sup­ port of the Japanese regime. Neither did Japan produce a "plebeian Führer or Puce. " The Emperor served adequately as a national symbol. Nor did a mass party play a significant role. Thus Japanese "fascism" evolved almost naturally without a clear break from the previous constitutional democracy. "Finally, the Japanese government did not engage in a massive policy of terror and extermination against a specific segment of the underlying population as did Hitler against the Jews."®* But for Moore, in spite of these and other differences, the "underlying similarities between

German and Japanese fascism" are far more significant:

Both Germany and Japan entered the industri­ al world at a late stage. In both coun­ tries, regimes emerged whose main policies were repression at home and expansion abroad. In both cases, the main social basis for this program was a coalition between the commercial-industrial Elites (who started from a weak position) and the traditional ruling classes in the country­ side, directed against the peasants and the industrial workers. Finally, in both cases, a form of rightist radicalism emerged out of the plight of the petty bourgeoisie and

®^Ibld. ®*Ibid., p. 304. 364

peasants under advancing capitalism. This right-wing radicalism provided some of the slogans for repressive regimes in both countries but was sacrificed in practice to the requirements of profit and "efficien-

Hoore gives his theory of fascism greater detail in a chapter on "revolution from above and fascism." When a

"bourgeois revolution" does not acccmtpany the transition to capitalism, conditions will be propitious for other routes toward modernisation. In the countryside Moore identifies two general types of "capitalist transformation" which are unfavorable for "the growth of free institutions of the nineteenth-century Western variety."

A landed upper class may, as in Japan, maintain intact the preexisting peasant society, introducing just enough changes in rural society to ensure that the peasants generate a sufficient surplus that it can appropriate and market at a profit. Or a landed upper class may devise wholly new social arrangements along the lines of plantation s l a v e r y . 56

Both these alternatives produce what Moore calls a "labor- repressive" agricultural system. This is coupled with a

"reactionary coalition” between the old aristocracy and the nascent bourgeoisie at the national level. "Where the coalition succeeds in establishing itself, there has

®®Ibid,, p. 305. ®®Ibid., p. 433. 365

followed a prolonged period of conservative and even authoritarian government, which, however, falls far short of C7 fascism." Often, in fact, unstable democracies are established.

Eventually the door to fascist regimes was opened by the failure of these democracies to cope with the severe problems of the day and reluctance or inability to bring about fundamental structural changes. One factor, but only one, in the social anatomy of these governments has been the retention of a very substantial share in political power by the landed élite, due to the absence of a revolutionary breakthrough by the peasants in combination with urban strata.5*

In Moore's eyes, fascism was basically "an attempt to make conservatism popular and plebeian."

Plebeian anticapitalism , . . appears as the feature that most clearly distinguishes twentieth-century fascism from its predeces­ sors, the nineteenth-century conservative and semiparliamentary regimes. It is a product of both the intrusion of capitalism into the rural economy and of strains aris­ ing in the postcompetitive phase of capital­ ist industry. Hence fascism developed most fully in Germany where capitalist industrial growth had gone the furthest within the framework of a conservative revolution from above.59

S^Ibid., p. 437

^°Ibid., p. 438

S*lbid., p. 448 366

Moore cites the research of Loomis and Beegle and of Rudolf

Haberle as providing strong evidence of the small peasants' support for Nazism. He also discusses the glorification of the peasantry as a universal element of fascist ideology.

In the end, of course, the peasantry is abandoned once it has bean used on the route to power. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy is a remarkable book, especially considering it is the work of an American. There are at least two possible reasons why Moore was able to produce a work so contrary to our hypotheses. First, Moore has an obviously brilliant mind, and his posi­ tion at Harvard's Russian Research Center provides an environment in which he can exercise his capacities in great freedom. Second, he has listed among his friends Herbert

Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, and Arno J. Mayer, all prominent emigre scholars. These associations have certainly had an impact on his thinking. Still, there are some criticisms which can be leveled against his book.^^ Chief among these is the fact that Moore never properly defines fascism more fully than to call it "plebeian anticapital ism* " (But fascism is, to be fair, not the central object of study for Moore.) Because his main concern is with peasant movements, he also fails to clearly distinguish between the movement

^^For a summary of critiques of Moore, see Jonathan M. Weiner, "Review of Reviews, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy by Barrington Moore, Jr.," History and Theory, XV (1976), 146-75. 367 and the final regime. In the case of Japan, for example, "plebeian anticapital1am" seems to have played only a small role in establishing the World War II regime; and the final regime had far more dissimilarities than similarities to Italy and Germany. Moore's conceptualisation of fascism thus lacks analytical precision. But on the positive side, Moore probably goes further than any other writer in placing the rise of fascism into a specific world-historical context. His scope of analysis is broad in its internation­ alism as well as in his inclusion of ideological and motiva­ tional factors. The method is con^arative. The data are drawn from secondary sources of high quality, and Moore's conclusions tie the entire package together to logical perfection.

Another American sociologist who has done some inter­ esting work on fascism is Bertram Gross, whose 1970 article on "friendly fascism" has just recently been expanded into a book. Gross sees America as fertile ground for the produc­ tion of a new form of regime called "techno-urban" fascism*

A managed society ruled by a faceless and widely dispersed complex of warfare-welfare- induatrial-communications-police bureaucra­ cies caught up in developing a new-style entire based on a technocratic ideology, a culture of alienation, multiple scapegoats, and competing control networks.51

Bertram M. Gross, "Friendly Fascism* A Model for America," Social Policy, I (November-December 1970), 46 (emphasis removed from original). See also Friendly Fascism (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1980). 368

Gross'a "fascism" is, in fact, so different from the Europe­ an variety that his analysis, although quite persuasive, is of little relevance to the concerns of this dissertation.

Under techno-urban fascism, certain elements previously regarded as inescapable earmarks of fascism would no longer be essential. Pluralistic in nature, techno-urban fascism would need no charismatic dictator, no one- party rule, no mass fascist party, no glorification of the state, no dissolution of legislatures, no discontinuation of elections, no distrust of reason. It would probably be a cancerous growth within and around the White House, the Pentagon, and the broader political establishment.

In other words, this new "fascism" is qualitatively differ­ ent from the classical version. So why call it fascism? It does make for an Intriguing title, but the interests of scholarly analysis would be better served by applying to this predicted new phenomenon one of the labels proposed by Arno J. Mayer.

Probably the low point in American sociological litera­ ture on fascism is achieved by Irving Louis Horowitz in a chapter of his Foundations of Political Sociology. Horowitz begins by rejecting the "Marxist" (R. Palme Dutt), "liberal"

(W. Ebenstein), and "psychoanalytic" (E. Fromm) theories of fascism as too one-sided. He prefers the "political- sociological" theory pioneered by O* Nathan and G. Stolper.

®^Ibid. 369

The political-sociological explanation of fascism best explains its different varie­ ties and strains* The theory states that the efforts of fascism and its leadership are no longer centered upon the economy, but the state* The objects of fascist energies are thus outside of the economic realm, and are not directed toward a reconstitution of the economy. Indeed, the ehabbiest aspect of the fascist doctrine is generally its economic t h e o r y . 5 3

It becomes immediately clear that Horowitz is most concerned to defeat the "Marxist" interpretation. But, as we have seen in the work of other scholars with similar ideological motivations, such a preoccupation can have disastrous results if one's knowledge of Marxism is limited. Consider the ludicrous statement that* "The greatest strength of the fascist movement since the thirties has been that of the major doctrines of political power, it alone accepts the fact that the base is the state and the superstructure, the economy. In his discussion of the "social basis of fascism," Horowitz misuses another Marxian concept when he singles out the "bureaucratic class" as the key group in fascism's

coming to power*

**Irving Louis Horowitz, Foundations of Political Sociology (New York* Harper and Row, 1972), p. 235. ^^Ibid. What Horowitz is trying to say here may have some validity; but it is impermissible to take the well-established terms "base" and "superstructure" and change their meanings to suit one's own needs— unless one can demonstrate inadequacies in the traditional definitions 370

. . . (1) The bureaucracy was directly related to the taeka and to the apparatus of the state; therefore it developed a statist ideology. (2) The bureaucracy was concerned with managing the economy and the society. (3) The bureaucracy had definite interests apart from other class formations, which could only be realized by their monopoly of power.55

It would be dangerous, indeed, for Horowitz to examine the real social class background of the bureaucratic "class," for he would surely discover that the bureaucracy recruits its members from some of the classes identified by Marxists and others as forming the mass basis of fascism. Horowitz does later refer to fascism as a "capitalist revolution," indicating he has some idea about its roots. He even seems to view it in a favorable light, at least in comparison to communismt

Fascism has to do with elitism and with managing classes. Bolshevism was concerned with smashing rather than managing social classes .... What the state does to or for its class structure determines whether the system is fascist or nonfascist, whether one is smashing classes like the Communists or mending classes like the fascists.5*

In fact, Horowitz describes the New Deal as a "neofasoist

®®Ibid., p. 237.

^^Ibid., p. 238. 371 regime" with better management of the economy but with "no visible persecution of minorities. This kind of muddled thinking is possible only in some­ one with little understanding of the reality of European fascism. Horowitz' s blind anti-Marxism and anti-communism further cripple his work. The entire book is really little more than an attempt to defeat Marxism by demonstrating the primacy of politics over economics. But Horowitz merely reverses the errors of the vulgar Marxists. In terms of our criteria Horowitz scores poorly. His scope of analysis is both overly broad, because he seems to regard any attempt to manage a capitalist economy as some kind of fascism; and overly narrow, because he sees fascism as a purely socio­ political phenomenon unrestrained by economic factors. Although Horowitz implies that his speculations on the nature of fascism are derived through comparative analysis, his annotation provides little evidence for this. His "data" seem to be derived mostly from his own head, as do hie conclusions.

C . Atypical Views Amongst sociologists we once again find few dissenters who have addressed the problem of fascism. One is Albert Szymanski, a "New Left" activist and sociologist at the

*?Ibid., p. 246. 372

University of Oregon Who decided to put "the Marxist theory of fascism" to the test. "This theory of the development of fascism claims that fascism is a response of industrial capitalists to the threat of a socialist revolution. Therefore, Szymanski reasons, one should be able to test for a correlation (Pearson's r) between Indicators of industri­ alization ("the Italian industrial census of 1911"), social­ ism ("election returns by region or sub-region in the gener­ al parliamentary election immediately preceding the rise of the Fascist movement— 1919"), and fascism ("fascist terror­ ism" as reported in II Popolo d* Italia, the Fascist party newspaper, in the first half of 1921 ).^^ Szymanski finds correlation coefficients of .55 and .45 for socialism and fascism (using two different indicators of fascist terrorism) but a coefficient of -.06 for industrialism and fascism. He concludes that "the Marxist theory of fascism" must be modified. "Fascism arose in Italy primarily as a response to the Socialist movement.The recruits

Albert Szymanski, "Fascism, Industrialism and Socialism: The Case of Italy," Comparative Studies in Society and History, XV (1973), T967 By permission oi Cambridge University Press. Szymanski provides a more enlightened discussion in The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class (Cambridge, Mass.: winthrop Publishers, 197Û), ppT 575-91.

**Since the Fascist party was part of a National Bloc ticket in 1919 and 1921, actual Fascist votes are not recorded. Fortunately, "early Fascism was virtually indis­ tinguishable from its terroristic activities."

^^Szymanski, "Fascism," 402. 373 for early Fascism came frcxn "Northern small and medium land holders" most pressed by the demands of "the Socialist- organized Agricultural Leagues." Finally, referring to the work of Loomis and Beegle and of Rudolf Haberle, Szymanski compares Italy and Germany* In both cases support came from small farmers. But:

The Italian farmers were immediately and directly threatened by the offensive of the Peasant Leagues. Fascism was for them a tool to push back the offensive of their workers and restore the old labor condi­ tions. In Northwestern Germany on the other hand, where the family farmers for the most part did not have to deal with agricultural laborers, not to speak of left-wing labor unions, Nazism was a response to the greatly depressed conditions of the farmers follow­ ing the crash of 1929.'^

Despite a certain crudeness and over-simplification, Szymanski*s article exemplifies the relationship that should exist between theory and research. Yet we find in the literature very few articles designed to test particular points of theories about fascism as this one does. The problem with Szymanski*s research is that his conception of "the" Marxist theory of fascism as "the response of indus­ trial capitalists to the threat of a socialist revolution" is a bit outmoded and fits only the most "vulgar" Marxist writings. A further problem is that Szymanski tries to do

^^Szymanski, "Fascism," 402 ^^Ibid. 374

too much with a simple, Amsrican-style test of hypotheses.

As he sets it up, the whole "Marxist theory" could poten­ tially be demonstrated to be incorrect in a study of fewer than ten pages I In the choice of indicators there lie even more problems, but these may be passed over here. In all, Szymanski does not perform much better than his mainstream contemporaries. His scope of analysis is too narrow due to

his simplistic Marxism. The appropriateness of his methodo­ logy is suspect, and the data may not provide proper support for his hypotheses* Thus Szymanski's conclusions are tenuous.

Another leftist sociologist, Walter GoIdfrank of the University of California, does much better. His idea is to apply to the problem of fascism the newly developing "world- systems" sociological perspective. This theoretical view­ point asserts that "... meaningful analysis cannot sepa­ rate the phenomena of the real %#orld into three (or more) categories— the political, the economic, the social— to be studied by different methods and in closed spheres (even 72 momentarily). " Further, the vrorld system is seen as having evolved into three separate groups of states— the core, periphery, and semi-periphery— membership in which is determined by political-economic factors. Goldfrank attempts to utilize this tripartite conceptual apparatus

72 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Preface" to Barbara Hockey Kaplan, ed., Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy (Beverly Hillst Sage Publications, 1978), p. 7. By permission of the publisher. 375

. . . to begin to account for the differ­ ence# between fascist and non-fascist occur­ rences. And we can con^are the various fascisms among themselves, from the feeble sects of Britain and France and the conser­ vative authoritarianism of Portugal all the way to the Nasi movement and regime.'3

Goldfrank begins by offering two "clarifications" of the meaning of fascism. First he suggests (as others have done less systematically) that many difficulties found in previous studies of fascism relate to a failure to perceive the different phases of fascism.

First was a peculiar European intellectual climate— itself not a national phenomenon— that originated in France but found echoes across the continent. Second came the for­ mation of political sects. Third came move­ ments in the form of political parties, where permitted. Fourth came the stage of regime. At the end, as defeat in the war spelled at least a temporary demise of fas­ cism, one could adduce a desperate fifth phase, a regression to sect-movement, the Republic of lalo in Italy, the super- barbarous last year of the thousand-year Reich.

These phases are an ideal-typical construct rather than necessary stages in the development of fascism. Goldfrank's second clarification lies in distinguishing two broad types of theories of fascism— "liberal" and

73 Walter L. Goldfrank, "Fascism and World Econo­ my," in Kaplan, ibid., p. 77. T^Ibid., pp. 78-79. 376

"Marxist." "Not surprisingly, the liberal theories tend to focus on fascism as ideology, sect, and movement, while the Marxist theories tend to focus on regimes and their ef­ fects, The emphases of these two brands of theory are "not surprising" to Goldfrank because the liberals are moved by a concern to protect capitalist democracy from all sorts of authoritarianism while the Marxists are motivated by a desire to see capitalism of all forms defeated. Each theoretical type has spawned three "structural theories" of

fascism. The first liberal form Goldfrank calls the "strains in modernization" approach. Its various exemplars point to anomie (Arendt), cultural lag (Parsons), or

pressure on the middle class (Lipset) as causes for the failure of liberalism. A second liberal strain sees fascism as a "developmental dictatorship" (Gregor), and a third focuses on "democratic breakdown" (Bracher) in narrowly political terms. On the Marxist side, one version sees fascism as the "culmination of revolution from above"

(Moore), one traces fascism to "interimperialist rivalry" (Lenin), and one sees it as "reactive class struggle from above" (Neumann). While Goldfrank believes "all these approaches have something to offer," he rejects them as incomplete.

^®rbid., p. 84. 377

Karl Polanyi (The Great Transformation) years ago laid

the foundation for a world-systems approach to the interpre­ tation of fascism. From Polanyi ' s work Goldfrank draws the outlines of a theory that fascism was the result of a con­ tracting world econony and "a hegemonic shift in world poli­ tics, from English to United States dominance." In the core, Germany had fought World War I to earn a hegemonic

position at the expense of Britain and France. But the victorious United States and its allies failed to complete the shift to American hegemony in the war's aftermath. The vindictive Versailles treaty destroyed any chance that Germany would willingly accept its secondary position. Early Nazi organizing among "the uprooted of World War I" was a simple task. The Great Depression helped increase

mass support as well as financial contributions from some industrialists and other moneyed groups. But in the long run the German economy was unable to sustain Hitler's expan­ sionism. When the industrialists fell into disagreement in 1936, the "primacy of politics" was irrevocably established.

As the Germans began to suffer military defeats, the regime reverted more and more to the movement stage, generating increasingly irrational and violent Nazi policies, in contrast to Germany, other core countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, England, and the United States) were not afflicted so severely by the Depression; their middle

classes were not sufficiently alienated to produce strong 378 fascist movsmants. Goldfrank suggests that these nations were spared due to their solid status as core manbers. The semi-periphery is made up of countries "at once exploited and exploiting in the world production process."

Many of these are on their way up or down in the interna­ tional economic order. Looking at Italy, Japan, Austria, Spain, and other countries; Goldfrank finds that although most of them spawned fascist movements, and some even regimes, none was congparable to the totalitarian fascism generated by Hitler* "In Germany, where fascist aims suffi­ ciently coincided with those of the conservative right and important groupings of capital, the fascist breakthrough was achieved.In the semi-periphery conservative ruling classes were able to control fascism— unless it was imposed from without by a conquering power. As for the periphery, Goldfrank finds here numerous sects, some movements ("Hungary, Rumania, and perhaps Mexico"), and "several varieties of at least quasi-fascist regimes" (Brazil, Argentina, Portugal, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, China, Croatia, Slovakia, the Ukraine). Although he does not make general statements about peripheral fas­ cism, he seems to imply that its manifestations are mainly imitative and generally serving the interests of core powers. The periphery seems also to be the most fertile

^^Ibid., p. 113. 379 long-range breeding ground for "faeciem" in the modern world — "with considerable tutelage from the United States." Goldfrank's exploratory analysis of fascism in terms of world-systems theory is quite suggestive, but upon close inspection it yields few new insights. One problem, despite Goldfrank's attempts at "clarification," lies in the defini­ tion of fascism. Arno J. Mayer's conceptual framework would be useful here, but Goldfrank appears to be unaware of it. Although he seems at times to consider fascism to be a specifically European phenomenon, Goldfrank also appears to believe the label is at least partially applicable to any rightist movement or regime anywhere. What he does appear to have successfully accomplished is to have isolated the most fundamental or general realm of conditions Involved in the creation of fascism (and, indeed, of all types of regimes). Without a particular global organization of economic activity, and without the relationships of superi­ ority and inferiority among nations, fascism could not have existed. Thus Goldfrank defines well the starting point for any analysis of fascism. He also makes clear in his discus­ sion of specific cases that far more conditions— ethnic, national economic and social structural, intellectual/ cultural, leadership, etc.--must be studied before an ade­ quate theory of fascism can begin to emerge. In terms of our evaluative criteria, then, Goldfrank's analytical pers­ pective is of immense breadth. His method is comparative. 380

His data corns from a wide range of secondary sources, and the few conclusions drawn from this preliminary piece of work do not exceed the limits thereof. (In fact, one might legitimately expect more conclusions and speculations from a work covering such a wide array of material. Perhaps Goldfrank will continue to produce studies of fascism which develop the perspective outlined in this article.)

D. Emigré Perspectives Theodore Abel was born in Poland and came to the United States in 1923. He earned Master's and Ph.D. degrees in sociology from Columbia University. During a visit to Germany in the summer of 1933, Abel conceived of a study of the Nazi movement which he carried out during the following summer. 7 7 The study was designed in the guise of an

essay contest for Nazi party members, with monetary prizes being awarded to those writing "the best personal life history of an adherent of the Hitler movement. " Of 683 manuscripts submitted, Abel selected 600— 'excluding as unacceptable for analysis forty-eight written by women, and thirty-five for various other reasons.

77 Let it be noted that Abel spent ten years study­ ing and then teaching sociology in America before doing his research. Our previous encounters with émigré scholars educated in America may lead us to expect from Abel a more "mainstream" style of approach than one following the hypo­ thesized émigré pattern. 381

In his introductory chapter, Abel draws a portrait of the "typical" Nazi follower:

He is male, in his thirties, a town resident of lower middle-class origin, without high school educationI married and Protestant; participated in the World War, but not in the military activities during the revolu­ tion of 1918 or later outbreaks; had no political affiliations before joining the National Socialist party and belonged to no veteran or semi-military organizations. He joined the party between 1930 and 1931, and had his first contacts with the movement through reading about it and attending a meeting. He was strongly dissatisfied with the republican regime in Germany, but had no specific anti-Semitic bias. His economic status was secure, for not once did he have to change his occupation, job, or residence, nor was he ever unemployed,

Abel also briefly addresses some of the methodological

issues involved in the study. He attempts to counter argu­ ments against the reliability of the autobiographies and to defend his value-neutral approach to the Nazi movement. The following chapter provides some historical background. Abel attributes Hitler's success to two basic negative influences on the German people— the revolution of November, 1918, and the Versailles treaty. Other factors Include the holding of German prisoners in France long after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and the occupation of German terri­ tories after the war. These spawned a variety of military

78 Theodore Abel, Why Hitler Came to Power (Ne%r York: Prentice-Hall, 19%), p. 6. dopyrigbt ® 1938, renewed 1966 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. By permission of Prentice-Hal1, Inc. 382

and ■ami-military organizations and political groups dedi­ cated to counterrevolution. Drawing heavily on Mein Kampf and the "contest essays, " Abel devotes three chapters to the growth of the MSDAP. Emphasis here is placed on Hitler's ideological linking of nationalism and anti-Semitism, his skillful use of propa­ ganda, his "charisma, " and his genius for organization. The essays are particularly insightful on the all-important topic of local-level organizing. By the end of 1932 the National Socialists had become the largest party in the Reichstag. When Hitler was installed as Chancellor the conservative establishment aimed to control him. However, the conservatives failed to understand that the Nazis were more than just another party.

A party might well be expected to conform to established procedure but a movement seldom adheres to regulations and precedents. Being revolutionary in character it is bound to sweep aside all considerations, once it gets into power, until it has completely asserted i t s e l f . ^9

Abel next moves into several chapters of analysis— i.e., identifying within the autobiographies some factors which seemed to play a part in drawing people into the movement. First is "discontent."

^®Ibid., p. 111. 383

The general dissatisfaction with the Republican regime, following the aftermath of the revolution of 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, has already been considered. After 1929 this opposition was reinforced by the belief that the growing number and severity of the problems confron­ ting the German nation were largely due to the inefficiency of the government. *0

But discontent could equally well have been exploited by any other revolutionary party. The success of the Nazis must have been due to another factor--its ideology. First, the combination of nationalism and socialism solved a real dilemma facing the Germans.

The majority of Germans, the bulk of the workers and the lower middle class, were responsive to nationalism but rejected it when it was advocated without consideration of the social question. While they favored the reforms advocated by the socialists, they were reluctant to adopt the Marxist program of internationalism.°1

Although the idea of a national socialism predated Hitler, it was he who first built a movement around it. A second aspect of Nazi ideology, the leadership principle, enjoyed credibility due to the long, pre-Weimar history of German authoritarianism and to the extraordinary personal magnetism of Hitler. Third, anti-Semitism capitalized on a prevalent

*Olbid., p. 121.

®^Ibid,, p. 143. 384

sentiment in Germany and had the added utility of serving as a pseudo-theoretical explanation for many of the country's ills. A chapter on "the why of the Hitler movement" concludes Abel's analysis. Here he attempts to weigh the relative importance of four factors contributing to the Nazis' success— discontent, ideology, tactics and strategy, and Hitler's charisma. Most fundamental was the widespread discontent, which Abel sees as a necessary, but not suffi­

cient, root. "It sets the conditions which make a movement possible, but it does not at the same time determine its special features, nor does it by itself determine its success." Next in importance was Nazi ideology, cleverly crafted to appeal to the sentiments arising out of the discontent of Germans at all levels of society. But it took a we11-organized promotional plan to win and hold adherents to the ideology. The participatory and dynamic nature of the movement, along with its constant growth, made the NSDAP the single most attractive party in Germany after 1930. The charismatic leader, finally, is the factor which gave Nazism the edge over all other political forces in Germany. As to the relative significance of these four factors, Abel concludes that "... the growth and success of the Hitler movement was an outcome of their combined

®^Ibid., p. 172. 38S

effect in much manner that none of the factors considered separately can be said to have played a greater or lesser role." f i3 Abel concludes by assessing several psycho­ analytic and "Marxist" explanations of fascism. Why Hitler Came into Power is perhaps best viewed as a fusion of the European and American styles of scholarship.

Although the American influence is far more evident in Abel's work, there are some elements of the European tradi­ tion which set it off from "American sociology." For example, with a new introduction and title in 1965, Abel attempted to emphasize "... the sociological character of the study; namely, the causal analysis of a particular case OA in terms of the social factors that determined it." Thus the new title. The Nazi Movement. But a close examina­ tion reveals that Abel's analysis is couched in terms of necessary conditions rather than sufficient causes, yielding a more sophisticated inquiry than would have his causal sociological pretensions. The scope of analysis, however, is limited largely to the realm of "the sociology of politi­ cal movements." (In the new Introduction Abel states his awareness of the significant problem that his original re­ search was virtually devoid of any insight into the charac­ ter of the eventual Nazi regime. ) Although Abel' s focus is

®^Ibid., p. 185. ®^Abel, The Nazi Movement (New York: Athertun Press, 1965), p. vïïï. 386

on the movement, he does lock at a wide range of factors from the economic to the psychological in his efforts to understand the movement's success* Methodologically, there are a number of problems which raise doubts about the general value of the study. As Abel notes, his contribution lies not in uncovering new factors in the movement's rise, but rather in demonstrating the effects of these factors on individual Nazis. However, one wonders about the represen­ tativeness of a sample which would seem to be composed of the most literate members of the movement. One might also wonder about the accuracy of the essays (despite Abel's reassurances), and about the very authenticity of some of them (a question not addressed by Abel). The data could in no way be considered representative unless other studies produced similar results to Abel's. And the conclusions are accordingly, and as Abel admits, best seen as illustrative rather than complete in themselves.

An article by Hans Gerth, a German émigré, while not in itself a noteworthy contribution to the construction of a general theory of fascism, may be mentioned here as an appropriate extension of Abel's work. Gerth uses official Nazi statistics to illustrate the post-movement phase of National Socialism, its transition to a party. "The Nation­ al Socialist party in Germany can be adequately described only as a fusion of two types of domination, namely, the 387

QC charismatic and the bureaucratic types." But Garth's study is in actuality more an illustration of Max Weber's theory of "the routinlsation of charisma" than a study of fascism. A much more important work is Rudolf Heberle's From Democracy to Nazism, a collection of essays on Nazism, three of which arose out of "a comprehensive regional study" begun while the author was still in Germany at the University of Kiel. Heberle makes clear his motivation for publishing these previously unpublished or separately published arti­ cles:

It is hoped that these papers will not only help throw light on the "causes" of Germany's tragic political course, but also aid in understanding and appraising the political forces in Germany on which we may be able to rely for the establishment of a lasting p e a c e .

Heberle's essays "... do not aim at an analysis of German political ideas in general, nor do they attempt to uncover the sources of National Socialist ideology in past political 8 7 thought." Rather, Heberle undertakes the specifi­ cally sociological study of Nazism’s "... immediate

O e Hans Gerth, "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," American Journal of Sociology, XLV (January 1940), 517. 86 Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945), p. vi. ®’lbid. 388 antecedents or forerunners among these political circles and movements in which political and politically relevant ideas SB are debated, modified, and propagated." The first of Heberle's essays outlines the "origin and nature of the National Socialist party." Here he seems to draw largely upon secondary sources but gives due considera­ tion to a variety of elements contributing to the Nazi triumph. Heberle's own particular interest lies in the role of the rural populace in bringing about this victory. Although the NSDAP had an urban origin, it eventually found itself checked in the cities by "a very firm bloc of Social Democratic and Communist labor votes." The party recognized and responded to a need to become more rural. "Consequent­ ly, if one wants to understand the reasons for its final success, one should study the Nazi movement in its rural ÛQ strongholds." One of those rural strongholds was Schleswig-Holstein. Heberle begins his study of this region by examining its political parties and elections before the first World War.

In response to the successes of a well-organized social Democratic party from 1890 to 1903, a coalition of "progres­ sive liberal" parties was formed. Its constituency included "the middle classes of small businessmen and small

®®Ibid., p. vii, **Ibid., p. 22. 389

manufacturers, the educated middle class, and the small farmers." The coalition stood against protective tariffs, anti-Semitism, and the national armament policy. It stood

for the expansion of the political role of the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag.

And yet, one can, in the ideology of the progressive Liberals in the region, discern certain attitudes and sentiments Which later on facilitated the conversion of broad masses of middle class elements to National Socialism: There was a combination of anti- capitalistic, anti-plutocratic sentiments with anti-imperialistic attitudes, and of an emphatic rejection of Proletarian Socialism with an attitude of social solidarity that favored progressive labor legislation or Sozialpolitik.90

By 1912 the Progressives were the pre-eminent party in Schleswig-Holstein, and by the beginning of World War I they had won victories in all the Prussian provinces. But it was the war which actually led to the changes they desired.

The collapse of the imperial regime in 1918 resulted in the establishment of parliamen­ tary democratic government. This fulfill­ ment of democratic demands came almost with­ out struggle. It was the second time in German history that this happened, and that was unfortunate, because political rights and institutions that have been received as gifts from fate are not likely to be held as high as those for %diich brave men have fought and died.91

®°Ibid., p. 29. *llbid., p. 31. 390

Hebarle next concentrates on events In Schleswig- Holstein from 1918 to 1932. He begins by delineating three separate "physiographic sones" which display three different socio-economic structures. The North Sea marshes evolved an economy centered around the production of beef cattle and wheat for distant markets. A class of large farmers came to dominate the highly stratified society which Heberle charac­ terises as a peasant aristocracy. The eastern hill zone has very fertile soil which is especially suited to grain production. Here, too, large estate owners dominate poli­ tics in a stratified rural social structure. The Geest, in contrast to the other two regions, has rather poor soil and evolved a social structure of small freeholders with little stratification. It is essentially a society of peasant villages where families are engaged in a variety of small- scale enterprises. Each region has produced its own "poli­ tical atmosphere," a concept which Heberle uses to encompass everything from minor and fleeting opinions to the very basic political values.

These basic attitudes are partly determined by interests which in turn are conditioned mostly by the occupations and industries of the population; but there are others which are determined by historical events, by past experiences such as victory or defeat in war.*2

®^Ibid., p. 40. 391

This conception is very much in agreement with a Marxian definition of ideology, although Heberle cites no such influence on his thinking.

In Schleswig-Holstein as a whole, there are three large social groups which contribute to the shaping of the politi­ cal atmosphere. The large landowners form the main support for conservatism. The urban and rural middle classes lean toward liberalism. The industrial labor class provides the core of Social Democratic support. Immediately following the first World War, the new Weimar government received some support from the middle classes as well as the working classes. But when the government opted to continue the wartime policy aimed at providing cheap food supplies for the cities, the rural middle-class farmers quickly turned against the Social Democrats. The Bauernverein, a movement representing the economic interests of middle-class farmers, spread throughout the Geest and some sections of the other two regions in 1918 and 1919. Out of this there arose a political party, the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landespartei, which had some localized successes, elected one person to the Reichstag, but then suffered a mortal defeat in the elections of 1921. Although the Landespartei never grew into a significant force, Heberle sees it as an important foundation stone in the building of National Socialism. "By analyzing the Landespartei ideology we can carry the analy­ sis of the development of the National Socialist doctrine to 392

a societal level which is not easily accessible to the student of the history of political ideas.While the Landespartei claimed to be in the liberal tradition, it gradually distinguished itself from liberalism by emphasiz­ ing states' rights, the need for a second legislative body based on "industrial representation," anti-Semitism, and the primacy of politics over economics (i.e., the control of big business). After the failure of the Lande spar te i a number of other movements arose to contend for middle-class farmers' alle­ giance. These failed for a variety of reasons. Then came the Nazis' turn. "The beginning of National Socialist propaganda among the Schleswig-Holstein farmers coincides approximately with the beginnings of the depression in agriculture."** In the spring of 1930 a Nazi agrarian program was announced which virtually assured rural support.

Typically National Socialist, it promised something to every major rural group. "The foremost promise, however, was that agriculture would be regarded as the privileged class (der 95 erste Stand) in the National Socialist state." Con­ currently with its propagandizing, the Nazi party seized every opportunity to become involved in local economic

**Ibid., p. 45, **Ibid., p. 71. **Ibid., p. 75. 393

interest and self-help organisations. In the election of July 31, 1932, the National Socialists polled nearly 64 per­ cent of the rural vote.

In fact, in the summer of 1932, there were only three rural groups which stood outside: the owners of large estates, or rather the older generation of them, since the younger ones had to a great extent already become National Socialists; the richest, and therefore, most respected large farmers; and finally, large parts of the agricultural working class, especially in areas of sharp class contrasts, where the Social Democratic party and the Communist party still had large followings.**

Heberle's next chapter, on "the ecology of political parties in Schleswig-Holstein," moves into the realm of statistical analysis. This contrasts with, and supplements, the method of historical narrative which predominates in previous chapters. Heberle first shows that the electoral trends in Schleswig-Holstein from 1919 through 1932 form a line graph quite similar to the graph for the Reich as a whole in the same period. Thus the findings of this study are likely to be representative of the developments in all of Germany. One of Heberle*s discoveries is that rural areas exhibited a far greater shift toward Nazism in the early 1930s than did urban areas. In order to find some

reasons for this change in rural areas, he sets up a com­ parative analysis of selected communities in each of the

**Ibid., pp. 80-81. 394 three geographical regions of Schleswig-Holstein* He finds that "... the great majority of communities where the Nazis obtained more than 75 per cent of the vote were 9 7 located on the Geest." Thus the Geest shifted from a 65 percent liberal vote in 1919 to a nearly 80 percent

National Socialist vote in 1932. The other two regions (to greatly condense Heberle's findings} were much more stable in overall political opinion and much more diversified internally, reflecting the more congplex social structures of these regions. All three zones, however, had the NSDAP making its greatest inroads in areas heavily populated by "... small farm proprietors, very much the rural equiva­ lent of the lower middle class or petty bourgeoisie (Klein- buerqertum) which formed the backbone of the NSDAP in the cities."*® Despite Heberle's efforts to place his study in the mainstream of American sociology, he seems unable to sup­ press the influence of his European training. Marxian theo­ retical pre-suppositions abound in the book, and several chapters of socio-economic analysis precede the single chap­ ter of statistical analysis* Heberle thus introduces his very specific study by showing how it fits into a broad- scoped analysis of the rise of National Socialism.

*^Ibid., p. 97. QQ Ibid., p. 112. 395

Methodologically, From Democracy to Nazism constitutes one of the classic uses of the "ecological" method of voting research. Although this has been extremely fertile, it does have the drawback of being unable to connect votes with 99 specific people. Heberle further aggravates the problem by presenting only percentages in his tables, there­ by leaving himself open to the charge that new voters could have been responsible for the observed shifts. Fortunately he strengthens his case with supplementary correlation analyses of party strength with factors such as farm size and occupational statistics. As for the data themselves, the government figures Heberle works with would appear to be reliable since they were all collected during the pre-Nazi period. Finally, Heberle*s conclusions do not exceed the limits of his data. When he does speculate beyond these limits, he makes clear he is doing just that. A recent attempt to summarize the state of our under­ standing of fascism is an appropriate work with which to complete our consideration of this subject. Juan J . Linz, of Spanish and German background, now an American citizen and professor at Yale University, has given us "some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological

99 Heberle points out that modern survey analysis, vdiich does connect votes with people, may be combined with ecological analysis to their mutual benefit. See his "Preface to the 1970 Edition, " From Democracy to Nazism (New York: The Universal Library, 1970), p. vi. 396

Historical Perspective.” This imposing title might raise expectations in the contemporary student of fascism that at last he or she has found the one resource which meaningfully organizes the myriad approaches to the subject. But, as we shall see, Linz's "Notes" are long on bibliography and short on analysis, Linz begins by attempting to identify fascism. He conceives of it in general as a product of Europe in the aftermath of World War I* It is specifically a counterrevo­ lutionary reaction to the threat of proletarian revolution:

"... we could define fascism as a party of revolution­ aries linked with the middle classes of the city and/or countryside.As to the question of why some movements succeed and some fail:

Our basic hypothesis is that while ideolo­ gical differences between these movements account for some of the variations, the most important ones are due to the particular historical national situation in which they were born, the political space already occu­ pied before the arrival of those latecomers, and some distinctive social structural problems of the different societies.101

A few pages later Linz evolves a "multi-dimensional typolo­ gical definition" designed to cover all fascist movements.

Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism; A Reader's Guide, p. 7. lOllbid., p. 10, 397

We define fascism as a hypernationalist, often pan-nationalist, anti-parliamentary, anti-liberal, anti-communist, populist and therefore anti-proletarian, partly anti­ capitalist and anti-bourgeois, anti­ clerical, or at least, non-clerical move­ ment, with the aim of national social inte­ gration through a single party and corpora­ tive representation not always equally enqphasizedr with a distinctive style and rhetoric, it relied on activist cadres ready for violent action combined with electoral participation to gain power with totalitari­ an goals by a combination of legal and vio­ lent tactics,102

Lins assigns some importance to the fascist ideology, contrary to those who argue it is of little importance because it is jettisoned once the fascist party attains power. Without the Ideology, Linz rightly asserts, the initial following so necessary to build a movement would not have been attracted. Thus a long discussion is devoted to the various elements of fascist ideology with emphasis on the sociological roots of their appeal* The unifying theme is the "anti" nature of fascism. The nearly universal opposition to Marxism, cwmnunism, liberalism, industrial capitalism, and other modern developments is viewed by Lins as basically derived from an anti-internationalism and anti- cosmopolitanism reflecting the various fascist movements' hype ma t iona list origins. Lins surveys various nations, attempting to find in their histories some reasons why the

l®*Ibid., pp. 12-13 398 fascists' "anti-appeals" found resonance. After briefly commenting upon the role of "crisis situations" he takes up the idea of fascism as a "generational revolt." Here Linz examines the very positive appeal of fascism as youthful and manly to the generation of war veterans and university students who had little to look forward to in the future. He finally, almost haphazardly, reaches a conclusion about the key factors in fascism's growth. At bottom is the

"historical crisis of liberal democracy in Italy, compounded in Germany with the economic crisis." This sets the stage for the political struggle:

In understanding that process, clues should not be searched for in the social composi­ tion but in the organizational capacity, the impact of activism, the combination of vio­ lence with the capacity to penetrate a com­ plex network of interest groups loosely linked with existing party structures whose members were ideologically predisposed to some but not all the themes of the movement, and which exercised enormous influence over their members and the community networks of rural and small-town G e r m a n y . 103

It is unfortunate that Linz devotes less than one page of his article to the aforegoing basic insights.

Instead of explicating more fully the process of the fascist accession to power, Linz quickly moves into a commentary on "fascist leadership." The leaders of various fascist parties tended to be younger, less educated, born

l**Ibid., p. 42. 399 in rural areas, and of the "lower professions." A longer discussion is devoted to "the membership of fascist par­ ties, " but few generalizations are offered. Linz's last major topic is "the electoral basis of fascism, " in which he summarizes the findings of studies in the tradition of Heberle's "ecological" methodology.

The ecological analysis of German and to some extent Austrian elections seems to confirm the following main trendsi a dis­ proportionate Nazi strength among Protes­ tants and a weakness among Catholics which is only slowly overcome; a disproportionate strength in rural peasant communities, par­ ticularly of northern and north-western Germany, apparently greater in those areas with a more homogeneous class structure and particularly those affected by market fluc­ tuations and the economic crisis; and a greater strength in small towns than in metropolitan centres, probably even if the occupational structure.were not different, as it certainly was.

Some studies indicate a greater fascist strength in areas "with a tradition of regional peripheral hostility to centralistic policies" and in areas where communistic organization was strong. Returning again to the effect of the economic crisis, Linz notes that ecological studies of

Germany have shown a definite parallelism between the Nazi vote and various indicators of economic downturn. He is quick to point out, however, that Nazism was also the result of "other non-economic variables"— ongoing conservative

^°*Ibid., p. 88. 400 opposition to the Weimar government, that government's inability to deal with the crisis, the youthful activism of the Nasis, the charisma of Hitler, etc. But even with these and other factors working in their favor, neither the National Socialists nor the Fascists were ever to attain the massive electoral majorities they craved, "The fascist plebiscitarian dream of overcoming the class and religious cultural cleavages of unintegrated German and Italian soci­ eties failed because of the opposition of the working class left and the Catholics » Only violence and coercion produced for fascist parties the kinds of vote totals they needed to demonstrate their domestic "popularity" to the rest of the world. Linz concludes, finally, ty arguing that

"fascism is dead," although many fascist elements survive in various contemporary regimes. It is the task of modern governments to see that the constellation of events and forces that led to classical fascism do not arise again. Linz's article is an excellent example of the mode of scholarship known as "liberal." This approach is often characterized by a "shotgun" presentation of variables

l**Ibid., p. 99.

The liberal "crisis-management" perspective suggested here and at other points in Linz's article is developed in his The Breakdown of Demworatic Regimesi Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19ié)* 401

Involved in a phenomenon and a studied refusal to order these variables in a framework that makes sense. Linz has thus been pretty well "Americanized," although at times a sense of the hierarchy of "causal" variables does manifest itself in this article. It is not surprising to learn that he came to this country in the early 1950s and earned his doctorate in sociology from Columbia University in 1959,

All in all, Linz's work has great utility as a "reader's guide" to fascism but is of little use to those concerned with building a theory of fascism. On the criteria we are interested in, however, the article scores well, Linz works within an extremely broad analytical framework, both at the international level and in the variety of factors considered

at the national level. The comparative methodology he employs is, at least potentially, the key to attaining insight into fascism as a general phenomenon, Linz draws heavily upon the large number of relevant social scientific studies of fascist and proto-fascist occurrences. It is his great contribution, in fact, to have assembled the single

best available guide to the social scientific research on fascism. He is weakest when it comes to drawing conclusions from the immense volume of material he deals with. A large part of this difficulty may lie in his illogical "organiza­ tion" of the material. It makes little sense as he presents it, although his presentation may merit "liberal" praise for obscuring some of the more radical insights which at times 402 peak through. When he does perceive some relationship, he usually puts it in the form of a sentence beginning with "It is not accident that . . . . " This habit is another appar­ ent device for the avoidance of unwanted perceptions.

The sociologists whose work is cited in this chapter provide good support for our hypotheses, of the mainstream sociologists. Parsons and Moore are exceptions to the rule; but Loomis and Beegle, Lipset, and Horowitz perform as expected. Of the dissenters, Szymanski fails but Goldfrank performs well. And all three of the dmigrds (Abel, Heberle, and Linz) come through with the kinds of broad-based approaches to fascism we predicted for them. Of the three non-supportive cases. Parsons' and Moore's exceptional performances are understandable in light of their strong European connections, only Szymanski, whose simplistic study seems to be the result of an inexplicably shallow interpretation of the Marxist writings on fascism, truly surprises us. CHAPTER VIII

RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

We must now determine whether the analysis of the preceding five chapters lends support to the basic hypo­ theses which have guided this dissertation. The first hypothesis states that there will be identifiable differ­ ences with regard to analytical scope, methodologies, and research conclusions among the fascism studies produced by orthodox members of the five American social scientific disciplines being considered. This has been well demon­ strated* The psychologists and analysts tended to focus upon the attitudes or personalities of fascists and their supporters, generally through the analysis of survey data or case studies. The two Americans who got so far as to think of fascism itself both fell into the error of searching for psychological causes of fascism.

Few mainstream economists have chosen to deal with the problem of fascism. The predominant trend manifests itself in a small selection of books and articles debating economic aspects of particular regimes— especially the German econo­ my's potential to sustain the war effort. Such studies are

403 404

usually limited to an analysis of available economic statis­ tics, are non-comparative, and result in extremely limited conclusions with little theoretical relevance* Among political scientists, two different trends deve­ loped. Many studies have been produced which fall into the predicted pattern of concentrating on narrowly political aspects of particular regimes. A book on "the limits of Hitler's power," for example, discusses only the kinds of limits imposed by other political actors. Such research, based largely on memoirs and captured documents, most often leads its authors to incomplete or irrelevant conclusions. A second trend lies in the adoption of the pseudo-theory of totalitarianism which, as a generalizing approach, we were not surprised to discover was the initial product of dis­ placed Europeans. Although studies of totalitarianism employ a comparative methodology, the scope of the compari­ son encompasses only political phenomena. This focus is remarkable for its consistent production of research conclu­ sions which validate certain cold-war Western ideological premises. Historians who have addressed the problem of fascism are far less likely to fall into any particular pattern of scholarship. There is some work which tends toward mono­ causality, but the alleged causes vary greatly from study to study. Among those who take a more general approach. 405

modernization "theory" serves the historians in mudh the same way totalitarianism serves the political scientists. But there are also several examples of recent American academic historical research which have contributed to the building of a general theory of fascism. Historians seem to have much greater latitude in the choice of approaches to fascism, perhaps because history, of the five social sciences here considered, is the least integrated by a consensus about its proper goals and methods. By way of contrast, sociologists come at fascism in a much more unified manner. A primary concern of sociology is with social structure, which entails a central focus on social classes. And American sociological research on fascism almost invariably stresses the class origins of the fascist movements. Although the knowledge of these roots is invaluable, it does not constitute the sufficient explana­ tion implied by many mainstream scholars. The failure to link class analyses to more general theories of fascism has been the orthodox sociologists' major weakness. Thus our review of social scientific investigations of fascism has clearly demonstrated that at least four of the disciplines produce distinctive kinds of perspectives on fascism which only a minority of scholars in each discipline seem capable to transcending. Moreover, this tendency too often leads to monocausal explanations. The extreme disci- 406

pllnal spaciallzatlon seem# to promote the Ignorance of alternative way# of understanding fascism. A further test of this assertion is provided by our second hypothesis, in which we state our expectation that those associated either directly or indirectly with the European intellectual tradition will fare significantly better in their handling of fascism when compared in terms of our evaluative

criteria. A preliminary accounting, shown in Table 1, lends substantial support to the second hypothesis among psychologists and sociologists, moderate support among historians, but no support at all among economists and

political scientists. At times in our study of the materials for this dissertation we encountered patterns of non-compliance with

the second hypothesis which may shed some light on the low level of overall support for this hypothesis. First, some of the more notable exceptions came from American scholars writing in the 1920s and 1930s— before the advance of

specialization began approaching its modern levels. Hoover, Haider, Schuman, and Parsons fall into this category. All four traveled extensively and studied in Europe— which may be an indication that American university education prior to

World War II was a much more exclusive, upper-middle-class 407

TABU 1 8om# American and Buropaan Social Sciantiata Who Produced in America Studiaa of Buropaan Faaoiem, Lieted According to a Judgment of Their Performance Relative to the Hypothesieed Pattern*

Discipline Confirming 2nd Hypothesis Refuting 2nd Hypothesis

Van Clute (1942) Brickner (1943) Alexander (1948, 1949) Psychology Reich (1946) Erickson (1942) Fromm (1941) Adorno et al. (1950)

Brady (1937) Hoover (1933) Hoolston (1941) Florinsky (1936) Economics Sweesy (1942) Hunk (1940) Walk (1938) Gurland (1941) Palyi (1941) Pollock (1941) Schweitser (1964) Nathan (1944)

Ermath (1936) Haider (1930, 1934) Political Lasswell (1933) Schuman (1935) Science Bbenatein (1943, 1945) Friedrich/ Neumann (1942) Brsesinski (1956)

Deutsoh (1935) Weiss (1967) Sohoenbaum (1966) Salvemini (1942) Turner (1969, 1972, 1975) Sarti (1970) History Allen (1975) Loewehberg (1971) Weber (1964) Sauer (1967) Mayer (1971)

Loomie/Beegle (1946) Parsons (1942) Lipset (1960) Moore (1966) Horowitz (1972} Ssymanaki (1973) Sociology Goldfrank (1978) Abel (1938) Heberle (1945) Lins (1976

NOTBt To simplify this table, social scientists are not listed according to their specific group labels (mainstream, dissenting, or dmigrè) within disciplines. Rather, they are listed according to whether or not they performed as hypothesised for their group. Dates in parentheses are publication dates unless works were written five or more years prior to publication. 408

Institution retaining strong ties to its European roots,^

In our discussion of émigre historians we noted what seemed to be another pattern, in which Europeans who emigrated while young and received their post-graduate degrees in America appeared more likely to attack fascism in a mainstream style. However, in our entire group of emigres, of the eight who were substantially educated here, only three (Sarti, Loewenberg, and Florinsky) can be said to have adopted a mainstream perspective on fascism* About the same proportion of European-educated social scientists did the same thing. Hence it would seem that the learning environment of higher education has little effect on the

émigrés with respect to their interpretive approach to fascism. The fact remains that a significant number of the European scholars failed to perform as well as we expected.

The major faults lay in concentrating on economic (Florinsky, Gurland, Pollock, Nathan) or political (Munk,

World war II seems to be a universally agreed- upon turning point for American higher education, Robert Nisbet, in The Degradation of the Academic Dogma: The University in America, 194S-1970 (New York: Basic Books, 1971 ), decries the loss of the medieval heritage of the university as a place where knowledge is pursued for its own sake. Most of the "knowledge" produced in the modern university is geared to the needs of state and economy and is increasingly financed from these sources. Adam Ulam cites 1945 as having begun a period of politicization of the universities as part of the scramble for newly available funds. The "student revolt" of the 1960s was a partial result* See Ulam's The Fall of the American University (LaSalle, Illinois: The Library Press, ISTTH 409

Friedrich, Salvemini, sarti) phenomena to the exclusion of others* Thus these Europeans committed similar errors to those committed by some of the Americans. Although the emigres were more likely to approach fascism as a general phenomenon, their record in producing studies of broad scope A is not spectacularly better than that of the Americans. Although there does appear to be an overall trend in support of the second hypothesis, our experience with social scientific studies of fascism is far from a conclusive demonstration of that trend. There are simply too many other forces at work In directions contrary to the hypothe­ sized tendency. Amongst Americans, for example, it seems that orthodox scholars just do not often come to see fascism as a problem deserving their attention. Host of those who do select fascism as a research subject are people who have rejected in one way or another the dominant trends in their disciplines, but who are not radically dissenting scholars. Hoover, Haider, Schuman, Weiss, and Moore are social scien­ tists who could have been considered dissenting scholars if a broader definition of dissent had been employed in this dissertation. Where the spirit of the second hypothesis

2 Note the difference here. It is one thing to adopt the general concept of fascism as an international phenomenon, and quite another to seek to invest that concept with a general meaning. The Europeans, for whatever reason, are far more likely to think in terms of the general concept than are the Americans. But when it comes to achieving a broad-based understanding of the phenomenon, the differences between emigres and Americans are greatly diminished. 410 hypothesis really seems to operate, then, is at the level of problem selection. Of the forty-seven authors considered in this dissertation, only twenty-three are native-born Ameri­ cans. Thus about half the research on fascism produced in this country has been generated by the small contingent of social scientists who emigrated here. One would, of course, expect the Europeans to be much more interested in the poli­ tical phenomenon from which many of them were running; but sufficient concern about the problem does exist among Ameri­ can social scientists to lead us to expect a better showing on their part* In support of this view we can point to hundreds and hundreds of research pieces by Americans on various aspects of particular regimes which do not consider the concept of a general, international fascism. Since 1960, as American academic specialization has proliferated, only three true contributions to the building of a general theory of fascism have been published in this country. One is by an émigré (Mayer), one is by a "radical" (Goldfrank), and one is by a sociologist just on the fringe of the main­ stream (Moore). At the same time a large number of impor­ tant works have been produced in various European countries. Only in Europe does a serious debate continue about the meaning of fascism.

In summary, this exploratory dissertation has had limited success in demonstrating a possible effect of acade­ mic specialization upon the study of fascism. It is clear 411

that each discipline generates a particular style of approach to fascism. This is hardly surprising* What we did not expect is the large proportion of mainstream social scientists who have been able to either rise above disci­ plinai frameworks or incorporate more limited studies into a larger perspective* Although few of these mainstream excep­ tions have been innovators, they have at least been able to see that fascism cannot be explained through the methods or areas of interest peculiar to any one discipline. Indeed, fascism so obviously demands a general social science approach that specialists are obliged to either ignore it (which is what has largely happened} or abandon the special­ ized perspectives in which they have been trained. The first reaction is not accounted for in this dissertation's research design, and the second contradicts our second hypo­ thesis. The only way in which the relationship between specialization and fascism scholarship could be adequately tested is through a thorough accounting of the kinds of studies of fascism and fascist regimes produced by social scientists in America. Such a tallying would likely demon­ strate a greater propensity of mainstream scholars to perform the kinds of specific research on particular regimes which, due to their indifference toward a general concept of fascism, were not included in the present study. Émigrés and dissenting Americans would be more likely to put either 412

Specific or general studies into a framework defined by the

concept of fascism.

If one could carry out the kind of accounting suggested above and thereby demonstrate more convincingly that the Americans have in fact found it difficult to think in terms of fascism as an international problem, one would then want

to take a more sophisticated look at the reasons for this failure. Surely academic specialization and professionali­ zation are the most immediately obvious conditions underly­ ing the Americans' performance; but one would also need to investigate the political culture which shapes the academic environment. Specialization and "value-freedom" may develop more quickly in an atmosphere where the range of political debate is relatively narrow. In America, such has been the case since World War II. Political views on the far left or far right have been effectively defined as part of a "luna­ tic fringe" of opinion not deserving the attention of normal people. This has been possible because the class structure of the United states does not contain most of the elements which in European countries support "extremist" views— a landowning aristocracy, a politicized working class move­ ment, a substantial sector of self—employed craftsmen, etc. Further, the system of proportional representation in most European nations tends to support smaller parties and thus a greater diversity of political debate. In America smaller parties have virtually no substantive rewards to work for. 4X3 and offlee-seeking individuals whose values might be more in line with a "fringe" party are forced to align themselves with one of the two major parties if they wish to have a serious chance of winning an election. Consequently

America has not experienced the proliferation of more or less powerful political parties found in western European countries. The range of public discussion rarely includes viewpoints which question the status quo from a socialist, communist, fascist, reactionary, or other "un-American" perspective. It is taken for granted that America has evolved the most productive possible form of society and that people had best prepare themselves for a suitable functional position therein. The universities, for their part, have tended to contain philosophical questions within certain departments and courses, thereby freeing most acade­ mic personnel to pursue "science" of one kind or another and to train young people for careers.

The European universities have, of course, exhibited the same trend toward specialization seen in the United States.* But alongside have persisted older philoso-

Por an overview of the history of education in Europe and elsewhere, see w. P. Connell, A History of Educa­ tion in the Twentieth Century World (New York* Teachers college Press, 1980); and Fritz K.Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe (Bloomington* Universitÿ ^ f Indiana Press, 19^9). Ringer points to the danger in educa­ tion's becoming "merely an extension of the occupational structure." He calls for a modern replacement for "classi­ cal humanism" as Insurance against education "losing its partial autonomy within the social system." 414

phlcal traditions which reflect the various political elements of the European nations. The difference is largely a matter of degree between the American and European situations, but it Is an important difference. For example, the leftist academic tradition continues to be a force in

Europe; whereas in the United States it has had little impact except when catalyzed by the Viet Ham war. And it is, after all, the left which has kept alive the issue of fascism when moat other groups of scholars have abandoned it. Another factor which should be investigated for its relevance to fascism studies is the traditional elitist organization of higher education, which also seems to have persisted to a greater extent in Europe than in America. We have seen that some of the finest studies of fascism produced by Americans were carried out in the 1930s by people like Haider, Hoover, and Schuman— who seem to have had sufficient funds for overseas travel and sufficient autonomy and time to construct well-thought-out, comprehen­ sive investigations of fascist regimes. Today, with an exponential increase in the number of academics, there has been no increase in studies of fascism employing the kinds of painstaking research we have admired. in Europe, on the contrary, at least in the realm of fascism studies, such 415

work continues to be produced.*

4 Some prominent examples are Karl Dietrich Bracher, German Dictatorship (New Yorkt Praeger Publi­ shers, 1970); Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (New Yorki Harper and Row, 1974); Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New Yorkt New American Library, 1969); and Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship (London: New Left Books, 197411 In addition to academic specialization, there are other variables in the European and American academic environments which need to be investigated as potential contributors to differences in scholarship. One possible factor discouraging American work on fascism is the limited access to document collections in Europe. Americans may lack the personal connections which are necessary to open doors to the documents they need. Another variable which should be considered is the apparent difference in funding between the United States and European nations. There may be more long-term grants available in Europe than here. And, finally, the much stronger tenure system in Europe might also work to encourage scholars to undertake more time-consuming research. CHAPTER IX

TOWARD A SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF FASCISM

Underlying this dissertation has been a deep concern with the construction of a proper social scientific theory of fascism. Although our focus on the American materials has been a limited one, certain insights have been derived which, in concert with those of recent international scholarship, lead to a fairly clear picture of what is needed in a theory of fascism. But let us begin at the most basic level.

A. What is a Social Scientific Theory? If one uncontestable conclusion can be drawn from this dissertation, it is that the subject of fascism cannot be contained within the bounds of any one discipline. A social scientific theory In the broadest sense is needed. Such a theory must have sufficient analytical space to anticipate all potential sources of influence upon the fascist movement and regime. It therefore seems necessary for our theory to encompass, at least conceptually, all of human social exis­ tence. The phenomena of human reality can best be organized

416 417 and understood as a series of levels. The foundation level is energy. All plant and animal life survives only to the extent of its capability to convert energy (along with inorganic natural resources) for its own needs. Only human­ kind has been able to harness energy for purposes beyond mere survival.^ The energy available to humans deter­ mines the limits for societal development. In constructing society humans raise themselves above the purely biological or animal level. The most basic as­ pect of society is a division of labor which allows indivi­ duals to specialize in particular activities and to develop them to a more efficient or productive state. For a variety of reasons certain people fulfilling certain activities are able to acquire more wealth than others, and a class structure evolves. Closely related to this division of wealth is a distribution of power— the political structure of a society. Each of these levels of society should be

An excellent introduction to the relationship between energy and society is Jeremy Rifkin's Entropy; A New World View (New York; Viking Press, 1980). Lest one wonder about the relevance of societies' energy use to the problem of fascism, see Rifkin's (pp. 239-40) suggestion that "fascism" may serve as a future "solution" to the prob­ lems encountered by societies whose energy needs begin to out-run available supplies. Another book worth investigat­ ing is W. Fred Cottrell's Energy and Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955). Our entire discussion of the hierarchi­ cal ordering of social phenomena is a much simplified presentation of a theoretical system being developed by Professor Cert Mueller of The American University. The present author is indebted to Professor Mueller and apolo­ gizes for omitting so many key elements of the original theory in an effort to be brief. 418 thought of a# "higher" than the one it preeupposee. The highest, political structure, in^lies a particular class structure, which in turn ing>lias a certain level of evolu­ tion of the division of labor. And the potential for humans to develop a division of labor depends upon preconditions in the animal and plant worlds, which presuppose, finally, the availability of energy. In other words, the lower levels can be understood as necessary conditions for the higher ones. Arising with the social structure is the individual human actor who, because of his or her dependence upon society, takes on the values deemed necessary for society's reproduction. The more complex the society, the more varied and independent human individuals tend to become. These actors produce the highest level of human accomplishment, culture— the sum of preserved creation. Unlike other animals, humans have the capacity to control the shape of their world. Most human effort throughout most of history has been devoted to maintaining the "naturally evolved" way of things. Social change occurs when a sufficient number of people dissatisfied with their world organize to make adjustments in the societal structure.

No social scientific theory can afford to ignore any of the above levels of phenomena; yet the specialization in American social science seems calculated to encourage such ignorance. The total dynamics of human society have become 419

obscured as ephemeral problems (inflation, wars, crime, psychosis, etc.) absorb the energies of social scientists. Working at social science is reduced to an exercise in the preservation of contemporary American society. Dissident

academic voices are tolerated as monuments to academic free­ dom— so long as they stay in their places. The chance is small that such an educational system will match intelligent social scientists with the kind of training they need to confront adequately problems of the magnitude of fascism.

B. What is Fascism?

One result of the over-specialization of social science is the disagreement about a definition of fascism. At the beginning of this dissertation we defined fascism as a poli­ tical system of one party rule which is established on the basis of mass support for its ideology of anti-liberalism and anti-socialism. A fascist movement is one which (not necessarily successfully) strives to forge such a system* We also specified that true fascism existed only in Europe between about 1920 and 1945.^ Let us now defend these geographical and temporal limits. If a label applied to a social phenomenon is to have analytical utility, it must be given historical content.

2 The best argument for these temporal limits is found in H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in S. J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 18-38. 420

The polls, for example, was a form specific to ancient

Greece. "Feudalism" has only analogies in the modern world.

And "possessive individualism" makes sense only in the con­ text of modern capitalism. Likewise, fascism has its spatial and temporal location, outside of which use of the label is inappropriate. Let us examine a few of the rejec­ ted candidates. Japan's World War II regime has been called

"fascist" by a number of observers. We have already regis­ tered our disagreement with Barrington Moore's employment of the term on grounds that a fascist party was not responsible for bringing the regime to power and that the regime itself owed more to Japan's imperial past than to the European model. These points are underscored by Masao Maruyama, who, nevertheless, still prefers to apply the term "fascism" to the Japanese regime. Maruyama distinguishes Japan as exem­ plifying "fascism from above" in contrast to the "fascism from below" of Italy and Germany. The Japanese "fascist" groups were never able to centralize and build a popular foundation.

In the final analysis it was the histori­ cal circumstance that Japan had not under­ gone the experience of a bourgeois revolu­ tion that determined this character of the fascist movement. From a different angle it reveals the marked continuity between the period of party government and the fascist period in Japan. The pre-modern character of right-wing leaders and organizations is a characteristic that can also be found to a lesser extent in the established political parties. The Japanese political parties, instead of behaving as the champions of democracy, had from an early date compro­ mised with the absolutist forces, adapted 421

themmelvem to it, and were contented with a ■ham constitutional system. Hence the oli­ garchic structure that had existed since the Meiji era was able to transform itself into a fascist structure without the need for a fascist "revolution."3

Maruyama thus seems to provide a strong argument for not calling the regime fascist. Even the movement, despite similarities to European movements, would seem to be better characterized as proto-fas cist.

Another non-European movement which has been labeled fascist is Argentina's Peronisro. Seymour Martin Lipset used this movement/regime as an example of "fascism of the left, " but in the process he demonstrated just how different it was from classical fascism. Brought to power through a military coup and exhibiting a "positive orientation toward the workers, the trade unions, and the class struggle," Peronism strongly begs for consideration as something unique and separate from European fascism, Lipset*s attempts to the contrary notwithstanding.* Gino Germani is much less willing to identify "peronism" with fascism and provides a fuller account of the differences.^ And Alistair

Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 80. 4 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 173-76. ^Gino Germani, "Fascism and Class," in S. J. Woolf, ed.. The Nature of Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 90-96. 422

Henneasy surveys a large number of writings on Peronism, most of which reject any identification of this phenomenon with fascism.*

Finally, the case of Spain may be examined as a pos­ sible example of fascism within Europe but later than the time period we have suggested. Yet few serious analysts would today assert that Spain under Franco approximated a fascist system. Indeed, as we noted in our chapter on the historians, Stanley Payne has argued powerfully that Spanish fascism ended with Franco's victory in 1936.^ From 1932 until then a remarkably authentic fascist movement, the Falange, had established a national presence with a maximum of about 5000 members. But the Falange never garnered enough votes to make itself attractive to conservatives who felt threatened by the Republic. The arny was a sufficient weapon, as John Weiss points out;

Franco was a traditional Spanish solution to traditional, if Intensified, Spanish prob­ lems. The outcome of the Spanish Civil War was not the victory of a dynamic, new revo­ lutionary conservativisro as in Italy and

Alistair Hennessy, "Fascism and Populism in Latin America, " in Walter Laqueur, ed.. Fascism* A Reader's Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles* University of California Press, 1976), pp. 255-94. ^Stanley G. Payne, "Fascism in Western Europe," in Laqueur, Fascism, p. 304. See also Payne's "Spanish Fascism in Comparative Perspective, " in Henry A. Turner, Jr., Reappraisals of Fascism (New York* New Viewpoints, 1975), pp. 142—69. 423

Germany. It was the direct and immediate victory of the old feudal classes of Spain joined by the upper-middle landowning and industrialist classes of the reaction.**

As the Falange's contribution to the victory was small, so

was its role in the subsequent dictatorship— especially after the defeat of the Axis.

Fascism, then, is best conceived as referring to that group of movements and regimes in Europe between 1920 and 1945 which fit into a certain pattern. Fascist movements were groups of economically desperate persons drawn together by more or less charismatic leaders to work for an authori­ tarian solution to their nations' problems. The ideologies of these movements reflected their host nations' histories

and Indigenous conservative and reactionary doctrines. The

social base lay predominantly in the lower middle classes; but mendsers were also drawn from amongst the discontented of

other classes. Fascist regimes were one-party states which owed their existence to the successful capture of power by such movements. These regimes rested on a compromise forged by the fascist leaders with bourgeois, aristocratic, and military leaders wherein military adventurism provided (tem­ porary) answers to the problems of industrial stagnation and unemployment.

g John Weiss, The Fascist Tradition (New York* Harper and Row, 1967), p. 74. 424

But fascist movements and regimes are also manifesta­ tions of a more general category of phenomena perhaps best 9 understood as forms of counterrevolution. We earlier examined the work of Arno J. Mayer on this concept. We may now modify his approach slightly. Any concept of counter­ revolution must begin with a definition of revolution. Mayer's "tentative" definition is probably adequate in portraying it as a violent, fundamental social structural

change brought about by militant actors guided by an innova­

tive ideology.The central focus here must be upon the idea of innovation. A revolution must bring about a

fundamentally new social structure in the history of a given nation, not a return to some earlier form. This is not to say that the concept of revolution is linked to the notion

of "progress"— which is loaded with value judgments about the direction history is, or should be, taking us. We need not be detained by this important philosophical question,

although we should note that Mayer does at times come close

A contrasting view is held by J . Sole-Tura, who applies the term "fascism" to all national political re­ alignments which strengthen a threatened ruling class grounded on monopoly capitalism. See "The Political 'In­ strumentality* of Fascism" in S. J. Woolf, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 42-50. It is this generalized use of fascism, also seen in the work of Masao Maruyama, Barrington Moore, and others, which we find so detrimental to the study of European fascism. ^*Arno J . Mayer, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956 (New York; Harper Torchbooks, 1971 ), ppï 47—48. 425

to seeing the “world communist revolution" as a progressive trend. (Most people will agree, however, that for the past century or so revolutions have, as a matter of historical fact, been almost exclusively associated with communist or socialist ideologies.) Counterrevolution is initially defined in terms of revolution, although it is much more than that. Revolution­ aries are generally at a disadvantage in their struggle to change things, but they may be at less a disadvantage when, during the early days of a revolutionary era, the form and substance of the new movement are ill-understood by propo­ nents of the old order. In the later development of the capitalist world it is difficult to find anything parallel­ ing the cataclysmic transition from feudalism to capitalism that was the French Revolution.And if we are cur­ rently moving toward an era of socialism (a question remain­ ing open to debate), it is likely that the transition will have to be accomplished by methods other than the revolu­ tionary ones which worked in the Soviet Union and China. It would seem that "pure" revolutions occur only infrequently in a revolutionary epoch, and that they are most often made

Herbert Aptheker, in The Mature of Democracy, Freedom and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1967), uses a definition of revolution which would include any method or rate of change from one mode of production to another. Thus all the present capitalist nations could be said to have experienced revolution. But this blurs the distinction between revolution and evolution. 426

possible by socio-economic chaos. Host nations tend to evolve more or less peacefully toward the new social form. Just as "revolution" can be accomplished in evolutionary

ways, so "counterrevolution" can be found in less extreme forms at different levels of struggle. Think of all the southern hemisphere nations where land-owning aristocracies, in concert with northern hemisphere bourgeois ruling

classes, have held back their own countries' capitalist development. And look at the American ruling class's incredibly successful record at portraying socialism as

unproductive, totalitarian, and even immoral. In the modern world, violent counterrevolution has seldom been required. Mayer was probably the first writer to attempt to

identify the different types of counterrevolution which have

evolved in the capitalist world system since 1870. One category, called by Mayer pre-emptive counterrevolution, is illustrative of the offensive capabilities of modern coun­

terrevolution. The right-wing forces of one nation may launch a counterrevolution based on their observation of

revolutionary events in other nations. Although there may be no serious threat of revolution in their own nation,

counterrevolutionary leaders are often able, if socio­

economic conditions are propitious, to manufacture a fear of revolution in those classes whose counterparts were expro­ priated by revolutions in other places. The counterrevolu­ tion can then be triggered by one or more events— factory 427

occupations, strikes, riots, etc.— which seem to verify the revolutionary fantasy. Both the Italian and German fascist victories could be interpreted as forms of pre-emptive coun­ terrevolution.

It may be useful to think of counterrevolution as being counter to evolution, too. Certainly at the mass movement level a great deal of the ideological appeal of a modern counterrevolutionary doctrine lies in its anti-capitalism. If such movements are supported by "disenfranchised" groups in the population, it must be realized that these groups' plight arises out of the evolution of the capitalist system. The resentment felt by marginal persons is, at least initially, directed at capital as well as at organized labor— both of which seem to prosper at the expense of other social groups as capitalism evolves. Successful counterre­ volutionary movements effectively exploit this dual resent­ ment. There is an expectation among many recruits that the movement will, when the battle is won, return their nation to some rural Idyllic past free of the threat of socialism— but also free of monopoly capitalism. Just as counterrevolutionary ideology is not unambigu­ ously pro-capitalist, so it is not unambiguously anti- socialist. The idea of socialism has evolved as capitalism has developed. In many parts of the world "socialism", in one form or another, has become an acceptable idea. Conse­ quently the more "rational" and moderate element (which 428

almost invariably controls the counterrevolutionary movement in the end) often tends to advocate an economy based on capitalism but managed through a redefined version of

"socialism." In Europe the idea of a national socialism appealed not only to segments of the proletariat but to many other class groupings which recognized the need to control the economy in some way. The failure of social-democratic and labor parties, and the failure of Marxism in general, to offer fresh solutions to national problems paved the way for fascist successes. The various European counterrevolutionary movements, most of which may also be labeled fascist, were specifically designed to fill a void in political life in Europe between the wars. Marxism and classical liberalism both failed to

inspire the broad masses during a period of economic insta­ bility. The fascist movements fine-tuned their often self- contradictory ideologies to attract the support of all dissatisfied social groups. The fascists offered "social­ ism" to the workers, a new ruralized society to the peasants, protection against chain stores to small business­ men, massive arms expenditures to big businessmen, etc. Still it must be said that fascism achieved few real succes­ ses on its own. Only Italy and Germany produced clear-cut victories. Any other fascist parties which exercised power were licensed by the invading Germans. 429

European faaclstn is but one form assumed by counter­ revolution in the capitalist era. Japan, Argentina, Chile, Greece, and other nations produced significantly different variations. These are all part of a general struggle between forces in the capitalist world system. On the left are groups which attempt to change the structures of indivi­ dual nations, usually in the direction of socialism. The most violent and complete victories on this side are called revolutions. These revolutions set the tone for a more general revolutionary era in which most of the national transformations may or may not be accomplished in a violent manner. But there is nothing inevitable about the direction of such changes. Nor are the already effected gains irre­ vocable, because there is always opposition from forces dedicated to the preservation or restoration of capitalism in one form or another. The most violent and complete victories by these forces are called counterrevolutions. These are brought about by mass movements whose stated goals are sufficiently close to those of traditional conservative groups to persuade the conservatives to stand aside in favor of the counterrevolutionaries. The more independent from traditional groups the movement becomes, the more irration­ al, violent, and destructive the counterrevolutionary regime tends to become. The actual tone and content of most coun­ terrevolutionary work in the world is determined by the more rational conservatives. Only in times of international war 430 and domestic economic crisis to conservatives tend to call on the help of a mass movement. During times of stability lesser forms of "counterrevolution" prevail.

C. Toward a Theory of Fascism Few social scientists have attempted to build general theories of European fascism. Most theoretical writings argue the merits of particular areas of "causation." Those approaching true generalization tend to discuss a large number of aspects of fascism, but not in any organized manner. Paul M. Hayes, for example, devotes chapters of his book. Fascism, to the myth of race; the idea of the elite and the leader; the totalitarian state; nationalism; social­ ism; militarism; economics; the Nazi appeal to Germany; Mussolini and the Fascist prototype; fascism, class, and social change ; the incapacity of political orthodoxy; and the potential for "fascism" in various parts of the modern 12 world. Yet he never evolves a satisfactory defini­ tion of fascism, let alone a theory. Heavy emphasis is placed upon the “intellectual origins" of fascism, although these never found fertile soil in Europe until after World War I. And although virtually every imaginable reason for that post-war fertility for fascism is mentioned in passing, these conditions are not presented in a way which indicates

12 Paul M. Hayes, Fascism (New Yorkt The Free Press, 1973). 431

their relative importance. The meaning of fascism is obscured rather than elucidated. Hayes' book is a virtual

paradigm for liberal scholarship on fascism. Another British writer, Martin Kitchen, comes much closer to developing a true theory of fascism. He devotes the first part of his book. Fascism, to a summary of previous theoretical efforts, of which he finds two basic classificationsi

Theories which assert that fascism is deter­ mined and produced by capitalism (or, to use the somewhat euphemistic terms, "industrial society," "modern society," "the age of the masses" or "modernization") are contrasted with theories which hold that fascism was an Independent force which was able to deter­ mine the course of capitalist development. The first group of theories are labelled "heteronomic" and the second "autonomic" theories of fascism. The extreme form of the heteronomic theory is that evolved by the Third International, which saw fascists as the agents of monopoly capitalism. The autonomic theory finds its most popular expression in the theory that fascism was an independent movement of the uprooted and alienated middle classes.13

Kitchen reviews particular examples of theories in each of his two groups and finds them lacking— most often because of the narrow focus they apply to the problem of fascism. It

is unfortunate that this book, which may be the best

Martin Kitchen, Fascism (London; The Macmillan Press, 1976), p. x. Reprinted by permission of George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Ltd. 432 available discussion of various theories of fascism, seems virtually unknown in this country. Kitchen's concluding chapter is of most interest to us, for he lays out a ten-point answer to the question "What is Fascism?" "Firstly, fascism is a phenomenon of developed industrial states."^* Only advanced capitalism pro­ vides the proper conditions to make it possible. "Secondly, fascist movements are triggered off by a severe socio­ economic crisis which threatens a considerable section of society with loss of status and even economic ruin, and which plunges society into a widespread feeling of uncertainty and fear."^* Bourgeois democracy no longer seems adequate to the task of governing. "Thirdly, fascism is a response to a large and organized working class which, through its political parties, whether communist or social democratic, have made significant demands on industry and on the bourgeoisie."^* Some capitalists thus lend finan­ cial support to the burgeoning movement. "Fourthly, fascism recruits its mass following from a politicised, threatened, and frightened petit bourgeoisie."^^ The movement

^*Ibid., p. 83. Ibid., p. 84. On this issue, see also Peter R. SinclalFi "^Fascism and Crisis in Capitalist Society, " New German Critique, No. 9 (Fall 1976), 87-112. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., pp. 84-85. 433 becomes an independent political force. "Fifthly, fascist regimes are characterised by an alliance between the fascist party leadership and the traditional elites of industry, 18 banking, the bureaucracy and the military." (This after the radical wing of the party has been purged.) "Sixthly, the social function of fascism was to stabilise, strengthen and, to a certain degree, transform capitalist property relationships and to ensure the social and economic domination of the capitalist class, which felt threatened, which was divided among itself as to the best means of over­ coming the crisis and which was prepared to relinquish some of its political power in order to maintain its privileged 19 position." Fascism never came to power without the cooperation of capitalists. "Seventhly . . . , fascism is a terror regime which dispenses with all the trappings of parliamentary democracy.This is usually accomplished through the declaration of a national emergency situation. "Eighthly, fascist movements use ideology deliberately to manipulate and divert the frustrations and anxieties of the mass following away from their objective source." (Race, fatherland, duty, etc., replace rational problem-

^*Ibid., p. 85. ^^Ibid. ^*Ibid., p. 86. ^^Ibid. 434 solving.) "Ninthly, fascist regimes pursue aggressive and 22 expansionist foreign political aims." Military aggression seems absolutely necessary to sustain the fascist ideology and economy. "Tenthly, the degree of intensity of any of these above points is determined by the level of capitalist development and resulting problems which the fascist regime is called upon to overcome." 23 There­ fore German fascism proved to be much more brutal and aggressive than Italian fascism. No other writer has come closer to assembling an out­ line for a general theory of fascism. But more order needs to be imposed upon Kitchen's criteria, and a few more points need to be added. First, the question of energy and material resources requires some attention. Although few direct effects have been investigated for Italy and Germany, the availability and types of resources no doubt played a role in shaping fascism. Germany, for example, probably had sufficient energy (in the form of coal) to win only a Blitz­ krieg— not a prolonged war. Further, the easy availability of coal certainly conditioned the growth of the synthetic gasoline and rubber industries. And Alan S. Milward

^^Ibid., p. 87. ^^Ibid. 24 A useful summary of work on some of the more critical theoretical points, however, is found in Francis L. Carsten's "Interpretations of Fascism," in Laqueur, Fascism, pp. 415-34. 435

has shown that one of the main German goals for occupied Norway was the utilization of its cheap hydro-electric power for the production of aluminum for aircraft construc- 25 tion. The Italian economy has been the subject of little research in this area. Although Italy was energy- poor, the Ethiopian campaign seems to have had no resource

goals. And in World War II Italy's energy needs were satisfied under the sponsorship of Germany. At the level of material resources, a much more direct

effect on policy is visible. Milward, in The German Economy

at War, argues that Hitler's Blitzkrieg strategy was a clear result of the German lack of key materials.

In any long-drawn-out war, especially a war of mass-productive resources, Germany was bound to suffer from her inherent raw material deficiencies. Coal was the only vital raw material essential for war with which Germany was well endowed. The Four- Year-Plan was an attempt to remedy this situation by increasing the production of ersatz rubber (buna), and of benzine and oils by the hydrogenation and Fischer- Tropsch processes. At the same time it had aimed at the increasing utilization of Germany's low-grade iron ores,2*

But Germany was dependent on outside sources for chrome, nickel, tungsten, molybdenum, manganese, zinc, lead, copper.

25 Alan S. Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, , pp. ltl-200.

26Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at war (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), pp. 12-13. 436 and tin, all of which could be cut off by enemies in a long war. Thus Germany, once committed to a policy of expansion, was virtually forced to adopt the "lightning war" method. And Italy, especially before its subsumption under the

German war agenda, was motivated by resource shortages. "Intervention in Spain was in part a gamble that in the event of a rapid Falangist victory. Franco would offer due compensation in minerals that Italy needed badly to build up 27 her war potential . . . ," writes Serge Hughes. Most of Italy's resource efforts were geared to solving the country's agricultural difficulties— thus the "Battle of Wheat" and the land reclamation program. Having touched upon the geo-physical basis of fascism, we may now address the most basic of Kitchen's criteria. In saying that a certain level of development of industrial capitalism is necessary before a fascist movement becomes possible. Kitchen is referring to the state of the division of labor and class structure. He describes well the general precondition for fascism in the class structure:

Only in advanced capitalism can there be a powerful capitalist class, a large and organised working class with a potentially revolutionary ideology which calls for a radical restructuring of society, and a large petit bourgeoisie which is caught in the contradictions between capital and

27 Serge Hughes, The Fall and Rise of Modern Italy (New York: Minerva Press, 1968), p. 190. 436 and tin, all of which could be cut off by enemies in a long war. Thus Germany, once committed to a policy of expansion, was virtually forced to adopt the "lightning war" method. And Italy, especially before its subsumption under the German war agenda, was motivated by resource shortages* "Intervention in Spain was in part a gamble that in the event of a rapid Falangist victory. Franco would offer due compensation in minerals that Italy needed badly to build up 27 her war potential . . . ," writes Serge Hughes. Most of Italy's resource efforts were geared to solving the country's agricultural difficulties— thus the "Battle of Wheat" and the land reclamation program. Having touched upon the geo-physical basis of fascism, we may now address the most basic of Kitchen's criteria. In saying that a certain level of development of industrial capitalism is necessary before a fascist movement becomes possible, Kitchen is referring to the state of the division of labor and class structure. He describes well the general precondition for fascism in the class structure:

Only in advanced capitalism can there be a powerful capitalist class, a large and organised working class with a potentially revolutionary ideology which calls for a radical restructuring of society, and a large petit bourgeoisie which is caught in the contradictions between capital and

27 Serge Hughes, The Fall and Rise of Modern Italy (New York: Minerva Press, 1968), p. 190, 437

labour and ia unable to find any way out of its social, economic and political d i l e m m a s . 26

This in turn presupposes a historically evolved division of labor far enough into the industrial era for large numbers of workers to have been separated from their tools and from control over their work. Only after this stage is reached can political events create a basis for fascism. Most of Kitchen's criteria for fascism speak to the realm of political structure— the expression of the rela­ tive power of class groups in a society. The movement is a response of "the politicised, threatened, and frightened petit bourgeoisie" to the "large and organised working class . . . parties, whether communist or social-democratic." The regime is "characterized by an alliance between the fascist party leadership and the traditional elites," and its ulti­ mate function is "to stabilise, strengthen and . . . trans­ form capitalist property relationships and to ensure the social and economic domination of the capitalist class." A basic truth about fascism is that some substantial coopera­ tion from the bourgeoisie is essential for the fascist victory. The reason for this, very simply, is that fascism does not revolutionize society on behalf of another class. Faced with a choice between petty bourgeois utopianism and industrial capitalism, fascist leaders have always been

28 Kitchen, Fascism, p. 63. 438

rational enough to aee that their survival requires selec­ tion of the latter. Another of Kitchen's conditions for fascism is "a severe socio-economic crisis." This crisis pervades all levels of economy and society, but only when it is mani­ fested in the political structure does action begin to take place. "Confidence in the existing political system and its representatives is shattered and bourgeois-democratic forms no longer seem adequate to master a crisis which appears to threaten the entire society." The history of authori­ tarian industrial development in Italy and Germany and the general European use of authoritarian coordination in World War I made dictatorship seem a logical choice for dealing with the crisis. Thus Kitchen describes fascism as a "terror regime " dispensing with "all the trappings of parliamentary democracy." Of course, it should be noted that significant differences in the amount of terror can be seen in the cases of Italy and Germany. But some terror is a requirement for dealing with those who disagree with fascism. Up to this point we have been concerned with the socio­ economic basis of fascism. We should pause briefly to dif­ ferentiate our approach from any interpretation of fascism

^*Ibid., p. 84. 439 which might be labeled "determinietic." Some of the "vul­ gar" Marxist texts have tended to reduce the fascist basis in capitalism to a relationship of causality. This resulted from a positivistic misinterpretation of the dialectic by some of Marx's less clever followers, wherein the political forms of capitalism were seen as direct effects of the deve­ lopment of the capitalist economy. Hence the definition, popularized by Dimitroff in 1935, of fascism as " . . . the open terrorist dictatorship of the most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital." 3 0 West­ ern liberal scholars countered with equally wrong-headed "theories" of totalitarianism or economic development. Or they studied the Ideology of fascism and concluded in the style of Mosset "Economics was indeed one of the least important fascist considerations."^^ Concurrent with these trends, as we have witnessed in the unfolding of this dissertation, a small but steady stream of liberal and Marxist scholars has built up an impressive collection of non-deterministic interpretations which recognize the impor­ tance of economic and other conditioning factors in the rise

Georgi Dimitroff, The United Front Against War and Fascism: Report to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, 1935 (New York : Gamma Publishing, Ï974), p. 3lGeorge L. Mosse, "The Genesis of Fascism," in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds.. International Fascism; 1920-1945 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 440

of fascism. Our effort her* has been to attempt to further this tradition by placing these factors in a hierarchical order from most general to most specific in their effects.

To continue, the next level of analysis is the acting individual, %dio connects to society through feelings of solidarity with various social sub-groups— 'perhaps most notably the family. The individual develops an ideology and a sense of right and wrong in the course of his or her group experiences. The fascist party attempts to fashion a sys­

tematized ideology which will find resonance in particular groups of individuals sharing similar values— especially in frustrated members of the lower middle class. At the same time, as Kitchen points out, emphasis is placed upon "essen­ tially irrational concepts such as authority, obedience, honour, duty, the fatherland or race" rather than upon rational solutions to specific problems. Because fascism offers nothing really new, it chooses to appeal to a deep sense of traditional family values that pervades the psyches of individual Germans. The social-psychological problem of "the authoritarian family" is foremost among the connecting links between the individual and fascist ideology. The highest level of analysis of fascism is the consi­ deration of its "culture." This might be thought of as the total "outcome" of fascism— its policies, its art, its philosophy— the codification of fascism. As such, this realm provides us (paradoxically) with some of the least 441

Insightful (and most misleading) information about fascism because it is the result of all that has preceded it in the chain of conditions. The same cultural manifestations could have resulted from many different sequences of socio­ economic phenomena. When Kitchen tells us that “fascist regimes pursue aggressive and expansionist foreign political aims, " it only takes on meaning in the context of all that has gone before it in his theoretical discussion. It con­ firms at the highest level the preceding analysis. Con­ versely, we have seen Instances where studies of fascist philosophies outside of their social contexts have yielded portraits of fascism which diverged from its reality. 3 2 A more fruitful line of research directs itself at the role of national cultural conditions in the creation and preser­ vation of fascism, as we shall see shortly. Kitchen's final point relates to the overall inter­ relationship between various levels of conditions. He is possibly correct in stating that "the degree of intensity"

32 Of the works discussed in this dissertation, Eugen Weber's Varieties of Fascism (Chapter VI above) is a good example, as is Mosse*s "The Genesis of Fascism" (Chap­ ter IX above K Perhaps the finest achievement by any scholar working with ideological pronouncements as primary data is Ernst Nolte's Three Faces of Fascism (New York: Mentor Books, 1969). His "phenomenological" method has as its main objective (p. 41) " . . .to put hasty judgment aside and try to let Italian fascism and National Socialism speak for themselves.” But Reinhard Kuhnl, in "Problems of a Theory of International Fascism, " International Journal of Politics, II (Winter 1972-73), 47-81, levels a^ devastating criticism at this and other aspects of Nolte's work. 442 o£ fascism is "determined by the level of capitalist deve­ lopment" of a nation. But while this may be the key factor (and herein lies the key to the longevity of communist- inspired fascism theories), it should also be pointed out that crisis situations in energy, natural resources, ethnic relations, or other areas might well be found to contribute equally to the severity of fascism's rule. It is certain, for example, that the anti-Semitic sentiments of large numbers of the German people contributed to the "excesses " of Nazism. A more judicious evaluation might not state so boldly the decisive influence of the level of capitalist development, especially given the fact that this point is based solely on a comparison of two cases— Italy and

Germany. In short, it is likely that conditions at all levels of analysis have the potential to autonomously affect the "Intensity" of fascism. The relationship is one of interplay rather than determination.

Kitchen concludes by stressing the historical limits of his theory. He suggests that modern regimes which seem to fit this pattern might better be called "neo-fascist" due to their numerous adaptations to contemporary capitalism and its culture. We would differ here only in suggesting that it is more productive to think in terms of the concept of

"counterrevolution*" A general conceptual approach of this type allows us to compare classical fascism to modern counterrevolutionary regimes and thereby uncover the common 443 elements as well as the differences. (Iran Immediately comes to mind as an appropriate target for such a compara­ tive study.) And a hierarchically organized approach allows us to trace the roots of a counterrevolutionary regime from their foundation in the geo-physical setting through the socio-economic structure to the realm of culture. For fascism. Kitchen's criteria provide a good starting point. Other groups of counterrevolutionary regimes may form dif­ ferent patterns of key criteria, thus demonstrating them­ selves to be unique classes of historical phenomena. For example, one may, in the near future, be able to look back at a category of Muslim fundamentalist regimes as a form of counterrevolution. The more historical types of counterre­ volution identified, the more meaning we will be able to attach to both counterrevolution and fascism. A more complete theory of fascism is still needed. Let us now suggest a framework which attempts to encompass all the fundamental conditions for European fascism. To begin with, many writers have suggested that a distinction must be 33 marked between the fascist movement and the fascist regime.

This is done most systematically by Reinhard Kühnl in "Problems of a Theory of German Fascism: A Critique of Dominant Interpretations," New German Critique, No. 4 (winter 1975), 26-27. Walter Goldfrank calls for an additional analytical distinction between movement and sect in his "Fascism and World Economy," but Alan Milward ("Fas­ cism and the Economy," p. 387) is probably correct in asserting that the study of fascist sects "Is not very important." 444

An even more fruitful scheme might be to distinguish three successive stages of fascism, each with its own constella­ tion of conditions. Fascism usually progresses no further than the movement stage. Many European nations had at least one authentic fascist movement sometime between 1920 and 1945. Only two movements reached (without outside assis­ tance) the second stage— seizure of power. These same two movements— Fascist and National Soclalist--established the only true and independent fascist regimes. For each stage one must ferret out the required conditions; and these should be understood hierarchically in at least seven cate­ gories* geo-physical, biological, labor structural, class structural, power structural, psychological, and cultural.

The methods of all the social sciences are thus required in forging a general theory of fascism. And the methods of one discipline, history, have special relevance to the final aspect of our theoretical framework— "triggering events." The movement and power seizure stages are set into motion by a few galvanizing incidents, the significance of which can only be discovered through repeated applications of the narrative method. There is no substitute for scholarly debate in evaluating the relative importance of these events. Looking more closely at our theory, we begin with the fascist movement. And at this stage we need to make a further distinction between general European conditions and 445

special national conditions fostering the growth of fascism. First, what conditions seem to underlie all the European fascist movements? At the geo-physical level the rise of fascism may have been related to some countries' isolation frcun colonial sources of raw materials after World War I— although the strength of this relationship was probably of a low order. Biologically speaking, one would have to con­ front the role of certain hypothesized "human needs" or instincts as contributors to fascist predispositions.^* Even if such were identified, however, the fact would remain that their satisfaction could have been accomplished through a variety of social forms. Thus relating them directly to fascism would be virtually impossible. It is in the division of labor that we find our first indispensable conditions for the development of fascism. Foremost is the notion that the division of labor was well advanced into the industrial era. This means that workers' skills had become so specialized they were meaningless outside of socially organized production. But a further condition, first suggested by the German Ernst Bloch in

1935, is that there apparently needed to be an uneven

Erich Fromm, in The toatomy of Human Destruc­ tiveness (New York* Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), critiques most effectively the writings of Konrad Lorenz, Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris, and others who have asserted the existence of innate aggressiveness. 446

development between town and countryside with respect to 35 the rationalization of labor. While the countryside and its culture remained pre-industrial in most European nations, the urban centers developed highly complex divi­ sions of labor allowing intellectual specialists to pursue rational technique in all areas of life. Rural residents (and recent rural migrants to the cities) must have seen urban society as a serious threat to their simple mode of life. When we look at the class structures of European nations we are left with little doubt that lower middle class elements provided the backbone of support for fascist movements. 36 The specific occupational categories varied from country to country, but the key factor is that the mass basis was composed largely of persons who were either self- employed, white-collar workers, or lower professionals— all intimidated by the wage gains and political strength of the organized workers. Other segments of fascist support came from "the disenfranchised of all classes." Thus even the working class contributed some support, especially from

^^Ernst Bloch, "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics," New German Critique, No. 11 (Spring 1977), 22-38. 36 The best summary of evidence on this point is Juan J. Linz's "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism," esp. pp. 59-81. 447

37 among unorganized, unemployed, and rural proletarians. Certain bourgeois elements also played a role with financial backing, but the significance of this support remains unclear.

The political structures of European countries were varied, but nearly all had strong leftist movements of a communist, socialist, or anarchist character. The middle class admired the activist stance of these parties but abhorred the goals toward which they were working. Fascist parties were the only ones to appeal to middle-class discon­ tent in an active way. They filled a real void in the poli­ tical structures of certain nations. Psychological conditions at the movement stage are largely derived from the sociological positions of individu­ als. The declining middle class is everywhere likely to be disposed toward authoritarianism, but only when this class is Investigated in particular national settings can we gauge the extent of its authoritarian potential. And at the level of cultural conditions certain aspects of the European cultural climate are fundamental in the rise of fascism. Foremost may be the extension of the rationalization of

37 The definitive treatment of this subject is Tim Mason's Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemelnschaft topladeni Weskdeutscher Verlag, 1977). Chapter Two of this book, translated by Sara Lennox, is published as "National Socialism and the Working Class, 1925-May, 1933," New German Critique, No. 11 (Spring 1977), 49-93. 448 labor into the realm of culture. The die juncture between the simple, religious, agricultural Gemeinschaft and the complex, secular, industrial Gesellschaft is a theme common to all fascist ideologies. Even the urban middle classes, it seems yearned for a return to the country life. World War I was the major triggering event for European fascism in general. It had a variety of effects. First, it demonstrated the potential of state-operated economies. Second, its outcome at Versailles did nothing to settle the geo-political tensions which had led to war. And third, it created a mass of veterans Who were some of the earliest and most fanatic fascist recruits. We may now become more specific and address the problem of Why some fascist movements became stronger than others. What are some of the special national conditions involved in the rise of fascism? The answers begin to appear at the level of the division of labor. It seems that the degree of conflict between persons in the capitalist industrial sector and those in the pre-industrial rural sector of a given nation will strongly influence the fascist movement. This may relate to late and authoritarian "bourgeoisification" of the nation. Italy, and especially Germany, are the two European nations which best fit these characteristics. In the class structure, the condition required for fas­ cism seems to be that at least three well-defined and size­ able elements must be present— a bourgeoisie, a proletariat. 449

and various declining middle class groups. Further, as we move to the level of political structure, there is an appar­ ent relationship between the level of organisation of the 38 working class and the strength of fascism. Fascist movements, being counterrevolutionary phenomena, arise only in response to other political happenings. There is some scholarly agreement that one of the key conditions in the political realm which aids in the growth of fascism is a state of equilibrium between the political parties of the 39 proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And a significant contributing factor to this equilibrium is the split between the Communist and social democratic sides of the political left.

In examining psychological conditions, it appears that the potential for authoritarianism was greater in some countries than in others. The outcome of World War I has been cited by many writers as leaving mental scars on the Italian and German people because the Versailles settlement

3S Albert Ssymanski comes close to demonstrating this in his "Fascism, Industrialism, and Socialism" (see Chapter VII above). The sparse data on this point are reviewed by Lins in "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism," pp. 25-26. 39 This idea was developed by Paul M. Sweexy in The Theory of Capitalist Development (see Chapter IV above), and earlier by tne German Otto Bauer. A more recent re-state­ ment is found in J. Sole-Tura, "The Political 'Instrumenta­ lity' of Fascism." 450 treated these nations unfairly. Another factor, especially in the case of Germany, is the "failed bourgeois revolution" 40 as described best by Barrington Moore. Capitalist development was spurred by state intervention in the economy rather than by competing, risk-taking entrepreneurs. Thus a self-assured liberal bourgeoisie (a potential defender against fascism) never developed. A final psychological dimension relates to the leaders of fascist movements. It is likely that history would have differed greatly had Mussolini and Hitler not been brought to positions of leadership in their parties. Part of their success was due to the way in which their o%m personalities reflected so well the insecurities and resentments of their movements ' 41 constituencies. Now let us be more specific about cultural conditions encouraging fascism. Again, the fundamental point is that in nations with significant fascist movements there was a duality of cultures reflecting the nations' incomplete bourgeois revolutions. On the one hand was the "official" culture of the ruling bourgeoisie— rational, individualis­ tic, secular, progressive, and internationalistic. On the

40 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Demo­ cracy. Italy's development of capitalism was less authori- tarian but still clearly state-guided, as shown by S. Lombardini, "Italian Fascism and the Economy, " in Woolf, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 152-164 41 See Reich's Mass Psychology of Fascism and Fromm's Escape from FreedomZ 451 other hand, as Karl Mannheim demonstrates in the case of 42 Germany, there also existed a conservative culture-- romantic, collective, religious, retrogressive, and nation­ alistic. The clash of the cultures seems to have accentu­ ated the dedication of certain social groups to the conser­ vative constellation; and fascists appealed directly to the conservative ideals of each nation. For example, two conservative cultural components were important in different countries. Corporativism was especially pronounced in the "Mediterranean" fascist movements (probably due to the influence of Catholicism); and racialism played a more powerful role in the German, Austrian, and other move- 43 ments. It may be that neither of these was an abso­ lutely necessary part of fascism, but each contributed to the success of certain fascisms. The driving cultural force behind all fascist movements was nationalism, which fed on a fateful climate of European inter/date rivalry.

42 Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in Kurt H. Wolf, ed., From Karl Mannheim (New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 1971J. See also George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (Hew York: Universal Library, 1964), and John WeTss' The Fascist Tradition. *^On corporativism, see Edward R* Tannenbaum's account of how the Fascists used it in The Fascist Experi­ ence (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 89-93; and Franz Neumann's debunking of Nazi "corporativism" in Behemoth, pp. 228-34. See also the discussion and collection of Italian corporative documents in Charles Delzell's Mediter­ ranean Fascism, pp. 107-32. On Anti-Semitism, see Peter G. jl Pulzer's The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 19647. 452

Each European nation needed special triggering events to begin the growth of fascist movements. Some likely candidates in German history were the 1919 Spartacist revolt in Berlin, the Munich "Beer-Hall Putsch** and subsequent jailing of Hitler, and the French occupation of the Ruhr. For Italy we might cite the "Red Week" of June 1914, the expulsion of Mussolini from the Socialist party, and D'Annunzio's Fiume expedition of 1919-1920. And the Spanish Falange was organized a year after a major election victory by Republican and Socialist forces and the adoption after­ wards of a liberal constitution. Following the movement stage of fascism came the seizure of power— attained only in Italy and Germany. The accession to power was built upon all the factors which conditioned the growth of movements. But at some point (different for each country) the size of the movement made it a force to be reckoned with on its own terms. This was the first condition for a fascist power seizure. The second phase is aptly expressed by Francis L. Carstent “Another . . . precondition for the success of the fascists was their alliance with certain ruling circles and with the political right, and there does not seem to be any disagreement among historians on this issue, irrespective of their political

views."** In both Italy and Germany the fascists

Carsten, "Interpretations of Fascism," p. 427. 452

Each European nation needed special triggering events to begin the growth of fascist movements* Some likely candidates in German history were the 1919 Spartacist revolt in Berlin, the Munich "Bser-Hall Putsch" and subsequent jailing of Hitler, and the French occupation of the Ruhr. For Italy we might cite the "Red Week" of June 1914, the expulsion of Mussolini from the Socialist party, and D'Annunzio's Fiume expedition of 1919-1920. And the Spanish Falange was organized a year after a major election victory by Republican and Socialist forces and the adoption after­ wards of a liberal constitution. Following the movement stage of fascism came the seizure of power— attained only in Italy and Germany. The accession to power was built upon all the factors which conditioned the growth of movements. But at some point (different for each country) the size of the movement made it a force to be reckoned with on its own terms. This was the first condition for a fascist power seizure. The second phase is aptly expressed by Francis L. Carstent "Another . . . precondition for the success of the fascists was their alliance with certain ruling circles and with the political right, and there does not seem to be any disagreement among historians on this issue, irrespective of their political views."** In both Italy and Germany the fascists

44 Carsten, "Interpretations of Fascism," p. 427, 453

simply would not have gained power without the support of 45 these sectors. Psychological and cultural factors in the seizure of power are, again, the same ones which relate to the building of movements. It may be, however, that special psychologi­ cal mechanisms play a role in the crucial acquiescence of major agrarian and capitalist leaders to the fascist will.'*®

Now let us consider some triggering events for the seizure of power. In Italy the first was a series of peasant and worker offensives (mostly factory occupations and land seizures) in the summer and fall of 1920. Second, when the Socialists became the largest Parliamentary party; Giovanni Giolitti, the liberal leader, opted in 1921 to bargain with Mussolini. He brought the Fascists into a coalition aimed at lessening the Socialists' Parliamentary power. The ploy failed, but Mussolini gained much-needed legitimacy in the process. A third important event was the

45 Adrian Lyttleton discusses the literature on this point in "Italian Fascism," Weber, ed.. Fascism, pp. 139-43. For Germany see Anson G. Rabinbach, "Toward a Marxist Theory of Fascism and National Socialism: A Report on Developments in West Germany," New German Critique, No. 3 (Fall 1974), 131-44.

*®Erich Fromm suggests that special psychological mechanisms may have been operative here, but that these groups' support "... was rooted in their understanding of their economic interests much more than in psychological factors." (Escape from Freedom, pp. 242-43.) 454

Fascist national congress of November 1921, where Mussolini made clear his fundamental conservatism and thus assured himself of the support of landowners, industrialists, the military and other groups. Finally, during 1922 the Fascists took the offensive, seizing some local governments and generally crushing leftist organizations wherever they were found. The offensive sealed the fate of Italian democracy. The "March on Rome" in October of 1922 was little more than a formal celebration of the installation of

Mussolini as premier by King Vittorio Emanuele III. In Germany the first event leading to the seizure of power was the death of Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, a moderate conservative who managed to keep Germany unified and relatively prosperous from 1924 to 1929. Thereafter began an increasing polarization between left and right marked by an escalating level of street violence. The NSDAP gained national stature in the Reichstag elections of September 1930, in which it rose from 12 to 107 seats. Then came the full force of the Depression in 1932, when over six million persons became unemployed. Finally, the repeated use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution by the govern­ ments of Bruning, Papen, and Schleicher paved the way for 47 Hitler's use of the same to consolidate his takeover.

*^The role of Article 48 is well demonstrated by Karl Dietrich Bracher in The German Dictatorship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 168-70. 455

Having failed to halt this anti-parliamentary trend in pre-

Hitler regimes, democratic forces were even less capable of forestalling passage of the fatal Enabling Act of March 1933.

A last group of factors requiring examination consists of those relating to the maintenance of fascism once in power. These begin to come into play at the level of class

structure. Many key groups were pleased that class struggle was interrupted by the new regime. The most obvious bene­ ficiaries were industrialists and landowners. The middle class perceived itself as benefitting, although it actually lost materially (or barely stayed even) in the long

run.*^ The working class was the biggest loser under fascism; but even here the main loss was institutional— the destruction of its autonomous organizations. And for a significant portion of workers who had been unemployed prior to the fascist takeover, the creation of jobs helped assuage 49 any resentment. The fascists were absolute masters at managing class struggle. A majority of Italians and

48 David Schoenbaum, in Hitler's Social Revolution, surveys much of the statistical evidence on this point for small business (pp. 129-51) and small farmers (pp. 152-77) in Germany. 49 On the German working class, see Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, pp. 73-112. On the Italian proletariat see Cesare Vannutelli, "The Living Standard of Italian Workers, 1929-1939," in Roland Sarti, ed.. The Ax Within: Italian Fascism in Action (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 1:39-60. 456

Germans wars kept docile through specially targeted pro­ grams. Working people were offered recreation and vaca­ tions. Military and bureaucratic expansion created jobs for fascism's lower middle class followers. Agricultural programs placated the rural supporters of fascism. And industrialists reaped the great rewards of war production. In short, life became orderly again. At the power structural level, the fascist regimes relied upon terror to discourage those for whom fascist social and economic programs were not sufficient. Nazi terror, especially, was so effective that it seems unlikely in the short run that any effective internal uprising could have been mounted. Another factor in fascist power was the military, the leaders of which stood fully behind fascism until it became quite clear that the fascist cause was lost. Lastly, the principles of leadership and one-party rule had the advantage of extreme efficiency when the regimes set out to accomplish many of their goals. But, certainly in the case of Germany, the leadership principle became a fatal flaw due to Hitler's lack of military and economic sophisti­ cation. In the area of psychological conditions for the main­ tenance of fascism we turn again to Erich Fromm, who noted a tendency in masses of Germans to accept the Nazi government as identical with Germany once Hitler attained power. 457

It me#m# that nothing im more difficult for the average man to bear than the feeling of not being identified with a larger group. However much a German citizen may be opposed to the principles of Nazism, if he has to choose between being alone and feeling that he belongs to Germany, roost persons will choose the latter.^0

Fromm here alludes to a possible psychological element in societal cohesion— an irrational communal feeling that may be a basic human psychological need. It seems Fromm is saying that if a society has developed a strong sense of group identity, it will tend not to reject any government unless it fails them materially* Both Fascism and Nazism delivered enough material and psychological benefits (especially in comparison with regimes that had preceded them) to assure that revolt would not occur. Finally, both Nazism and Fascism produced cultures uniquely designed to reinforce their rule. Any culture will reflect to some degree the values of its ruling class, but fascist culture was a totalitarian package in nearly perfect consonance with fascist ideology. Every program had a function— usually related to either social control (in the case of the lower classes) or economic incentive (for the

^^Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 234. ^^See the important Article by Rainer Stollman, "Fascist Politics as a Total Work of Art: Tendencies of the Aesthetization of Political Life in National Socialism," New German Critique, No. 14 (Spring 1978), 41-60. 458 upper classes). But the fundamental purpose of fascist culture was to prepare the population for war. Fascist goals were only attainable through the subjugation and exploitation of neighboring countries. Most scholars seem to have concluded that militarism and continuous expansion were necessary components of fascism which had to lead to its eventual downfall. Clearly the history of fascism demonstrates that it was self-destructive; but this may be more due to the immense role of Adolph Hitler in European fascism than to any innate socio-economic laws. If Hitler's warmaking abilities had been sharper, or if he had chosen to stabilize his empire at a certain point, who can say how long fascism might have reigned? CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

We can now be reasonably certain what fascism was. At the beginning it was a movement in industrializing European nations in the 1920s and 1930s. It appealed to the lower middle class and to other social elements disenfranchised by capitalist development. Its ideology was anti-capitalist and anti-socialist; and it was extremely authoritarian, building upon psychological and cultural traits embedded in European societies. Fascism became a significant movement in those nations where the clash between city and country­ side was greatest, where class conflict was well-developed but tending toward equilibrium, and where psychological and cultural authoritarianism was most prevalent. Fascist movements seized power in Italy and Germany. These two nations had all the required conditions for strong movements, to which were added the necessary triggering events and the crucial decision by the old ruling groups to support fascism. Once in power fascism maintained itself by creating order, some semblance of prosperity, psychological security, and, for those who required it, terror. The

459 460

question of whether fascism might have stabilized and sus­ tained itself over a long period (had World War II been avoided) remains open to debate.

There can be no doubt now that fascism, as we have come to understand it here, no longer exists. We have seen that a more ^fruitful category of analysis is the general concept of counterrevolution, under which may be subsumed fascism, Peronism, military dictatorships, and all other regimes in the capitalist era which attempt to turn back steps toward

liberalism or socialism. Scholars of every nation bear the responsibility of examining their own and other societies

for tendencies toward, or (unfortunately too often) the very substance of, counterrevolution. For the United States, Bertram Gross takes a step in this direction with his Friendly Fascism. Although the term "fascism” may be mis­ used by Gross (as we argued in Chapter VII), he does dis­ tinguish "classical" fascism from his "friendly" variety on a wide range of criteria. In fact. Gross' greatest contri­ bution lies in his demonstration that modern "fascism" would not resemble the classical version and would not come to power in the same way. For example, whereas European fascism represented an attempt by "capitalist laggards" to catch up to the leading industrial powers, "friendly fas­ cism" would be an effort to preserve America's current position of world dominance. The seizure of power would 461

likely be more gradual, requiring less violence. And where­ as classical fascism provided for "... anxiety relief through participatory spectacles, mass action, and genuine bloodletting the modern variety would likely offer "... more varied relief through sex, drugs, mad­ ness, and cults, as well as alcoholism, gambling, sports, and ultraviolent drama.The shape of a modern coun­ terrevolutionary regime. Gross well understands, must be sought in the characteristics of the society which spawns it. No scholar examining such a phenomenon may rest with a simple prediction of events to come. Gross concludes strongly by rejecting determinism and calling for an active struggle against counterrevolutionary tendencies in American society. As we have attempted to demonstrate throughout this dissertation, fascism and counterrevolution are not subjects to be met in the sacred realm of value freedom. Much more engaged scholarship is needed on the various historical forms of counterrevolution, as is more work on the concept and theory of counterrevolution. But this dissertation suggests that more attention also needs to be directed at the "conditions of Intellectual production" in America. These seem to hinder rather than encourage such

^Bertram Gross, Friendly Fascism (New York; M. Evans and Coiqpany, 1980}, p. 170. 462

research. At least four areas need to be investigated: Specialisation (Are trends toward narrower scopes of acade­ mic training preventing recent generations of intellectuals from acquiring the tools to attack problems of the magnitude of fascism?)} funding (To what degree is the selection of research problems determined by the sponsors of research?); bureaucratisation (What is the effect on scholarship of increasingly utilitarian administrative policies?); and politicisation (Have American universities become less inde­ pendent of the larger political culture? Are academics losing some of their autonomy in the area of problem selec­ tion?) These and other concerns have been reinforced in the process of preparing this dissertation. One hopes that other persons will continue to raise such issues in the aca­ demic environment. When these discouraging trends are no longer questioned, they will have won the day. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Work* on the Sociology of Knowledge Curtia, James E., and Petraa, John W,, eds. The Sociology of Knowledge I A Reader. New York: Praeger Publi­ shers, 19^0.

Eriksson, Bjorn. Problems of an Empirical Sociology of Knowledge. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1975. Friedrichs, Robert W. A Sociology of Sociology. New York: The Free Press, 1970% Gouldner, Alvin. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New Yorkt Basic Books, 1970.

Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils* New York: Harvest Books, 1936. Melanson, Philip H. Political Science and Political Know­ ledge. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1975. Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1^49. Mills, C. Wright. "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge." Power, Politics, and People. Edited by Irving L. Horowitz. New York: Ballantine Books, 1963.

II. Works on Fascism Produced in America* Abel, Theodore. Why Hitler Came Into Power. New Yorki Prentice-Hall, 1938. Adorno, T. W., et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969. Alexander, Leo. "Destructive and Self-Destructive Trends in Criminalized Society." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXXIX (January-February 1949), 553-64.

*Only those books and articles fully analyzed in the test of this dissertation's hypotheses are listed in this category.

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'War Crirnas and Their Motivation." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXXIX (Sapteniber-October 1^48), 290-^26. Allan, William Sheridan* "The Appeal of Fascism and the Problem of National Disintegration." Reappraisals of Fascism. Edited by Henry A. Turner, Jr. New York: New Vietrpolnts, 1975.

Brady, Robert A. The Spirit and Structure of German Fas­ cism. New Yorin The Viking Press, 1537,

Brickner, Richard M. Is Germany Incurable? Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943. Oeutsch, Harold C. "The Origins of Dictatorship in Germany." Dictatorship in the Modern World. Edited by Guy Stanton Ford. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935. Ebenstein, William, The German Record: A Political Por­ trait. New Yorkl Farrar & Rinehart, 1945.

______. The Nazi State. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943.

Erikson, Eric. "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth." Psychiatry, V (November 1942), 475-93.

Ermarth, Frits. The New Germany. Washington, D.C.: Digest Press, American University Graduate School, 1936. Florinsky, Michael T. Fascism and National Socialism: A Study of the Econwnic and Social Policies of the Totalitarian State. New York': Macmillan Publishing Co., 1936. Friedrich, Carl J . "The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes." Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. Co-authored with Michael Curtis and Benjamin R. Barber. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969. , and Brsezinski, Zbigniew K, Totalitarian Dictator­ ship and Autocracy. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Hass, t Harvard University Press, 1965. Fromm, Erich. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1941.

Goldfrank, Walter L. "Fascism and World Economy." Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy. Edited by Barbara Hockey Kaplan. Beverly Hills: Sage Publica­ tions, 1978. 465

Ourland, A. R. L. "Technological Trends and Economic Struc­ ture under National Socialism." Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, IX (1941), 226-63.

Haider, Carmen. Capital and Labor under Fascism. New York* Columbia University Press, 1930. Do We Want Fascism? New York* John Day Company, 1934.

Heberle, Rudolf. From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany. Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1^45.

Hoover, Calvin B. Germany Enters the Third Reich. New York: HacmilIan Publishing Co., 1933.

Horowitz, Irving L. Foundations of Political Sociology. Now York* Harper & Row, 1972. Lasswell, Harold D. "The Psychology of Hitlerism." Political Quarterly, IV (July-Saptember 1933), 373-84.

Linz, Juan J. "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective." Fascism; A Reader* s Guide. Edited by Walter Laqueur. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976. Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960• Loewenberg, Peter. "The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort." American Historical Review, LXXVI (December 1971), 1457-1502. Loomis, Charles P., and Beegle, J. Allen. "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas." Aiwrican Sociological Review, XI (December 1946), 724-34. Mayer, Arno J. Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956. New York: Harper & Row, 19Ï1. Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Munk, Frank. The Economics of Force. New York* G. W. Stewart, 1 9 4 6 .

Nathan, Otto. The Nazi Economic System. Durham, N.C.* Duke University Press, 1944. 466

Nathan, Otto. The Nazi Economic System. Durham, N.C.t Duke University Press, 1944.

Neumann, Franz. Behemoth: The structure and Practice of National Socialism, 19K3-Ï¥44% New York: Harper & Row, T956%

Palyi, Melchior. "Economic Foundations of the German Tota­ litarian State." American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (January 1941), 46Ÿ-Sé.

Parsons, Talcott. Essays in Sociological Theory. Rev. ed. New York: The Free Press, 1964. Pollock, Frederick. "Is National Socialism a New Order?" Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, IX (1941), 4 4 o —^5.

Reich, Wilhelm. The Mass Psychology of Fascism. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1970% Salvemini, Gaetano. The Origins of Fascism in Italy. Translated by Roberto vivarelli. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Sarti, Roland. "Fascist Modernization in Italy: Tradition­ al or Revolutionary?" American Historical Review, LXXV (April 1970), 1029-45.

Sauer, Wolfgang. "National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?" American Historical Review, LXXII (December 1967), 404-24% Schoenbaum, David. Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939. New York : Doubleday, 1966.

Schuman, Frederick L. The Nazi Dictatorship. New York* Alfred A. Knopf, l9&5. Schweitzer, Arthur. Big Business in the Third Reich* Bloomington* Indiana University Press! 1964. Sweezy, Paul M. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York * Monthly Review Press, 1968. Szymanski, Albert. "Fascism, Industrialism, and Socialism* The Case of Italy." Comparative Studies in Society and History, XV (October 1973), 396-404. Turner, Henry A. "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler." American Historical Review, LXXV (October 1969), 56-70. 467

"Fascism and Modernization." World Politics, XXIV TJuly 1972) 547-64.

Van Clute, Walter. "How Fascism Thwarts the Life Instinct." toerican Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XII (April 1942), XiS—40. Weber, Eugen. Varieties of Fascism. Princeton* D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964. Weiss, John. The Fascist Tradition. New York* Harper & Row, 1967. Walk, William. Fascist Economic Policy. Cambridge, Mass.* Harvard University Press, 1938. Woolston, Maxine Sweezy. The Structure of the Nazi Economy. Cambridge, Mass.* Harvard University Press, Ï941.

Ill. Other Works Which Contain Significant Contributions to the Building of a General Theory of Fascism firacher, Karl Dietrich. The German Dictatorship. New York* Praeger Publishers, 1 ^ 6 7 Bullock, Alan. Hitler, A Study in Tyranny. New York* Harper & Row% 1974.

Kitchen, Martin. Fascism. London* Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976. Kuhnl, Reinhard. "Problems of a Theory of German Fascism* A Critique of Dominant Interpretations." New German Critique, No. 4 (Winter 1974), 26-50. ______. "Problems of a Theory of International Fascism. " International Journal of Polities, II (Winter 1972-73), 47-81. Laqueur, Walter, ed. Fascism* A Reader's Guide. Berkeley and Los Angeles* University of California Press, 1976. Mayer, Arno J* "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem." Journal of Modern History, XLVII (September 1975), 4 0 9 - l W : Milward, Alan S. The German Economy at War. London* Athlone Pres si 19^5. 468

, and Mosse, George L., eds. International Fascism, T920-1945. New York* Harper Torchbooks, 19561 Rabinbach, Anson Q. "Toward a Marxist Theory of Fascism and National Socialism* A Report on Developments in West Germany." New German Critique, No. 3 (Fall 1974), 131-44.

Turner, Henry A., Jr., ed. Reappraisals of Fascism. New York: New Viewpoints, 1975.

Vajda, Mihaly. "On Fascism." Telos, No. 8 (Summer 1971), 43-63. Woolf, S. J., ed. European Fascism. New York* Random House, 1968.

______, ed. The Nature of Fascism. New York, Vintage Books, 1959%