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104Th Annual Conference on Taxation 104th Annual Conference on Taxation Photo courtesy New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau Photo courtesy New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau JW Marriott Hotel New Orleans, LA November 17–19, 2011 Photo courtesy New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau Visitors and courtesyPhoto New Orleans Convention National Tax Association 104th Annual Conference on Taxation Conference Chair: Program Chairs: Leonard Burman, President, Jon Bakija, Williams College National Tax Association Jane Gravelle, Congressional Research Service Photo courtesy New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau REGISTRATION — FOYERS Wednesday, November 16 (3:00 PM - 7:00 PM) • Thursday, November 17 (7:30 AM - 5:00 PM) • Friday, November 18 (8:00 AM - 2:00 PM) • • • • • • • • • PROGRAM AT A GLANCE • • • • • • • • • THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17 CONCURRENT SESSIONS 10:15 – 11:45 AM • Taxes and Distribution GENERAL SESSION 8:30 – 10:00 AM State Sales Taxes in Decline Tax Reform in an Era of Fiscal Imbalance Tax Analysis Using U.S. Administrative Data Corporate Tax Reform CONCURRENT SESSIONS 10:15 –11:45 AM Tariffs and Taxes, from Before the Civil War to the New Era State and Local Government Fiscal Behavior and the Great Recession Taxing Bad Things Public Opinions Towards Tax, Spending, and Fiscal Reforms Kinks and Notches in Federal Tax Policy • LUNCHEON NOON – 1:30 PM Behavioral Response to Personal Income Tax Rate Changes Speaker: Peter Diamond, MIT, Winner of the 2010 Sveriges Riksbank Prize Topics in Corporate Income Taxation in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel Frontiers of Public Finance: 2011 NTA Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation STUDENT RESEARCH FORUM POSTERS ON DISPLAY IN Award Winners REGISTRATION AREA 1:30 – 1:45 PM • LUNCHEON NOON – 1:30 PM CONCURRENT SESSIONS 1:45 – 3:15 PM Speaker: Scott S. Cowen, President, Tulane University Taxation and Top Wealth Holders The Corporate Tax in Integrated Economies CONCURRENT SESSIONS 1:45 – 3:15 PM State and Local Finance: Policy and Practice in the Great Recession New Insights on Tax Policy and Firm Behavior Responsiveness of Labor Supply to Incentives Tax Expenditures in an Era of Large Budget Deficits Topics in Property Taxation Field Experiments in Public Economics Graduate Student Session Fiscal Issues of Disasters and Recoveries Empirical Evidence on the Causes of Tax Compliance and Evasion GENERAL SESSION 3:30 – 5:00 PM Economic Analysis and Legal Doctrines of Taxation In Honor of Alan Auerbach, 2011 Holland Award Recipient STUDENT RESEARCH FORUM POSTERS ON DISPLAY CONCURRENT SESSIONS 3:30 – 5:00 PM REGISTRATION AREA 5:00 – 5:30 PM Multinationals, Transfer Pricing, and IPOs Taxation in Latin America • RECEPTION 5:15 – 6:30 PM Property Tax Rates: Causes and Consequences In Honor of Alan Auerbach, 2011 Holland Award Recipient Higher Education Interstate Tax Competition Income Inequality, Income Volatility, and Economic Mobility • SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19 GENERAL SESSION 5:00 – 6:00 PM CONCURRENT SESSIONS 8:30 – 10:00 AM ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION Tax Amnesty in the American States PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: LEONARD BURMAN, Syracuse University Local Policy, Public Services, and Land Values Coordination of Tax and Transfer Systems • RECEPTION 6:15 – 7:30 PM Recent Attempts at State Tax Reform Evidence on Social Insurance and Policies to Encourage Private Insurance Coverage • FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18 How Do People Adapt to Economic Shocks? Evidence from Tax Return Data CONCURRENT SESSIONS 8:30 – 10:00 AM CONCURRENT SESSIONS 10:15 – 11:45 AM State and Local Taxes on Capital Income: Implications for International Tax Federal Influence on State Taxation: Description and Prescription Competition Health Policy New Developments in Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries Accounting Research on Corporate Taxation Targeted Versus Non-Targeted Government Interventions in Education Public Policy Towards Housing Corporate Taxation: Theory and Evidence about the Value of Deferral and Theory and Practice of Redistributive Taxation Other Planning Decisions Small Business Tax Policy and Compliance Issues Taxation and Housing Income Tax Provisions for Low-Income People: Compliance and Design Issues THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17 LocatioN: oRLEANS • BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE TO PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATE CHANGES GENERAL SESSION 8:30 – 10:00 AM Organizer: Gerald Auten, U.S. Department of the Treasury LocatioN: iLE DE FRANCE 1 Moderator: Seth Giertz, University of Nebraska-Lincoln TAX REFORM IN AN ERA OF FISCAL IMBALANCE Presentations: Moderator: Mark Mazur, U.S. Department of the Treasury Identifying the Elasticity of Taxable Income, Sarah Burns and James Organizer: Jane Gravelle, Congressional Research Service Ziliak, University of Kentucky Panelists: When Tax Rates Go Up: Another Look at the 1993 Act, Gerald Auten and William Gale, The Brookings Institution Laura Kawano, U.S. Department of the Treasury Diane Lim Rogers, Concord Coalition Expected Income Tax Changes and Household Behavior, Lorenz Kueng, Charles McLure, Stanford University UC Berkeley Donald Marron, The Urban Institute and The Tax Policy Center Discussants: Seth Giertz, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Ivan Vidangos, Federal Reserve Board of Governors • Coffee Break: 10:00 – 10:15 AM Jon Bakija, Williams College LocatioN: RoSALiE CONCURRENT SESSIONS 10:15 – 11:45 AM TOPICS IN CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION LocatioN: MAUREPAS Organizer/Moderator: Jane Gravelle, Congressional Research Service STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL BEHAVIOR AND THE Presentations: GREAT RECESSION Long-Term and Short-Term Revenue Effects from Changing Tax Organizer/Moderator: Ronald Fisher, Michigan State University Depreciation Allowances, James Mackie, U.S. Department of the Presentations: Treasury Understanding States’ Differences in Weathering Economic Effect of Tax Reform on Investment Incentives, Robert Carroll, Thomas Downturns, Therese McGuire, Northwestern University, Nathan Neubig and Gerald Prante, Ernst & Young LLP Anderson, University of Illinois at Chicago and Teresa Garcia-Milà, The Tax Elasticity of Corporate Debt: A Synthesis of Size and Variations, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ruud de Mooij, International Monetary Fund Predicting the Impact of the Housing Crisis and the Great Recession Effective Corporate Tax Reform: Reducing the Corporate Tax Burden by on Big City Finance, Howard Chernick, CUNY, Hunter College, Adam Increasing the Section 199 Deduction, Michaele Morrow, Northeastern Langley, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and Andrew Reschovsky, University University of Wisconsin-Madison Discussants: Jane Gravelle, Congressional Research Service An Exploration of Recent Changes to State Tax Structures, John McClelland, U.S. Department of the Treasury David Sjoquist and Robert Buschman, Georgia State University LocatioN: ST. CLAUDE State and Local Government Debt and Borrowing Before and During FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC FINANCE: 2011 NTA OUTSTANDING the Great Recession, Ronald Fisher, Michigan State University and DOCTORAL DISSERTATION AWARD WINNERS Robert Wassmer, California State University, Sacramento Organizer/Moderator: James Sallee, University of Chicago Discussant: Thomas Garrett, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Presentations: Claim Timing and Ex Post Insurance Selection: Evidence from Dental LocatioN: FRoNTENAC PUBLIC OPINIONS TOWARDS TAX, SPENDING, and FISCAL “Insurance”, Marika Cabral, Stanford University REFORMS Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End Spending? Evidence Organizer/Moderator: William Gale, Brookings Institution from Federal Procurement, Neale Mahoney, Stanford University Presentations: Taxpayer Response to Targeted Audits, Mark D. Phillips, University of Understanding Joint Support for Government Spending and Taxes: Chicago Linking Benefits and Costs in the Mass Public, James Garand, Discussants: Amanda Kowalski, Yale University Louisiana State University and André Blais, Université de Montréal Alexander Gelber, University of Pennsylvania Public Opinion Toward Government Spending, William Jacoby, Damon Jones, University of Chicago Michigan State University LocatioN: iLE DE FRANCE 2-3 The Federal Income Tax in Popular Culture, Larry Zelenak, Duke • Noon - 1:30 pm Luncheon University School of Law Speaker: Scott S. Cowen, President of Tulane Discussants: Leonard Burman, Syracuse University University, NEw Orleans After the ShockS Diane Lim Rogers, Concord Coalition CONCURRENT SESSIONS 1:45 – 3:15 PM LocatioN: CoNDE LocatioN: MAUREPAS KINKS AND NOTCHES IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY NEW INSIGHTS ON TAX POLICY AND FIRM BEHAVIOR Organizer/Moderator: Joel Slemrod, University of Michigan Organizer/Moderator: Jesse Edgerton, Federal Reserve Board of Governors Presentations: Presentations: Do Cheaters Bunch Together? Profit Taxes, Withholding Rates and Financing Frictions and the Efficacy of Tax Incentives: Evidence from Cash Tax Evasion, Paul Carrillo and M. Shahe Emran, George Washington Grants for Renewable Energy Investments, Jesse Edgerton, Federal University and Anita Rivadeneira, Centro de Estudios Fiscales Reserve Board of Governors and James Sallee, University of Chicago Servicio de Rentas Internas – Ecuador Business Use of Bonus Depreciation: Evidence from Tax Data, 2001-2009, Does the Earned Income Tax Credit Reduce Saving by Low-Income John Kitchen and Matthew Knittel, U.S. Department of the Treasury Households?, Caroline Weber, University of Michigan Tax and the Nature of the Firm, Mihir Desai, Harvard University, Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Force Participation: Evidence from Dhammika Dharmapala, University of Illinois College of Law
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