COALITIONAL STRATEGY OF BHARTIYA IN INDIAN POLITICS : A CRITICAL STUDY

OLTOA SRTG F BHARTIYA OF STRATEGY COALITIONAL ABSTRACT

JANATA PARTY IN INDIAN POLITICS : POLITICS INDIAN IN PARTY JANATA ABSTRACT THESIS Submitted in Partial Fullfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of A CRITICAL STUDY CRITICAL A Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science

By RABIA DARAB

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF Professor Abdulrahim P. Vijapur

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA)

2019 Mob. No. +91 9897906122 E-mail: [email protected]

Ph.D. (JNU), LL.M. (Essex) Professor & Ex-Chairman Certificate

This is to certify thatMiss. Rabia Darab , Research Scholar of the Department of Political Science, A.M.U. Aligarh has completed her thesis entitled “Coalitional strategy of Bhartiya Janata Party in Indian Politics: A Critical Study”, under my supervision. This thesis has been submitted to the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, in the fulfillment of requirements for the award of the degree ofDoctor of Philosophy. To the best of my knowledge, it is her original work and the matter presented in the thesis has not been submitted in part or full for any degree of this or any other university.

(Prof. Abdulrahim Vijapur) Supervisor Acknowledgement

The credible opportunity to complete the task on time is only possible with the blessings of Allah, the Creator of all the worlds. I am very thankful to Almighty Allah for giving me courage, patience, and sincerity throughout in completing this study.

The honest effort, care, and love of my parents – Mr. Ishtiaq Ali and Mrs. Mushahida Ishtiaq – to boost my career are the strongest things in this world that help me to achieve my goals. Words can’t express humble gratitude to them. May Allah give them better rewards in this world and hereafter?

The strength that helps me to achieve this academic height is none other than my respected mentor Professor Abdulrahim P. Vijapur. His incredible guidance and encouragement always inspire me to improve my research performance. The perceptive, substantial, and insightful comments on the earlier drafts of this thesis greatly improved its contents and readability of the final draft.

I am also thankful to our adore Chairman, Professor Nigar Zuberi, whenever I faced ambiguities in my academic expressions it was she who stood to rescue me from getting stumble through her inspirational words. I owe my esteem to all the rest of the faculties of the Department of Political Science AMU, Professor Arif Hameed, Professor Mohd. Abid, Professor Mirza Asmer Beg, Dr. Aftab Alam, Professor Farhana Kausar, Professor Arshi Khan and Dr. Adil Ghaznavi.

I am also thankful to faculties of different departments of the Aligarh Muslim University for their support and cooperation including Professor Munawwar Hussain (D/O- ForensicMaulana Medicine), Azad Dr. Library,Riaz Ahmad Aligarh (D/O- Zoology), Muslim Er. University Ahmed Ali (Rtd. Chief UPPTCL).

The personnel whose support makes the study easy includes administrative staff of the Department of Political Science, especially Mr. Afzal, Mr. Faheem, Mr. Sulaiman, Mr. Asif, Mr. Nizam and Mr. Asaf Khan (Seminar Library Incharge). Thanks also goes to the staff of Maulana Azad Library AMU, for their cooperation and help.

My Special thanks goes to my well-wishers including Dr. Javed Ahmad, Dr. Mudasir Ahmed Qazi, Dr. Bilal Qadir, Dr. Shama Akhtar, Dr. Sheetal, Swaleha Parveen, Rubela, Khushboo, Saba, Gazala, Habiba, and those whose names might I forget at this time of excitement.

My Gratitude also goes to family members without their support this work would not have been possible my Grand Parents (Maternal, Paternal) my sisters Sana Ishtiaq, Kainat Husna, Samia Lareb, my sister in law Shabana my brothers Adnan Khubaib, Adan Ishtiaq, my brother in law Mohd Rizwan, my niece & nephew Rayyan, Hadin and Hania.

Rabia Darab

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CONTENTS

Page No.

Acknowledgement i-ii

Abbreviations iii-v

List of Tables vi

Introduction 1-14

 Objectives of the Study  Chapterisation scheme  Literature Review  Methodology

Chapter-I: Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP): 15-44

A Historical Perspective

 Introduction  Organisational Structure  The Emergence of  Origin of Jana Sangh (1951-1977)  Janata Party (1977-1979)  Emergency (1975)  1977 Elections Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University  Creation of the Janata Party  Fall of the Janata Government  The New Beginning 1980  Gujarat Riots (2002)- Carnage  2004 Elections  Victory in 2014 Elections

Chapter- II: Bhartiya Janata Party’s Coalitional 45-96

Strategy: from State to Centre

 Introduction  The System  1967 Elections: Jana Sangh’s role in mobilising non-Congress parties  Tactics of Jana Sangh for 1967 elections  1967 elections: A revolution

Coalition at the State Level  Coalition in West Bengal  Coalition in Uttar Pradesh  Coalition in Madhya Pradesh  The Haryana Coalition  The Coalition trial in Kerala  Strategy or Moderation of Jana Sangh after 1967  The Railway strike of 1974  Emergency and the role of Jana Sangh (1975-77)  Jana Sangh’s rise to National Level politics  1977 State Elections and Major Conflicts  Conflict, Contradiction and fall of Janata Government

Coalition at the Centre Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University  New Beginning (rise of the BJP)  Dawn of the Coalition Era  The Government  Failure of the National Front  The Government  Failure of the United Front Government  The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance  Fall of BJP-led government (2004)

Chapter-III: Indian Party System: A Comparison of the Regimes of NDA (1998 to 2004) and UPA-I and II (2004 to 2014) 97- 128  Introduction  2004 Elections and Alliance strategy of the BJP and Congress  Alliance strategy of BJP- NDA  strategy of the BJP  BJP Debacle in 2004 Lok Sabha Polls  Emergence of Loose Bi-Polar Alliance System BJP (NDA) and Congress (UPA) 2004 -2009  UPA-up and NDA- down (2004 elections)  2009 Lok Sabha election and BJP debacle  2014 Lok Sabha election: Debacle of the Congress led UPA and revival of the BJP led NDA  2014 Election from castes to social engineering  Tactics for brand Modi

Chapter-IV: Coalitional Strategy of BJP pre

and post 2014 elections 129-158

Maulana Introduction Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University  Intra party negation  Election Campaign of : 2014  New tactics through old techniques: vote mobilisation strategy  Modi’s Rally  Corruption  The stereotyped of Hindutva  RSS support  Coalition strategies of BJP after 2014 elections  Importance of pre-electoral allies  Jammu and Kashmir   Bihar  Goa  Gujarat  Assam 

Conclusion 159- 162

Bibliography 163-174

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIADMK - All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagom

ABVP - Akhil Bhartiya Vidhyarti Parishad

AICC - All India Congress Committee

AIRF - All India Railway men’s Federation

AGP - Assam Gana Parishad

AITC - All India Trinamool Congress

AIUDF - All India United Democratic Front

AD -

AAP -

BPF - Bodoland People’s Front

BJS - Bhartiya Jana Sangh

BJD - Biju

BJP - Bhartiya Janata Party

BLD - Bhartiya

BSP -

BMS - Bhartiya Kisan Sangh

Congress (I) - Congress (Indira)

Congress (O) - Congress (Organisation)

CongressMaulana (R) Azad- Library,Congress Aligarh (Requisition Muslim) University

CFD -

CPI (M) - (Marxist)

CPI - Communist Party of India

DMK - Dravida Munnetra Kazhagom

GNLF - Gorkha National Liberation Front

GFP -

iii

HJC - Haryana Janhit Congress

INLD -

IFDP - Indian Federal Democratic Party

INC -

JD (S) - Janata Dal (Secular)

JD (U) - Janata dal (United)

JP - Janata Party

JMM -

KPP - Kamtapur People’sParty

LJP -

LDF - Left Democratic Front

MDMK - Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagom

MGP - Maharashtravadi Gomantak Party

NAC - National Advisory Council

NCMP - National Common Minimum Programme

NCC - National Coordination Committee

NCP - Nationalist Congress Party

NDA - National Democratic Alliance -

NF - National Front

NPP - National People’s Party

NFIRMaulana Azad- Library,National Aligarh Federation Muslimof Indian Railwaymen University

PEPSU - Patiala and East Punjab States Union

PSP -

PDF - Progressive Democratic Fund

PDP - People’s Democratic Party

PMK -

RJD -

iv

RLD -

RSS - Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh

RSP -

SIT - Special Investigation Team

SAD - Shirmani

SRP - Socialist Republican Party

SS -

SSP - Samyukta Socialist Party

SVD - Samyukta Vidhayak Dal

SDF -

SSP - Party

SJM - Swadeshi Jagran Manch

TDP -

TRS - Telengana Rashtriya Samiti

UDF - United Democratic Front

UF - United Front

UPA - United Progressive Alliance

VHP -

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

v

LIST OF TABLES

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Table No. Description Page No.

1 Performance of the Jana Sangh in National Elections. 51

2 Congress performance (1977-2009). 113

3 Some State’s Performance of the Congress (INC) and

BJP (2004-2009). 115

4 National and Regional Parties, (1991-2009) in % of

Valid Votes. 117

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

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Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Introduction

After independence Indian National Congress (INC) was the dominant party at the national and states politics in India till 1967. At the national level Congress as a ruling party formulated policies and governments in the states implemented those without contention. Due to its national character, vast area and multiplicity of diversities in the country, the dominant party system proved unable to fulfil the desires of the different regions. Thus, the centralised nature of the government created a gap between the local aspirations and national policies. This is evident from the State Assembly election of 1967, when regional parties became shareholders in the states. Hence, the “One Dominant” party system created a favourable milieu for the emergence and growth of regional parties in India.

The term coalition is derived from the Latin word ‘coalitio’ meaning ‘to grow together’. In the political system it implies that some political parties or groups will come together and form alliance or temporary union in order to exercise control over political power.1 A coalition government is formed when more than one political party or group of them come together on the basis of common understanding or agenda. They do not lose their separate identity. They agree to a common minimum political economic and social programme and when differences arise any group or party is free to withdraw from the coalition.

Coalition can take place in two phases- pre-election alliance as adjustment or settlement between the parties and post-election union to share power and run the government. Moreover the extremism of such parties are soften and flexible to a great extent in the process of mutual concessions causing the least damage to the image of either of them. SometimesMaulana coalition Azad is based Library, on racial Aligarhcommunity, Muslim sometimes University on religious alignments, and sometimes on economic interests. Coalition provides an easy framework for binding diverse ideas and ideologies.2

India has had seven consecutive elections (1989-2009) in which no single party won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house), resulting in minority situations (hung

1 Chander N. Jose. Coalition politics: the Indian Experience. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2004 2 Shani Nares chander. ed. Coalition politics in India. Julludur. New Academic Publishing Co, 1971 1 parliament) whose solutions were dependence of minority governments on external support.

After 1989 a multi-party coalitional model has emerged at the national level. Since then coalitional governments are formed under the leadership of different parties. Some proved successful and some failed because of the growing importance of regional or state parties in the formation of coalition governments. At the national level coalition politics emerged after 1969 partially when the INC lost majority after split in the party and Congress (R) supported by the DMK at the Centre. Between 1977 and 1979 when the INC lost power at the centre, the government was formed by the Janata Party. It was coalition of various parties. But the coalition failed to complete its tenure. In 1980 Congress regained power at the centre and remained party with majority in the Lok Sabha till 1989. 1989 was the benchmark year when the one party dominance system shattered and the Congress lost power at the centre. It was the year that changed the fate of Indian Politics. Multi-party system developed and coalition politics became inevitable. Emergence of coalition phenomena reflects the federalized tendencies of Indian Society and Polity.

The coalition governments of 1989, 1991 and 1996 indicated that there should be pre- poll alliances among the partners and that there should be an alliance on the ideological base otherwise there is always a fear of losing the support of coalition partners. In 1989 too, the coalition of opposition forces against Rajiv Gandhi couldn’t survive because of differences with the BJP’s separate agenda. This period also shows that the third force (National Front) proved unsuccessful for holding government for full term. National parties like BJP and the Congress were responsible for the instability in 1990 and 1997. finally forged a grand coalition in 1999 after the bitter experience Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University in 1998 but he had to put the BJP’s three core issues the Ram temple, a uniform civil code and Article 370 in cold storage. George Fernandes, the architect of the NDA in 1999, used this pre-condition to attract other regional parties. Neither these contentious issues, nor cow vigilantism or anti-Muslim propaganda, dominated the political discourse during the Vajpayee regime, indicating that the BJP could compromise with even its basic identity for power.

The NDA government of 1999–2004 was, for the first time at the centre, a surplus majority coalition in which there were redundant partners, so that the coalition would 2 not lose its majority by the withdrawal of support by the largest partner party of the BJP, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) (which opted out of participation in the government). This surplus majority character of the coalition, combined with the spatial compatibility of its partners, most having clearly demarcated state strongholds not overlapping with others, gave the NDA and its leading party, the BJP, an extraordinary stability despite being a 24-party coalition. It also gave the BJP exceptional bargaining power with actual and potential allies. Thus, an additional strategy that could be employed by the BJP during 1998–2004, was a coalition with state parties that offered them a share of ministerial positions at the centre in a would-be national coalition government led by the national party in return for seat-sharing arrangements for parliamentary seats from their stronghold states, in a context in which the leading national parties are expected to form coalition governments at the centre.

The Importance of Pre-Electoral Coalition

In contemporary Indian governmental issues, the motivators for national parties to frame pre-electoral alliances are direct. Given India's first-past-the-post electoral framework, the collection of votes at the voting public level is significant for winning seats. By suggestion, given the breakdown of the national party framework into distinct state party frameworks, the development of partnerships with parties commanding a noteworthy state-level vote share totals supporters level votes shares in states where one's own party is not sufficiently able to go it alone. Thus, pre-electoral alliances have the capability of expanding the quantity of seats won in spite of the fact that they come to accept the surrendering of a specific number of seats to partners, and also including such partners for a post-election government. The absence of coalition for BJP in 2004 and 2009 assumed a key job in the restricted triumph of the UPA. The significance of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University pre electoral alliances is that the seat-sharing proportion between partners tends to get stuck in a narrow band, and not simply easily upward or downward as per the demands of a partner seeing its prominence to be on the rise demanding more seats.

In 2014, the BJP struck a range of new alliances, most of them on more favourable terms than in the past while retaining its key old alliances (Shiv Sena, Akali Dal) on status quo terms. Thus, in 2014, the BJP forged pre-electoral alliances in ten states, compared to six alliances in 2009, in which both it and its partners contested seats, of which seven were new alliances – Bihar, , Tamil Nadu, Haryana, 3

Kerala, Meghalaya and UP – and defined by more favourable terms. While the BJP has won 282 seats, a majority of the 543 elected, in the Lok Sabha, it has formed a surplus majority NDA government with its pre-electoral coalition partners, taking the tally up to 334 seats.

Importance of Coalition for BJP

Leaving aside the importance of pre-electoral coalitions, the centrality of coalition politics will remain due to the NDA’s dependence on opposition parties beyond the coalition to pass legislation in the . Till 2019, the BJP has 82 members in the 245-seat Rajya Sabha, and just 117 with its NDA allies (NDA allies are just 35). Coalition politics will remain important because the BJP’s stated objective is to expand its base outward from its current strongholds in the northern and central Hindi-belt states and the western states to the south and north-east. Though in the last state election of Tripura BJP won the election and started its north-east base but still it formed future plans and other strategies for other north-east states in the next State Assembly elections. Coalition parties, at the very least, allow for better representation of the country’s diverse populace.

Sanjay Ruparella writes that “parties enter into agreements (to make alliance) primarily to satisfy three interests: to get elected into office, to be able to set policy, and to capture more votes. These main objectives, Ruparella argues, can ensure that ideologically opposed parties function together”.

Coalition strategy of BJP in 2019 elections

Lok Sabha elections of 2019 will be different and tough compared to the one in 2014. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The strategy, which was used the party was that the PM will address 100 rallies across the country. If we look closely at these rallies, we will find that priority has been given to West Bengal, Kerala, , Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and the North-East. The reason is that in the last Lok Sabha election, the BJP won most of the seats in the northern and western states. While in the south, in Karnataka and undivided Andhra Pradesh, they tied up with the Telugu Desam Party and won 17 and 19 seats, respectively. The BJP won one seat in Tamil Nadu, but they couldn’t get even a single seat in Kerala. This time, the party has garnered the support of the All India Anna

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Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu, and superstar has also signalled support even while remaining independent. The way Modi mentioned the degeneration of culture in a rally in Kerala, makes it clear that the saffron party wants to strengthen its roots in the state. In west Bengal BJP feels that it can polarize the votes in its favour. Modi and Shah have their ambitions pinned on Odisha, too. Naveen Patnaik is a popular leader there and has been in power for the last 15 years. But this may become his strength or weakness. Shivraj Singh Chauhan in Madhya Pradesh and in Chhattisgarh could not have won the recently held Assembly elections despite being popular in their states. Naturally, it raises BJP’s expectations in Odisha. The Congress is the main opposition party in the state, but by visiting Odisha four times in 24 days; Modi has proved that he is working hard towards establishing his party as a strong and main party in the historic land of Kalinga. The strategy which is hidden from the public eye and everyone not knows about this.

Now we come to the PM’s speeches. We must have noticed, wherever the PM goes, he show off the work done by his government in that region. For example, in Punjab, he talked not only about the Kartarpur corridor, but also explained in details about what the centre has been doing for the state’s women, unemployed youth and senior citizens. After this, in Kerala he not only tried to acknowledge on the religious sentiments on the pretext of Sabarimala, but also counted one by one the development projects and works of the central government. Modi is definitely making an effort to project his image as the “Vikas Purush".

Literature Review

This section is about a review of the literature, the purpose behind the review of the literatureMaulana was not Azadonly to findLibrary, out the available Aligarh literature Muslim on the University BJP but also to identify the literature which could give a sound theoretical base to the present study and assist explanation part of the PhD thesis. Although a vast amount of literature has recently been published on the nature and working of political parties (mainly the BJP) in India however only those studies are included for review which features the history, electoral politics, development of Jana Sangh, the significance of coalition politics and place of the BJP in Indian politics and its coalition strategy in Indian Politics.

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Review of Literature

Craig Baxter in his book The Jana Sangh: a Biography of an Indian Political Party (1969) also traced the history, ideology, and development of the . Baxter argued that the Jana Sangh announced its major policy as one nation, one country, one culture and the rule of law. Jana Sangh argued that the sentiment of patriotism can be expressed in terms of complete allegiance to Bharat. Baxter in his book identifies the principles, policies and strategies of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh.

Hartmann in his book Political Parties in India (1971) had worked on the nature of political parties in India. The study was devoted to the questions like, how these political parties came into existence, built up their organization and how these operate in the elections at the centre and the state levels. The study also included the electoral performances of these parties in the midterm poll of 1971 and a discussion on their manifestoes.

B. D. Graham in his book Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: the Origins and Development of BJS (1990) traces the history and development of Bharatiya Jana Sangh. He argued that the Jana Sangh, formed in 1951, is the only party, which did not emerge from within the Congress. Jana Sangh during the initial year of its formation was closely linked to the RSS and adopted the RSS method of mobilisation which relied on gradual organizational expansion rather than rapid electoral mobilization. The party emphasized on the primacy of the Hindi as against the English language and essentially appealed to the liberal, educated middle classes in North Indian small and provincial cities. A major reorientation of the Jana Sangh in a more populist direction took place from 1965 onwards, when it adopted a new programme based on Deendayal Upadhayay'sMaulana 'Integral Humanism'. Azad Library, The party since Aligarh the 1967 Muslim election adopted University the mixed strategy where they emphasized on socio-economic populist policies. In spite of this in the 30 years of its existence, the BJS failed to emerge as a major force or party in political arena.

Walter K. Andersen Elections 1989 in India: The Dawn of Coalition Politics (1991) study has analyzed the verdict of the 1991 Indian Lok Sabha elections. The fall of the VP Singh government and the events that took place before the 1991 election, the verdict of 1991 election, the performance of national parties particularly of the

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Congress (I), the BJP, the National Front and left combination has been discussed by the author in detail.

James Manor BJP in South India 1991 General Election (1992) focused his analysis on the electoral performance of the BJP in south India in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections. The two Lok Sabha elections (1989 and 1991) were compared in terms of percentage of votes, and seats contested by the BJP. From Andhra Pradesh, two constituencies, Secunderabad and Hyderabad. The analysis includes a discussion on the impact of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on the performance of the BJP. In Karnataka, the analysis focused on the constituencies won by the party: Bangalore South, Tumkur, Mangalore, and Bidar. The author viewed that the reasons behind the advancements made by the BJP in South India (Karnataka in particular) were (i) decline of the Janata Dal; (ii) the poor performance of the Congress (I)’s state government and conflicts within it; (iii) the shift of Lingayats and Vokkaligas vote in favour of the BJP.

Pradeep K. Chhibber and Subhash Misra Hindus and Babri Masjid: The Sectional Basis of Communal Attitudes (1993) In this paper, the writers have tried to assess that who supported the demolition of the mosque among the Hindu community in India and who could be considered more communally minded. For this purpose the writers have taken the data from the Post-Babri Masjid survey conducted by Organization for Socio- Economic System in Delhi, Amroha and Aligarh. The Authors have taken the social basis of Hindu Community in which they have included caste, gender, age, occupation etc. After the regression analysis, the authors have concluded that the communal feelings were supported by the Hindu middle classes.

Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh in their book Hindu Nationalists in India: the Rise Maulana of Bharatiya Azad Janata Library, Party (1994) Aligarh trace the Muslim heritage and University leadership, strategies, policies and issue orientations, organization and electoral performance of the BJP. The study by the authors may be conveniently divided into three parts dealing with the nature and origin of Hindu nationalism in India; reasons and factors for the rise of the BJP; and finally psychological account of the party in terms of national and state level elections held in the last fifteen years or so. They argued that the BJP, in the initial years of its formation, in 1980s, adopted a broad based secular policy by giving primacy to the principle of Gandhian as a mechanism for resolving India's socio- economic and political problems. However, the party failed to achieve any electoral 7 success in the 1980s which forced it to revive its Hindutva identity. The adoption of the Hindutva posture enabled the party to gain electorally by exploiting the Hindu sentiments of the majority community. They further argued that the party performed better in the urban and in Muslim constituencies which indicate that the party has the capacity to attract urban people who are generally better informed than their rural counterparts and that it can unite the majority to its favour to oppose the minorities and other national political parties.

Keonard Elst and Manini Chatterjee look into the changing strategies of the BJP since 1991 onwards, Manini Chatterjee in her article The BJP: Political Mobilization for Hindutva (1994) argued that the BJP since its inception in 1980 has moved through three broad phases of development and is now in its fourth phase. The first phase was under the Presidentship of A. B. Vajpayee, and dated from 1980 to 1986. The second phase started since 1986 onwards with the appointment of Advani as President in 1986 and continued till the general elections in 1989. The third phase can be subdivided into two or three distinct sub-phases. The third phase continued up to the November 1993 when the BJP faced setback in the Assembly elections in four Northern states. The BJP has since then entered the fourth phase. She argued that the BJP is and will always remain as a right wing party which adopted flexibility and dynamism primarily to prevent any radical onslaught on the power structure of the present system while using the space provided by the bourgeois system to further a reactionary agenda.

Christophe Jaffrelot in his book The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics (1925 90) (1996) traces the origin and development of Hindu nationalists since 1925, starting with the origin, ideology and development of Hindu Mahasabha, RSS, Jana Sangh and finally the BJP. He argued that the Hindu nationalist movement have Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University always fluctuated between two types of strategies. While the moderates relied on an 'ideological fellowship or agreement with Hindu traditionalists', 'mobilisation on socio- economic, populist issues; the radical combination was based on a 'strategy of identity building through the censure and copied of other', 'ethno-religious mobilisation' and the 'development of a network of activists'. The adoption of different strategies at different points of time is guided by the adoption of the communal attitude by the Congress party, the growing dissatisfaction among the Hindus due to the preferential treatment of the minorities and the role of the RSS activist network and religious leaders. Jaffrelot

8 argued that the BJP in the initial years of its formation in 1980 did not exclusively relied on the RSS method of party building and building social base and communal themes. But as this strategy failed to deliver any positive result during the elections in 1984-85, the BJP changed its line back to the adoption of radical strategy of 'ethno-religious mobilisation' by taking up the Ram Janambhoomi Babri-Masjid issue. The adoption of this movement was one of the principal reasons for the success of the BJP in the elections in 1989 and 1991. But this strategy also proved to be counterproductive since 1993 onwards. As a result the BJP leaders from 1993 onwards adopted a more moderate strategy by downplaying communal issues and emphasising on socioeconomic populist policies and the problem of corruption, etc.

Jafferlot and Hansen in their book The BJP And Compulsion Of Politics In India (1998) analyse the BJP's performance in 1996 elections and argued that the strength and tenacity of BJP and Hindu nationalist politics in India will be determined by their ability to adopt to the characteristics of regional politics, of specific configurations of caste politics and peculiar compulsions and idioms of the different political fields it engages with. If that does not happen, BJP is likely to shrink to a party limited to northern and western India.

Thomas Blom Hansen in his book The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (1998) tried to understand the precarious and contingent process through which the dispersed grievances and sentiments in various parts of the Indian society were reframed by the Hindu nationalist discourse, organized by its movement and party, and hence aggregated into what appeared to be, and indeed, was staged as, a spontaneous surge of social or cultural identity in public arena. Hansen attributes saffron wave of the last 15 years, not just to 'imaginative political strategies' Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University or 'reserves religious nationalism' but locates the growth in the broader realm of "public culture-the public space in which a society and its constituent individuals and communities imagine, represent and recognise themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expressions and representations of the state and civic organisations."

While B. D. Graham, Craig Baxter, Anderson and Damle and Balraj Puri trace the history and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh; Yogendra K. Malik and V.B.

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Singh, Partho S. Ghosh, Keonard Elst, Manini Chatterjee traces the origin and the development of the ideology, structure, organisation and policies of the BJP.

Sudha Pai New Political Trends in Uttar Pradesh-The BJP and the Lok Sabha Elections, 1998 (1998) has described the Lok Sabha elections held in 1998 and the emergence of the new political trends in the Indian politics. The author has detailed about the emergence of a bipolar situation supported by regional parties and the seats and votes obtained by the INC and its allies on the one hand and the BJP and its allies on the other. The bipolar regional trends were examined in the case of 1996 and 1998 elections. The author has carefully examined the increase in the regionalization of politics due to the rapid mobilization and politicization of new regional and social groups and the reasons behind it.

Shela Seshia (1998) in his paper has analysed the Rise of the in the Indian party system. The paper has been divided into three sections. In the first section, the Indian party system and national politics prior to the rise of the BJP has been discussed in order to establish a base line for the analysis of subsequent developments. The second section is focused on party system dynamics and the factors associated with the BJP ascendance. The third section has assessed the impact of the BJP on electoral politics at the national level and also examined the BJP-led coalition government’s assertion of India’s nuclear capability.

Partho S. Ghosh's book BJP And The Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: from Periphery to Centre (1999) is largely a biography of the BJP which covers the entire spectrum of the rise of Hindu organisations in the first part of the twentieth century, and catalogues all the major political events in the post-independence period leading up to the rise ofMaulana BJP. It also Azad delineates Library, in detail Aligarh the social, Muslim economic University and the political agendas of the BJP. Partho S. Ghosh viewed the rise of the BJP as the logical culmination of Hindu communalism. He linked it further to the dynamics of electoral politics in which the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy together with other variables such as caste, matter.

Zavos (2000) in his book The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India has paid greater attention to the concept of Hindu Nationalism, its ideology, Hindu religion in 19th century and the organization of the state, Indian nationalism and Hinduism.

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Discussion has been carried out on organization of Hinduism, development of Indian nationalism and the development of the Hindu Sabha movement and imaging of the constituency of Hindu nationalism during the early years of 20th century in which Hindu Mahasabha, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh emerged as torch bearers of Hindu nationalism.

C. P. Bhambri in his book Bharatiya Janata Party: Periphery to Centre (2001) argues that the rapid rise of the BJP in Indian politics for the last one decade or so is perplexing. He argued that the opportunistic politics of alliances and coalition made by the secular parties was partly responsible for the BJP to move to the centre stage. Prof. Bhambri said that the BJP became "a party of, by and for Hindus and its goal is to establish Hindu Rashtra". There are two faces to the BJP: first face is when the BJP was in opposition or when it was striving to gain the upper hand in politics. And the second face is visible when the BJP came to power by aligning with a large number of parties based on regional, caste, religious identities. In the first case it used caste and communal idiom, symbolism and images, including the violence to its advantage. Here its larger agenda is clear. Nonetheless, when it became a partner in coalition politics, it was forced to compromise to hold on to power. This does not mean collapse of the original agenda.

Rangarajan (2001) in his research paper has focused on the National Democratic Alliance Government (BJP Govt.) and the limitations on its working caused by its coalition partners. The article has revealed the causes of uncertainty of the BJP government. It has discussed the issue of Ram Temple issue. The article has revealed the history of the political life of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani and their partnership in politics. The retreat of the BJP from its commitments and ideological Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University issues and getting softening about these issues were also discussed by the author.

Yogendra Yadav The Elusive mandate of 2004 (2004) in his work on the 2004 Lok Sabha elections has focused on the structural changes in the political parties including the BJP and the various strategies and issues adopted by these parties to counter each other, and the methods to attract the voters.

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Adeney and Saez (2005) in their edited book Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism provided a sum of the contributions made by scholars on the politics of coalition making and the Hindu Nationalism by the BJP. An academic evaluation of the performance of the NDA coalition, relationship between coalition politics and Hindu nationalism, the promises made by the NDA coalition and what they delivered after the elections have been discussed in the work by various scholars. In addition, the work aimed at linking the outcomes with the coalition politics, exogenous factors and the Hindu nationalist ideological agenda. The performance of the BJP-led coalition from 1999 and 2004 elections also has been evaluated. Finally, the work also aimed at making a contribution to the study of Indian politics, largely by comparing different types of administration, specially a comparison between a government led by a Hindu nationalist party versus one that is led by a non-Hindu nationalist party or coalition. A comparison of policy making by different governments in India also has been provided by the contributors of this work.

Christophe Jaffrelot, The : A Reader (2005) in his work on The Sangh Parivar (the family of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has focused on the RSS as a Hindu nationalist sect, its ideology, organization and training of the Swayamsevak. The women wing of the Parivar ‘The Rashtra Sevika Samiti’s founding, working and many other aspects have been discussed in detail. The leadership and the organization of the Jana Sangh (1951 to 1967) and the BJP as working at the centre has been thoroughly analysed. The study includes discussions on the structure and strategies of the Bajrang Dal and Durga Vahini. A brief discussion on the RSS schools, network of its educational ashrams/and its strategy of social welfare (Seva Bharti) has also been provided. The ideology and strategies of the Bharatiya Majdoor 60 Sangh and its works also have been analysed. The Hindu nationalistic approaches of the Sangh about the economy have been discussed. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University E. Sridharan Coalition Strategies and BJP’s expansion (2005) in his paper has analysed the expansion of the Bharatiya Janata Party across Indian states from 1989 to 2004 through its strategy of coalition-building. The paper has showed that the BJP leveraged its perceived pivotality as a third party in several states to form state-level electoral coalitions on progressively better terms with state-level first or second parties, so to be able to expand across states.

12

Zoya Hasan in her book India after Indira: Policy, Power, Political Change (1984- 2004) (2012) seeks to analyse important aspects of political change in India when the different parties was expanding and risen power, investigates the changes within the Indian National Congress after , and how the Congress was reshaped and developed under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), the Ayodhya issue and re- emergence of the Congress as a ruling party in 2004.

Research Objectives

The research objectives formally guide the research path, one has to undertake in successfully completing the study. It is the duty of the researcher to frame the inquiries in line with the intended research analysis. The gist of the intended research is sometime portrayed by well-defined research objectives. The objectives of the present study comprise following:

 To study the historical background of the Jana Sangh, the mother party of BJP.  To examine the expansion of the BJP from state to centre through its coalitional strategy.  To analyse the causes of the rout of the NDA in 2004 Lok Sabha elections and the Alliance strategy.  To look the era of Congress from 2004 to 2014 (its rise and fall).  To examine the coalition strategy of BJP in pre and post 2014 elections.  To analyse the importance of coalition in Indian Party System special reference to the BJP.

Research Methodology

In theMaulana present study Azad multi -Library,variant methods Aligarh have beenMuslim adopted University in order to achieve the objectives of the study. The study has adopted descriptive method; Historical approach has been used in order to explain the historical background of Jana Sangh ancestral party of BJP, its presence from lower level to national point. The study has utilized the plenty of secondary data and less primary one. It is based on Secondary sources include books, articles in scholarly journals, newspapers and magazines.

13

Hypothesis

Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has benefitted from Coalitional Political Strategy since 2004 and got surplus majority to form government with allies of National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

Chapterisation Scheme

The work is divided into the following chapters.

First Chapter titled, “Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP): a Historical Perspective”,

This chapter provides a brief outline of Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) a recorded framework, it's beginning, and journey from the formation of Jana Sangh (1951) to the arrangement or formation of BJP (1980) and its outcome.

Second Chapter titled, “Bhartiya Janata Party’s Coalitional strategy: from State to Centre”, deals with the Coalition system in Indian politics, its growing stage to maturity. Different experiences of coalition government at both levels (State, Centre) formation of Jana Sangh and its growth from periphery to centre. It also examines the political and social processes that led to the decline of the Congress and rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). It also includes the detailed examination of the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) coalition. And how the new phase of coalition politics in the country is contextualised.

Third Chapter titled, “Congress era (2004-2014) its weaknesses: BJP’s Strength”, examines the causes of the rout of the NDA in 2004 Lok Sabha elections and the Alliance strategy era of Congress from 2004 to 2014 (its rise and fall), how the two consecutive terms CongressMaulana wins the Azadsupport Library, of various regional Aligarh parties Muslim and made University UPA-I, UPA-II successfully. And cognately BJP made strong base for future elections, and decided to change its electoral process to win the hearts of its allies and the people of India.

Fourth Chapter titled, “Coalitional strategy of BJP pre and post- 2014 elections”, examines the pre and post coalition strategy of BJP in 2014 elections, importance of the coalition in Indian politics. And how BJP became one man show party instead of various negation of that very person, party’s success revolves around him. It also shows the need of coalition of the BJP at state level which obviously rendezvous at national level.

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Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Chapter- I

Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP): A Historical Perspective

This chapter provides a brief outline of Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), it's beginning, and journey from the formation of Jana Sangh (1951) to the arrangement or formation of BJP (1980) and outcome.

Introduction

The Bhartiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party) is one of the two notable parties in the Indian political framework, alongside the Indian National Congress. As of 2014, it is the nation's biggest political party as far as delineation in the National Parliament and State Assemblies. The BJP is a conservative party with close ideological and authoritative connections to the Hindu association; - the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh).1

The supporters of BJP would gladly call it as a Nationalist party which is profoundly dedicated to the possibility of Hindutva- a political rationality that should be a religion-equitable term. BJP is a rightist party, which speaks to a more extensive political coalition called the Sangh Parivar. The BJP’s official philosophy is "Integral Humanism," grounds initially detailed by Deendayal Upadhyaya in 1965, who represent it as supporting an "indigenous economic model that puts the human being at center stage."2 It focused on Hindutva, a philosophy express by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. As indicated by the party, Hindutva is social patriotism favouring Indian culture over westernization, along these lines, it reaches out to all Indians paying little mind to their religion. However, researchers and political examiners have called their Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Hindutva belief system aspires to reclassify India, recast it as a Hindu nation to the avoidance of different religions, making it a Hindu patriot party. BJP is truly firmly connected with the RSS. The party could never do anything against the will of the RSS as they depend on the grassroots intensity of the Sangh's shakhas. BJP is viewed as the political wing of RSS, and the party's dependence on the RSS has always been

1 Malik Yogendra and Singh K.V.B., Hindu Nationalism in India: the Rise of BJP (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 318. 2 Hansen Thomas Blom and Jaffrelot Christophe (ed.), The BJP and the Compulsion of Politics in India (Oxford University, 2002), p. 112.

15 acknowledged. At least, 60% of the BJP framework had Sangh foundation. The rate is considerably higher in the Hindi hinterland and the states like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat etc. BJP has gotten proficient leaders from the association or its front association, the Sangh group acts as a mentor and a caring figure to the BJP.3

Organizational Structure

The organization of the BJP has many structures or levels of organization, with the president being the most amazing expert in the party. Until 2012, the BJP constitution ordered that any qualified person could be national or state president for only three- year term. This was revised to a maximum of two sequential terms.4 The national executive is president, which contains a variable number of senior leaders across the country. It is the highest decision making body of the party. Its members comprise of a few Vice-Presidents, general-secretaries, treasurers and secretaries, who works with the president. An official board of trustees, drove by a president, exists at the state, territorial, district, and local level. The BJP is a cadre-based party. It has close connections with other associations with similar ideology; similar to the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) the frameworks of these groups regularly boost the BJP. Its lower members are largely from the RSS and its members, known as the Sangh Parivar.5

Article VII of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh Party's constitution elaborates the organizational structure of the party which is as under:

I. National Level a. The National President Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University b. The Plenary of the Special session of the party c. The National Council d. The National Executive

3 Seshia Shaila, “Divide and Rule in Indian Party Politics: the Rise of Bhartiya Janata Party”, Asian Survey 38, no. 11 (University of California Press 1998), p.1041. 4 Swain Pratap Chandra, Profile and Performance (New Delhi: A.P.H, 2001), pp. 71-76. 5 Ibid., p. 77. 16

II. State Level a. State Council b. State Executive

III. Regional Committees

IV. District Committees

V. Mandal Committees

VI. Gram/Shahari Kendra

VII. Local Committees

Supportive Organizations

1. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). 2. The Akhil Bhartiya Vidhyarthi Parishad (ABVP), the student’s wing of the RSS. 3. The Bhartiya Kisan Sangh (BMS), the farmer’s division. 4. The Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, the labor union associated with the RSS. 5. Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP). 6. The BJP Mahila Morcha, its women’s division. 7. The Bhartiya Janata Yuva Morcha, it's youth wing. 8. The BJP Minority Morcha, its minority division. 9. Bajrang Dal. Maulana10. Vidya Azad Bharati. Library, Aligarh Muslim University 11. Seva Bharati. 12. Vanbasi Kalyan Sangh.

The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism

As we realize that the base of Hindu Nationalism begins from the second half of the nineteenth century with the establishing of Arya Samaj, in 1875 by Swami Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883). According, V.P. Varma the Arya Samaj represented 'a new

17 aggressive and militant spirit' among the Hindus in the northern part of India. In the twentieth century, the Samaj turned into (the beginning stage for) a movement of reconversion of Muslim or Christian believers to Hinduism.6 Those developing thoughts later became fundamental principles of the Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu orthodox parties. There is no doubt that the main ideologue of neo-Hindu Nationalism was Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920). He proceeded with the campaign against cow slaughter which was started by Swami Dayananda. For long the Hindu Mahasabha had preached the Shuddhi and Sanghatan movement and brotherhood with untouchables when V.D. Savarkar took up the leadership of the organization in 1937. For the unity of Hindus, he coined the term 'Hindutva' and said that each Indian, who takes India as his motherland and as the holy land, belongs to the Hindus. As per this theory, the Hindus shape a religious community, as well as a Nation, 'Hindu Rashtra'.7 The idea of Hindu Nationalism was supported with the formation of the Ram Rajya Parishad in 1948 by the members of princely states. It was the most orthodox Hindu Party. The party aimed to return to the glorious days of Rama's rule, where everyone was delighted, prosperous and religious. The party was against any change of the caste-ridden society. But soon the Ram Rajya Parishad vanished.

In an extensive measure, the state of India's party framework after independence relied on the changes which were occurring in the Indian National Congress, that immense and broadly spread political affiliation which had headed the nationalist movement during the times of the British Raj. In 1947 its positions agents of three essential intellectual groups with very distinct however different perspectives, the first wished to consider India to be a liberal-democratic state with a constitution that was both secular and parliamentary in character; the second sought after the arrangement of a socialistMaulana state in whi Azadch collectivist Library, standards Aligarh administered Muslim social University and economic association; and the third was attempting to understand a State which embodied Hindu traditions and values.

There were significant contrasts of temperament between those Hindus who were basically backward-looking, whom we may conveniently call Hindu traditionalists, and the individuals who, however revivalist, were forward-looking, whom we may

6 Horst Hartmann, Political Parties in India (Meenakshi Mudranalya, 1984) p.112. 7 Ibid., p. 113. 18 call Hindu patriot. While the Hindu traditionalists were preservationist in their approach, the Hindu patriots needed to remold Hindu society on corporatist and to mold the state as indicated by them. In organized politics these issues were collect for the most part in three bodies: first of all there was a vast and persuasive group of Hindu traditionalist within the Congress (INC); secondly, a blend of Hindu traditionalists and Hindu patriots within the Hindu Mahasabha lastly, a delegation of activist Hindu patriots within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS or National Volunteer Organization).

The roots of the Mahasabha are generally followed back to the formation of different various Hindu Sabhas in the years before the First World War, but it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that it started to transform from a deliberate relationship into a body which had many of the attributes of a political party. Under the leadership of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who became its president in 1937, it took an immediate enthusiasm for decisions and in party governmental issues for the most part, and introduced itself as a disagreeable to the Congress (INC) and the Muslim League.

However, it failed to make any significant progress in the post-war years and entered the independence period as a generally decentralized body, based on mainly its major provincial Hindu Sabhas and strongly related to upper-caste and socially conservative view.8

The RSS had developed on quite different lines. Founded at in 1925, it had become the most successful of a class of associations which specialized in recruiting young men and adolescents into informal militia bands (known as shakhas) with a centralized framework presided over by full-time workers and teachers. Under its first leader,Maulana Dr. Keshav Azad Baliram Library, Hedgewar, Aligarh the RSS spreadMuslim beyond University its points of origin in Maharashtra to northern India. He was deeply influenced by the writings of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. He considered that the cultural and religious heritage of Hindus should be the basis of Indian nationhood.9 Hedgewar insisted on the term’ Rashtriya’ (national) for his exclusively ‘Hindu’ organization, for he wanted to re-assert the identity of Hindu with Rashtriya.

8 Prakash Indra, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement (New Delhi: Facsimile Publisher, 1938), pp. 1-31. 9 Anderson Walter, “The Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh: Early Concerns”, Economic and Political Weekly 7, no.11 (Bombay, 1972), p. 589. 19

And when Hedgewar died in 1940 his successor, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, a Maharashtrian Brahman who had been a teacher at the Banaras Hindu University, concentrated on developing the organization’s philosophy and doctrine. The ordinary RSS volunteers, or swayamsevaks, were urged to consider themselves a brotherhood committed to the change of Hindu society and to the unavoidable formation of a Hindu Rashtra, or Hindu country. It has been criticized as an extremist organization and as a Paramilitary group.10 It has also been criticized when its members participated in anti-Muslim violence and have since framed militant wing, Bajrang Dal. Alongside other extremist organizations, the RSS was engaged with an extensive variety of riots, regularly promoting and involving in violence against Christians and Muslims.11

In 1948, Gandhi Ji announced that in an effort to bring friendship between Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims he would undertake a fast till he didn’t get any assurance from that particular community or their leaders, then on 30 January, he was assassinated by Nathuram Vinayak Godse, a young Maharashtrian. He belonged to an extremist group in the Mahasabha and had been a member of a small volunteer organization, the Hindu Rashtra Dal, and in the early 1930s of the RSS. After the death of Gandhi, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS were both treated by the Government of India as constituting risk to lawfulness: Golwalkar, as a leader of the RSS, and V.G. Deshpande, the General Secretary of Mahasabha, were arrested and the Government proclaimed that no association preaching brutality or public disdain would be tolerated.12 On 4th February 1948, the Home ministry released a report declaring that Mukherjee was a significant mediator between the Government and the Mahasabha at this stage. Having served as its working President, he had turned out to be full President ofMaulana the Mahasabha Azad after Library,the Savarkar's Aligarh renunciation Muslim from the University post at the end of 1944, but when India became free he took the view that the organization should no longer be confined to Hindus alone.13 After that, the Working Committee leave this choice and put down for Mukherjee's second option, the resuming of political exercises with an open participation. When a subcommittee started to draw up a

10 Ibid., p. 590. 11 Ghosh Partha S., BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: from Periphery to Centre (Manohar Publications, 1999), p. 227. 12 Statesman, Calcutta, February 3, 1984. 13 Statesman, Calcutta, November 24, 1984. 20 resolution along these lines for submission to a gathering of the association's All-India Council there were, according to Mukherjee, 'sharp differences of opinion.' Finally, a working committee meeting at Delhi on (6-7 November 1948) decided in favour of the resuming of political activities, with membership being limited to Hindus.14 Mukherjee himself had been put in a troublesome position and there were voices calling for him either to break with the Mahasabha by and large or to leave from the Government of India.15

The RSS too was feeling compress to alter its authoritative points. Following a time of a half year of confinement, Golwalkar was set at freedom on 6 August 1948 and afterward wrote to Nehru and Patel to complain about the official prohibition on the RSS. He suggested that the RSS should create a composed constitution and that this record ought to contain a declaration of faithfulness to the constitution of India and the National Flag, arrangement for a law based association, and attain to limit its exercises to 'social' work and to maintain a strategic distance from brutality and mystery. These terms were not acknowledged by the RSS leaders, and the provincial governments with the cooperation of the central government, along these lines continued with the ban.16

Then, on 13 November 1948, Golwalkar dropped an earlier mandate which he had issued to disband the RSS and called his supporters 'to continue their work in the normal manner'.17 He was arrested on the following day and sent back to jail in Nagpur. On 9 December the RSS began demonstrations against the ban and a large number of its members were arrested in the following weeks. Golwalkar declared a conclusion to the disturbance on 14th January 1949 and various mediators then tried to clear the ground for further negotiations. At long last, an agreement was reached to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University the central government about a written constitution and the restriction on the organization was lifted on 12th July 1949.18 The Constitution expressed that the point of the RSS was 'to weld together the various groups inside the Hindu Samaj' and that it clutch to 'quiet and honest means for the acknowledgment of its beliefs'.

14 Statesman, Calcutta, November 9, 1984. 15 Bruce D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: the Origins and Development of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (Cambridge University Press), pp. 14-17. 16 Statesman, Calcutta, November 14, 1984. 17 Ibid., B.D. Graham. p.18. 18 J.A. Curran (Jr.), Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A study of the RSS (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), pp.18-22. 21

The actual organization of the RSS at about that time has been described in detail by an American observer, J.A. Curran. “He suggests the Golwalkar’s authority as Sar Sanchalak (chief leader) was considerable, but that he formulated strategy and policy in consultation with a group of lieutenants (including the general secretary, Prabhakar Balwant Dani who made up the core of his national executive committee Kendriya Karyakari Mandal). Curran suggested that the RSS derived most of its funds from donations which the swayamsevaks made each year on a special ceremony when offerings, known as Dakshina (the term for the gift which a student gives to his teacher at the end of his education under the orthodox Hindu system), were made before the Sangh’s triangular saffron-colored flag, Bhagwa-Dhwaja, and ranged from thousands of rupees to a few pices”.19

After lifting of the ban, Golwalkar went on a lengthy speaking-tour of India, during which one of his main concerns must have been to estimate the damage suffered by his organization as a result of the government’s sanctions. At that time the membership of the RSS had fallen from its 1947 level between 400,000 and 500,000 members to about 100,000, but by the first quarter of 1951, the level had risen again to a little above 600,000.20 The RSS had a special appeal for the lower-middle-class youth of the towns; like the Arya Samaj, it offered them membership of a generalized Hindu community and an escape from the narrow identification of caste and occupational groupings. In other words, of one RSS slogans was: ‘every shakha was an ashram where Hindus were nationalized and nationalists Hinduised’.21

Origin of Jana Sangh (1951-1977)

The division between the Hindu traditionalists and the liberal secularists inside the Congress wasMaulana extended Azad by their Library, different responses Aligarh to Muslim the episodes University of Communal brutality which happened in East Bengal and West Bengal during the winter of 1949- 50. In the Cabinet, Nehru, who sought after an arranged settlement, recommended that he and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, should visit the two Bengals, a thought which Liaquat Ali refused to consider, while Patel, who supported an exchange of populations, called for a hard line to be taken with Pakistan. Nehru

19 Graham B., Hindu Nationalism, p. 17. 20 Curran J.A., Militant Hinduism, pp. 18-22. 21 “The Story of the Sangh”, Organiser, August 30, 1949. 22 himself was obliged to think about war as a possible course of action;22 however on 17 March 1950, after several visits to Calcutta and West Bengal, he clarified to the Indian parliament that he was against an exchange of population. Rather he recommended that he and Liaquat Ali Khan should make a joint statement guaranteeing the minorities in the two nations of assurance and fair treatment.23

The crisis had again revived the subject of whether India ought to remain a secular state or whether it ought to represent the viewpoint of its Hindu dominant part. As connected to the Bengal crisis the crucial test was whether the government would treat the rioting as an issue whose solution required the co-operation of the two nations or whether it would follow up on the simple premises that Pakistan has paid for the abuse of her Hindu minorities. On 26th March 1950, Nehru wrote to Patel proposing either the Congress Working Committee or the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) should meet to settle a clear line of arrangement. Patel reminds to recollect Gandhi's desire that they ought to cooperate with the government. Having recognized the conflict between Communalism and Secularism as his main concern and having defended the idea that India ought to be a secular state, Nehru indicate to the insecurity of Indian Muslims and of minorities in general, and suggested that 'the fact that Liaquat Ali and he (Nehru) pull in various direction, and on any occasion the belief that they do as such, is very harmful'.24 Serious differences within the cabinet turned out to be clear after Liaquat Ali had accepted Nehru's invitation to visit Delhi. When the general principle of an agreement between the two nations was discussed, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee is reported to have expressed a lack of confidence in Pakistan's good faith and to have demanded the addition of a penal clause to accommodate sanctions against whichever nation neglected to honour the agreement, a demandMaulana which Azad would Library, almost certainl Aligarhy have destroyedMuslim theUniversity coming negotiations. Nehru and others rejected this strongly,25 after four days, on 6th April 1950; Mokerjee submitted his resignation as a Cabinet minister to Nehru.

In spite of Mukherjee's protest, Nehru and Liaquat Ali signed the agreement which (known as the Delhi Pact) on 8 April 1950, thus affirming the intention of their

22 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography 1947-1956 (London: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 82. 23 Graham, Hindu nationalism, p. 22 24 Ibid., p.23. 25 Ibid., p.23. 23 respective governments to uphold the rights of their minorities, to facilitate the government of migrants and to restore communal harmony in the two Bengals.26

Mukherjee started to look over framing another Hindu patriot party in the mid-year of 1950, however, made no clear path to set up one until the late in 1951, by which time it was clear that the tide in the Congress was blowing towards Nehru and his supporters. He expected that the conservative of the Congress drove by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Purushottamdas Tandon may extend support to him. But Patel died in December 1950 and Nehru replaced Tandon as the Congress President.

In January 1951, the primary concrete steps toward shaping another party in the Punjab-Delhi zone were embraced. In the following months in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Bharat, Orissa and Rajasthan units of the new party were opened. However, in south India and in Maharashtra where the RSS framework was not for supporting the proposed party the Jana Sangh did not have an organizational base when it was established on 21st October 1951 in Delhi.27 Mukherjee became its first President.

A new Party, the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) was established for the support to the Hindu philosophy. The party 'resulted from a combination of a party less leader Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, and a leaderless party, the RSS.'28 In its starting, the party was not more than the expansion of a disciplined cadre of the RSS in the Northern part of India and Mukherjee's personal following in West Bengal. The Jana Sangh offers an internal philosophy of 'Individual, Society, and Nation and traces back its philosophical roots to the Vedic age'. Dayananda, Vivekananda, Tilak and other Hindu nationalists are quoted with a specific end goal to clarify the party position, for the 'Jana SanghMaulana the political Azad articulation Library, of the Aligarh cultural renaissance.'Muslim University The Jana Sangh expressed its basics as 'One Country, One Nation, One Culture and the Rule of Law.'29 The Jana Sangh remains for 'Bhartiya Samskriti' which obviously implies old and obsolete Hindu culture. As per its belief system, Indian Nationalism and Hindu

26 Ibid., p.24. 27 Horst Hartmann, Political Parties, pp. 113-114. 28 Baxter Craig, “The Jan Sangh” (Philadelphia, 1969), p. 6. 29 Ibid., p.114. 24

Nationalism were one and a similar thing and whosoever attempted to distinguish between the two was conflicting with the enthusiasm of India's Nation building.30

The early Jana Sangh along these lines contained two disparate desires: it was torn between those powers which were drawing it towards a constitutional role and those which were pulling it towards legislative issues. The impact of the constitutional powers was weakened by the results of the 1951-52 general elections, which the Congress won with large majorities; just three Jana Sangh members, including Mukherjee, were returned to the Lok Sabha and a minor bunch of the party's candidates gained up places in the Legislative Assemblies at the state level. In the Central Parliament, Mukherjee tried to regain the situation by forming an alliance with groups to the right of Congress. By the first meeting of the new parliament in May 1952 he had managed out to develop a small United Nationalist Party, drawn fundamentally from the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Akali Dal, Ganatantra Parishad, and Jharkhand groupings,31 and further negotiations prompted the merger of this body with an Independent Democratic Party to frame a National Democratic Party, comprising of 32 members in the Lok Sabha and 10 in Rajya Sabha.32

However, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha refused to recognize either this or some other non-Congress groups as the official Opposition Party in the house, deciding that such a party who take place as the opposition ought to have no less than fifty members and have certain other particular properties.33 With his parliamentary role limited, Mukherjee started to look outside parliament for zones in which the government could be challenged, and he swung to the Kashmir dispute. This included a considerable lot of the issues about which he and numerous other Jana Sangh leaders felt more seriously. By the mid-year of 1952, the international dispute about the status of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Kashmir had just come to end earlier Jana Sangh had taken the position that Kashmir was an integral part of India, that the reference of the question to the United Nations should be withdrawn, and the proposal for a plebiscite should be surrendered34 but its main concern was to exert pressure on the Government of India to change its policies towards the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370 of the Indian

30 Ghosh Partha, BJP and the Evolution, p. 226. 31 Statesman, Delhi, May 17, 1952. 32 Statesman, Delhi, May 28, 1952. 33 Statesman, Delhi, June 5, 1952. 34 Graham B.D., Hindu Nationalism, p. 35. 25

Constitution provided that Article 238, which applied to part B (i.e. Jammu and Kashmir which is under the control of India and its Constitution) states, in general, should not apply to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and that the power of the Indian Parliament to make laws for the state ought to be restricted to issues indicated in order of the President of India, in consultation with the state government in regards to the areas of policy covered by the Instrument of Accession (foreign affairs, defence and communications) and with its concurrence in other matters.

The Jana Sangh did not have its own party units in Jammu and Kashmir but it was in sympathy with the Praja Parishad and with its strong leaders, Prem Nath Dogra, a Brahmin, formerly a civil servant in the princely state who had at one stage headed the RSS groups in Jammu city. On 8 February 1952 he and some other demonstrators had been arrested after a conflict with the police and Mukherjee had brought the issue up in Parliament.35 Public authorities in Delhi and in various centers in Punjab had no trouble in containing the demonstrations. Mukherjee was powerless against the charge that he has permitted his party to be drawn into a possibly brutal and communalist agitation against the government and that he himself had failed to keep the Kashmir issue in context.

Mukherjee decided to visit Jammu in May 1953, possibly with the intention of recapturing the initiative in this lengthen dispute by transferring the debate to the courts, where his skill as a supporter could have been utilized to advantage. His stated reason behind making the journey was that he wanted to study the situation there for himself and to explore the possibility of peaceful settlement,36 but he may also have planned to make an issue of the right to free entry to the state. A permit was required for entry to Jammu from Punjab but Mukherjee did not try to get one and seems to Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University have assumed that the Punjabi authorities would prevent him from crossing the border. He had done as such, he could then have appealed to the Supreme Court against the permit system and incidentally brought up the issue over the Kashmir matter. When he reached the border he was arrested by Kashmiri Police when he signified his intention to the entry. He had started to challenge the legality of his arrest and detention before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir but he fell sick and died

35 Ibid., p. 36. 36 Ibid., p. 39. 26 all of a sudden on 23 June 1953, this shocked his supporters and they suspended the agitation in both Jammu and Delhi for a time of grieving. In the final estimation, the Jammu agitation had cost the Jana Sangh bad deal. After the death of Mukherjee, three Hindu parties began thinking for the merger. After those unpleasant experiences the party decided to go it alone sometime but after that, it merged with several other parties’ in 1977 to become a new party (i.e. Janata Party) for the reason to defeating Indira or the Congress .

Janata Party (1977-1979)

The Janata Party (JP) (People’s Party) was a combination of Indian Political Parties having different ideologies opposed to the State of Emergency that was imposed between 1975 and 1977 by the government of India under the Prime Ministership of Indira Gandhi and her Party, the Indian National Congress (R). In the general election held after the end of the emergency in 1977, the Janata Party defeated Congress (R) to form the first non-congress government in the history of the Republic of India.

The Janata Party, formed few months before the general election of 1977, was a result of several years of cooperation between the Jana Sangh and other non-Congress forces in the Lok Sangharsh Samiti. The Party consisted of defectors from Congress, Congress (O) headed by former Congress leader and old-style Gandhian, Morarji Desai, the Socialist Party, the Bhartiya Lok Dal headed by the north Indian peasant leader Charan Singh, and the Jana Sangh. All these parties gave up their separate identities and merged in the new party on a common platform which, in spite of vague common programmatic statements, was held together primarily by a common determination to defeat Indira Gandhi. The role of the Jana Sangh cadres and of the SanghMaulana Parivar in securingAzad Library,an electoral Aligarhvictory for tMuslimhe Janta Party University was significant.37

Post Indian independence movement, the Indian National Congress became the most popular political Party in independent India and won every election. However, the Indian National Congress divided or scattered in 1967 over the issue of the leadership of Indira Gandhi, the daughter of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Supporters of Indira Gandhi claimed to be the real Congress Party, adopting the name

37 Zavos John, Hansen T.B. and Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 131. 27

Indian National Congress (R) -where “R” stood for “Requisition.” Congress Politicians who opposed Indira identified themselves as the Indian National Congress (O) - where “O” stood for “Organisation” or “Old.” In the 1971 election, the Congress (O), Samyukta Socialist Party and the Bhartiya Jana Sangh had formed a coalition called the “Grand Alliance” to oppose Indira Gandhi and the Congress (R), but failed to have an impact; Indira’s Congress (R) won a majority in the 1971 elections and her popularity increased significantly after India’s victory in the war of 1971 against Pakistan.38

However, India's inability to resolve serious issues such as unemployment, poverty, inflation and shortages of food dissolved her generality. The successive convene of "President's rule" to expel state governments represented by opposition political parties were viewed as authoritarian and opportunist. Political leaders, such as Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Kripalani and Congress (O) chief Morarji Desai condemned Indira's government as tyrannical and corrupt. Narayan and Desai established the Janata Morcha (People's Front), the Predecessor of the Janata Party. The Janata Morcha won the elections for the Vidhan Sabha (State Legislature) of the state of Gujarat on 11 June 1975.

Raj Narain, a leader of the Socialist Party of India, who had unsuccessfully contested election against Indira from the constituency of Rae Bareilly in 1971, lodged a case at the Allahabad High Court, alleging electoral malpractices and the use of government resources for her election campaign. On 12 June 1975, the Allahabad High Court found Indira guilty and banned her from holding public office for six years. The opposition immediately demanded her resignation and stepped up a mass protest against the government.39 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Emergency

Things began to change in the mid-1970s, during the JP movement. Student organizations were at the forefront of this struggle, as is clear from the role played by the Chhatra Sangharsh Samiti (CSS, Student Struggle Committee) formed in Patna on February 17, 1974. That was the difficult situation of the first inclusion of the Sangh

38 “The rise of Indira Gandhi” Library of Congress Country Studies, Retrieved 10-Aug-2016. 39 Frank Katherine, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002), p. 371. 28

Parivar in a legitimate, united opposition front. One-third of the 24 members of the CSS representing body originated from the Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), the student's union of the RSS, whereas only four were communist, two were from the Gandhian Tarun Shanti Sena and two were from the Congress(O). In March, the CSS swung to JP, who was already in touch with RSS leaders. In June 1973, JP had managed a grieving function in memory of M.S. Golwalkar and 20 years before, Nanaji Deshmukh, a senior RSS pracharak, had taken part in the bhoodan programme. After JP agreed to lead the student movement against the Congress, Deshmukh turned into his familiar and a key organizer of the dissents. JP at that point welcomes all the opposition forces to merge in order to give India a two-party system. Charan Singh was in favour of this arrangement, but the Jana Sangh had a few reservations. All these parties assert themselves with contesting the Gujarat elections under the same umbrella, called the Janata Front. Rather than weakening their character by combining their party into another one, Sangh Parivar leaders liked to participate in a coalition. Deshmukh became general secretary of the NCC (National Coordination Committee), whose president was Morarji Desai, and Advani as well D.P. Thengadi (the founder of the BMS, the workers' union of the Parivar) were among its members.40

On 25 June 1975, the President of India, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, accepted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s recommendation to declare a state of national emergency. Indira argued that the political and civil disorder constituted a threat to national security.41 A state of emergency enabled the Central government to issue executive command without requiring the consent of parliament. Elections were postponed and public gatherings, rallies, and strikes were banned. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Curfews were imposed and police forces were empowered to make warrantless searches, seizures, and arrests. The Central government also imposed censorship on radio, television, and newspaper. Opposition political organizations such as Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) were banned and their leader arrested.42 In that context, the emergency

40 Jaffrelot Christophe, Who mainstreamed BJP? The Indian Express, July 21, p. 376. 41 Ibid., p. 377. 42 Ibid., p. 382. 29 played the role of incentive. The fact that Indira Gandhi sent political leaders from different parties to the same jail was a major factor.

Indira called for elections for May 1977, at that time the emergency era had been widely unpopular. The most controversial issue was the 42nd amendment to the Constitution of India, which deprived citizens of direct access to the Supreme Court, except when a violation of the fundamental rights resulted from Union Law. The Parliament was given unrestrained power to amend any parts of the Constitution. Stopping on civil liberties and allegations of widespread abuse of human rights by police had angered the public. Indian laborers, urban workers, teachers, and government employees were also disappointed or unhappy by wage freezes and the cut down of trade union activities and rights.43

1977 Elections

During the election campaign, the leaders of the Congress (R) and the Janata Party traveled across the country to rally supporters. Indira and her Congress (R) promoted the record of achieving economic development and orderly government. Although she offered apologies for abuses committed during the Emergency, Indira and the Congress (R) defended imposing the state of Emergency as being essential for National Security. Then again, Janata leaders assaulted Indira for ruling as a tyrant and jeopardizing human rights and democracy in India. Actions taken during Emergency significantly decreased support for the Congress (R) among its most loyal constituencies. The bulldozing of slums near the Jama Masjid was widely disliked among India’s Muslims, and the defection of Jagjivan Ram essentially diminished support for the Congress (R) among India's Dalits. BLD leader Charan Singh's peasant rootsMaulana helped him Azadbring considerable Library, support Aligarh in the Muslim rural part Universityof Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state of India. The , the Sikhs of Punjab and regional political parties, such as the Tamil Nadu-based Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party became imperative partners. The leaders of the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Jana Sangh revived India's middle-class merchants, trader and conservative Hindus. The Hindu Nationalist RSS and trade unions aligned with this Janata helped truly consolidate voting blocs.

43 Brass Paul, The since Independence (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 40- 50. 30

The 1977 election drew a turnout of 60% from an electorate of more than 320 million. On 23rd March, it was announced that the Janata Party had won a sweeping victory, securing 43.2% of the popular vote and 271 seats. With the support of the Akali Dal and the Congress for Democracy, it had to collect two-thirds or an absolute majority of 345 seats. Although the Congress for Democracy won 28 seats.

In contrast to the rest of the country, the Janata Party won only six seats from India’s southern states- none from the state of Kerala - where the Emergency had not caused political unrest. The Congress(R) won a total no. of 153 seats, mainly from India’s south. However, Janata candidates consonantly defeated Congress (R) candidates in the northern “Hindi belt”, especially in Uttar Pradesh. One of the most stunning results of the election was the defeat of Indira Gandhi from her constituency of Rae Bareilly, which she lost to her 1971 opponent Raj Narain by a margin of 55,200 votes. The Congress (R) did not win any seats in Uttar Pradesh and was wiped out in 10 states and territories by Janata candidates.44

The Janata Party resist a serious challenge in choosing a leader to become India's new Prime Minister, where the opponent offers of party leaders could divide the party and weakening its greater part before it took control. Janata Party chairman Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, and Jagjivam Ram delighted the support of a significant number of Janata MPs and the activists brought from their own particular political parties into the Janata organization. After a time of consideration, Narayan and Kripalani chose Morarji Desai to become the chairman of the Janata Parliamentary Party on 24th May. Although a few leaders, such as George Fernandes and Jagjivan Ram hesitate to support Desai and condemned the undemocratic technique of selection, Desai's position was soon confirmed and strong.45 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Taking office as Prime Minister, Desai also took charge of the Ministry of Finance. Charan Singh became the minister of Home Affairs, while Jagjivan Ram assumed the Ministry of Defence. BJS leaders Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Advani were respectively given charge of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Raj Narain was appointed Minister of Health, George Fernandes was made the Minister of Communications. Congress (O) veteran and

44 Ibid., pp. 118-128. 45 Ibid., pp. 176-191. 31

Janata competitor Neelam Sanjiva Reddy won the presidential election to become the 6th president of India on 25 July 1977.

The results of the election weakened the Congress (R). Significant numbers of Congress (R) MPs and activists criticize Indira's leadership and left the party. Therefore, many of them still faithful to Indira Gandhi and renamed their party as Congress (I) – “I” remaining for Indira. Indira Gandhi proceeded as the President of Congress (I), which remained the biggest opposition party for many more years.

The main moves made by the Desai government were to formally end the state of emergency and media control and repeal the disputable executive command issued during the Emergency. The constitution was changed to make it more difficult for any future government to declare a state of emergency; fundamental freedoms and the independence of India's judiciary were reaffirmed.

Creation of the Janata Party

The Janata Party was officially launched on 23 January 1977 when the Janata Morcha, Charan Singh’s , Swantantra Party, the Socialist Party of India of Raj Narain and George Fernandes, and the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) joined together, dissolving their separate identities (the merger of all party organizations was to be completed after the election). In spite of the fact that the political belief systems of Janata constituents were diverse and clashing, the party could join under the over- reaching appeal of Jayaprakash Narayan, who had been the ideological leader of the anti- Emergency movement and after that Janata Party. Morarji Desai was chosen as the first party chairman. Ramakrishna Hedge became the party general secretary, and Jana Sangh Maulanapolitical Lal KrishnaAzad AdvaniLibrary, turned Aligarh into the party Muslim spokesperson. University

The Janata manifesto was released on 10 February 1977 the manifesto focussed on agriculture and unemployment and for ensuring decentralization of economic and political power.46 The most significant was that of Jagjivan Ram, who commanded great support amongst India’s Dalit communities. Ram was a former minister of Defence and left the Congress (R) and along with his supporters formed the Congress for Democracy on 2nd February 1977. Although committing to contest the election

46 Mirchandani G.G., 320 Million Judges (Abhinav Publications, 2003), pp. 98-102 32 with the Janata Party, Ram opposed consolidating his party organization with Janata. It was eventually decided that the same manifesto as the Janata Party and would join the Janata Party in Parliament, however, hold a separate identity.47

Fall of the Janata Government

Regardless of a solid begin, the Janata government started to ineffective as huge ideological and political divisions developed. The party comprised of veteran communists, trade unionists, and professional business leaders, making major economic changes difficult to accomplish without drive a public divide.48 Socialists and Secular Janata Politicians shared an antipathy for the Hindu nationalist agenda of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, whose members included Vajpayee, Advani and different leaders from the former Bhartiya Jana Sangh. Violence between Hindus and Muslims led to further confrontations within the Janata Party, with most Janata leaders demanding that Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani choose one between remaining in government or party and being members from the RSS. Vajpayee and Advani as well as other members from the former BJS opted to remain members of the RSS and therefore resigned from their posts and from the party. Through 1979, support for Morarji Desai had declined considerably because of worsening economic conditions as well as the emergence of claims of nepotism and corruption including members of his family. Desai's argumentative attitude crumbles his support.49 His main rival Charan Singh had built up a bitter relationship with Desai. Dissenting Desai's leadership, Singh resigned and pulled back the support of his BLD. Desai also lost the support of the Secular and Socialist Politicians in the party, who considered him to be favoring the Hindu nationalists BJS.50 On 19 July 1979 Desai resigned from the government and eventually retired to his home in Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University . The failing health of Jayaprakash Narayan made it difficult for him to remain politically active and act as a unifying influence, and his death in 1979 denied the party of its most well-known leader. Dissenters anticipated Charan Singh as the new Prime Minister instead of Desai.

47 Ibid., pp. 105-107. 48 The Rise of Indira Gandhi. 49 Kuldip Singh, “OBITUARY: Morarji Desai”, (London: The Independent, 11 April 1995) 50 The Rise of Indira Gandhi. 33

President Reddy appointed Charan Singh as the Prime Minister of a minority government with the strength of 64 MPs, calling upon him to frame new government and prove his majority. The takeoff of Desai and the BJS had significantly lessened Janata's majority, and various Janata MPs refused to help Charan Singh. MPs that were faithful to Jagjivan Ram pulled back themselves from the Janata Party. Former partners, for example, the DMK, Shiromani Akali Dal and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) had distanced themselves from the Janata party. Desperately seeking enough support for a majority, Charan Singh even tried to negotiate with Congress (I), which refused. After just three weeks in office, Charan Singh resigned. No other political party in a situation to build up a majority government, President Reddy broke up the Parliament and called for fresh elections in January 1980.51

The New Beginning 1980

The past Jana Sangh reinvented itself in June 1980 after breaking off from the Janata Party. The new name they adopted was Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Gandhian Socialism turned into their new philosophy.52 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was born under shocking conditions and situations over which it had no control, conditions which were both unfortunate and peculiar, shocking since they signify the shattering of JP's dream of building a party which was to be a national alternative to the Congress.53 In 1980, when the 7th Lok Sabha polls were held, the Janata Party, of which the BJP was a part, won only 31 of 433 seats it had contested. This horrible decimation was the defining moment in the political history of India when leaders including Vajpayee, L.K. Advani, and others separated their ways from Janata Party to move another political party BJP.

Indira Gandhi,Maulana who had Azad consolidated Library, her Hindu Aligarh credentials Muslim by constantly University visiting temples, was assassinated (in the reaction of operation BLUE STAR) on 31st October 1984, just before the elections. Which ride huge sympathy wave, the Congress won 414 seats in the Lok Sabha – a performance not seen at the peak time of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. The BJP won only two seats-even not as much as the seats they had won the first time when they had contested elections as the Jana Sangh in 1951. All

51 Ibid., 52 Nag Kingshuk, The Saffron Tide: The Rise of the BJP (Rupa Publications, 2014), p. 11. 53 Horst Hartmann, Political Parties, p. 339. 34

Hindu votes had gone to the Congress. There was some change in the BJP positions and Vajpayee, the boss of the party, was sidelined, his position assumed control by his old partner Lal Krishna Advani.

In 1980 when the BJP chose the philosophy of Gandhian Socialism, the RSS was disturbed. Its president, Balasaheb Deoras, was concerned: he felt that the party was abandon or lose its Hindu base. He proposed utilizing the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) _ a twenty-year-old outfit that was removed a part of the Sangh Parivar to speak to the Hindu cause. Under the direction of the RSS, VHP started its Hindu mobilization programme in Uttar Pradesh (UP).54

Ramjanmabhoomi movement (Demolition of Babri Masjid)

Advani jumps on to the VHP movement and connect the BJP's fortunes to the previous and decide to use the issue of Ram Janmabhoomi to mobilize Hindu society. In Ayodhya, a small town in UP’s Faizabad district stood a mosque that had been the subject of a dispute for over 125 years. Local Hindus trusted that the mosque had been built by the invading armies of Babur in 1528 by bulldozing ancient temple that remained there- a temple that was believed to have been constructing at the very place where Lord Ram had been born. After Independence, the nearby Hindus had advocated for themselves and managed to place an idol of Ram into the mosque. A court intervention brought about a stay order and the mosque was closed, however, the idol remained in the mosque where, at appointed times, the priest would offer pujas. Entry to the Hindu devout was, however, prohibited. Under Advani, the BJP took up the Ram Janmabhoomi issue vigorously, help to a large extent by the VHP which was continuously mobilizing Hindus through different religious yatras across UP. MaulanaThis occurred Azad in the late Library, 1980s. Aligarh Muslim University

Rajiv Gandhi was elected Prime Minister on the basis of the major mandate he got, but the former Indian Airlines pilot had little political knowledge and experience. Surrounded by his advisors, most of them not chosen judiciously- Rajiv's government stumbled from one controversy to another. The Bofors issue which revolves around pay-offs in the purchase of firearms from a Swadeshi Company- soon became a major scandal. Rajiv's finance minister and later defense minister V.P. Singh who had raised

54 Nag Kingshuk, The Saffron Tide, p. 12. 35 his voice against the deal soon formed his own party Janata Dal-which turned into a major opposition party to the Congress. In the resulting elections in 1989, the Janata Dal and BJP joined hands and won a larger number of seats than the Congress. The Janata Dal formed the government with V.P. Singh as the Prime Minister and the BJP decided to help it from outside.

V.P. Singh wanted to do something that would leave an enduring impact and memorize his name in history. He brought out the Mandal Commission report that had been gathering dust for over 10 years and proposed to present reservations of other backward classes (OBCs) in the institution of higher education and government jobs. The BJP was frightened: the party was attempting to combine Hindu votes but V.P. Singh's move had the potential to divide Hindu votes into OBCs and higher castes. Advani quickly left on a mechanized Rath yatra from Somnath on the western coast of Gujarat to Ayodhya to thrill Hindus on the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. He felt this was the only way he would have the capacity to balance the effect of the Mandal Commission's prescribed reservations.55 It was a long yatra that went through many states, mixing Hindu sentiments on the way; there were also law and order issues in many places in the wake of the yatra as there were frequent Hindus-Muslim conflicts. At that point when the yatra was going through Bihar, the new Chief Minister of the state, Lalu Prasad Yadav, of Janata Dal ended the procession and arrested Advani. The BJP quickly pulled back their support from the V.P. Singh government, as a result, which fell. A few months and the stop-gap government of Chandrasekhar later, polls were held and in the midway, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. The Congress, consequently, delighted in another sympathy wave in the second phase of polling. Subsequently, the party returned to power in mid-1991 with P.V. Narasimha Rao at the helm. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

In UP, a BJP government was shaped and, taking advantage of this, the party and the VHP increased the Ram Janmabhoomi movement which aimed at building a Ram temple at his origination; along these lines recovering the Hindu legacy that they said had been destroyed by ceaseless invasions by the Muslims in the medieval ages.

55 Ibid., p.13. 36

On 6 December 1992, the RSS and its associates organized a rally involving 150,000 VHP and BJP kar sevaks at the site of the mosque. The functions included speeches by BJP leaders, such as Advani, , and .56 During the initial hours of the rally, the crowd grew gradually more eager and started raising militant slogans. A police line or chain had been placed around the mosque in preparation for an attack. However, around noon, a young man managed to slip past the police chain and climb the mosque itself, wave a saffron flag. This was seen as a signal by the mob, who then stormed the structure. The mob set upon the building with axes, hammers and grappling hooks and within a few hours, the whole mosque was leveled.57 Hindus likewise destroyed various different mosques inside the town. After that, a series of communal riots across the country was begun amongst Hindus and Muslims. These throw out everywhere throughout the nation, killing more than 2,000 people. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement was a watershed for the BJP. The party that had been struggling in the Jana Sangh days and that was break up in the wake of the death of Indira Gandhi had now arrived. The felling of the Babri Masjid was the zenith of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement and secure Hindu vote in favor of the BJP. Earlier, the political situation in the nation was set apart by the Congress on one side and other smaller opposition parties on the other. From here on, it was the Congress on one side and the BJP on the other.

The BJP may have developed as a major force in the country in many states however it lost power in UP. In fact, the Party's belts weakened in UP from that point, primarily due to the rise of the Dalits under the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the consolidation of the intermediate castes which remained to benefit by the Mandal reservations-in the . Several offenses by the Narasimha Rao governmentMaulana brought Azad the B Library,JP to power Aligarh New Delhi Muslim for the first University time ever in 1996. The government lasted 13 days because of the resistance of the other parties to support those allegedly responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the subsequent communal violence. The BJP also decided to change its leader, Vajpayee, who had been sidelined for a long time, was taken back to the helm and Advani was place to the number two position. The BJP returned to power, this time for 13 months. After another election later, the BJP remained in power for 5 years in the consequence of

56 Tully Mark, “Tearing down the Babri Masjid”, BBC News, December 5, 2002. 57 Guha Ramchandra, India after Gandhi: the History of World’s Largest Democracy (Harper Collins, 2007) pp. 582-598. 37

Babri Masjid, It was Vajpayee who became the Prime Minister, leading a coalition government called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that contained a group of parties including the Akali Dal, Shiv Sena, DMK, Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Janata Dal (United) and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). The BJP had realized that Vajpayee would be acceptable as Prime Minister to constituents of the NDA and not Advani, who had energetically driven the Ram Janmabhoomi movement.58

Gujarat Riots (2002) - Carnage

Since assuming power in Gujarat in 1995, the BJP had ''collect its internal positions with VHP and RSS members, and others that shared and would effectively promote Sangh Parivar policies and programmes”. Frequently this was to the burden of officials who were unbiased and secular. As a 1998 joint report commented, ''a well- planned strategy is being worked by the Hindutva forces in Gujarat and it aims at communalizing society at the grass root level''. Such patterns were compounded in 2001 with the appointment of Narendra Modi as chief minister in the state, the first RSS pracharak (leader) to gain such a position. An attack on a train in Godhra that killed 58 Hindu pilgrims (including VHP activists) on 27 February 2002, Modi asserted that the violence originated from Pakistan, went for destabilizing the state. Consistent with BJP policy norms, state officials contended that local Muslims were both to blame and were inherently pro Pakistani in their loyalties. On the following day, Hindu-Muslim violence emitted over the state, leaving thousands dead in a matter of days, and denoted the worst communal violence since Partition.

Contrasting with many other instances of communal violence, observers noticed the extent of state complicity and arrangement in the Gujarat riots, contending that most of the violenceMaulana ''was stateAzad-backed Library, and one Aligarh-sided violence Muslim against University Muslims – equivalent to a deliberate pogrom''. Certainly, the diffusion of Sangh Parivar activists into the Gujarati state apparatus helped the resultant organized, systematic and pre- planned violence, whereby agitators were given lists of Muslims' houses, flats, and shops were supported by local police and even gave legal assistance in case of arrest. In short, ''saffronisation'' of state institutions empowered by the presence of BJP personnel who promoted Hindutva policy norms – meant that there was no assurance

58 Nag Kingshuk, The Saffron Tide, pp. 14-15. 38 for Gujarat's Muslim population. These activities obviously resound with 1984 against Sikh riots. These events served as an example of the extreme communal agenda of the BJP that is conceivable when coordinated through a state apparatus where Hindutva has turned out to be implanted and normalized. Shortly after the riots, a BJP hardliner stated that ''the party leadership can certainly make an interpretation of this Hindu reaction into votes''. Perceptively, in December 2002, the Modi government was swept back to power in state assembly elections, uncovering the intense help of Hindutva, even at its most communal, and its acknowledgment into mainstream Indian government.

On 27 February 2002, the state of Gujarat saw the worst communal riots that occurred in the state. The riots were started off when the Sabarmati express, coming back from Ayodhya to Ahmedabad, was stopped near to the Godhra railway station. The Jana Morcha (Faizabad) daily in a report of February 24th detailed instances of misbehavior by kar sevaks who supposedly hit and threatened Muslim travelers with iron rods insisted that they shout "Jai Shri Ram" and coercively uncovered Muslim women. Many people in Ahmedabad and Godhra also reported such cases. Since such publicly motivated and provocative conduct was commonly known, it was weird that as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in its Interim Report has also observed, no action including a police safeguard was taken at the time, in perspective of the known communally charged atmosphere in Godhra.59

The loss of life evaluated was as high as 2000, while 150,000 were displaced. Rape, mutilation, and torture were also widespread, several cities and towns of Gujarat state were on fire. In the consequence of the violence, it became clear that many attacks were focused not only on Muslim populations, as well as on Muslim women and Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University children. Organizations such as, Human Rights Watch criticized the Indian government and the Gujarat state administration for failure to address the resulting humanitarian condition of the people, the overwhelming part of them Muslim, “who fled their homes for help camps in the aftermath of the events.60 According to Teesta Setalvad in the districts of Morjari Chowk and Charodia Chowk, in Ahmedabad, 40

59 A lasting Legacy: The BJP led National Democratic Alliance and India’s politics, Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no. 1. (2012), pp. 27-28. 60 Vandana Shiva, India divided: Diversity and Democracy under Attack, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), pp. 25-30. 39 people murdered by police shooting, all were Muslim.61 An international fact-finding committee formed of all women international experts from US, UK, France, Germany, and Sri Lanka reported sexual violence was being used as a strategy for terrorizing women belonging to minority community in the state. ”62

It is estimated that at least 250 girls and women had been gang-raped and then burned to death. Children were murdered and burnt alive and those digging mass graves depicted the bodies as “burned and butchered beyond recognition”. Children were forced fed petrol and then set on fire, pregnant women were gutted and their unborn child's body then shown to the women. In the Naroda Patiya mass grave of 96 bodies, 46 were of women. The murderers also flooded homes and gave electric shocks to the entire families inside. Violence against women also included their being stripped naked, objects being forced into their bodies and then being killed. According to Kalpana Kannabiranan, “the rapes were a part of a well organized, deliberate and pre- arranged procedure, and that this puts the brutality in the region of a political pogrom and genocide”.63 Other acts of violence against women were acid attacks, beatings and the killings of women who were pregnant. Children were also killed in front of their parents. Children and new born children were held upward before being thrown into flames.

The most disastrous part of the riots was that the entire state government machinery blindly supported the agitators internally, politically and officially.64 The then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi and a several high positioning government authorities were blamed for starting and condoning the violence. The unfortunate happening in the Gujarat state (Godhara riots 2002) under the BJP government was the result of the Hindu-hostile to minority motivation convinced by Chief Minister Narendra Modi. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The Sangh Parivar in Gujarat was completely engaged with practicing state control for the motivations behind building up Hindu Rashtra before the start of riots.65

61 Saif Samir, Violence against Muslims in India: the Dark History, (AppLi Books Publisher, 2017) 62 Murphy Eamon, Jackson Richard, and Poynting Scott (eds.), Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice, (Routledge, 2009), pp. 86-90. 63 Kannabiran Kalpana, Tools of Justice: Non-discrimination and the Indian Constitution, (Routledge, 2012), p. 414. 64 Jaffrelot Christophe, Hindu Nationalism, p. 16. 65 Bhambari C.P., pp. 11-12. 40

2004 Elections

The Godhra riots proved too costly to the BJP when the party was destroyed out of power at the center during the 2004 General elections. The riots caused agitation both nationally and internationally, Vajpayee called for elections in mid-2004, six months ahead of schedule but he thought that it was hard to shield his party's government in the state because of its inability to control the riots effectively and with quickness. At the same time, there were strong allegations that components of the VHP had blow the violence. The state's Chief Minister, Narendra Modi's position stayed stiff, making life much more difficult for Vajpayee, who was further hindered by Advani and his group of hardliners in the party. After some time, in December 2002, the Modi-led BJP enjoyed the home to victory in the state elections and Modi proceeded in his part as Chief Minister of Gujarat again.66

The NDA's campaign was based on the slogan “India shining”, in his previous government which looked to trace it as in charge of a rapid economic change of the country.67 But, in the general elections in 2004, much against people's expectations BJP lost the polls hardly. The party went into the elections on the back of its good economic performance but the events in Gujarat hung round its neck like a grindstone. There was a combination of minority votes against the BJP and this brought the Congress to power. Vajpayee was shocked and upset and said in interviews that it would have been a better chance if he had hacked out Modi in 2002.68

However, the NDA unexpectedly suffered a heavy defeat, won only 186 seats in the Lok Sabha, contrasted with the 222 of the Congress and its partners. succeeded Vajpayee as Prime Minister as the leader of the United Progressive Alliance.Maulana69 After Azad the 2004 Library, General ElectionsAligarh, itMuslim was observed University that the Hindutva philosophy was thoroughly discredited and no amount of effort could revive it. The people felt cheated by the promises made by Sangh Parivar and the BJP.70 From that point on, the BJP fell into disorder. Vajpayee decided to pull back from politics and his place was taken by Advani. At that time, Advani was past seventy-five around

66 The Hindu, New Delhi, March 7, 2002. 67 Randeep Ramesh, “Shock defeat for India’s Hindu Nationalists”, The Guardian, May 14, 2004. 68 Ibid 69 Ibid 70 Nag Kingshuk, the Rise of BJP. p.17. 41 then and the BJP required second call of leaders to assume control and take responsibility for the party.71 Only one of the leaders, Pramod Mahajan, had the capacity to run and raise assets for the party; numerous many at that time thought that the party would inevitably be led by him a couple of years down the line. But, he was unfortunately shot dead by his own brother due to any dispute. So Advani preceded the party with second level leaders like , , and . With Vajpayee out of the picture, the RSS grow its hold over the party and appointed a little-known leader, , as President of the party. The BJP went to polls in 2009 under the leadership of Advani, the party once again tried to attempt to launch the electorates with its "forceful Hindutva" platform, but the people had rejected the party's new emphasis on a return to sectarianism and the party lost badly. It was clear that there was a stronger consolidation of minority votes against the BJP in the reaction of Gujarat 2002 riots, and continued to retreat them.72 After its defeat in 2009, another round of thought was started inside the party about the party's presence and its running in a healthy way. RSS tightened its control over the BJP and replaced Rajnath Singh with a President's post. Advani continued to be in the party but many observed that after two progressive misfortunes his innings were over. There was an acute leadership crisis because it was not clear who could take the party to victory in the next elections. Then Modi won his second progressive elections in Gujarat in 2007; Narendra Modi turned into a contender for leading the party. Despite the fact that he couldn't dispose of the communal touch, he could warm up to industries through progressive policies to attract investments through the Gujarat model and other likewise development. In 2012, Modi was cleared of complicity in the brutality by SIT (Special Investigation Team), in 2013 months after Modi won his third election in Gujarat, the RSS decided to have him blessed as the Prime Ministerial Maulanacompetitor of Azad the BJP. Library, The move Aligarh passed through Muslim two University phases in quick succession. First, Modi was appointed as head of the campaign committee of the BJP for the election and afterward, a few months later, as the Prime Ministerial candidate.73

71 Ibid 72 Ibid 73 Reddy B. Muralidhar, “It’s official: Modi is BJP’s Choice”, The Hindu, New Delhi, September 13, 2013. 42

Victory in 2014 Elections

The 2014 General Election generated India’s highest-ever voter turnout rate, at 66% a sharp increase from the 58% turnout in 2009. In these elections, the BJP won 282 seats, leading the NDA to a tally of 336 out of 543 contestable seats on 31% of the vote share. It may the outcome of extreme regional polarization of upper caste in BJP’s support, which pointed to the limits of BJP’s message in states with strong regional parties and identities. Citizens with higher media exposure were much more likely to have voted for the BJP in 2014. Another important reason in a landslide victory of the BJP in 2014 election is Hindi media propagated well the so-called development achieved in the state of Gujarat after Narendra Modi took over the charges as the Chief Minister. Technological and economic advances were given more weight age to catch the psychology of Indians. Slogans like “ACCHE DIN AANE WALE HAIN”, “ABKI BAAR MODI SARKAR” etc. were mind catching for poor’s.

This was the first instance since 1984 of a single party achieving an outright majority in the Indian parliament and the first time that it achieved a majority in the Lok Sabha on its own strength. The BJP parliamentary leader Narendra Modi was sworn in as the 15th Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014.74 Political analysts have provided several reasons for this victory, including the popularity of Narendra Modi, the Prime- Ministerial candidate of the BJP, The BJP was also able to expand its traditionally upper-caste support base and received significant support from middle-class and Dalit people, although its support among Muslims remained low.75

Conclusion

BJP Maulana owes its origin Azad to the Library, formation Aligarh of Jana Sangh Muslim in 1951 University. Its founders included persons belonging to the old Hindu Mahasabha and RSS, and both. The thinking of the founders had a intense effect not only on the Jana Sangh but also on the present BJP. Some changes have taken place in their attitudes, some by compulsion and some others due to the prevailing conditions in the country.

74 Eswaran Sridharan, India’s Watershed vote, Journal of Democracy 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 20-21. 75 Ashutosh Varshney, “Hindu Nationalism in Power?” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 34-36. 43

In the 1980s a number of developments helped in the growth of BJP. One was the decline of the Congress which provided the much needed space for the emergence and growth of not only the BJP but also of the other parties. BJP had also to take the opportunistic step, as an antidote to caste politics, of raising Hindutva in a big way. Thus, the BJP, which in 1980 started off as a broad-based party by giving priority to the principle of Gandhian Socialism and projected issues like socio-economic policies affecting the common people, took on to the opportunistic politics in a bigger way partially due to the adoption by the Congress party of communalist politics like the Shah Bano case and the opening of the locks of the Babri Mosque by Rajiv Gandhi as PM, and partially due to its failure to expand its own support base. As a result, the party (BJP) adopted the strategy of ethnoreligious mobilization particularly since the mid-1980s onwards. The party participated in the Ram Janam Bhoomi movement in a big way along with other Hindu nationalist organizations like RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal. The Ramjanamabhoomi movement helped the BJP in polarising the communities along the religious lines and increase the Hindu support. However, the BJP's attempt to unite people along the religious lines received a serious setback when the V.P. Singh government at Centre took the decision to implement the policy of reservation. The reservation policy broke down the BJP's hegemony over the Hindus by taking away the backward caste Hindus from the BJP hold. After that the Gujarat riots in 2002 proved like a turning point for the BJP and proved to be the worst experience because due to that BJP lost their two consecutive elections, 2004 and 2009 respectively which side lined the BJP from the mainstream of the politics. Then in the 2014 general election, BJP nominated Narendra Modi as their Prime Ministerial candidate and led BJP to another level, people motivated by the development of Gujarat as “Gujarat Model”, and the role of media for propagating Modi as the new and best choiceMaulana for the Azad BJP, becameLibrary, the Aligarh reason for Muslim BJP’s victory University in the 2014 elections.

44

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Chapter II

Bharatiya Janata Party’s Coalition Strategy: from State to Centre

This chapter deals with the Coalition system in Indian politics, its growing stage to maturity, different experiences of coalition government at both levels (State and Centre), formation of Jana Sangh, and its growth from periphery to centre. It also examines the political and social processes that led to the decline of the Congress and rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). It also includes the detailed examination of the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) coalition and how the new phase of coalition politics in the country is contextualised.

Introduction

India, the largest democratic country in the World, has experienced different types of government since independence. The country has experienced single party government and coalition government, both at the federal and state level. However, it was the emergence of coalition politics that the Indian politics became more inclusive and federal as visualize by the constitution makers. The concept of coalition government however is not a new phenomenon to Indian parliamentary democracy and it can be traced back to the year 1946, when an Interim Government was formed under the leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. It consisted of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. After the new Constitution of India came into force on 26th January, 1950, there have been more cases of coalitions in the state than at the centre. Before 1967, there were coalition formations like in PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union), in 1952-57 and Andhra Pradesh and oneMaulana each in Orissa Azad (now Library, Odisha) (1957 Aligarh-62) and Muslim Kerala (1960 University-64). However, all of them were short-lived and did not run smoothly. In 1967, there were eruption of coalitions in eight states, namely Kerala, West Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. In these states coalitions were based on negativism “anti-Congressism” and hence, these unprincipled governments were short-lived.1 These experiments made coalitions look as opportunistic power-driven mentality of various political groups. The fragmentation of Indian politics reflected its

1 Kumar Pradeep, Coalition Politics in India: a Study of National Democratic Alliance (1999-2004) Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra April (2013), p. 1. 45 diversity and plurality were political parties continued to be motivated by parochial and regional considerations. And it is due to this character of Indian society that coalitions are extremely relevant to the country. Thus coalition is not merely the coming together of various political parties to capture power; it is also reflective of the fragmentation of social interest at the grass root level.2 Thus, Indian Politics is always bound to be coalitional contained within different political parties; functioning within the rules of what Robert Dahl calls as a Polyarchical Democracy. In this land of minorities based on caste, language, culture and religion, neither a single group is in a position to determine the destiny of the entire nation, nor is there a stable combination of minorities that can retain its decisive role over a long period of time.3 As far as post- independence political history of India is concerned, the decade of 1960s is of great importance. The decade saw the transition from a single-party system to the emergence of regional parties based upon the system of alliances and coalitions.

As far as national political parties were concerned, their importance in the electoral landscape was overshadowed by the Congress. In the first general elections of 1952, the Jana Sangh, precursor to BJP, won only three Lok Sabha seats. It maintained a minor presence in parliament until 1967. In the early 1953; the Jana Sangh's first major campaign began that centred on a demand for the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir into India. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, who was the founder of Jana Sangh, was arrested in May, 1953 for violating orders from the state government restraining him from entering Kashmir. He died of a heart attack the following month, while still in jail. Mauli Chandra Sharma was then elected to succeed Mookerjee; however, he was forced out of power by the RSS activists within the party and the leadership went instead to Deendayal Upadhyaya. Upadhyaya remained the General Secretary until 1967, and workedMaulana to build Azad a committed Library, grassroots Aligarh organisation Muslim in theUniversity image of the RSS. The party minimised engagement with the public, focusing instead on building its network of propagandists. Upadhyaya also articulated the philosophy of Integral Humanism, which formed the official doctrine of the party. Younger leaders, such as Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani also became involved with the leadership during this period. The major themes on the party's agenda during this

2 Chakrabarty Bidyut, Indian Politics and Society since Independence: Events Processes and Ideology (New York: Rroutledge, 2008), p. 153. 3 Quraishi Zaheer M., Coalition Government: Experience and Prospects, s. Bhatt and v. Mani (eds), Indian on the threshold of 21st Century (Delhi: lance, 1999), p. 108. 46 period were legislating a Uniform Civil Code, banning cow slaughter and abolishing the special status given to Jammu and Kashmir. After assembly elections across the country in 1967, the party entered into a coalition with several other parties, including the and the Socialists. It formed governments in various states across the Hindi heartland, including Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. It was the first time the Jana Sangh held political office, albeit within a coalition; this freezes the Jana Sangh's more radical agenda.4

The general elections of 1967changed the political complexion of the country and put an end to one-party dominance. There was not only the growth of a mixed political party system with a consequent rise in state power, but also of a Centre with its strength significantly reduced. For the first time in history, the non-Congress parties endeavoured to play an important role in government formation and governance by putting together an alliance of different political parties. It was a shift from “dominance to competition” and for a time intra-party coalition was replaced by inter-party coalition.5 In order to sustain the coalition, a common minimum programme was framed that avoided, as far as possible contentious issues. However, with this the cracks in the Congress system developed due to a complex unfolding of socio- economic circumstances. However, the coalitions were not stable, apparently because they were neither ideologically cohesive nor programmatically uniform. The only common factor that cemented the bond among these regional parties was there anti- Congress sentiments.6

In the Hindi heartland Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, the non-Congress sentiments were articulated by those who had left the Congress before the 1967 elections. In UP, the Congress ministry which was headed by C.B. Gupta collapsed Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University within three weeks of its formation; it was later replaced by the Charan Singh led SVD ministry following the latter’s defection from the Congress. In MP, after the desertion of Vijaya Raje Scindia, the Congress lost its numerical strength and the government of D.P Mishra was defeated. Later, G.N. Singh led SVD ministry came to power. It

4 Guha Ramchandra, India after Gandhi: the History of the World’s Largest Democracy (India: Picador 2007), p. 230. 5 Ibid, p. 278. 6 Brass Paul, the Politics of India Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 63. 47 was comprised of the Scindia group, the Jana Sangh, the SSP and the PSP. The situation in Haryana was somewhat different where the Congress lost its majority in the assembly following the large-scale defection of Congressmen.7

These coalitions obviously drew largely on anti-Congress sentiments, which was both their strength and weakness; strength because anti-Congress feelings crystallized the desire for a political bond between those in opposition to be a political ‘foe’, and weakness because oppositional sentiments were not strong enough to sustain the bound the moment there were clashes of interest among the constituents.8

The results of February 1967 mid-term poll in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Punjab were undoubtedly an articulation of a new wave in Indian politics. The Congress lost with big scale and that demonstrates its failure to accommodate the conflicting socio-political interests of voter groups that had been the base of the earlier Congress system.9

The Congress System

As conceptualized by the framers of the Constitution, parliamentary federalism in India was supported by what is popularly described as ‘the Congress system’. It develops largely due to homogenous elite in roles of authority and decision-making. The major reason for its long term viability was probably the success of the post- Independence political process that brought wide sections of society into the political arena and provides space to every section of Indian society.10 After the independence in 1947, the Congress, which functioned as a broad-based nationalist movement transformed itself into the dominant political party of the nation. Although a number of oppositionMaulana parties came Azad into existence, Library, it was Aligarh recognized Muslim that the Congress University was the

7 Ibid, p. 64. 8 Ibid, p. 67. 9 Chaudhary Ray N.C.B., “The Politics of India’s Coalition,” The Political Quarterly, 40, no.3, (July- September, 1969), pp. 296-7. 10 Kothari Rajni, State against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance (Delhi: Ajanta, 1988), p. 157.

48 chief party, representing a historical consensus and enjoying a continuing basis of support and trust.11

Rajni Kothari described the ‘Congress system’ as “a huge, hierarchically-structured party, broadly rooted throughout the countryside, and apparently providing a mechanism through which a plurality of elites, sub-elites, and groups could both voice their claims and attempt to realize them.” The diversity of social groups in the Congress ruling party was considered to be its most positive feature, making it possible for the opposition parties by forging links with like-minded Congress factions. The practice of intra-party democracy and socially depth in the party, and political leaders at different levels in the state added strength to the system which in turn expanded the democratic space.12

This Congress system lasted for two decades; it collapsed with the introduction of new leadership and was replaced by personality oriented politics. In Kothari’s words:

“Built as it was around a system of one-party dominance the Congress system, while allowing a great deal of internal flexibility and a long period of stable democratic functioning nonetheless produced a centralized, bureaucratic apparatus that was lacking in effective distributive policies and any sound philosophy of justice; it eventually ended up in a neo-liberal, marketized doctrine that led to consequences which produced a sharp reaction from the people at large. An electoral democracy... broadened its social base and has shown special regard for diverse type of minorities and hence gained so much legitimacy got eroded over time and forced the political Maulanamanagers Azad to compromise Library, with Aligarh and ult imatelyMuslim become University a party to

11 Kothari Rajni, “The Congress 'System' in India,” University of California Press 4, no. 12 (December, 1964), p. 1163,Accessed,April 13,2017,http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642550 12 Ray Amal, “Coordinating Pluralism: The Federal Experience in India,” in Rasheeduddin khan (ed.), Rethinking of Advance Studies (1997), pp. 98-102.

49

monied and ‘mafia’ interests that resulted in undermining the autonomy of the state and the political system”.13

It is argued that Indian politics in the first two decades after independence was built on a sort of consensus which was primarily based on elite accommodation. The system passed uncontested because of its nearness to the mobilization of the national movement, and the relation of implicit trust between its leadership and the masses. It was a consensus of ‘discourse rather than ideological positions’.14 Soon after Nehru’s demise, the system started breaking down. However, the process became especially evident from 1969 onwards, when Indira Gandhi assumed power and faced many pulls and pushes with increasing opposition strength. Indira Gandhi ‘rejected the principle of consensus in favour of the majoritarian principle’.15 With the de-institutionalization of the Congress party the erosion of India’s federal system started.16 The success of the Congress system was attributed to its ‘central role in maintaining and restructuring political consensuses’. The system continued almost uninterrupted till the 1967 elections, when non-Congress governments came to power in several states, introducing a new trend of coalition politics in India.17

1967 Elections: Jana Sangh’s role in mobilising non-Congress parties

The Jana Sangh, as the political arm of RSS, was created in 1951; it stimulate the RSS structure based on paramilitary units named shakha, under the charge of its supreme leader M.S. Golwalkar, who had agreed to the creation of the party only dubious.18 Most of the party cadres came from the RSS, including Deendayal Upadhyaya, who functioned as the party’s General Secretary until his mysterious death in 1968.19 The

13 Kothari Rajni,Maulana The Democratic Azad Experience Library, in Partha Aligarh Chaterjee Muslim (ed.), Wages University of freedom (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.27-28. 14 Kaviraj Sudipta,On State, Society and Discourse in India, in James Manor (ed.), Rethinking Third World Politics (London: Longman, 1991), pp.87-8. 15 Chaterjee Rakhahari, “Democracy and Opposition in India,” Economic and Political Weekly, no.17, (1988), p. 847. 16 Rudolph L.I. and Rudolph S.H., In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 1987), p. 99. 17 Kothari Rajni, “Continuity and Change in the Indian Party System,” Asian Survey, (1970), p. 939. 18 The Organizer, (1956), p. 5. 19 Jaffrelot Christophe, the Hindu Nationalist Movement in Indian Politics 1925-1990’s (New Delhi: Viking, 1996), pp. 405-411.

50

RSS cadres also occupied the positions of Organizing Secretaries, who formed the party’s steel frame. The party-building pattern that crystallized under Upadhyaya therefore enabled the RSS to exert a strong influence over the Jana Sangh because of the relationship between the party cadres and their mother organization. As a result, the party favour to replicate the taste for ideological discourses and secrecy of its mother organization. Its leaders were eager to retain the ideological purity of the RSS and its upper caste, even Brahminical, ethos. Therefore, the attractiveness of the Jana Sangh as a political party was limited to traditional elites of North India only. Since the Southern part of India could not accept languages deriving from Sanskrit, including Hindi, as their idiom, the Jana Sangh remained a niche party due to the reason and contended itself with that status for ten years.

In fact, it was as much a suitable party as a ‘message seeker’ less interested in winning elections than in using electoral platforms to propagate its ideology. But the party was supposed to speak for all the Hindus and also to influence the state.

Table 1: Performance of the Jana Sangh in National Elections

(Seats won and % of valid votes)

Year 1952 1957 1962 1967 1967 Seats (%) 3 (3.1) 4 (5.9) 14 (6.4) 35 (9.4) 22 (7.4) The main purpose of the Jana Sangh was to capture power in order to correct the public policies or what it called wrong doings of the Congress. According to the followers of Hindutva, the policies which were adopted by the Congress over the years were harmful to Hindus. It eloquently criticised the recognition of English language and regionalMaulana languages Azad at the Library,expense of Hindi;Aligarh the correlative Muslim creation University of linguistic states in the framework of a federal union institutions that the Hindu nationalists wanted to abolish because of their dangerous potential for secession; the granting of an autonomous status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir that Nehru had promoted to defuse the separatist tendencies in the province,20 Thus Jana Sangh’s policy remained confined to identity and it instrumentalized this symbol of identity in order to mobilize the majority community at the time of elections. A case in point was the 1967 election

20 The Organizer, (1956), p. 5. 51 campaign in which it made the Hindu identity catch phrase. The party allied itself with the other cultural groups like, Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP Vishva Hindu Association) which was intended to federate all the Hindu sects and to gather their representatives on the same platform.21 Prior to elections, the Jana Sangh effort to mobilise the majority Hindu population against the Congress government so to force the government to pass a bill to prohibit the cow Slaughter. Some of the most prominent religious figures went on fast for weeks, and on the street the Jana Sangh, with the support of the RSS, made unprecedented efforts to mobilize its supporters. In February 1967, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators rallied around the Parliament of India to force the MPs to pass a law prohibiting cow slaughter.22 This movement gave some advantage to the Jana Sangh in the parliamentary elections and its voting strength jumped from 6.4 to 9.4 percent of the valid votes. The movement to stop cow slaughter however, failed to make substantial impact and this happened due to the following three reasons first, Hindus were not as responsive as the Jana Sangh party expected; second, many states had already passed prohibitive laws in that respect; finally, the government did not compromise on the secularism of the state. The nature of Indian constitution is such that it admitted religious parties along with its commitment to secular values, thereby prohibiting the use of religion in shaping policy.

The Jana Sangh made tactical moderation to its ideology, the Hindu nationalism, since its creation. The party certainly diluted some aspects of its initial programme, such as the promotion of Hindi as a common language, because it alienated South Indian voters. The exclusive nature of Jana Sangh politics denied its required support. However, the electoral competition did not contradict the most radical dimension of the Jana Sangh’sMaulana favourite Azad strategy Library, the manipulation Aligarh of MuslimHindu symbols University to mobilize supporters before the elections. On the contrary, the holding of elections made such campaigns more likely. What convinced the Jana Sangh from continuing with such mobilization was the uncompromising attitude of the Congress government, which defended the constitutional rules. This push factor was complemented by a pull factor since, simultaneously, other opposition parties were prepared to join hands with the Jana Sangh even if it did not give up the Hindutva oriented aspects of its programme.

21 Jaffrelot, the Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 417. 22 Ibid, pp. 420-424. 52

As a result of these two aspects of the political system, a secular government and an accommodating opposition the Jana Sangh, gained legitimacy in the Indian political system in the 1970s; not because it became more moderate, but because the centre of gravity of Indian politics shifted to more conservative and even traditionalist sectors of the .23

Tactics of Jana Sangh for 1967 elections

With the death of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in May, 1964 the Hindu traditionalists became more vocal and strong in their criticism against Congress government. The internal tussle in the Congress party and weak positioning of Indira Gandhi added strength to the Jana Sangh. However, the Jana Sangh’s commitment to the campaign was qualified; it was a ‘mixed strategy’ designed to foster ethno-religious mobilisation while permitting a pragmatic approach to building up support by appeals to non- ideological interests. It was successful in recruiting notables and princes to contest the 1967 elections and concluded a number of electoral alliances with other non-Congress groups. Besides this, its closeness with the VHP appeared to be the effective agent of a Hindu instrumentalist strategy precisely because its religious network was a means by which a Hindu nationalist mobilisation could be achieved.24

Throughout 1960’s and 1970’s the Jana Sangh moved towards a strategy of ethno- religious mobilisation coupled with a pragmatic integration in the legitimate opposition. It was linked to the evolution of two parameters, the religious network and the political context. The religious network associated with the VHP and other cultural Hindu groups reinforced the capacity for mobilisation of the Hindu nationalist due to the activism and prestige of different kinds of sadhus. However, this network appeared too Maulanaweak and in Azaddiscipline Library,d, and not Aligarh reliably to Muslimexecute a stratUniversityegy of mobilisation; more importantly, much of the Jana Sangh’s strategy was directly conditioned by the political context. The accession to power of an inexperienced Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and increased influence of traditionalist Congress bosses apparently convinced the Hindu nationalists that it was possible to implement a strategy of ethno- religious mobilisation. Parallel to this, certain opposition parties witnessed an erosion

23 Jaffrelot Christophe, Hindu Nationalism: A Reader (Permanent Black, 2009), p.350. 24 The Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 427.

53 of their anti-communal traditions. This development arise not only from the emergence of the Swatantra Party, which inherited certain features of Hindu traditionalism, but also from the growing determination expressed notably by Ram Manohar Lohia, leader of SSP (Samyukta Socialist Party), to forge an alternative to Congress independent, within certain limits, of ideological affinities. The determination was not interrupted by the Jana Sangh’s restoring the strategy of Hindu mobilisation during the 1966-67 election campaign, which allowed it to initiate a ‘mixed strategy’ combining the advantages of instrumentalism with those of alliances. This paradoxical conjunction undoubtedly contributed to the party’s electoral gains in 1967.

The call for non-Congressism became the hallmark of the SSP during the 1967 election. From 1965 to 1967, the party endeavoured to develop a formula through which disparate parties would be able to work together to form non-Congress government. The SSP suggested that the opposition parties join together in pre-election alliances and agree to distribute legislative constituencies in accordance with the past performance of the various allied parties. The pre-election alliances were, according to the party’s 1967 election manifesto, to be based on time-bound minimum programme. The Common minimum programme was intended to reconcile the ideological positions of the parties and agreed to a common agenda within which the non-Congress coalition governments will function.25 The SSP attempted to legitimize the notion of all-inclusive non-Congress coalition by arguing that the left-right distinctions commonly drawn in politics are meaningless. The Jana Sangh whole- heartedly accepted the formula because of political expediency. It entered the coalition with the intention of using the coalitions to strengthen its own hand at the expense of its alliance partners. The Jana Sangh’s leadership argued that their political enemies could be moreMaulana readily undermined Azad Library, from within Aligarh the government Muslim than fromUniversity outside the government.

Beside this, the Jana Sangh clearly had better financing in 1967 elections than in previous elections. It did receive significant help from many of the large business organizations in India. Several candidates adopted by the party were people of substance and presumably financed their own campaign and those of others. The bulk of the underwriting, however seems to have continued to come from the middle class

25 Ibid, p. 430. 54 shopkeepers and professionals, also includes some national firms such as Hindustan Motors of the Birla Group and the Modi Industrial Complex of Uttar Pradesh, who make up the backbone of the party.

The manifesto of the party was adopted at a Pratinidhi Sabha session at Nagpur on 3- 6 November, 1966. It contained little which was fresh. The eight pledges of the party were:

1. Both, Communist China and Pakistan are in illegal occupation of large areas of Indian Territory. While the Congress government has agreed to their occupation, the Jana Sangh will take all necessary steps to regain them. 2. In the interest of National security, the Jana Sangh will develop adequate defence potential, including atomic weapons. 3. The Jana Sangh will disperse political power in a real and effective manner. 4. The Jana Sangh will end the emergency. In the interest of civil liberties, the Defence of India Rules will be repealed. 5. The Jana Sangh will ensure equal treatment to all citizens, without favour or discrimination, irrespective of language, caste or creed. 6. The cow is our national point of honour. Cow-slaughter will be legally banned. 7. The Jana Sangh will change the plan. With a view to balanced development and effective implementation, it will adopt micro-economic planning, region- wise and project-wise. 8. Non-Alignment can neither be a creed nor a permanent basis of our foreign policy. The Jana Sangh will follow an independent foreign policy.

With these pledges, fleshed out into a 118 paragraph manifesto, the Jana Sangh fought the Maulana1967 elections. Azad26 Library, Aligarh Muslim University

1967 Elections: A revolution

The fourth general elections of 1967 marked a watershed in the post-independence political and constitutional development of India. This general election changed the political complexion of the country and put an end to Congress party's dominance

26 Baxter Craig, the Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party (Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 266-7. 55 particularly at the state level. There was not only the growth of a mixed political party system with a consequent rise in state power, but also of a Centre with its strength significantly reduced. For the first time, the non-Congress parties made a determined bid to emerge from the role of ‘pressure politics’ to a role of ‘democratic opposition parties’ with actual or potential possibilities of their forming alternative governments. A shift from ‘dominance to competition’ was indeed brought about, although as it was only an existing situation and not a stable party system. It was the time of political arrangements and coalition of heterogeneous aggregation. The foundation of these coalitions was a partnership based on the negative virtue of keeping the Congress out of office and not a partnership in the positive virtue of affecting any social change.27 For the first time since independence, the Congress lost hold in eight states U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Rajasthan and Punjab, where non-Congress governments were formed. In all the states coalition governments with regional parties as important participants were formed. Not only the Congress party lost the state assembly elections but also, its strength was reduced at the Centre where it managed to win only 279 seats in Lok Sabha against its previous tally of 361 seats in 1962.28

With the weakening of Congress power at the state level there was an explicit manifestation of instability and regionalism at the state level. This was, partly, a result of decline in national leadership and almost totals darkening of the past continental role of the Congress and partly, a result of the rise of new agriculture elites in the wake of Green Revolution.29 The distribution of power profoundly altered the Centre-state relations. The economic condition by this time also presented a dark scenario. As a result of drought in 1965-66, agricultural production fell nearly 17% from the preceding year.30 Consequently, early 1967 and 1968 were the years which experiencedMaulana the decline inAzad industrial Library, production, Aligarh unprecedented Muslim inflation, University food seal- city and unusually high level of violence over various matters. It was clear that Indian voters were communicating their personal economic dissatisfaction by action at the polls. It is noteworthy that 45% of those who were Congress voters in 1962 and who

27 Editorial, “The problem,” Seminar (1969). 28 Ray Amal, Federal Politics and Government (Delhi: Macmillan, 1979), p. 14. 29 Ray Amal and Kinkaid John, “Politics Economic Development and Second Generation Strain in India’s Federal System,” A Paper of Institute for Social and Economic Changes Bangalore, p.37. 30 Kamal K.L. and Mayer Ralph C., Democratic Politics in India (India: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p. 112. 56 saw their personal economic position getting worse left the Congress party.31 Some political observers stated that the 1967 election displayed inclinations towards the development of a two party system in the country. Gujarat, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu were pointed out as likely pioneers in this direction. The post 1967 election analysis revealed that at the national level a ‘Pentagonal political pattern’ emerged with the Congress, the Communist, the Swatantra, Jana Sangh and the Socialist parties within it.32

The process of coalition formation in the states after 1967 elections was unique in the sense that for the first time non-Congress parties came together to share power. However, in most states, where non-Congress coalitions came to power in 1967, the governments were formed with parties having different political ideologies and programmes. Since neither the Congress nor the other parties ruling in most states enjoyed a conclusive majority in the assemblies, governmental instability seemed inevitable sooner or later. This instability was more obvious in the non-Congress coalition. In order to break the Congress’ monopoly and secure power, many mutually opposed groups joined together on the strength of basic minimum programme. These minimum programmes could surely not sustain them for long, especially since they had to seek to resolve basic problems having gained control of the State governments.33 In 1967, for the fourth time in India’s history, the opposition went to the polls with the high, and previously bolt, hopes of dislocating the Congress party. This time however, there was a different result; for the opposition did reduce the Congress to a minority in several states and almost without exception, in the other states sharply reduced the Congress majorities.

Coalition in West Bengal Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The coalition in West Bengal was illustrative of an experiment of a non-Congress government. However, the communist parties decided to collaborate with their ideologically opposite counterparts. Discarding its ideological generality, the

31 Elderseld Samuel J., “The 1967 Indian Election Patterns of Party Regularity and Defection,” Asian Survey, 10, no. 11 (1970), p. 1023. 32 Mishra S.N., “The Crisis, the Country, the Congress,” A Thesis on Post Coalition Crisis Congress Socialist Forum (1967), pp. 11-12. 33 Rudolph and Rudolph “New Era for India,” in Verma S.P. and Narain Iqbal (edit) Fourth General Election in India (Delhi, 1970), p. 23. 57

Communist Party of India’s (Marxist) leadership further valued the importance of coalition against an organizationally mighty Congress by even justifying their participation in governance, even with the so-called communal parties.34 The rationale of CPI (M) in joining this coalition was simple to bring in compatible political parties in opposition to major political party and to strengthen the party’s efforts at promoting the people’s well-being by adopting pro-people socio-economic programmes.35

There are other factors that contributed to the decline of the Congress and later, the establishment of coalitions in the states. By the mid-1960s, most nationalist leaders had passed away. Political leaders of the stature of B.C. Roy and Atulya Ghosh had kept factional fights in the organisation under control and thus, the issue never became a serious problem for it. As a result, the Congress gained enormously by drawing on its nationalist role in successive elections. Factional infighting later led to a split and the Bangla Congress emerged even before the All-India Congress was divided. Second, two consecutive droughts in the mid-1960s resulted in severe food shortages that posed a serious difficulty to the Congress government. The situation was particularly uncertain in West Bengal, presumably because of the influx of refugees from East Bengal after partition. The growing strength of the left parties in West Bengal also contributed to the Congress’ decline. As the poll outcome shows, there had been a steady decrease of Congress seats in the legislature from 150 in the 1952 elections to 127 in 1967; on the other hand, the left political parties had registered a significant increase – from 42 to 72 seats. A factor that enhanced the electoral presence of the left parties was the crisis caused by the food shortage in the state that the Congress government failed alleviate. Besides, industrial strikes added to the economic misery of the people. The recurrence of riots in the state indicated the weakness ofMaulana the government Azad in maintaining Library, law Aligarh and order. Muslim In the aftermath University of the 1967 elections,36 the United Front government came to power with the left parties the CPI, CPI (M), Forward Bloc and Revolutionary Socialist Party, joining hands with dissident Congressmen who formed the Bangla Congress. Although it signalled a new era of

34 Chakrabarthy Bidyut, Forging Power, p. 68. 35 Ross Mallick, Indian Communism: Opposition, Collaboration and Institutionalization (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 102. 36 Kohli Atul, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 274.

58 coalition in the state’s politics, the UF government was formed when the state was in the agony of a variety of crisis. The food shortage was a failing heel, besides which the government was divided within by the party feuds among its constituents. One of the major factors was the unbridgeable gap between the two principle communist parties the CPI and CPI (M).37

A coalition faces difficulty when its allies fail to appreciate the significance of ‘togetherness’ in a state of chaos and crisis. The anti-Congress sentiments that brought together were not strong enough to sustain the coalition when a serious crisis develops. Neither the Bangla Congress nor the other constituents, including the two leading communist parties ever submerged their distinct identities within the government for the sake of the coalition, which was anyway fragile from the beginning due to drought, recession, inflation and labour discontent. It was nonetheless always a tight rope walk for the front since its majority was fragile, and its constituents, especially the communist, were never comfortable with a coalition that brought the two major communist parties on one platform. The CPI (M) never got over its firmly established hatred in the aftermath of the 1964 split with CPI.

The root suffered a death blow, not from the communists, but from the dissident Congressmen; they broke away to form a Progressive Democratic Front (PDF) under the leadership of P.C. Ghosh, the food minister in the previous government. The governor dismissed the ministry on the ground that the front had lost its majority, and had no locus stand. A new Ghosh ministry took over with the help of the Congress which had till then been remained aloof from the coalition. However, after just three months, the honeymoon with the Congress was over, and the PDF ministry lost its legislative majority. President’s rule was declared, and that chapter of coalition politics Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University came to an end.38

37 Ghosh Sankar, The Disinherited State: A Study of West Bengal (Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1971), p. 156. 38 Bidyut Chakrabarty, Forging Power, p. 71.

59

Coalition in Uttar Pradesh

With the general elections of 1967 the texture of Uttar Pradesh politics changed completely.39 The Congress lost its electoral majority for the first time in the state, even though it was still the single largest party in the assembly, and opposition forces occupied the vacuum. The space created with the weakening of Congress was occupied by two principal opposition parties the Socialists and the Jana Sangh. More importantly, the rise of the Jana Sangh was fleeting, as the party which had only 6.3 per cent of the vote in the first general election obtained 21.6 per cent in 1967. The Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) also gained at the cost of the Congress.

As the 1967 election results indicate, the Congress lost its electoral support in comparison with its tally in the third general elections in 1962.40 All the non-Congress parties involved with each other to explore the possibility of forming coalition governments. However, the ideological dissimilarities, mainly between the Jana Sangh and the Communists, delayed the process of power sharing in the state; despite the fact, both the parties were united in Bihar under the leadership of Mahamaya Prasad Singh.

On the other hand, Congress took advantage of this situation and left no stone unturned to form a government in the state. However, the factional fight between C.B. Gupta, who was elected leader of the Congress legislative party with the support of independent members, and Charan Singh, an equally strong competitor for the leadership, made Congress weak and unorganised. Charan Singh was very much angry by the Congress high command because of latter’s preference to C.B Gupta; consequently he refused to join the ministry. The Congress government led by C.B Gupta was aMaulana divided lot Azadsince a largeLibrary, number Aligarh of MLAs Muslimowing allegiance University to Charan Singh and his confidante Jai Ram Verma stayed disconnected. Barely after a few weeks, split took place in the state unit of Congress on 1 April, 1967 and the breakaway group under the leadership of Charan Singh formed the Jan Congress.41

39 Hasan Zoya, Quest for Power: Oppositional Movements and post- Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 28. 40 Verma M.S., “Coalition Government: UP’s First Experiment,” The Department of Public Administration, Lucknow: Lucknow University (1971), p. 43. 41 Hindustan Times, April 9, 1967.

60

With this defection, C.B. Gupta had to resign as it failed to secure confidence of the members. With the fall of Congress government, the non-Congress parties accelerated their process of government formation and initiated with the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) involving the Jan Congress, Jana Sangh, SSP, PSP, Swantantra, Communists, Republican Party, and independents in the legislative assembly. The SVD was a combination of heterogeneous elements with clear ideological dissimilarities among the partners. It was led by Charan Singh, who was elected unanimously as the leader of the SVD on 3 April, 1967, and sworn in as Chief Minister of the first coalition government in UP.

The SVD government set before itself a‘19-point programme’ which enunciated a list of governmental measures and preferences to improve UP’s socio-economic profile, these include (a) abolition of land revenue, tax on land and buildings, and profession tax; (b) introduction of equal pay for equal work for teachers of aided schools with their counterparts in government schools; (c) linking dearness allowance with the cost of living index and its acceptance by government employees; and (d) enunciation of a well-defined policy for achieving stability in the prices of food grains, agricultural produce, and consumer goods.

The euphoria over the non-Congress coalition was short-lived and the cracks in coalition became apparent when the issue of ‘the abolition of land revenue cropped up.42 In particular, Ram Manohar Lohia, the SSP leader criticised the government and threatened to pull out from the SVD unless the government accepted the demand. The other issue which cast a shadow over the SVD government was the Jana Sangh’s utilisation of government machinery for party interests and that irked parties like the PSP, SSP, CPI and Republican Party – who were critical of the role of the Jana Sangh Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University in this matter. The continuous internal strife within the ministry paralysed the government and compelled Charan Singh submitted his resignation to the Secretary of the SVD for the first time on 16 August, 1967. It was after an assurance from the all the constituents that he withdrew his resignation and continued as the Chief Minister. Things did not change much and the disagreement within the coalition remained and it expanded with the removal of the CPI from the SVD, and the Jana Sangh’s decision

42 National Herald, June 26, 1967. 61 to stay neutral in case of a no-confidence motion. Finally, Charan Singh had to resign and article 356 was promulgated on 24 February, 1968 in the state.43

Coalition in Madhya Pradesh

Though the coalition experiment was a failure in West Bengal, its counterpart in Madhya Pradesh (MP) completed a full term of five years in three different epitomes. MP had two SVD coalitions, following by a third led by the Congress. There were a series of coalitions that continued their whole term, in spite of a few hiccups. Thus, the MP experiment ‘provides a remarkable example of an uneasy, incomplete alliance, surviving one ministerial crisis after another, and gaining a fresh lease of life “for the time being” on each painful occasion’.44

The first stroke was the defection of Govind Narayan Singh and his Congress colleagues from the party, led by Chief Minister D.P. Mishra. Once the short-lived congress ministry was overthrown, G.N. Singh constituted a coalition ministry with thirty-six ministers, of who nineteen were from the Lok Sevak Dal, which was led by Singh, and also supported by Vijay Raje Scindia of Gwalior with seven from the Jana Sangh and rest from other splinter groups. The Mishra ministry collapsed when it lost its legislative majority due to the defection of the factions led by G.N. Singh and Vijay Raje Scindia. The media attributed the fall of the ministry to the personal rivalry between the erstwhile chief minister, Mishra and Scindia.45

The matter was not of ideological differences but changed personality clashes between two former members of the provincial Congress. That ministry with G.N. Singh as Chief Minister lasted for twenty-one months and survived as a result of efficient balancing betweenMaulana those withinAzad its Library, fold and its Aligarh distract. Muslim University

The politics of secrecy reached at peak when Singh himself broke away, along with his colleagues, and from the SVD they went back to the Congress. On 19 March, 1969

43 Hindustan Times, February 18, 1968; The Times of India, February 18, 1968; National Herald, February 18, 1968. 44 Ray Chaudhary N.C.B., “The Politics of India’s Coalitions,” The Political Quarterly, 40, no. 3 (1969), p. 299. 45 The Times of India, August 8, 1967; Hindustan Times, August 9, 1967.

62 the Raja’s ministry lost its majority, and had no alternative but to vacate the fort. The Congress gained in the process. However, its euphoria was short-lived as the Congress legislative party leader, D.P. Mishra was rebuke by a judicial verdict, and had to step down. This in turn forced a change in leadership, and S.C. Shukla was chosen as the leader of the Congress in the state. With Shukla at the helm of affairs, a new coalition was formed with assistance from the “Progressive Legislators” group of twenty. The coalition remained fragile as it relied on a variety of political groups within the legislature for survival; unlike that in West Bengal, it concluded its term.

The Haryana Coalition

Coalitions in India drew on dissidence and defection. The Congress was the first victim. By the 1960s, the Congress seemed to have lost its accommodating capacity to diffuse contradictory interests before they became disastrous. The decline of the Congress, therefore, seems to have been historically conditioned. A summary of the coalition experiment in Haryana revealed the extent to which political circumstances conducive to coalition evolved due to the historical weakness of the Congress it failed to preserve its social base. Disagreement that was once managed internally became devastating in the course of time, presumably because of the party’s incompetence to dissolve crisis by conferring ‘patronage’.

The story of Haryana repeats that familiar pattern. A ministry headed by Bhagat Dayal Sharma came to power after the 1967 poll. It lasted for but a fortnight when Rao Birendra Singh, who broke away from the Congress along with fourteen MLAs, established a Front government in the province. It was tit for tat. Since Sharma was alleged to have support to the defeat of a large number of Congress candidates loyal to Singh,Maulana the curre Azadnt chief Library, minister was Aligarh taught a Muslim lesson this Universityway. The Rao ministry, however, failed to make group of majority support due to the opposition of the Sharma group it was more or less predicted, and the Rao government therefore never tried to prove its majority on the floor of the legislature. After weeks of a shaky existence, the governor dismissed the ministry but was unable to constitute an alternative ministry with the consideration that ‘the state administration had been paralyzed and no

63 alternative government was possible with a large number of legislators rapidly changing their loyalties’.46

The mid-term poll in Haryana did not deliver any respite to governmental volatility. The new face in the Congress was Bansi Lal. Sharma was not permitted to contest, but financially supported a large number of willing Congress candidates who were loyal to him. Bansi Lal was in a risky position, in which he hardly had power to impact the newly-elected members of the legislative assembly. Sharma supported Lal with the hope that he would defend his bid to become president of the state Congress.

Lal was in reluctant to stand behind Sharma, who by then became the leader of a factional segment within the legislature, called the United Front. With strong Jat support, Lal managed to abandon Sharma’s efforts, as the latter had only a narrow support base among the upper-castes, particularly the Brahmins, who never had a significant numerical presence within the caste groups in Haryana. The strong caste majority and the SVD opposition’s fear of losing its support base acted in Lal’s favour; the likelihood of a showdown by the opponents against the ministry was nipped in the bud.

The Haryana coalition is a story of two clear possibilities. On one hand, the first two experiments of the SVD were a familiar articulation of coalition as a politically expedient exercise. The fragility of these coalitions was visible from the very outset, largely due to the doubt in garnering sufficient numerical support in the legislature. The other scenario, articulated by Bansi Lal, demonstrates, on the other hand, the extent to which a strong social base deters the dissidents when there is no guarantee for their electoral victory. In fact, the Congress system survived because it had created a social baseMaulana by projecting Azad its multi Library,-cultural characteristics.Aligarh Muslim The groups University that left the Congress to form distinct political units or parties sought to appropriate the social base that they represented when in the Congress.

The complex evolution of coalition governments in Haryana, it is clear that the era of single-party majority was being reversed and that, true to Indian’s multi-cultural

46 The Times of India, November 22, 1967.

64 personality, coalition governments were nothing but examples of new experiments in the political arena.47

The Coalition trial in Kerala

This southernmost state of India is Socio-politically unique and different in its demographic profile. Not only Hindus, but Muslims and Christians too have significant shares in Kerala’s population. The politics of Kerala is in fact ‘the making of permutations and combination of the four communities48 of Ezhavas (22.1%), Christians (22.1%), Muslims (19.1%) and upper-caste Hindus belonging to the Nair community (14.4%).49 Since 1967, Kerala has been governed by two different coalitions CPI (M) led Left Democratic Front (LDF), and the Congress-dominated United Democratic Front (UDF). Besides the three major Communist parties – CPI (M), CPI, and Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), the LDF also included the Mani and Pillai faction of the , the Muslim League, and the vacillating Congress as long as it existed. Like the LDF, the UDF is equally heterogeneous because apart from the Congress, the other constituents were the Muslim League, a faction of the Kerala Congress, the Janata Party, the Praja Socialist Party, the (Nair) National Democratic Party, and the (Ezhavas) Socialist Revolutionary Party.

The disintegration of the Congress system in 1967 concurred with the formation of the non-Congress government in Kerala. Under the leadership of E.M.S. Namboodripad, the United Front came to power.50 In order to ensure the smooth functioning of the coalition government, a coordination committee was set up, with representatives from the coalition partners, including the CPI (M). The United Front’s vital problem rose chiefly from internal rivalries, which in turn provoked clashes within as well as betweenMaulana its constituents. Azad TheLibrary, coordination Aligarh committee Muslim failed toUniversity ease the tension within

47 Chakrabarty, Forging Power, p. 78. 48 Sadsivan S.N., “Administration and Social Development in Kerala: A Study in Administrative Sociology,” (New Delhi: IIPA, 1988), p. 6. 49 Nossiter T.J., Marxist Governments in India: Politics, Economy and Society (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 61. 50 Randive B.T., “Lessons of the Break-Up of Kerala United Front, Communist Party of India (Marxist),” (Calcutta, 1970), p. 18.

65 the coalition, and its existence became virtually ornamental. Its failure was attributed to the prevalence of conflicting opinions that could never lead to a consensus.51

The coordination committee was practically unproductive. A reason for its gradual decline was the reluctance of the major partner, the CPI (M), to endorse the decisions, arrived at after deliberations in the committee.52 The role of the coordination committee was insignificant. In fact, it was alleged that the committee always acted as a shield for the CPI (M), since it was headed by a member of this party. As a result, the coalition partners were always suspicious of one another, and the government machinery was utilized to improve their political fortune, rather than to strengthen the coalition government in the interest of the people.53

The coalition government had not the spirit of accommodation and consensus, but compromise, on most occasions. In view of the bitter relationship between the CPI and CPI (M) – the Muslim League, that was a key to the coalition’s survival managed to squeeze maximum profits in exchange of their assistance. In order to cut off the CPI, the League emerged as the most adequate strategic partner to the CPI (M) in its opposition to the former. The position of the CPI (M) was most at risk when the League joined hands with other coalition partners in demanding an interim enquiry into corruption charges against CPI (M) ministers. The chief minister declined and suggested a no-confidence motion against the government. The motion was carried out and Namboodripad gave his resignation. His calculation that the governor would impose article 356 proved incorrect, and CPI leader Achutha Menon was invited to form a minority ministry consisting of the Muslim League, Indian Socialist Party, and Kerala Congress, supported by the RSP, and tacitly, by the Congress. The Menon ministry was a unique example of a coalition where the CPI (M) was totally Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University excluded.54

51 John P. John, “Coalition Government in Kerala,” (Trivandrum: The Institute of Public Policy and Management, 1983), p. 129. 52 Ibid, p. 142. 53 Namboodripad E.M.S., “Anti-Communist Gang-up in Kerala: Betrayers of UF set-up Anti-People Government, Communist Party of India (Marxist),” (Calcutta, 1970), p. 28. 54 Nossiter, Communism in Kerala, pp. 99-100.

66

Unlike other states in India where the coalition experiment did not last beyond 1969, except perhaps West Bengal where ideologically inspired coalition survives since 1977. Kerala is the only state continuously governed by a coalition of parties irrespective of ideology. Crucial to coalition in this densely populated state on the south-western coast of India is not ideology, but the success of the political party or groups in gathering support of the major communities of Ezhavas, Nairs, Christians and Muslims. The growing decline of ‘the left and right ideologies’ seems to have created a vacuum in which the community-based choices have gained in importance both in the formation of a ministry and its survival.55

So, the 1967 experiment brought about extensive changes in Indian politics in two fundamental ways first, the days of single party majority was over and was substituted by a coalition of parties, not purely on the basis of ideological compatibility but for a desire to push the Congress party out of power. In the establishment of coalition, defection was an important ingredient, and most of the parties were adversely affected, except those parties to the far right and left, that maintained their organizational integrity through discipline and ideological steadiness. The period of 1967-69 proved a transitional stage, or discontinuity, in politics, illustrating the rise of a new phase in which coalition of parties became an inevitable phenomenon. Second, anti- Congressism grew with the 1967 elections, and the idea that the Congress party was incapable of being defeated. Anti-Congressism was defined in a vague manner so as to attract all the parties opposing the Congress. This was probably how the major Communist parties, including the CPI (M) and CPI, shared a platform with the dissident members of the Congress while forming the United Front government in West Bengal. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The high priest of anti-Congressism was Ram Manohar Lohia who, as Kothari argues, ‘devoted himself to destroying the Congress monopoly of power by uniting all anti- Congress forces in the country.’56 Lohia succeeded in his mission, and Indian polity was clearly divided into two opposite camps those supporting the Congress, and those who opposed it. Any group, any party, and any leader who declared himself in

55 Ibid, p. 101. 56 Kothari Rajni, Politics in India (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1986), p.183.

67 opposition to the Congress were considered to be politically correct and worthy of admiration.

The Lohiaite anti-Congressism made electoral tactical sense, for parties with an anti- Congress stance overthrew the Congress only when they were united. This was not always put into practice because of highly antagonistic contradictions among the non- Congress parties, which were rooted in the social realities of rural India. Unfortunately, there was no cohesive opposition and in spite of having won power in the 1967 elections in as many as nine states, no durable coalition was formed. A new phase had begun, when both the Congress and the opposition parties wanted to redefine themselves in the changed environment. That (1967) was an era of possibilities. The Congress lost power and for its restoration it had to renew itself keeping in mind the changed nature of the Indian polity. Euphoria of non- congress parties for electoral victory over the Congress was brief. That was an era of political uncertainty, where none of the major political parties was sure of their fate in future India. Characterized by uncertainty and chronic political instability, the period 1967-69 was therefore a clear break with the past by creating a definite space for coalition politics, as opposed to mono-centric, single party rule.57

Strategy or Moderation of Jana Sangh after 1967

The Jana Sangh’s practical integration strategy after the 1967 elections, when the party joined a whole series of heterogeneous coalitions, was also a model of reference. The political context, especially Indira Gandhi’s anti-communalistic attitude and the weakness of the religious network, doubtlessly convinced party leaders that they could not organize a strategy of Hindu mobilisation in any sustained fashion. It is also likely that the mixedMaulana reception Azad among Library, the electorate Aligarh to the Muslim cow protection University movement persuaded them to abandon this line of attack. At the same time, the mainstream opposition parties seemed ready to cooperate with Jana Sangh, which in response proceeded to tone down the Hindu nationalist themes in its public statements. This development strengthened the position of those in the Jana Sangh’s national leadership who were willing to make the party’s ideology more acceptable to moderate opinion

57 Chakrabarthy, Forging Power, p. 88.

68 and thus improve its chances of taking power, even if this meant participating in coalition governments.58 The Jana Sangh’s leaders changed the party strategy under certain external constraints. The strategy of ethno-religious mobilisation, for instance, was described as conditioned by the political context and the dependability of the ‘religious network’. However, the Jana Sangh also appeared to be subject of internal constraints in determining its party strategy. In fact, the frequent changes of the 1960s between strategies of militancy and moderation party reflected the tension between the efforts of all-India leaders to become integrated into mainstream politics and the staunch Hindu nationalism at the grassroots.59 A freshly formed Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) tried to mobilise the Hindu community, not very successfully, in their anti-cow slaughter movement. The issue of cow became icon of Hindu nationalist organisations and a useful tool to project Muslims as butchers of the cow.60

The relative failure of the 1967 “cow protection movement” concurred with a adjustment in strategy of the Jana Sangh, whose leaders had comprehended that a radical approach would restrict the party to a marginal role. Thus, it tried to become acceptable to new voters. The most important move in this direction was the way it watered down its Hindi-only policy in order to attract more supporters from South India. This change was finalized in December, 1967 during its Calicut (Kerala) plenary session the first one in south India when the party declined to set a deadline for making Hindi the national language and admitted that the adoption of this idiom had to take place on a voluntary basis.61 Simultaneously, the Jana Sangh developed populist socio- economic proposals in order to speak to “the common man” a formula party president A.B. Vajpayee used systematically. The Jana Sangh’s moderation was also partly due to the altering strategy of other opposition parties that were willing to partner with it, demandingMaulana pragmatism. Azad Library, Until the Aligarh 1960s, the Muslim Jana Sangh University was “the political untouchable” for most of the opposition parties, including the Socialists, who strongly

58 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist, p. 222. 59 Engineer Irfan, “Hindu Rashtra, Cow and Muslim,” The Milli Gazette, April 9, 2015. 60 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism, p. 228. 61 Jaffrelot Christophe, “Refining the moderation thesis: Two religious parties and Indian democracy: The Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva radicalism and coalition politics,” Journal Democratization, 20, no. 5 (2013), pp. 880-81.

69 criticized its communalism. In the early 1960s, the socialist leader, Ram Manohar Lohia developed the notion of non-Congressism, which supported the need for the opposition parties to form alliances against the Congress. Cross-ideological alliances are believed to be a moderating factor on extremist parties and an indication that pragmatism is winning out over ideological purity.62 In 1967, this settlement resulted in the making of post-election coalitions in some states where the Jana Sangh became part of the governments. None of them lasted for long because of the ideological dissimilarities, which sometimes reflected the contrasting social basis of the allied parties, indicating that Jana Sangh preferred, for the moment, to retain purity. By the end of the 1960s, strategies of moderation were being criticised by the local cadres of the Jana Sangh and by the RSS because of the dilution of the Hindu nationalist identity they implied.

At the end of the 1960s the Jana Sangh could no longer avoid the debate on the dilution of its ideology because of its partaking in various coalition governments in the states after the fourth general election. Because of that, the change of strategy in the late 1960s and early 1970s advocates that the real division within the Jana Sangh was not vertical, of the factional type, but horizontal. It pitted against each other all-India leaders and the local cadres who were deeply imbued with the RSS’s ethic. In other words, the Sangathanist network played a greater role than the rivalries at the top in shaping the Jana Sangh’s strategy.

In fact, the coalition governments broke in 1968-69, partly because of the attitude of the Jana Sangh’s local cadres. On one level they were prepared to make concessions about issues, such as the status of Urdu which the national leadership was reviewing; while on another level, they did not want to go too far in compromising the party’s Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University identity and were eager not to show their social basis or hinder the promotion of interests close to the Hindu nationalist fold, e.g. transfer of Civil servants or education policy. This conflicting attitude certainly aroused the doubts of partners of the Jana Sangh. In 1969, the Jana Sangh decided that it would no longer associate itself with non-Congress coalitions given its unrewarding experience of earlier experiments.63 The strategy which the party adopted in the early 1970s brought about a new social

62 Jaffrelot. Hindu Nationalist, p. 230. 63 Qazi Mudassir, “Coalition Governments in India: A Historical Overview,” The International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 3, no. 9 (2015), pp. 27-29. 70 and economic radicalism and an appeal to the patriotic sentiments engendered by the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan.

The fifth general election of 1971 expected great importance in the Indian electoral politics, because in this election the opposition political parties along with defected Congress group entered into an electoral alliance to face the Congress (R) as united front in the election. The Jana Sangh, the Congress (O), the Swatantra party, and the SSP formed the National Democratic Front. This experiment of electoral alliance did not bear fruit to opposition political parties because the Congress won the election in a comprehensive way by appealing to the electorates through the radical slogan of Garibi Hatao. Thus the Congress (R) under the leadership of Indira Gandhi formed the government at the centre. This was the beginning of new Congress dominance era which differed from the earlier Congress dominance era under Nehru and Shastri. The new Congress party under Indira Gandhi was characterised by the lack of internal factional competition which led to monopolistic dominance and the erosion of openness in the Congress system. Though Indira Gandhi was successful in neutralizing the internal party challenges to her authority by causing split in the Congress party but during the latter years of her rule she faced numerous political, social and economic challenges which threatened her government. The financial drain caused due to the Bangladesh war, decline in the food production due to failure of monsoons and the Arab Israel war of October1973 brought international energy and fertilizer crises which resulted in the high inflation, widespread food shortage and unemployment.64

The Railway strike of 1974

The workers of Indian Railways went on a strike in 1974. The strike went on for 20 days,Maulana and by 17 Azadlakh workers Library,; it is the Aligarh largest known Muslim strike Universitytill date. The strike was held to demand a raise in pay scale which remained the same many years in spite of the fact that pay scales of other government owned entities had risen over the years. Further, since British rule, the Railways termed the work of the loco staff as “continuous”, implying that workers would have to remain at work as long as the train ran on its trip, often for several days at a stretch especially on the goods trains. Independence brought no changes for the workers on this. The spread of diesel engines

64 Ibid, p. 30. 71 and the consequent intensification of work in the Indian Railways since the 1960s created much dissatisfaction and anger among the workers. The Railways, although government owned, continued to be an organization in which the accepted worldwide standard of an eight hour working day was violated with impunity. When the crafts unions raised the issue, they demanded a 12-hour working day for loco running staff.

During the 1960s, unrest grew amongst railway workers on the issue of low salaries, harsh working environments and long hours of work. The negative response from the management and the inability of the two railway unions recognised by the Railway Board All India Railway men's Federation (AIRF) and National Federation of Indian Railwaymen (NFIR) to fight for their complaints and protect their interests caused a sense of frustration and disaffection among workers. Recognised union leadership was increasingly perceived to be corrupt and likely to fall affected in a bad way to material privileges due to their proximity with the railway management. There was a perception between the worker activists that the Government, the railway management and the recognised unions were cooperating and working together to overpower and control the militant and independent activities of workers. Under these conditions, a sense of combined and independent action to fight for their interests led to the formation of independent, category based unions like the Loco Running Staff Association. These developments were a clear sign of the labour militancy and the commencement of class consciousness among the railway workers, which led to the all India railway strike in May 1974.

The strike of May, 1974 started with a major setback when all its main leaders like Fernandes, along with scores of active local level leaders were arrested on the night of May 2, 1974. However, there were numerous areas in the country where the strike was Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University intense, with remarkable display of unity among workers and other sections of the society. The strike was led by the AIRF with Fernandes as its president. The Government and the railway management unleashed a reign of terror by deploying security forces on the workers and their families. There were already conflicting and contradictory opinions on the decision to strike both within the AIRF and between the NFIR and category unions.

As a result, there were instances of destroying and cooperation with the management during the strike. The political leadership from among the non-Congress (I) parties like 72 the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M) and the socialists, constrained by their internal political compulsions, were keen to have a quick negotiated settlement rather than a continue general strike. This created a sense of confusion and uncertainty among rank and file worker activists. The strike began on 7 May and was withdrawn in three weeks, on 28 May 1974 without any immediate gains.65

Although it was a failure, the long-term outcome of the 1974 strike was the establishment of ‘the railway workers’ movement as a social force with massive potential. Its demand were not met, it projected a unique mobilization of workers across the country, reinforcing the position of the organized labour. The railway strike also established George Fernandes as an all-India leader by taking him out of the confines of Bombay. His role as a militant trade union leader attracted government attention, and it was not unanticipated that he became the principle opposition to authoritarian rule during the 1975 Emergency. As a rallying point for the opposition, Fernandes played a significant role in cementing a bond among like-minded political leaders for the coalition against the congress that bore fruit in the 1977 Lok Sabha poll.

The coalition experiments in the states in 1967 were therefore to become a reality at the national level within a decade. The railway strike gave impetus to bringing together those who opposed Indira Gandhi’s strict rule in the name of governmental stability. The 1974 railway strike was defining moment in Indian politics it created circumstances for diverse political parties to come together despite being ideologically dissimilar- but pragmatically compatible.66

Emergency and the role of Jana Sangh (1975-77) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The emergency was imposed to blow political opposition against Indira Gandhi’s government. Threatened by a massive political mobilisation by opposition political parties, the Congress government suspended the constitutional machinery in the name of protecting the ‘Security, safety, and integrity’ of the nation. The first effort at challenging the state was articulated by the students in Gujarat in January, 1974. The

65 "Looking back at anger.” The Hindu, 2002. 66 Fernandes George, the Railway Strike of 1974, p. 53.

73 student movement, soon joined by major opposition parties, was a product of popular anger due largely to the steep increase in the prices of food grains, cooking oil, and other essential commodities. In view of the crisis, the Indira Gandhi government forced the state government to resign and, the suspension of the assembly, President’s rule was imposed. Morarji Desai undertook a fast unto death, and the Gujarat assembly was finally dissolved in March, 1975.

A similar situation emerged in Bihar in the month of March, 1974, when students organized a series of protests against the state government for failing to provide necessary commodities. As in Gujarat, the opposition parties extended support to the students involved in the agitation.67

The Emergency is a frequently invoked, but little examined period of Indian history. Most discussions about it centre on Indira Gandhi's authoritarian personality and the damage it caused to democratic institutions at that time. Of course, the Congress was voted out of office in 1977, and this is rightly taken as proof that voters will not tolerate prolonged abuse of power. The Emergency, in fact, rendered the Jana Sangh, the BJP's predecessor, respectable and paved the way for it to enter the mainstream of Indian politics. According to L.K. Advani, it changed what he called the “untouchable” status of the Jana Sangh in politics. Briefly recollect the immediate events that led to the Emergency. On June 12, 1975, the Allahabad High Court ruled in favour of Raj Narain against Indira Gandhi, declaring her 1971 parliamentary election in Rae Bareilly null and void because of electoral malpractice. She was held guilty of corrupt practices under section 123 (7) of the Representation of People Act, for obtaining support of government officials in her constituency, Rae Bareilly, in order to enhance her election prospects. Meanwhile, the ABVP led Nav Nirman movement in Gujarat and the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Sampoorna Kranti agitation led by Jayaprakash Narayan (J.P.) in Bihar had made an impact in those States. Indira Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court for an absolute stay order against the High Court judgment. On June 24, the Supreme Court granted her a conditional stay, depriving her of voting rights in the Lok Sabha, but permitting her to continue as Prime Minister. The Allahabad judgement and the Gujarat poll results gave a fire to the JP movement. On June 25, J.P. and other opposition leaders,

67 Chakrabarty, Forging Power, p. 100.

74 including Morarji Desai, held a public rally at the Ram Lila grounds in Delhi where they declared that Indira Gandhi should resign. They urged the people to join them in a non-cooperation movement. The next morning, Indira Gandhi announced a national Emergency assumed in view of “threats to national security”. The Nav Nirman and the J.P. movements were labelled as the threats to national stability, though these movements might, in fact, have already peaked by April or May, 1975. Opposition leaders were arrested, and the Congress dissidents (Chandra Shekhar and Ram Dhan), the government also imposed strict censorship of the press and suspended all Fundamental Rights, and a ban was soon declared on grassroots organisations, including the RSS and 13 of its cover organisations.

In the propaganda accompanying the Emergency, secularism and socialism were the watchwords of Indira Gandhi's government. It was at this time that India came to be declared as a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic, with `socialist' and `secular' being added by her. Campaigns for discipline and productivity were instituted, including Indira Gandhi's 20 point programme, but what became most controversial were Sanjay Gandhi's five point programmes. Two of those five points were mainly pursued, namely, sterilisation campaigns, aimed disproportionately at Muslims, and urban "beautification" drives beginning at settlements in the Jama Masjid area in Delhi. The backlash against these campaigns was widespread. Not surprisingly, after the Emergency, both ruling and opposition parties increasingly came to distance themselves from using the word ‘secularism,’ regardless of who was in power.68

The Emergency proved to be a major political input toward the consolidation of a coalition of opposition parties even in its aftermath. Two dimensions of this coming Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University together of opposition parties seem important: on the one hand, those opposed to Indira Gandhi drew primarily on anti-Congressism, defined vaguely as a political stance against the Congress party; the other dimension highlighted an all-round effort by JP to bring together ideologically diverse political parties on the basis of this underlying thread of opposition to the Congress. The chief protagonists of the conflicts of 1973- 75 were also the chief campaigners in the elections of 1977. The Emergency period gave a sharp turn to Indian politics, setting a new furious march of events and

68 Rajgopal Arvind, “The Emergency and the Sangh,” The Hindu, June 13, 2003. 75 introducing an entirely new style of government in the country with unalike norms and values.

On February 15, 1976 Mrs. Gandhi asked the opposition parties to follow the path of democracy so that democratic system could function in the country. A large majority of the people detained in the jails were in favour of reconciliation. Only a hardcore opposed it. Leaders were released from the jail. This gave an opportunity to Jaya Prakash Narayan to summon leaders of opposition parties in March, 1976 to form a new political party Janata Party.

On January 16, 1977 Emergency was relaxed and Lok Sabha Elections were announced. On January 23, 1977 the Janata Party was launched with Morarji Desai as Chairman and Charan Singh as Deputy Chairman.69

Jana Sangh’s rise to National Level politics

The Janata experiment of 1977-79 was in a class by itself for at least two fundamental reasons. First, it was the first attempt at forming a coalition government at the national level. Non-congress coalition governments had, of course, come into being in 1967 in as many as nine states. But those were state level experiments, though they had an evident impact on the Union government. Second, although at a different level, the Janata government was continuity in the sense that not only did it draws upon anti- Congress sentiments, but it also brought into its fold parties with diverse ideological views on the basis of certain mutual socio-economic and political objectives.

With the merger of the Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD), and Socialist Party, the Janata Party was constituted in January, 1977. The Congress Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University suffered a serious blow when senior leaders, such as Jagjivan Ram, Nandini Satpathy, and H.N. Bahuguna left it and formed the Congress for Democracy (CFD). Parties such as the CPI (M), DMK, and Akali Dal agreed to join hands with the Janata Party in order to give a straight fight to the Congress and its allies, the CPI and AIADMK, in the forthcoming national poll.70

69 Ibid., 70 Fernandes George, George Fernandes Speaks (New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1991), p. 95. 76

In view of the alleged and publicized atrocities committed during the Emergency, the Congress had lost its popularity to a large extent. Of 542 parliamentary seats, the Janata Party obtained 330, while the Congress had a share of 154, with 7 seats going to the CPI and 21 to the AIADMK. The Congress was wiped out in north India it won 2 of the 234 seats it contested in seven northern states.

JP’s success in strengthening the bond suggested a possibility of political unity regardless of serious dissimilarities in class terms. This resulted in the Socialists agreeing to moderate its ideological division with other constituents in post- Emergency. The class character of the BLD never stood in the way while forming a coalition in which a completely opposite BJS (Bhartiya Jana Sangh) was a significant partner. Even the RSS endorsed the participation of the JanaSangh in the Janata experiment, as its leader, Bala Saheb Deoras, realized that ‘to remain in the mainstream of national politics, the RSS should opt for a politics of accommodation’ by redefining its exclusivist ideological identities. In fact, the changed RSS attitude was crucial in the formation of the Janata alliance. As soon as the 1977 elections were announced, four opposition parties the Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Bhartiya Lok Dal, and Socialist Party merged to form the Janata Party, which decided to have common candidates and a common symbol.71

The Janata Party’s election manifesto of 10 February had three charters: political, economic and social. As the Emergency was a nightmare, the political charter sought to release people ‘from the bondage of fear’ by lifting the Emergency proclamation of 1971 (external emergency was in operation since 1971 Bangladesh war) and the 1975 internal Emergency; to repeal MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act) and other anti-democratic legislative steps; to revoke the 42nd Amendment; to restore Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University fundamental freedoms together with that of the press, and to release the Emergency. The thirteen-point economic charter pledged to delete the right to property from part IV of the Constitution; to affirm the right to work, and full employment in ten years.

71 Kanungo Parlay, RSS’s Tryst with politics: from Hedgewar to Sudarshan (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), p. 184.

77

The fifteen-point social charter called for reform of education and the eradication of illiteracy.72

The poll results were more or less predictable the Congress lost and the opposition parties won a majority. In Lok Sabha, the Janata party won 270 of 539 seats. Its allies, the Jagjivan Ram-led Congress for Democracy won 28, the Akali Dal won 8, and the CPI (M) had 28 seats in the new Lok Sabha. Indira Gandhi was also defeated in Rae Bareli in UP and Congress was collapsed in north India. History was created a history of non-Congress coalition in India. What was articulated at the state level in the 1967 elections was translated at the national level in the 1977 election.

The coalition suffered, almost inevitably, a blow when there was a crisis over who would be Prime Minister. There were three aspirants Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram. With the intervention of Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) and J.B. Kripalani, the issue was resolved, with Desai being chosen by the two senior and experience leaders. The candidates accepted the verdict in the larger interest of the coalition, and also it was a decision of JP and Kripalani, who were always held in high esteem as the architects of the anti-Congress coalition. Singh was given the powerful ministry of home affairs. Jagjivan Ram accepted the important portfolio of defence after a show of reluctance. External affairs went to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leader of the Jana Sangh, which later transformed into the present-day BJP. The ardent socialist and arch- enemy of Gandhi, George Fernandes, was given charge of industries.

The Janata Party that held power between March, 1977 and July, 1979 was a hurriedly assembled coalition of quite different opposition parties and groups united mainly by their opposition to Indira Gandhi and the Emergency. The unity among the opposition groups was politicallyMaulana beneficial, Azad andLibrary, the natural Aligarh contrast among Muslim them Universitybegan to surface once the common enemy was defeated. The Janata Party was a coalition, dominated by the conservative, but secularist, faction of the Congress party. It also had the Jana Sangh, a party of the ‘Hindu Right’, representing mainly the high caste middle class in the urban areas of north and central India.

72 Austin Granville, Working in a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian Experience (Oxford, 2003), pp. 398-99.

78

Conflict, Contradiction and fall of Janata Government

The hurriedly cobbled combination of four opposition parties was united only to force out Indira Gandhi and nothing else, so there was an ideological mess on almost every policy issue. Too many wrong things had happened during the Janata raj that robbed it of its popularity. The happiness over the victory of the Janata Party coalition was short-lived. The government received frequent setback by the continuous quarrel and infighting in the party, both at the Centre and in the States. There was an increase in lawlessness and people were fed up with soaring prices. However, the most heartrending development was a shocking increase in atrocities against Dalits. These were by no means unknown during Gandhi’s reign. But the sudden increase in their frequency and the acceleration of the inhumanity were phenomenal, obviously because the “intermediate castes”.73

The coalition had its initial hiccups. The Socialists did not appear to be comfortable with the increasing influence of the RSS in governance through three of its Swayamsevaks Atal Bihari Vajpayee, L.K. Advani, and Brij Lal Verma. They apprehended that with its organizational strength, the RSS would soon become too powerful a force within the party to dismiss lightly. This confusion among the Janata constituents left them ill at ease with the RSS from the very outset. Based on this fear, the Socialists formulated a strategy to keep the RSS at bay. A suggestion was made by Madhu Limaye (follower of R.M. Lohia) for the merger of the RSS with the youth wing of the Janata Party to form a united volunteer organization.74 The Janata Party stayed ‘a coalition of different parties and groups’ and was ‘a victim of factionalism, manipulation and personal ambitions of its leaders’. Bound by anti-Indira Gandhi sentiments, the coalition was too different historically, ideologically, and even programmaticallyMaulana Azad, to get Library,together. The Aligarh lack of ideological Muslim similarity University stood in the way of the consolidation of a relatively stable coalition. 75

The non-Jana Sangh components of the Janata Party appeared to have issued ‘the first selvo’ against the coalition in Uttar Pradesh. In February, 1979 the UP chief minister, Ram Naresh Yadav dropped two Jana Sangh ministers from his Cabinet for ‘their alleged

73 Malhotra Inder, “The Janata’s Collapse,” The Indian Express, September 2, 2014. 74 Kanungo Parlay, RSS’s Tryst with Politics, p. 419. 75 Chandra Bipan, India After Independence, p. 264.

79 violation of the Janata election pledge of discarding communal pursuits in the interest of harmony among the multi-religious communities in India’.76 The factional struggle took an unpleasant turn, when in June, 1979 Charan Singh, the Home Minister, was forced to resign and later accommodated in the ministry with the Finance portfolio. Charan Singh broke up the party and the government with support from the Socialists on the grounds of the Jana Sangh member’s refusal to relinquish their ‘dual membership’ of Janata Party and RSS.77 Raj Narain, whose claim to defeating Indira Gandhi in the Lok Sabha elections, resigned from the ministry and formed the Janata (secular) in order to distance his members, from the Janata Party that included ‘the communal Jana Sangh’.78

The government suffered a further blow when the opposition parties criticized the government for its complicity with the allegedly corrupt son of the Prime Minister, Kanti Desai. It soon became an issue of personal bickering with the Janata Party coalition, and a no-confidence motion was brought by the Congress (I) leader, Y.V. Chavan, in July of 1979. Following the resignation of several ministers, and secession of major Janata Party constituents, such as the BLD and socialists the Morarji Desai-led government soon became a minority government.79 Apprehending that the government would lose the no- confidence motion since it lacked the sufficient numerical support in parliament, the Morarji Desai government resigned on 15 July, 1979. The Janata experience was, however, short-lived. Soon the party fell into chaos and eventually broke down under the twin pressure of increasing organisational strains and governmental non performances. As days passed, growing inner strains surfaced and it led to open splits, constraining the nation to opt for midterm polls to the Lok Sabha in the early 1980.

New Beginning (rise of the BJP)

After breaking off from the Janata Party the former Jana Sangh reinvented itself in June, 1980.Maulana The new name Azad they Library, adopted wasAligarh Bharatiya Muslim Janata PartyUniversity (BJP) and Gandhian Socialism became their new doctrine.80 It also brought Hindu nationalism

76 The Times of India, February 29, 1979. 77 Anderson Walter and Damle Sridhar, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism (New Delhi: Vistaar, 1987), pp. 138- 139. 78 Hindustan Times, June 13, 1979. 79 Hindustan Times, July 15, 1979. 80 Nag Kingshuk, the Saffron Tide: The Rise of the BJP (Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2014), p. 11.

80 back into the political realm by the backdoor. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was born under stunning circumstances over which it had no control, circumstances which were both tragic and grotesque, tragic because they marked the shattering of JP’s dream of building a party which was to be a national alternative to the Congress; grotesque because a set of dubious politicians without a political base but with unlimited and unprincipled ambition succeeded in destroying a mass party.81

In 1980, when the BJP chose the credo of Gandhian Socialism, the RSS was upset. Its boss, Balasaheb Deoras, was anxious; he felt that the party was leaving its Hindu base. He suggested using the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) a twenty year old outfit that was vaguely a part of the Sangh Parivar to represent the Hindu cause. Under the guidance of the RSS, VHP began its Hindu mobilization programme in Uttar Pradesh (UP), the most populous state in India by raising the Ayodhya issue.82

The 1980 mid-term poll brought back Indira Gandhi's Congress (I) into power with another split of Congress in 1978. The electoral success of the Congress (I) actually marked the Centralization, well as for personal triumph of Indira Gandhi. Thus, she became the hallmark of her party as her survival. The new Congress party that returned to power was noticeably different to the one that had existed even ten years before. In the course of this period, it had lost a number of experienced second level leaders and its capacity to operate efficiently at both levels of the federal system had been further disintegrate by consecutive splits and defections. Though formally retaining a territorially based party organisation with different levels of power and responsibility, the functioning of the party was centralized to an unprecedented degree with a heavy emphasis on the criterion of personal loyalty to the party leadership.83

Indira Gandhi, who had consolidated her Hindu credentials by frequently visiting temples,Maulana was assassinated Azad Library, (in reaction Aligarh to operation Muslim BLUE STAR University) on the last day of October, 1984, just before the elections. Riding massive sympathy wave, the Congress won 414 seats in the Lok Sabha a performance not seen in the heydays of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. The BJP won just two seats – even less than the seats they had won the first time they contested elections as the Jana Sangh in 1951. All Hindu votes had gone

81 Hartman Horst, Political Parties, p. 339. 82 Nag Kingshuk, The Saffron Tide, p. 12 83 Satyamurty T.V., “Centre- State Relation,” Economic & Political Weekly (1984), p. 51.

81 to the Congress. There was some reorganizing in the BJP ranks and Vajpayee, the boss of the party, was side-lined, his position was taken over by his old associate Lal Krishna Advani. Without Jan Sangh, the BJP returned to its original legacy.

The 1984 election was the last to bring a majority one-party government at the centre. The Congress party declined as an organization. This decline was apparent long before the Congress’ share of the votes began to drop since 1989 onwards. Attempts to revive the party by holding organizational elections in 1980s and 1990s indicated the institutional flaw in the party. The BJP had made the largest gain at the expense of the Congress. The expansions in the last decade of the previous century prompted the general idea that Indian politics had entered an era of post-Congress polity. The congress stopped performing the functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and social conflict resolution through authoritative policy outputs. One of the main consequences of this was the rise of BJP.

After the Janata experience of coalition government in 1977-79, single party dominance recurred during the period from 1980-89. This phase was unlike that from the earlier period of Congress dominance because it was set in a multiparty context. As at the centre many new opposition parties got established, and gained electoral support in the states as well. After the Ninth General Elections of 1989, situation changed dramatically in favour of a coalition arrangement at the Centre.84 Since 1989 till 2004, five coalition governments have been formed on democratic principles. These represented the National Front Government led by V.P. Singh (1989-90), the BJP led coalition government under the Prime Ministership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in (1998-99), the second inning by the BJP led NDA government (1999-2004) and the Congress-led UPA government in the 14th Lok Sabha.

Dawn of theMaulana Coalition Era Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The elections to the Ninth Lok Sabha in November, 1989 marked a watershed in national politics as for the first time since independence a hung parliament was thrown in with no party or group receiving a clear majority to form a government on its own. The Congress, under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi got the largest number, i.e. 195 seats, in the House of 525, followed by Janata Dal with 141 seats and BJP with 88

84 Khan Arshi, Coalition Politics in India since 1967”, in: Akhtar Majeed (ed.), Politics and Power Sharing (New Delhi: Manak Publication, 2000), p. 136. 82 seats. The Ninth General Elections of 1989 provided a coalition (minority) government, a recently emerged third force, thus strengthening the multiparty system.85 The elections of 1989 were held in an environment jam-packed with emotions. There was single dominating issue or slogan, political frustrations, factionalism and personality clashes which preceded the election scene. The message of 1989 Elections was priority and had a plebiscitary character.86 The agenda had now begun to be defined through the interpretation of the vote. Two types of attitudes succeeded, viz. one, the TINA factor namely, there is no alternative to Rajiv. It was counter challenged by the SITA87 factor, viz., Singh is the alternative. Thus, the Janata Dal was a coalition of four parties, which came under the banner of social justice. The Janata Dal and later the National Front wanted to reach an understanding to take the place of Congress government because of increasing corruption and defence scandal, and more the forced resignation of V.P. Singh, the then Finance Minister. After the failure of the Congress to form government, National Front (NF) got the required support for establishing the government at the centre.

The National Front Government

The National Front, the BJP and the Left formed an alliance in some 400 constituencies on the eve of November, 1989 elections, to make sure that the opposition vote did not split. The most notable feature of the 1989 elections was the skilful deployment of the electoral arithmetic, which the opposition exploited to its best advantage.88 In their joint pursuit to overthrow the Congress at the centre, the National Front stood at the axis with the strong support of the BJP and the Left. V.P. Singh played a vital role in uniting the opposition parties the Janata Party, Lok Dal (A), Lok Dal (B) and others to unify under the label Janata Dal and insisted several other parties to fight against the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Congress. Thus, the emergence of this large coalition against the Congress had indicated polarization of voters with the maximum possibility of the coalition government.89 The 1989 results gave an ambiguous verdict against the dynastic rule and the results made a call for change. In 1989, the voter adjudged the Congress (I) to

85 Ibid, p.151. 86 Narang A.S., Indian Government and Politics (New Delhi: Jawahar Publication, 1997), p. 509. 87 Saxena Rekha, “Forthcoming 1998 ‘Party System and the Electoral Turning Points in India,” Trends in Social Science Research, 5, no.1 (1998), p. 289. 88 Ibid. p. 290. 89 Ibid, p. 292. 83 be incapable and inadequate, but did not give enough strength to the National Front or the Janata Dal. Thus, this resulted in a minority government at the centre. The two emerging political forces the BJP and the National Front, defeated the Congress. Regardless of the Congress winning 39.5 per cent of the votes, it lost severely in terms of seats from 415 in 1984 to 195 seats in 1989. The Janata Dal alone won 143 seats. While all the opposition parties agreed to come together to form a government under V.P. Singh in December 1989, the Left parties and the BJP agreed to support the government from outside.90 The NF government managed to bring two groups of Indian politics, the Left and the BJP, together.

The issue of these two groups supporting the National Front was clarified by a common logic the Congress (I) had to be kept at niche by any means. The urgency of stopping the Congress (I) from forming a coalition government was perhaps an important, but by no means the only reason in the formation of the government. Another was the opportunity for the BJP and the Left to use the minority government.91 Support to V.P. Singh's government at the Centre was part of a bigger game plan of the BJP. It was the time for the BJP to play a waiting game, expecting to improve its position by displaying power directly or indirectly in six states, and of course, at the national level. The BJP was, of course, dreaming to come to power at the centre in next parliamentary elections. This was possible if it could take advantage of the conflicts within the National Front, the limited political impact of the Left, the disordered state of affairs in the Congress (I) and most important of all, the growing militant Hinduism. Support from the Left, however, was based on short-term plan. Its leaders realized that left support was vital to make the National Front stronger than its numerical strength in the Parliament.92 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Failure of the National Front

This was the minority coalition and had great risks of its premature collapse. Disputes within the Janata Dal started to surface soon after it came to power. Hard pressed in

90 Khan Arishi, Coalition Politics in India, p. 158. 91 Sinha Dipankar, “V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar and nowhere Politics in India,” Asian Survey, 31, no. 7 (1991), p. 601. 92 Saxena Rekha, Forthcoming 1998, p. 290.

84 the internal power struggle, V.P. Singh, on August 7, 1990 announced a 27 per cent reservation for jobs in the Central Government and PSUs (Public Sector Undertakings) for socially and economically backward castes, i.e. the OBCs to further consolidate his and his party's base among them. While this speeded up the collapse of Janata Dal, it also sent alarming signals to other National Front partners who were facing the onslaught of the pro-Mandal leaders. According to George Fernandes, it was a measured political move which went wrong and brought the government down. V. P. Singh assumed that by doing a favour to a segment of the population will support him and therefore he could win. But the government failed because it implemented the recommendations of Mandal Commission without taking the coalition partners into confidence.93 Also, it was under the tremendous pressure of the BJP to pursue soft- pedalled policy towards the militant-rightist forces on the Ayodhya issue.94 Further, throughout its eleven-month rule at the head of the National Front Government (Nov. 1989-Nov. 1990), the Janata Dal was rocked by extreme factionalism between its Jan Morcha and the Lok Dal constituents, the latter led by the Devi Lal. Next, the JD became implicate in the controversies created by the Prime Minister's decisions to reserve central government and public sector employment for the OBCs. The National Front government was finally abandoned by the BJP, and it took support from the NF, following the triumphant Hindu revivalist rath yatra under taken by L.K. Advani, the then BJP President. Advani hopped on to the VHP bandwagon and hitched the BJP’s fortunes to the former and decide to use the issue of Ram Janmabhoomi to mobilize Hindu society and gaining votes for the next election. The National Front government, deprived of the BJP support, as a result, fell in a no-confidence vote in the Lok Sabha. Concurrently, the National Front Coalition suffered another loss when Chandra Shekhar engineered a split in the Janata Dal for becoming the Prime Minister that too on Maulana the support ofAzad the Congress. Library, He Aligarh too lost after Muslim six months University when the Congress withdrew its support. Thus, the 1989 elections and the National Front formation presented that there is an alternative to both Congress and the BJP which can provide democratic governance. But its strength was rooted in alliance and coalitions which were not impossible but very difficult tasks.95 A few months and the stop-gap

93 Fermandes George, “Rules of Coalition Politics,” Asian Affairs, no. 10, (1999-2000), p. 29. 94 Narang A. S., Indian Government and Politics, p. 510. 95 Khan Arshi, Coalition Politics in India, pp. 159-160.

85 government of Chandrasekhar later, polls were held and in the halfway, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. The Congress, hence, enjoyed another sympathy wave in the second phase of polling. As a result, the party came back to power in mid-1991 with P.V. Narasimha Rao at the helm.

The Tenth Lok Sabha (1991) was a minority government formed by the Congress party under the Prime Ministership of Narsimha Rao with some dubious support resulting from horse trading with the JMM (Jharkhand Mukti Morcha) the government was able to complete its full tenure. Later, after five years of congress rule, with the electoral verdict for the next Lok Sabha, coalition governments began to settle as a reality of the Indian politics.

The Eleventh Lok Sabha of 1996 witnessed the emergence of the BJP with 161 seats, as the largest single party in another hung parliament, followed by the Congress and the Janata Dal.96 The BJP and its allies as the largest political combine in the Parliament were invited by the President to form the government on the condition that it will have to win a vote of confidence on the floor of the Lok Sabha within 13 days of its swearing in on May 16, 1996. On May 28, the BJP was unsuccessful in proving its strength in the parliament and the Vajpayee government resigned. During the debate over the confidence motion, Vajpayee declared that his party was ready to freeze its controversial stand on the construction of Ram Temple, abrogation of Article 370 and the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code in the interest of evolving a consensus in the country.97

The United Front Government

In the trial ofMaulana the failure ofAzad two week Library, BJP minority Aligarh government, Muslim the NF University-led alliance made a fragile United Front coalition government comprising of 13 national and regional parties headed by H.D. Deve Gowda with the outside aid of the Congress. The UF was made up of various parties divided on a number of issues but united for the sake of power politics. The UF Government actually arose in the complex post- election negotiations among the parties. This was in a clear contrast to the establishment of Janata Party in 1977 and NF in 1989. Both were formed before the

96 Saxena Rekha, Forthcoming 1998, p. 295. 97 India Today, May 26, 1996. 86 elections. Moreover, both were marked by combined manifestos and comprehensive seat adjustments to avoid mutual contest and shared campaigning.

The UF chiefly had a three level coordination mechanism to facilitate it to move from the formation to the governance stage and to sustain and bear the relationship between parties, both within the coalition and outside it. These are common minimum programme, steering committee, and the third level was Prime Minister and main supporting party.

Failure of the United Front Government

The United Front coalition government which was led by Deve Gowda was like a chariot being pulled at times in several directions by 13 horses (like many parties coalition run at a time). There were personality conflicts among the United Front leaders because of which the United Front lacked unity. The Front's link with the Congress was particularly unstable. In the spring of 1995, the Congress seemed to be keen to substitute the United Front government by a government of its own in coalition with a different set of more likeable allies. Having failed in doing so, it searched for a face-serving device signifying an alteration in the leadership of the United Front Deve Gowda to I.K. Gujral, both from the Janta Dal on the plea of the coldness of the former to the interests and opinions of the Congress. Finally, the Congress took away its support to UF in November, 1997.98 Therefore the UF Government could govern for only 19 months and the eleventh Lok Sabha was dissolved on 3 November 1997. Succeeding developments after the ill-timed collapse of the UF coalition influenced three major forces in different terms. The BJP and its allies became the greatest beneficiary and the two other important players Janata Dal and Congress remained feeble,Maulana jumbled andAzad separated. Library,99 Aligarh Muslim University

From the borders of Indian political scene in 1984, the evolution of the BJP to the position of third largest party in the Lok Sabha elections of 1989 with 86 members, second largest party in 1991 with 119 members and single largest party in 1996, 1998 and 1999 with 161, 181 and 182 members respectively might be claimed by the

98 Saxena Rekha, Forthcoming 1998, p. 296. 99 Khan Arshi, Coalition Politics in India, p. 163.

87 protagonists of Hindu Nationalism as triumph of their political philosophy, but the ground reality gives a distinct picture. In fact the BJP, while coming into the race for political power with other political parties also adopt the same market mechanism to buy the voters which its political rivals had been doing to win elections. Without caring about its image of being a ‘party with difference’ the BJP joined strategic poll alliance against the Congress in all the Lok Sabha elections since 1989, regardless of the castiest, sectarian, parochial or corrupt image of the political leaders and their parties.

A noteworthy feature of the Lok Sabha election was that it was the first time after the death of Indira Gandhi, the Lok Sabha election was contested on the matter of leadership and the country has took in Vajpayee as its leader. The key challenge before him was to create a balance between his heart and mind. The RSS may not interfere this time in the rights of the prime minister, but there were a number of issues, mainly relating to national economy on which Sangh leaders did not agree with Vajpayee. Thus, the real test before Vajpayee was to uphold a balance between the pull and the pressure from RSS which continued to be his soul and his alliance partners.100

The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance

National Democratic Alliance was first formed in the year 1998, and once more came to power in 1999 under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The NDA was an alliance of many national and regional political parties led by the BJP. The NDA assured to end political unsteadiness created between 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections. Its common manifesto in the elections of 1999 was an agenda for a proud and prosperous India. The NDA Government was the first national coalition government in India to carry out a full five year term in office. The capability of the 24 parties NDA to governMaulana the full term Azad is one Library, of the most noteworthyAligarh Muslimmodern events University in the history of post-independence politics in India. In the year 1999, the NDA government came in the Centre along with its alliance, and worked up till 13 May, 2004.

The 12th Lok Sabha elections (10 March, 1998) rendered chances to the biggest political party, the BJP, led coalition governments at the centre. The only significant

100 Upadhyay R., “Electoral gains of the BJP and its ideological dilemma,” South Asia Analysis Group (1999), p. 86.

88 dissimilarity between the coalition governments of two phases was that, in the latest phase, the coalition government had quite an easy majority whereas, number of partners sharing power at the Centre increased. The main electoral arena pitted the BJP and its allies against the Congress, and the campaign had a little of the character of a presidential election, with Vajpayee and projected over parties and issues. Before the campaign had even begun, the Congress met crisis, as the powerful Congress leader from Maharashtra, Sharad Pawar, challenged Sonia’s leadership on the grounds of her Italian birth, and broke away to form his own Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). The BJP instantly took up the drumbeat of Sonia’s foreign origin, and contrasted the “Videshi” (foreign) with its own “Swadeshi” (home-grown) credentials.

As a result, a comparatively firm coalition pattern was seen in the case of 1998 elections. On one hand, there was BJP with 19 coalition partners; on the other was Congress with six allies and the UF with eight partners. The BJP was victorious, which had the highest number of partners and had touched the magic number of 270 seats in Parliament.

The BJP truly arose as an all India party like Congress and there was an increase of only 18 seats to BJP’s 1996 tally. It was able to institute a strong presence in the South and in the East areas and was no longer a party only of the Hindi, Gujarati and Marathi speaking areas. At the same time, the improved status of the BJP in the 12th Lok Sabha election results and the BJP’s peace-making attitude towards regional parties further strengthened connections between the BJP and many regional parties. This relationship was centred on two emerging political realities. First, the BJP came to know that regional parties and ascertain of socio-cultural realities were inevitable forces whose support and collaboration was essentially required for government Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University formation. Therefore, it was essential for BJP to display both, an adequate attitude and to get ready for a common agenda for governance. Second, it also remained silent on three contentious issues Ram Mandir, Article 370 and Uniform civil code, not as any withdrawal from its ideological commitment but as a functional requirement to temporarily smoothen the means of achieving power.101 Compulsions of electoral politics and the prospects of victory in the elections encouraged BJP to adopt a much more reasonable attitude. This, combined with the strategic alliances contributed to the

101 Khan Arshi, Coalition Politics in India, pp. 165-167. 89 end of the political untouchability of the BJP and boosted its ability to stake a claim to power sharing in New Delhi.

Moreover, it is to be noted that after the election results of the 12th Lok Sabha elections, nearly 95 MPs of regional parties provided support to the BJP. This political support was again grounded on polarization of regional parties. In the North east, regional parties were a prevailing force. In the East, they emerged dominant. In South, they stretched their area of impact from Tamil Nadu to Andhra Pradesh. North India shows the stable strength of regional parties. In the West, regional parties doubled up their strength in the 12th Lok Sabha elections. For the first time, the BJP acknowledged the reality of increasing regionalism in politics. Thus, in the 12th Lok Sabha, the BJP and its allies made the coalition government of overall 18 political parties. It stayed in power for almost 18 months which also included five months as a BJP-led Caretaker Coalition government at the centre. However, this coalition was unsuccessful to win the vote of confidence in February, 1999 due to the opposition of the Congress and other parties. Thus, in 1998, the key factor that brought BJP and its allies to Lok Sabha in such large numbers was the alliance that BJP struck in different parts of India. Although it was expected that such a coalition might be responsible for stability in Indian politics but this did not happen. The poles within the BJP-led coalition took their toll and lastly fell after 13 months of rule and the Vajpayee government lost the vote of confidence by one vote i.e. 269-270.

The BJP-led allies met on 15th May, 1999 at Delhi and gave their alliance an official collective name, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The constituents of NDA retained their discrete identities, but decided to contest the thirteenth Lok Sabha Elections (held on September-October, 1999) with a mutual manifesto under the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University leadership of Atal Behari Vajpayee. The NDA still stayed a co federal inter-party formation. But then, the composition of the NDA was much more diverse in regional and cultural terms than the Janata Party and which was fundamentally a North-Indian Phenomenon.102

102 Singh M.P. and Saxena Rekha, India at the Poll Parliamentary Elections in the Federal Phase (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003), pp.198-99. 90

In the 1999 13th general elections, Vajpayee's campaign had since grown from 18 parties of BJP-led coalition allies to 24, and the BJP's share in the coalition both in- terms of seats and votes stood further reduced. In this elections, NDA won 305 seats, the allies account for 123, and even of the BJP's 182, only a hundred-odd have been won an its own strength, the rest coming via-alliances. The NDA's 30 plus majority in the Lok Sabha, which means more room for Manoeuvre, and the election also called as the Kargil election.

Election 1999 was a replay of election 1998. It would appear, bearing in mind that it's a historic second term in power for the BJP-led alliance, and Atal Behari Vajpayee became the first Prime Minister since 1971 to have been re-elected to office an accomplishment made all the more outstanding by the fact that he returned as the head of a coalition. Vajpayee had also changed from last elections of 1998, leader of a tentative coalition to confident commander of 24 parties’ alliance.103

The constituents of the 24 parties BJP-led National Democratic Alliance were as follows:

BJP, Janata Dal (United), Telugu Desam Party, Shiv Sena, Biju Janata Dal, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Trinamool Congress, Indian National Lok Dal, Pattali, Makkal Katchi, Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, Akali Dal, Marmaraiichi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress, Manipur State Congress Party, Himachal Vikas Congress, Sikkim Democratic Front, MGR Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, , Hayrana Vikash Party, Janatantrik BSP Democratic Bahujan Samaj Morcha, Independent (Maneka Gandhi), TDP was not a constituent of the NDA, but supported the coalition from outside and J.D. (U) was the resultMaulana of a merger Azad of Samata Library, Pary, Lok Aligarh Shakti and Muslim Janata Dal University (Sharad Yadav).

The 1999 mandate was an essential moment in India's political history. For the first time since 1984, an incumbent government was returned to power through a democratic process after the 1984 national poll, four consecutive elections failed to produce a clear majority for any political party or alliance. Each of these elections resulted in a hung parliament. After nearly more than a decade, a pre poll alliance, the

103 Subrahmaniam Vidya, "BJP & Friends," The Times of India (1999), p. 17. 91

NDA formed a government at the centre with absolute majority. It was the finest hour of Vajpayee’s political career; which cross over four decades without at the helm, the NDA would not have seen the light of day.104 In 1999 elections, BJP was a chase of its own triumph. It suffered a 2.5 percent drop in its popular vote than 1998 elections and seats won same. The social base of the BJP was consolidation of upper castes, tribal, OBC supporter, particularly in the Hindi belt and western India. BJP did well in constructing a system seemingly dominated by two coalition governments. But that was far cry from a bipolar or two party systems. India's two biggest national parties (Congress and BJP) commanded a falling vote share, now a little over one half. In those elections, BJP had handsomely thrived in two areas, firstly, in associating the 'trident' (Mandir, Article 370, uniform civil code) agenda with Hindutva and then distancing itself from it. Secondly, the BJP has seized on economic neo-liberalism as its hallmark to win support from privileged classes here and abroad. BJP steadily grew its base; apart from avoid argumentative issues, such as abrogation of Article 370, and the imposition of a uniform civil code. The party carried both policies at once, at one hand it gave the importance to ‘Gandhian Socialism’ and on the other also retained Deendayal’s policy of ‘Integral Humanism’.

The oil price and budget issue in 2000 saw different allies openly voicing their displeasure, in spite of the discussion in the cabinet. The development issues which were discussed in its manifesto were also not seen to complete. Its organizational wing (VHP, RSS) clashes with the BJP also ruined its image because the VHP and RSS wanted to preserve the Hindutva ideology and fundamentalism but Vajpayee had an image of reasonable leader which was beneficial for him and upon which he had been constantly chosen as the Prime Minister from 1996-2004 (three consecutive session; 1996, 1998,Maulana 1999), the anotherAzad tragedyLibrary, which Aligarh took plac eMuslim was the extreme University shocking pogroms in Gujarat in 2002, which left 2,000 dead 200,000 displaced the cruel attitude of the BJP chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi to the despite caused under his administration, the strong and persuasive evidence that the Gujarat pogroms were allegedly organized under his direction and with the active involvement of senior members of his cabinet. The consistent support to Narendra Modi, by the BJP in the

104 Padgaonkar Dileep, “How Many Horses to a Stable Government,” The Times of India (1999), p. 17

92 post-Godhra incident in February 27, 2002 had drawn some of its constituents in direct confrontation with the BJP, especially the Telegu Desam. The Gujarat crisis rocked the federal government and almost brought its demise.

Fall of BJP-led government (2004)

The Godhra riots proved too costly to the BJP when the party was dismantled out of power at the centre during 2004 General elections. The riots caused disturbance, both nationally and internationally. Vajpayee called for elections in early 2004, six months ahead of schedule but he found it challenging to defend his party’s government in the state due to its inability to control the riots efficiently and with promptness. At the same time, there were strong allegations that elements of the VHP had fanned the violence. The Gujarat state’s Chief Minister, Narendra Modi’s stance remained firm, making life even more tough for Vajpayee, who was further stopped by Advani and his group of hardliners in the party. Advani became deputy Prime Minister and Modi continued in his role as Chief Minister of Gujarat. A few months later, in December 2002, the Modi-led BJP sweep home victory in the state elections.105

The NDA’s campaign was based on the slogan “India shining”, in its former government which sought to portray it as responsible for a rapid economic transformation of the country.106 But in the general elections of 2004, much against people’s anticipations, the BJP lost the polls, although narrowly. The party gone into the elections on the back of its good economic performance but the events in Gujarat hung round its neck like a dead-weight. There was a consolidation of minority votes against the BJP and this brought the Congress to power. Vajpayee was surprised and said in interviews that it would have been better if he had axed or removed Modi in 2002.Maulana107 On the otherAzad hand, Library, the NDA Aligarhunpredictably Muslim suffered University a heavy defeat, winning only 186 seats in the Lok Sabha, compared to the 222 seats of the Congress and its allies. Manmohan Singh succeeded Vajpayee as Prime Minister as the head of the United Progressive Alliance.

105 Randeep Randeep, “Shock Defeat for India’s Hindu Nationalist,” The Guardian (2004). 106 Ibid. 107 Kanwar Yogendra, “Not removing Modi, was a mistake says Vajpayee,” The Hindu (2004).

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After the 2004 General Elections, it was perceived that the Hindutva ideology was thoroughly discredited and no amount of effort could revive it. The people felt cheated by the promises made by Sangh Parivar and the BJP.108 From then on, the BJP fell into chaos. Vajpayee decided to quit politics and he was replaced by Advani. But Advani was past seventy-five at that time and the BJP required second rung leaders to take over the responsibility of the party.109 Only one of the leaders, Pramod Mahajan, had the ability to network and raise resources for the party; many at that time thought that the party would sooner or later be led by him a few years down the line, but he was tragically shot dead by his own brother after some quarrel. So Advani continued the party with second level leaders like Sushma Swaraj, Arun Jaitley and Venkaiah Naidu. With Vajpayee out of the picture, the RSS strengthened its grip over the party and chosen a little known leader, Rajnath Singh, as President of the party. The BJP went to polls in 2009 under the leadership of Advani; the party once again tried to cast the electorates with its “aggressive Hindutva” platform, but the people overruled the party’s new emphasis on a return to sectarianism and the party lost severely. Apparently there was a stronger consolidation of minority votes against the BJP as the sceptre of Gujarat 2002 continued to haunt them. After its defeat in 2009, another round of introspection began within the party about its survival and its running in a healthy way. RSS tightened up its control over the BJP and replaced Rajnath Singh with a President’s post. Advani continued in the party but many perceived that after two successive losses his innings were over. There was an acute leadership crisis because it was unclear who could take the party to victory in the next elections.

In the meantime, Narendra Modi won his second successive election in Gujarat in 2007 and he became a contender for leading the party. Though he could not get rid of the communal stain,Maulana he was ableAzad to warm Library, up to industries Aligarh through Muslim progressive University policies to entice investments. In 2012, Modi was cleared of involvement in the violence by SIT (special investigation Team). In 2013, months after Modi won his third election in Gujarat, the RSS decided to officially choose him as the Prime Ministerial candidate of the BJP. The elevation passed through two stages in rapid succession. First, Modi

108 “The Meaning of Verdict 2004,” The Hindu (2004). 109 Nag Kingshuk, The Rise of the BJP, p. 17.

94 was appointed as the chief of the campaign committee of BJP for the election and then, a few months later, as the Prime Ministerial candidate.110

The 2014 General Election generated India’s highest ever voter turnout rate, at 66%, a sharp rapid increase from the 58% turnout in 2009. In these elections, the BJP won 282 seats, leading the NDA to a tally of 336 out of 543 contestable seats on 31% of the vote share. It may the product of extreme regional polarization of upper caste in BJP’s support, which pointed to the limits of BJP’s message in states with strong regional parties and identities. Citizens with higher media exposure were much more likely to have voted for the BJP in 2014. Another main reason in the landslide victory of the BJP in 2014 election is that Hindi media spread well the so-called development achieved in state of Gujarat after Narendra Modi took over the charges as the Chief Minister. Technological and economic developments were given more weightage to catch the psychology of Indians. Slogans like “ACCHE DIN AANE WALE HAIN”, “ABKI BAAR MODI SARKAR”, etc were mind catching for poor’s.

This was the first instance, since 1984, of a single party attaining an absolute majority in the Indian parliament and the first time that it achieved a majority in the Lok Sabha on its own strength. The BJP parliamentary leader Narendra Modi was sworn in as the 15th Prime Minister of India on 26 May, 2014.111 Political analysts have provided several reasons for this victory, counting the popularity of Narendra Modi, the prime- ministerial candidate of the BJP. BJP was also able to expand its traditionally upper- caste support base and received weighty support from middle-class and Dalit people, though its support among Muslims remained low.112

Conclusion Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University On the basis of the analysis of ideology, strategies and social base of the Jana Sangh and BJP, we can conclude that there is a strong relationship between Jana Sangh and BJP, because BJP has the roots in Jana Sangh and it is only the transformation of that very party, Jana Sangh was the base and BJP is the new phase. Its roots from periphery

110 Ibid, p. 18. 111 “Election Results of 2014: India places its faith on Moditva,” The Times of India, May 17, 2014. 112 Diwakar, Rekha, “The 16th General Election in India,” Electoral Studies (2014), pp. 1-6.

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(state) to centre and changing strategies adopted by the Jana Sangh to mobilise non- Congress parties. Its founders include people belonging to both the old Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. Some changes have taken place in their attitudes, some by compulsion and some others due to the prevailing objective conditions in the country and also mobilise its strategies and campaign at the time which demands to build the base and to present its identity.

The rise of the BJP began at the end of the 1980s. It developed an ideological- fundamentalists Hindutva faction to a major party with integrative character and elements of Hinduism. The lapse of the Ayodhya campaign led to a recognisation of the party including the assertion of the moderate wing with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as central figure. The BJP integrated into the political mainstream. Its, normalization made it possible to form coalitions and facilitated the BJPs rise as governing party from 1998 to 2004.

The NDA government of 1999-2004 was, for the first time at the centre, a surplus majority coalition in which there were redundant partners, so that the coalition would not lose its majority by the withdrawal of support by the largest partner party of the BJP, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) (which opted out of participation in the government). This surplus majority character of the coalition, combined with the spatial compatibility of its partners, most having clearly demarcated state strongholds not overlapping with others, gave the NDA and its leading party, the BJP, an extraordinary stability despite being a 24-party coalition. It also gave the BJP exceptional bargaining power with actual and potential allies. Thus, an additional strategy that could be employed by the BJP during 1998-2004, was a coalition with state parties that offered them a share of ministerial positions at the centre in a would- Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University be national coalition government led by the national party in return for seat-sharing arrangements for parliamentary seats from their stronghold states, in a context in which the leading national parties are expected to form coalition governments at the centre.

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Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University CHAPTER III

Indian Party System: A Comparison of the Regimes of NDA (1998 to 2004)

And UPA-I and II (2004 to 2014)

This chapter examines the causes of the rout of the NDA in 2004 Lok Sabha elections and the Congress Alliance strategy era of Congress from 2004 to 2014 (its rise and fall), how two consecutive terms congress win the support of various regional parties and made UPA-I, UPA-II successfully. And cognately BJP made strong base for future elections, and change its electoral process to win the hearts of its allies and the people of India.

Introduction

Before the beginning of 2004 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP led NDA government was sure that it would win the general elections and A.B. Vajpayee would remain Prime Minister of India for the upcoming term. A.B. Vajpayee was the most popular politician in India at that time given his management of 24 party coalition governments. Besides this, under his leadership India has showed a promising growth rate which reached an unprecedented level of 8 per cent per annum. The Indian economy got the major increase when he enlarged the scope of the FDI, increased disinvestment in central PSU’s and prepared ground for telecom revolution coupled with infrastructural development. His management of foreign policy towards neighbouring countries particularly towards Pakistan was commendable. He continued with his policy of indo- Pak detente despite the Kargil controversy and series of aggressive terrorist attacks in India. However, during his tenure, the communal tension reached to its peak. The Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University heightened communal tension had distressed fallout in Gujarat which witnessed a communal carnage in 2002. This incident completely disfigured his government’s performance.

The BJP’s good fortune changed for a time being when it won the State Assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh which were held in December 2003.The BJP interpreted these results as a marker of broader national sentiment hence called for early Lok Sabha elections. The elections were held in April–May 2004, which

97 was supposed to be held in September 2004. The BJP issued positive slogans accompanying its election campaign: ‘Shining India’ and the ‘Feel Good Factor’. Constantly during the 2004 parliamentary election campaign, leaders of the BJP repeatedly insisted that their emphasis was on economic development and good governance, and not on Hindu nationalism. The BJP in its “Vision Document” put more focus on good governance and all round development”. 1 Switching to the Hindi language, this agenda was often referred to as Bijli-Pani-Sadak, that is, electricity, water, and streets. 2 This deal was mould into the Common Minimum Programme of all the parties. According to the BJP poll strategists the slogans was “response to the aspirations and expectations of the people”. Mixed messages about this emphasis on economic development rather than Hindu nationalism were communicated by the prominent campaign event of the time.

As stated above, the good performance of the NDA government in some sectors made it confidence that it has a probability to return to power again. However, that overconfidence attitude, which sometimes amounted to sheer arrogance, retrospectively appeared as one of the reasons for the BJP’s defeat. But there were other, deeper explanations. This chapter examines the real dimensions of the Party’s setback and before turning to its implications for its future strategy and the performance of the Indian National Congress (INC) in 2004 elections and aftermath.

The 2004 Lok Sabha elections saw, for the first time, a political battle at the national level between two serious coalitions, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). It was a loose bi-polar contest between the two alliances led by two centrist parties.3 For the first time The Congress Party put together a broad pre-election coalition covering several major states to take on the NDA Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University coalition.

2004 Lok Sabha Elections and Alliance strategy of the BJP and Congress

The major difference in the Lok Sabha Election of 2004 over 1999 has been that the Congress Party, which both resisted coalitions (the Panchmarhi declaration of 1998)

1 Bhartiya Janata Party. Vision Document- 2004. New Delhi: BJP Publication, March, 2004. 2 Deshpande Rajiv and Iyer Lakshmi, “Inside the Fog of War,” India Today, March 22, 2004. 3 Fadia Babu Lal, Indian Government and Politics (Agra: Sahitya Publication, 2010), p. 530.

98 and which was inherently less 'coalitionable' before, became a significant coalition builder in 2004. The reason for which Congress was considered inherently less 'coalitionable' than the BJP is the distribution of relative strength between the Congress and the BJP was such that in most of the states of the south and east, the main contest was between the Congress and a regional or Left party, with the BJP being a third minor party. While in most of the northern Indian states like Gujarat and Maharashtra, BJP or BJP-led coalition had direct contests with the Congress, during the 1990s. Therefore, while the regional parties of the South and East, like the TDP, AIADMK, DMK, BJD or AGP, or Karnataka JD (U), , could find the BJP a useful ally against their main rival, the Congress could not combine with these regional parties or the Left parties since they were its main rivals in their states, except for states where the Congress itself was reduced to a third or worse position such as in Tamil Nadu.4

Thus the Congress became coalitionable in those states where it had been reduced to a third or fourth party status like Bihar, Tamil Nadu, UP or became coalitionable where it faced a direct contest with the BJP led NDA and there was a third or fourth minor party present. This does not mean that prevalence of such conditions will necessarily lead to formation of such coalition. And likewise for the BJP under similar conditions where it was a first or second party facing the Congress with a third party available, or when it was a third or fourth party. These conditions should be viewed as merely necessary not enough for the formation of coalitions at the state level. Prior to 2004, one or the other of the situations mentioned above prevailed in seven significant states- Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar and Tamil Nadu (in the last two of which the same situation existed earlier). In Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, and J&K, the Congress faced either the BJP (Jharkhand,Maulana Jammu Azad region Library, of J and K) orAligarh NDA coalition Muslim in which University the BJP was a partner, dominant (Maharashtra) or otherwise (Andhra Pradesh, Kashmir, in which the National Conference was a potential post poll NDA ally). In Bihar and Tamil Nadu, the Congress faced an NDA alliance in which the BJP was a junior partner. This time in each of these states, there was a third force, either a party or coalition, with which the Congress could potentially ally against the BJP/NDA coalition. In Maharashtra, the NCP, already a coalition partner in the government, was a potential anti-NDA ally. The emergence of

4 Eswaran Sridharan, “Electoral Coalitions in 2004 General Elections: Theory and evidence,” Economic & Political Weekly, 39. no. 51 (2004), pp. 5418-5425.

99 the TRS in Andhra, gave the Congress a coalition-building opportunity with an ally against the NDA. In Jharkhand, the JMM was a potential anti-NDA partner. In J and K, the PDP (People’s Democratic Party) was a potential anti-NDA and anti-National Conference (a potential post-poll NDA ally) ally in all three regions of the state. In Bihar, the Congress reduced to fourth party status, and already a coalition partner of the ruling RJD (Rashtriya Janata Dal), was eminently 'coalitionable' as a minor partner for the RJD.

In Tamil Nadu also, as in the past, the Congress reduced to third party status, was potentially 'coalitionable' for both of the dominant parties there i.e. AIDMK and DMK this time going with the DMK-led alliance. And in Himachal Pradesh, the Congress negotiated the merger with itself of its breakaway faction of 1998, Sukh Ram's Himachal Vikas Congress, adding to its voter base.5

Alliance strategy of BJP- NDA

The neo-liberal policies and communal agenda of the BJP disillusioned many allies of the NDA. The BJP took its success after elections for granted and completely ignored task of nurturing and strengthening alliance and its high and mighty ways alienated important allies.6 The process of leaving the NDA started even before the elections and it got reduced in size when the key allies like TC, DMK, MDMK, PMK, INLD, JMM, NC and faction of JD(U) led by that was later organised as a new political party-the Lok Janshakti Party in Bihar-left the NDA. The NDA lost its credibility especially after anti-Muslim Godhra riots of Gujarat in 2002. That tragic incident affected aspect of the proclaimed secular political parties and especially those political parties which had their vote bank rooted in Muslim community. The deep internal crackMaulana in the NDA Azad came Library, to open on Aligarh the occasion Muslim of censure University motion on the Gujarat riots against the NDA government in the Lok Sabha on April 30, 2002.7 When TDP, TC, NC and LJP expressed their agony on the issue and protested against the apathy of the NDA government during the riots. Infact as compared to 1999 the regional political parties were more concerned about their own local agendas and support bases

5 Ibid., p. 5426. 6 K. K. Katyal, “Government Formation and After,” The Hindu, May 19, 2004. 7 K. Ratnayake, “Deep Cracks in India’s Ruling Coalition Revealed in Debate for Gujarat Violence,” World Socialist Web Site, May 6, 2002.

100 of survival than the national agenda and the national alliance with the BJP. The BJP carried on its efforts to consolidate prevailing alliances and searched for new allies. It maintained its alliance with influential regional political parties like the BJD in Orissa, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, TDP in Andhra Pradesh, JD (U) in Bihar and Meghalaya, SAD in Punjab and added MNF in Mizoram, the SDF in Sikkim, IFDP in Kerala, the NPF in Nagaland and AIADMK in place of the DMK in Tamil Nadu. In Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal the party decided to contest alone because of its strong presence. In general the BJP had lesser alliances than the Congress. The NDA’s manifesto was released on April 8, 2004 and the PM justified inclusion of Ayodhya and Ram temple as the national issue. The presence of a few allies like JD (U), SAD, BJD, TC and IFDP indicated unpopularity of the NDA. The BJP was not in a situation to claim support of more than ten allies unlike 1999 when it had twenty four allies. The BJP was hopeful still hopeful of securing comfortable majority to repeat the NDA government.8 There was absence of concrete election issues. The main emphasis of the current NDA was to propagate achievements of the NDA government at large scale. The NDA efforts were to form its consecutive government and for that it tried to use contentious issues for the campaign.

Hindutva strategy of the BJP

The defeat in 2004 was not just sad for the BJP; it is tragic for the party. Through the 1980s and 1990s, it has struggled to acquire a national status. Far from being a minority, extremist pariah party, it has commanded national attention and international respect. From the irresponsible behaviour of some of its leaders as part of a scream mob bringing Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University down the Babri mosque in 1992, it rose to power briefly in 1996 and again in 1998 and 1999. Its strength was confirmed at 182 parliamentary seats in two general elections (1996 and 1998). This was a contrast from the Jana Sangh polling approximately 50 seats (much as the CPI/CPM used to). In 2004, it had the chance to move up 182 seats to the radiant elevation of 200 seats and above. Had the BJP broken through to 225 seats, and then it could have dominated the next coalition, or even ruled alone with

8 Vyas Neena and Parsai Gargi, “Ayodhya, ‘Foreign issue’ on NDA agenda,” The Hindu, April 8, 2004.

101 outside support. Winning another five-year term would have been an immensely significant move for the BJP’s plan of gaining cultural hegemony. Five more years would have given the BJP ideologues a real stranglehold on history and social science disciplines. The new Congress-led UPA Government has shown the importance of this by moving on the school history textbooks issue immediately. However, the setback from 182 to 138 parliamentary seats was serious, despite the fact that in terms of vote share the BJP did better than the INC.9

Through the 1990s, the BJP had a difficult trapeze act to perform. It wanted to be known as the party for Hindus and this required them to be strongly anti-Muslim, not only anti Pakistani. It also had to convince the voters that it could be a reliable and responsible party capable of effectively ruling India. For the latter, it needed to not only manage the economic reforms but also to secure a coalition with disparate forces. Its Hindu phase led to Advani’s Rath Yatra (chariot procession) of 1992 and the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. Its more extreme supporters have moved from anti- Muslimism to sheer xenophobia, so that all non-Hindu religions are criticized. An attack on Christian missionaries was the new expression and weapon in the struggle. While Narendra Modi did not agitate the post Godhra riots in 2002, he did almost nothing to restraint them and was re-elected later that year. This told one section of the BJP that coming to power via mob riot was, if unattractive, at least an effective option. There was much talk of a ‘Modi strategy’ for winning mid-term state elections in Himachal Pradesh and elsewhere after Modi’s triumphal re-election. This section of the party is the traditionalist core of the BJP whose most cherished ideologue is Hedgewar and whose custodian is Advani. The other face of the BJP is not as a Hindu party, but as a nationalist party, believing in India emerging as a strong nuclear power able to sweep on theMaulana world stage Azad with its Library, weapons rather Aligarh than any Muslim message University of ahimsa (non- violence). It wants to show competence in government. This BJP wants a high stature in world politics for India; it wants rapid economic growth with the latest technological device. It wants India to challenge China and contain Pakistan. Its favourite ideologue is Savarkar and Vajpayee is its face.10

9 Katherine Adney, Lawrence Saez, Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism (Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies, 2006), p. 258. 10 Ibid., p. 259. 102

In possessing this dual face, the BJP is not uncommon. Ideological parties of the Left or the Right also face such a perpetual problem. The core supporters want to change the world, the pragmatic office seekers merely want to handle the world better than other parties have done. The ideologues want to take to the streets, mobilise the masses, bring down the old order, and usher in a new era. The pragmatists want to move in the corridors of power, raise real resources and achieve set targets. The very success of the pragmatists ruins the chances of the ideologues since the world is not ruined but improved. Thus far, the BJP has managed to keep the two factions together since it wanted to achieve power. Having tasted power and made inroads in the cultural sphere, it badly wanted to continue in power. Indeed, the ideologues allowed the pragmatists to have the front line roles in the election in the hope that their strategy would win another term to sharpen the ideological struggle. Now with a defeat, criticism are breaking out as to who was responsible. There has already been argument or disagreement around the issue of Narendra Modi. Vajpayee was quoted as having said that Modi needed to be removed if the BJP was to win national confidence. The ideologues shot this down pretty quickly. Instead, they were quick to blame Arun Shourie who as the Minister for privatisation was outstandingly successful. However, Shourie was not ideologically sufficient for the RSS. On the other hand, the ideologues overreacted to the prospect of Sonia Gandhi becoming Prime Minister. BJP leaders, such as Uma Bharti and Sushma Swaraj, took this almost as a personal affront and instead of behaving like rulers of states; they behaved like the mob that demolished the Masjid 12 years ago. In the event they were wrong footed by Sonia Gandhi who stepped back from taking the position of Prime Minister.

In opposition, the BJP will have problem in keeping the ideologues down, unless there is a realMaulana prospect Azadof a return Library, to power Aligarh soon. The Muslimparty faces Universitya problem of competing generations. The ‘old guard’, composed of Vajpayee, Advani and Joshi is moving on, and the ‘new generation’ of Pramod Mahajan, Arun Jaitley, Narendra Modi and Uma Bharti are waiting to take over. The ideology pragmatism divide stretches across the generations. Unlike the INC, the BJP does not currently rule in many states, though it gained a few in the 2003 state assembly elections. Narendra Modi and Uma Bharti are

103 ideologues, rather than pragmatics. However, the pragmatists were not totally sidelined since they were able to secure Arun Shourie a seat in the Rajya Sabha.11

BJP Debacle in 2004 Lok Sabha Polls

After the elections, BJP leaders offered their own explanation for the defeat. Outgoing Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared: ‘It is very difficult to say what are all the reasons for the defeat in the elections but one impact of the violence was we lost the elections’, clearly a specific reference to the adverse effect of the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat.12 Ten days later, Lal Kishna Advani made the opposite comment. In a 40-minute speech to the National Executive Committee of the BJP, he rendered that neglect of the Hindu nationalist themes had been one of the reasons for the party’s defeat. Certainly, Muslims resorted to strategic voting to help defeat the party whenever they could. But they have been doing so, more or less systematically, for years now in spite of the constant attempts by the BJP at chase them. None of the Hindutva themes including the construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya was a prominent issue throughout the general election campaign. However, the BJP is so closely identified with Hindu nationalist ideology that it does not need to champion it to be seen as associated with it. The defeat of the BJP candidates in the constituencies where Ayodhya, Varanasi and Mathura are situated reflected the lessen influence of Hindu nationalism over voters. In these three places, the BJP had won repeatedly during the 1990s. In Uttar Pradesh, two champions of the demand for the building of a Ram temple in Ayodhya, Vinay Katiyar the Uttar Pradesh state BJP president and Swami Chinmayanand a former Union minister of state for home affairs lost their parliamentary seats. But Ayodhya was not an issue in the 2004 elections and the defeat of the BJP, therefore, is not for the sake of secularism. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The CSDS exit poll showed, for instance, that there was, among the public, ‘a widespread support for a ban on religious conversion’13, a traditional demand of the Hindu nationalist movement. Another possible cause for the defeat of the BJP-led coalition was socio-economic. Yogender Yadav argued that, the 1999 general election the BJP relied on a ‘new social bloc’ since the NDA parties secured ‘the support of 60

11 Ibid., p. 260. 12 Central Chronicle, June 13, 2004. 13 Datar A., “A Vote for Secular Politics,” The Hindu, May 20, 2004.

104 per cent of upper caste Hindus and 52 per cent of the dominant Hindu peasant castes (which are not classified as OBCs, such as Jats, Marathas, Patidars, Reddys and Kammas)’. For five years the NDA adopted an economic policy which was in favour of these groups.

The 2004 exit poll conducted by the CSDS showed that 26 per cent of the ‘very poor’ and 18 per cent of the ‘poor’ considered that their economic condition had worsened under the NDA Government. Logically enough, among NDA voters, 35 per cent declared that their situation had improved compared to only 22 per cent of INC voters.14 One of the major allies of the BJP, the TDP, was clearly punished for what was perceived to be its ‘pro-rich policy’, and 81 per cent were of the view that the information technology revolution one of the priorities of the TDP Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu has not improved the lives of ordinary people,15 at a time when suicides by over indebted peasants multiplied.

The 2004 Lok Sabha electoral setback of the BJP could be better understood by analysing the particularity of politics at the state level, largely because the state has become the most relevant unit of politics in India. In several states, the support of the social bloc that supported the BJP in 1999 just terminates prior to the elections. Particularly in the Hindi heartland as Uttar Pradesh was a case in point. The BJP retained 77 percent of the votes among the Banya community, but this was a very small community. In contrast, the Party could keep only 58 per cent of the large Brahmin community because 18 per cent of them have opted for the INC in the 2004 Lok Sabha polls. There may be multiple reasons for the erosion but certainly BJP’s support base among the upper castes eroded majorly because of the return of prominent OBC leader, to the helm of the Uttar Pradesh and the BJP’s repeated alliances with a Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Dalit-based party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), had the same effect. Instead Brahmins, who had paid allegiance to the Nehru–Gandhi family till the 1980s, got influenced by the entry of Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi into the fray. Similarly, the BJP retained only 50 per cent of the Rajput vote, whereas the Samajwadi Party (SP) received 28 per cent of them. This turn of events was probably happened because Mulayam Singh Yadav and his right hand man, Amar Singh (a Rajput), presented a large number

14 Suri K., “Reform: The Elites want it, the Masses don’t,” The Hindu, May 20, 2004. 15 “Poll Graphics,” The Hindu, 2004.

105 of Rajput candidates. Lastly, the BJP only retained the support of 22 per cent of the peasant dominion castes, since 54 per cent of them instead chose the SP/RLD coalition, most probably because of the attractiveness of Ajit Singh’s party the RLD to Jat voters.

An intra-state analysis may be repeated in the case of Gujarat also. Three major local factors explained the mixed results of the BJP. First, the agitation ironically led by the RSS supported farmers’ union against Narendra Modi’s agricultural policy. Second, the factional fight between Gujarat’s Chief Minister and . Third, a development in favour of the BJP was the voting pattern of the Adivasi communities. In Gujarat, 48 per cent of the voted for the BJP (compared to 46 per cent for the INC). This remarkable achievement is largely a result of the combined ground work of the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (Ashram for the Tribal Welfare), the RSS off shoot doing social work among the tribal and the VHP whose ‘missionaries’ reconvert Adivasi tribal’s to Hinduism and then mobilise them against Christians and Muslims.

However, besides state-centred explanations for the BJP defeat, there are others with a pan-Indian relevance. The INC has certainly been responsible for the BJP’s setback in two respects. First, the Congress leader, Sonia Gandhi, who had not been taken seriously by Hindu nationalist groups displayed great electioneer capabilities. Furthermore, the Hindu nationalists attempt to denounce her as a foreigner have probably backfired, and tended to transform her into a victimised target of xenophobes. Second, the Congress was faster than the BJP in adjusting to the realities of the rise of regional parties and its corollary, the new era of coalitions. Consequently, the Congress leaders chose their allies much more cautiously than the BJP at that time. More importantly, the BJP has been affected by the anti-incumbency reflex that the Indian electorate has developed over the years. Logically enough, this factor did not play any Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University role in the states where the party was in command for less than six months, namely in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. In these states the party continued to benefit from the same sentiment of anti–incumbency that had removed the Congress from power. The variable of anti-incumbency had some impact in Gujarat, where the BJP was in office, and in Uttar Pradesh, where it was part of the ruling coalition eight months before. Overall, the electorate’s anti-incumbency reflex affected about half of the BJP’s outgoing MPs, since those who had been re-nominated eventually lost in the election.

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Finally, within the Sangh Parivar, the line of conduct pursued by the Vajpayee Government created some discontent within the VHP. This organisation notably detached itself from the NDA Government when it turned out that the building of a temple in Ayodhya would not be supported by Prime Minister. Two other components of the Sangh Parivar, the BMS, the largest labour union in India, and the SJM, the economic wing of the RSS, resented the economic liberalisation policy implemented by the NDA Government. The RSS itself shared these reservations and therefore did not wholeheartedly support the BJP during the general election campaign. For instance, soon after the general election, the spokesperson of the RSS said that:

“The grassroots traditional voter and cadre of the RSS were not so enthusiastic about the BJP. There were some organisational differences. Our cadres did work for the BJP at the time of elections, but there was grudge on several issues, Hindutva and also economic issues”.16

The 2004 defeat was considered by most of the components of the Sangh Parivar to be a rejection of the moderate line of conduct advocated by Vajpayee. The General Secretary of the VHP, Praveen Togadia declared soon after the elections, with his traditionally nuanced sense of rhetoric that:

The Bharatiya Janata Party betrayed the Hindus. The BJP left its core ideology of Hindutva and trust on the basis of which they had been voted to power. For votes they tied up with the jehadis.17

However, the 2004 Lok Sabha election has changed the context substantially for the BJP’s allies. First, the BJP turned out not to be an important electoral asset to some of its partners, like the JD (U) in Bihar, which won in their own strongholds. Second, the generalMaulana atmosphere Azad has altered Library, in such Aligarh a way as theMuslim dominant University force was not as much imbued with Hindu nationalism as it used to be in previous elections. Instead, social issues were back on the front line and the BJP has precisely ignored issues that concerned millions of Indians at its own cost. On the other hand, the INC emerged as the natural spokesman for the masses. In this changed context, coalition partners of the BJP who swallowed the Gujarat pogrom without dissent got concerned about their

16 The Hindu, May 15, 2004. 17 Ibid. 107

Muslim voters. They also began to worry about any return to a more aggressive Hindu nationalist agitation. For instance, soon after the NDA’s defeat, the JD (U) informed the BJP that it would leave the coalition if the party returned openly to espouse Hindutva issues. Right after the general election, the National Executive Committee of the JD (U) issued a resolution to this effect. It declared that:

“We joined the National Democratic Alliance only after the three controversial issues (construction of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya, Article 370 and Uniform Civil Code) had been removed from the agenda of the NDA. If any effort is now made to revive them, we shall have to take another road”.18

The TDP, another BJP ally, has adopted a similar line of conduct to that of the JD (U). For instance, the TDP’s spokesperson announced that ‘if the BJP chooses to adopt the communal agenda, we will break ties with it’. 19

Emergence of Loose Bi-Polar Alliance System led BJP (NDA) and Congress (UPA) - 2004 -2009:- UPA-up and NDA-down (2004 elections)

In 14th Lok Sabha elections, a very narrow range of outcomes came to the fore between the NDA’s ‘defeat’ and the UPA’s victory. The tally of Congress Party and its allies was 222, with a total vote share of 36.5 percent. The Congress party managed to improve its tally from 114 seats to 145, an improvement of thirty one seats in comparison to the 1999 parliamentary elections. The NDA got 189 seats only and there was substantial decline in its popular vote share, from 40.8 percent to 35.9 percent, a fall of 4.9 percent. The BJP on its own lost forty four seats to finish at 138, comparison to the 182 in the previous 13thLok Sabha elections of 1999. This depicted a real erosion of its popular support base. The allies of BJP lost much more in term of seats, as their Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University tally declined from 144 seats to just 51 Lok Sabha seats.20 On the other side, the Congress’ allies, DMK, TRS, NCP and RJD won 118 seats for the UPA, sealing the fate of the NDA.21

18 The Hindu, August 2, 2004. 19 The Hindu, August 5, 2004. 20 Yadav Yogendra, “The Elusive Mandate of 2004,” Economic and Political Weekly, 39, no. 51(2004), p. 5385. 21 Chawla Prabhu, “Sonia Shining,” India Today, 29, no. 20 (2004), p. 27.

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The anti-NDA parties showed their complete faith in the leadership of Sonia Gandhi and agreed to form the United Progressive Alliance (UPA).The Left parties also decided to support the UPA government from outside, but accepted the post of the Speaker. On 22 May 2004, the Congress Party led UPA, one of the largest combinations of eighteen parties, formed Council of Ministers, headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Sonia Gandhi held the position of chairperson of UPA and specially constituted body- National Advisory Committee (NAC), to look after the functioning of the government. A Common Minimum Programme was formulated to run government, on certain accounts. The Manmohan Singh government resist with various problems, which came from partners, particularly from the Left parties. They had divergent views on foreign policy and economic reforms. The Left Front decided to withdraw support from the UPA on the issue of Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal on 9 July 2008. However, Government managed to win ‘vote of confidence’ with the support of Samajwadi Party (SP), Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) and Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) in July 2008.

The 15thLok Sabha election was over on 13 May 2009, by going through five phases. The average vote percentage in the elections happened to be around 57 percentages.22 Unlike 2004 national elections, almost all parties surround their bets, leaving space for post-electoral possibilities. Both, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress Party shed baggage, primarily to . The Lok Sabha elections of 2009, saw a strange combination of old and new, short-term and long-term friends, alliances and enemies, bound with or against each other, making it one of the most puzzling and complicated elections. There was an absence of nation level alliance and only region specific alliances prevailed. Both the alliance maker parties, as the BJP and the Congress, and even the Left Front, preferred alliance only to bridge ‘territorial gap.’ NeitherMaulana the BJP, norAzad the Congress Library, Party, Aligarh even the CPIMuslim (M) was University willing to give space in their respective areas of strength, to their friends or allies. The Fourth Front formed by the trio leadership of Lalu-Paswan-Mulayam, on the basis of allies, not disrupts each other’s space and was limited to their specific regions.23

22 Editorial, “Overall Reality of Indian Democracy,” Mainstream, 47, no. 22 (2009),p. 2. 23 K.K. Kailash, “Alliances and Lessons of Election 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly, 54, no. 39 (2009), p. 52.

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The Congress Party already declared in January 2009 that there would be no national level alliance, but seat sharing adjustments would be restrained to regional levels. Similarly, the BJP alliance arrangement was limited to region specific. The Third Front failed to take any concrete shape, despite the efforts made by Left parties particularly, the CPI (M) and the CPI. It is because, the constituents of Third Front particularly, CPI (M) looked forward to the post-poll scenario, throughout its electoral campaign. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), claimed to support the Third Front, but refused to have an alliance. 24 However, it lacked a formal organization, which took place after the elections. During this while, each of its constituents engaged in friendly contest with non-Congress and non-BJP parties. Every single partner of Third Front fought the elections on its own in their respective states and then to form a formal organization.25

The national elections in 2009 produced surprising results. The predictions proved to be unrealistic.26 The Congress Party led multi-party United Progressive Alliance won splendid victory, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set to form government at the Centre for second time. It was a huge set back to the NDA on the one hand; and the CPI (M) led Third Front decimated, on the other.27 The UPA had a tally of 262 seats, with Congress Party, itself getting 206 Lok Sabha seats. The NDA got only 157 seats, with BJP’s own score being 116. While, the Third Front reduced to just 80 seats. The Fourth Front sought to develop a separate political identity, in order to enhance its bargaining power with the Congress, brought down to just 27 Lok Sabha seats.28

The anti-incumbency factor turned out, and non-workable in 15th Lok Sabha elections. The people ignored rhetoric, candidates were judged on the basis of performance and casted their votes. That is why; it turned out to be one of the remarkable elections. For the first time, since 1967, an incumbent government was re-elected into the office, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University without an emotive issues like war of 1971 and 1999 Kargil War or the assassination of Prime Ministers such as Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. The combination of clean

24 Ibid., p. 53. 25 Roy Ramashray , Regional Base and National Dream: Alliance Formation, 2009 National Elections, in Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds.), India’s 2009 Elections, Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011), p. 38. 26 Prasad Kamala, “Lok Sabha Poll 2009: UPA Returns to Power,” Mainstream, 57, no. 24 (2009), p. 4. 27 The Times of India, May 17, 2009. 28 Ramakrishnan Venkitesh, “Congress Resurgence,” Frontline, 26, no.11 (2009),p. 4.

110 image of the Prime Ministerial candidate Manmohan Singh and suddenly energized Rahul Gandhi did the trick. The Indian National Congress (INC) leadership was successful to cash implementation of various schemes of UPA-I government such as National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and Rs. 60,000 crores loan waiver plan to farmers.29 The NREGA helped it a lot in the 2009 general elections like the ‘garibi hatao’ (remove poverty) slogan of Indira Gandhi in 1971.

As a consequence of this, a large part of rural India voted for the Congress Party. The Civil-Nuclear Deal with USA caught less attention of rural people than the NREGA. The poor masses in rural areas first needed food and then electricity.

However, the electorates in urban areas seemed to support the latter issues. The parties, which opposed the Civil-Nuclear Deal alleging the surrender of national sovereignty to American neo-imperialism, were openly branded as anti-national, anti-development and pro China by the national media. The Congress Party managed to grab most of the seats in urban areas particularly the national capital Delhi and the financial capital- Mumbai. 30 The election results underline the facts that Congress Party gained maximum and crossed 200 marks. The strategy of alliance formation at regional level paid Congress a rich dividend. It forged state level alliance where it needed the support and party refrain from alliance where party tried to strength its position particularly in cow belt.31

In brief, Lok Sabha elections of 2009 changed the nature of political contest among the political parties. There were seven national political parties, thirty eight regional parties and more than 1000 registered parties in the race for power at the Centre. The main contender was three-the NDA, the UPA and the Third Front. The Left Front and other regionalMaulana parties triedAzad to occupyLibrary, non- CongressAligarh and Muslim non-BJP University space by bringing new issues, new leaders and fresh energy to politics such as pro-Mandal movement, campaign against new economic policies and the agitations on question of ‘jal’, ‘jungle’ and ‘jameen’ (water, forest and land). Ironically, this space failed to take place only benefiting one the Congress.32 The two prominent alliances of national parties as the

29 Purie Aroon, (Editorial), India Today, 34, no. 21 (2009), p. 1. 30 Kumbhar Sitaram, “Has the Congress Earned Dividend from the NREGA,” Mainstream, 57, no. 23(2009), p. 11. 31 Roy, pp. 37-38. 32 Yadav Yogendra, “Making Sense of the Verdict,” The Hindu, May 18, 2009. 111

Congress Party led UPA and the BJP led NDA, got hold over the most of the seats in the Lower House and the state assemblies. The Third Front managed to save its hold in some regions, but did not perform up to the expectations. The partners of Fourth Front particularly the RJD and the LJP were decimated but the Samajwadi Party (SP) managed to retain its strong hold in Uttar Pradesh. The regional player turned around the coalition maker for better bargaining and strong parliamentary presence. The party system in India is becoming bipolar, i.e. one pole represented by the Congress Party and the other pole headed by the BJP. The regional parties and caste based parties have only limited choice to make alliance either with the BJP or the Congress Party.33

2009 Lok Sabha election and BJP debacle

The Indian parliamentary elections, which started on 13 April 2009 and ended more than one month later on May 16, broke one more record since 714 million people were eligible to vote and about 58% of them exercised their right to franchise. The elections were also unique because of their outcome as, for the first time since 1984; the ruling party was able to alternative anti-incumbency reflex, which had become almost systematic till then. With 206 seats and a comfortable majority in the Lok Sabha thanks to its allies, the Congress is intended to rule for five more years with some room for exercise. Indeed, the defeat of the Communists and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) brings Indian politics back to the centre, the favourite political space of the Congress.

Since the 1990s, it seemed that India have entered into the post-Congress phase of its political history. The fate of the dominant party of past years seemed to be sealed for good. It had lost its ability to rally groups, which sometimes were poles apart, like the upper castes, the Dalits and the Muslims. Indeed, until the early 1990s, the Congress’ dominance formulaMaulana had lied Azad upon Library,this capacity Aligarh to encompass Muslim contending University social groups. It was a genuine ‘catch-all party’. In the 1967 general elections for example, the vote in favour of the Congress did almost not vary according to the level of income.34 In North India, it was more specifically based on a ‘coalition of extremes’ to use the terms of Paul Brass (1980), since its key supports came from the Brahmins, the Scheduled

33 Wallace Paul and Roy Ramashray (eds.), India’s 2009 Elections, Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011). 34 Madsen Douglas, “Solid Congress Support in 1967: A Statistical Inquiry,” Asian Survey, Special Issue ‘Elections and Party Politics in India: A Symposium’, 10, no.11 (1970), pp. 1004-14.

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Castes and the Muslims. The party thus obscured two cleavages, the one opposing the high and the low castes, and the one separating religious communities. The same technique turned out to be successful in other regions too. The all India opinion polls conducted by the CSDS show that till the 1980s, the Congress party managed to attract between 35.8% and 50.5% of the voters from any social group.35 In 1989, the Brahmins, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Muslims were still over-represented within the Congress (I) electorate. According to an opinion poll survey, carried out after the 1989 elections, where the Congress (I) won39.5% of the valid votes, it grabbed the support of 41% of the Brahmins who were interviewed, 44.2% of the SCs/STs and 45.8% of the Muslims. In 2009, the Congress performed very well in terms of seats in the Assembly, an achievement even more commendable that it was already in office since 2004. It had never won so many seats since 1991.

Congress performances (1977-2009)

1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

Number of 154 353 415 197 232 140 141 140 145 206 seats Share of 34.3 valid votes 42.7 48.1 39.5 36.5 28.8 25.82 28.30 26.53 28.52

in % Total no. 492 492 517 517 529 521 543 543 543 543 Of seats Source: Election Commission of India.

The Congress 2009 election performance is remarkable for two reasons. First, no Prime Minister in office for a full term of five years had won elections since Jawaharlal Nehru in 1962. Definitely, Manmohan Singh is no Nehru. He is more of a technocrat than a 36 statesman.Maulana But hisAzad prestige, Library, supported Aligarh by his reputation Muslim of integrity University and wisdom, was increasing among the population at large. The Congress’ performance was also remarkable because of the party’s score in multiple key states like Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan and even more in regions where the party had been side-lined for decades. In1991 the Congress won so many seats in Kerala (13 out of 20 an increase of 8% in terms of valid votes compared to 2004 and Uttar Pradesh (21 out of 80, an increase of

35 Jaffrelot, Christophe and Verniers, Gilles, “India’s 2009 Elections: The Resilience of Regionalism and Ethnicity,” South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2009. 36 Jaffrelot and Gilles, 113

6.2% in terms of votes even 26 out of 85, if one includes Uttarakhand created in 2000 for making the comparison easier with the previous elections when the Congress could not win more than 16 seats over the last 20 years). In these four states, the Congress has successfully captured 45 more seats than in 2004. In comparison to 2004, the Congress has improved its results in 16 out of 28 states; a result even more striking if compared with the BJP’s performances during the same period. Last but not the least, the idea that Congress has benefited from a national wave -i.e. from a homogeneous pattern of political following among voters across states-is also supported by its scores in terms of votes in states where it could not win many seats: in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, where total votes increased by 6.4% (the party lost one seat in the former but gained 8 in the latter), and in Punjab where they increased of 11% (with an additional 6 seats).

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Some State’s Performances of the Congress (INC) and the BJP (2004-09)

INC - - BJP - - 2004 2009 Won/lost 2004 2009 Won/lost National Seats: 145 206 +61 138 116 -22 Votes (%) 26.53 28.52 +1.99 22.16 18.847 -3.32 29 33 +4 - - - Andhra Pradesh 41.56 38.95 -2.61 8.41 3.75 -4.66 3 2 - 5 12 +7 Bihar 4.49 10.96 +6.43 14.57 13.93 -0.64 1 1 - 10 10 - Chhattisgarh 40.16 37.31 -3.85 47.78 45.03 -1.75 12 10 -2 14 15 +1 Gujarat 43.86 43.38 -0.48 47.37 46.52 -0.85 9 9 - 1 - -1 Haryana 42.13 41.77 -0.46 17.21 12.09 -5.12 3 1 -2 1 3 +2 Himachal Pradesh 51.89 45.61 -6.28 44.24 49.58 +5.34 2 2 - - - - Jammu and Kashmir 27.83 24.67 -3.16 23.04 18.61 -4.43 8 6 -2 18 19 +1 Karnataka 36.82 37.65 +0.83 34.77 41.63 +6.86 4 12 +8 25 16 -9 Madhya Pradesh 34.07 40.44 +6.37 48.83 43.45 -5.38 13 17 +4 13 9 -4 Maharashtra 23.77 19.61 -4.16 22.61 18.17 -4.44 6 7 +1 1 - -1 Delhi 54.81 57.11 +2.20 40.67 35.23 -5.44 4 20 +16 21 4 -17 Rajasthan 41.425 47.19 +5.77 49.01 36.57 -12.44 9 21 +12 10 10 - Uttar Pradesh 12.04 18.25 +6.21 22.17 17.50 -4.67 6 6 - - 1 +1 West Bengal 14.56 13.45 -1.11 8.06 6.14 -1.94 Source: Election Commission of India.

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The success of the Congress is mainly due to its President Sonia Gandhi whose prestige enhanced because of the way she gave up the frills of executive power when she decided not to be the PM. She is very much in command of the Congress, a party which, otherwise, would be divided into many factions, as during the Narasimha Rao years (1991-96) being above factions, with the mantle of the ‘dynasty’ on her shoulders, she neutralizes them and maintains the cohesion of the party and that of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in general, given her great talent as a negotiator and peace maker. The success of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh (UP) has been credited to her son Rahul Gandhi, who is in charge of rebuilding the party in this former stronghold. This achievement his first success in fact makes him a potential contender for the post of Prime Minister after Manmohan Singh. According to the CSDS exit poll Rahul is lagging behind in terms of popularity in UP only 4% of the respondents opted for Rahul Gandhi, against 28% for Mayawati (BSP), 27% to Mulayam Singh (SP) and 12% to Rajnath Singh (BJP) at that time.37

The success of the Congress is also due to some of its best thought out policies, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which promises a minimal guaranteed wage (amounting to one hundred days of work hours per annum, at government-fixed rates) to every rural casual worker;38 the Right to Information Act, which makes bureaucracy obligated to explain its decisions when asked by concerned citizens; and the implementation of a 27% quota for the OBCs in the university where, according to surveys, the Dalits were in larger number than the OBCs because of reservations. All this pleased a popular electorate, which was also sensitive to the fall of the inflation rate in India, a double-digit inflation can make a government fall whereas the growth rate (on the decline since mid-2007) does not play such a big role in a country Maulanaused to slow growthAzad tillLibrary, the 1990s. Aligarh The urban middleMuslim class University also appreciated the 2008 nuclear deal with the US through which transfer of civil nuclear energy technology to India was agreed by Washington in spite of the fact that the country had

37 Beg Mirza Asmer and Kumar Sunil, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” Economic & Political Weekly, 44 (2009), pp. 190-93. 38 According to the CSDS exit poll, 31% of the rural poor and 29% of the rural very poor said that they had benefited from the NREGA, which is more than the level of support for any other previous or existing poverty-alleviation program.

116 not signed the TNP, not only for the mark of international recognition it represented, but also because of its implications in terms of energy.

This being said, neither the success of the Congress, nor the re-nationalization of Indian politics that it is supposed to reflect according to the media must be overrated. The Congress got hold over 61 seats more than in 2004, but it has improved its score in terms of valid votes by only 2%. In fact, the party has won approximately 27% of the valid votes in every election since 1996. The graph below shows that the two largest parties, Congress and BJP, are actually not making significant progress, whereas the regional parties are: in other words, there is no re-nationalization of politics in India, but a constant trend towards regionalization. As a matter of fact, regional parties got more valid votes in 2009 in compared to the combined valid votes of Congress and BJP, thus confirming a trend already visible for the first time during the 2004 elections.

National and Regional Parties, 1991-2009 (in % of Valid Votes)

Parties 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 Congress 36.26 28.80 25.82 28.30 26.53 28.52 BJP 20.11 20.29 25.59 23.75 22.16 18.84 Total 56.37 49.09 51.41 52.05 48.59 47.36 Regional Parties 43.63 50.71 48.59 47.95 51.41 52.54 Grand Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Election Commission of India

This regionalization of politics is precisely helped the Congress, as much as the progress it made on its own. The party got benefited from this phenomenon in three differentMaulana manners. Azad Firstly, Library, in several states,Aligarh newly Muslim formed local University or regional parties a clear indicator of the increasing fragmentation of Indian politics has helped the Congress by keep back into the votes of its main opponents, often established regional parties. In Andhra Pradesh, the , created by the film actor , deprived Chandrababu Naidu’s Telugu Desam Party of about 20 seats which have mostly gone to the Congress by winning 160 000 votes per constituency on an average. In Maharashtra, the Congress and its ally, the Nationalist Congress Party, won all the six seats of Mumbai thanks to the 126,000 votes that Raj Thackeray’s Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (a breakaway sect of the Shiv Sena) won on an average

117 in these constituencies otherwise some of them at least would have been won by the Shiv Sena and/or its ally, the BJP. In Tamil Nadu, the emergence of a new party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of Vijaykant, restrained the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) from winning in about 15 constituencies where the Congress and more especially its ally, the DMK, won most of the seats.

Secondly, the Congress was in beneficial position due to good performance of its regional allies. The DMK won 18 out of 38 seats and helped the Congress to succeed. In Maharashtra, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), an offshoot of the Congress Party, won 9 seats. In West Bengal, the Congress re-established a very fruitful alliance with Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool National Congress (TNC), which won 19 seats and helped the Congress win 7 more. Thirdly, the BJP-led coalition (the National Democratic Alliance, NDA) lost very important allies prior and during the campaign.

In 2004, most of the analysts believed that, indeed, it was not the Congress, which won the elections but the BJP, which lost them by using counterproductive (‘pro rich’) strategies and slogans such as ‘Shining India’. In 2009, it seems that the Congress has hugely benefited from the fall down of the NDA as a matter of fact; the departures of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), the AIADMK, the TNC and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) really sealed the fate of the BJP. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar admit that ‘Changes in the composition of the NDA meant a net loss of 42 seats and nearly 8% points of national votes if the BJP had managed to retain the NDA of 2004, the gap between the UPA and the NDA would have been much narrower’.39 One may claim that the face of the elections would have been truly altered, even because in states like Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, not only would the BJP have had allies, but the Congress would have also been facing not two but one main Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University opponent, which makes a huge difference in a ‘first past the post’ electoral system. Some of the former allies of the BJP-like the TNC-went for the UPA, but others simply regained their independence and fought elections in their states on their own; another symptom of the regionalisation of politics at the expense of national coalition politics.

39 Yadav Yogendra and Palshikar Suhas, “Between Fortuna and Virtue: Explaining the Congress Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic & Political Weekly, 44, (2009), pp. 33-46.

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In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, instead of softening its image, made necessary in the post-Godhara carnage in Gujarat, which has made it tuff for the BJP to find allies among a number of regional parties, such as TDP in AP, for which Congress historically has been the enemy, the combination of Varun Gandhi’s ‘hate speech’ and anti-Christian riots in Orissa led it to lose allies, such as Orissa’s BJD. In addition, Narendra Modi remains a powerful, but divisive, figure in the BJP and has benefits and costs for the Party. His state-level victories which were based on a development centric agenda works in favour of the BJP; while the post- Godhara massacres of Muslims and the lack of justice for the victim’s works against it. US’s refusal to grant a visa to Modi in 2005, gave a new lease of life to Modi. The question is whether or not the BJP will use the anti-US sentiment, was which so effectively used by Mrs Indira Gandhi to mobilize from time to time during her period in power. The US decision to confer the title on Pakistan of a major non-NATO ally and to sell F-16s to Pakistan and before that, gives BJP a basis to mobilize the large anti-Pakistani constituency in India by attacking the US policy towards Pakistan. But the BJP was unlikely to take this course. This was because the BJP understands that the future emergence of India as a major global power, and this being its overriding objective, requires considerable US support and improved economic ties with its neighbours, including Pakistan. At the same time, USA was interested in promoting a dynamic and liberal democratic India, as a counter to the growing global dominance and assertiveness of China, but under an authoritarian Communist leadership. It was imperative for Congress to get the BJP’s in order to promote closer India–US relations, which are strongly opposed by the Left. Apart from the continued tension between its ideologues and moderates brought out more clearly in the aftermath of early June 2005 Advani’s visit to and positive statements in Pakistan on its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his regret over the demolition of the Babri Masjid,Maulana there is also Azad a serious Library, problem Aligarh faced by the Muslim BJP in its University necessity to pass on the party’s leadership from the aging leadership of Advani to second-generation leaders. An attempt to give more responsibility to such second-generation leadership in post- 2004 election period couldn’t work because of some quarell between the then Party President, Venkaiah Naidu and the bright BJP leader from Madhya Pradesh, Uma Bharti, forcing Advani to resume the Party Presidency. But RSS Supremo Sudarshan forced Advani to quit and force Rajnath Singh as President of the BJP. Building of the Ram temple at Ayodhya and other issues which were lying latent under Vajpayee, have re-surfaced as major planks of BJP’s agenda in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. This is

119 to ensure continued support from the core constituency, who are attracted to the BJP because of its Hindutva Ideology. At the same time, to broaden its appeal, other contentious issues, such as the introduction of uniform civil code, are likely to be dropped from the party manifesto.

In Comparison to 2004, in the 2009 Parliamentary elections, Congress managed to improve its position by more than 60 seats from 145 to 206. The reasons for this are complex. At a broader nation-wide level some of the factors, which favoured the Congress, were: (a) the need for political stability in the midst of the economic upheaval both the Third and Fourth Fronts were seen in general to be vehicles of political instability and therefore did badly; (b) the confusion among the voters about whether BJP was presenting Advani or Modi as leaders, leading to BJP doing worse than in 2004 ; (c) the attack made by Advani on Manmohan Singh as a weak leader, when the latter had moved the country to a higher growth trajectory and had an image of a clean and decent person offended opinion makers in India and (d) the association of the Congress with NREGS debt waiver scheme and the Forest Dwellers Act of 2006, which had benefited the rural areas.

Though these factors played a role, state and regional factors remain significant and therefore an explanation still has to be sought at state and regional level. There were real improvements for Congress (a) in the Hindi heartland in UP and MP respectively, it won 21 seats and 12 seats compared to 9 and 4 in 2004, because of the substantial return of the Muslim vote, estrange from SP in UP and because of the increased fear of BJP in MP, in the aftermath of Varun Gandhi’s hate speech; in Rajasthan, it gave a thumping to BJP by winning 20 out of 25 seats because of the effective implementation of NREGS and disenchantment among the rank and file BJP supporters with the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University authoritarian approach of the state Party Chief , reflected in a low turnout of 47%; in Delhi, it had a clean sweep, winning all the 7 seats, because of good administration of Sheila Dixit and the appreciation of good economic management under Manmohan Singh, which had benefited its citizenry the most; in Uttarakhand it won all the 5 seats, because of dissatisfaction with BJP’s Chief Minister B.C. Khanduri and division within the BJP’s state administration (b) in Andhra Pradesh, where it secured 33 seats out of 42, because of confusion in the opposition, as TDP and TRS, which had little in common tied up, combined with the farmer debt waiver scheme,

120 which helped the rural areas in this state, where debt related suicide deaths had been the highest, and the popularity of Congress Chief Minister Y.S.R. Reddy (c) in Kerala, where the tendency of this state to alternatively support Congress led United Democratic Front or UDF and CPM led Left Democratic Front or LDF continued and helped the Congress in 2009, when it won 13 seats in comparison to none in 2004, when the LDF was triumphant (d) in Maharastra, where it won 17 seats, five of which in Vidarbha, which benefited from the debt waiver scheme and where farmer suicides had been very high, and with NCP all the seats in Mumbai, because of reduction in the Shiv Sena votes, as the Raj Thackeray’s MNS played a spoiler role. But none of the above should give Congress long-term comfort. The reason behind that is because the Shiv Sena continues to improve its position in rural areas in Maharastra, while the BJP remains a potential competitor in Rajasthan, the LDF in Kerala and the TDU in AP. In addition, the BSP will gradually erode support for Congress in UP and MP, as it improves its capacity to reach out to Muslim voters in these states.

2014 Lok Sabha election: Debacle of the Congress led UPA and revival of the BJP led NDA

The UPA-II failed to capitalise on the momentum provide by the 2009 Lok Sabha election which in way gave it confidence that its social policies like MGNREGA, minority development programmes, high social sector investment was endorsed by the people. The UPA-II witnessed more policy paralysis than the UPA-I. The UPA-II though much stronger than the UPA-I did not succeed in full filling promises it had made to the electorate during election campaigning. It was disfigured by the series corruption scam, high inflation, slow growth rate, and more importantly, by the slow growth rate in employment.40 Moreover on the foreign policy front it failed to improve Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University its economic crisis and the relation with Pakistan.

On the economic front the economy indicators depicted that economic growth story of the UPA-II was at an “end.” The GDP growth rate declined from 8.8 percentage in 2010-11 to 6.4 percentage in 2011-2012.41 It further declined to 4.4 percentage in first

40 Qazi Ahmad Mudasir and Iftekhar Ahemmed, “Coaliton Government in Indian: A Historical Overview,” The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies, 3, no.9 (2015), pp. 28-29. 41 Chandrasekhar C.P., “Return of the Crisis,” Frontline, 29, no.11 (2012), p. 4.

121 quarter of 2013 (April to June).42 This economic crisis included rupee’s depreciation, which hit record low of 68.85 against the US dollar ($) 43and onion prices rose up to rupees eighty to ninety per kilograms. The number of unemployed persons went up to 10.8 million in January 2012 from 9.8 million in January 2010.44A weak rupee was a potent factor for inflation to rise, because of which both government expenditures and consumer budget also grew. The income of aam aadmi (common man) was getting squeezed by inflation.

Therefore, the people stumble under the impact of double digit food inflation and the UPA-II government contributed to stoke up inflationary fire by frequently increasing the prices of petro-products, which was followed by sharp decline in energy and fertilizer subsidies in the Union Budget. The hunger and malnutrition were still widespread and the level of deprivation in terms of access to education and health care were huge. For example, the country was facing continuing agrarian crisis despite the improvement in growth rate of agriculture output in recent years. But the continuing farmers’ suicides constituted to tragic manifestation of the crisis. The UPA-II failed to address, even in a prior way, the issue of unemployment, inflation and inclusive growth, which were promised by Congress Party during 15th Lok Sabha elections in its manifesto. The Manmohan Singh regime touched its lowest point in its nine years tenure in May 2013, when another scam ‘Railgate’ was exposed by media. The popularity of the UPA reached to its lowest decay during that time when even India Today, opinion poll rated that UPA-II was most corrupt government of the last thirty five years. The issue of corruption was the problem of the UPA-II government, starting with Commonwealth Games, Adarsh Housing, CVC appointment, 2G,45 helicopter scam, Coalgate and then Railgate scams. Things further slipped out of the hand of UPA when it showedMaulana lacklustre Azad approach Library, towards the Aligarh demand of Muslim Lok Pal Bill. University The movement for Lok Pal was started by Anna Hazare activated conscience of the nation and became the rolling point for collective anger of the people against the exponential magnitude of corruption in Congress Party led UPA regimes.46 Things became clear for Congress

42 Business Line, August 31, 2013 and The Tribune, August 31, 2013. 43 The Tribune, August 29, 2013. 44 Sengupta Jayshree, “Focus on Job Creation,” The Tribune, August 31, 2013. 45 Purie Aroon, (Editorial), India Today, 36, no.17 (2011), p.1. 46 Raman Amerada, “Anna Domini,” Outlook, 51, no.34 (2011), pp. 26-33.

122 when it lost Assembly elections namely in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi and Chhattisgarh in November/December 2013.

The UPA-II government was slip from one crisis to another over the years, fighting ghost of scams and scandals, a series of avoidable administrative gaffes, soaring food inflation and reeling under restrictions from pro-active judiciary. Both, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress Party chief, Sonia Gandhi were looking decidedly ill- at-ease in their attempt to retrieve the government and party’s credibility. Their efforts to shake off the most corrupt tag, through the effective propagation of its pro-poor agenda, did not appear to have cut much ice. It is observed that the UPA-II did not have any guiding principles like Common Minimum Programme (CMP) and controlling mechanism as National Advisory Committee (NAC) and Coordinating Committee like earlier coalition governments of the UPA-I and the NDA.

2014 Election from castes to social engineering

Indian Election campaign 2014 (16th lok sabha elections) was the second most expensive campaign in the history of world, after the US presidential Campaign. There was a significant evolution in the campaigning strategy as the parties tried to seek to innovative campaigning methods like social media, crowd fund raising, digital rallies and effective story telling rather than sticking to the conventional print and television.

The rise of Modi was not sheer magic it was the result of deliberate, well-crafted campaign that evolved over several years. When UPA’s started to decline somehow in 2011, due to some corruption charges, Modi or BJP had already begun planning for his Delhi bid. It was a much sought after, single-minded journey to the top, not an overnight 47 successMaulana. Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

This election saw the return of the plebiscitary mode based on a personality. Personality politics is neither completely new, nor was it absent all these years. However, at the National level, this feature had almost disappeared after the 1980 Lok Sabha election. Starting early on in 2013, Narendra Modi turned this election into a plebiscite on his leadership. He even challenged the Congress to similarly enter Rahul Gandhi’s name in the contest. While the Congress did not do that officially, it had no choice but to

47 Prasannarajan S. and Sahgal Priya, “The Siege of Delhi,” India Today, 36, no. 35(2011), pp. 18-24. 123 counter Mr. Modi with Mr. Gandhi. But it was not a contest between two leaders. It was plainly a plebiscite on Mr. Modi. The BJP as a party was only the backdrop to this main script. Opinion polls released by Lokniti in July 2013 showed that initially in many States respondents were not openly naming their favoured candidate for Prime Minister. However, as the electoral campaign got momentum, voters were caught up in the game of “Kaun Banega Prime Minister”, trumping all other considerations. In July 2013, almost four out of every 10 respondents were unable answer the query who they would prefer to be the next Prime Minister. This proportion came down to less than three in every 10 by the time elections happened. The acceptability of Mr. Modi across States neutralised the importance of the State in shaping voter choices. This marked a clear reversal from the past few elections that were practically shaped at the State level.

The BJP has always succeeded in projecting an image before the Lok Sabha election that is unstoppable; it’s called psychological warfare. In 2009, the BJP presented LK Advani, as the Iron man of India. But unfortunately, BJP lost the elections, in fact with a much bigger margin. This proves that the people of India do not easily get fooled by showmanship. This time (2014) the BJP has chosen Narendra Modi, the latest iron man in their depot. With the nomination of Modi, the BJP has already started to counter trouble with walking out of the NDA. The media was giving a lot of coverage to Modi. The media only wants to print ‘eye-catchy news’. It was not their concern whether what Modi says is right or wrong. He was busy in changing history. Modi claimed that he will solve India’s economic slowdown. Modi talks of eliminating corruption resound with people’s aspiration and strike a right chord.

The results of the 2014 national election indicate a sea change, and the BJP’s NDA coalition re-emerged after a 10-year break from power to establish the clearest non-INC Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University political majority in India’s democratic history.48 Analysis to unpack the logic for this resounding shift is limited given the recent developments; the analysis points to many factors to explain that why the public dissatisfied with the Congress Party’s control of parliament from 2004-2014. Chibber and Ostermann argue that the BJP effectively utilized “vote mobilizers, a group of individuals who actively help a campaign but who are often neither members norm partisans” to secure political success in areas that had previously been INC strongholds, drawing on Prime Minister candidate Narendra

48 Sridharan Eswaran, “Behind Modi’s Victory,” Journal of Democracy, 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 2 5-27.

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Modi’s image as a transformational candidate to appeal to this aspirational group. Ganguly’s composite analysis of several viewpoints suggests that the INC’s “lackluster leadership as well as its failure to sustain economic growth or to curb the country’s high levels of corruption” also contributed to the BJP’s success. Sridharan suggests that “the BJP’s success at employing a message of market-friendliness against Congress’s liking for ” may have been principle in the BJP victory at a time in which the rhetoric of open development was exchange better than anti-poverty subsidies promoted by the INC. Thus, while there are several factors that could explain the BJP’s victory, the party’s explicit embrace of neoliberal policies and it’s framing of these changes as promoting the welfare of all Indians appear to have resonated with a significant portion of voters.

In the current renewal of the BJP, the party has pursued a strategy to secularize its image through the use of the language inclusive development. The BJP’s 2014 slogan, “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas,” or “participation of all, development for all,” combats the perception of the BJP as a party that reinforces communalism.49 This language was often used throughout the campaign in concert with proclamations of the BJP’s aid of Muslims in pursuing development.50 In a February 2015 speech, Modi took this rhetoric further, stating “India first” was the government’s religion.51 This statement directly contrasts with Advani’s previous claims that defined the cultural character of India as distinctly Hindu and his argument that the recognition of Hinduism as the binding of Indian society would lead to the promotion of equality within India.52

Modi even contrasted the BJP plan with the political strategy of the INC, stating, “We believe in economic development, while you play the politics of votes, letting Muslims suffer in poverty”. 53 This language recalls the charge of pseudo-secularism in its Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University reference to rival parties’ “playing the politics of votes” while shifting the narrative to a more secular political focus in comparison to the thorny issues of the Uniform Civil Code.

49 Bharatiya Janata Party. "2014 Election Manifesto." 50 Rahman Shaikh Azizur,"Muslims, Modi and Divided India," Al Jazeera, March 3, 2014. 51 Joshua Anita, " Modi: My govt’s only religion is India first," The Hindu, February 25, 2015. 52 Advani Lal Krishinchand, My County, My Life (Rupa Publication, 2008). 53 Rahman.

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Tactics for brand Modi

Modi proved himself to be a correct strategist who launched a highly effective parliamentary political campaign that shifted the focus from problematic considerations like identity and social welfare to development and Modi’s personal leadership. This was a shrewd reading of the public mood on both issues. On the issue of development, one pre- election survey conducted by the Lok Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania’s Centre for the Advanced Study of India, administered in October and December 2013,54 found that about 25% of the respondents recognised economic growth as the number one issue, and closely followed by corruption (21%) and inflation (18%). 55 Modi was also helped by the widespread concern, especially among the large cohort of young voters, about their job prospects. According to the Indian Election Commission report around 50% of the population between the ages of 18 and 25 and about 10% of some 814 million electorates voted for the first time in the 2014 election.56

The campaign was also presidential in style; Modi brought the attention of public on the comparison between his significant economic achievements as three-term Chief Minister of Gujarat and Rahul Gandhi, the vice president of the congress party, who had never held any public administrative position. Was able to develop a connect with the tens of millions of poor young Indians, by drawing a sharp distinction between his humble origins and experience as a tea seller and those of Rahul Gandhi, heir to the most prominent political dynasty in India. Two prominent Indian-American Columbia economists, Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya,57 had been in favour of Modi’s ‘Gujarat’ model, often responding publicly to criticism of Modi’s record. They argue that the substantial reduction in poverty, malnutrition, and illiteracy was a result of rapid economic growth in Gujarat. Many critics pointed out that Gujarat’s growth trajectory was set long before Modi’s arrival, that Modi himself has not had significant role, or that the state’s economic growth has not includedMaulana the poor, theAzad disadvantaged, Library, an dAligarh minorities. Muslim Foremost amon Universityg these critics have been left-leaning economists Amratya Sen and Jean Druze who have claimed that Gujarat’s growth statistics mask a severe shortage of social infrastructure. BJP victories in the November- December 2013 State Assembly elections in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,

54 Lok foundation and Centre for the Advance Study of India, Pre- Election Survey, 2014. 55 Vaishnav M. Kapur D. and Sitcar N.,“Growth is No. 1 Poll Issue for Voters, Shows survey,” Times of India, March 16, 2014. 56 Shah S., “Vital Facts and Numbers About 2014 Indian Polls,” International News, March 28, 2014. 57 Panagariya A., “Here’s Proof that Gujarat has Flourished under Modi,” Tehelka, March 29, 2014.

126 and Chhattisgarh (with the prominent exception of Delhi) made the cadre believed that an all-out effort for the 2014 National election would bring victory.58 Simultaneously, Modi mentored the efforts to work out pre-polling alliances to enable the BJP to form a coalition government if it did not get the required majority of 272 votes he could rely on residue of the old NDA, like the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and Akali Dal in Punjab two of the 15 allied parties that enabled Atal Bihari Vajpayee to form his coalition government in 1999.

Conclusion

It is evident from above discussion, the BJP led NDA and the Congress Party run UPA-I and II claimed that they had considerable achievements during their term in the office. They tried to build a progressive and modern India. The Vajpayee government achieved eight percentage economic growth rate in it last year of tenure (2003-04). In contrast, Manmohan Singh regime attained 7.91 percentage average growth rates during nine years governance from 2004 to till March 2013, which was comparatively closer to the targeted growth rate. During the period, 2004 to 2008, the GDP growth rate varied from seven percentages to 9.7 percentages.

The UPA in its first term from 2004 to 2009, tried to stick with the NCMP by implementing MGNREGA and removed Ministry of Disinvestment under the agreement between the Congress party and Left parties. Later on, the UPA-I signed treaty on Civil Nuclear Deal with USA, despite the resistance of Left Front. The UPA-II in its second term was more focused on ‘inclusive growth’ and allowed FDI in many sectors including retail. The BJP along with other opposition parties opposed the decision of UPA-II, to allow FDI in retail sector. By and large, the differences between BJP and Congress were getting blurred on the economic issues.

BothMaulana the regimes (NDAAzad and Library, UPA) worked Aligarh under great Muslim stress and University strains and rolled back many decisions under the threat given by one coalition partner or another, and BJP always valued its Hindutva themes but altered its strategy according to the need of time and elections. The regional parties as LJP, NC, AIADMK, DMK, Trinamool Congress held positions both in the NDA and in the UPA and Left parties (outside supporter of UPA-I), etc, put the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments in suspense or in strain for one issue (such as POTA, price hike of petroleum products and FDI etc) to another. In a way, these regional parties had no national vision and thought in terms of power but not about

58 Wallace Paul, India’s 2014 Elections: A Modi led BJP Sweep (India: Sage Publications, 2015). 127 common goals. They laid the roots of political instability. The corruption cases and scandals eroded the credibility and legitimacy of the governments of both - A.B Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. The NDA and the UPA were neck deep in various scams. The politicians and their parties too were busy with day’s battle and have no time, to inclination to talk about issues that really matter. The inflation, Naxalism, corruption, price rise, terrorism, internal and external security, poverty and hunger, still the real issues, which need to be addressed more strongly.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

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Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Chapter- IV

Coalitional Strategy of BJP pre and post- 2014 Elections

This chapter examines the pre and post coalition strategy of BJP in 2014 elections, importance of the coalition in Indian politics. And how BJP became one man show party instead of various negation of that very person, party’s success revolves around Modi. It also shows the need of coalition for the BJP at state level which obviously rendezvous at national level.

Introduction

The 2014 Lok Sabha elections assumed much importance in the electoral journey of the India state. Prior to the elections the coalition government led by Congress was much more defame by the corruptions and mis-governance. The alliance partners in the government looked directionless. But during its decade long rule the Congress led UPA government had unveiled a number of signature welfare programmes (such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) designed to benefit the poor and historically disadvantaged groups like Dalits, Muslims, and STs. The inclusiveness slogan was much more accomplished. But it did not yield dividends for it in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls. The 2014 Indian General Election marked a single party-the Bhartiya Janata Party, winning a majority of seats in Lok Sabha, the first time since the 1984 election. The Congress, the other main national party, suffered its worst ever defeat. This election was termed by some as a ‘Critical Election’ signalling the advent of a new phase of a ‘BJP dominant’ party system in India. Thus, at the time of the 2014 election, the two main national parties, the BJP and the Congress, contested to win a majority for theirMaulana respective Azad alliances, Library, the National Aligarh Democratic Muslim Alliance University (NDA) and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). Many regional parties decided to fight the election on their own, anticipating a greater post-election role in the government formation. These included Janata Dal (United) (JDU) in Bihar, All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) in West Bengal, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (ADMK) in Tamil Nadu, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP) in Uttar Pradesh and Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Orissa. A new challenger to the mainstream political parties was the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) of Arvind Kejriwal, which emerged from the ruins of an anti-

129 corruption civil society movement of 2012 led by social activist Anna Hazare. The Aam Adami Party contested the 2014 election in 432 of the 543 constituencies.

The defeat of BJP in 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabah elections helped it to evolve as a stronger and more accomplished political party, focusing equally on the conventional and the new age tactics for election campaigning. The poll strategist of the BJP adopted a multi-phased strategy with overlapping objectives to fulfil the common goal of winning 272+ seats in the 2014 General Elections. Much more before the Lok Sabha polls the BJP initiated a strategy inclined towards connecting with the internet savvy generation on their preferred social networks. Post 2012, the party adopted a twin strategy which included connecting with more and more people but at the same time building an interest and the desire to stay connected by opening up the doors of IT cell, India 272+ and various other volunteer communities, instilling the feeling of pride in being associated with BJP. The party launched some exceptionally innovative campaigns and initiatives like Mere Sapnon Ka Bharat,( India of my dreams) NaMo Number, Chai Pe Charcha ( Talk on Tea) to register their presence synonymous with Growth, Development and Good Governance. The BJP on Social Media reached the peak point at that time, wherein, the stage was set for them to engage with the users and gain votes by tangible conversions. The party work on assemble and collect the scattered synergies towards one common goal that was Mission 272+.

The spectacular victory of BJP over Congress in the 2014 Indian general elections was made possible by many factors. However, the main and overarching cause of BJP’S victory was, the process which started in 2009 with the backing of the Indian corporate sector, the image building of Modi as a kind of fearless and unblemished hero who having raised his home state, Gujarat, to an extraordinary level of economic Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University development and was now in a position to apply the same feat at the all-India level. ‘Modi’s legend’ first conquered the middle class’ imagination and, then, was spread among the masses and, transversally, among first-time voters by that same middle class, with the help of RSS volunteers. Thus, a movement or campaign was created and deployed with disastrous effects, not only against Congress but, as shown by the cases of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, against some of India’s strongest regional parties. The results of the 2014 general were both surprising and important. Most observers believed that the BJP, the rightist party which represents so-called Hindu

130 nationalism, was going to win. However, nobody was expecting it to take the absolute majority of seats in the Lok Sabha. Although in a necessarily simplified fashion, the 2014 general elections can be seen as a battle between the Indian National Congress Party and the BJP.

The political battlefield could potentially have been determine by the results of the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) governments led by the Congress in the 2004-14 legislatures, and the results of the Modi-led BJP governments in Gujarat from 2001 to 2014. In any case, the term 'potentially' is not utilized by chance during the political campaign, while the consequences of the Modi governments in Gujarat turned into a sort of reference worldview, any discussion of the UPA governments' outcomes was restricted to the matter of fact stunning scandals that had become public domain in the second half of the second UPA government, and to the backing off of the development rate and the industrious high inflation, especially for foodstuff, during a similar period. As it were, the Congress Party was not able make a case for the UPA governments' accomplishments since 2004, which were a long way from inconsequential, both financially and from the point of view of social equity. In its ten years in power, the UPA governments had pushed through a series of neoliberal reforms, counterbalanced by social policies aimed at protecting the weaker social strata and enlarging the space of democracy. The neoliberal reforms had translated into steady growth of the GNP, even if that growth had slowed down in the last two years.1On the other hand, the UPA governments had implemented laws such as the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), giving each rural family the right to 100 days of work; the 2005 Right to Information Act (opening the government’s work to the scrutiny of both individual citizens and grassroots organisations); the 2006 Forest Rights Acts, granting land Maulanaand forest rights Azad to India’s Library, adivasis Aligarh (Tribals); theMuslim 2013 Food University Security Act, granting a certain amount of food at very reduced prices on a monthly bases to some 80 percent of the population; and the 2013 Land Acquisition Act (which provides fair compensation for those whose land is expropriated to favour economic development).

These policies both the continuation of the liberal reforms and the launching of a set of anti-poverty and/or anti-discrimination laws could be and have been roundly criticised

1 Torri Michelguglielmo, “The Modi wave: Behind the Results of the 2014 General Elections in India”, Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50, no. 2 (2015), p. 57.

131 both because they were not rightist enough and, vice versa, because they were not leftist enough. Yet, in itself, this could be taken as an indication that such policies represented a balanced approach to the problems they were supposed to solve. This was exactly what Jairam Ramesh, one of the Congress leaders, claimed after the defeat.

However, it is a fact that, during the electoral campaign, Congress appeared unable to highlight the economic and social achievements of the UPA governments. Indeed, Congress’ campaign was a “listless and confused campaign”,2 which was ultimately fought on the battleground chosen by Narendra Modi.

On his part, Narendra Modi was able to project Gujarat’s economic record during his tenure as Chief Minister as the model of economic development, a model supposedly invented and implemented by Modi and ready to be applied to the whole of India. In doing so, Modi was able to push into the background a number of important elements: Gujarat’s development was not unique; other Indian states had been growing faster than Gujarat. Critics argue that the Gujarat model was far from being inclusive; historically, Gujarat had always been one of the wealthiest areas of India; the beginning of the Gujarati economic boom predated Modi’s arrival as Chief Minister.3

The BJP, like other Indian parties, is far from being a democratic organisation. However, especially because the central leadership was weak after 2004, a number of influential bosses were able to acquire a position of eminence and a solid following in their respective states. Narendra Modi was one of these influential state leaders; but Vasundhara Raje in Rajasthan, in Madhya Pradesh, and Raman Singh in Chhattisgarh were hardly less successful, powerful or popular in their own states. This means that the BJP had in-depth political roots in a number of important states. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Alongside the party, there was the RSS, historically the most important non- parliamentary Hindu organisation. The RSS is a secretive, extremely well-knit, semi- military body, which controls, more or less closely, or influences most other political or social Hindu organisations, including the BJP. In an electoral battle, its strength rests

2 “There is a Long list of Congress leaders behind Narendra Modi’s Sucess,” IBN Live, May 16, 2014. 3 Shariff Abusaleh, “Gujarat Shining: Relative Development of Gujarat and Socio-Religious Differentials,” US- India Policy Institute (USIPI) Occasional Paper no. 02, April 2012.

132 on its well-organised and numerous bodies of volunteers. The other parties in the NDA were much less influential and well organised than either the BJP or the RSS. But at least the Shiv Sena (Shiva’s Army) in Maharashtra and the TDP (Telugu Desam Party) in Andhra Pradesh were political forces to be compute with.

Much more important support, however, was given Narendra Modi’s camp by the two powerful social groups named: India Incorporate and the middle class. The first is made up of the limited number of extremely wealthy families which dominate the private economy in India.4 Historically, the political strategy of its members has been to guard their risks by supporting all the main parties on the political battlefield, even if not necessarily to the same extent. But already before the 2009 general elections, some key members of the group had started to abandon their traditional position of equidistance, and came out into the open not so much for the BJP as for Narendra Modi. This happened at a time when the BJP official candidate for prime minister of India was not Modi, but Lal K. Advani. After the BJP defeat in the 2009 elections, big business support for Modi consolidated.5 This pro-Modi preference eventually resulted in the strategic choice by most of the top Indian corporations to massively bankroll the BJP and the BJP only.6 India Inc.’s support for Modi was also important because of its control of a vast majority of the press and all private television networks. The media projected Modi as an immensely energetic, forceful, intelligent leader, a kind of fearless and blemish less knight, while highlighting and magnifying out of all proportion Rahul Gandhi’s weaknesses and miscalculation.

Intra-party negotiation

Soon after the loss of the BJP in the 2009 elections, the party machinery went to total repairMaulana and decided Azad to fully Library, invest in defeating Aligarh the Muslimruling party University in 2014. In an effort to maintain its apolitical reputation in the process, the RSS established a parallel national booth-level agency to encourage voter turnout.7 Besides this there was internal agitation within the party to change the guard of the party at the highest level and introduce new

4 Ghosh D.N., Business and Polity: Dynamics of Changing Relationship (Kolkata: Sage Publication, 2011). 5 The Economic Times, September 6, 2013. 6 “Narendra Modi Road Wave of Money to Indian Victory,” Financial Times, May 19, 2014. 7 Yadav Shyamlal, “Why RSS Changed its Stand on Reservation,” The Indian Express, November 3, 2015.

133 face to the party. Far from having an easy path to follow, Modi had to fight all along and overcome considerable hurdles to be chosen as the leader of the BJP election campaign and prime minister designate. He was confronted by the opposition of a strong group of BJP leaders within his party, the most powerful of whom was his former mentor, Lal K. Advani, and within the alliance, the open hostility of Nitish Kumar, the Bihar Chief Minister and leader of the Janata Dal (United) (JD (U), People’s Party), a key NDA component. The JD (U) was the strongest among the BJP’s allied parties. On top of all that, for quite some time the RSS leadership appeared far from enthusiastic about the idea of having Modi as the BJP candidate.8

Inner-party tussles were bound to intensify in the BJP and there were apprehensions that its long-standing allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), such as the Janata Dal (United), may leave the alliance coalition if Modi was elevated. More importantly, the alliance believed that Modi’s reputation as the Chief Minister who presided over the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom and his pursuit of an aggressive brand of anti-minority politics throughout his career, particularly during his two terms as Chief Minister, have the potential to trigger communal polarisation across the country. Despite all this, there was little doubt that Modi’s hat-trick has the political energy to bring about a comprehensive generational change in the leadership of the saffron party. Since the inception of the party in 1980, the core of the BJP’s central leadership had been occupied by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani, together or individually. Both of them were practitioners of Hindutva politics right from the days of the Jan Sangh, the predecessor of the BJP. All through these years, the party projected either Vajpayee or Advani as its next Prime Minister. Even in the15th general election, held in 2009, the BJP as well as the Sangh Parivar, its larger ideological conglomerate, had thought Maulanalong and hard Azad about projectingLibrary, a Aligarhnew face, but Muslim finally settled University for Advani. However, Modi’s third time victory in the Gujrat Assembly elections certainly advances the case for the generational change more forcefully. The victory has also placed him as the number one choice of the party, at least in the eyes of a large section of its rank and file. Sections of the party have already started demand for a bigger role for Modi at the national level. An opinion survey of sorts conducted by the Uttar Pradesh unit of the BJP to find out which national leader could be fielded from

8 “RSS not Ready for PM Modi,” The Sunday Guardian, February 2, 2013.

134 prominent constituencies in the State, particularly from high-profile seats such as Lucknow and Varanasi, reportedly recorded a huge preference for Modi.9 These were the signals of major intra-organisational problems for the BJP and the Sangh Parivar. It is no secret that many leaders of the BJP, including Advani, party president and Sushma Swaraj were opposed to a larger role for Modi at the national level. A large number of top leaders of the RSS including ‘Sarsanghchalak’ Mohanrao Bhagwat, were of the view that Modi will not make a good prime ministerial candidate.

On the other hand, the JD (U) leadership persisted with its opposition in November 2011 when Modi launched his Sadbhavana rally. Around the same time, Advani had started a Jan Chetna Yatra, and it was well known that the two BJP leaders were competing to enhance their respective claim to prime ministership. Nitish Kumar promptly supported the Advani yatra and even inaugurated it. The JD (U) has repeatedly made clear its preference since then. It is of the firm view that Modi’s elevation would signal the loss of whatever little minority support that the NDA has and that the JD (U) cannot afford to suffer the depletion of its support base. Evidently, the tussle between these positions will amplify in the days to come.

Parties such as the JD (U) were apparently worried about the social polarisation that Modi’s elevation would cause in various parts of the country. Senior leaders of JD (U) feared that greater assertion of Hindutva ideology under Modi’s leadership, leading to small and big communal riots in different parts of the country may cost its minority vote could lead to a migration of minority votes to the Congress, despite the popular anger at the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government’s track record at the Centre. In short, Modi’s elevation was seen as political hara-kiri for the NDA. Moreover, the Akali Dal, and NDA constituent, as well as inclined allies at that time, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Trinamool Congress was also apprehensive about the emergence of such a situation.10

Thing start to change for Modi gradually and he succeeded in pushing aside the internal opposition, and got the party to back him. More importantly, with the beginning of 2013, the RSS leadership changed their attitude vis-à-vis Modi and started to actively support him. From then on Modi’s march became unstoppable: on June 2013, he was

9 Ramakrishnan Venkitesh, “Polls & Portent”, Frontline, 29, no. 26, December 29, 2012. 10 Ibid.

135 officially put in charge of the election campaign, and on September 2013 he was designated as the party’s candidate for the prime ministership. All of this happened in spite of the opposition of Advani and others, and at the cost of an open break with Nitish Kumar’s JD (U).11

Election Campaign of Narendra Modi and Push for Presidential Style of Election

There was much that was extraordinary about India's 2014 parliamentary elections. For the first time in 30 years, a single party achieved a parliamentary majority on its own, tangle the expectations of most pre-election observers. Not only did a single party win a majority but, for the first time in India's democratic history, this party was not the Congress Party.12 This excludes the 1977 elections when the Janata Party won a majority, the Janata Party was an umbrella coalition bringing together multiple parties. Instead, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured its first parliamentary majority, albeit on a platform which professed to foreground economic development and growth over religious majoritarianism. The elections saw record levels of voter participation, in terms of both turnout (66.4%) and the size of the franchise (834 million). And, in a manner unseen since Indira Gandhi's premiership in the 1970s, the elections hinged on the candidacy of an individual, projected national leader-Narendra Modi-giving the contest a quasi-presidential feel. The level of election expenditure by the BJP and its omnipresence in the media and cyberspace also made these elections a departure from past experience.

Narendra Modi started his election campaign in September 2013, well in advance of the Congress Party. From the beginning, Modi presented himself as the politician responsible for the extremely successful ‘Gujarat model’ of development, and the person who,Maulana if elected prime Azad minister, Library, would implement Aligarh it Muslimin all of India. University This dominant argument was supplemented by others, perhaps less often repeated, but hardly less important in conquering crucial swathes of the electorate. One was the fact that unlike what had been the rule in the BJP leadership he himself belongs to a low caste. This was supplemented by the attention he gave to the Dalits, exemplified by his remark on 3 March 2014, at a rally in Muzaffarpur (Bihar) that “the next decade will belong to the

11 “Nitish Kumar Pulls the Plug on NDA,” The Statesman Weekly, June 22, 2013. 12 Chhibber P. K. and S. L. Ostermann, “The BJP's Fragile Mandate: Modi and Vote Mobilizers in the 2014 General Elections,” Studies in Indian Politics, 2, no.2, (2014).

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Dalits and the backwards”.13 This was a trump card, particularly in states such as Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar, where the low castes (or Other Backward Classes, OBCs) and Dalits are numerous and politically powerful.

Another theme, used with devastating results, was the contrast with Rahul Gandhi. Modi continuously highlighted the fact that, whereas he was a self-made man who, starting from the lowest rungs of the social ladder, had climbed to the top on the strength of his willpower and abilities, his adversary was the pampered descendant of an illustrious family, without any particular personal merit, whom Modi derisively dismissed as the Shahzada, the ‘princeling’.

Modi was well aware of the importance of targeting young people and the importance in doing so of the new forms of communication, from mobile phone text messages and direct calls to massive use of the social media, including Twitter and Facebook. It is estimated that television and mobile phone penetration allowed the BJP campaign to reach around 74 percent of Indians.14 Moreover, already during the summer of 2013, that is before the official launching of his campaign, Modi had taken a stance on the rising cost of education at various institutions (something Rahul Gandhi never did) and, in August, in a meeting of the BJP central leadership in New Delhi, asked his party’s state units to focus their attention on young and first-time voters.15

BJP's campaign in 2014 was unprecedented because it relied so heavily on the person of its leader, exactly what Indira Gandhi does during her political journey. For the first time a leaders staked his claim for power by show casing his records as Chief Minister. Narendra Modi challenged the friendly traditions of the BJP by using a parallel structure of support by activists with personal allegiance to him. This had the effect of side-lining partyMaulana veterans. He Azad employed Library, new communication Aligarh Muslim strategies University to ‘saturate’ the public sphere and reach voters directly. The BJP, under Modi, appropriated themes such as corruption and caste that are more closely associated with other parties, as well as building on Modi's experience as Chief Minister of Gujarat. He also fell back on more

13 “In 2014, Hindutva versus Caste,” The Hindu, March 26, 2014. 14 Basu Dipankar and Misra Kartik , “BJP’s Demographic Dividend in the 2014 General Elections: An Empirical Analysis,” Economics Department Working Paper Series 172, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2014. 15 “Narendra Modi wants BJP to focus on First-time,” Live Mint, August 18, 2013.

137 traditional Hindu nationalist themes, and relied on the support of the RSS. It was this combination of new and old that distinguished the BJP’s campaign in 2014.16

New tactics through old techniques: vote mobilisation strategy of BJP

While Indira Gandhi claimed that she embodied India through her slogan “Indira is India and India is Indira” Modi, as Chief Minister, often claimed that he spoke on behalf of ‘60 million Gujaratis’, as if they had all voted for him. During the 2014 campaign he tried to establish a similar equation by refusing any division of the nation. But Modi did not only reject the Congress, he rejected any party and said ‘In 2014, not vote for any party or person but vote for India’, which suggested that since he was candidate to the post of Prime Minister and he did not want parties to play a role in these elections, a vote for India was a vote for him.

Modi, besides his organisational skills (inherited from his past role as a Pracharak), is a gifted orator who knows how to shock large crowds by resorting to sharp formulas and plays on words. He cultivates his body language in the most expressive manner and systematically, as evident from the way he wore the typical hats of the local culture when he visited different regions of India not to say anything about the ‘Modi kurta’ and his sense of colours. This time his role model was the ‘iron man’- Vallabhbhai Patel and Mahatma Gandhi. Modi had started to cultivate this image as Chief Minister of Gujarat in opposition to Manmohan Singh whom he called “Maun (silent) Mohan Singh”17

Narendra Modi has tried to become the man of the people by organise the most impressive communication campaign India had seen since Indira Gandhi in 1971. Using another developmentMaulana-oriented Azad slogan Library, Garibi Hatao Aligarh Mrs Gandhi Muslim had shortUniversity circuited the notables of the Congress in order to relate directly to the people by holding a record number of meetings and resorting to the radio. Modi has used similar techniques by more modern ways. Like Indira Gandhi did in her elections, he took the country by storm, holding 437 rallies between September 2013 and the election. But he amplified the impact of these meetings by resorting, by the end of his campaign, to the 3D technology he had already tested during the 2012 state election campaign. During these

16 Chibber and Ostermann, Indian Election 2014. 17 The Indian Express, Ahmedabad, 0ctober 30, 2012.

138 rallies, Modi spoke at three to four venues in one day and was shown by 3D holographic image to 100 locations at the same time. According to his website, 3D holographic projections delivered 12 speeches across 1350 venues during the months of April and May 2014. Rajdeep Sardesai, a well-known Indian journalist, gives other figures: ‘A crew of 2500 members handling 125 3D projector units were involved and more than 7 million people reportedly witnessed the 3D shows over twelve days’-for a total coast of Rs. 200 crore18 but this technique was apparently effective. An activist who coordinated this campaign in Uttarakhand reveals that ‘In rural areas, the 3D projection is like magic. People came from faraway villages to watch this’.

Modi used another technique during state election campaign of Rajasthan in 2013 when video vans criss-crossed the countryside. In Uttar Pradesh, 200 ‘NaMo Rath’ (Mahindra Maximos equipped with 54-inch LCD screens) visited 19,000 villages in the 403 constituencies in order to show a 10-minute recorded speech by Modi. Besides, Modi related to thousands of tea stalls across the country for ‘Chai pe Charcha’. In 4000 tea stalls spread over 24 states, Modi could interact with Indian citizens through combination of technologies such as DTH, Video Conferencing, and Mobile Broadband.

The main innovation of Modi during the 2014 election campaign probably lies in the way he not only attracted, but also recruited and organised vote mobilisers, building parallel to the

BJP apparatus structures of activists paying allegiance to him personally. He worked on this strategy as early as 2012, using the Gujarat state election as a trailer. The team he started to build then was largely made of US-trained professionals and IT experts, like MaulanaPrashant Kishore, Azad who Library, formally setAligarh up in June Muslim 2013 a groupUniversity called Citizens for Accountable Governance (CAG), with its headquarters in Gandhinagar. The 200–400 members of the CAG were more than vote mobilisers, not only because they were paid – like some 800 of their interns – but also because their work was to build a dense network of vote mobilisers at the grass roots level. There was eventually to be approximately 100,000 volunteers working for Modi forming the ‘Modi for PM’ team and the ‘Mission 272’. The staunch supporters of Modi or called as ‘Modi Bhakt’, said

18 Sardesai, Rajdeep. The Election that Changed India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2014).

139 regarding to 2002 riots the more you blamed him the more of our support he gained. A study by the CMS Media Lab showed that Modi got 33.21% of the prime-time news telecasts during the campaign from 1 March to 30 April 2014 (and more than 40% in the days before polling took place), against 10.31% for Arvind Kejriwal and 4.33% for Rahul Gandhi. This massive deployment of communication was made possible by the financial resources the BJP could mobilise. According to The Economist's estimates, the party spent $1 billion during the 2014 election campaign. BJP or we can say Modi employed new communication strategies to ‘saturate’ the public sphere and reach voters directly. The BJP, under Modi, appropriated themes such as corruption and caste that are more closely associated with other parties, as well as building on Modi's experience as Chief Minister of Gujarat. He also fell back on more traditional Hindu nationalist themes, and relied on the support of the RSS. It was this combination of new and old that distinguished the BJP's campaign in 2014.19

Modi’s Rally

The particular of the BJP election campaign was reflected in the downplaying of the party apparatus and coalition politics. It found expression in slogans such as “Har Har Modi, “Ghar, Ghar Modi” or “Abki bar, Modi Sarkar.” Infact, the whole campaign of the BJP concentrated on the qualities of its leader, irrespective of the party's programme. The image that was projected was that of a ‘doer’ which echoed the skills of a CEO. On one of the posters used during the campaign, Modi was presented as ‘Initiator, Innovator, and Implementer’. Accompanying this was the decline of the warm modus operandi of the BJP and the marginalisation of senior leaders. While he promoted , his right hand man in Gujarat, to lead the election campaign in UP.20 Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Jaswant Singh was denied a ticket (like Harin Pathak, a close associate of Advani and the sitting MP of East Ahmedabad). Advani himself was ‘persuaded’ to fight from Gandhinagar, M.M. Joshi had to leave his Varanasi seat which Modi wanted to contest and Rajnath Singh himself had to move from Ghaziabad to Lucknow.

19 The Economist's, May 24, 2014. 20 Joshi Poornima, The Organiser, 2014.

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Modi's strategy also integrates sitting MPs and other personalities who would pay direct allegiance to him. Many turncoats came from the Congress, like , the MP of Domariyaganj (UP). In Gujarat, about one-third of the 26 BJP candidates were ex-Congressmen. In UP, ‘BJP gave tickets to more than two dozen outsiders, including four of yoga guru Ramdev's nominees’21 And soon after, M.J. Akbar, whose long career in the media had taken him from The Telegraph to India Today, joined the BJP too. According to the CSDS exit polls, 27% of the BJP voters supported the party because of Modi only. He also tried to emancipate himself from coalition politics, although not with complete success. While the Vajpayee government had been forced to make concessions to the BJP's NDA allies, Modi wanted a clear-cut majority. As a result, the coalition was never projected as a winning card and the BJP prepared a programme of its own. While L.K. Advani longed to keep the JD (U) on board, Narendra Modi did not try to retain this old partner within the NDA. At the same time, the party benefited from seat adjustments with allies that did not necessarily belong to the NDA. Its election campaign would have been more complicated without such a coalition strategy. The BJP and the Shiv Sena shared the constituencies of Maharashtra between them, the BJP and the SAD did the same in Punjab. Besides, Naidu's TDP and Paswan's Lok Janshakti Party returned to their fold and helped the party to a large extent in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. But smaller, new allies contributed to the BJP's election campaign too. The Rashtriya Lok Samata Party in Bihar and Apna Dal in UP are cases in point. The attachment of the BJP to coalition politics in spite of the Modi phenomenon shows that the party's campaign was not all that new.

Corruption

Since the 1989 elections, when V.P. Singh used the Bofors affair against Rajiv Gandhi, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University corruption has played a major role in several campaigns. In 2014, it was bound to be a factor because of the major scandals that had badly affected the reputation of UPA 2, including the 2G scam and ‘Coalgate’, which had triggered off massive mobilisations behind Anna Hazare. These issues remained prominent on the public scene also because they were on the top of the agenda of the Aam Aadmi Party. During the 2014 election campaign, Kejriwal attacked Modi along similar lines, using the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) which had discovered many ‘irregularities’ in

21 Gandhi, Jatin, “Modi's New BJP,” India Today, 28, no. 24, April 2014.

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Gujarat in 2013.22 In a very detailed report, it accused the Modi government of causing a loss to the exchequer of about Rs. 580 crore by bestowing ‘undue’ favours on large companies, including Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), Essar, the Adani group, Larsen and Troubo, Ford, etc.23 “CAG Land allotment at a throw away price was the main issue.24 This dimension of the ‘Gujarat model’ did not affect Narendra Modi during the election campaign because he was able to project a clean image, in contrast to the Nehru/Gandhi family. That was partly due to the fact that he presented himself as a bachelor, dedicated to the cause of the nation.

Modi's attacks on the Nehru/Gandhi dynasty had another dimension: not only he did not need as much ‘black money’ as this political descent did, but in contrast to this patrician lot, he was a true plebeian. Modi has always tried to present himself as an Aam Aadmi, a common man according to him, when he was Chief Minister of Gujarat, he emphasised this aspect of his origin in contrast to that of Rahul Gandhi, whom he occasionally called ‘Mr. Golden Spoon’.

The Stereotyped of Hindutva

Modi's campaign has also tried an old technique of the Hindu nationalist parties to exploit majoritarian sentiments by polarising religious communities after attempting something else. To begin with, his meetings were intended to welcome Muslims to whom skull caps and burkas were distributed in order to make them more visible in the crowd. The Muslims who attended the Jaipur meeting of Modi in September 2013 were requested to wear sherwanis and skull caps. According to observers, ‘the dress code idea has been put forward to ‘polish' the BJP's pro-Muslim image in the state’.25 These efforts were, however, short-lived. Not only did the BJP give a remarkably low number of tickets to MaulanaMuslim candidates Azad-7 outLibrary, of 428, that Aligarh is 2%26 but Muslim gradually University Modi gave some Hindutva flavour to his campaign. First, Narendra Modi continued to attack the

22 Report No. 2, Government of Gujarat – Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Revenue Receipts. 2013. 23 The Hindu, April 15, 2013. 24 The Times of India, April 13, 2013. 25 “BJP's Burqa of Secularism,” Business Standard, September 2013. 26 Jaffrelot Christophe and Gilles Verniers, “Invisible in the House,” The Indian Express, 2014.

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Congress as a party pampering to Muslims. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, he used to call the Union government ‘the Delhi Sultanate’ and Rahul Gandhi Shehzada. He also accused the UPA government of providing Rs. 50 crores subsidy for setting up slaughter houses and for promoting meat export in the framework of a ‘pink revolution’27 Modi declared: ‘There is no subsidy for farmers or for rearing cattle, but the Congress gives subsidy to those who slaughter cows’.28 Both things being identified with Muslim. Second, he associated himself with Hindu symbols and personalities. Besides wearing saffron clothes in some of the most important occasions of the election campaign, Modi visited many Hindu sacred places before his meetings. For instance, he paid respect at the admire Vaishno Devi cave before addressing an election meeting in Jammu and Kashmir. He also appeared on stage next to Baba Ramdev, a popular yogi, and Swami Adityanath, the Mahant on the Gorakhpur Math. More importantly, he decided to contest from Varanasi, the ‘capital’ of Hinduism, and not only from Vadodara. His canvassing there was replete with religious references including the sacredness of the Ganga river that had ‘called’ him to the city.29

The last section of the BJP Election Manifesto simply mentioned that the BJP would ‘explore all possibilities within the framework of the Constitution to facilitate the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya’30 Interestingly, this section on the ‘Cultural Heritage’ of India ignored the non-Hindu dimension of this heritage and mentioned only ‘Ram Mandir’, ‘Ram Setu’, ‘Ganga River', and ‘Cow and its Progeny’. The Ayodhya issue was referred to on several occasions during the election campaign.31 Pakistan, which mostly heard in Modi's speeches during the Gujarat state elections campaigns as the base of transnational terrorists striking India, was part of the BJP campaign too. In Jammu and Kashmir, he tweeted ‘3 AKs are very popular in Pakistan: AK 47,Maulana AK Antony Azad & AK Library,-49’. While Aligarh Antony was Muslim the UPA UniversityDefence Minister, Modi Delhi. He also said in a meeting in Hiranagar that these three AKs were helping Pakistan

27 The Hindu, May 3, 2013. 28 Balchand K., “Modi Fears a ‘Pink Revolution’,” The Hindu, April 3, 2014. 29 Pandey Prashant, “Narendra Modi in Varanasi: ‘I’m here on the Call of Ganga Mata’,” The Indian Express April 25, 2014. 30 Bhartiya Janata Party, Election Manifesto 2014. 31 Khare Harish, “Modi, the Man and the Message,” The Hindu, April 4, 2013.

143 in different manners. In the case of Kejriwal, this claim arrive from the fact that dubbed Kejriwal ‘AK 49’ in reference to his brief term of 49 days as Chief Minister of ‘his website shows Kashmir as part of Pakistan’.32 One month later, a former BJP minister of the Bihar government, Giriraj Singh, during one of his election meetings in Mohanpur declared: ‘Those opposing Narendra Modi are looking at Pakistan, and such people will have a place in Pakistan and not in India’33 these type of pro Hindu or Hindutva statement shows the commonality of the BJP. Besides the commonality of Hindutva, the BJP's strategy of polarisation relied on more characteristic techniques, as is obvious from the developments following the Muzzafarnagar riot in August 2013. This riot had caused the death of 55 people and the displacement of 51,000 others – a record in UP 34 Some of the BJP MLAs who had been formally implicated in the riots by the UP police were ‘felicitated by the BJP at an Agra rally addressed by Narendra Modi, where they were hailed as “heroes” who had “ensured the safety of Hindus” at the time of riots’35 At the time of ticket distribution, the UP BJP asked for the nomination of four of these MLAs. Three of them were nominated and one of them, Sanjeev Balyan, became Minister of State in Modi's government in May 2014 after winning a landslide victory in Muzzafarnagar.

RSS support

The RSS's top leaders have generally supported Modi. This is partly due to the fact that the Sangh Parivar grassroots have become increasingly supportive of Modi. This is especially true of the young swayamsevaks and pracharaks. Second, for some time there was no clear alternative (at least until December 2013, before Chouhan won in Madhya Pradesh for the third time). L.K. Advani was not considered as an effective leader because of his age and his two previous defeats. Third, the RSS leaders recognised in Modi a true,Maulana staunch Hindu Azad nationalist. Library, In fact, Aligarh his style helpedMuslim the RSSUniversity to overcome

32 The Hindustan Times, March 26, 2014. 33 The Times of India, April 20, 2014. 34 Ahmed Hilal, “Muzzafarnagar 2013: Meanings of Violence,” Economic and Political Weekly, 47, no. 40 (2013), pp. 10-12. 35 Tiwari Ravish, “Narendra Modi as a ‘Backward Leader’, Nitish Kumar as an Upper-caste ‘Hero,’” The Indian Express, April 16, 2013.

144 some of the organisation's past discouragement. He dared to say and to do things RSS old-timers would have hesitated to articulate, partly because they had experienced state repression under Nehru and Indira Gandhi. He has, for instance, openly declared being a ‘Hindu nationalist 36 for all these reasons, and also the fear that the UPA might continue to target ‘Hindu terrorists’ related to the organisation if it remained in office37 the RSS has supported Modi more forcefully than any previous BJP prime ministerial candidate. The RSS formally endorsed him during the Bangalore meeting of its top policy-making body, the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha, in March 2014, when the joint general secretary, Dattatreya Hosabale, declared: ‘Modi is a strong leader. He is a swayamsevak himself and we are proud of it. The country wants a change. He has proved his worth in Gujarat’38 Four days later, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat had to remind Swayamsevaks that they should keep some distance from politics: ‘We are not in politics. Our work is not to chant “Namo, Namo”. We must work towards our own target’39 But the RSS was already ‘working overtime, in the old fashioned way it knows best, door-to-door, its role extending well beyond managing the ubiquitous Namoraths that are strong the distant villages’40 In states where the BJP was to some extent weak, like West Bengal, the RSS suggest intensively.41

The RSS and its associate outfits in the Sangh Parivar played an active role in all the three narratives, while the BJP’s allies in the NDA primarily focussed on promoting the “development visionary” and on Modi. Thus, the BJP-NDA and the Hindutva combine employed multiple plans effectively to bring a big electoral victory. Broken down into thematic components, three social and political streams dominated this scenario. First, the people’s disappointment with the UPA II government. Second, the carefully cultivated hope in the “visionary” leadership of Modi and third, the blatant communal 42 polarisationMaulana engineered Azad through Library, riots and Aligarh attacks on Muslim minorities. University

36 Ghosh Deepshika, “Narendra Modi’s ‘Hindu Nationalist’ Posters Should be Banned, says Samajwadi Party,” NDTV.com, July 24, 2013. 37 Narayanan Dinesh, “RSS 3.0,” The Caravan, May, 2014. 38 The Hindu, March 7, 2014. 39 Yadav Shyamlal, “Bhagwat Cautions RSS Cadres Against Crossing Limits for BJP, Says Can’t Chant ‘Namo Namo,’” The Indian Express, March 11, 2014. 40 Gupta Smita, “Far from the Din, RSS Working Hard for Modi’s Success,” The Hindu, April 19, 2014. 41 Sabyasachi Bandopadhyay, “RSS ‘systematic campaign’ behind BJP entry in Bengal,” The Indian Express, May 21, 2014. 42 Ramakrishnan Venkitesh, “Five years of Betrayal,” Frontline, April 12, 2019.

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Coalition strategies of BJP after 2014 elections

Post 2014 politics in India has once again resulted in the beginning of an era of coalition politics particularly, although at the national level there was a one party rule, in which smaller regional parties having a small base in the states have an important role to play in national politics. Beginning with and post the 2014 elections, the word “development" has acquired a new place in Indian elections and is being chanted by various political parties during the election campaign without much attention being paid to this.

The BJP beat a range of new alliances, most of them on more favourable terms than in the past, while retaining its key old alliances (Shiv Sena, Akali Dal) on the same terms. Thus, in 2014 the BJP had pre-electoral alliances in 10 states compared with six alliances in 2009 in which both it and its partners contested seats, of which seven were new alliances. The BJP pursued a strategy whereby it could increase the geographical breadth and extent of its alliances. Accordingly, it made its electoral partnership with the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra but expanded the alliance to include parties such as Swabhimani Paksha, Republican Party of India (A) and Rashtriya Samaj Paksha (RSP). In Bihar, the BJP resumed its earlier pre-2002 partnership with the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), and continued with its alliance with Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab. In Haryana, the BJP forged an alliance with Haryana Janhit Congress (HJC), a breakaway faction of the Congress party. The party made an assault in Tamil Nadu and Kerala by proactively seeking out smaller parties. In Tamil Nadu, the BJP benefited with its alliance by winning one of the seven seats contested. Though the BJP failed to open its account in Kerala, it secured a respectable vote share of 10.3%. In UP, the BJP formed an alliance with minor party Apna Dal (AD). This alliance benefited the BJP in eastern Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University UP. In the east, the party made its assault by seeking new allies in West Bengal (Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and Kamtapur People’s Party (KPP) and in the states in the north-east, except Assam. The BJP’s alliance in Meghalaya with P. A. Sangma’s National People’s Party (NPP) helped it to secure one seat. In Goa the party consolidated its base by seeking an alliance with Maharashtravadi Gomantak Party (MGP). In 2014, the BJP clearly benefited in a major way from its alliance in states such as Maharashtra, Bihar and Haryana, and in a lesser but still important way from alliances in Tamil Nadu, Meghalaya, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Goa. By contrast,

146 the Congress in 2014 had alliances in eight states (Table 3), one more than its seven in 2009 on essentially the same terms as before, except that in UP and Bihar it contested in coalition, unlike in 2009, and with an improvement over the terms of 2004, the last time it allied with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) in Bihar, and with two minor allies in UP. In all other states the terms remained essentially the same.

Importance of pre-electoral allies

Importance of pre-electoral allies

In contemporary Indian politics, the incentives for national parties to form pre-electoral coalitions are straightforward. Given India’s first-past-the-post electoral system, the aggregation of votes at the constituency level is vital for winning seats. By implication, given the breakdown of the national party system into distinct state party systems, the formation of alliances with parties commanding a significant state-level vote share helps to aggregate constituency-level votes shares in states where one’s own party is not strong enough to go it alone. Hence, pre-electoral coalitions have the potential of increasing the number of seats won although they come at the expense of accept a certain number of seats to allies, and also including such allies in a post-election government.43

The BJP won 282 seats, a majority of the 543 elected, and 545 seats (including the two nominated Anglo-Indian members) in the Lok Sabha; it formed a surplus majority NDA government with its pre-electoral coalition partners, the principal ones being the Shiv Sena, LJP, TDP and SAD, taking its majority in the Lok Sabha to 334, a seemingly invulnerable position, given that the next largest party, the Congress with only 44 seats, wouldMaulana find it impossible Azad toLibrary, be the nucleus Aligarh of any Muslim possible alternative University coalition. The importance of pre-electoral allies for the BJP’s current majority needs to be noted because this is an NDA government with five non-BJP ministers in the 45-member council of ministers (four in the 23-member cabinet, of whom one each is from the Shiv Sena, TDP, SAD and LJP, and one out of the 22 ministers of state is from a minor Bihar party). Of the 282 seats won by the BJP, as many as 57 seats are accounted for by states in which the BJP depended significantly on coalition partners (not counting UP, where

43 Farooque Adnan and Sridharan Eswaran, “Is the Coalition era over in Indian Politics?” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, December 4, 2014.

147 the AD was a minor ally). These are Maharashtra (23 seats), Bihar (22 seats), Haryana (7 seats), Andhra Pradesh (2 seats), Punjab (2 seats) and Tamil Nadu (1seat), the figures in variation indicating the number of BJP seats, and principal allies in these states being the Shiv Sena, LJP, HJC, TDP and Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) and several minor parties (in Tamil Nadu), respectively (Table 2). Now, even if we assume that two-thirds of these 57 seats would have been won by the BJP contesting alone, this would still leave it 19 seats short of its present total and short of a majority. Hence, the BJP’s majority in 2014 was crucially dependent on vote transfer from its pre-electoral allies, a calculation that undoubtedly had weight in the formation of a surplus majority NDA coalition government. Coalition politics will also remain important because the BJP will need to expand its base outward from its current strongholds in the northern and central Hindi-belt states and the three western states and Karnataka towards other states in the south and east. For this it will need allies in the other southern states and possibly in Odisha, West Bengal and Assam (in all of which it has had BJD, AITC and (AGP) as allies at various times in the past). Of the BJP’s 282 seats, as many as 244, or 87%, came from this Hindi-belt plus western India stronghold, or in other words, it won a massive 81% of the 304 seats in this region, or an even more massive 92% of the seats contested (244 out of 266 contested) in this region based on a 44% vote share in this region. Reproduce such a strike rate in this region would be extremely dubious. Expansion into the south and east will be necessary and would require either a doubtful amount of jump or, more realistically, the formation of pre- electoral coalitions with regional party allies. Finally, coalitions will remain critical in the opposition space in Indian politics and can make a huge difference in some places. In the August 2014 by-elections to 10 assembly seats in Bihar, barely three months after the BJP sweep in the Lok Sabha election, the newly formed JD (U)-RJD-Congress coalition wonMaulana six out of 10 Azad seats. ForLibrary, the Congress Aligarh in particular, Muslim a viable University recovery path will of necessity involve coalition formation either before or after elections in a number of states, particularly states such as Tamil Nadu, Seemandhra, Telangana, West Bengal, Jharkhand, and, perhaps, Assam, in addition to existing coalitions in Kerala and Maharashtra.44 The BJP, since 1989, has grown partly on the basis of its own

44 Ibid.

148 ideological appeal and mobilization and partly by leveraging coalition and pre-electoral coalitions were important for the BJP’s majority in the Lok Sabha (2014).

The Rajya Sabha and the Continuing importance of Coalition Politics for the BJP-led- NDA Government leaving aside the importance of pre-electoral coalitions, the centrality of coalition politics will remain due to the NDA’s dependence on opposition parties beyond the coalition to pass legislation in the Rajya Sabha. At present, the BJP has only 43 members out of 245 seats in Rajya Sabha, and just 57 with its NDA allies.

In the state elections thereafter the BJP spread far and wide, forming governments in state after state. At one point in 2017 the BJP ruled 19 states. However, in the last five years, the political graph of the country has changed.

Jammu & Kashmir

In 87-member Assembly, a coalition government was formed between PDP with 28 seats and BJP with 25 seats after defeating the alliance of National Conference (15) and Congress (12) ruling earlier. In order to keep the BJP out of the power in the state the secular political parties led by Congress proposed a Grand Alliance or Secular Alliance consisted of the PDP, NC, and Congress. However, the PDP insisted that the mandate of the people of the Jammu region should be respected. The PDP believed that forging alliance with BJP would improve the synergy between Srinagar and New Delhi and would reduce down the trust-deficit. In the meanwhile, the BJP made it clear that keeping it out of the power would amount to disrespecting the mandate of Jammu.45 The PDP leadership thought that a hostile central government would be antithetical for the fragile peace of the state and for its policy of healing touch, the foundational principleMaulana of the PDP. Azad Proximity Library, between Aligarh the state Muslimand the central University government is also a political compulsion of the state because the state is heavily dependent on Union government for financial assistance and the prevalence of separatist tendencies, political and armed, made it imperative that Srinagar and New Delhi pull along well. Keeping the BJP out of the power would have not only intensified the regional

45 Qazi Mudasir, “The Fallout of the PDP-BJP Alliance”, Zenith International journal of Multidisciplinary Research, Vol. 9, no. 2, (2019), pp. 352-353.

149 polarisation further, which has dominated the political process in the state since 1947, but would have also invited a hostile central government.46

The BJP’s rational behind the alliance was simple to exercise power without responsibility and the second reason was what KK Kailash calls, “federal calculation,”47 Moreover, it tried to reach out to Muslim population by projecting itself accommodative through an alliance with a Muslims political party in a Muslim majority state. The alliance was cobbled despite the reservations of RSS, the BJP’s ideological mentor. The alliance was finally cobbled in March 2015 with a Common Minimum Programme or popularly called Agenda of Alliance.

The alliance gave some hope of change in the political environment of the state. It was the right moment to balance the regional and national aspiration. However, the very basis of the mandate was based on communal polarisation and that impacted the working of the coalition government from the very beginning. The BJP government at the central level neither respected Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s doctrine of Insaniyat (humanity) Jamhooriyat (democracy) and Kashmiriyat (Kashmir’s age old-legacy of amity and co-existence) nor did it appreciated the PDP’s healing touch policy, which in fact have worked in parallel during 2002-2008.48 Further, The BJP started to lose its core constituency of Upper caste Hindus voters, the by election in Gorakhpur, and Phulpur were lost by BJP, largely because of its bad economic decisions, demonetisation and GST, coupled with an act of scorning the democratic institutions. The surge in militant violence and deterioration of law and order in the state further adds to its worries. Moreover, it was the Kathua rape and murder case which further dented the BJP’s image in Jammu and that was more basic to its concern. It found its base, regional and religious, shrinking. Thus the first priority was to consolidate the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Hindu vote. After three and half years, the coalition ended in 2018. The state is now under President Rule as the Governor rule ended in mid-December 2018. The unique experiment of North Pole and South Pole ended in a dramatic way and brought political instability in the state. In the whole script the BJP outsmarted the PDP and not let the later to take the moral high ground by breaking from the alliance which was expected.

46 Ibid. p. 354. 47 Kailash K. K., “Middle Game in coalition Politics”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, no. 4 (2007), pp. 307- 317. 48 Qazi Mudasir, The Fallout of PDP-BJP, p. 356.

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As far as intra-state is concerned the alliance further sharpened the regional divide and we are witnessing a Hindu Jammu and Muslim Kashmir. Although it was acknowledged in the Agenda of Alliance that steps should be taken to bridge the gap between the regions. Yashwant Sinha compared the alliance with dyarchy and held that neither the BJP was concerned about the violence in Kashmir nor PDP cared about communal overtones in Jammu. There was clear cut division of labour within the alliance related to their political constituencies which further widened the divide between the two regions of the state. From the very beginning the alliance fought on different issues. The issues like removal of AFSPA, talks with Pakistan and Hurriyat, Rehabilitations of Kashmir Pandits, Acquittal of Separatists etc. created bad taste between the two.

Maharashtra

The wave of 2014 Lok Sabha elections leading to change of power at the Parliament have a strong impact on the Maharashtra Assembly election of 2014. The review of Lok Sabha and Assembly elections from 1960 to 2014 clearly points out that Congress party performance at election of 2014 has been worst in the five decades of Congress Political history. In the 2014 elections Congress seems to have had no clear support to the social as well as economic groups, contrary to this the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) seems to have gained support from all the sectors of the society. In case of Maharashtra too, Congress had been strongly supported by Maratha- Kunbi community, but by 1990’s the Maratha-Kunbi community in Marathawada and Vidarbha started supporting Shiv Sena and BJP on the issue of Hindutva i.e. Hinduism, while the farmer class also which was with the Congress split up to support the Peasant and workers Party. So also even in Western Maharashtra, Congress support seemed Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University to be declining. Congress in Maharashtra, in trying to concentrate on the poor and grass root sections of the society, neglected the capitalist section. It failed to frame a strategy to regain the lost support of the economic class. After the incredible victory of BJP at Lok Sabha Elections 2014 BJP looked at Maharashtra as a ‘Prestigious elections’ and a challenge against the Political History of Maharashtra as Congress stronghold and dominant state. Moreover during 1999-2014, a large number of leaders of Congress and its ally National Congress Party (NCP) were alleged of corruption and this became an issue which BJP capitalized upon during the 2014 election. It is in

151 such circumstances that Assembly elections in Maharashtra were held. In the 2014 Maharashtra Assembly elections, BJP was supported by Republican Party of India (RPI), Swabhimani Peasant Party, Rashtriya Samajwadi Party (RSP) and Shiv Sangram (SS) Party. The success of BJP although is seen as the achievement of highest number of seats in Assembly elections, it has not achieved a clear majority indicating it is not an out and out vote for BJP, rather it has been an incumbency vote, through which voters of Maharashtra while retaining some of the veteran congressites have rejected a large number of them on the grounds of their performance.49

Bihar

The 2015 Assembly Elections in Bihar has become a playground for the coalition of Janata Dal (U), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), their allies with Indian National Congress and National Congress Party on one hand, and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies on the other. The Nitish Kumar-led former alliance against BJP-led latter is one of its own kinds of election battles in the history of the state for two interesting reasons. Firstly, the eighteen years old partnership between JD (U) and BJP, which saw them through three Assembly elections, is broken this time. Secondly, Nitish (JD (U)) and Lalu (RJD) have joined forces after being arch enemies for twenty five years. Many says Nitish’s empty promises in last five years, integrate with internal rivalry between the foot soldiers of JD (U) and RJD, the elections may actually see a copy of 2014 Lok Sabha elections. On the other hand, people have also observed the power of unified Other Backward Castes (OBCs) through union of Yadavs (Lalu) and Koris and Kumris (Nitish) that will greatly diminish BJP’s vote share.50

To win the Bihar elections, the BJP, which is perceived in the state as a political party dominated byMaulana the upper castesAzad (‘Brahimin Library,-Bania’), Aligarh would Muslim need the support University of a broad social coalition, including from the lower castes that benefited from reservations. The BJP has had a limited presence in Bihar. From 2005 to 2014, it remained a junior member in a coalition government with the JD (U). The RSS was involved in every aspect of the party’s campaign, providing advice on candidates and issues, campaigning

49 Rasam Vasanti, “Changing Politics of Maharashtra- an Analysis of Maharashtra Assembly Elections- 2014,” Shivaji University Kolhapur, Maharashtra, India, December 2014. 50 Kaushik Arun Kumar and Goyal Yugankl, “Electoral Competition and Representation Political Dynamics in Bihar,” Economic & Political Weekly, 50, no. 39, September 26, 2015.

152 and mobilising voters. The seeming reorientation in the BJP’s electoral strategy- a focus on Pan- Hindu identity issues that exceed caste cleavages- was made with inputs from RSS leaders. The strategy change was implemented to create a unified spectrum of Hindu voters, overcoming caste divisions and to counter attempts by the opposition to mobilize voters. RSS workers went door to door, communicating to voters that a defeat for the BJP-led NDA in Bihar would be a ‘blow to Hindu self-esteem’ and compromise their safety. The message was given that the only a vote for BJP ‘will keep them safe in the country’. The BJP, despite the substantial support from the RSS, suffered the disgrace of an unexpectedly large defeat in the Bihar elections. The prospect of the BJP’s dominance and a concern for political survival had brought the JD (U), RJD and the Congress together to fight the BJP.

There is no better indication of the RSS’s increased influence across the Indian spectrum than the fact that Nitish Kumar, who in 2015 had issued a call for a ‘sangh- mukt Bharat’ (RSS free India), dumped his anti-BJP poll partner and provoke his alliance with the BJP in 2017.

The state of Bihar having 243 Assembly seats, witnessed a very interesting regime shift when Janata Dal United (JD-U) head Nitish Kumar broke his party’s alliance with Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal (JDU) in 2017. The new coalition government of the JD (U) came into existence with the BJP. Earlier, however, Nitish Kumar had been very critical of the BJP. The current NDA government in Bihar consists of 70 JD (U), 53 BJP, 2 LJP and 4 Independent MLAs.

Goa

SeveralMaulana political nuances Azad are Library, established Aligarh in this very Muslim sequence ofUniversity promise-in ceremonies and the events that unfolded after the results of Goa were announced. They are multidimensional and with diverse specifications for different States, but an overall assessment points to three dominant themes. First, the BJP’s political supremacy, particularly that of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and party president Amit Shah, allows the leadership extraordinary hold in extralegal political and administrative manipulation. Second, this climate of political supremacy has encouraged the BJP and its larger Hindutva fraternity led by the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) to the extent that they can afford to shed all aspiration of moderation and open their core

153 sectarian and communal agenda. Third, the Congress is stumble so pathetically in the face of this BJP-Sangh Parivar onslaught that it seems to have lost even the real politik skills for which it was once widely acclaimed across the political spectrum.

The element of extra-legal political and administrative manipulation and misuse of the power of governor was on display most strikingly in the formation of governments in Goa. The BJP got only 13 of the 40 seats in Goa, where it had an incumbent government with 24 seats in the outgoing Assembly. Chief Minister Laxmikant Parsekar was defeated in the election. The Congress, on the other hand, got 17 seats and its ally, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), won one seat. Yet, the BJP managed to cobble up a majority by forming alliances with regional parties, including Goa Forward, which won three seats and had contested the election on an overtly anti-BJP platform.51 But Governor invited the BJP to form the government after consulting Union Minister Arun Jaitley (this she disclosed in an interview). She explained her decision at that time by saying that she had waited for the Congress to approach her, but of the BJP, who was then the Defence Minister, mark his claim first and submitted letters of support from regional parties such as the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) and Goa Forward Party (GFP), claiming majority. She said she was left with no option but to invite the BJP to form the government. The Congress, left smarting, approached the Supreme Court, which also scold it for not hold its claim in time and ruled that a post-election coalition may form the government if there is no other claimant.52 The turnaround was achieved by political manipulation involving senior Union Ministers and personalities in important constitutional offices.

Gujarat

The 2014 LokMaulana Sabha elections Azad were Library, contested on Aligarh the platform Muslim of Vikas or University development and created unprecedented happiness and expectations, especially amongst the young and the middle class. The aspirational middle class expected more jobs, better infrastructural facilities and more growth opportunities. This expectation was fanned by the media and was effectively utilised by the BJP’s electoral strategists to make it the central plank of the party’s campaign. It also won some support and acceptability for the BJP from section of

51 Ramakrishnan Venkitesh, “March of Hindutva,” Frontline, April 14, 2017. 52 Dhawan Rajeev,” From Goa to Manipur Modi’s Governor has Sabotaged Democracy,” The Wire, March 23,, 2017.

154 the liberal intelligentsia and the business community who are otherwise against to BJP’s saffron agenda. BJP developed new electoral strategy of the party is to shift the electoral agenda from development to religion/regional pride. The ability of the party in changing the course of the narrative was evident during demonetisation, when the goals shifted from flushing out black money to curbing terrorism and then to digital economy.

Modi’s focus on Gujarati identity also indicates the manner in which the BJP is strategising to encash the politics of patronage. In his recent rally Modi's message was clear that this time their ‘vadapradhan’ (prime minister) is sitting in Delhi and if another of their own sits in Gandhinagar, then the development of Gujarat will happen even faster. Modi appealed to the Gujarati pride and if unreliable reports are to be believed, he has not been unsuccessful either.53

Another strategy of the ruling party was that they delaying announcement of elections and postponing the Parliament session. Although Himachal Pradesh elections were announced on 12 October, Gujarat elections were announced two weeks later on 25 October, perhaps to give more time to the state and central governments to get fix benefits to the people. Once elections are announced, and the model code of conduct comes into force, such announcements are barred. The Winter Session of Parliament was not just postponed without any date being set but nobody was consulted or told about this. Again, this was to facilitate the whole Cabinet and other leaders of the BJP to camp in Gujarat for the duration of the campaign. Modi was announcing big schemes; chief minister Rupani also announced execution of spending proposals. These appear to target the disaffected sections of Gujarat and one can obtain from them which sections have become disillusioned from the great ‘Gujarat Model of Development’. All this could have been done during the five years of BJP’s current term (or even earlier). But it needs a hard calculation of the Amit Shah kind to withhold these till the elections. Communal and castiest tactics was another strategy of the BJPMaulana there is no Azad“official” Library, connection Aligarhto this arm ofMuslim BJP’s propaganda University machine, a series of WhatsApp and Facebook videos, images, messages etc. were circulated among people giving frightful warnings about Muslim community, law and order, women’s security, terrorism and other Islamophobic material in order to sustain the communal polarization in the state and disrupt any unity that may be building between religious communities. In a state where 9% population is Muslim, the BJP has not put up even a single candidate from

53 Manish M., “Gujarat Elections: is BJP putting a new Electoral Strategy to Test?,” Governance Now, December 9, 2017.

155 that community, although there are reports that it hold up several independent Muslim candidates in constituencies to divide Muslim vote. In order to counter caste based movements led by Hardik Patel, Alpesh Thakore and Jignesh Mevani, the BJP tried to bribe colleagues of Patel, allegedly giving Rs.1 crore to one of them who later revealed the foul story to media. The government threw out a series of bribe to caste groups.54

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaigning, which was for the most part controversial and divisive, that played a role in turning a section of voters towards the BJP, thus saving it from a possible defeat. This is the period when the Prime Minister, who is hugely liked in Gujarat (by 72% of those surveyed, post-poll), campaigned extensively in the State. Starting from November 27 right up till December 11, he addressed more than 30 election rallies across the State. Most of his speeches, especially the ones made at rallies post-December 5, focussed on divisive themes. Mandir-Masjid, Mughals, Pakistan, Ahmed Patel, Salman Nizami, etc.

Assam

The election in Assam revolved around three crucial political factors: the consolidation of the BJP as the dominant party in the State; the inability of the Opposition to produce a counter-narrative; and the social polarisation on religious lines. The political dominance that the BJP found first in 2014 and then in 2016 in Assam has been a vital factor in giving the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) a definitive edge over other parties in this election. The party retained its alliance with the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF) to attain a regional character and used its newly attained regional clout to check the consolidation of anti-BJP votes.

Even as the BJP’s campaign strategy remained focussed on three major issues the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, development activities by the Union government and the performance of the BJP-led government in the State since 2016 the reason for the party’s success seems to have been the polarisation it achieved. The survey indicates that the NDA managed to mobilise all social groups in its favour, except Muslims who voted overwhelmingly for the Congress. Three-fourths of upper castes, three-fifths of the OBCs, two-thirds of Dalits and over four-fifths of Adivasis ended up voting for the BJP.

54 Varma Subodh, “BJP’s five point strategy for Gujarat- How it May not be enough,” News Click, December 8, 2017.

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But 70% of the Muslims, who constitute about a third of Assam’s population, consolidated behind the Congress. Not only did the Congress attract an overwhelming proportion of Muslim votes in Kaliabor and Nowgong as the All India United Democratic Front did not field any candidates in these constituencies, the party also won in Barpeta, where the regional party was very much present. The AIUDF, which contested in only three Muslim- dominated constituencies to avoid a division of Muslim votes elsewhere, managed to win just the Dhubri seat. The controversy over the Citizenship Amendment Bill does not seem to have affected the BJP much among Assamese Hindus, the community that was at the forefront of the protests. The survey found that the BJP alliance managed to secure 59% of the Assamese Hindu vote. This is despite the fact that the survey found that 75% of Assamese Hindus were opposed to the Bill. The BJP alliance got more votes than the Congress even among those Assamese Hindus fully opposed to the Bill. Most Assamese Hindus were opposed to the Bill and yet a majority of them voted for the BJP alliance.

In a socially diverse State that had undergone decades of ethnic conflict and insurgency, religious polarisation cutting across ethnic cleavages presents an interesting case. The party’s success lay in its ability to neutralise the opposition to the Bill and divert the attention of Hindus towards the increase in Muslim population, presumably due to arrival from Bangladesh with Congress patronage.55

Tripura

The BJP's strategy in the Assembly elections in Tripura is twofold. One is at the macro level, where expel for the war is the narrative and ideology. The second is at the micro level, where the party aims to do booth management efficiently so as to actually make the voter feel that there is a possibility of a visible difference, which will happen when the party comes to power. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University At the macro level, one of the most daunting tasks faced by the party is to convince the voters at large, that a change is possible and voting for someone other than the Left doesn't involve a threat to their lives. The emphasis on change is visible by the slogan given by the BJP, 'chalo-paltai', which means to change the incumbent.

55 Ahmed Hilal, Sharma Dhruba Pratim and Tripathi Vikas, “Post poll survey: BJP’s Polarisation Strategy hits the mark in Assam,” The Hindu, May 28, 2019.

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The conclusive victory for the BJP in the first electoral contest between the political Left and Right in the country, winning Tripura by a two-third majority, was scripted over two years. If the CPM saw it, it did little to fight back. From the issues to pick up, including salaries being paid as per the 4th Pay Commission in the state when the country had moved onto the 7th, to targeting the youth, who are believed to have broken ranks with families to vote for it, and tapping into the RSS’s long-term Northeast agenda to setting in place its own base, the BJP has been at work since January 2016 to crack the strong hold built by the Left over 25 years. Calling the RSS-BJP campaign a campaign for “Communist- Mukt Bharat”.56

Conclusion

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and BJP president Amit Shah, the party devised electoral strategies taking into account micro details of caste, sub- castes, religious compositions and other specifics of the constituencies while selecting party candidates. Under them, electoral victory at any cost became the driving force of the BJP. Part of the strategy was to carefully identify ambitious or dissident leaders from rival parties.

Those were then wooed and inducted into the party. This had begun in the run-up to the 2014 general elections when a host of Congress leaders like former UP Chief Minister Jagdamibka Pal, Satpal Maharaj and Purandeswari were admitted into the BJP. Many others like Chaudhary Birendra Singh joined the ruling party later. A Congress leader and prominent minister in the former Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi’s cabinet in Assam, , was admitted a year before the assembly elections and proved critical in the BJP’s win. In Uttarakhand, many Congress leaders, including ministers, were admittedMaulana to the party Azad before Library, the respective Aligarh assembly Muslim elections. UniversityAnother strategy was to identify castes and sub-castes which have not been part of the power structure and give tickets to their members. The party also reached out to the economically weaker and socially backward groups. In UP, the party roped in the non-Yadav castes from other backward castes and non-Jatav Dalits among the Dalits; it would reap rich electoral dividends.

56 Roy Esha, “How Tripura was won,” The Indian Express, June 26, 2018.

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Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Conclusion

India is a country of diverse identities. These identities play a role in joining different allies. like NDA and UPA, have played a significant role in formation of different coalitions for centuries. Post 2014 politics in India has once again resulted in the beginning of an era of coalition politics in which smaller regional parties having a small base in the states are having an important role to play in national politics. Bharatiya Janta Party has left no stone unturned in reaching out to the new and existing voters through digital and social media platforms. The key highlight of BJP’s social media strategy is the seamless integration across various platforms with consistent communication and messaging. The party has been phenomenal in terms of the usage of different social media platforms to the best of their capabilities. Decimating the opposition by splitting their party members, they also used ‘Horse Trading’ strategy like they did in Karnataka assembly elections of 2019, misuse of the powers of Governor in many States at the time of formation of government. Sometimes the defectors are rewarded with plum ministerial berths, often with impressive monetary gains. With every passing moment, the politics of India is moving very fast towards all battles in electoral democracy. And with these passing moments, BJP uses its best coalitional strategies at State as well as Centre to win at any cost and want to capture both the houses of Parliament with its majority members.

The Indian National Congress during its national movement days and also after independence reinforced this only in diversity. The Congress Party dominated coalitional character. The wide range of social grouping in the Congress Party make possible for the opposition parties to influence the likeminded factions in the Congress Party. Thus, in spite of providing an alternative to the Congress government, opposition partiesMaulana influenced Azad the factional Library, groups Aligarhof the Congress, Muslim which University resulted in no alteration of power. However, it was in 1967 that the electoral landscape of India took a dramatic shift and new social groups emerged and tried for space in the political process. The Congress Party could not accommodate and reconcile with the new groups, hence new political formations into existence around these social groups, which made the political process more competitive. The Congress Party was defeated in the majority of states and anti-Congress coalition governments were formed in a number of seats. The process

159 continued steadily which ultimately got institutionalised at the national level in 1989 and lasted till 2019; in 1977 first coalition government was formed but that short-lived.

In terms of strategy BJP have always swing between different set of strategies at different point of time in order to enlarge their support base. The strategies are classified as militant and moderate, while the militant strategy emphasised on the development and application of the strategy of ethno-religious mobilisation and have essentially an anti-Muslim implication in it, the moderate strategy emphasised on building up alliance with the other parties and emphasising on socio-economic populist policies.

The BJP after 1989 Lok Sabha polls emerged as an alternative to the Congress Party at the national level but it was not strong enough to stake a claim for government formation. It had limited social base which prompted it to moderate its stand to reach out to regional forces. The decline of the Congress Party created space for the BJP to strengthen itself, which in the beginning relied heavily on the Hindutva ideology. Soon the BJP realised the changing pattern of Indian politics and softened its ideological stands on issues like, ‘Uniform Civil Code’, ‘Article 370’, and ‘Ram Janmbhoomi’ among several others. This helped the BJP to attract more partners to its alliance. The other factor which was responsible for attracting state based parties and regional forces towards the BJP led alliance was that the BJP, right up to the 2004 general election was widely perceived to be electorally successful, an asset as a partner in national and state- wise alliances, and this maintained coalition tie against a common enemy, Congress. This ultimately culminated in a successful completion of tenure by the NDA government in 2004. On the other hand, the Congress Party did not opt for alliances and worked as a spoiler in some coalition governments by its outside support. This reluctant attitude towards forging an alliance with regional forces led to the further Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University degeneration of the Congress Party. The decline of Congress as a dominant force resulted in the emergence of coalition politics which was characterised by competition and cooperation among the political parties.

Anti-Congress coalition governments were formed at the national in 1977, 1989, 1996 and 1998 but all these coalition governments failed to sustain and provide an effective government. These coalition governments failed to sustain largely because of ideological differences, personality egos, factionalism and defection. Besides these general causes, the different coalition governments like Janata government, National Front government,

160

United Front government led by BJP in 1998 had their own specific causes, for the downfall. All these coalition governments after defeating their common enemy, the Congress, could not decide the crucial point. The Janata government failed because the Janata Party, which was the product of merger of the opposition parties, maintained their earlier ideological positions which created friction, hence resulted in the fall of the government. The National Front government failed because there were lack of common minimum programme and conflict managing mechanisms. Furthermore, the main party of the National Front i.e, the Janata Dal was faction-ridden. The internal factional fight within the Janata Dal created such conditions which forced the outside supporting party particularly the BJP withdraws its support from the government. The United Front government lay down a common minimum programme and put forth conflict managing institutions, but it made one mistake it kept the Congress, which was supporting the coalition governments from outside, out of the coordination committee which resulted in the breakdown of coordination between the two. Similarly, the BJP led coalition in 1998 laid down a common minimum programme and conflict managing institutions but it hardly took them seriously.

The decade long instability of coalition governments came to an end with the completion of tenure by the BJP led NDA in 2004. The NDA successfully completed its term and discarded the long held notion that coalition governments are by nature unstable. The BJP anchored the NDA coalition government. Moreover, the BJP learnt the lessons from failures of previous coalition governments and laid down a National Agenda for Governance (NAG). The agenda was based on the principle of accommodating the ideological goals of those within the alliance. In order to manage the conflicts within the NDA government, different conflict managing institutions were devised. A coordination committee was established to see the policy implementation and Maulana to resolve conflicts. Azad Library, Moreover, Aligarhan inter-ministerial Muslim group University called as Group of Ministers (GoM) that worked as a coordination mechanism to minimise the differences of opinion and conflicts within the cabinet was also established.

The strategy of BJP between 2004 to 2013 when it was functioning as an opposition party it opposed the decisions of UPA-I and II and prepared its strong coalitional base for election 2014, BJP always valued its Hindutva themes but changed its strategy according to the need of time and elections. But its campaign has been effective precisely because it combined traditional and new features.

161

BJP has left no stone unturned in reaching out to the new and existing voter’s population through digital and social media platforms. The key highlight of BJP’s social media strategy is the seamless integration across various platforms with consistent communication and messaging. The party has been phenomenal in terms of the usage of different social media platforms to the best of their capabilities. The party has launched some exceptionally innovative campaigns and initiatives like Mere Sapnon ka Bharat, NaMo Number, Chai pe Charcha to register their presence synonymous with growth, Development and Good Governance. BJP on Social Media has reached the pinnacle point, wherein, the stage is set for them to engage or merge with the scattered synergies towards one common goal, i.e, Mission 272+.

Indian electoral politics is undergoing a transformation from single party (Congress) dominant electoral system to a multi-party or coalitional system with no single dominant party because of the need of time and different ideologies of the parties which represent the diversity of the country The electoral milieu is characterized by a symbolic relationship between the two national parties and the regional parties. The BJP was better than any other party in adjusting to the decentred Indian polity. The BJP had more space to manoeuvre and form alliances with regional parties. In order to form alliances, the BJP was willing to field smaller number of candidates in national elections earlier- it was a price BJP had to pay in order to enlist the support of the regional parties and got an image at the national level. The BJP, in effect was better than Congress in forming coalitions and its strategy is more workable than other parties.

The election of 2014 seems to have initiated a new political phase whereby bringing in a government in complete mandate in terms of full fledge majority of a single party after 1984 and give a new face to coalition politics. The kind of gesture which BJP received by the public mandateMaulana makes Azadthe situation Library, look easy Aligarh to give a call Muslim for a new University “BJP System”.

India is a country of social coalition. The virtue of tolerance is inbuilt in Indian ethos. Governance by a national coalition will not be a problem. Let us hope and wish that if the coalition government formed after the 17th Lok Sabha election is led by the wisest and the best.

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