RECANATI-KAPLAN FELLOWSHIP SERIES The U.S. Intelligence Enterprise and the Role of Privatizing Intelligence Sunny Jiten Singh PAPER SPRING 2019 Recanati-Kaplan Foundation Fellowship Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 www.belfercenter.org/fellowships/recanatikaplan.html Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Design and Layout by Andrew Facini Cover photo: From left, CIA Director Gina Haspel, Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Gen. Robert Ashley, with (not pictured) FBI Director Christopher Wray, National Security Agency Director Gen. Paul Nakasone and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Director Robert Cardillo testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington Tuesday, Jan. 29, 2019. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana) Copyright 2019, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America RECANATI-KAPLAN FELLOWSHIP SERIES The U.S. Intelligence Enterprise and the Role of Privatizing Intelligence Sunny Jiten Singh PAPER SPRING 2019 About the Author Sunny J. Singh is a 2018-2019 Recanati-Kaplan Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center where he worked on the Intelligence Project. With wide-ranging government experience to include work as a Political Analyst covering global hotpots and as a former Presidential Daily Briefer, his research interests include studying current global events through a lens of historical analysis and the potential strategic implications those bear on U.S. national security. As such, Sunny’s previous research focused on the use of spy craft in states predating the second millen- nium BC and its significance on modern intelligence. His book, Kautilyan Antecedents of the Westphalian Order, which focuses on the extent of the Mauryan State under Canakya was published in 2008. Sunny holds a Master’s in Diplomacy from the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University and a Ph.D. in Global Affairs from Rutgers University. Acknowledgements The author wishes to recognize the former Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, for being gracious with his time to review the paper and for offering his invaluable insight. The author is grateful to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Director of the Intelligence Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs for his leadership and support throughout the duration of the Recanati-Kaplan Fellowship. ii The U.S. Intelligence Enterprise and the Role of Privatizing Intelligence Table of Contents 1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................1 2. The Intelligence Enterprise—The Beginnings .................................................3 Colonial Alliances .........................................................................................................................3 The Shift from Singular to Modular Intelligence Contracting ............................................11 3. The Government and Private Industry: Post-9/11 Paradigm21 .................. 4. Regulatory Ambiguity Fosters Loopholes ...................................................25 5. The Approach Forward .....................................................................................30 Conclusion................................................................................................................... 37 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School iii From left, CIA Director Gina Haspel, Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Gen. Robert Ashley, with (not pictured) FBI Director Christopher Wray, National Security Agency Director Gen. Paul Nakasone and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Director Robert Cardillo testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington Tuesday, Jan. 29, 2019. AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana 1. Introduction To understand the US intelligence community and the seventeen com- ponents1 comprising it, one must study the collective as an enterprise that gathers intelligence, conducts all-source, non-policy prescriptive and objective analysis which it disseminates and briefs to policymakers. The underlying force behind the intelligence enterprise consists of three parts; its workforce, the private firms that support that workforce through intel- ligence-driven contracts2 and the context upon which these two interplay. Only then does the complexity of this arm of the national security appara- tus come into focus. This paper offers a descriptive and a prescriptive narrative that provides context on the where we’ve been on the evolution of the government-in- dustry relationship and postures on the where we must go to remedy the concerns outlined herein of this duality. As such, the paper highlights key succinct episodes of American history that shed light on the foundational elements of intelligence gathering through three phases; informal and singular relationships, quasi-governmental networks, and the transforma- tion of the former to the modern commercial industry. Throughout these stages, it becomes evident that the reliance of the US government on pri- vate entities grew during internal and foreign wars as did the blurred lines of who should do what and under whose authority. The primary underlying theme that emanates throughout the paper is the realization that while the National Security Act of 1947 was established to codify the loose threads 1 The author stresses that there are seventeen intelligence components vice agencies of the United States, to include five whose principal mission is to produce intelligence; the others augment the principal five organizations with the caveat of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which is a hybrid. These components comprise the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Army Intelligence and Security Com- mand, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Air Force Intelligence, the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Department of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 2 The United States Intelligence Community breaks down contracting into two spheres, core and non-core. The core contracting system relies on companies in the private sector who provide contractors to support the government in a variety of roles, which this paper outlines in subse- quent pages. The non-core contracting base conducts services that has no direct role on mission or operational equities. These roles include but are not confined to providing custodial, food and like services. The non-core contractors are uncleared. Additionally, further nuance distinguishes between contractors who produce commodities such as collective equipment, such as RPVs, work stations, vice contractors who provide Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance to augment the government’s workforce. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 1 of intelligence collection, especially after the failure of US intelligence to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbor; what has transpired is a return to the loosely governed intelligence structure emphasized yet again by a lack of demarcation of what does and does not constitute core governmental functions, limited oversight and accountability, decision-making authority and a pronounced outsource culture. At no time in US history, the paper suggests, does this aspect of the government-private sector partnership get lost in translation than following the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the dizzying number of civil liberty and human rights violations accompa- nying it. Today, the cottage industry as it has become, outsourcing has shown its ugly face with serious lapses in responsible behavior. Inversely, any lapse in policymaking would be considered equally irresponsible. While there is no doubt that as outsourcing continues to nourish and flourish private industry, there is likely to be less oversight because Congress is over- whelmed by the sheer enormity of privatized intelligence functions, not to mention longstanding issues facing congressional committees such as staffing shortages to conduct effective oversight. As such, noting this trend, the for-profit private industry will continue to reap the rewards of a policy- making establishment it considers weak. The purpose of the paper is not to suggest that outsourcing has no place in the role of government; to the contrary, the paper argues the elements of these two spheres have morphed into this modern strand of DNA which cannot be undone but to the point, DNA functions within the confines of the right environment as should outsourcing under straightforward regulation. The privatization of intelligence cannot be allowed to function in a vacuum and inadequate oversight must be called out to avoid further