Music Education As Aesthetic Education: a Critical Inquiry

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Title: Music Education as Aesthetic Education: A Critical Inquiry

Author(s): David J. Elliott

Source: Elliott, D. J. (1991, Fall). Music education as aesthetic education: A critical inquiry. The Quarterly, 2(3), pp. 48-66. (Reprinted with permission in Visions of Research in Music Education, 16(2), Autumn, 2010). Retrieved from http://www- usr.rider.edu/~vrme

Visions of Research in Music Education is a fully refereed critical journal appearing exclusively on the Internet. Its publication is offered as a public service to the profession by the New Jersey Music Educators Association, the state affiliate of MENC: The National Association for Music Education. The publication of VRME is made possible through the facilities of Westminster Choir College of Rider University Princeton, New Jersey. Frank Abrahams is the senior editor. Jason D. Vodicka is editor of the Quarterly historical reprint series. Chad Keilman is the production coordinator. The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning is reprinted with permission of Richard Colwell, who was senior consulting editor of the original series. Music Education as Aesthetic Education: A Critical Inquiry

By David]. Elliott University of Toronto

~~lVl usic education as aes- If it can be further demonstrated that the thetic education" (or source of this commitment is logically flawed, MEAE) 'is one of the then the need for critical re-examination be- most influential concepts in the history of comes even more immediate. Such is the our field. For decades its principles have case, I believe, with the philosophy of music been repeated, refined, and assumed in education as aesthetic education. countless publications. For years its as- Overview sumptions have been applied by curriculum planners and classroom teachers. Accord- In a previous review (Elliott, 1989a), I examined ingly, generations of music educators have several weakness in MEAE. Here I undertake a been reared on its beliefs. more through philosophical analysis. The most extended expression of these be- Indeed, it is important to emphasize that the liefs is Bennett Reimer's A Philosophy ofMu- intent of this effort is nothing more or less than to sic Education (1970) The range and depth "do philosophy" on behalf of music education. of Reimer's work has made MEAE an intellec- \Vhat "doing philosophy" includes is being "criti- tual hub for inquiries differing widely in pur- cal"-not in the vulgar sense of deliberately find- pose, motivation, and method during the last ing fault, but in the Greek sense of kritikos. being 20 years. In short, A Philosophy ofMusic a careful scrutinizer of reasons, concepts, and be- Education (APME) is one of music liefs to separate light claims from wrong. In sum, education's "classic" formulations. an uncritical philosopher is no philosopher at all. Given the stature of MEAE and the complete What the MEAE philosophy has taken decades reaffirmation of its underlying beliefs in the to develop cannot be fully examined in one essay. new edition of APME (1989), it may seem that Accordingly, the focus here is MEAE'sphilosophi- there is little to say at this point beyond noting cal foundations. Consider, however, that since new variations on old themes. Not so. J\lIEAE'spractical guidelines depend on these The "new" version of MEAE provides an im- foundations, the adequacy (or not) of the latter portant opportunity to remind ourselves that directly implicates the former. unexamined philosophical commitment is of To anticipate, I suggest that despite moditica- negative value where the health of a profes- tions and additions, the central weaknesses of sion is concerned. Viewed as rational prac- MEAE are not only repeated but deepened in tices, music, education, and music education APME (1989) Chief among these weaknesses are are dynamic, evolving systems. In contrast, the following: philosophical commitment is often static. 1. MEAE depends on a cluster of blurred distinctions and oversimplified dichotomies that undermine Hence guidance therefrom is likely to become its logical integrity; obsolete eventually. A<; a matter of principle, 2. the basic premises of MEAE depend on a reduc- then, our commitment requires regular review. tionist concept of "music;" and 3. at its core, MEAE is only a cogent explanation of David]. Elliott is Professor and Chair of Mu- Susanne Langer's illogical theory of alt. sic Education at the Uniuersity of Toronto, These weaknesses do not disqualify MEAE Ontario, Canada. completely. Nevertheless, they are sufficient

48 The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning in number and depth to aver that MEAEnot Although MEAE's basic equation (music = only fails to provide a plausible explanation of fine art) may seem quite natural and the nature and value of MUSIC, it fails to offer unassailable at first, it is neither. The assump- a defensible account of the uniqueness and tion that music is a "fine art" (or aesthetic) in necessity of music in education. In short, its nature and value is not only theory-laden, it while its place in history is not in dispute, is theory-generated. Accordingly, several phi- MEAE's status as a philosophy certainly is. losophers suggest that to embrace the "aes- This article has two parts. Part One addresses thetic" concept of music is to embrace a par- the first and second weaknesses listed above. ticularly limited notion. Indeed, the aesthetic Part Two addresses the first concept of music rests on and third. More specifically, the obsolete social and his- Part Two attempts to explain torical pronouncements of a why MEAE's central claim- Philosophy" is distant time and place (See that "music education is the Berleant, 1986; Sparshott, education of human feeling" not a conve- 1982, 1987; Wolterstorff, (Reimer, 1989,p. 53)-fails the nience store full 1980, 1987; Donougho, test of logical scrutiny. 1987; Subotnick, 1987; of theories ~wait- Danto, 1986). Part One ing to be pur- First of all, then, although The fundamental premises Reimer claims that "there of MEAEstate that "the essen- chased by rm.isic exists at present an ex- tial nature and value of music educators shop- tremely high level of agree- education are determined by ment about the nature of the nature and value of the art ping for the 'best music ... among those of music [italicsmine]" (Reimer, possible point of who have given serious 1989, p. 1).1 APME promises thought to this matter" (p. to explain the meaning of these view.' Rather, 3), much serious thought in premises through "reasoned, philosophy is an the contemporary philoso- careful, systematic statements" phy of music speaks against (p. 2). At first glance, every- active practice: it this claim. To explain more thing seems in order. Unfortu- is the critical fully, we must look care- nately, these premises blur fully at what "aesthetics" several important concepts and exarrlination of really means. distinctions. Let me explain. concepts, as- 1.2 "Aesthetics," says 1.1 Although the term "art" Reimer, is "the branch of saturates MEAE from begin- surnptioris and philosophy concerned with ning to end, Reimer does not beliefs. questions of the nature and explain that what he actually value of the arts" (p. 1). means by "art" is not art, but Furthermore, says Reimer, "fine art." The distinction is " Aesthetics is the study of that crucial. Why? Stated correctly, about art which is the essence MEAE's premises go as follows: The essential of art ... so among all the disciplines of nature and value of music education are de- thought that are interested in the arts, aesthetics termined by the nature and value of the fine is the one devoted to an explanation of their intrinsic nature. (p. 2) art of music. This distinction highlights two There are several reasons to question key questions: Reimer's notion of aesthetics. First, aesthetics 1. Who/What says that music is a priori a "fine art"? and is not the (only) branch of philosophy con-

2. How does the equation music = "fine art" cerned with the nature and value of music. restrict or expand our understanding of what Aesthetics (properly understood) offers only MUSIC is? one particular viewpoint on the nature and Section 1.3 below provides several answers. value of music. Hence it is arbitrary to im- First, however, a larger point must be made. ply, as APME implies, that aesthetics is the

Volume II, Number 3 49 definitive philosophical source on what is ena. Aesthetics provided the required con- essential about music's nature and value. In cept. According to the "aesthetic concept," fact, as I argue next, it may be the reverse. music, painting, and so on are not "useless;" l.3 Western philosophical thought about rather, they all have one particular use: They art and beauty began with the Greeks. But it are "objects" which exist primarily to be con- was not until the eighteenth century that a templated "aesthetically," i.e., in abstraction particular group of theorists including from their contexts of use and production. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Baumgarten The formalization of the "aesthetic con- founded "aesthetics" and, along with it, the cept" was aided by the social practice of con- notion of art as "fine art." ceiving and using "music" (and so on) as a "Aesthetics" was originally coined by a collection of objects or "works" in this fine young German philosopher, A. G. art way: of "that use itself coming into Baumgarten (1735), to designate a field of prominence among the cultural elite of the study that would accomplish for the emo- eighteenth century" (Wolterstorff, 1980, p. 7). tional effectiveness of nondiscursive symbols Theoretical norms of contemplation were si- what logic accomplished for the symbols of multaneously and subsequently codified. conventional reasoning. Most attempts to These norms included the overarching con- formulate a systematic theory of "fine art" cept of "aesthetic experience" and its con- based on aesthetic assumptions, including comitants: intrinsicality, disinterestedness, Susanne Langer's theory of art, duplicate psychical distance, and so on. (Two hun- Baumgarten's intent. dred years later, MEAE continues to embrace From a primary concern with poetic imag- and promote these same aesthetic norms ery, Baumgarten's sense of "aesthetics" grew wholly and uncritically [See Reimer, 1989, quickly to include the images of painting, the pp. 102-104]) Those for whom the "fine arts" general effectiveness of works of art and, fi- were the center of concern made aesthetics nally, all natural things. Those who consid- into the theory of alt. ered the beauty of art no different than the Properly understood, then, aesthetics is not beauty in nature deemed aesthetics the study a synonym for "the philosophy of art" or "the of beauty. Aesthetics is still commonly used philosophy of music," as aesthetic educators in this sense: namely, as "pertaining to sen- believe. Rather, aesthetics is "that branch of sory contemplation and its objects." Aesthet- philosophy that is concerned with the analy- ics then become entangled with the notion sis of concepts and the solution of problems that beauty was something accessible only to that arise when one contemplates aesthetic those with taste. Like morality, taste was objects" (Hospers, 1967, p. 35). Aesthetics is considered an attribute that was innate yet not the theory of art; aesthetics is one par- open to influence through education. In ticular body of theory. Moreover, aesthetic short, as conceived by Baumgarten and theories are inherently narrow. How so? Be- elaborated by Kant in his Third Critique, aes- cause the aesthetic concept of music begins thetics was actually "an offshoot of attempts and ends with the reductionist assumption to formulate a normative theory of taste; that that music has only one nature and one pur- is, to vindicate the preferences of cultivated pose: "Music" is essentially a matter of au- persons" (Sparshott, 1987, p. 39). tonomous objects or "works" that exist to be Now prior to the emergence of aesthetics contemplated in a uniform and narrow way, in the eighteenth century there was no such i.e., aesthetically. It is precisely this set of thing as the grouping we now call the "fine eighteenth-century axioms that underlies arts." Of course, music, painting, poetry, and MEAE (See Reimer, 1989, pp. 28, 99) and that so on were in place centuries before MEAE continues to perpetuate. Baumgarten's arrival, as was the term "art" in The question that arises next is this: Why the Greek sense of ars or tecbne something did the aesthetic concept and its accompany- done or made.s Missing until the eighteenth ing norms emerge at this particular time? century, however, was a conceptual basis for Several writers, including Donougho (1987), uniting these otherwise disparate phenom- Geertz (983), Kristellar (1965), Elias (969),

50 The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning Berleant (1986), and Bourdieu (1972, 1984) thetic experience-are "anachronistic . . . and emphasize that aesthetics was indigenous to manifestly unsatisfactory" in accounting for the social context of eighteenth-century Eu- most examples of music, dance, painting, rope. The nobility of the time were legiti- and so on of the past century and even "mis- mized as such by their association with the leading" when applied to examples from ear- princely courts of the period, and, naturally, lier periods (p, 104). by their preference for and support of court- In sum, since one aspect of MUSIC no approved pursuits. Such pursuits included doubt involves its status as a product, and the "beaux arts." Music was at the center of since aesthetics offers one important histori- this legitimation and sponsorship process. cal notion of the product dimension of mu- Donougho (1987) comments on this "prestige sic, it would not be unreasonable to suggest function" of fine art: that the "aesthetic concept" of music be It served to mark off the nobility from the granted a limited place within a more com- crowd and to affiliatethem with the court. prehensive and realistic philosophy of music Having lost the status attendant upon their mili- education. But more than this, would be un- tary role, they [the nobility]received compensa- reasonable since, as many philosophers now tion in aesthetic coin. Becoming cultured rather than learning how to use the rapier became the hold, the central weakness of aesthetics is primary duty of the gentleman, the" bonnete that it fails to acquit MUSIC as a rich and bomme," And where the elite had used to par- complex human phenomenon. The aesthetic ticipate in popular culture (festivals,carnivals, concept of music is unjustifiably essentialist: and the like), they now began to withdraw and It is on a hopeless quest for the singular es- establish a sense of "high" culture, excluding sence of "art," something that we can catch the "low" (p, 342). and repeat in one evocative phrase. l.4 In view of the above, it seems reason- It follows from the above that APME's fa- able to suggest that MEAE's definition of aes- miliar distinctions among three alternative thetics is, at best, incomplete. What Reimer theories of art-referentialism, absolute for- defines as "the branch of philosophy con- malism, and absolute expressionism (pp. 14- cerned with the nature and values of the 29)-are distinctions without a difference. arts" (p. 1) is the philosophy of art, not aes- How so? Because all three theories are aesthetics. Moreover, aesthetics and the phi- thetic theories. They all begin and end with losophy of music are not synonymous, be- the constricted notion that "music" Callmusic cause not all philosophical thinking about everywhere) is a priori a collection of au- music embraces the assumptions underlying tonomous aesthetic objects. the "aesthetic" concept of music. Indeed, Thus, in addition to being conceptually several contemporary philosophers empha- and historically inaccurate, MEAE's equa- size that what some people (especially aes- tions-i.e., aesthetics = the philosophy of art thetic educators) too often take as fact-that = the philosophy of music-give music edu- music is aesthetic in nature and value-is not cators the false impression that there are no a fact, nor is it born of fact, nor do all phi- philosophical alternatives to the aesthetic losophies of music begin and end with the view. As Alperson (1987) clearly demon- norms promulgated by aesthetics. The aes- strates, however, there is a large body of thetic concept of music is merely one notion Western philosophical thinking about music of music rooted in eighteenth-century a that originated with the Greeks and that priori assumptions. flourishes today unencumbered by the aes- More to the point, the likelihood that the thetic concept. On these grounds, Sparshott main ingredients of this originating context (1982) objects to the common confusion be- have already passed away and that the aes- tween aesthetics and the philosophy of a11 thetic axioms anchoring MEAE are now ob- that MEAE perpetuates: solete has been argued vigorously of late .. works of art are made before they are en- (e.g., Sparshott, 1980; Berleant, 1986; joyed. Not only does their status as things Wolterstorff, 1987). Berleant (1986), for ex- made by people radically affect the way we ample, argues that the old aesthetic axioms- perceive them and think about them, but the aesthetic object, aesthetic qualities, and aes- making itself is a human activitythat one would

Volume II, Number 3 51 "The nobility of [eighteenth-century Europe] were Iegitirnizecl as such by their association with the princely courts of the period, and ... Music was at the center of this Iegitimatiori and sponsorship process." -- David]. Elliott

expect to be more, rather than less, an ex- piece of music. In all cases, the goal is to pression of human intelligence than the ap- achieve an "aesthetic experience" by perceiv- preciation of criticism of them. . . . But to ing and reacting to the "aesthetic compo- treat the philosophy of art as a division of nents of a thing" (p. 107). Thus, says aesthetics casts doubt on the legitimacy of Reimer, just as the "music educator (aesthetic this procedure (Sparshott, 1982, p. 16). to the core)" looks at the natural valley scene 1.5 Sparshott's observation leads us to and "loses himself in the expressive qualities other blurred distinctions in APME. First presented to his vision" so that "his experi- among these is Reimer's claim that "the ence is aesthetic" (p. 105), the very same mu- words 'musical' and 'artistic' will often be sic educator moves next to a Mozart sym- used to substitute for the word 'aesthetic' be- phony and approaches it in the same way. cause they usually mean the same thing" (p. "He [sic] perceives those qualities which xiii). Reimer's conflation of these terms is make sound expressive-melody, rhythm, mistaken. There is an important body of harmony, tone color, texture, form-and philosophical discourse that speaks against their fusion in a work . . . His experience of the suggestion that these terms "usually mean the music ... is aesthetic" (p. 106). Indeed, the same thing." A simple example will em- his or her experience is aesthetic, but this phasize the crucial distinction between "aes- does not automatically mean that our busy thetic" and "artistic." music educator's experience of the Mozart Any phenomenon, natural or human-made, symphony is artistic, let alone musical. To can be examined in terms of its sensuous, for- be musical, one's experience and under- mal, or "beautiful" qualities. A sunset, for ex- standing of a Mozart symphony must go far ample, can be looked at solely in terms of its beyond aesthetic qualities. colors and so on. But the experience of a Educationally speaking, then, whereas a painting of a sunset is a different matter alto- comprehensive philosophy of music or gether. Here we must be concerned not only painting would be equally concerned with a with the concrete aspects of the painted sun- wide range of considerations impacting on a set, but with its artistic (as well as its many musical performance or a painting, an aes- other) aspects: e.g., the skill and knowledge thetic philosophy like MEAE focuses almost demonstrated in the production of the paint- exclusively on aesthetic elements (Reimer's ing; the standards of artistry met or failed; the brief references to "artistic/cultural influ- way certain traditional problems, techniques, ences" notwithstanding). In fact, aesthetic and processes of painting were taken up, met, theories in general, and the aesthetic theo- or surpassed; the way the sunset is character- ries of Langer and Meyer in particular (upon ized by the artist, and so on. But in the case which the MEAE depends), have little to say of a natural sunset, artistic criteria do not apply about artistic matters. Accordingly MEAE since a sunset has no link with a human artist. has little to say about artistic matters. MEAE In other words, what separates a painting of a conceives such aspects of MUSIC as craft, sunset from the "natural beauty" of a real sun- skill, technique, artistry, expertise, and per- set is the presence or absence of human formance as "means behaviors" (p. 167) or agency and artistry. "technical-critical" considerations that have According to MEAE (pp. 104-106), how- no intrinsic values. Indeed, it is a major ever, it apparently matters little whether one weakness of MEAE that it makes no use of is looking at a natural country scene, or a important distinctions in the recent philo- painting of a country scene, or listening to a sophicalliterature of "artistry" (e.g., Howard,

52 The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning "Elliott's quote about ho~ the nobility in eighteenth-century Europe used the 'prestige function' of fine art to mark themselves off from the crovvd ... is about as germane to contemporary aesthetics ... as eighteenth-century science is to contemporary quantum physics." -- Bennett Reimer

1982; Best, 1982; Fethe, 1977; Rao, 1988). nature and the value of music is, therefore, a In short, MEAEis an aesthetic philosophy questionable philosophical strategy. In fact, through and through, not an artistic philoso- it contradicts APME's promise to provide mu- phy. The point is worth emphasizing in sic educators with "a probing analysis of the view of the implication arising from APME's nature of music" (p, 7). Moreover, consider conflations that MEAE is more comprehen- that APME's one-dimensional notion of phi- sive than it really is. In fact, the MEAEno- losophy may be partly to blame for its ten- tion provides minimal insight into many es- dency to traffic in oversimplified dualisms sential concepts related to music as an artis- (e.g., reasoning versus feeling, science versus tic endeavor in general, and to music and art, making versus creating) as opposed to music education as it concerns performance undertaking careful conceptual analyses of in particular. Hence MEAE's curricular sug- these key terms. More on this in a moment. gestions about performance as a "means" in 1.7 For the above reasons, I suggest that both general music and performance pro- an explanation of the natures and values of grams are weakly founded. music are not necessarily (or even likely) to In sum, because MEAE's aesthetic axioms be found in an aesthetic concept of music as exclude the vast majority of ways of concep- MEAEmaintains. Put differently, Reimer's tualizing and experiencing music, an aes- claim that "aesthetics is the study of that thetic concept of music is, at best, an over- about art which is the essence of art" (p. 2) is simplified concept. Indeed, MEAE's prior comparable to claiming that (say) Puritanism assumption that the nature and the value of is the study of that about religion which is music (instead of natures and values) can be the essence of religion. determined for all music everywhere is, in Indeed, by relying on aesthetics for a itself, narrow and arbitrary. This last point grounding concept of music, MEAE negates deserves a further word. the possibility of developing a philosophy of 1.6 In contrast to the position taken in music education based on an independent APME,I suggest that "philosophy," properly philosophy of music as MUSIC. The objec- understood, is not concerned with saying what tions of aesthetic educators notwithstanding, is "necessary and unique" about phenomena it seems clear that MEAE's grounding "aes- like music, or what music is "at bottom" (p. thetic concept" of music is static: It rests 85). Rather, philosophy seeks to say what mu- squarely on the central axioms of eighteenth- sic is all about when considered comprehen- century "aesthetics" (Berleant, 1986). sively. Furthermore, philosophy is not a con- Thus, when Reimer claims that "the posi- venience store full of theories waiting to be tion about art being taken in this book is, purchased by music educators shopping for essentially, a 'musical' one" (p. 119), it is ac- "the best possible point of view" (pp. 14-15). tually the reverse. (In any case, what we Rather, philosophy is an active practice: It is need and want is not a philosophical posi- the critical examination of concepts, assumption on fine art, but a philosophical position tions, and beliefs. On this view, precise dis- on MUSIC.) Properly understood, the posi- tinctions and comprehensiveness are the hall- tion about music taken in MEAE is not a mu- marks of good philosophy. sical one but an aesthetic one. That is, MEAE's initial insistence that we should Susanne Langer's theory of fine art (MEAE's confine ourselves to a search for the single foundation) begins with the prior assumption

Volume II, Number 3 53 that music = autonomous aesthetic objects (= subservient to internal "aesthetic qualities." "perceptible forms" = "presentational sym- Thus we find, for example, that MEAE cat- bols" and so on). egorizes the "technical-critical" experience of 1.8 In view of the above, MEAE's conten- music as "nonmusical" because it is tion that aesthetic appreciation is the most "nonaesthetic" Cp. 120): i.e., because "in this appropriate way of approaching musical per- response the perception is of the technical formances "is to promote a normative rather and peripheral elements which go into the than a descriptive paradigm of artistic re- making of music" (p. 125). Following sponse. It may be desirable to some, but Reimer's previous cont1ation (aesthetic = ar- that is all" (Markowitz, 1983, p. 34). tistic), such matters are therefore also Indeed, in reflecting on the logic and plausi- nonartistic. Note also that matters of audi- bility of MEAE'snotion of "musical experience size, intonation, and style are listed to- ence," consider that aesthetics defines "musi- gether under "technical-critical" as if they all cal" via a negative norm. That is, MEAEinsists had equal status in the process of music- that listeners ought not to consider the sounds making Cp. 125). that they listens to in equal relation to human More importantly, MEAE seems wrong to concerns outside the sounds themselves: so- suggest that the control and deployment of cial, historical, moral, political, religious, or technical elements of a performance are a even musically "technical-critical." MEAE's priori "mechanical" elements. Excellent per- theoretical center of gravity lies inward: "Ab- formances pivot on how they are achieved, solute Expression," says Reimer, "insists that and how they are achieved involves "tech- meaning and value are internal; they are func- nique" as part of artistry and musicianship in tions of the artistic (i.e., the aesthetic) qualities a far more rich and complex sense than themselves and how they are organized." MEAEever takes up in its limited references Accordingly, MEAE insists that the listener to "craftsmanship." Surely the matters of a strive for a kind of "immaculate perception" pianist's style and a violinist's vibrato are not of so-called aesthetic qualities. Of course, as simply "technical-critical" and not at all we now realize, this asocial, ahistorical "nonmusical" as MEAE declares (p. 120). amoral-in a word, this "a-human"-notion Before leaving the point about "outside" of musical experience is in keeping with musical matters, consider that Kivy (1984) is Europe's eighteenth- and nineteenth-century only one among several contemporary phi- ethnocentric norms of appreciation. losophers who has provided rich and de- In fairness, Reimer does tack on the qualifi- tailed explanations of the so-called cation that "the artistic/cultural influences "extrarnusical significance" of representa- surrounding a work of art may indeed be tional music. Such analyses provide strong strongly involved in the experience the work reasons to question MEAE's narrow view that gives, because they become part of the inter- referential musical experiences are a priori nal experience for those aware of these influ- nonmusical because they are "nonaesthetic" ences" (p, 27). As far as MEAEtakes it, this Cp.120). In fact, one of the several ways in makes sense; unfortunately, MEAE doesn't which music performs its several cognitive take it very far. It can't. MEAE's focus is functions is the way in which some works dominantly internal in all circumstances. act as predicates to various "subjects" Moreover, MEAE does not provide a plau- (people, events, places). That is, passages of sible explanation of how external influences music can and do function as musical "predi- become internal, or how a listener can be cates" to characterize "subjects" indicated by concerned with practical and social aspects titles and programs. Such pieces and pas- of music and, at the same time, "be removed sages "characterize" by means of the equal from practical, utilitarian concerns" (p. 103). interplay between musical patterns and con- In sum, MEAEmaintains that all music ev- textual cues that we understand verbally and erywhere ought to be approached aestheti- nonverbally, not by reference to a dictionary cally by making "external" considerations- of one sort or another, but by knowledge even artistic considerations of performance- and cultural conventions.

54 The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning Overall, MEAE directs the listener to ho- philosophy of music, the philosophy of art, mogenize the diversity of practices and pur- the history of musical practice, and poses that musical performances and compo- ethnomusicology presents a major challenge sitions can and do involve by: (1) imputing a to the "aesthetic concept" of music that an- single purpose to all of them; (2) imposing a chors MEAE: "the assumption that music is single mode of response on all their listeners; necessarily art in the fine art sense is and (3) attributing a single motivation to all ahistorical and arbitrary" (Donougho, 1987, artists. Furthermore, MEAE holds that the p. 24). Put differently, the aesthetic axioms music of all cultures must be approached in that anchor.MEAE relate to the contemporary the same way, i.e., aesthetically (p.145). This philosophy of music as IQ relates to the con- seems to defy logic, cultural reality, and the temporary psychology of intelligence. Ac- basic ideals of multicultural education, as I cordingly, MEAE's aesthetic concept of music argue elsewhere (Elliott, 1990) could no more ground (say) Wolterstorff's In plain English, MEAE's insistence that all multifaceted reflections on music than the IQ instances of "music" everywhere ought to be concept could ground Howard Gardner's approached aesthetically, listened to aes- theory of multiple intelligences. thetically, and taught aesthetically is analo- 1.10 As a coda to this part of the discus- gous to a sports law stating that all instances sion, and as a prelude to the next, let us now of "football" ought to be approached, appre- examine a concept that is given a prominent ciated, and taught as soccer. MEAE's insis- place in the new version of MEAE: namely, tence will only impress those who are al- Reimer's concept of "a concept." Reimer ready convinced. wants to say that music is "nonconceptual in In fact, what is the basis for MEAE's edict essence," but this cannot be held. Musical that if a person does not follow the aesthetic cognition is conceptual in both the traditional rules of engagement, then a person's experi- sense (which Reimer underestimates) and in ence is "nonmusical"? The basis cannot be the much more contemporary senses of the past or present human practice. The Greeks term which Reimer overlooks. Moreover, had music but no concept of "the aesthetic MEAE's fabricated dichotomy, music (= non- point of view," and many forms and practices conceptual) versus the basics (= conceptual), of contemporary music and world musics is not only unsupportable, it shoots music militate against such norms. The same is educators in the foot. Let me explain. true of many other musics in many other pe- Based on what he believes are "two excel- riods of musical history. In fact, the imposi- lent definitions of a concept" (taken from tion of a uniform method and standard of Gowin, 1970 and Kaelin, 1970), Reimer aesthetic perception in relation to all music makes three untenable claims (pp. 80-81). listening seems to be the antithesis of what is First, says Reimer, "what is needed for a con- most observable about the practice, the pro- cept to exist ... is something that is mani- duction and the experience of music: its di- fested more than once. A singular instance versity, non uniformity, and ambiguity-even of something cannot be a concept" (p. 81). with respect to its perception. The second thing needed for a concept, says 1.9 To conclude this brief examination of Reimer, "is some sort of sign or symbol, or aesthetics, consider that the essence of music name, or indicator of the common feature conceived aesthetically lies in a set of prede- being noticed" (p. 81) Third, a concept has termined norms that dictate an idiosyncratic to do with "how well a person associates a concept of what music is. The link between particular symbol or name with the phenom- music and aesthetics (properly understood) is enon to which it refers" (p. 83). Let us take therefore not a natural link; it is a purely each of these claims in turn. theoretical link based on the institutionaliza- First, although it has long been assumed that tion of a specific social/historical doctrine of a singular instance of something cannot be a production, attention, appreciation, evalua- concept, substantive evidence from cognitive tion, and interpretation. science leaves little doubt now that a concept The weight of modern scholarship in the can be represented by what cognitive scien-

Volume 11, Number 3 55 "More directly, Reirrier's 'nonconceptual' notion of rm.isic shoots rrrusic education in the foot: It not only represents the nature of rrursic cognition to both our allies and our opponents, it flags the baseless notion that rrrusic cognition is devoid of 'thinking' as this terrn has traditionally been understood." -- David]. Elliott tists call "an exemplar": that is, one specific by Reimer's chosen sources. Rather, a con- instance of a concept or a subset of a concept cept is a cognitive unit that can be manipu- (See Smith, 1988; Kemler-Nelson 1984; Brooks, lated as though it were a mental object 1978; Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Medin & (Nelson, 1985, p. 72), or embodied in action. Smith, 1981; Nosof'iky,1986; Estes, 1986). In Indeed, people regularly conceive problems fact, not only are exemplar-based concepts and their solutions in nonverbal modes (now highly adaptive, but children "generally learn considered instances of conceptualization): artificial categories by nonanalytic exemplar i.e., various forms of concrete and abstract rep- strategy" (Smith, 1988, p. 43), resentation (See Glucksberg, 1988; Shepard & Second, it is not a necessary condition of Metzler, 1971; Miller, 1972; Kosslyn, 1983; and "a concept" that a phenomenon be paired Potter et. al., 1986). Moreover, even brief ref- with a symbol of any kind, nor is it the case erence to Tbe Encyclopedia of Philosophy that when no words or other symbols are (1967) and/or T7JeEncyclopedia qf Psychology present "the experience is nonconceptual" as (1984) reveals that the modern understanding Reimer maintains (p. 81). Again, many lines of "having a concept" is not limited to know- of evidence now indicate that conceptual- ing the meaning of a word or associating a ization can proceed in words, or actions, or symbol with a phenomenon. Instead, "having abstract and concrete imagery. a concept" and "conceptualizing" includes a Since Reimer brings up the subject of action, wide range of cognitive processes. For ex- recall what Gilbert Ryle (1949) pointed out ample, a musician may have a clear, years ago in his well-known book, T7JeCon- nonverbal, aural concept of "tone quality" cept of Mind: namely, that intentional actions which s/he mentally manipulates or concep- are conceptual through-and-through. With this tualizes while composing, arranging, or per- in mind, consider the following passage from forming music. APME: "No words or any other symbols need Hence, Reimer is incorrect when he claims be present as you ... take the walk, and so that "In all cases ... a concept is a mecha- long as no such vehicles are present, the expe- nism by which one can refer to a noticed rience is nonconceptual" (pp. 81-82). phenomenon" (p.83). Furthermore, in hav- Reimer trips the old Cartesian trap by sug- ing a concept of something like "tone qual- gesting that intentional physical action is not ity" (i.e., holding an aural image in my conceptual. Not surprisingly, then, MEAE is mind), I also have "knowledge of this phe- unable to provide an adequate explanation nomenon. And although there are many of musical cognition as it manifests in musi- phenomena I cannot put into words (e.g., cal performance. the precise quality of a clarinet's tone), I can Returning now to the main point of this still conceive them and think with them as section, consider that our contemporary un- mental representations. "Clarinet tone" is not derstanding of "a concept" goes far beyond merely a perceptual construct, as MEAE's the old "classical" formulation which MEAE oversimplified dichotomy of percepts and adopts to contrast (falsely) with its concepts leads us to think. Each "clarinet "nonconceptual" notion of music. Cognitive tone," (melody, and so on) is a specific audi- science now recognizes various types of con- tory event that we pick out of the acoustic cepts (Smith, 1988; Nelson, 1985); wave and categorize as such by means of a "conceptualization" is no longer uniformly myriad of contextually sensitive cognitive conceived in the one-dimensional terms held processes. Thus it does not seem to be the

56 The Quarterly journal of Music Teaching and Learning "I find it incomprehensible that [Elliott]criticizes me for not regard- ing musical experience as cognitive, -w-henthat is precisely the point I argue . . . " -- Bennett Reimer

case that concepts only provide "knowledge while thinking, not the tongue" (Glucksberg, about" and "never yield knowledge of" as 1988, p. 239). Reimer errs by conflating the Reimer maintains (p. 83). two. In short, and as Smith (1988, p. 21) In sum, although MEAE (p. 81) is correct makes clear, the classical view of a "concept" in saying that no words are necessary while put forth by Gowin and Kaelin (and adopted listening to Beethoven's music, conceptual- by Reimer) "has been seriously undermined izing in all sorts of ways (conventional and by the collective work of linguists, philoso- unconventional) is necessary in varying phers, and psychologists" since the 1970s proportions according to the kind of music (see Schwartz, 1979; Fodor, et al, 1980; and being cognized, the description under Smith and Medin, 1981). Accordingly, which it is being cognized, and the context Reimer's alleged dichotomy between "con- in which it is being presented and out of ceptualization" and "aesthetic perceptual which it originated. structuring" cannot be held. Moreover, this Kivy (1990) emphasizes, in fact, that all "new" contrast is just Langer's discursive-pre- music listening experiences are concept- sentational dichotomy in new jargon. laden (in the traditional and nontraditional To end this section of the discussion, note sense). Moreover, says Kivy, it is a serious that although MEAE puts great faith in underestimation of our cognitive capacities to Howard Gardner's overview of cognitive sci- suppose that thinking about music while lis- ence (p. 85), Gardner's survey does not stand tening to music compromises our enjoyment up as a reliable source on the nature of audi- or affective experience of the music, as tory cognition. Hence, to use Reimer's own Reimer suggests (p.109). Although academ- words, perhaps we ought to be "very cau- ics separate such cognitive aspects out for tious in making claims that cannot be sub- discussion, in reality they occur coinciden- stantiated," (in which category I include tally and in much more complex ways than Gardner's very general claims about the in- we can possibly describe in simple dichoto- herent separateness of language and music mies (e.g, thinking about versus thinking processing). How so? In contrast to the with). We hear "music" in terms of various Reimer/Gardner reflections on musical cogni- descriptions which we can (and often do) tion versus language cognition, recent studies think about and with at the same time. in auditory cognition indicate that music and Even in the case of so-called "pure" instru- speech cognition share many commonalities mental music, the sounds are never "alone" not previously understood. in the strict sense of being "intrinsically" 1.11 Following from the above, but now on meaningful. The meaning and/or enjoyment the larger view, MEAE's basic notion of "the of musical experiences is neither direct nor musical experience" relies too heavily on immediate as MEAE claims (p. 91). On the vague, Romantic notions that take no account contrary, it is heavily mediated by knowledge of the research literature in music cognition and experience: by what has been tradition- which has burgeoned since the first edition of ally understood as conceptualization, and by APME. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder what has more recently been understood. why any philosophy (let alone music edu- Overall, then, the absence of internal cation's only philosophy), so concerned as it is speech while listening to music or making (and ought to be) with issues of perception, music does not mean that such experiences affect, consciousness, cognition, mind (and so are nonconceptual as Reimer claims, only on), should so consistently overlook contern- nonverbal. As Glucksberg phrases it, what porary research in cognition generally and mu- matters is the way in which the mind "speaks sic cognition particularly,

Volume II, Number 3 57 More specifically, how can MEAE maintain untenable dichotomy: music = non conceptual such a stark contrast between thinking and versus "the basics" = conceptual. feeling? For as the recent literature on affect Viewed broadly, we must consider the pos- makes clear, cognition and affect overlap like sibility that MEAE's penchant for simple di- themes in a fugue; their complex intercon- chotomies (e.g., "writing and reading edu- nections are not nearly so black-and-white as cates reasoning," whereas "creating art and MEAE's dualisms make it appear (See Elliott, experiencing art educates feeling," pp. 32-33) 1987). More accurately, there seems to be may actually place music educators in a no such thing as thinking without feeling, or defenseless position. For in response to feeling without thinking (including reason- similarly unsupportable characterizations of ing). Thus there are no good reasons to the nature and value of the sciences versus claim, as MEAE claims, that "reading and the arts (e.g., science = reasoning versus mu- writing" are devoid of affective involvement. sic = feeling), Vernon Howard (988) sounds or can it be held that reasoning, logic, ratio- a warning: nality-in a word thinking (See p. 80), as this Such a simplistic and misleading scheme alien- term has traditionally been used-is absent ates even as it misrepresents, leaving us con- from music-making and music listening. In fused as to what art and science are, what they do as symbolic constructions, what the complex fact, the richness of musical cognition inheres relationships among them are, and what it takes in it being conceptual in a wide array of to do them well (p. 18). senses. MEAE's central claim that music Let us now turn to a detailed examination of (along with each of the other so-called "fine MEAE's central claim: the claim that music arts") has a special corner on feeling, and education is the education of feeling (p. 53). reading and writing on thinking, is an over- simplification (to say the least). Part Two 1.12 In view of the above, and as Vernon The philosophy of MEAE is intended to ex- Howard 0982; 1990) makes clear, "music"- plain the idea that "music and the other arts especially music performance-necessarily are a basic way that humans know about depends on many varieties of thinking rang- themselves and their world; that they are a ba- ing on a continuum from traditional forms of sic mode of cognition" (p. 11). In fact, as propositional thinking to nonverbal forms of Reimer credits (e.g., pp. 45, 50, 63, 102, 119), procedural thinking (see Elliott & Rao, 1990). this idea and its supporting theory are original Thus, when Reimer states that music is to Susanne Langer. Hence MEAE's philosophy "nonconceptual in essence" we must con- is essentially an explanation of Langer's theory sider the possibility that his philosophy offers of art, which holds that "works" of fine art are a misleading view of the nature and value of a special kind of symbol. music and music cognition and, therefore, of 2.1 To Langer (and therefore to Reimer, pp. the nature and value of music education. 29-37), neither the variety of the external world More directly, Reimer's "nonconceptual" nor the constant flux of our feelings is know- notion of music shoots music education in able unless somehow ordered or stabilized. the foot: It not only misrepresents the nature The way humans make their experiences intel- of music cognition to both our allies and our ligible to themselves and to others is to impose opponents, it flags the baseless notion that symbolic forms and patterns on their experi- music cognition is devoid of "thinking" as ences. Symbols are more intelligible than the this term has traditionally been understood. things they stand for (events, feelings) because More accurately, music cognition (as it ap- symbols are stable and orderly. plies in both music-making and music listen- On this view, languages (reading and writing) is concept -laden in the richest sense of ing) are one way we order our experiences. the term. But to Langer, works of art also provide or- In sum, although MEAE wants to tell us that dered patterns that are analogous to impor- music is "cognitive" (which it most certainly tant aspects of our lives. Therefore, says is), MEAE fails to provide a substantive expla- Reimer, "creating art, and experiencing art, nation. Instead, it posits an oversimplified and do precisely and exactly for feeling what

58 Tbe Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning writing and reading do for reasoning" (p. 33). share a similar structure in order for a sym- The ordered patterns of works of art (nondis- bolic pairing to exist. Ernest Nagel (943) cursive symbols, or expressive forms) are made this point decades ago in a classic cri- more understandable than the "raw experi- tique of Langer's theory. Nagel (p. 324) ob- ence" of feeling because they are focused, served that if we take y = sin x as an ex- objective, and orderly, whereas feelings are ample of a symbol, we realize that it stands not. Langer (1953) therefore defines art as for a specific type of curve, the pattern of "the creation of forms symbolic of human which has no analogous relationship to its feeling" (p. 40). On this view, music is a symbol at all. agel feather points out that a "device to hold onto feeling ....a means to map only succeeds in re-presenting a geo- give it permanent embodiment" (Reimer, p. graphical area to the extent that an inter- 33). Thus, Langer (958) concludes, if "the preter understands from the outset that a flat arts objectify subjective reality," then "art piece of a paper with such-and-such marks education is the education of feeling" (p. 8). means such-and-such. In other words, a Reimer refashions Langer's thesis as the map is not a priori presentational. Its mean- grounding concept of "music education as ing depends on prior discursive explanation. aesthetic education": From this standpoint, it does not have an The major function of art is to make objective analogous structure to that which it repre- and therefore accessible [or "conceivable" sents. Furthermore, there is nothing to pre- (Reimer, 1970, p. 39)] the subjective realm of vent us from giving someone a "picture" of a human responsiveness. Art does this by captur- geographical area by describing it in words ing and presenting in its intrinsic [or "aesthetic," ibid.] qualities the patterns and forms of human that specify landmarks, distances, geographi- feeling. The major function of education in the cal relationships, and so on. Again, such ver-

arts is [0 help people gain access to the experi- bal descriptions have no analogous relation- ences of feeling contained in the artistic [i.e., ship to that which they symbolize. "aesthetic" ibid.] qualities of things. Education Nagel's criticisms are enough to dissolve the in the arts, then, can be regarded as the educa- foundations of Reimer's dualistic view of sym- tion of feeling (p 53). bols. For if things do not need to share the Anchoring Reimer's (i.e., Langer's) philoso- same logical form to be paired ill a symbol- phy, then, is the following dualism: discur- object relationship, then the basis for the sive forms provide information (knowledge unique importance Langer and Reimer claim about) whereas nondiscursive forms provide for presentational f01111Sdisappears and, along insight into feeling (knowledge of). Music, with it, the claim that there is a natural dispar- on this view, is a special kind of symbol: a ity between what discursive and presentational presentational form (p. 86ft'). fOI111scan symbolize. But even if Langer was 2.2 Langer and Reimer want to claim that correct on this point, there are two further ob- music is a presentational form that is "isomor- jections to her grounding dualism (which in- phic with the patterns of felt life" (p. 102). cludes the claim that discursive form is funda- This claim depends upon the further claim that mentally incapable of presenting the forms that the necessary and sufficient condition for one our feelings take). Before explaining these thing to symbolize another is that both things two objections, however, there is an odd con- share a similar structure or have the same tradiction in MEAE that begs for attention now: "logical form." That is, Langer's theory main- namely, Reimer's curious claim that music tains that the "pairing" process we perform does and, at the same time, does not arouse when we understand that something repre- feeling. Let me explain. sents something else symbolically requires us 2.3 A vital tenet of Langer's theory is that to make a logical relationship in our minds music does not arouse feeling in a listener; between the two members of the pair. Such music does not provide listeners with an ex- pairing requires us to make an analogy be- perience of actual feeling. On the contrary, tween the structures of the two items in the Langer (1942) believes that: paired relationship. if it [music] has emotional content, it "has" it Unfortunately, this pivotal claim cannot be in the same sense that language "has" its COI1- defended. It is not necessary that two things

Volume 11, Number 3 59 "Is it not the case that people often find musical performances valuable for themselves?" -- David]. Elliott

ceptual content-symbolically .... Music is not he says that music captures and presents "the the cause or the cure of feelings, but their patterns and forms of human feeling" (p, 53), logical expression (p. 218). or do we believe him when he says that mu- Thus, says Langer emphatically (942), sic produces subjective responses (p, 130) "what music can actually reflect is only the and arouses feeling Cpo50)? The question morphology of feeling [italics mine]" p. 238). seems rather important given MEAE's central Musical patterns represent the general forms concern with feeling and the "education" of that various feelings take and that various feeling. MEAE offers no answer; instead, it feelings can share. In other words, musical simply knots two opposing (and equally un- patterns have an open or unconsummated tenable) theories together. link with the forms of feeling (Langer, 1942, (The reader will please note at this point p. 240). Reimer quotes and rephrases that I am not suggesting that music and affect Langer's point on several occasions (e.g., pp. are unconnected; not at all. I am only arguing 50, 52, 88-90, 131). that the MEAEphilosophy fails to provide a At the same time, however, Reimer also plausible explanation of the music-affect rela- claims that music presents conditions which tionship on which to rest its central claims). "arouse feelings" Cp. 50). In fact, Reimer 2.4 ow, the first of our two objections to goes further: He claims that "the explanation MEAE's grounding dualism (see section 2.1 of musical experience given here (i.e., above) concerns the fact that it is not the Reimer's explanation of Langer's theory) im- forms of our feelings that we usually have plies another theory of how sound can be the most difficulty capturing in words (See used to give rise to feelings" (p. 130). In the Budd, 1985), Instead, it is the specific con- very next paragraph, Reimer quotes a key tent of feeling that we have difficulty putting passage from Langer which emphasizes the into words. However, this difficulty is likely opposite: "The tonal structures we call 'mu- not due to some natural incapability of dis- sic' bear a close logical similarity to the forms cursive forms to render feeling. Rather, it of human feeling" (Langer, 1953, p. 27, cited may be a result of the fact that: (a) what we in Reimer, p. 131). Immediately following feel is unformed, or only in the process of this quotation, Reimer reverses himself again forming, when we attempt to put our feel- by referring his readers to Leonard B. ings into words; and/or (b) that we simply Meyer's theory (956) for an explanation of are not adept at using the expressive possi- how music arouses feeling. Unfortunately, bilities that language affords to capture the Meyer's arousal theory has also been system- forms and/or content of our feelings. atically discounted in a number of analyses Second, language does have a powerful (e.g., Budd, 1985; Kivy, 1990). capacity to engage our feelings beyond its So, whereas Meyer's theory is an arousal special use in poetry or drama, as any reader theory of the music-affect relationship, of good prose will confirm, and as any wit- Langer's is not. Contrary to Reimer's belief, ness to a skilled speaker, storyteller, or co- then, Langer's theory does not imply a theory median will attest. Langer and Reimer at- of how music arouses feeling; in fact, her tempt to support the opposite view by pro- theory explicitly denies that music arouses viding a reductive account of the affective feeling. Why? Because for Langer to suggest capacity of language. Of course, if one re- otherwise would be to dissolve the basis for st.ricts oneself to simple words and phrases to her claim that music provides us with insight represent what one feels, or if one com- into feeling by symbolizing its dynamic forms pletely overlooks the power of human utter- (not by arousing its actual content). ance and inflection (or argument, or logic) to So Casks the reader), does music arouse move people with words, one can make it feeling, or not? Do we believe Reimer when seem that discursive form is somehow inad-

60 The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning "The arts always have been and rerriairi a source of a special, sat- isfying way for Iiurriaris to experience." -- Bennett Reirner

equate in this regard. But of course, lan- tinguishable natural and artificial processes guage offers so much more. In short, which are already available for our contem- Reimer's (i.e., Langer's) reductive view of plation in any number of objective forms. It language is not a satisfactory basis on which turns out, then, that not only are presenta- to rest the contention that words are natu- tional forms "quite powerless to give precise rally incapable of moving us, or that "reading knowledge about the factual world" (p. 87), and writing" are devoid of affect. they do not give us precise knowledge of 2.5 Next, MEAE's claim that the signifi- subjectivity, only "a sense of" the "dynamic cance of music is a result of an "isomorphic" form of feeling" (p. 92). Harold Osborne relationship between the patterns of music (984) is quite direct in his assessment of and the forms of human feeling is open to these weaknesses in Langer's theory: several obvious objections. Whatever else we may say about them, works First, as Langer admits, (and as Reimer ac- of art are essentially individual and uniquely cepts implicitly, pp. 45-50; 101-102), different created constructions, to be apprehended each for what it is, not rudimentary concepts feelings may share the same forms. To or generalized statements about feeling or Reimer and Langer, then, feelings are not dis- anything else Cp. 87). tinguished by the forms they take (e.g., pat- In the third place, then, we must question terns of growth and decay, tension and reso- whether the value that MEAE attributes to lution, flowing and stowing, etc.). Accord- music provides a convincing explanation of ingly, the best we can obtain from music is why music is necessary. For what could be not an understanding of actual feeling, but the value of music's very general relationship only insight into the general forms of feel- with forms of feeling (and the forms of many ings. I3ut what could the value of such a other things)? Why would anyone want such general awareness be? Indeed, generality general "knowledge of' the forms of feeling? (says Reimer) is the precise characteristic of And why would people value music over discursive form that makes it inadequate as a any number of other vehicles that can objec- means of understanding feeling. tify the "morphology of feelings"? Could ac- Second, if the affective states of depression cess to such patterns be the primary reason and joyfulness, for example, can both share why people seek to make music and listen to the same form, then the unique value that music? If so, then how can Reimer claim si- MEAE attributes to music is dissolved. How multaneously that (a) discursive forms are so? I3ecause if entirely different feelings are not capable of capturing the forms of feeling not distinguished by their forms, then these because they deal in generalities (p. 86) and forms of development must not be limited to (b) that "presentational forms" are capable of music or to feeling. In other words, there is capturing human feeling because they repre- nothing to distinguish the forms of feeling as sent the general forms of feelings, and of Langer and Reimer Cpp. 100-102) describe storms, and of the breathing of kangaroos? them from the forms of an indefinite number 2.6 More fundamentally, there is a crucial of natural and artifical patterns that permeate contradiction in MEAE's premise that music is human existence: e.g., the ebb and flow of a nonreferential, presentational symbol. Why? tidal seas, the expansion and contraction of a On one hand, Reimer (p. 92) and Langer rubber band, the breathing pattern of a kan- (1957) insist that music is self-referential: garoo, or as Reimer suggests, "the gathering The art symbol ... is the expressive form. It is storm, its energy, its dissolution" (p. 101). not a symbol in the full familiar sense. for it does At best, then, MEAE's concept of the sig- not convey something beyond itself (p. 139). nificance of music sums to this: what music On the other hand, however, Reimer and can do is little more than to re-present the Langer hold that music is significant precisely general forms of an infinite number of indis- because it expresses something beyond itself:

Volume 11, Number 3 61 It is a metaphor or an analog, "a tonal ana- likelihood. That is, it seems implausible to logue of emotive life" (Langer, 1953, p. 27; suggest that whenever we encounter the iso- Reimer, pp. 52, 131). morphic relationship of music and feeling we This contradiction raises two major problems experience music "immediately" (pp. 91-92) for the philosophy of MEAE. First, Reimer's as a means to an end: that we understand grounding notion of music is hopelessly am- immediately that an "analog of feeling" is the biguous on an essential question: Is music self- object of our cognition and that music is its referential or not? The question is important vehicle to cognition because, following because the efficacy of Reimer's philosophy Langer (942), we find "the latter more easily pivots to some considerable extent on his available than the former" (p, 58) or, follow- "straw man" tactic of discrediting referentialism. ing Reimer, because "we can examine the In fact, although Reimer tries to have his object that captures the feeling" (p. 35). cake and eat it too, logic will not allow it. In fact, is it not the opposite? Is it not the For if (a) the locus of music's significance case that people often find musical perfor- ("knowledge of' the forms of feeling) and (b) mances valuable for themselves? If so, then the means of providing this "knowledge of" we must at least question the primacy of the (musical patterns) are parallel, then (a) and function that Langer and Reimer assign to (b) are logically separate. In other words, music: that listeners seek out music to get MEAE is not an absolutist theory as Reimer "knowledge of" a composer's "understanding claims, it is a referential theory. What MEAE about the nature of feeling" (p. 66). Even if is really claiming is that the significance of we admit this possibility, we could not say music lies outside the sounds themselves: that it is either a necessary or a sufficient re- i.e., in our own personal awareness that we quirement for the enjoyment of understand- have (somehow) grasped something about ing of music that we listen to it as a presenta- how feelings go. tional form in order to gain something more Indeed, consider that what the MEAE ex- interesting than the sounds themselves; i.e., a planation really amounts to, as Kivy (990) feeling of having grasped the forms of feel- argues, is a fancy variation on referential ac- ing. For these reasons, it is difficult to argue counts of musical meaning. That is, instead with Malcolm Budd's conclusion (1985) that of a conventional program or narrative, Ab- "it is not in general true for the listener that solute Expression substitutes a "deep'· or hid- music is any kind of symbol" (p. 116). den narrative (Reimer following Langer fol- 2.8 On the other hand, perhaps Langer lowing Schopenhauer?) concerning the and Reimer really do make a case for the progress and development of feeling. Quite idea that music provides a specific under- conveniently, of course, the meaning of this standing of music in virtue of their idea that special narrative is "ineffable." music is an unconsummated symbol: that Second, if music captures not actual feeling music imposes orderly forms on what we al- but an "analogue of emotive life," then as Tho- ready feel, or that it imposes new patterns mas Clifton (983) rightly observes: "Langer for our feelings to take. In either case, ac- seems to have introduced into her argument a cording to Langer and Reimer, a listener "fills strangely circular syllogism" Cpo43): in" the forms of the unconsummated symbol An is a symbol of human feeling. (the music) with many possible ways of feel- We experience symbolized expressions of feeling "depending on who is experiencing it ing in works of art. Therefore, art is the symbol and what that person brings to the experi- of a symbol (pp, 43-44). ence at that particular moment" (p. 88). 2.6 Apart from these logical flaws, com- But like the empty 'forms in a coloring mon sense is enough to raise doubt about book, one could easily spend one's entire life MEAE's basic notion that music is symbolic in filling in the given forms with a few basic some strange sense of this term. For even if colors. In other words, if one does not feel we defy logic and admit that there may be a deeply or broadly before perceiving and re- type of symbol that can be both referential sponding to the "open" forms of feeling, and and non-referential simultaneously, this if one can not "know of' these feelings with- would still require us to accept another un-

62 Tbe Quarteriyfournal ofMusic Teaching and Learning out the forms that music allegedly imposes siveness" (Reimer, p. 53), To Reimer and on one's feelings, it is difficult to see how Langer, then, music and feeling are synony- imposing such forms could amount to any mous. Aside from the logical weakness of "knowledge of" feeling. Furthermore, it does this notion, it creates another problem. For if not seem plausible that a listener's lack of the forms of feeling can only be accessed experience with feeling could be improved when feeling is objectified in music, how can merely by offering new forms for his or her we judge whether or not a piece of music is amorphous feelings to take. "sensitive," i.e., whether or not it has suc- 2.9 Beyond the weaknesses already noted, ceeded in capturing "the depth and quality of there are four more arguments against the feeling" (p.136)? How can we compare significance that MEAE claims for music. something with itself? Reimer tries to com- First, how can it be said that music "edu- pensate for this problem by positing other cates" if neither the forms that our feelings criteria for judgement. But because the ma- take, nor any insight we gain into these jority of these criteria (e.g., imagination, sen- forms, is intelligible outside music listening sitivity, and authenticity) involve dimensions experiences? According to MEAE, our minds of experience wherein means-ends distinc- cannot hold the forms of feeling in con- tions are not relevant (see Sparshott, 1986) sciousness. They slip the grasp of our cogni- they fail to provide adequate bases for deter- tion; feelings are elusive: "they disappear mining musical excellence. into thin air," says Reimer, so that before a The larger problem with MEAE's criteria of feeling can "wash away," we need to "make judgement, of course, is that they rest on a it into an object so that it stays as it is" Cp. concept of "creativity" that is obsolete in 35). [either the analogous forms of music terms of contemporary philosophical and that capture the forms of feeling, nor any in- psychological research, as I explain else- tuitive recognition-nor any "flash of under- where (Elliott, 1989). Hence many of MEAE's standing"-'·none [of these) is permanent be- assumptions and pronouncements on the yond the sound that passes" (Langer, 1942, p. "creativity" of performing, composing and 244). On this view, whatever we sense listening are not only questionable, but po- about the nature of human feeling is only tentially damaging to music education. available to our minds during the "immediate Third, if MEAE is correct that our cogni- experience" of works of art (Reimer, p. 92); it tion cannot retain (a) the elusive forms of cannot be known or retained outside of the feeling, or (b) the analogous forms of feel- experience of music. On this view, to claim ing embodied in music, or (c) a logical intu- the listener has achieved" knowledge of" feel- ition about the forms of feeling, then ing, that listener would have to be perma- MEAE's claim that the primary function of nently engaged in listening to music. The music is "cognitive" rests on an equally pe- Langer/Reimer notion of "knowledge of feel- culiar sense of "cognitive." Indeed, in addi- ing"-"knowledge" that evaporates in the ab- tion to what has already been said about the sence of musical form-is peculiar at best; at inadequacies of this philosophy's notion of worst, it defies logic and common sense. "a concept," MEAE seems in conflict with Second, as Sparshott (1963) and Lemmon itself on an important point: namely, how (975) point out, to posit that musical pat- we get this curious "cognitive" payoff from terns and the forms of feeling are "isomor- music. Consider the following. phic" requires that these two phenomena be On one hand MEAE insists we adhere to a separately identifiable in the first place, "that specific way of listening to music to receive is, that they can be known independently of what it offers. That is, we must follow all the each other and brought together for an in- rules of "aesthetic experience." As already vestigation of similarities or dissimilarities" noted, these eighteenth century canons are (Lemmon, p. 43-44). But this is precisely based on an elaborate system of prior social! what MEAE denies: "The major function of historical concepts (verbal and nonverbal). art is to make objective and therefore acces- These must be learned (formally or infor- sible the subjective realm of human res pon- mally); they are by no means "natural" laws.

Volume II, Number 3 63 On the other hand, MEAE asserts that music MEAE is advancing the view that music is presents the forms of feelinz "immediately" neither unique nor necessary in the curricu- . b' via a pure perception of sounds. lum since any "fine art" offers the means to 2.10 Finally, MEAE's departing plea for a improve that which MEAE most wants to im- tranformation of music education to "a still prove: not musicianship, not musicality, not undefined unity with its sister arts" Cp. 241) is artistry, but "aesthetic sensitivity" (p. 229). yet another way in which this philosophy According to this philosophy, as long as a undermines its own intent to provide a "fine art" is available in the curriculum stu- strong and secure basis for music education. dents will have access to "forms of feeling" How SOl A final note on Reimer's debt to the embodiment of which is the essential Langer will explain the point. function that "all art serves and fulfills in the Langer's theory of fine art takes the aes- same manner" (p. 229). thetic concept of the "fine arts" one step fur- Conclusion ther. In her attempt to construct a compre- Since MEAE holds that the nature of music hensive theory, Langer (1953) argues that is limited to symbolizing the forms of feeling; :'the proper way to construct a general theory ~nd since the activity of imposing general IS by generalization of a special one" (p. 24). forms on feelings does not seem to be edu- Hence Langer generalizes her symbolic cative in any logical sense; and since the theory to all the "sister arts." The outcome of forms that music re-presents are neither dis- this logic is the conclusion (repeated by tinguishable between feelings nor among Reimer) that all fine arts are unified in a com- other nonaffective phenomena; then MEAE's mon purpose: to express forms of human notion that music "educates" human feel- feeling (p. 231) ing-and that music education is the educa- Unfortunately, Langer's argument fails. For tion of feeling-seems implausible. constructing a general theory from a special Put directly, MEAE's adopted position on one only holds if the special theory one be- the nature and value of music has severe gins with is satisfactory in itself (which is weaknesses. Its most important propositions doubtful in the case of Langer's theory), or if do not pass the test of logical scrutiny. Ac- all such theories turned out to be the same cording to MEAE's own premise, then, the regardless of their starting point. But verifica- same must be said of this philosophy's expla- tion of this is not possible. Thus, as Sparshott nation of the nature and value of music edu- (1963) notes, Langer's logic ought to raise se- cation. rious doubts in anyone bothered by such ex- For these reasons (and others that cannot clusive claims of truth based upon one-sided be given more space here), I suggest that and unverifiable accounts (p. 43), From this "music education as aesthetic education" perspective, Reimer's belief that "any claim does not provide a secure philosophical basis we make for the value of music in education for the organization and conduct of music can be made equally validly by every other education. art" (p, 227) is problematic on three counts. In conclusion, if there are good reasons for First, as I have explained already, Reimer's music educators to have such a thing as a claim is based on an illogical theory of the "philosophy of music education," then per- nature and value of music. Second, it rests haps it is time to begin looking for an alter- on a questionable approach to developing a native to "music education as aesthetic edu- general theory. Third, it prevents MEAE from cation." Perhaps the time has come to de- providing what it promised readers at the velop a new philosophy of music education, outset: a "strong foundation" for explaining not by culling from normative theories of why music's value is "unique" (i.e., singular, music-as-fine-art, or "symbol," (or whatever), without equal, or impossible to duplicate). but by undertaking an independent philo- For how can music's value be unique if the sophical analysis of MUSIC itself. same value can be provided by many other pursuits? Following IvlEAE'slogic, if teachers Endnotes or administrators substitute painting or 1. All page references refer to the 1989 edition of dance, or poetry for music, they are still pro- A Philosophy of Music Education. viding students with something that MEAE 2. APMEdoes not include a careful analysis of asserts has essentially the same nature and this root sense of "art" (see Reimer, 1989, pp; value as music: a perceptible form expressive 65-66). of human feeling. As it turns out, then,

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Volume II, Number 3 65 Experience. A Philosophical Stud)' with Implicationsfor 61 346-367 'UGO,""" .."G Education CISAesthetic Education Ph.D. __ . (1982). The 711eOl]/cftb« Arts. Princeton: Princeton diss .. I\01thwestern Universitv. Universitv Press. Reimer, Bennett 097(/1989). A Philosophy ofMusic EclIICC7- (1986).' Excellence in the Arts. journal ojAestbctic Lion Englewood Cliffs.NT Prentice-Hall Education; 20 (Winter) 137-140. Schwartz, S. P. (979). Natural Kind Terms. G;gnitloll,7: (]987). Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds. In 301-315 Philip A. Alperson What Is Music. An lntroduc- Shepard, R N. and Metzler, J (971). Menral Rotation of lion to the Philosophy pp. 33-98. New York: 'Jhrec-Dimcnsioual Objects. Science. 171: 701-703. Haven Publications. Smith, E. E. (]988). Concepts and Thought. In Robertl. Subotnick, Rose R. (1987). The Challenge of Contemporary Srcrnberg and E. E. Smith (eds.). 7Z,ePsvcbologv 0/ Music. In Philip A. Alperson (ed.), What I, Music: All pp. 19-49. Cambridge: Cambridge Introduction 10the Philosophy of Music. pp. 359-367. Universitv Press. New York: Haven Publications. Smith. E. E. Medin, D. L (1981). Categories and COII- Woltersto1fI I\icholas. (980). Arl in Action Grand Rapids: cepts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. Sparshott, Francis E. (1963). The Stntcture ofAestbetics. __ . (1985). The Work of Making a Work of Music. In Toronto: of Toronto Press. Philip A. Alperson (ed.), Whal 11" Music: All Introduc- (980). \Vhat of lilt A.Ie: Notes Towards a 11011 10 the Philosophy o/lvfllsic. pp. 101-129. New Homespun Ontology. Pacific Philosophical Quarter/I', York: Haven Publications. ~

Psycholllusicology a journal of research in music cognition Special Issue: Music Expectancy Volume 9, Fall 1990 James C. Carlsen, Editor

Preface • J. C. Carlsen The Performance of Global Expectations • lYrA. Scbrnuchler

Expectancy and Attention in Melody Perception • WI Dowling

Schema Driven Properties in Melody Cognition: Experiments on Final Tone Extrapolation by Music Experts • I Ahe and E Hoshino

Expectancy Profiles Generated by Major Scales: Group Differ- ences in Ratings and Reaction Time • B. Frankland and AI Cohen

Learning and the Development of Expectancies: An Interactionist Approach • M.R. Jones

Expectancy in Music Cognition • A.M. Unyk

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Psychomusicology is published biannually. Address all inquiries concerning back issues and subscription requests to Psychomusicology, Illinois State University, College of Fine Arts, CVA116, Normal, IL 61761 USA.

66 The Quarterlyfournai ofMusic Teaching and Learning