On Defining the Renaissance
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“On Defining the Renaissance: A Humanistic Approach”! Central Renaissance Conference Session on Problems of Definition and Value University of Missouri – Columbia Columbia, Missouri March 29, 1974 Karl J. Fink and James W. Marchand It seems somehow impolite to challenge the methodological basis of scholarship in Renaissance studies – to ask whether the questions posed are good ones or if they can even be posed, but, with due apologies, this is what we wish to do. In so doing, however, that is, in discussing the question of “What is the Renaissance?”, we hope that we will not be simply beating a dead horse, for it is to be hoped that those non-productive questions of yesteryear as to the meaning of the term itself and whether it ought to be applied to this or that phenomenon are past. We are well aware that there is a large volume of material, surveyed masterfully by Ferguson and Burdach, for example, on defining the Renaissance and by Kristeller on related concepts of comparable complexity like Humanism. There are even those, like Taylor, who have so despaired of arriving at a reasonable definition of the term Renaissance that they pride themselves on not using it at all.1 If, however, one surveys all these attempts at a definition of the term the Renaissance, one will note a lack common to all of them: a lack of attention to the strategy of definition and the field of concept formation. In other words we are not so ! This article is based on a talk given at the 1974 Central Renaissance Conference hosted by the University of Missouri in Columbia. Our discussion is directed primarily to the theme set for the conference – “Sixteenth-century Civilization: Fulfillment or End of the Renaissance?”, although we feel the issues involved in defining the Renaissance are significant for other areas of the Humanities. 1 For discussion of various attempts to define and/or delimit the Renaissance, see Konrad Burdach, Renaissance, Reformation and Humanismus, 2nd ed., (Berlin, 1926), and especially Wallace K. Ferguson, The Renaissance in Historical Thought, Five Centuries of Interpretations, (Boston, 1948). Concerning the related concept of Humanism the reader may refer to Paul Kristeller, “Studies on Renaissance Humanism during the Last Twenty Years,” in Studies in the Renaissance, (New York, 1962), IX, 7-30. H.O. Taylor prided himself on writing two volumes on Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century, (New York, 1920), without having used the forbidden term. much interested in proposing another definition for the Renaissance as we are in discussing the prior question, namely, how does one go about discussing such a problem. It is hoped that our deliberations may thus have importance for the question of definition, delimitation, and periodization in literature in general, as well as for defining the Renaissance. The first thing one notices in observing the definitions of the Renaissance is the question of the appropriateness of the term: was the Renaissance a real rebirth or just a continuation?2 Or, would it be appropriate to choose another term, such as revitalization, renewal, reaffirmation, etc.? It is commonly held in works on definition theory that these are pseudo-questions, since they are nominal and not real, that is, have merely to do with labels, tags, and not real things, or, as Paul Lehmann put it, they are merely examples of Etikettierung.3 Before we put the question of name aside with a casual A Rose By Any Other Name, however, we might do well to look at William Dray’s well-known article “’Explaining What’ in History.” He points out that a world of importance can be attached to a word such as revolution when Ramsey Muir says: “It was not merely an economic change that was beginning: it was a social revolution.”4 Before Dray it was often maintained that the term applied to a historical event of conglomerate of events was of no importance; almost no one maintains this today. The first point in our discussion of strategy is then this: It is quite proper to ask whether the Renaissance was actually a Renaissance. In discussing this question, it is naturally of importance to be reminded of the other renaissances, The Carolingian Renaissance, The Ottonian Renaissance, and The 2 See on this question C. H. Haskins’ The Renaissance of the 12th Century, (Cambridge, 1927), 3-32. 3 Paul Lehmann, “Das Problem der Karolingischen Renaissance,” in: I Problemi della Civilta Carolingia (Settimane di studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’ Alto Medioevo, I), (Spoleto, 1954), 309-358. 4 William Dray, “’Explaining What’ in History,” in: Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History, (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), 403-408. 2 Renaissance of the 12th Century,5for the Renaissance is an historical process and, pace Lehmann, not a historical fact. It is one of several theoretical constructs such as Humanism, Mannerism, Gothic, or Baroque which are of use to us in explicating some of the facts of the period, but it is useless to ask when it begins and when it ends, except as this question helps us in explicating these facts. While some may consider the “rival” renaissances by now to be superannuated, one ought at all times keep the generality of the term in mind.6 If there exists renaissances, then, what sort of concept is the notion of renaissance? Not all concepts are alike, although most of the works on the definition of the renaissance tacitly assume that they are. There are, for example, non-metrical concepts such as hot, where the amount of heat necessary to be hot is not only not defined, but un-definable to anyone but the scientist, who himself cannot make up his mind. We have porous concepts, such as phone in linguistics, where things keep slipping though the conceptual framework of the concepts. Or, of vital importance to the human sciences are dialectical concepts like “democracy” where the antinomy between the One and the Many cannot be absolutely resolved.7 In fact, there are many different kinds of concepts and no advance in the philosophy of science over the past quarter-century has been so important as recent work on the problem of concept formation.8 However, such questions have always occupied philosophers. This is witnessed by the concern of the 5 See the discussion by Haskins and Lehmann cited above, notes 2 and 3. 6 The Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip Wiener, (New York, 1973), states that the term Renaissance is a “synoptic abstraction,” but also expresses the view that it is autonomous and contemporary with a particular cultural change and with a specific epoch, IV, 121. 7 For a survey of various kinds of concepts see Francis Zartman’s Definition and Open Texture, (University of Illinois Dissertation, 1964). Others can be located in separate discussion such as the dialectical concepts found in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s Analytical Economics, (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 17-46. 8 See Ernan McMullin, “Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science,” New Scholasticism, 40 (1966), 479- 517. 3 1920’s and 1930’s with theory construction: botryology,9 and theory of clumps,10 typology,11 nonmetrical ordering,12 numerical taxonomy,13 to name but a few. In a number of fields, notably sociology and psychology, there have been attempts to articulate “languages” of research.14 In other fields, notably biology, attempts at axiomatization have led to examination of concept formation.15 In spite of the importance of such matters to literary study, as is seen by the number of works on terminology, we know of no work which deals with definition of concept formation in literary study. In this unfortunate state of affairs scholars have expended much energy on long and involved discussions on terminology rather than actual issues. This is perhaps nowhere so evident as in prelim questions such as “What literary movement does Mörike fit into?” or “Define romanticism” and in the interminable series of papers on the definition of comparative literature. Our present study will present a discussion of the notions of concept formation and will apply these to the question of the definition of literary movements in general, to the renaissance specifically. Concept Formation Aristotelian concepts are those amenable to Aristotelian (classical) methods of classification and division. Such concepts are characterized by clear borders, no overlap with other concepts, and the possibility of uniquely assigning an entity no overlap with 9 I. J. Good, “Botryological Speculations,” in: The Scientist Speculates, ed. I.J. Good, (New York, 1965) 120-132; idem, The Estimation of Probabilities, (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 10 R. M. Needham, “Applications of the Theory of Clumps,” Mechanical Translation, 8 (1965), 113-127. 11 W. S. Allen, “Classification and Language,” Classification Society Bulletin, 1 (1965), 13-22; Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, (New York, 1965), 155-171. 12 Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, (Chicago, 1952), 155-171. 13 R. R. Sokal and P. H. A. Sneath, Principles of Numerical Taxonomy, (San Francisco, 1963). 14 George Mandler and William Kessen, The Language of Psychology, (New York, 1959); Jerome S. Bruner, J. J. Goodnow and G. A. Austin, A Study of Thinking, (New York, 1956); Robert Bierstedt, “Nominal and Real Definitions in Sociological Theory,” in: Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. L. Gross, (Buffalo, 1959), 121-144. 15 J. H. Woodger, Axiomatic Method in Biology, (Cambridge, 1937); idem, The Technique of Theory Construction, (Chicago, 1939). 4 other concepts, and the possibility of uniquely assigning an entity to a concept. This is assured by following the three rules: “1. There must be only one fundamentum divisionis at each step. 2. The division must be exhaustive.