The Metaphysics of Material Beings: Constitution, Persistence, and Identity
Philosophy 650 Spring 2008 Professor Brandon C. Look
Description:
This seminar will focus on contemporary discussions in analytic metaphysics concerning the nature of material objects. We will consider a number of questions, including the following: ¾ What is the relation between a material being and its physical parts? ¾ What are the essential properties of a material being and its parts? ¾ In what sense can a material being be identical over time? ¾ Are we best to understand material things as constituted by temporal parts? ¾ What is the difference between the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of material beings?
Expectations, Requirements, and Grading:
Students are expected to attend all seminar meetings, have read closely the required readings, and be active participants in discussion.
Each student will be required to write a short, weekly “reflection paper,” in which he or she addresses two questions: (1) What is the most important unanswered question from the previous week’s session? (2) What is the most important unanswered question in the required reading for the present session? As part of the assignment, students are to explain why these questions are important. These papers are to be no more than 500 words long and are to be completed by 1:00p.m., Tuesday and e-mailed to me at [email protected].
In addition, each students is required to write one seminar paper of approximately 20 pages in length. Students are encouraged to discuss an appropriate topic with me.
Due date: Wednesday, April 30, 2008.
Final grades will be based on three components: participation, quality of reflection papers, and final paper – though the final paper will constitute the bulk (80%) of the final grade.
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Texts:
Required:
¾ Material Constitution: A Reader, edited by Michael C. Rea, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. ( = MC) ¾ Persistence: Contemporary Readings, edited by Sally Haslanger and Roxanne Marie Kurtz, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. ( = P)
A short list of books for further reading:
¾ Gallois, André. Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. ¾ Hawley, Katherine. How Things Persist. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. ¾ Heller, Mark. The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four Dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. ¾ Merricks, Trenton. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. ¾ Sider, Theodore. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. ¾ Van Inwagen, Peter. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. ¾ Wiggens, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
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Date Topics/Readings:
1/15 Introduction/Class Mechanics
1/22 Coincident Entities
David Wiggins, “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time” (MC 1) Frederick C. Doepke, “Spatially Coinciding Objects” (MC 2)
1/29 Coincident Entities
Mark Johnston, “Constitution Is Not Identity” (MC 4) Ernest Sosa, “Subjects Among Other Things” (MC 5)
2/5 Contingent Identity and Counterpart Theory
Allan Gibbard, “Contingent Identity” (MC 6) David Lewis, “Counterparts or Double Lives?” (MC 7)
2/12 Eliminativism and Dominant Kinds
Peter Unger, “I Do Not Exist” (MC 9) Peter van Inwagen, “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts” (MC 10)
2/19 Indeterminacy Solutions
Terence Parsons, “Entities Without Identity” (MC 13) Frances Howard-Snyder, “De Re Modality Entails De Re Vagueness” (MC 14)
2/26 Relative Identity and Temporal Parts
Peter T. Geach, “Reference and Generality” (MC 15) Hugh S. Chandler, “Constitutivity and Identity” (MC 16) Mark Heller, “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects” (MC 17)
3/4 Metaphysics of Temporal Parts: Perdurance
David Lewis, from On the Plurality of Worlds (P 3) Theodore Sider, “Four-Dimensionalism” (P 4)
3/18 Metaphysics of Temporal Parts: Exdurance
Theodore Sider, “All the World’s a Stage” (P 5) Katherine Hawley, from How Things Persist (P 6)
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3/25 Problems for Temporal Parts
Judith J. Thomson, “Parthood and Identity across Time” (P 7) Sally Haslanger, “Persistence, Change, and Explanation” (P 8)
4/1 Metaphysics of Enduring Things: Eternalism
Peter van Inwagen, “Four-dimensional Objects” (P 12) Hugh Mellor, from Real Time (P 13) Mark Johnston, “Is There a Problem about Persistence?” (P 14) Graeme Forbes, “Is There a Problem about Persistence?” (P 15)
4/8 Metaphysics of Enduring Things: Presentism
Mark Hinchliff, “The Puzzle Change” (P 16) Ned Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism” (P 17)
4/15 Metaphysics of Enduring Things: Presentism
Theodore Sider, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment” (P 19) Dean W. Zimmerman, “Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism” (P 20)
4/22 Problems for Endurance: Temporary Intrinsics
David Lewis, “Tensing the Copula” (P 21) Theodore Sider, “The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics” (P 22)
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