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AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A15Q0075 Runway Overrun
AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A15Q0075 Runway overrun WestJet Boeing 737-6CT, C-GWCT Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Quebec 05 June 2015 Transportation Safety Board of Canada Place du Centre 200 Promenade du Portage, 4th floor Gatineau QC K1A 1K8 819-994-3741 1-800-387-3557 www.tsb.gc.ca [email protected] © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2017 Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0075 Cat. No. TU3-5/15-0075E-PDF ISBN 978-0-660-08454-1 This report is available on the website of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada at www.tsb.gc.ca Le présent rapport est également disponible en français. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0075 Runway overrun WestJet Boeing 737-6CT, C-GWCT Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Quebec 05 June 2015 Summary On 05 June 2015, a WestJet Boeing 737-6CT (registration C-GWCT, serial number 35112) was operating as flight 588 on a scheduled flight from Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario, to Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Quebec. At 1457 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft touched down in heavy rain showers about 2550 feet beyond the threshold of Runway 24L and did not stop before reaching the end of the runway. The aircraft departed the paved surface at a ground speed of approximately 39 knots and came to rest on the grass, approximately 200 feet past the end of the runway. -
Runway Excursion During Landing, Delta Air Lines Flight 1086, Boeing MD-88, N909DL, New York, New York, March 5, 2015
Runway Excursion During Landing Delta Air Lines Flight 1086 Boeing MD-88, N909DL New York, New York March 5, 2015 Accident Report NTSB/AAR-16/02 National PB2016-104166 Transportation Safety Board NTSB/AAR-16/02 PB2016-104166 Notation 8780 Adopted September 13, 2016 Aircraft Accident Report Runway Excursion During Landing Delta Air Lines Flight 1086 Boeing MD-88, N909DL New York, New York March 5, 2015 National Transportation Safety Board 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 National Transportation Safety Board. 2016. Runway Excursion During Landing, Delta Air Lines Flight 1086, Boeing MD-88, N909DL, New York, New York, March 5, 2015. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-16/02. Washington, DC. Abstract: This report discusses the March 5, 2015, accident in which Delta Air Lines flight 1086, a Boeing MD-88 airplane, N909DL, was landing on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport, New York, New York, when it departed the left side of the runway, contacted the airport perimeter fence, and came to rest with the airplane’s nose on an embankment next to Flushing Bay. The 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 98 of the 127 passengers were not injured; the other 29 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. Safety issues discussed in the report relate to the use of excessive engine reverse thrust and rudder blanking on MD-80 series airplanes, the subjective nature of braking action reports, the lack of procedures for crew communications during an emergency or a non-normal event without operative communication systems, inaccurate passenger counts provided to emergency responders following an accident, and unclear policies regarding runway friction measurements and runway condition reporting. -
Repair Capabilities List
Repair Capabilities List Eaton P/N Customer P/N Nomenclature Aircraft Usage Repair Capabilities Comments 100000-14 N/A Linear Actuator Lockheed C-130 Yes 100000-29 N/A Actuator Embraer EMB120 Yes 100000-60 N/A Linear Actuator Fokker F28 MK0070; F28 MK0100 Yes 100000-77 2045352 Actuator, Embraer EMB-500 Yes Electromechanical Linear 100100-1 030A-989504-1 Actuator Aileron Mitsubishi MU-2B, -26A, -36A, -40, -60 Yes 102000-1 N/A Actuator Landing Mooney M20 Yes Gear Assembly 102000-2 N/A Actuator, Landing Mooney M20 Yes Gear Wednesday, February 13, 2013 Page 1 of 43 Eaton P/N Customer P/N Nomenclature Aircraft Usage Repair Capabilities Comments 102000-3 560254-503 Actuator Landing Mooney M20 Yes Gear Assembly 102000-4 560254-505 Actuator, Landing Mooney M20 Yes Gear 102000-7 560254-507 Actuator, Landing Mooney M20 Yes Gear 102000-9 N/A Linear Actuator N/A Yes 102000-10 N/A Actuator Assembly, Mooney M20 Yes Linear 102000-12 N/A Actuator Assembly, N/A Yes Main Landing Gear 102000-13 N/A Actuator, Landing Mooney Yes Gear Assembly 104500-1 N/A Linear Actuator Gulfstream Yes Wednesday, February 13, 2013 Page 2 of 43 Eaton P/N Customer P/N Nomenclature Aircraft Usage Repair Capabilities Comments 104500-2 N/A Linear Actuator Gulfstream Yes 105900-2 159SCC100-23 Trim Control Linear Gulfstream GIII, GIV, and GV Yes Actuator 114000-1 N/A Actuator, Rotary Cessna Citation Yes Approved through Direct Shipment Authorization - Expires 9/14/13 114000-3 N/A Actuator, Rotary Cessna Citation Yes 116900-2 N/A Linear Actuator Fokker F27 MK050 Yes 116900-3 N/A Door -
Introducing the 787 - Effect on Major Investigations - and Interesting Tidbits
Introducing the 787 - Effect on Major Investigations - And Interesting Tidbits Tom Dodt Chief Engineer – Air Safety Investigation ISASI September, 2011 COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 1 787 Size Comparison 767-400 787-8 777-300 ~Pax 3-Class 245 250 368 ~Span 170 ft 197 ft 200 ft ~Length 201 ft 186 ft 242 ft ~MTGW 450,000 lbs 500,000 lbs 660,000 lbs ~Range 5,600 NM 7,650 NM 6,000 NM Cruise Mach 0.80 0.85 0.84 COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 2 By weight 787 777 - Composites 50% 12% Composite Structure - Aluminum 20% 50% Other Carbon laminate Steel 5% Carbon sandwich 10% Fiberglass Titanium 15% Composites Aluminum 50% Aluminum/steel/titanium pylons Aluminum 20% COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 3 COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 4 787 Wing Flex - On-Ground On-Ground 0 ft COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 5 787 Wing Flex - 1G Flight 1G Flight ~12 ft On-Ground 0 ft 1G Flight COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 6 787 Wing Flex Ultimate-Load ~26 ft 1G Flight ~12 ft On-Ground 0 ft Max-Load COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 7 787 Static Load Test @ Ultimate Load COPYRIGHT © 2010 THE BOEING COMPANY Smith, 7-April-2011, ESASI-Lisbon | 8 Investigations with Composite Materials • Terms: Composites Aluminum disbond fatigue delaminate beach marks inter-laminar shear striation counts water absorbsion corrosion fiber architecture metallurgical prop. -
November 2020 Vol
BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL AVIATION OPERATORS SURVEY GULFSTREAM G500 AIREON IN SERVICE ADJUSTING APPROAC NOVEMBER 2020 $10.00 AviationWeek.com/BCA Business & Commercial Aviation OPERATORS SURVEY Gulfstream G500 A step change in aircraft design H SPEED NOVEMBER 2020 VOL. 116 NO. 10 H SPEED NOVEMBER 2020 VOL. 116 NO. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE Aireon in Service Winter Ground Ops Adjusting Approach Speed Flying Petri Dish C&C: Stop. Look. Think. Digital Edition Copyright Notice The content contained in this digital edition (“Digital Material”), as well as its selection and arrangement, is owned by Informa. and its affiliated companies, licensors, and suppliers, and is protected by their respective copyright, trademark and other proprietary rights. Upon payment of the subscription price, if applicable, you are hereby authorized to view, download, copy, and print Digital Material solely for your own personal, non-commercial use, provided that by doing any of the foregoing, you acknowledge that (i) you do not and will not acquire any ownership rights of any kind in the Digital Material or any portion thereof, (ii) you must preserve all copyright and other proprietary notices included in any downloaded Digital Material, and (iii) you must comply in all respects with the use restrictions set forth below and in the Informa Privacy Policy and the Informa Terms of Use (the “Use Restrictions”), each of which is hereby incorporated by reference. Any use not in accordance with, and any failure to comply fully with, the Use Restrictions is expressly prohibited by law, and may result in severe civil and criminal penalties. Violators will be prosecuted to the maximum possible extent. -
Final Report
Contents Synopsis ............................................................................................................................ 1 1. Factual Information .............................................................................................. 3 1.1 History of the flight ........................................................................................ 3 1.2 Injuries to persons .......................................................................................... 4 1.3 Damage to aircraft .......................................................................................... 4 1.4 Other damage ................................................................................................. 4 1.5 Personnel information .................................................................................... 4 1.5.1 Commander ...................................................................................... 4 1.5.2 Co-pilot ............................................................................................ 6 1.6 Aircraft information ....................................................................................... 6 1.6.1 General information ......................................................................... 6 1.6.2 Aircraft description .......................................................................... 6 1.6.2.1 Wheel brake and steering system .................................. 7 1.6.2.2 Anti-skid system ........................................................... 9 1.6.2.3 Brake system -
Service Center Full Capabilities List
AMETEK Part Number OEM Number Description Platforms Location Contact Number 182936 10-60735-1 OXYGEN PRESSURE INDICATOR BOEING 727 / 737 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 182972 10-60735-2 OXYGEN PRESSURE INDICATOR BOEING 727/737/747/757/777/P-8 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 253884 10-60775-6 SURFACE POSITION INDICATOR BOEING 737 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 260456 N/A DC VOLTMETER INDICATOR NOT IDENTIFIED Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 260457 N/A DC AMMETER NOT IDENTIFIED Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 260461 60B00120-1 OXYGEN PRESSURE INDICATOR BOEING 747-100,-200,-300 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 260516 60B00120-2 DUAL OXYGEN PRESSURE INDICATOR BOEING 747-400 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 260519 60B92012-1 FUEL TEMPERATURE INDICATOR BOEING B747/B767 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 520445 671788-101 ENGINE VIBRATION MONITOR UNIT LOCKHEED L1011 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 520467 60B00108-7 COMP DUCT TEMPERATURE INDICATOR BOEING 747 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 520487 60B00126-4 APU TACHOMETER INDICATOR BOEING 747-100,-200,-300 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 520549 672449-101 AIR TURBINE TACHOMETER INDICATOR LOCKHEED Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 520616 01-3621-9-0001 PNEUMATIC PRESSURE INDICATOR MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC10 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 520690 672490-101 RAM AIR INDICATOR LOCKHEED L1011 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 521314 60B00117-5 CSD OIL TEMPERATURE INDICATOR BOEING 747 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 521394 5940-00-901-8270 COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE INDICATOR E-3/E-6/E-8 Binghamton, NY 607-763-4708 521396 60B00108-10 SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE INDICATOR E-3/E-6/E-8 -
INTRODUCTION the Global Landing Gear System Is a Retractable Tricycle Type Consisting of Two Main Landing Gear Assemblies and a Steerable Nose Landing Gear Assembly
Bombardier Global Express - Landing Gear & Brakes INTRODUCTION The Global landing gear system is a retractable tricycle type consisting of two main landing gear assemblies and a steerable nose landing gear assembly. Each assembly is equipped with a conventional oleopneumatic shock strut. On the ground, all three landing gear assemblies are secured with gear locking pins. The landing gear is fully enclosed when the gear is retracted. Normal extension and retraction is electrically controlled by the Landing Gear Electronic Control Unit (LGECU) and hydraulically operated by systems 2 and 3. Emergency extension of the landing gear system is enabled through the Landing Gear Manual Release System handle in the flight compartment. Each landing gear assembly has twin wheels and tires. The main wheels have hydraulically powered and electrically actuated carbon brakes, controlled through a brake-by-wire system. Main landing gear overheat detection is available. Antiskid protection and automatic braking is provided. The main and nose landing gear assemblies use proximity sensors to provide air and ground sensing. This is accomplished by two sensors (referred to as weight-on-wheels or WOW) on each assembly. All hydraulically actuated doors, uplocks, downlocks and nose shock strut (centering) use sensors to determine their position for gear operation. Landing gear status and position is visually displayed on EICAS and aurally annunciated in the flight compartment. The antiskid, nosewheel steering indication and status are also displayed on EICAS and -
COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS COLD WEATHER COLD OPERATIONS WEATHER Getting to Grips With
getting to grips with COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS COLD WEATHER COLD OPERATIONS WEATHER getting to grips with AIRBUS INDUSTRIE 01 / 00 Flight Operations Support - Customer Services Directorate Getting to grips with COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS A Flight Operations View AIRBUS INDUSTRIE FOREWORD The purpose of this document is to provide Airbus operators with an understanding of Airbus aircraft operations in cold weather conditions, and address such aspects as aircraft contamination, performance on contaminated runways, fuel freezing limitations and altimeter corrections. This brochure summarizes information contained in several Airbus Industrie documents and provides related recommendations. At the end of each chapter, a summary of main information to be remembered is highlighted and grouped together in the overview chapter. Should any deviation appear between the information provided in this brochure and that published in the applicable AFM, MMEL, FCOM, AMM, the latter shall prevail at all times All readers are encouraged to submit their questions and suggestions, regarding this document, to the following address: AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Flight Operations Support Customer Services Directorate 1, Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, BP 33 31707 BLAGNAC Cedex - FRANCE TELEX: AIRBU 530526F SITA: TLSBI7X Telefax: 33 5 61 93 29 68 or 33 5 61 93 44 65 AI/ST-F 945.9843/99 3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword Overview Useful information in Airbus Industrie documentation Glossary / Definitions Abbreviations A. AIRCRAFT CONTAMINATION IN FLIGHT A1 Icing principles A1.1 Atmospheric -
FSF ALAR Briefing Note 6.4 -- Bounce Recovery -- Rejected Landing
Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction Tool Kit FSF ALAR Briefing Note 6.4 — Bounce Recovery – Rejected Landing A rejected landing (also called an aborted landing) is a go- Preconditions around maneuver initiated after touchdown of the main landing gear. A rejected landing is a challenging maneuver and typically Four preconditions (usually referred to as the “four-no rule”) is recommended only when an aircraft bounces more than must be observed before initiating a touch-and-go: approximately five feet (1.5 meters) off the runway after touchdown. • No ground spoilers: – Ground spoilers must not be armed or manually No global statistical data are available on rejected-landing selected after touchdown; incidents or accidents. Nevertheless, the following are possible consequences of an incorrect decision to conduct a rejected • No autobrake system: landing: – Autobrakes must not be armed; • Tail strike following a go-around initiated because of • No reverse: directional control difficulties after thrust reverser selection; – Thrust reversers must not be selected upon touchdown; and, • Aircraft performance limitation following the inappropriate selection of reverse thrust during a touch- • No pedal braking: and-go landing and failure of one reverser to stow; and, – Pedal braking must not be used after touchdown. • Loss of control following a go-around initiated after thrust reverser selection and failure of one reverser to stow. The above preconditions show that conducting a rejected landing during a nontraining flight (i.e., with ground spoilers and autobrakes armed, and being ready to select reverse thrust Touch-and-go Training upon touchdown) involves an added challenge. A touch-and-go landing is a training exercise. -
National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Incident Final Report
National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Incident Final Report Location: Jamaica, NY Incident Number: NYC03IA117 Date & Time: 05/30/2003, 0431 EDT Registration: N703GC Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-11F Aircraft Damage: Minor Defining Event: Injuries: 3 None Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air Carrier - Scheduled Analysis The cargo airplane was on approach to land at night, on runway 4R; an 8,400-foot-long, asphalt runway. The flight crew received the current automated terminal information service weather, which included winds from 240 degrees at 4 knots. The captain was the flying pilot. He stated that he utilized the autopilot to 500 feet, before clicking it off, and stayed on the glide slope. The airplane's landing weight was about 470,000 pounds, and it was configured for a normal approach, which included autobrakes set to minimum and 35 degrees of flaps. The captain reported that the airplane touched down between 1,500 and 1,800 feet beyond the approach end of the runway, at an airspeed of about 158 knots. The captain applied reverse thrust and everything seemed normal until he observed the alternating red and white runway lights, which seemed to be coming up fast. The captain stated that with about 3,000 feet of runway remaining, at a speed of 110 knots, he began to apply manual braking. The first officer stated he could feel the brakes grab, and the airplane's nose pitched down. The airplane departed the end of the runway and entered an Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS). The airplane's nose gear came to rest approximately 238 feet beyond the end of the runway, 115 feet into the EMAS. -
B737 NG Landing Gear
B737 NG Landing Gear Boeing B737 NG - Systems Summary [Landing Gear] Introduction The airplane has two main landing gear and a single nose gear. Each main gear is a conventional two–wheel landing gear unit. The nose gear is a conventional steerable two–wheel unit. Hydraulic power for retraction, extension, and nose wheel steering is normally supplied by hydraulic system A. A manual landing gear extension system and an alternate source of hydraulic power for nose wheel steering are also provided. The normal brake system is powered by hydraulic system B. The alternate brake system is powered by hydraulic system A. Antiskid protection is provided on both brake systems, but the autobrake system is available only with the normal brake system. [Aircraft Option] A brake temperature monitoring system displays each main landing gear brake temperature on the lower DU. Landing Gear Operation The landing gear are normally controlled by the LANDING GEAR lever. On the ground, a landing gear lever lock, prevents the LANDING GEAR lever from moving to the up position. An override trigger in the lever may be used to bypass the landing gear lever lock. In flight, the air/ground system energizes a solenoid which opens the lever lock. Landing Gear Retraction When the LANDING GEAR lever is moved to UP, the landing gear begins to retract. During retraction, the brakes automatically stop rotation of the main gear wheels. After retraction, the main gear are held in place by mechanical uplocks. Rubber seals and oversized hubcaps complete the fairing of the outboard wheels. The nose wheels retract forward into the wheel well and nose wheel rotation is stopped by snubbers.