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Introduction Understanding and Misunderstanding Traditionally, pragmatics has been considered as forming a triad with syntax and semantics (a partition People talk in order to communicate. Good commu- originally ascribed to Charles Morris, and inspired by nication happens when speakers understand each ideas from the philosopher Charles S. Peirce). Here, other correctly, that is, in accordance with what the syntax is considered to be the study of the formal speaker means and the hearer understands the speak- relations of one sign to another, while semantics stud- er to mean. When such an understanding does not ies the relations of signs to objects in the outside occur, the communicative situation becomes one of world. Finally, pragmatics is thought of as the relation misunderstanding rather than of understanding. of signs to those who interpret the signs, the users Many people (including most linguists) believe that of language (Morris, 1938: 6). It is the latter part of communication, and hence understanding, depends Morris’ definition that will be the guiding point of this solely on the words spoken. The famous reply to a article; however, the original restriction to signs will journalist’s question, ‘‘Read my lips,’’ attributed to for- be relaxed, such that we now speak of communication mer U.S. President George H. W. Bush, expresses a in a very broad sense, also including nonverbal means belief in the validity of the verbal utterance as proffered such as gestures and body movements. The emphasis by a speaker, without regard either to what the speaker of this modern study of pragmatics is, as it was for may have had in mind or to the actual circumstances of Morris, on the user; however, the user is not thought the speaking and reading. of here as an isolated individual, but as a social animal Another widespread error is made by people who in the Aristotelian sense: a being that is dependent on believe that human communication should obey 52 Pragmatics: Overview (or actually obeys) the rules embodied in what is frequently happens that one person does not under- usually called grammar (by many linguists interpreted stand what the other is saying, not because the words as ‘‘a device that will generate all the correct sentences are not clear or the phrasing ambiguous, but simply of a language, and no incorrect ones,’’ as Noam because the one interlocutor does not see what the Chomsky and his followers have preached ever since other is talking about, or because she or he interprets 1957, the year in which Chomsky’s first and very that which the other is talking about as something successful treatise on syntactic structures appeared; entirely different. In Rancie`re’s words, Chomsky, 1957). This assumption (which has sur- The cases of misunderstanding are those in which the vived in a number of avatars, also among nonlin- dispute on ‘‘what speaking means’’ [an allusion to the guists) was publicly denounced as a fallacy soon seminal work by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, after its first public appearance; celebrated linguists Ce que parler veut dire; 1982] constitutes the very ration- such as the late Archibald Hill, anthropologists such as ality of the speech situation. In that situation, the inter- Dell Hymes, and sociologists such as Erwing Goffman locutors both do and do not mean the same thing by the all were quick to point out that human communica- same words. There are all sorts of reasons why a certain tion very rarely proceeds in accordance with the strict person X understands, and yet does not understand, rules of grammar. Pronouncing a correct sentence another person Y: because, while he perceives clearly belongs in the realm of the impossible, not to say what the other tells him, he also does not see the object pure fantasy: real people speak in ways that are rather of which the other speaks to him; or even, because he far away from the strictures of the grammarians, yet understands, and must understand, sees and wants to make seen, another object represented by the same they are often, if not always, understood correctly (in words, another reasoning contained in the same argu- the sense in which I used this word above). ment (Rancie`re 1995: 13; my translation and emphasis). But what happens when misunderstandings occur? What are the reasons for people’s wrong apprehen- It is the task of pragmatics to clarify for us what sions of their interlocutors’ utterances? Is it the case it means to ‘see and not to see’ an object of which that they do not understand the words that are spoken? the ‘same words’ are being used, yet are understood in Or are there deeper reasons for misunderstanding? different, even deeply diverging ways. Notable exam- While it is true that understanding a message to ples of this ‘(mis-)use’ are found in political discourse, some degree depends on a correct interpretation of the very subject of Rancie`re’s reflections: words such the words being used, as well as on a certain respect as ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘peace,’ and so on have for the usual form these words and their combinations over the ages been consistently and willfully mis- take in any given language (not to speak of a pronun- understood and misused in political discourse. The ciation that is not prone to being perceived wrongly, deeper reason for such misunderstandings is not in or not at all), it remains the case that words, no matter what the words mean (and certainly not what they how well chosen and correctly joined and pro- originally may have meant; here, the Greek roots of nounced, do not convey the entire message, or even the word ‘democracy’ and its original meaning of the major portion of what we intend to say. Popular ‘people power’ provide a sad example). The way we handbooks of communication and advertising often understand a word has to do with the situation propagate the slogan that in business, the words count in which it is being used, and that means: a situa- for 5%, the body language for the remaining 95% of tion where speakers and hearers engage in a ‘common your message. While this may be somewhat of an scene’ (Rancie`re’s expression) where they meet and exaggeration, the point these business communication discuss, respecting each other’s background and un- experts want to make is clear: words taken by them- derlying assumptions about what exactly is com- selves will not do the job; understanding a message is mon to them as actors on that scene, in a particular more than a verbal matter. situation of language use. The French philosopher Jacques Rancie`re (1995) distinguishes between a simple misunderstanding Situations and Contexts (French: malentendu,orme´connaissance, i.e., a wrong understanding, or even a lack of understand- A situation can be roughly described as a meeting of ing) and a misunderstanding on a deeper level human interactants having a common background (French: me´sentente), where understanding is not and trying to realize a common goal. Exactly how only difficult, but even impossible, because there is common those backgrounds and goals are can be the not, and cannot be, any common platform where all subject of much dispute, and even seemingly insignif- the involved parties can meet.

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