Language, Truth and Power in Ancient Greek Thought : Prolegomena to Nietzsche
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University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1993 Language, truth and power in ancient Greek thought : prolegomena to Nietzsche. Paul M. Shepard University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Shepard, Paul M., "Language, truth and power in ancient Greek thought : prolegomena to Nietzsche." (1993). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1922. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1922 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND POWER IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT: PROLEGOMENA TO NIETZSCHE A Dissertation Presented by PAUL M. SHEPARD Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY September 1993 Department of Political Science Copyright by Paul Michael Shepard 1993 All Rights Reserved LANGUAGE TRUTH , AND POWER IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT' PROLEGOMENA TO NIETZSCHE A Dissertation Presented by PAUL M. SHEPARD Approved as to style and content by Nicholas Xenos, Chair A. f ,'prnnerome B. King, Membe J. Peter Euben, Member 3- Peter R. Pouncey, Member George ^ Sulzner, B^partment Chair Department of Political Science For Dennis, my Patroclus. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There were some who fought the Trojan war for loot, others for honor, a few for justice. This project represents my Trojan War, and has lasted about as long. During that time I have acquired no loot, collected little acclaim, and seen precious little justice. I have, however, been rewarded by a small amount of wisdom, mostly unconventional, and a stalwart number of friends, equally unconventional. Although I cannot name them all, there are a few heroes among them for whom my appreciation is eternally grateful. They cannot go untold. Felix Oppenheim first enlisted me in the roles of political theory. It was, characteristically for him, a wholly magnanimous, kind and gracious gesture. It was for me, the intellectual wanderer, a welcome home. Bill Connolly has been the mentor every graduate student needs and hopes to have. His early care and encouragement gave me the energy and confidence to continue. His rare intellectual vision and acuity launched me on an exciting new odyssey at a time of life when I might have headed for firmer ground. Jerry King's warm good nature, reverent irreverence and unfailing insight presented a welcome refuge whenever my ship floundered at sea. Nick Xenos paid me the honor, unusual for a committee chairman, of allowing me to v chart my own course through difficult waters without taking over the helm. I want to single out Peter Pouncey for special, heartfelt thanks among my committee members. His own work, and his generous reception of mine, rekindled for me an intellectual fire that might otherwise have become extinguished through neglect. Jane Bennett has been a true friend and colleague from the beginning. More than she knows, her buoyant enthusiasm, unrestrained optimism, refreshing candor and helpful comments have kept me afloat over the years. Gary Lehring taught me that it is possible, and often necessary, to become a warrior without losing one's innocence or sense of humor. Carol Cheu opened a place in her heart for me, a man who could not, and would rather never have become a warrior. I especially want to express my gratitude and appreciation to Larry Feldman, without whose unselfish assistance and wholehearted support this voyage could never have been completed. Lastly, but above all others, my heartfelt appreciation for Dennis goes beyond words. He has at all times been all things to me: father, mother, brother, son, and lover. He watched me set sail and waits for my return. Somehow he remains my friend. vi ABSTRACT LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND POWER IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT- PROLEGOMENA TO NIETZSCHE SEPTEMBER 1993 PAUL M. SHEPARD, B.A., WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos The meaning of democracy was contested theoretical and political terrain in classical Athens. In this dissertation I examine three contending theoretical views of democracy found in the works of three Greek thinkers — Thucydides, Aeschylus and Plato — present at the height of Athenian democracy. I show that each view draws upon competing conceptions of nature, language, truth, and power in order to claim the contested terrain. I argue that the heroic view of democracy, portrayed in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, saw politics as the means by which states achieve immortal glory through feats of war which simultaneously destroy them. In this view political power was delivered by the unified voice--the single identity--of the Athenian assembly produced by the power of persuasion. I interpret the tragic view, represented by Aeschylus' Oresteia, to criticize the heroic tradition of politics as dangerously unbalanced. The Oresteia offers an alternative vii . view of democracy in which multiple voices divided against themselves produce not weakness but balance as a shield against the loss of limits implied in the heroic view. I argue that the ambiguity of language, and the ambiguous identity it produces, is affirmed by tragedy to be a source of political strength and not a sign of political disintegration The Platonic view articulated in the Republic opposes both the heroic view of politics and its tragic revision. I contend that the Republic, while appearing to oppose democracy, actually seeks to place it on a more secure foundation grounded in the logical concept of identity and rational thought applied to the soul. I argue that the Platonic attempt to found political order on the twin concepts of logical and psychological identity maintained by rational thought and language actually recapitulates on a grand scale the same dangers it identifies in its heroic opponents. And I suggest in conclusion that our Platonic legacy may effectively blind us to the dangerously heroic trajectory of the modern political state. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ABSTRACT v±± Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ^ Notes 2.5 2. THUCYDIDES AND THE LANGUAGE OF POWER 17 Thucydides and Homer 17 The Truth of Power and Language 25 The Speeches and the War 34 Pericles: The Heroic Ideal 52 The Fall 66 The Melian Dialogue 84 Notes 94 3. TRAGEDY AND DEMOCRACY 102 From Oikos To Pol is 102 Dike: From Eunomia to Isonomia 113 Tragedy and Theory: The Oresteia 125 Heroic Agamemnon 136 Sickness, Suffering and Wisdom 148 Tragic Orestes, Tragic Wisdom 156 Notes 167 4. PLATO'S REPUBLIC: THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF TRAGEDY 177 Agony v. Identity 177 The Government of Desire 189 Judgment and Conviction 209 Notes 224 5. CONCLUSION 228 Democratic Possibilities 228 Notes 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY 244 ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The collective nature of political power is expressed in various terms such as "assent," "consent," or "obedience." "Action in concert" 1 is the phrase chosen by Hannah Arendt to express the same concept and to distinguish between the nature of political power on one hand, and force or violence on the other. As Arendt well recognized, however, action in concert poses a problem of limits. If politics is by its very nature a marshalling or pooling of individual power, on what basis or by what means is the requisite assent, consent, or obedience obtained and what are its limits? How, in other words, are we to distinguish between cooperation and complicity? The experience which shaped Arendt' s political theorizing was of course the degree of cooperation, active or passive, which contributed to the power of Nazi Germany. Arendt ' s entire work is devoted to the need to distinguish between this kind of political power and more "legitimate" instances. In this respect Arendt 1 s work is representative of much of Western political thought, and it follows a venerable tradition which seeks to found that distinction upon a notion of truth. In her essay, "Truth and Politics," Arendt poses the rhetorical question of whether political power "could or 2 should be checked not only by a constitution, a bill of rights, and by a multiplicity of powers, as in the system of checks and balances, . [but also] by something that . has its . source outside the political realm, and is as independent of the wishes and desires of the citizens as is the will of the worst tyrant." 2 To Arendt, the answer is clearly "yes," and in her essay she goes on to argue for a version of "factual truth" to fill that authoritative position. It is beside the present point if Arendt's effort ultimately fails to establish factual truth as the unimpeachable authority needed to ground or legitimize political action. For in that essay and in her larger work Arendt conveys the conceptual architecture behind a significant tradition of Western political thought. Arendt's lifelong search for a truth to occupy the position defined by the intersection of power, authority, and freedom represents a tradition which seeks to admit the necessity of power in political action while simultaneously seeking a basis to limit that power once admitted. The figure which haunts the shadows of all such efforts is Friedrich Nietzsche. If Nietzsche's work can be said to culminate in an affirmation of will to power, the persistent target of this affirmation is the concept of truth in its various historical articulations beginning with Plato. Traditional approaches to Nietzsche tend to read his work as endorsing, even celebrating, the priority of power over and against truth. 3 The implicit assumption within the 3 traditional critique is that truth and power stand in primary opposition to each other and, more specifically, that truth operates as a limit to power.