Spain's Transition to Democracy: a Model for Eastern Europe? Author(S): Kenneth Maxwell Source: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol
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Spain's Transition to Democracy: A Model for Eastern Europe? Author(s): Kenneth Maxwell Source: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1, The New Europe: Revolution in East-West Relations (1991), pp. 35-49 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1173811 Accessed: 28-02-2020 19:12 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms The Academy of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science This content downloaded from 46.252.97.82 on Fri, 28 Feb 2020 19:12:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Spain's Transition to Democracy: A Model for Eastern Europe? KENNETH MAXWELL Spain's foreign and defense policies have been in flux since the 1970s. After a long period of enforced isolation under the Franco regime, the new de- mocracy has moved increasingly into a position of influence in Europe. This pro- cess of normalization of international relations was fortified by accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1982, to the European Commu- nity (EC) in 1986, and to the Western European Union (WEU) in 1988. In some ways, the factors compelling this transformation are similar to those facing all Western European governments and reflect the dramatic changes in East-West re- lations, the long-term impact of the 1989 democratic revolutions in central Eu- rope, and the uncertainties as well as potential dangers of the post-cold war epoch now unfolding. Spain has also played an increasingly important role on the world stage as a model of the peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Spain and Eastern Europe, for example, are different in many basic ways; nevertheless, Eastern Europeans have learned from Spain's democratization. More recently, a debate has begun among political scientists as to the relative merits of parliamentary and presidential systems in consolidating democratic polities; again, Spain has been the starting point.1 Although the process of democratization in Spain has received a great deal of scholarly attention and a substantial literature now exists on the subject, the in- teraction of the new regime with the rest of the world has been little studied. That is curious when one considers how central the events in Spain were during the immediate prewar period and how widespread interest in the Spanish Civil War This essay is based on extensive interviews in Spain and the United States, over the period 1987-90, and a series of meetings with United States and Spanish government officials and military officers at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, D.C., at the Ortega y Gasset Foundation in Toledo, and in Madrid, Spain. This content downloaded from 46.252.97.82 on Fri, 28 Feb 2020 19:12:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 36 I KENNETH MAXWELL continues among the general public. It may be, in fact, one of the little noted factors that contributed to Spain's negotiated transition that avoided outside interference and the East-West controversy. Certainly, until the end of the cold war, a radical process of regime substitution made it likely that internationalization would follow. Spain's neighbor, Portugal, is the classic case. Because the fall of Portugal's old regime preceded the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, Portugal's turmoil and outsiders' intrusive role in the struggle for democracy provided a salutary lesson of what should be avoided. The Spanish past, moreover, set important parameters in the international arena. For the United States, in particular, the nature of bilateral relations under Franco provoked much ill will over the United States bases in Spain after democratiza- tion. In Spain, however, the diminution of the United States presence was seen as providing an array of options that in no way undermined Spain's basic engage- ment in a democratic Europe. Ironically, given the internal opposition to Spain's joining NATO and the lack of resonance that talk of the "Soviet threat" had among the Spanish public, Spain's belated entry into the alliance occurred just before shifts in the international system so profound as to bring the very basis of NATO into question, or at least its rationale as an anti-Soviet coalition. Three dimensions framed the debate about Spain's foreign and defense policies during the 1980s. First, Spain had to surmount the constraints arising from its historical experience. Second, the Iberian or regional context saw a major rap- prochement, best summarized as a process of Europeanization. Third, the Atlantic connection, involving bilateral relations with the United States, was subject to substantial modification. In each instance, priorities were reordered, or - perhaps more accurately in the case of Spain-set for the first time. It should be remembered that, until the mid-1970s, Spain was a dictatorship that the armed forces helped create. In 1981, elements of the army and the paramili- tary security forces attempted to overthrow the new constitutional democracy. These attempts, of course, have been only the most dramatic manifestations of a deeper process of change and adjustment. But they exemplify the circumstances limiting Spain's participation in Western Europe and NATO. The military is reposi- tioning itself with respect to civil society, rearticulating and justifying its role within a democratic polity. For almost fifty years, principally as a result of the Civil War and the nature of the Franco regime, Spain had an insignificant role in international affairs. But in many other respects Spain had been marginal to the European mainstream since the end of the Napoleonic wars and had been severely shaken by the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in the 1890s-events that still condition Spanish reflexes, at least rhetorically, to the United States in particular. Even in the early 1970s, Spain was regarded as a pariah by a large part of the international community and was therefore excluded from many of the organizations established during the post-World War II period, especially in Europe. This exclusion limited what Spain could do internationally and the Spanish elites' exposure to international experience. Thus, for many decades, the country's international relations were severely dis- torted and self-limiting. This content downloaded from 46.252.97.82 on Fri, 28 Feb 2020 19:12:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY | 37 Spain did not share the modem industrialized nations' formative influences and common experiences, such as victory (or defeat) in World War II, postwar recon- ciliation and economic reconstruction, and the building of European transnational institutions. Indeed, until the early 1950s, Spain was formally excluded from the new international organizations. Throughout the cold war, Spain was firmly anti- Communist, and that, more than anything else, helped it to develop close security relationships, especially with the United States after 1952. But Iberian anticom- munism, coming from the interwar decades, was accompanied by a hostility to the postwar Western community's democratic values. In fact, the dissociation of "defense of the West" from "defense of Western values" during most of the post-World War II period has been at the root of Spain's difficulties in integrating foreign and defense policy into a coherent and popularly acceptable doctrine. After Franco died in 1975, one of the most fundamental tasks of the new democratic regime was to develop a defense and foreign policy more in keeping with a democratic polity and Spain's importance in Europe. Because of the am- biguity of Spain's security relationships before democratization, foreign policy and defense were among the last areas to be normalized in the process of Western Europeanization, and curious holdovers from the old regime continued in new guises. Spain's past also made foreign policy and security arrangements highly susceptible to demagogic posturing, especially in its relations with the United States. The Transition from Francoism In Spain, democratization took place by consensus and reconciliation. The new system incorporated the previously clandestine anti-Franco opposition, and the opposition accepted important continuities from the Franco era - especially in the security and military area. Initially, the transition was conducted by a broad but factious centrist coalition, the Uni6n de Centro Democratico (UCD), led by Adolfo Suarez, a former functionary of Franco's political movement. The UCD achieved remarkable breakthroughs in constitution making and institutional innovation, but it was increasingly unable to contain its centrifugal balances. Since 1982 Spain has had a majority government (a Socialist majority led by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, elected in 1982 and reelected with a smaller majority in 1986 and a disputed one-seat majority in 1989). In 1986 Spain joined the EC. In the mind of the civilian political leadership, the European engagement was essen- tial to ensure the successful consolidation of a European-style democracy, an es- pecially important concern after the failed coup of 1981. Four recent developments, however, help explain some of the special features of Spain's democratization. First, King Juan Carlos I was instrumental in consolidating democracy. The king, as Franco's designated successor, provided continuity. Moreover, he backed the construction of the broad centrist coalition that was critical to the transitional period through the UCD and worked closely with Suarez.