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The Channel Dash Was an Event During Which an Amazing and Moving Act of Bravery Took Place

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www.channeldash.org/learning The Channel Dash was an event during which an amazing and moving act of bravery took place. It was also a moment in WWII that has much to reveal to us. The Purpose of the Learning Resource The Channel Dash Memorial Trust started out to provide a memorial to 18 brave Fairey Swordfish crew, who flew their mission in adverse circumstances. Their part in this piece of history only appears for 30 minutes on 12th February 1942. The main characters in this story are the British and German militaries. Their weaponry, tactics, timing and planning provide a fascinating insight into the second world war. The lessons learned here can be transferred to campaigns in business and large organisations. Examining the facts surrounding this event reveal the complexities of war: The nature of conflict is dependent on the technology and equipment in use. The planning of an operation is simpler for attack than for defence. The element of surprise can bring a huge advantage. Chance conditions, such as weather, can aid or hinder success. Chains of communication can break down if secrets are held from the people in the chain. How this could be used in Secondary Schools This resource is interactive and will take about 30 minutes to read and absorb the material. It would require pupils to have access to a computer for individual or paired work. As a cover lesson the students could read and understand the material and fill in the Gapped Worksheet which they can have open in a second window. As an in depth study students could take more than one lesson, do some of the activities provided, and undertake further research. The learning resource provides ready access to the Web for independent enquiry. The Background to the Channel Dash The Germans had three of their most prestigious ships berthed in Brest harbour in France. They were not serving any useful purpose there and so it was decided to bring them home to Germany for repairs prior to operations against the Artic Convoys to Russia. The nature of war was changing. Air power had become more significant and potent as a weapon. However Britain and Russia still relied on ships to deliver vital food and resources from other countries after their own supplies became exhausted. The German U boats were key in winning the Battle of the Atlantic, destroying merchant ships and their cargo, and large warships were not required for this action at that time. Getting Germany’s prized capital ships up the English Channel and home would be a great morale boost to the German people. Allowing this to happen would be a missed opportunity to take out feared German armoury and make the British look very foolish. www.channeldash.org/learning Outline of Events Battle of the Atlantic commenced in 1939, ships carrying vital supplies were lost. After the German capital ship “The Bismark” had been sunk in 1941 the Germans deployed less vulnerable U boats to continue the battle of the Atlantic and the three capital ships were berthed in Brest. There they were close enough to the RAF to sustain bomb damage so the German decided to move them home. Operation Cerberus team began to plan, co-ordinate air and sea resources and practise manoeuvres for the return of the capital ships to Germany. Operation Fuller team began to plan air, land and sea resources to stop the German ships. The forces did not share information, later vital intelligence went unnoticed. February 11th 1942 Operation Cerberus began. The careful planning and co-ordination of German forces lead to a smooth execution despite the two hour delay while the RAF bombed Brest. February 12th the Operation Fuller began but without full strength because the British were not prepared for the Germans to sail up the English Channel in daylight Surveillance failed on three occasions and mist fell so the targets could not be seen from the coast. February 13th Operation Cerberus was hailed a success by Germany. Timeline of Events The website leads learners and enquirers through a timeline of the day revealing the events as they take place. he background maps plot the positions of these events. The facts are given without interpretation to excite further curiosity. Activities for Learners 1. Tarsia Rectangle quiz. 2. Organising statements to reveal different patterns www.channeldash.org/learning Tarsia Quiz. Cut out the boxes on this and the next page and match the questions to the right answers to make a rectangle. 24 www.channeldash.org/learning 95 www.channeldash.org/learning Click and drag these statements into three groups: Due to Chance, Due to bad planning, Due to good planning. Is there a pattern? Mist prevented gun The Sealion operators seeing submarine ran out ships of batteries. The RAF did not The RAF were report sighting of tricked by radar fleet quickly. jamming. The RAF did not The spotter plane look out for mined lost radar and ships. returned home. The Services were The Swordfish flew on 4 hour alert without full fighter during daylight. support. Luftwaffe fighters The RAF did not had practiced fire on react to sighting of slow aircraft. fleet quickly. www.channeldash.org/learning Click and drag these statements into two groups: Helped the British, Helped the Germans What happens? Mist prevented gun The Sealion operators seeing submarine ran out ships of battery power. The RAF did not The RAF were report sighting of tricked by radar fleet quickly. jamming. The RAF did not The spotter plane look out for mined lost radar and ships. returned home. The Services were The Swordfish flew on 4 hour alert without full fighter during the day. support. Luftwaffe fighters The RAF did not had practiced fire on report sighting of slow aircraft. fleet quickly. www.channeldash.org/learning What was Operation Cerberus? What was in Brest? What aircraft fired torpedoes? Who was Otto Ciliax? What is a capital ship? Who planned thoroughly? Was secrecy a good idea? .
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