Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC)

Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Godfrey A. Pirotta

Med Agenda MEDAC Publications in Mediterranean IR and Diplomacy

Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration Godfrey A. Pirotta Prof. Godfrey A. Pirotta Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC)

Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration Godfrey A. Pirotta

Malta, January 2021

Med Agenda

MEDAC Publications in Mediterranean IR and Diplomacy Table Of Contents

5 About the author 6 Preface 10 Acknowledgments

Part 1

12 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment 25 From Hymn to National Anthem 32 Building a New 48 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization 62 The Malta Labor Party and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 86 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta 106 Malta’s Foreign Policy After Mintoff 111 The Challenge of European Membership: A Study of Malta’s Parliament Approach to the Issue 1962-87 133 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta

150 Photo Inset

Part 2

158 Future of the Public Service 166 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta 178 The Organization of Public Administration and Civil Society: Comments and Remarks 186 L-Istat u t-Tmexxija tal-Istituzzjonijiet 196 Bringing Good Governance to Malta 202 A New Creation or an Image and Likeness? The Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Governance in a Centralized Micro-State 218 Public Administration Education and Training in Small States: The Case of Malta 1950-1995 242 A Farewell to Paternalism Through Public Enterprise? Privatisation in the Small Island 258-270 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

About the author

GODFREY A. PIROTTA is Professor of and Policy Studies at the University of Malta. He is also non-resident Ambassador to the Czech . A graduate of the Universities of Oxford, Reading and Bath, he has been a member of the Department of Public Policy since its inception, and its former head. In 2017, he was appointed Chairperson of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC). He is the author of a number of books exploring Malta’s governing institutions and official historian of Malta’s House of Representatives. He has taught at a number of overseas universities and his research papers have appeared in refereed journals across four continents. In addition, he has contributed several scholarly chapters to books on public administration, public policy and politics. He has been honoured by a number of Universities, the most recent being his appointment as Honorary Professor of Political Science and International Relations by the University of National and World Economics, Sofia, Bulgaria. During his career he helped launch a number of organisations both in Malta and abroad, among these Malta’s first consumer movement and the Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and Management. He sits on the advisory boards of several international organisations and in Malta has helped pioneer the study of small states, politics and public policy generally. In 2016 the President of the Republic of Malta appointed him a Member of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Malta.

5 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Preface

have, during my long academic career and active life, been given many titles. II have been invariably described as an economist, a historian, a political scientist, a public policy expert and a public administration expert. There is some truth in all of these descriptors for my specialisation is rooted in the study of the social sciences. Indeed, political science, international relations, public administration, sociology and social policy, and economics have formed the principal content of my studies during my years at Oxford, the University of Reading and the University of Bath. In all of these areas a sound knowledge of history was essential but I have never considered myself a true historian. Nonetheless, within the confines of Maltese historical studies I have contributed to a branch of history which has been largely ignored, i.e. that pertaining to the study of the historical development of governing institutions. Malta’s public service had received scant, if any, attention before the appearance of my study The Maltese Public Service: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-state 1800-1940 in 1996. Nor had anyone explored the impact of Malta’s Parliament on Maltese political development before the publication of my book Malta’s Parliament: An Official History 1800-2004. A third study, Guardian of the Public Purse: A History of State Audit in Malta 1814-2014, conducted in collaboration with my colleague Professor Edward Warrington, traces the evolution of this crucial governing institution. This interest in institutional history can also be evidenced in a numberof papers in this collection. These include Bread, Language and Civil service employment, A New Parliament House, and Malta’s Parliament and the European Dimension: the early years 1962-1987.

The descriptors employed in my regard, with the exception of that of economist, may be said, therefore to be fairly applicable. This is not to say that I have not written or commented on economic issues. Indeed, early into my teaching career as a teacher at a newly established Junior Lyceum secondary school I taught economics up to O Level standard. I believe that economics as a subject had not as yet been taught at this level in state schools. Given the above, it ought not to be surprising that in 42 years as an educationist I have taught all of these subjects from economics to social policy, from political thought to government, from public policy to public administration, from history to constitutional studies. But, I did more than just teach these subjects: in several instances I was the one that introduced them as areas of studies in their own right both within the University of Malta or outside of it. In some instances it fell to me to consolidate, their at the time, fragile position as academic areas of studies. The former is very much true in the case of public policy and political studies. Until then public policy was virtually unheard of within the walls of the University of Malta while it was not until 1993 that the first course, at Diploma, level in political studies was introduced. In the case of public administration,

6 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

I joined the University of Malta in 1979, the time that the course was being launched at degree level. The task of relaunching the degree fell again on me, during my fifteen years as Director of the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM). In 1990 public administration studies had been relegated to a Diploma level. Furthermore, I was there at the birth of the Small Islands Institute at the University of Malta and it is very likely that my study of the development of the Maltese public service, mentioned above, was the first study to appear in Malta that strongly highlighted the importance of smallness on public administration. I was also the first to introduce within the University of Malta the study of policy-making in micro-states as a study-unit at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels.

One of the descriptors which have never been applied to me is that of adult educator. However, I believe that this description would fit better with me than that of economist or historian. During my long career I had made it my duty to provide as many opportunities as possible for individuals often described as “mature students” to further their studies. I did this through several lay institutions, such as the Social Action Movement and the trade unions, but also at the University of Malta. One important vehicle through which this was achieved was IPAM, which provided hundreds of mature individuals, employees of the public service, with an opportunity to embark on studies from diploma level to Masters level and in exceptional circumstances even to doctorate level. Another important institution which contributed in a similar fashion, was the Workers’ Participation Development Centre which organized courses which attracted students from different working backgrounds, including the dockyards and the unions.

Many of the papers appearing in this publication in some way or another reflect all of these elements. Some of them were published in internationally refereed journals, some as chapters in books while others were presentations delivered to mixed audiences. It was decided to try as much as possible to present them in a thematic rather than a chronological order. It is not my intention to discuss each paper individually but merely to highlight some story or give some background to some of them. The first paper, Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment was written to highlight a neglected aspect of the so-called “language question” which plagued Maltese politics, and to some extent still does, for nearly a century. It aims, based on a document going back to the time that this question was becoming a dominant issue, to show that this question was equally about bread and butter issues as well as linguistic. Most historians have ignored this document probably because it did not fit nicely with the dominant view: that the issue was merely a cultural one. However, this official document had been publicly available since the time that the issue of language had arisen and it cannot be possible that all those who wrote about this issue had missed its existence. The second paper, also of a historical nature, traces the process whereby a hymn written for schoolchildren eventually became our

7 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration national anthem. The story is an intriguing one and demonstrates what level of importance Britain attached to this fortress during the war. This article also helped to inspire two books on the subject by two leading Maltese authors.

In Malta political parties play an intrusive role in the life of the people. Two papers, one on the role they played in the political modernization of Malta and the other on the historical relationship between the and the help in furthering our understanding of Maltese political parties and their historical role. Furthermore, the issues discussed continue to impact on the psychology of Malta’s political parties and the electorate. It is a view strengthened by the article Malta’s Parliament and the European Dimension: the Early Years 1962-1987, which demonstrates that each party’s view of the European Union continues to be influenced by its past. The article on women’s political struggle in Malta also throws light on the attitude of our two main political parties on gender issues. The paper, the Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta, with Professor Maurice Mullard, in some way also helps to explain how the island’s political parties address public expenditure issues in Malta and how public expenditure is factored into their politics.

One paper in this collection, i.e., that on Malta’s foreign policy stands alone. Although it was never intended to appear in the way it was published, its final conclusion has been vindicated by more than 35 years of neutrality. I was, in 1983, reading for my Ph.D at the University of Bath when all the leading stations in Britain announced that , Malta’s most renowned Prime , had stepped down from his office. The next day my supervisor, Professor Rudolf Klein, at the time Editor of The Political Quarterly, suggested that I should write a piece for the journal. The following day I left what I thought was a very rough draft in his office only to learn a few days later, to my utter surprise, that he had felt this draft to be very publishable and that it had already been forwarded to the printers. My uneasiness over the matter was dispelled about a year after its publication when the World Bibliography Series concluded that this article was the “most concise and coherent” rendering of Malta’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, I still feel it needs much further polishing.

The rest of the collection by and large touch aspects of public administration or governance in Malta. One paper was the subject of a presentation I gave in 1998 and it is here published in its original in the . I decided to have this paper included because many of its recommendations, after just over twenty years, have resurfaced in reports on governance in Malta by the Council of and the Venice Commission. Indeed, some of them have only just recently been part of Constitutional reforms passed by Parliament. One of the recommendations in the article, and one now adopted by Parliament, that of giving the President more say in the choice of members of the judiciary, I have long ago abandoned as a viable reform. Indeed, I have been for the last 18 years a staunch believer that extending powers to the Office of the

8 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

President will be counterproductive as Maltese politics are too partisan and recent events have demonstrated that some groups would gladly bring the Presidency to ruin in pursuit of their partisan agenda. Another article, first published in 2002, titled Bringing Good Governance to Malta, made clear the direction that Maltese politics were increasingly taking and seen in the light of current events that it had made clear in an unequivocal manner that the writing was on the wall and we can only ignore it at our own peril. The rest of the papers deal mainly with the public service and its reform. For the reader who perseveres to the end of this publication the probable final conclusion would be that here one can find a longstanding sustained cry for a reform of Maltese governing institutions. Other papers and articles, not published here, fall much into this same framework and touch such subjects as clientelism, political patronage, and electoral reform.

My final word goes to MEDAC for offering to publish these papers in one collection. For this I wish to thank Professor Stephen Calleya, its Director, for making the offer and Thomas Attard, a graduate of the Academy now serving as a research graduate with the Academy, for his constant help in this enterprise. MEDAC is an institution that works for peace in the Mediterranean by bringing young diplomats, from the region and beyond, to study diplomacy, giving them an opportunity to cultivate and extend their vision of the region and the world. Many of MEDAC’s 850 alumni now hold leading positions at Foreign Minister level, as ambassadors or within international development agencies. MEDAC’s thirty-year story is one of unparalleled success and I am honoured that the Academy has decided to publish this collection.

Godfrey A. Pirotta 22nd November, 2020

9 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the following publishers for permission to print:

Horizons Publications, Malta Mireva Publications, Malta Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy, University of Malta. Policy Research Centre, Sheffield Business School, Hallam University, Sheffield, U.K. Commonwealth Secretariat, London U.K. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, U.K. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands. Koran Association of Public Administration, Seoul, S. Korea. John Wiley and Sons Ltd., U.K. Parlament ta’ Malta. Malta. Department of Public Policy, University of Malta.

VGPV

10 Part 1

1. Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment 2. From Hymn to National Anthem 3. Building a New Parliament House 4. Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization 5. The Malta Labor Party and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 6. Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta 7. Malta’s Foreign Policy After Mintoff 8. The Challenge of European Membership: A Study of Malta’s Parliament Approach to the Issue 1962-87 9. The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment

(Published in ‘Colonial Encounters: Maltese Experiences of British Rule: 1800-1970s’, John Chircop (Ed.), Horizons Publications, Malta, 2015)

n 1878, a request from Malta by an elected member, Sigismondo Savona, Ireached the Colonial Office in London asking that entrance examinations for the Home and India Civil Service and for Commissions in the naval and military services be held in Malta.1 Under normal circumstances a request of this sort coming from the natives of a colony would have been dismissed by Colonial Officials in London. Instead it gave rise to a flurry of correspondence between the Colonial Office, the Treasury and other relevant British departments and Malta. The reason for this was that at this time circumstances in Malta were not considered normal as Italian unification seemed to evoke, in the minds of British officials, some challenge to British possession of the islands, a challenge which seemed to be encapsulated in the so-called ‘language question’, i.e. Italian versus English. The Secretary of State for the and his officials believed that this Maltese request, if acquiesced in, would resolve this question, which had only just burst in full force upon Malta, in favour of the . On this last point alone it is rather unclear why historians that have written on this period and especially on the language question have constantly ignored this event.

By the time the disagreement between a large section of Malta’s elites and the British over language had flared up in the 1880s, Malta had already obtained concessions denied to most other Crown Colonies.2 For example, the civil service in Malta was indigenized as early as 1838 when a Royal Commission recommended that, with one or two exceptions, all the executive offices of the civil service of Malta should be held by Maltese. Most of the other colonies not controlled by white minorities achieved this just before or immediately on independence. This article will look at the background to this Maltese request, how it was influenced by the issue of language and how both were ultimately conditioned by bread and butter concerns. It will also argue that had Britain accepted this request the language question could have been resolved rather quickly and not left to drag for nearly sixty years.

1 Pirotta, Godfrey, The Maltese Public Service: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-state (Mireva Publications, Malta), 1996, 325-6. 2 For a thorough rendering of this development see Pirotta, 1996, notably ‘Chap- ter Six, The Liberal Impact 1832-1846’.

12 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

The Issue of Language

When the Treaty of Paris of 1814 formally ceded the Maltese islands to Britain the language of administration and of the educated classes was Italian.3 However, the language used for daily intercourse among all Maltese, especially the lower classes was the ‘Maltese’, a language, some have called it a dialect, which was heavily influenced by Arabic and Sicilian.4 In the decades immediately following the British takeover of Malta several attempts were made by London to supplant Italian with English but these found resistance from the local elite and the many Italians who had found refuge in Malta during the time of the Risorgimento.5 There were several reasons for this which cannot all be discussed here and many studies have been published which attempt to explain the cultural, racial and political arguments that surround this issue. What interests us here are the bread and butter issues which underpinned support or opposition to the English language in the period under British rule but especially from 1878 to 1890 and how these led to a request from Malta for examinations to outside civil services and commissions in the services to be held in Malta.

Geoffrey Hull, in his study of the ‘language question’, shows that from the outset the official British position was to work to make English the official language ofMalta and on assuming their office new governors were instructed to work towards this end.6 But the decision taken by Thomas Maitland, first British governor of Malta, to remove all Maltese public officers holding executive offices from their office and replace them with British ones alarmed the Maltese no end.7 Hence, from this period onwards, whenever an attempt was made to advance English in Malta or replace the Italian code of laws with one based on the British code, resistance to such changes intensified. Consequently Malta’s professional elites came to interpret measures aimed at the elevation of English to the status of an official language in the civil service and the courts as a direct threat to their economic interests and livelihood. Hull quotes two studies to support this view. The first is by an Italian historian who argues that when the issue was shed of sentimentality one ‘would discover that the hostile attitude of the Maltese judiciary towards English was due principally to economic motives.’ Submission, she argues, would have opened up the entire judicial system to the English and Maltese lawyers would have been forced to abandon their profession.8 The other source he quotes is Herbert Ganado, a Maltese journalist and politician, who in his memoirs notes the ‘the Maltese had understood[…] that if the English 3 Hull, Geoffrey,The Maltese Language Question. A Case Study in Cultural Imperi- alism, (Said Publications, Malta) 1993, 4-9. 4 Aquilina, Joseph, Papers in Maltese Linguistics, (Malta University Press, Malta), 1961, 180. 5 Hull, 1993, 8-12. 6 Hull, 1993, 1-24. 7 Pirotta, 1996, 72-105 8 Fiorentini, Bianca, “Malta rifugio di esuli”, 52 quoted in Hull, 1993, 23.

13 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment was to take the place of Italian, the British would continue to take the best positions in our country and exercise the higher professions, as had happened shortly after they arrived, when even the President of the Court was an Englishman.’9

When British pressure to remove Italian relented and the Italian language was allowed to keep its status, relations with Britain improved or moved on to other contested issues, such as the demand for political representation.10 But the defence of the Italian language was not restricted to the courts and the administration but also to the schools. In an attempt to widen education and make it linguistically accessible to all children greater emphasis was being placed on the use of Maltese, rather than Italian, as a tool for learning. But pro-Italian Maltese were opposed to any measure that would give the local tongue any status let alone the status of a language. One important reason for this was that since the Maltese ‘language’ was considered to be a corrupt dialect of Arabic Malta’s elites feared that British attitudes to Malta would resemble more closely those applied to other non- European colonies. Experience had already taught them that some British governors had thought of them in this way11 and had behaved towards them in the way British officials tended to behave towards non-European subjects. And the debate as to what race the Maltese belonged to tended also to re-surface, from time to time, in the Colonial Office thereby influencing British policy towards Malta. Hence, their claim that their language was Italian was also a statement of their European identity. This is borne out by Judge Bonavita as early as the 1830s when he wrote that adopting the English legal code would once again have given rise to ‘the geographical problem…as to whether Malta belongs to Africa rather than to Europe’ allowing Britain to treat Malta like ‘one of those isolated British possessions….’12 This, he argued, would lead to the complete subjugation of the Maltese to the British in every sphere, a situation which Malta’s educated elites with their Italian education could never permit. Consequently, pressure by Italophiles helped to stall or defeat any attempt to extend the use of Maltese in schools as well as attempts to teach English in the first years of schooling.13 English was to be taught from the third year onwards and only in urban schools.

A situation for potential conflict over language arose in 1857 when Governor Reid introduced competitive examinations for entry into the civil service.14 Until this time entry into the civil service was wholly unregulated and left to the discretion of the governor 9 Ganado, Herbert, Rajt Malta Tinbidel, (Lux Press, Malta), quoted in Hull, 1993, 23. 10 In 1838 two Royal Commissioners concluded that Italian was a far more useful a language for the Maltese than English. This damped down efforts and calls for an Anglici- zation policy in Malta until the late 1870s. See Pirotta, !996, 133-176. 11 See Pirotta, 1996, 229. 12 Quoted in Hull, 1993, 13. 13 Hull, 1993, 19. 14 Pirotta, 1996, 191-194.

14 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration although some control was exercised by the fact that appointments and promotions needed to be ratified by the Colonial Office. However, the tendency in London wasto defer to the man on the spot and to sanction his recommendations. Employment in the civil service provided the only secure employment to young people with an education and some knowledge of English in addition to Italian, which was still the dominant language of administration, was seen as an asset. Consequently, the number of claimants for offices ran into the thousands every year and many were often appointed even when no vacancies existed. Governor Reid had claimed that in the first ten months of 1857 he had received 1,163 petitions for employment.15 The aim behind this reform was, therefore, twofold: that of ensuring that those desiring to enter the civil service were of proven ability and to avoid the ‘great inconvenience’16 that had been caused in several departments by the appointment of incompetent persons. While this reform may or may not have been popular among the Maltese, petitions to the governor from individuals seeking civil service appointments for themselves and/or their sons continued to be lodged even after entrance examinations had been introduced, but there is no evidence which highlights instances of strong opposition to it. The syllabus for the examinations, however, might have given rise to suspicion if not outright controversy given that English was a compulsory component. At this time matriculation in Italian was the principal pre-requisite for entry into the university which was not the case for English.17 One reason why it did not may have been the great trust then existing between Reid and local political leaders, the governor tending to consult with the elected members of the Council of Government on nearly everything. But, on this occasion, the Governor did not consult with the elected bench but, nonetheless, the measure does not appear to have attracted any marked opposition. The matter was indeed raised in the Council by an elected member, Dr Laferla, just a week after the first examination had been held. Laferla had asked the Chief Secretary whether all future situations or only some of them were to be conferred through examinations. He also asked whether the subjects in which the candidates were to be examined were to be always the same or not. The Chief Secretary replied that, as a general rule, in future all junior situations would be conferred in this way and explained that the subjects examined could not in all cases be exactly the same.18

The crucial issue here, given Maltese attitudes on the subject of English, is that all those wishing to compete in the entrance examinations had to pass a test in English in addition to Italian and arithmetic. This automatically meant that candidates had to become

15 Reid to Labouchere, 5 Nov. 1857, C.O.158/182, NAL, UK. 16 More O’Ferrall to Grey, 21st Jan. 1851, Despatches to the Secretary of State, May 1850-55, vol.7, National Archives (NAR), Rabat Malta. 17 This actually occurred in 1860, three years after the introduction of civil service entrance examinations. See Hull, 1993, 17. 18 Minutes of the Debates of the Council of Government, Sitting 46, 2 June 1857, C.O.161/27, NAL, UK.

15 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment more proficient in the English language if they hoped to make a career in the civil service. This, in turn, raised the importance of English to a level unprecedented before and seemed to fly in the face of the alleged opposition to its diffusion. It may be closer to the truth to say that the Maltese patrician class was not against the learning of English. Knowledge of English provided them and their children with the opportunity to access jobs in the civil service of Malta and other colonies, and some did, and in securing commissions in the military and naval services, although in the latter case in much more limited numbers. But knowledge of English also helped many working class men to obtain work in the naval dockyard, on British men-of-war and the merchant navy, and working class women to gain employment as maids with British service families and as shop assistants with retailers enjoying a British clientele. Thus, the benefits of learning English were recognized by Malta’s elites (and urban working classes) and they had no problem in consistently re- affirming this in the Council of Government. For example, Dr Naudi, leader of the elected members in the Council and speaking in English, told the House that he had no hesitation in assisting the Government in its project to diffuse the English language and what he had done for himself and for his children no one should doubt for a moment that he would not do for others.19 And knowledge of English was indeed spreading even though not at the pace desired by Britain. Captain Kirton, an Englishman who also formed part of the elected bench on Council, was of the decided view that the English language had ‘made enormous strides….as all classes are willingly learning it for the sake of the advantages secured by its acquisition.’20 It was a view that was also shared by many others including Sir Adrian Dingli Advocate and the Governor’s most influential advisor. However, what these individuals were against was that Italian might lose its status as the official language of the administration, the courts and education. As long as Britain retained the status quo on this issue these elites felt ready to co-operate with the colonial government on any measure, even the diffusion of English.

Britain was ready, though not happy, to let things continue as they were hoping that as knowledge of English spread Italian would lose its influence. For example, at one time Colonial officials found the governor’s efforts to save a private school founded by two sisters with the aim of diffusing knowledge of English among the island’s middle classes rather vexing with the Colonial Secretary expressing the view that the best thing that could have happened was ‘that this school should have died a natural death.’21 But a changing international scenario, especially the unification of Italy, soon put paid to this policy and by 1878 Britain had embarked on a declared policy of Anglicization in Malta. Some concerns about the possibility of Italian irredentistinfluence gaining a foothold in Malta had already

19 Pirotta, Godfrey, Malta’s Parliament: An Official History, (House of Representa- tives, Malta), 2006, 38. 20 Quoted in Hull 1993, 31. 21 Granville, min. of 12 Mar. 1869, on Grant to Granville, 26 Feb. 1869, C.O.158/218, NAL, UK.

16 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration been expressed by a couple of Governors in the 1860s and early 70s but by 1878 these concerns had also become those of the Colonial Office. Thus, in that same year, the Colonial Office decided to send to Malta three investigating Commissioners two of whom, Julyan Penrose and Patrick Keenan, were specifically instructed to look at ways of making English either the official language of the administration and/or to speed up its knowledge among the entire population. Julyan ultimately recommended that the marks for English in civil service examinations should be higher than those for Italian; that all books and documents in all departments were to be kept solely in English; that all claims on government were to be accepted only when submitted in English; that all communications with the public were, unless circumstances prevented this, to be conducted in English; and that eligibility for higher office in the civil service, especially to that of head of department, should be dependent on a thorough knowledge of English. He also recommended that English should be legally constituted as the only language of the Council of Government and the language qualification for voting eligibility should preferably be the English language. Finallyhe recommended that gradually Italian should be replaced by English in the Courts but with some linguistic choice being allowed to the Maltese in the giving of evidence. Keenan’s recommendations also favoured the elimination of Italian from the educational system and the introduction of Maltese and English as the two principal mediums for education.

These recommendations struck at the very heart of those very interests which Malta’s elites had, on and off, sought to defend for nearly eighty years. Not surprisingly then they vowed to resist Anglicization with all the means at their disposal fearing that their economic interests would suffer irretrievably if they didn’t. Fortunato Mizzi, the leader of the Anti-riformista group, as the opponents of Anglicization came to be known, argued that their struggle was about freedom and dignity but, above all, bread and butter. ‘As soon as the English language should be installed as the official language,’ his newspaper argued, ‘all the posts [in the public service] big or small will be occupied by Englishmen.’22 This was a widely diffused view, one which was strengthened by the government when, after 1878, it sought to make employment or promotion within the civil service the stick with which to beat the anti-riformisti.23 For example, Hely-Hutchinson, the Chief Secretary, had stressed that those who oppose English must understand ‘that their opposition shuts them out of all hope of employment or favour from the Government.’24 This too was a widely held view on the side of the government and its supporters and served to make the ‘language question’ one of the most bitter in the as a British colony. It is enough to say at this stage that the conflict at times brought the administration to a near

22 Quoted in Pirotta, 1996, 344. 23 To see how the language question embroiled the Maltese civil service see Pirotta, 1996, Chapters 8-9. 24 Lee, Hilda, Malta 1813-1914. A Study in Constitutional and Strategic Develop- ment, (Progress Press, Malta), 1976, 228.

17 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment halt with the elected members voting down the estimates and the financial votes of the government.

Making Malta an Examination Centre

But if proof was needed as to how intertwined the issue of language and civil service employment were, one need only look at how the Maltese request for the holding of examinations for the home and India civil service and for commissions in thearmy and navy led to intensive negotiations between Malta and London and the interested departments there. This request had arrived at the Colonial Office after Sigismondo Savona, than an elected member of the Legislative Council, and leader of the pro-English minority Riformisti Group, had tabled this request in the Council in May 1878. When submitting this request to London the governor emphasised ‘the great boon’ that such a concession would offer qualified young males in Malta ‘by opening out a new field of industry beyond the narrow limits of these islands.’ He also emphasised ‘the very limited means of the parents and families’ and their inability to meet the expense required for their children to sit the examinations in London. Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Colonial Secretary, jumped at the idea since he saw advantages for Britain too. He quickly grasped that, if conceded, this request would give a boost to the study of English in Malta as educated young men would seek to compete for these offices. He therefore instructed his Under-Secretary to lobby the Civil Service Commission (hereafter CSC) on the issue. The Memo sent to the CSC not only stressed how anxious the Colonial Secretary was that this request was acceded to but also informed the Commissioners that the Secretary of State was ‘ready to consider the question of providing the necessary funds’ if the CSC agreed to hold, even by way of an experiment, an examination in Malta or ‘to admit the Maltese to compete in any other way.’25

The CSC, however, thought there were too many difficulties with this scheme and, despite every desire to meet Hicks Beach wishes decided that such a scheme could not be implemented. But both the Colonial Office and the governor in Malta knew how far acceptance of this demand would go to dramatically increase the importance of English in Malta. Both knew that if Britain’s Anglicisation policy was to succeed ways had to be found to ensure that wider knowledge of English would give the Maltese tangible benefits which Italian could not provide for them. Hence neither of them was inclined to give up on this project. The issue was left to simmer but once the decision was taken to impose English in Malta the authorities felt that London was to be pressed again on the matter. Thus, two years after it was first raised Malta was once again insisting with London that the granting of this concession would ‘remove one of the greatest discouragements that locally exist for a more general and profound study of the English language in Malta.’26 It further argued

25 Ibid. 26 Fielding to Kimberley, 30 Sep. 1880, in Correspondence, 1884.

18 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration that it would go far in setting aside an often used argument by the anti-riformisti that the community would gain very little from a wider diffusion of the English language and hence acceptance of the Maltese request would make for an irrefutable reply. Lord Kimberley, the new Colonial Secretary, lost no time in supporting this renewed demand informing the CSC of the ‘considerable importance’ that he attached to this issue ‘both as a means of facilitating the efforts of the Colonial Government to promote the study of the English language in Malta, and of attaching the Maltese to this country by enabling them to enter her Majesty’s service.’27 Hence, it was crucial that the obstacles facing the Maltese, i.e. the necessity of having to travel to London to sit for the examinations, be removed.

A new governor, Sir A. Borton, re-iterated his predecessor’s concern but raised the stakes when he wrote that the ‘feeling in the Council would be unanimous, or nearly so, in favouring of adopting the reforms’28 in favour of the English language. In London the reaction was immediate and the Civil Service Commission agreed to reconsider the matter with urgency. But in Britain the Home Civil Service was, by and large, under Treasury control and as the issue also involved expenditure and the payment of fees by candidates sitting for these examinations the CSC was obliged to consult the Treasury before proceeding any further. But according to the Commission, the Treasury raised serious objections forcing it to reluctantly decide against holding examinations in Malta although it signalled its readiness to hold preliminary examinations for the army and for ‘men clerkships of the Lower Division of the Civil Service.’29 The Lords of the Treasury, after examining the request had concluded that holding examinations for the Home Civil Service and the India Civil Service would give rise to precedents which might ultimately lead to problems with other colonies. ‘It is one thing’ argued the Treasury to examine in Malta for the local army corps and for the local civil service ‘but quite another thing to localize examinations for Her Majesty’s civil and military services at large, so as to enable those who are entitled to compete to be examined at home.’30 Once conceded to Malta, the Treasury believed, this concession would have to be extended to the other colonies. One would, they said, have to simultaneously ‘examine for the Indian Civil Service in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras at the least.’ Hence the Lords of the Treasury were not prepared to concede the principle without further consideration. At the time examinations for the India Civil Service were held only in London effectively excluding Indians from competing for offices in ICS.

Encouraged by the fact that the India Charter Act of 1833 and the Orders in Council of 1870 and 1876 had expressly laid down that examinations should ‘be open to all

27 Colonial Office to Civil Service Commission, 25 Oct. 1880, in Correspondence, 1884. 28 Borton to Kimberley, 24 Dec. 1880, in Correspondence, 1884. 29 Civil Service Commission to Colonial Office, 5 Apr. 1881, in Correspondence, 1884. 30 Treasury to Civil service Commission, 23 Feb, 1881, in Correspondence, 1884.

19 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment natural-born subjects of Her Majesty’31 the CSC decided to continue its argument with the Treasury. It stressed, for example, that these provisions could only have a practical effect if people in the colonies could access the examinations under discussion. The Commission told the Treasury that what to-date had prevented it from implementing the provision in India was the ‘impossibility of having all the candidates examined viva voce’ by the same examiner and thus of satisfying the essential condition for a fair comparison of merit. They admitted that this objection could be raised in the case of Malta but not in the case of preliminary examinations for the Army, Class I and the Lower Division clerkships of the Home Civil Service and in the examinations for the Registry of Temporary Copyists or competitive examinations for Men Clerkships of the Lower Division. There was a difficulty, they said, that it may not be possible, because of distance, to observe the order of selection as laid down in the case of successful candidates from Malta, but they did not think this difficulty insurmountable or such as to preclude the holding of examinations in Malta ‘if otherwise expedient.’ The Civil Service Commission, however, went further in its support of the colonial authorities in Malta. It did not fear, it said, making this precedent in Malta for it did not necessarily follow that what was practicable in Malta would be practicable elsewhere. Each case had to be decided on its own merits. They did not believe this experiment practicable in and because of the delays in communications with those colonies. Finally, the Treasury ought to know, the CSC said, that the Commission had already in fact expressed its readiness to hold examinations as far away as Australia for commissions in the Army.

The Treasury, however, did not relent noting that it did not quite see the distinction which the CSC was trying to make between Malta and Canada.32 It also objected to making the filling of vacancies in the public service in the U.K. dependent on the colonies or to have to wait for successful candidates to have to travel to Britain before an appointment could actually be offered to them. Examinations for public appointment, the Treasury said, were not prizes for successful competitors but merely a means for ‘recruiting the public service in the best and most convenient manner.’33 The only concession which the Treasury was ready to make was to allow in Malta the holding of preliminary examinations for the Army and for men Clerkships of the Lower Division of the British civil service.

The disappointment of officials at the Colonial Office can be seen through their minutes on the correspondence between the Treasury and the CSC. Fairfield, a Colonial Office clerk noted that the Treasury had failed to understand that they lived in an era in which no subject felt bound to ‘any sovereign whom he considers objectionable’ and, therefore, ‘it was highly important….to prevent the 150,000 Maltese from becoming sulky and throwing themselves into the arms of the Italia Irredenta party, which lately

31 Civil Service Commission to Treasury, 11 Mar. 1881, in Correspondence, 1884. 32 Treasury to Civil Service Commission, 28 Mar. 1881, in Correspondence, 1884. 33 Ibid.

20 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration established a paper in Malta. But I don’t suppose the Treasury would do anything but scoff at such considerations.’34 The educated Maltese wanted work in clerical occupations but this work could not be had in Malta as already the civil service there was overstaffed. It was natural for them, therefore, to become sulky and turn towards Italy for employment opportunities of this sort. Wingfield, his superior, agreed. ‘I should have thought’ he minuted, ‘that the advantages [to British policy in Malta] so forcibly pointed’ out by the Secretary of State and the governor in Malta would outweigh Treasury objections for ‘it would not surely happen that the service would suffer from the delay of sending for the Maltese who stood first in order for a vacancy.’35 He concluded by noting that Britain had ‘been (perhaps unavoidably) opposing the wishes of the Maltese in many ways’ and he did not see why ‘the inconvenience of a slight possible occasional increment to some Government Department at home to encourage the adoption of the English Language in Malta’ should create such difficulties’ To this note the Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, added his own pessimistic note: ‘I fear we shall not succeed.’36

While acknowledging the efforts made by the Colonial Office to get the Treasury to relent Governor Borton was not convinced that what had been conceded, i.e. the possibility of holding examinations in Malta for Lower Division Clerks, would be enough to help resolve the language question in Malta. Being able to sit for all examinations in Malta was something which the Maltese wanted and needed very badly and he could not therefore ‘overstate the keen disappointment’37 that the whole Maltese community would experience once this decision was communicated to them. He also expected trouble. The Council of Government, he told the Secretary of State, had freely voted several of the estimates connected with the proposed educational reforms in favour of the English language. He also stressed that the elected members had shown themselves determined to raise the standard of so as to enable ‘the youth of Malta […] to successfully compete with others’ in examinations for service out of Malta, but especially India. He claimed that the Maltese were certain that their wishes would be met and had shown themselves in recent times disposed to support the diffusion of English in Malta. He assured the Secretary of State that if the objections had been financial he had little doubt that the Council of Government would have made any sacrifice to raise the necessary funds. But now that the door to employment in the public service of the Empire has been closed, he warned London, the Maltese would be forced to look for employment in other, mainly Italian-speaking Mediterranean communities. He thought the decision from London ironic, for while London found it impossible to acquiesce in this Maltese demand, it had no qualms about pushing through reforms to which the Maltese ‘were very much opposed.’

34 Minute Fairfield to Wingfield, 7 May 1881, on Borton to Kimberley, 30 Apr. 1881, CO.158/259, NAL., UK. 35 Minute Wingfield to Kimberley, 7 May 1881, CO.158/259, NAL., UK. 36 Kimberley to Borton, 21 Apr. 1881, in Correspondence, 1884. 37 Borton to Kimberley, 30 Apr. 1881, in Correspondence, 1884.

21 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment

Given the staunch opposition of the anti-riformisti to the policy of promoting English at the expense of Italian it might seem incredible that allowing examinations to the Home and India civil service in Malta would have had the effect of getting them round to favour the policy. But the Governor certainly believed this to be so, as did Sigismondo Savona who had made the transfer from elected member to director of education soon after having moved his appeal for this concession. Victor Houlton, the Chief Secretary in Malta, had been even more forthright in making this claim. In a letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Houlton wrote that the elected members had personally declared to him that if London conceded their demand they would be prepared, with the exception of the courts, to set aside the Italian language and adopt English instead.38 The Colonial Office had also quickly accepted all these statements from Malta and had given the proposal all the support it could master.

Whether the reports reaching London from Malta as to the readiness of the anti- riformisti to abandon their anti-English stance if their demand was conceded were true or merely wishful thinking on the part of Colonial Officials in Malta is open to debate. The fact that all those who have written on this period have ignored this event, which in the eyes of the Colonial Office merited so much attention and energy over a period of nearly five years, does however raise questions. But there is evidence to suggest that there was more to this issue than just wishful thinking by British officials in London and Malta. The introduction of competitive entry examinations which had made a strong knowledge of Englishsine a qua non criteria for entry had provoked no controversy and had in fact advanced knowledge of English in a way which no other measure had.39 Knowledge of English tied to secure employment was, therefore, perfectly acceptable to the Maltese. Julyan himself had noted in his report that the public service appeared to provide the best vehicle by which the study of English could be advanced.40 Another indication is the reluctance of the governor in Malta to inform the elected members that their appeal had been rejected. In a reply to a question on the matter from an elected member a year after the issue had been all but settled in London, the government had declared that ‘great hopes were entertained that the difficulties to the concession are temporary and not insurmountable.’41 This does indicate how important the issue was for the elected members and how unwilling was the government to lose their goodwill. It was important because its acceptance would have broadened the range of employment opportunities open to educated Maltese. Finally, another piece of evidence, and an important one, is a letter sent by Salvatore Cachia Zammit, an elected member and one of the leaders of the anti-riformista group, seeking

38 Houlton to Herbert, 28 Sep. 1881, CO.158/260, NAL., UK. 39 Pirotta, 1996, 294-5 40 Ibid., 294. 41 Cachia Zammit to Kimberley, 26 Oct. 1882, in Borton to Kimberley, 30 Oct. 1882, in Correspondence, 1884.

22 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration to re-open the matter about a year after Houlton’s own letter to the Colonial Office. In his letter Cachia Zammit noted that ‘the Imperial Government would gain’42 if their demand was conceded as the matter touched both British and Maltese interests. This was a direct hint that implied that concession would make diffusion of English more likely because of the advantages it offered the Maltese over others in competing for jobs in the Empire. But more importantly he concluded his letter by reminding the Secretary of State that ‘there is no people on the face of the globe that does not like practical benefits, and that does not gradually get well affected in proportion as these benefits become recognised.’ The message was clear: give us what we are asking for as the matter touched our bread and butter interest and in return we shall reciprocate by supporting as far as we can and in line with our interests the diffusion of English in Malta. It also meant that the elected members would no longer insist on Italian as the language of administration although from what had been written they were not yet ready to concede it in the courts.43

Governor Borton understood perfectly well the message from Cachia Zammit to the Secretary of State and lost no time in seeking to drive it home. Writing to Derby, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies in May 1883, he stressed the progress that had been made in respect of the educational reforms touching the English language under Savona.44 But, he added, ‘nothing would so much contribute to assist him [Savona] in this praiseworthy endeavour, as well as to secure the hearty concurrence of the large majority of his fellow-countrymen, as an announcement that examinations’ for the Home and India Civil Services would in future be held in Malta. Such was the link between employment and language that neither Savona nor the governor seemed able to accept that their wish was not going to materialise. Hope was the last to die but the Treasury remained unmoved.

Conclusion

It would be interesting to speculate as to how things would have turned out had Britain conceded Malta’s elites their demand. Would the practical benefits which it was argued would have been derived from this concession been enough to resolve the language question as the documents give us to understand? There can be little doubt that if the appeal had been conceded Malta’s elites would have felt obliged to make concessions in return. One cannot think that Governors and Chief Secretaries were deliberately misleading the Colonial Office or that they had not discussed this in some detail with the elected members. Cachia Zammit’s letter appeared to be the last card that Malta had to play and coming from an elected member was intended to reinforce and support the Governor’s efforts on the case. We know from what the Chief Secretary had written to the Colonial Office that Malta’s elites were not prepared to allow that English, and by implication the English

42 Ibid. 43 Houlton to Herbert, 28 Sep. 1881, CO.158/260, NAL., UK. 44 Borton to Derby, 31 May 1883, in Correspondence, 1884.

23 Bread, Language and Civil Service Employment legal code, become the language of the courts. What the Maltese wanted was to extend employment opportunities for their families while not endangering their control over this traditional patrician stronghold. They accepted that they had to concede something in return but they probably did not feel that conceding wider use of English in an otherwise already saturated public service in return for employment opportunities elsewhere was to their long term disadvantage. The courts were, however, a different matter. Thus, there is something to be said for the view that had Britain conceded the Maltese demand in respect of overseas examinations the language issue might not have taken such a centre stage in Anglo-Maltese relations and the issue would have been resolved earlier rather than later.

Bibliography

Official Papers

C.O. 158/182, /218, /259, /260 National Archives, London, U.K. Correspondence Relating to the Question of Making Malta a centre for Civil Service, Naval and Military Examinations, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1884. Despatches to the Secretary of State, May 1850-55, vol.7, National Archives (NAR), Rabat Malta. Minutes of the Debates of the Council of Government, Sitting 46, 2 June 1857, C.O.161/27, NAL, UK.

Publications

Aquilina, Joseph, Papers in Maltese Linguistics, (Malta University Press, Malta), 1961. Hull, Geoffrey, The Maltese Language Question. A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism, (Said Publications, Malta) 1993. Lee, Hilda, Malta 1813-1914. A Study in Constitutional and Strategic Development, (Progress Press, Malta), 1976. Pirotta, Godfrey, The Maltese Public Service: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-state (Mireva Publications, Malta), 1996. Pirotta, Godfrey, Malta’s Parliament: An Official History, (House of Representatives, Malta), 2006.

24 From Hymn to National Anthem

(Published in the Sunday Times of Malta, 22nd October 2006)

ational anthems are part and parcel of the many symbols employed by Nsocieties to reinforce a citizen’s emotional attachment to his country. In the case of Malta a hymn written in the second decade of the 20th century was destined to become the island’s national anthem. Indeed, from its first playing until its formal establishment as a national anthem, this hymn evoked a sense of patriotism and fervour, which can hardly be understood today except by those who remember Malta’s colonial days. This short article sets out to shed light on how the circumstances brought about by the war contributed significantly to establish this hymn as Malta’s national anthem.

Symbol of nationalism

In September 1945, Rużar Briffa (1906-1963), one of Malta’s leading poets, penned a poem in Maltese which he titledJum ir-Rebħa (Victory Day). This poem referred to an incident that had taken place at the Empire Stadium in Gżira on March 25th of that year, when an All Malta Selection played the visiting Yugoslav side Hajduk Split.1 On that day, as was and still is the practice, when a “national” side plays a visiting foreign side, national anthems are played. Since Malta was a British colony, the British (and Empire) anthem God Save the King was also considered to be Malta’s national anthem. However, since 1942, the British authorities had allowed the playing of the Innu Malti (Maltese anthem) on selected occasions.

On the day in question the only anthem played by the band of the King’s Own Malta Regiment (KOMR) was God Save the King. The Maltese crowd that packed the Gżira stadium for the game was apparently dismayed at this “inexplicable exclusion” of the Innu Malti and as the Maltese language newspaper Il-Berqa reported the following day, the crowd “in a moment of great emotional fervour” stood up as a body and sang the Innu Malti.2

For Briffa that event, at which he had been present, marked the victory ofMaltese nationalism in its struggle to assert itself against both English and Italian. Astrident Maltese nationalism had begun to make its presence felt in the second decade of the 20th Century, and following the riots of 1919 Britain had finally granted Malta a which delegated responsibility for purely internal affairs to an elected Maltese Ministry.3

25 From Hymn to National Anthem

In 1931, Briffa, with Ġuże Bonniċi, founded at the University of Malta l-Għaqda tal-Malti, which had as its main aim a wider diffusion of the Maltese language among university students and ultimately its establishment as a language in its own right.4 Maltese nationalism reached its peak during World War Two, not least by the grant of the George Cross to the Islands on Aril 15th, 1942 and the several other tributes to Maltese gallantry coming from world leaders..

The story of Malta’s national anthem or Innu Malti is closely intertwined with British efforts to nurture the expanding roots of Maltese nationalism in the faceofa growing challenge from Italy to its continued possession of Malta. As Dennis Austin has pointed out, the policy adopted by Britain in Malta was indeed an unusual one as it was generally recognised that the growth of indigenous nationalism tended to eventually pave the way for a demand for greater constitutional freedoms or indeed independence from colonial rule.5

The conflict over the use of Italian in Malta had engendered a sense of insecurity among the British and consequently no effort was to be spared to ally the average Maltese subject to the British cause. Britain had gone so far as to establish Maltese as a subject at school and to print school books with the Union Jack and the Maltese flag side by side.

The Maltese hymn

The hymn that was eventually to become Malta’s very own national anthem came into being when, in 1921, Albert Laferla, the Director of Education, asked the renowned poet Dun Karm Psaila to compose some verses to music by Dr Robert Samut. Dun Karm, who during his lifetime was honoured as Malta’s National Poet, is reputed to have set out through his poetry to defeat the belief that the Maltese language, because of its Semitic origins, was incapable of any literary beauty. Samut, a physician by profession, was also an amateur musician and composer and had composed a hymn to be played by the King’s Own Band of .

It was to this Samut’s score that Dun Karm’s lyrics were added. As a musical score, it was apparently played for the first time at the in 1919 and sung to Samut’s music for the first time in the same theatre in February 1923 in a concert organised by the Għaqda tal-Kittieba tal-Malti.6 Eventually it was formally played and sung again on September 8th, 1928, after the speeches made near the to commemorate the victory of 1565.

The war years

On June 11th, 1940, a few hours after Il Duce declared Italy’s entry into the war on the side of Nazi Germany, Italian bombs started falling over Malta. The death and 26 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration destruction wrought on that first day of the war was a prelude of much worse to come. Despite its plans, code-named Operazione C3: Malta, Italy never launched its invasion of the island but embarked instead on a plan of attrition through air raids intended to lead to its surrender.7 This plan took on a new dimension when, in early 1941, the Germans transferred to the Malta war theatre squadrons of their dreaded dive-bombers. This, combined with a relentless attempt at a blockade of the islands, soon wrought havoc and distress on every aspect of Maltese life.

As the life of the besieged became more desperate so the importance of maintaining morale became more crucial. For this purpose, the authorities in Malta had endeavoured to maintain a semblance of normality, keeping schools operating and the civil administration, including the courts, functioning as best as they could. Theatre performances took place from time to time and films, including propaganda newsreels, for showing in cinemas were brought over in submarines.8 But there was a general belief among the authorities that the war would give rise, on a somewhat large scale, to what they termed cases of “war neurosis” and for this purpose had prepared hospital facilities for their care. To their surprise and relief this did not occur on the scale they had envisaged, the number of cases needing treatment being comparatively very few.9

To maintain this positive development, in 1940, the local authorities offered to pay civilian bands £3 subsidy for musical performances in towns with a large population of evacuees.11 The programme was to be under the control of the authorities and arrangement had been made with the military authorities for the release of ‘key men’, once a week, for rehearsals and for playing. A typical performance was that given by the La Vallette Band in October 1940 which, in addition to traditional opera pieces, played works of a ‘patriotic nature’ such as Britannia by Vessella, Salut d’Amour by Elgar and Edith Cavell by Vassallo.12

In that same month, heads of department were directed to inform the Information Office, in advance, of the details of any public activity being organised by their departments, but especially of those which tended “to support public morale and to encourage the continuance of normal life in the island”.13 But the Blitz of January and April 1941 seemed to call for a greater consolidation of the local rather than imperial type of patriotic fervour. One step that at the time seemed to answer this need was the formal recognition by the British authorities in Malta of the Innu Malti as a national anthem.

Recognition

The matter was raised in the Council of Government by Dr George Borg of the Constitutional Party in December 1940.14 Dr Borg had argued that “recognition of the anthem would considerably help to consolidate public feelings”. Sir Ugo Mifsud, leader of the Nationalist Party, was not quite convinced that recognition of this hymn was the way

27 From Hymn to National Anthem to proceed and instead called for a competition for a national anthem. The Labour Party leader, Dr Paul Boffa, explained that he was not, in principle, against competition “had not the anthem been universally accepted in Malta and there was such a demand for it”. The Lieutenant Governor, while promising to give the matter his utmost consideration, observed that the government was “naturally extremely sympathetic towards any wish on the part of the , more particularly at times like these”. Privately, however, he feared that competition could give rise to controversy which would “not be limited to the musical merits of the works offered”.15

Internal minutes give an insight into the discussions that followed. One official claimed that the Innu Malti followed the lines of the God Save the King and was a prayer for Malta. Dr Laferla, who had instigated its very composition, noted that although it had been originally written for the schools it had “attracted such attention that the majority of the local civil bands (including the KOMR)” had adopted it as the national anthem. He also noted that this “had also been done in the Maltese colonies of North Africa” and that “the hymn” had been “broadcast from London, Paris, Alexandria and other places”.16

The Lieutenant Governor, and one would assume the Governor too, was concerned by what was meant by the use of the term “formal recognition” and asked Dr Borg to explain. The latter replied that what he meant was that he wished to see the anthem played on suitable occasions before the God Save the King. The matter was further discussed in the Executive Council of February 4th, 1941. The meeting concluded that as the Maltese hymn had already been adopted by the majority of the local bands and had already been broadcast on a number of occasions, it would advise the Governor to sanction it as the Maltese national anthem. Col. Roger Strickland, leader of the Constitutional Party, agreed to ask a question in the Council of Government thereby giving the Government an opportunity to make the decision public.

In fact, a statement to this effect was made in the Council of Government at its sitting of February 27th, 1941, which ran as follows: “After careful inquiry the Government has come to the conclusion that the Maltese anthem known as Innu Malti has won for itself, in the 20 years or so since its publication, a place in the esteem of the people which fully justifies its recognition as the special national anthem of the Maltese. Arrangements will accordingly be made insofar as the Government can do so, to have it played on all suitable occasions at the end of musical programmes immediately before God Save the King.”

It should be noted that permission to play L-Innu Malti was restricted to musical performances. To this extent the playing of the anthem was not considered proper at the end of cinema and theatrical performances or other official activities, where Godthe Save the King was to retain its pre-eminent position. In April 1941 a circular was addressed on the

28 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration subject to all band clubs in Malta and . In it the Lieutenant Governor’s Office included the above statement and went on to inform them that “now that official recognition has been given to it, His Excellency wishes that the practice [of playing it] should become more general.”17

Three weeks earlier Governor Dobbie had written to the services asking them to play the national anthem,18 and the Lieutenant Governor’s Office was informed towards the end of April that arrangements were being “made for the issue of band parts for this anthem to all ships on the station carrying bands.”19 By July 1942 the progress made by the national anthem led to the BBC to inquire from the Colonial Office whether theInnu Malti had been recognised by Britain and if so whether they could use it in broadcasts to Malta.20

Retraction

This request gave rise to some consternation at the Colonial Office, but the matter was not adequately dealt with until December 1942. In a letter to Campbell, the Lieutenant Governor, Mr Acheson, a permanent official at the Colonial Office, informed him of the position being adopted. “The point is, of course,” Acheson told Campbell, “that there is in fact only one national anthem for Malta as for the rest of the Empire, and it does not seem appropriate to give that title to any other composition, or to link any other composition with the national anthem in such a way as to suggest that they are of equal importance.” The Innu Malti, Acheson went on, should be considered as a hymn of Malta and he was informing the BBC and the Naval authorities not to include it in programmes as a national anthem.21

In his reply Campbell referred to the circular sent to local band clubs in April 1941. He admitted that he felt that “the Government had been in error in adopting the title ‘Maltese National Anthem’”. He felt “certain that it would cause no offence, or effect any particular comment” if they altered the title to Malta Hymn or Hymn of Malta, which he had been told was the correct interpretation of Innu Malti. However, he was of the view that to do away with the practice of playing the hymn beforeGod Save the King would lead to comments and “would be strongly resented in Malta”. He thought therefore that “it would be very unwise to try to alter the present arrangement”. Nonetheless he promised that he would ask the Times of Malta and Il-Berqa to use the new title.22

The matter was taken further in talks between the Secretary of State and the Governor, Lord Gort, during the latter’s visit to London in February 1943. Acheson informed Campbell it had been agreed that the practice of playing the Innu Malti “need not be disturbed and indeed might well be encouraged” and that he understood “that Lord Gort proposes to encourage it, but that no formal honours such as military salutes, etc. should be given to it” as they understood it in London to be already the case. It was also agreed

29 From Hymn to National Anthem that the English title was to be altered from National Anthem to Hymn of Malta and the Admiralty was to be informed accordingly. The BBC once again was to be informed that L-Innu Malti was not to be regarded as a national anthem but as a hymn that was accepted by the Maltese as a symbol of “their sense of unity and pride in their Maltese race and of devotion to their homeland”.23

This final decision was communicated to Miss Mabel Strickland as proprietor of the Times of Malta and Il-Berqa on April 12th, 1943. “You will”, Miss Strickland was told, “no doubt use the new title in any publication of these newspapers.”24 The following day the new status and title of theInnu Malti as merely a popular hymn was communicated to all band clubs. Despite some minor protests, notably from the Xirka għat-Tixrid ta’ l-Ilsien Malti, which wanted the anthem to be played on every occasion with the God Save the King,� the matter remained in limbo. But the reaction of the crowd at the football match played at the Empire Stadium in March 1945 and the interpretation given to it by Ruzar Briffa was a clear indication that the Maltese were beginning to feel the first deep stirrings of nationalism which Briffa and his colleagues in l-Ghaqda tal-Kittieba Maltin had long hoped for.

However, the issue was not and could not be fully resolved until 1964 when Malta became independent. The status of Dun Karm’s hymn as Malta’s national anthem was at this point enshrined in the Independence Constitution and, although from time to time there is, because of its religious symbolism, debate about its appropriateness, it has retained its position as our national anthem.

Notes and References

Endnotes 1 The All Malta Selection was made up of six Maltese and five British players. 2 Il-Berqa, March 26th, 1945. 3 Godfrey A. Pirotta, The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva, Malta, 1996, Ch. 12. 4 “Rużar Briffa” in M. J. Schiavone and L. J. Scerri, Maltese Biographies of the Twentieth Century, PIN, Malta, 1997. 5 Dennis Austin, Malta and the End of Empire, Frank Cass, UK, 1971, pp. 17-8. 6 Schiavone and Scerri, op. cit., pp.464, 490. 7 Mariano Gabriele, Operazione C3: Malta, Roma, 1973. 8 For extensive coverage se Ernle Bradford Siege Malta: 1940-1943, London, 1985.

30 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

9 Annual Report of the Medical and health Department for 1941, LGO 1942/113, National Archives (NA), Rabat. 10 LGO 1940/3206. NA. 11 Ibid. 12 LGO 1940/3590, NA. 13 Sitting of December 16th, 1940. 14 Minutes, LGO 1940/4922, NA. 15 Ibid. 16 LGO 1940/4922, NA. 17 Ibid. 18 Med 105/129. Public Record Office, Kew. 19 BBC to Colonial Office, July 13th, 1942, LGO 1940/4922, NA. 20 Acheson to Campbell, December 23rd, 1942, Secret, CO158/89607/42, PRO, Kew. 21 Campbell to Acheson, January 8th, 1943, Secret, LGO 1940/4922, NA. 22 Acheson to Campbell, March 10th, 1943, CO 158/89607/42, PRO, Kew. 23 LGO 1940/4922, NA. 24 Ibid.

31 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015

(Published in ‘Mill-Parlament’, House of Representatives, Malta, 2015)

alta has a new Parliament House. Although its inauguration has not laid to Mrest the controversies that surrounded the project, it is fair to say that it has brought closure to a debate that has spanned almost 100 years. This article explores the debate as it happened in Parliament during this entire period. It will show that the debate began as early as 1921 when Britain conceded Malta its very first Responsible Government Constitution and that the issue was of some importance from the start. Before 1921, Malta had no Parliament but a small Council of Government under the direct control of the Governor. Now, under the 1921 Constitution Malta was to have a bi-cameral Parliament made of a Senate and a Legislative Assembly.1 Consequently, the Tapestry Chamber, in which the Council of Government held its meetings was rather small for the purpose. Hence, the need to find more suitable premises for the purpose.

The new Parliament, as noted, was to consist of two chambers: the senate with 17 members of which seven were directly elected by voters and ten nominated by community corporations; and a 32 member Legislative Assembly elected from eight electoral districts. Since only one adequate hall existed at the time, both Chambers were forced to hold their sittings in the rather small Tapestry Chamber and sit on different days. There was a further complication: the 1921 Constitution also laid down the obligation, in certain circumstances, for the holding of joint sessions between Senate and Legislative Assembly thereby making the issue of space more acute.2 And, on the occasion that the two Chambers were obliged to sit concurrently, two different halls had to be used. On such occasions the Senate held its sitting in the Tapestry Chamber while the Legislative Assembly made use of the Armoury. In the case of some joint sittings between the two Chambers the Armoury was generally made use of.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the issue of finding adequate accommodation for the two Chambers featured in the Governor’s first Speech from the Throne when he was addressing a Joint Sitting of Parliament in November 1921.3 He did not mince his words: the issue of finding adequate space which would allow both Chambers to carry out their work 1 See Godfrey A. Pirotta (2006) Malta’s Parliament: An Official History, House of Representatives, Malta, for a complete background to this event. 2 On several occasions, in the period 1921-32, whenever a joint sitting was re- quired, the two Chambers had to make use of the Armoury in the Palace for their sitting. 3 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, Joint Sitting of 3 Nov. 1921.

32 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration properly was a pressing one, he told members. The current chamber could only meet their requirements if the two Chambers managed to come to some mutual agreement about its use. He urged members to consider whether each House should have its own Chamber or, indeed, whether Senate and Assembly should meet in separate buildings reminding them, however, of the need to keep costs constantly in view. He also called upon members of both Houses to consider what kind of accommodation was required by Ministers for them to carry out their day-to-day responsibilities, especially since it had already become apparent that all MPs were of the view that the existing facilities were inadequate.

The Tapestry Chamber, while opulent in its own way, was too small to comfortably accommodate all the members of the Legislative Assembly, the press and the Strangers who wished to attend the sittings. The Head of the Ministry, at the time Joseph Howard, was even in greater difficulties as his only facility was an office in the Grandmaster’s Palace. Indeed, it was not until sometime later that the Auberge D’Aragon was adopted as the Office of the Head of Ministry. Such were indeed the working conditions in Malta’s first parliament that, in February 1922, when the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution to establish a Parliamentary library Gerald Strickland, from the Opposition benches, sarcastically remarked that the only space available for a library was on Mr. Speakers’ desk.4

It was not long after, however, that the issue was raised again by Giovanni Adami, a back-bench member, who asked whether it would be a good idea for the government to try to acquire, for use as a Parliamentary House, one of the existing Auberge’s currently held by the British military authorities. This suggestion was noted but it was left to Gerald Strickland in another sitting to raise the matter more forcefully when he pointed out that lack of space to accommodate strangers was undermining the true role of the House. ‘The heart and soul of responsible government,’ he told the House, ‘is publicity. The electors should know what is being done; ….[they] are entitled to know what takes place in this House.’5 He suggested, therefore, that in future sittings should be held in the Hall of St Michael and St George and he pressed the government to approach the authorities for permission to use this hall. He was supported by Enrico Mizzi who argued, however, that the House should not give up its control over the Tapestry Chamber. Mizzi further argued that the public had a legitimate right to attend Parliamentary sittings and as the Palace was public property no single individual, meaning the Governor, had any privileged right over its use. Mizzi’s argument reflected a long-standing grievance over property held by the British services and which the Maltese side claimed belonged to the civilian government. Howard, as Head of Ministry, argued that what was required was a resolution of the House stating clearly which buildings members thought the government should acquire and promised that his would do its best to acquire them.

4 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 17 Nov. 1922. 5 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 5 Jan. 1922

33 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015

This suggestion was taken up by Gerald Strickland during the Sitting of January 30, 1922 when he proposed that the House should make ‘a humble address’ to the Governor asking him to obtain the assent of the Imperial Authorities to make theAuberge de Castille available for use as a Parliament House. He argued for a ‘humble address’ because he believed the question of ownership was a sensitive and legally ambiguous one and he felt sure that if the matter was not approached with care and courtesy, it would inevitably fail. Britain, at the time, had agreed to send to Malta an arbitrator to examine and try to resolve disagreements over property and he feared that anything more than a ‘humble address’ may jeopardise these talks. Enrico Mizzi, however, successfully pushed through an amendment which called for the appointment of a Commission of MPs to draft the address. He wanted the Governor to support their case for Parliament to move to Castille which he insisted belonged to the civil government. This Commission eventually held two meetings and a Report outlining the address to be made to the Governor was placed on the Table of the House on February 14, 1922.6 It was discussed later in the same sitting when its various articles were examined. The main difficulty facing MPs was that they did not wish, by their address, to appear ready to surrender rights over buildings which they held to be for the use of the civil government. At the same time they wanted to demonstrate their readiness to be flexible and although they were adamant that theAuberge de Castille belonged to the civil authorities, they were prepared to come to some sort of arrangement with the military services for its use. In the meantime, Members of the Senate, while keeping in close contact with the proceedings in the Legislative Assembly, were also trying to see if they could find a more adequate place for their own sittings and, in October1921, held an informal and private meeting at theAuberge de France to see if it could be adapted for their use. But, even here, matters did not really move forward.

1924-27 More of the Same

By the time that the 1924 elections had come around, little progress had been achieved. Consequently, the issue was once again to take prominence during Malta’s second . In fact, by November 1924, Gerald Strickland was once again raising the issue when during a debate he expressed the hope that the transfer to the would take place soon as the conditions in the Chamber were becoming really oppressive.7 The Speaker informed Strickland that, accompanied by the President of the Senate and other Ministers, he had paid a visit been to the Auberge de Castille to investigate the adequacy of the premises as a Parliament House and was happy to report that the Great Hall was both longer and larger than their present chamber.

However, in December, an impatient Strickland once again raised the issue. The Head of Ministry replied that plans were being prepared and measurements taken to

6 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 14 Feb, 1922. 7 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 24 Nov. 1924.

34 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration ascertain whether the Legislative Assembly, the Senate and a number of key government departments could be accommodated there and whether the War Department could be accommodated in the Palace and possibly the . Nevertheless, by the end of February 1925, the matter had not been settled and Dr Magri, a backbencher, asked the Head of Ministry to lay on the Table of the House the correspondence that had gone on between the Government and the military authorities over the transfer.8 The Head of Ministry replied that it was not the moment for such a measure and took the opportunity to deny rumours that his Government intended giving up the Tapestry Chamber. Dr Magri, however, raised another issue and this in respect to what he considered an affront to the House because of the practice, by the Governor, of using the Tapestry Chamber as a cloakroom during State Balls. The Head of Ministry sought to pour oil on frayed sensitivities by reminding the Member concerned of the support that the Governor was extending to the two Houses in trying to ensure their transfer to the Castille.

Finally, in May 1925 the Head of Ministry raised the matter himself for the first time. He rose to move a Motion calling for the setting up of a Joint Select Committee of both Houses ‘to consider and report on the advisability, or otherwise, of moving the Imperial Authorities to hand over to the Civil Government theAuberge de Castillefor use principally as a Parliament Building’ in exchange for other buildings.9 The Select Committee was to consist of ten members, five from each House. He had already informed the Senate as to how matters stood at the time and from his statement there and his reading of letters from the Governor on the subject it appeared likely that the military authorities would consent to move as long as the signal station was allowed to remain on top of the building. Indeed, from the correspondence presented, but especially from the letters by the Governor, the impression conveyed to Members was that it was action from the Cabinet that was required to settle the matter.

Although the Head of Ministry was supported in his proposal, much of the debate that took place on it was conditioned by past fears that in order to obtain the Auberge de Castille Members would have to surrender other property, including the Tapestry Chamber, in exchange for it. The Select Committee that emerged from this debate was to consist of Mr Speaker, Salvatore Borg Olivier, the Head of Ministry (UPM) Augustus Bartolo (CP), Col. Savona (LP), and (PDN). The Senate, while it concurred in the appointment of a joint Select Committee, by proposing an amendment which sought to preclude that any part of the Governor’s Palace could be traded for the Castille, made negotiations with the British authorities virtually impossible.10 To some degree this amendment was a personal embarrassment to the Head of Ministry because when presenting his Motion he had revealed that the proposal to exchange partsof

8 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 26 Feb. 1925. 9 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 4 May 1925. 10 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 14 May 1925,

35 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015 the Palace for the Castille had come from the Governor and that he had described the Governor’s role in the matter as very generous. This, apparently, had also brought the charge in newspapers that the Head of Ministry had acquiesced rather quickly in offering to give away Malta’s historic public buildings to the British armed services. Thus, in a later sitting of the Legislative Assembly, the Head of Ministry declared that the matter concerned every Member of the two Houses rather than the Government and that he would therefore be leaving it entirely in their hands. He, thereby, withdrew his membership of the Select Committee and refused to nominate a Minister as his replacement.11 The Senate’s amendment was, nonetheless, accepted by the Legislative Assembly, as was the Head of Ministry’s wish to be excluded from the Committee with his place being taken by Prof. Galea of the Constitutional Party. As its representatives on the Select Committee the Senate appointed its President, Max Debono, Marquis Paolo Apap Bologna, Count Alfredo Caruana Gatto, Antonio Cassar Torregiani, and Col. Alexander Mckean.12

The Report of the Joint Select Committee, if one may indeed call it so, was brought before the Legislative Assembly on June 15, 1925. It merely repeated the resolution adopted by both Houses in May and its thrust was to place the ball firmly back in the Government’s court when it stated it could not proceed with its work before it could be ascertained whether the military authorities were prepared to accept other premises other than the Palace. For this reason, it suggested that the Government should approach the military services to sound out their views on this issue. The Head of Ministry promised that the Government would do its best to get the information required but he made it clear that it was his intention to present the Report to the Governor.

By December, however, it was clear that the negotiations with the military services had broken down. This was attested to by both Gerald Strickland and the Head of Ministry at the start of the Sitting of the 15th of that month. Strickland complained, a complaint upheld by the Speaker, that because of the noise coming from the lobby he had found it totally impossible to understand the minutes while they were being read. He then expressed his regret ‘that the negotiations for the transfer to the Castille’ had fallen through. The Speaker sympathized completely to the extent that he described the existing facilities as a ‘proper disgrace.’ The Head of Ministry went further and, in addition to stating that they lacked even ‘the ordinary amenities of life,’ he described how Ministers very often had to carry out important duties in the corridor and how on one occasion the Governor’s butler had the goodness of lending him his own room so that he could deal with some urgent business that had come up.13

11 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 28 May 1925. 12 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 15 Jun. 1925. 13 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 15 Dec. 1925.

36 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

The Legislative Assembly discussed the issue again in February 1926, this time at the invitation of the Speaker.14 As the Speaker has no power to initiate debate, before proceeding further he asked for and obtained permission from the House to leave his Chair. After the Clerk of the House had read out some items of correspondence between the Government and the military authorities, Mr. Speaker then gave a blow by blow account of the difficulties facing the House in the execution of its business. He also outlined how the offer of the Castille had come from the Governor and how it had been suggested that, in exchange for this auberge, the military would take over other premises in the Palace. He reminded the House that a Joint Select Committee had been formed to deal with the issue but the amendment of the Senate to its terms of reference, which excluding the cession of any part of the Palace to the military, had ultimately frustrated its work. A visit to the Castille, he said, had convinced him that the building was not only big enough to provide the facilities required by Parliament but could also accommodate a number of government departments. It was his decided opinion, he told members, that while they should step back from their decision to withhold the Palace from the military, but without at the same time renouncing to the Tapestry Chamber, they should be prepared to negotiate the transfer to the Castille. The Senate, he said, should be asked to withdraw its amendment to the terms of reference of the Select Committee and if that House insisted on its maintenance, then the Legislative Assembly should, if necessary, proceed with the matter on its own.

The Speech by Mr. Speaker, Salvatore Borg Olivier, gave rise to an impassioned debate among the Members of the House. Gerald Strickland held that the issue needed solution because it was in his view crucial to the future of self-government in Malta. ‘If,’ he told members, ‘we are to have a popular government which will do good to the country and which will uplift the condition of the Maltese, we should make this House not only possible but attractive to most people, to the representatives of the professions and to the various branches of thought and learning, not to mention the leisure classes who ought to take much more interest in politics than they do under present conditions.’ The Head of Ministry concurred with most of what was said in the debate and promised that his Government would be ready to assist in every way. However, when Augustus Bartolo moved that a new Committee should be established free from any limitations as to the options that might be negotiated, the matter was brought to a halt by Enrico Mizzi’s insistence that Bartolo’s Motion required four days’ notice. This opposition to the Motion, coming as it did from a Minister, soured the atmosphere and resulted in Professor Bartolo throwing the Order papers on the floor of the House.

When the Motion came up again for discussion four days later, its sponsor was Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, popularly known as il-Gross. After a very brief introduction he passed on to nominate the members who were to sit on the proposed Committee. These

14 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 17 Feb, 1926.

37 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015 were Mr. Speaker, Dr Ugo Mifsud the Head of Ministry, Prof Bartolo, Col. Savona and the proponent. In the end two other members, Prof Galea and Dr Adami, were added to the Committee. The Head of Ministry’s view that the Senate should be asked for its concurrence was resisted but it was agreed that once the Committee had drafted its report the Senate would be consulted.15

The Committee reported back in the middle of March.16 In its Report the Committee reiterated the generally accepted view that the Auberge de Castille was the only building suitable for a House of Parliament but that the requirements of the military, if an exchange was to be affected, would require the transfer to them of the Auberge de France and the entire lower floor of the Palace, which the Committee was not prepared to recommend. Thus, in the view of the Committee, the proposed deal with the military authorities was inadvisable. However, they felt it their duty to stress the obvious and acknowledged necessity of arriving at some satisfactory arrangement in order that Parliament and its members may be able to carry out their duties in a satisfactory manner. They therefore proposed the appointment of yet another Joint Select Committee to inquire into and report upon the ‘best means of making provision for the Sittings of Parliament and the general conduct of its business.’ Discussion of the Report, which the majority of the Members wanted to adopt there and then was, however, prevented by Lewis Mizzi who objected to a suspension of the rules. So, it was not until March 22, that a Motion calling for the setting up of a Joint Select Committee could be moved and debated. The duty of moving the motion fell on the Head of Ministry who, while nominating Mr Speaker, Dr Adami, Prof. Galea, Prof Bartolo, Dr Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, Col. Savona and himself as members to represent the Legislative Assembly, he re-outlined the difficulties facing their work and appealed to members to support his Motion. The Motion was seconded by Bartolo who expressed the hope that every individual member of the House, ‘who feels for the dignity of the new status’ that Malta had attained, should help the Committee to achieve its aim.17

Nonetheless, there the matter rested for, by October 1926, the Committee had made little headway on its work. This became apparent during a debate on a money vote which was before the Legislative Assembly at the time. The Head of Ministry hadjust explained that a vote of £330 had been inserted in the estimates ‘in order to give more comfort to members of this House.’ At this stage a member asked the Head of Ministry for information as to whether the Select Committee had come to some decision. The PM replied that the Committee had as yet not reached any conclusion and in default of this he expressed his intention of proposing, at some future sitting, that a sum of money be voted in order that the Assembly may transfer to the Auberge de France. It was here that

15 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 23 Feb. 1926. 16 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 16 Mar. 1926. 17 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 22 Mar. 1926.

38 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Prof. Bartolo intervened and challenged the Head of Ministry to explain what he meant for as a member of that Committee he wanted to inform the House that the Committee had never met. This statement gave rise to a heated exchange between the Members and the accusation that it was futile to appoint Select Committees when these were treated in such a way by the Government. The Government, as Bartolo pointed out, by stating that it was preparing to bring before the House a vote of expenditure of this sort had also indicated that it had come to a unilateral decision over the transfer of the House to the Auberge de France.18

However, the Select Committee, which was under the chairmanship of the President of the Senate did hold a number of meetings although apparently, for reasons which are not clear, Prof Bartolo was never notified. This was revealed two weeks later when Gerald Strickland clashed with the Head of Ministry during Question Time. Strickland had asked the Head of Ministry whether the Cabinet or the Head of Ministry had committed themselves to the transfer of Parliament without the consent of the House. In the exchange that followed, the accusation that the Committee had not met, was repeated and it was at this stage that the Speaker revealed that the Committee had indeed met and that it had conducted a number of inspections of possible sites which could be used as a Parliament House. Not surprisingly, Bartolo was furious, but as it was Question Time, debate had to be curtailed.19

The Report of the Committee, with Professor Bartolo’s signature on it, was finally laid on the Table of the House by Mr. Speaker on December 6, 1926. The Report of the Joint Committee, while reiterating the reasons why it was necessary to find more suitable premises, concluded that the only building capable of providing the required space and facilities was the Auberge de France. The Committee was also of the view that the cost of transforming this building for the purpose of using it as a Parliament House was about £2400. It also pointed to a number of drawbacks, such as the closeness of the Hall to other buildings, the noise from the streets, and the fact that the debates, ‘especially if they are of a heated character, would be audible from the streets and from the buildings in the vicinity.’20 Nonetheless, the Committee felt that the advantages tended to outweigh the disadvantages and recommended that the necessary steps should be taken to implement the Report. The Senate was to continue to use the Tapestry Chamber but the Legislative Assembly was to reserve the right to make use of that Chamber when deemed necessary or advisable. In this way, the Joint Committee made it clear that the Maltese side of the Diarchy was not prepared to surrender its foothold in the Palace. After the reading of the Report by the Clerk of the House the Head of Ministry also laid on the Table a plan showing the proposed alterations to Auberge de France and invited the members to find the time

18 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 25 Oct. 1926. 19 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 8 Nov. 1926. 20 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 6 Dec. 1926.

39 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015 to inspect the premises as he intended to move the adoption of the Report the following week.

True to his word, a week later the Head of Ministry presented a resolution in Parliament to this effect.21 But interestingly enough, during Question Time, in reply to a question from Antonio Dalli as to whether the Committee had considered the use of the Public Library as suitable premises as a Parliament House, he placed on the Table a report from Hannibal Scicluna, Director of Libraries, dated December 11, 1926, explaining why it was inadvisable for the Government to proceed further with this idea. The fact that the report featured the date of the previous day gives one the impression that the Government had not yet settled on the Auberge de France as the most suitable place. However, in moving the adoption of the Report the Head of Ministry placed a great deal of stress on the expediency of not giving up the Tapestry Chamber going so far as to state that the Imperial Authorities had intimated that this Hall was included under reserved matters. The contention of both Houses, however, he said, was to reject this assertion and to maintain that the Hall was intended as a place for Parliament to meet. That this point needed to be raised so forcefully gives the impression that once the British side of the diarchy had learnt of the intention of the Legislative Assembly to transfer to another building they intended to take control of the Hall. Nevertheless, the Head of Ministry recommended that Parliament should now act as advised in the Report of the Joint Committee. He concluded that the issue was not a political one but of interest to all Members of the House.22

Although at the beginning of the sitting Strickland had said that on this question there was no party line, he replied with a defiant speech which accused the Government of incompetence and pooh-poohed the idea that any Secretary of State would allow that either House of Parliament should be evicted from the Palace building against its will. Furthermore, he rejected the Motion for, in his view, the Castille was the only building ‘where with dignity, or even common respect for the position of the legislators of this country, any transfer of any sort should be contemplated.’ That, he said, was the opinion of the Governor and of the Head of Ministry. Why had both now retreated from that position, he asked? Even from the Report itself, he argued, it was clear that the Auberge de France with its drawbacks did not possess those qualities which made it fit to house the Members of the Legislative Assembly. However, at this stage the debate became very personal and acrimonious and by eight in the evening no decision had been arrived at. Some Members retraced old arguments, such as the transfer to the Public Library, while others put forward new suggestions. For example, there were those who suggested building a new Parliament House over or in place of the , situated right across from the Governor’s Palace.

The debate continued after the holiday recess with a long speech from Prof Carlo Mallia who argued that the choice of the Auberge de France was not a happy one. It did 21 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 13 Dec, 1926. 22 Ibid., 40 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration not make sense for members to vote to move to another site which in their hearts they knew was not better than the present one and which ultimately provided only a temporary solution to their problems. He declared, therefore, that despite his membership of the Cabinet, he would be voting against the Motion. Prof. Galea, who was nominated to sit on the Select Committee because of his technical knowledge and who had drawn up the plans for the minor alterations that the Select Committee had said were necessary at theAuberge de France, explained the advantages of moving to this building but admitted that he could not give his assurance that the drawbacks could be entirely eliminated. He concluded his speech by inviting his fellow MPs not to overlook the fact that the renovation of this building would be an asset to the country even if at some future time they decide to move to new premises. De Giorgio argued in favour of building a completely new Parliament House and thought the area of the Main Guard would be an excellent choice as it would place the two Palaces of the – the Governor’s Palace and the new Parliament – across from each other and in the very heart of the capital city. He therefore proposed that the Motion should be amended so that the debate may be adjourned until ‘efficient means be found for eliminating the drawbacks’ mentioned in the motion. After further discussion this amendment was agreed to and the debate on the transfer of Parliament to a new site adjourned.

Another Attempt

In the 1927 elections the ruling party was defeated and a coalition government composed of Strickland’s Constitutional Party and Boffa’s Labour Party took power. Six years of debate had failed to bring about a resolution of the matter and the issue was to remain dormant until 1929. It was again brought to the attention of parliament by Ugo Mifsud, former Head of Ministry but now Leader of the Opposition, during Question Time. Mifsud noted that he had received a letter from the Lieutenant Governor informing him that there was no prospect that the Auberge de Castille will be handed over to the civil authorities for its use as a Parliament House. Having done so, however, he quickly added that he did not wish to press the Government to reveal at what stage its plans were on this issue. Strickland, however, replied that the matter was of public interest and he informed the House that as the Castille project had fallen through his Government was planning to ‘take steps towards the establishment of Houses of Parliament over the Casino San Giorgio, the back of the Main Guard and the Garrison Library.’23 To prove his point he laid on the Table of the House a letter which had been sent to the manager of Sciclunas Bank informing him of the interest that the Government had of acquiring the property and inviting him to discussions on the matter. In the letter the Government also hinted at the possibility that the property might be expropriated if an agreement could not be reached.

Ugo Mifsud returned to the subject on January 31 when he asked the Head of Ministry whether he would agree that the issue of choosing a site for a Parliament House 23 Ibid. 41 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015 was one which devolved exclusively on both Houses of Parliament rather than the Executive. Strickland agreed and proposed the appointment of yet another Select Committee of the House to consider the question and invited Mifsud to nominate its members, which he declined to do.24 Consequently, the matter was dropped although it did not take long before it became the subject of a Parliamentary Question, this time by Giovanni Adami. He asked the Minister of Public Works whether in the judgment of his Department’s technical staff the space over the Main Guard was sufficient to accommodate the two Houses of Parliament, whether the site was under the jurisdiction of the Governor and whether the Garrison Library was publicly or privately owned? The Minister replied that the space was quite adequate for the purpose but that the approval of the Governor was required before the project could be embarked upon.25

On February 15, 1929, Strickland laid on the Table of the House the opinion of the Public Works Department on the proposed building of a Parliament House on the Main Guard site across from the Palace. The two Houses of Parliament were to be accommodated on the first floor while the offices were to be fitted in the space between the two Houses and the staircase below. The papers also included ‘rough sketches’ showing how the existing buildings were to be incorporated into the scheme. According to these papers the estimated cost of the building was £60,000.26 But it was in April 1929 that Strickland finally moved, in the Legislative Assembly, the Motion that ‘in the opinion of this House the site opposite the Palace in St George’s Square is the most suitable for a Parliament House.’27 According to the Head of Ministry this site had a number of advantages: it was near the main offices of government; it was in the centre of town; and it was easily accessible to the residence of the Head of Ministry at the Auberge de Aragon. In moving the resolution Strickland said that some people will say that the Government did not have the money needed for the project but he knew of a way how the project could be financed although he was not prepared to go into any detail at this stage. The Opposition was not impressed with this statement reminding the Government of the many capital projects that were already in hand. It also reminded the Government that all parties were agreed on the notion that the present Council Chamber should remain in the hands of the Maltese Parliament. Ugo Mifsud estimated that the project would cost about £65,000 and moved an amendment to the original Motion in which he proposed, once again, that the whole question be referred to a Select Committee. Mifsud’s colleague, Carlo Mallia, for his part wanted the whole matter thrown out on the basis of lack of funds but during his speech made a suggestion which was quickly grasped by Strickland. This was that one should explore the idea of building a second floor on the Auberge de Aragon.28

24 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, Sitting of 15 Feb. 1929. 25 Ibid. 26 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, Sitting of 15 Feb. 1929. 27 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, Sitting of 4 Apr. 1929 28 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, Sitting of 29 Apr. 1929.

42 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

But the project was financially beyond the means of the Government and when a few days later Strickland asked that the debate on his Motion, which had been adjourned, be postponed he was greeted with laughter from the Opposition benches.29 Once again the proposal to build a new Parliament House had failed to make any headway and the issue was not to be brought up again until some years after the Second World War.

A New Parliament Hall

Indeed, after 1930 there was no need for a new Parliament Hall or Houseas disagreements with Britain, between the newly elected Nationalist Party government, a pro-Italian language party, and the Colonial Office resulted in the loss of the 1921 self- government Constitution and a return to status for Malta. The Tapestry Chamber was in every sense adequate for the work of the re-instated Council of Government and the increasing threat of war made redundant any plans for a new parliament house. When the war did finally come, in June 1940, the struggle for survival took precedence over every other consideration and when the war was over the priority for Maltese was to try and raise their devastated island from the economic and social difficulties that it faced. The war had one benefit for Malta, if one can, in the situation facing the island call a new self-government Constitution a benefit. From a logistical point of view this Constitution somewhat mitigated the accommodation problems being faced by Malta’s parliamentarians mainly on the ground that under the new Constitution the Senate had been abolished.

That Members did not find the building or acquiring of a new Parliament House or Hall urgent can be seen from the fact that the issue remained dormant until the 1970s. Of course, the years 1947-1964 were momentous years for Malta with many landmark changes and decisions. For example, between 1950 and 1953, Malta had five separate governments and following Malta’s demand for independence in 1957, Britain once again withdrew Malta’s self-governing Constitution. The latter was re-introduced in 1962 but Independence was the overriding issue and despite an increase in the number of MPs under the new Constitution the issue of a new Parliament House never re-surfaced again for another 10 years. By that time the number of sitting MPs had risen to sixty-five.

Indeed, it was during the debate on the 1974/5 General Estimates when the votes falling under the Office of the Prime Minister were being discussed that the issue was debated again. At that sitting, the Prime Minister began by drawing the attention of Members to the changes taking place within the precincts of the Palace with the migration of some Departments, such as the Ministry of Finance, to Floriana and the transfer of others in their place. He told the House that it was his hope that within a short period of time the entire First Floor of the Palace will be used to House all the offices connected

29 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, Sitting of 16 Apr. 1929.

43 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015 with Parliament and those of the Governor-General. This, he said, would allow the Government to extend the facilities available to Members and to improve the library. The government’s intention, he said, was to transfer the Chamber from the Tapestry Chamber to the hall currently occupied by the Armoury so that the former may be preserved. To some comments from Members that this would break with tradition, the PM replied that tradition will be maintained by the fact that the Chamber will remain within the Palace and that the Tapestry Chamber will be protected. The tapestries, he said, should be open for viewing by the public and tourists rather than locked away. The new Chamber, he said, should allow members more space and, if the House agreed, a proper lobby for strangers to meet with their MPs would be established somewhere where they would not intrude or disturb the whole House.30

The Opposition did not quite agree with the proposed move with the Leader of the Opposition stating that they would rather remain in the Tapestry Chamber then see the Armoury moved to a different place within the Palace. The Prime Minister replied, however, that the Opposition had in the past expressed its Opposition to theHouse moving to Castille as it wanted it to remain within the Palace. Now what the Government was proposing was that the House does remain in the Palace but will move to a new hall. Following this statement from the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition appealed to the Prime Minister that if a move was to be made than the Government should consider the needs of Members in the light of similar needs in other foreign Parliaments. He suggested that a good look should be paid as to how some European Parliaments, housed within historic buildings, had gone about modernising their chambers and to see how the lighting, furniture, public address system and seating should be improved. He certainly hoped that their present desks, which in his view were little better than school desks, would not be transferred to a new Chamber. The Prime Minister replied that no allocation was being made under the current budget but appealed to all members to make suggestions on what he was proposing.

The matter came up again for discussion almost a year later when once again the House had resolved itself into a Committee of Supply to discuss the financial votes falling under the Prime Minister’s portfolio. Dr Albert Borg Olivier de Puget asked the Prime Minister under which item the expenses incurred so far on the proposed transfer of the House to the hall of the Armoury could be found? He also wanted to know when the Government intended consulting the Opposition on the proposed transfer? In his reply the Prime Minister informed the House that Mr. Speaker had informed him that very same evening that although the amount was not yet known, the Swedish Government had tabled a Motion in its own Parliament to provide for the cost of the new furniture for the new House of Representatives in Malta. He also stated that he would be very happy to consult with the Opposition but the latter had consistently maintained that it did not agree, in

30 Debates of the House of Representatives, 27 Mar. 1974.

44 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration principle, with the transfer of the House to the Armoury. So, what was he expected to consult on, he asked? The plans had now been finalised and he was not prepared to tell the Swedish Government that there might be a change in plans. In other areas where the arrangements were still pending he would welcome the views of the Opposition as he hoped the new facilities would serve to bring about a better relationship between the two sides and with the public in general.31

Architect Richard England was engaged to prepare the design and Architect Michael Ellul, Head of Antiquities to direct and supervise the work. The ne Chamber, now in the Armoury was inaugurated on August 13, 1976, on the very last day that Parliament was to sit before it was dissolved and new elections called. It was opened by Sir , President of the Republic, in what he himself described as a ‘short and solemn ceremony.’ He also said that the new Chamber would allow Members, Parliament staff, the press and the public more space to carry out their respective duties and would also allow for a more modern and efficient means of recording debates. Sir Mamo concluded his speech by noting that the new Chamber had banished to another place armsand weapons, ‘which even though old and ornamental remained nonetheless symbols of war and conflict. The tools of Parliament,’ he said, ‘are argument, debates and the votes.’

Mr. Belding, Swedish Charge D’Affaires at the Swedish Embassy in Rome, also spoke during the ceremony. He expressed his regret that the Swedish Prime Minister could not be present for the inauguration of the Chamber. He said that it was a great honour for his country to be associated with this project and he hoped that this new Parliament Hall would serve as a reminder of the close good relations existing between the two countries. In addition to providing the funds for the project the Swedish Government had also sent to Malta two renowned architects and two foremen to oversee and assist with the project.

Another distinguished guest was Sig. Colombo, at the time President of the Italian Senate. In his speech he thanked the Maltese Government for its invitation and its earnest desire that the Italian Government should be associated with this event. This invitation, he said, had been gladly accepted for many reasons: firstly, because it underlined in a significant way the ties of friendship binding the two countries in a common vocation for peace; secondly, because the ceremony also provided eloquent evidence of the values of democracy, freedom and justice which formed a common heritage; and finally, because in the new Chamber future Maltese will be debating the great problems arising from the future peaceful development of the Maltese nation.

The proceedings were wound-up by Mr. Attard Bezzina, Speaker of the House, who spoke after the distinguished guests had finished their speeches. In his own speech Mr. Speaker outlined the number of times Parliament had discussed the issue of a new

31 Debates of the House of Representatives, 17 Mar. 1975.

45 Building a New Parliament House: 1921 – 2015

Chamber and how, after nearly six decades, it had been finally decided this should be established in place of the Armoury. He thanked the Swedish Government both for its contribution and for providing professional assistance for the project. Concluding his speech Mr. Speaker also thanked Sig. Colombo and went on to note that he had personally ensured that no one unconnected with the physical side of the project be allowed to enter the Hall before it was completed. He said that two architects were more than enough and he had no desire to have another 55 (the number of MPs at the time) interfere with the project.

The occasion was soured, however, by the fact that the Opposition had stayed away from the ceremony. It claimed that coming as it did on the very last sitting of Parliament before dissolution the ceremony was nothing but a partisan act to gain electoral advantage. It also criticized what it called lack of consultation by the Government over the project.

Final Act

As in 1976 the Tapestry Chamber gave way to the House of Parliament, as the new Chamber was to be called, the latter has now given way to a completely new complex designed for the purpose by Italian architect Piano. It stands at the new entrance to Valletta designed by the same architect. Its design contrasts sharply with the ruins of the old Opera House that was destroyed by German bombers during the Second World War but never rebuilt. The new Parliament House brings to an end a long saga but only time will tell whether it will fulfil its functions efficiently and effectively. Like its predecessors it was the outcome of a great deal of soul searching and unfinished plans. The idea of building an entirely new Parliament House was briefly raised after the Nationalist Party was returned to office in 1987. The plan was to rebuild this new Parliament House at Castille Place just across the street from the Office of the Prime Ministerat theAuberge de Castille, however, it was never implemented.

But in 2004 the idea resurfaced once again when the Prime Minister of the time, , floated the government’s idea to build a New Parliament House on the ruins of the Opera House. This however, provoked a torrent of opposition, not least from those who still harboured the hope that one day this Opera House would onceagain rise from the ashes. In 2011 this idea was the subject of a powerful speech by the Prime Minister who seemed to indicate that the government had finally decided. This was a rather confusing declaration as in June 2009, the government had unveiled the architectural plans prepared by Renzo Piano for the regeneration of and the Opera House and which also included plans for a new Parliament House. The protests against these plans had been loud as were the protests against the design of the new Parliament House planned to rise between the entrance to Valletta and the ruins of the old Opera House. But this time the

46 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration government pressed on with its plans and Piano’s creation, love it or hate it, stands on this location.

The new Parliament House was inaugurated on May 4, 2011 by Prime Minister . Following short speeches by the Prime Minister and Anglu Farrugia, Speaker of the House, the keys to the new building were handed to the latter by the Commissioner of Police.

VGPV

47 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization

(Published in ‘Maltese Society: A sociological Inquiry’, RG Sultana & G Baldacchino (eds), Mireva Publications, Malta, 1994)

Introduction

ntil fairly recently, political parties, in Europe as in Malta, have been Uthe principal vehicles for political action. Through their activities and organization, they have provided the means by which popular interest and participation in politics could be achieved (Lane & Ersson, 1991, p. 102; Birch, 1970, p. 111). Various factors - in particular the widespread rise of professionally organized and managed pressure and lobbying groups - have led recently to a decline in the strength and influence of political parties. This is not to say that parties are no longer important to the politics of democratic societies, for in the final analysis it is parties that govern; but merely to highlight the fact that, today, other secondary associations also play an important political role and are legitimate power brokers and agenda setters in their own right. Nonetheless, as Blondel (1978, p. 1) has observed, political parties are still the principal means by which democracy, or at least a large measure of it, is maintained in modern politics and by which democracy from below and leadership from above can blend in our complex and changing world. Nor should one ignore the fact that it was political parties that gave practical expression and meaning to such commonly used concepts as choice and competition, rights and political equality, free association and political participation, representation and accountability.

Since their inception in Malta over one hundred years ago, political parties have come to exercise enormous hold and influence over the Maltese electorate. Every five years or so, during general elections, over ninety percent of those entitled to vote, although under no legal compulsion to do so, turn out to cast their vote in favour of one of the contending parties and its candidates. On election day, cloistered nuns have been known to abandon the seclusion of their convents to join with other voters at the polls. Other voters, sometimes only a few days from the grave, can also be seen being ferried, frequently of their own volition, from their sick beds to some polling station in order that they too may register a preference. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Maltese tend to flock to political meetings at which party leaders are usually the main speakers.

Existing hard evidence, small as this evidence is, indicates that, in Malta, voters and parties tend to be united by a rather strong bond. A survey of voters carried out in 1984 found, for example, that 55% of those questioned tended to see themselves as being close

48 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration to a political party. In contrast, the percentage for Europe was only 39% (Gallup, 1984). This observation was subsequently confirmed by Abela in his sociological study of value transmission in Malta (Abela, 1991, p. 196). The author also found that the intensity of the Maltese sense of belonging to political parties was much greater than that for Europe. In contrast to Malta, the large majority of European respondents were found to be either fairly close to (31%), or merely sympathizers of (51%), political parties; Tabone, in his study of the Maltese family, found, for example, that 42% of the families interviewed had at least one member who was a card-carrying member of a political party; that almost 72% buy a political newspaper (44% every day, 10% every Sunday, and 18% occasionally); and that 46% attend political meetings or other political manifestations (Tabone, 1987, pp. 144-5). But even more significant is the fact that just over 30% of the families interviewed openly admitted their readiness to obey their preferred political party always and in everything. This finding seems to emphasize the great loyalty which parties enjoy among a large strata of Maltese society - even, that is, when their instructions and directives go against the citizens’ personal interests and opinions, or against the customs and traditions of Maltese society.

Indicators of Change

There are signs, however, that seem to suggest that the voter-party relationship is beginning to change. Baldacchino (1989) has argued, for example, that a degree of political de-freezing or re-structuring in traditional party loyalties has been witnessed in several West European states during the last decade or so. He attributes this process of re-alignment to the presence of an increasingly better-educated and affluent electorate which is beginning to give rise to a new political culture and which is now exerting new pressures on existing political structures. Such a shift may also be taking place in Malta and may be already influencing the political party environment. This thesis seems to enjoy, at least prima facie, some support from the result of the 1992 General Election which, for the first time in decades, saw one of the major parties - the Nationalist Party (PN) - gain a five percentage point lead over its post-war rival, the Malta Labour Party (MLP). Until recently the typical difference in votes which had separated the two parties was a mere two per cent (Schiavone, 1992).

The ongoing controversy over the issue of political party participation in elections for local Councils, which were introduced in Malta for the first time in 1993, may also be taken as an indicator of change. A voter survey held over the issue of local Councils found, among other things, that 59% of those questioned wished to see political parties either barred from contesting local elections or voluntarily refraining from fielding candidates (MISCO, 1993). Only 21% “agreed strongly” that parties should take part in the contest. “A plague on both your houses” was how a Sunday newspaper interpreted the results of

49 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization this survey (The Malta Independent, 9 May 1993). While its title may tend to exaggerate the growing divide between voters and parties, it does seem to express voter frustration at the way both major parties have, over the years, sought to monopolize every activity or project at the expense of individual citizen participation. Nonetheless, the findings of the survey seemed representative enough of voter opinion to induce the Malta Labour Party to refrain from nominating candidates for these elections (L-Orizzont, 12 June 1993). The results of the elections for the first twelve (out of sixty-seven) proposed Councils, held in November 1993, did partially vindicate the survey’s findings. For while it is true that the Nationalist Party did gain an overall majority of Council seats, the overall majority of the votes cast were won by the independent candidates. Furthermore, 38% of those entitled to vote, despite the urging and the solicitations, stayed at home, while 9% of those who actually voted invalidated their votes (The Sunday Times, 21 November 1993).1

Further evidence of growing disenchantment with political parties, especially among young people and the more articulate of the population, may be discerned from the growing number of letters and articles in the Maltese press which seem to conclude that parties are somehow bad or harmful to Maltese society. One reason for this stems from the acute levels of polarization that have characterized Maltese politics for the best part of this century, but which have been made worse by the way party competition was conducted during the 1980s. Another reason which might have served to strengthen this view may centre on the failure of both major parties, especially when in office, to discipline ministers and other party officials whenever alleged irregularities, sometimes of a very serious nature, are brought to light. In the view of many voters, this state of affairs contrasts sharply with that found in Europe and in nearby Italy where the tangenti affair - a term which has now been absorbed into daily Maltese linguistic usage - has resulted in the investigation, arrest, removal from office and/or imprisonment of several senior politicians, party officials and distinguished businessmen.

Nonetheless, it would be premature to try to infer from the above discussion that Maltese political parties are facing a crisis equal in scale to that being experienced by parties in Europe. Baldacchino (1989) may in fact be right in his assessment that, in Malta, similar developments lag behind those in Europe both in time and in momentum. But it is also true that political parties in Malta are no longer the sole political agenda setters and the number of instances when parties have had issues forced upon them, as in the case of environment-related issues, have increased.

1 The Hunters & Trappers Association urged members to boycott council elections in protest against the way in which Government was allegedly giving in to pressure from the environmental lobby.

50 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

The Argument

The future of Maltese political parties is not, however, the subject of this essay. Rather its concern is, in a sense, with their past. For parties do not exist in a vacuum and they are as much a product of Maltese society as the latter is a product of their vision and their activities. This paper, however, cannot on its own fill the void that exists in this sphere or indeed in the entire field of Maltese political sociology. What it seeks to do is to try and stimulate enough interest and debate in the hope that other studies will follow. It aims to do this by exploring, albeit in a general manner, the role played by Maltese political parties as agents of political modernization. This is an area of study which, like several others, has so far been neglected but which requires examination if we are to come to a better understanding of Maltese society.

The argument suggests that it was the pursuit of political modernization by different sets of Maltese elites that prompted the rise of Maltese political parties after 1880 and that it was this goal which conditioned both their development and their politics in later years. Therefore, the perspective which I offer below suggests that what mainly divided and set each group of local elites against each other, thereby giving rise to parties, was not a question of language but how each group defined the values and goals of political modernization and the strategies required to secure their interests and attain power.

This is not to say that language played no part but that language was not the raison d’être that gave meaning to local parties. Language was a banner which helped, for a time, to identify the respective emphasis of each elite group and the interests which each represented. It was as much a rallying factor as a means by which respective elite interests could be protected or promoted. The exaggerated attention which the language question has received from academics and non-academics has served, in the view of the author, principally to obscure rather than to explain the rise, role and impact that Maltese political parties have had on the entire social, economic and political environment of Malta. Even Frendo’s (1979) excellent study of the issue does not adequately resolve some of the dilemmas which such a singular focus on the language question raises. For example, it does not quite explain why one set of elites should make the Italian language, instead of the Maltese, their basis for nationalism to the opposition of English, the language of the colonizer. After all, it has always been accepted that Maltese and not Italian was the language of those who identified themselves as Maltese. Furthermore, research does tend to stress that, in Malta, irredentist sentiments played a truly insignificant part.

In contrast, the perspective which I propose will allow the integration of a number of issues into the discussion, including the questions of race and colonial government. Space, of course, does not permit an indulgence in detail; but it is hoped nevertheless that the discussion will suffice to stimulate wider debate among interested academics.

51 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization

The Characteristics of Modernity

Political modernization may be defined as the process by which traditional societies are induced to relinquish old authority structures and time-honoured customs and styles of life in order to achieve modernity. It is a process which, among other things, involves a political commitment to raise, to western standards, the social condition of the people, in terms of education, housing and health, to extend political participation, and to replace existing traditional authority systems through the development of key political institutions and conflict-resolving mechanisms, such as political parties, representative assemblies, impartial judiciaries, and secret ballots, capable of supporting participatory decision-making (Welch, 1971). It involves also the gradual diffusion of a political culture which places special emphasis on individual freedom, individual rights, political and legal equality, consent, choice, political tolerance, accountability and secularization (Apter, 1965).

All this is necessary because in a modernized society power is not the prerogative of one individual or one exclusive group, nor is it divinely sanctioned. Power cannot be absolute, for individuals enjoy certain inalienable rights which the state must guarantee and which allows individuals to exercise these rights free from government control or intervention. Rights, to be truly so, must belong to everyone without exception and the state must ensure that no individual or group of individuals are hindered or obstructed in the enjoyment of their rights, either through its own measures or those of other individuals or institutions. Where inalienable individual rights are concerned, majority views cannot hold merely because they are the view of the majority. When individual, civic rights are thus respected, citizens are said to enjoy political and legal equality.

This also implies that a modernized society is a secular society. This is not, however, to be understood in the sense that religion has no place in the life of, or social significance for, individual members of society. Rather, religious leaders are not expected to wield political power and no single religious creed is allowed to dominate policy-making institutions thereby leading to discrimination against adherents of other, probably minority, religions or against non-believers. Religious authorities, of whatever denomination, are free to promote their religion, to conduct services and to speak freely on any issue; but they must do this mindful of the fact that others may - and have the right to - fundamentally disagree with their point of view and that the State has an obligation to protect and guarantee the rights of all its individual members. A modern secular society, therefore, is one which is normally characterized by mutual respect, social, religious and political tolerance, and the absence of political violence of any sort.

52 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

In a modernized political system, there is also nothing hereditary or permanent about political power. All government is said to rest, in the first instance, on the consent of the people. Power, therefore, is regarded as a trust. Those in whose hands it is vested are not only to be held accountable for its (ab)use but are also liable to be removed. Governments can be opposed legitimately and their measures and performance openly and publicly criticized. Furthermore, since the people have the right to remove and replace a government, in modern political systems people are also said to have choice. The latter finds its expression in the periodic election of representatives to Parliament, when candidates, normally sponsored or under the umbrella of a political party, compete for votes. The more the candidates and parties that take part in the electoral competition, the greater the choice enjoyed by the voters. Thus, in modernized political systems, the capture or retention of political power depends, by and large, on the ability of individual political parties to harness popular support at the polls on the basis of democratic competition, i.e. free, fair and open elections. It is for this reason that in so-called modern societies, political parties are often seen as enshrining “the competitive spirit” (Smith, 1972, p. 48) of these societies and Duverger was probably right in his conclusion that,

on the whole, the development of political parties seems bound up with that of democracy. (Duverger, 1955, p. xx)

These then are the characteristics of what is held to be a modern political system, and the process which must be travelled in order to attain it is known as political modernization. The emphasis here is on the notion of a process. This implies that a society cannot achieve modernity overnight but that there are stages, not necessarily time-defined, through which a modernizing society has to progress.

One may argue, rightly in my view, that what has been presented above amounts to a rather particularly ethnocentric view of political development, for the latter has been fully equated with the process of development in the West. There are two points which I would like to raise in my defence. First, that the Western model of political development has come in for some strong criticism in the sense that modernization does not necessarily lead to economic growth and an equal distribution of social benefits. Despite this, it remains the dominant model of political modernization. More so, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe, which has also rendered redundant (at least as far as popular opinion is concerned) Marxist alternatives to Western models of development. Furthermore, the Western model depends greatly on its doctrine of human rights which holds that these rights are universal and the very fact that most nations subscribe, at least in theory, to this doctrine enhances the dominant status enjoyed by this model.

53 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization

The Maltese Identity

My second defence relates entirely to the case of Malta. Granted that the adopted model of political development is ethnocentric, given its overt Western origins, I submit that rather than creating problems for our analysis it is highly relevant. This is because the goals and values of Western society have nearly always been the goals and values of Maltese society and of its elites. European colonization has, of course, played an important part in this, allowing for certain integrative mechanisms - such as settlement, inter-marriage and imitation - to strike deep roots in Malta. Religion has both aided and abetted this integrative process for it served to place Malta on the European side of the religious, and geographical, divide between Christianity and Islam. Christianity has, after all, been one of the hallmarks or characteristics of all that defines Europe. Today, Maltese of all ages do not merely identify with most of what is European, be it culture, fashion or sport, as some non-Europeans do also; they also see themselves as Europeans. Perhaps more than ever before, their focus is strongly Europe-oriented.

Nonetheless, Malta’s geographic location on the extreme periphery of Europe and the distinctly Arab-based language of the inhabitants did not always readily lead to an outright endorsement of this view by the European powers that have colonized the islands. Not infrequently, therefore, Maltese claims to a European identity have been challenged though not quite fully rejected. The Order of St. John, for instance, whose members were recruited from the ranks of Europe’s nobility and which ruled Malta from 1530 to 1798, consistently refused to allow members of Maltese noble families to join its ranks or to contemplate the setting up of a Maltese branch orlangue . It did not, however, bar Maltese from joining its ecclesiastic community. The Maltese were, after all, Catholics. We also find, in this period of Maltese history, episodes in which the racial animosity displayed by some members of the Order of St John towards the Maltese was of such intensity that, quite often, the two communities found themselves on the brink of violent confrontation (e.g. Ryan, 1930, pp. 113-5).

The issue of Maltese racial identity also played a part - at times an important part – during the period of British rule. It was, for example, an issue which, for a time, served to obstruct schemes for Maltese migration to the British , such as Australia, which then favoured a “Whites” only immigration policy (Attard, 1983, p. 46; Yorke, 1990). It also served to influence the ebb and flow that characterized Maltese political development in this period although, in the case of Malta, political and constitutional development was further complicated by the fact that the island was an important strategic British fortress. But the racial issue was never far from the surface, especially in the 19th century when it featured openly in official correspondence and internal colonial office minutes.2 Indeed,

2 For a thorough discussion and examples of this aspect, see Pirotta (1991).

54 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration the way colonial officials, governors or visiting Commissioners viewed the Maltese tended to have some bearing on how Maltese political affairs were conducted.

The evidence for this is well documented; for this reason, one solid example should suffice. It has often been noted by students of Maltese history that, in contrast with other crown colonies, a number of Maltese civil servants were already holding the office of Head of Department by the late 1830s and that by the 1920s nearly all such offices were in Maltese hands (e.g. Lee, 1972). Few have, however, commented on the fact that one of the principal arguments which had secured this reform was intimately concerned with the question of Maltese racial identity. “The Maltese” John Austin and G.C. Lewis had reported, in support of their recommendation to have executive offices in the Maltese civil service opened to Maltese officers,

are a European and Christian community, and far superior in institutions, manners, science and arts to the most advanced of the Asiatic nations. (Austin & Lewis,1838)

While this appraisal did help to persuade British colonial officials to adopt and implement the proposed reform, one should note that the comparison resorted to by the Commissioners was not to Italy or some other European community, but to the most advanced of the Asiatic nations. Relations between the local community and British officers servingin Malta were, it seems, at times complicated by the issue of race to the extent that the racial identity of the Maltese, not infrequently and under different guises, gave rise to public debate (Pirotta, 1991, Chapter 6).

There is evidence that strongly suggests that the issue of racial identity has left a lasting impression on the Maltese and that, even after independence, Maltese political thinking has remained conditioned by the experiences of past centuries. Witness to this is the way politicians, sections of the local press and some constituted bodies reacted to the avis on Malta’s application to the European Community made public by the European Commission in July 1993. One local newspaper, for example, emphasised in one of its leader articles the fact that the Commission had declared that Malta had a “right” (unlike Turkey or Morocco), to assert its vocation of membership of the EC, a right enjoyed only by those countries which are indisputably European (The Sunday Times, 4 July 1993). The Maltese Prime Minister too felt it necessary to stress that “the Commission had made it clear that Malta had the qualifications for full membership” (The Times, 1st July 1993), one of the essential qualifications being Malta’s European-ness. But perhaps the most explicit statement in this connection was that made by the Maltese Institute of Directors. Theavis , declared the Institute,

55 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization

confirms what has always been assumed in Malta but not always accepted outside it, namely that we are a European people living in a European country. (The Malta Independent, 4th July 1993)

This discussion, as I hope to show, is not without significance for our examination of the modernizing role of Maltese political parties. Indeed, at this point, I would like to suggest that one of the factors that contributed towards the emergence of Maltese political parties in the latter part of the 19th century was occasioned by the pressing need, felt by local elites, to endeavour to steer Malta on the path of political modernization.

Modernization and Autonomy

It was the generally held view of the time, however, among Malta’s elites that progress towards such political modernization was not possible until a large degree of autonomy in local affairs had been secured. Representative government was seen as the minimum form of autonomy if take-off into political development was to be achieved (Frendo, 1979; Pirotta, 1991). This view was based on the fact that existing and earlier forms of had failed to satisfy the aspirations of Malta’s elites. Government, to all intents and purposes, had retained its military character and, with the intensification of superpower rivalry in the Mediterranean, Britain’s military presence in Malta became more accentuated and intrusive. This is not to say that Malta’s elites were in any way opposed to the employment opportunities and other benefits which came Malta’s way as a consequence of the island’s fortress role (Pirotta, 1991, Chapter 9). What Malta’s elites complained of was that military interests tended to set, or dominate, the entire political and economic agenda in Malta, blocking and obstructing political development.

The issue took a new turn in the very early 1880s when Britain, determined to secure its strategic interests in the Mediterranean, resolved to embark on a policy which had, as its ultimate aim, the complete Anglicization of Malta. Henceforth, it was decided, English and not Italian was to become the language of education, administration and ultimately of culture in Malta. To achieve this aim as rapidly as possible, Maltese was to be given a settled alphabet and employed as the medium of instruction in the first years of a child’s schooling. The intended reforms split Malta’s elites in two, with one group, the riformisti, supporting them and a second group, the anti-riformisti, opposing them.

The riformisti, though not opposed to the idea of representative government, came to hold that, given the backward social and economic condition of the mass of the Maltese people, the time was not yet ripe for political development. What Malta required was development, yes, but of a social and economic kind. They believed that the use of Maltese (in lieu of Italian) in education would serve to extend the benefits of education to an ever-increasing number of Maltese. Knowledge of English would also unlock the door

56 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration to employment opportunities at home and within the rest of the British Empire. They also held that the sooner the Maltese mastered the English language and came to adopt the values, habits and way of life of Britain (what they came to call, in the fashion of the times, the Mother Country), the sooner the Maltese would be allowed to adopt British- type political institutions (Lee, 1972; Frendo, 1979).

The stand adopted by the anti-riformisti was, as may be expected, opposed to this thesis. Anglicization, they argued, while clearly of economic benefit to certain classes, had British strategic interests at heart and would only serve to obstruct and retard Malta’s political development. The Maltese, their argument ran, were not unmindful of British strategic interests. Hence, the issue as to what language they were to adopt in running their affairs was theirs to decide, since it was a purely local matter. Italian, they insisted, and not Maltese was the language of Malta for the Maltese were, as a people, of Italian descent. The Maltese language was no language at all and to impose it on the Maltese by such formal means as education would serve only to sever the Maltese nation from its rightful European heritage and culture. The elevation of Maltese to the status of a national language would thus hinder and not promote political modernization (Frendo, 1979, Chapter 2).

Stated like this, the position of the anti-riformisti or nazionalisti - as they eventually came to call themselves - seems at best perplexing and at worst anti-nationalist. Seen, however, in the context of racial identity and its intimate connection with existing doctrines of self-government, of self-determination in purely local affairs, the anti-riformisti platform gains greater coherence.

From a political point of view, thenazionalisti were right in resisting the elevation of Maltese to the status of a national language. Maltese was, and largely remains, an Arab-based language. It is not a European tongue. Hence, to claim it as one’s language is tantamount to renouncing one’ European-ness. It would be equivalent to admitting that the Maltese were not, racially or culturally, European. In that case, given the dominant European view that peoples that were not European by race were unfit for European institutions, the Maltese would either be refused representative government altogether or the prospect of it would be delayed indefinitely. What the Maltese “required most was to be governed and not represented” (Bertram, 1930, p. 176). For the nazionalisti, this state of affairs was utterly unacceptable. They were no longer prepared to wait for representative government to simply come about. This explains Fortunato Mizzi’s view, as the anti-riformisti leader, that the Maltese language was “the curse of the country” (Frendo, 1979, p. 35) and that it was for the sake of “patriotism” that its imposition should be resisted and Italian upheld.

57 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization

Political or Economic Development?

Seen from this perspective, it would appear that what at least initially divided and set these two elite groups apart was their respective emphasis, one favouring as its foremost goal social and economic development, the other political development. The difference was, echoing Blonde’s remarks (1978, p. 1) also a reflection of the dominant interests and aspirations of the respective blocks’ popular base. The riformisti were essentially representing the new middle classes of importers, contractors and traders (who flourished on the presence of the large British garrison stationed in Malta), as well as the working classes who were mainly composed of drydocks and other Admiralty employees who constituted the bulk of the industrial labour force around the Grand Harbour (Zammit, 1984, p. 25, Note 48). No wonder therefore that their concern was primarily materialist and utilitarian, given that a pro-English platform permitted openings in social mobility for themselves and, with an institutionalized English curriculum at school, for their children. Bread and butter concerns were more immediate and enticing to them than the distant and somewhat alien pronouncements in favour of the granting of political concessions. Given the existing franchise limitations, such concessions would not have applied to most of them anyway. To the contrary, the anti-riformisti platform was closely akin to the traditional, professional-religious establishment. Their economic livelihood was less dependent on the British military machine; and their political agenda was also intent on preserving their socio-political status from upcoming social upstarts.

The onset of mass democracy in the past Second World War period sealed the fate of the pro-British “liberals” as a truly independent political force and ensured the rise of the Malta Labour Party, the Island’s first genuine mass party. Class politics rather than language now became the overt rallying banner with the consequence that by the late 1950s and early 1960s, a painless fusion between the two traditional and opposing elites was under way. This, I believe, is a point which has received scant attention from students of Maltese politics, and it does point to the notion that the language question was not all that it seemed to be. It was the Labour Party which, given its working-class base, inherited the materialist, utilitarian and ultimately secular perspective favouring English as a tool for development and Maltese as a mobilizing force. Labour’s utilitarian but modernizing approach can best be identified with reference to two general but inextricably limited policy orientations. The first is the domestic aspect. For Labour, nothing better epitomized the social and moral dimensions of a modern society than the creation of a welfare state. But the maintenance, rather than the establishment of such a state requires in a consistent manner enormous public funding which neither Malta’s economic capacity nor fiscal potential could ever provide. Labour hoped that the second external dimension would remedy this. In the 1970s therefore, Labour set about rapidly decoupling Malta’s economy from its dependency on a declining British defence budget, wresting Malta from the jurisdiction of NATO and actively promoting a neutral and non-aligned status for the

58 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Islands. It was a policy which aimed to open up for Malta the possibility of new markets, investments and financial aid from hitherto untapped sources, but notably from oil-rich Arab states (Pirotta, 1985). The price that Labour had to pay to achieve its policy aims, such as the championing of the Arab cause in international fora, the projection of the Maltese as a partly European partly Arab people, and the compulsory teaching of Arabic in Maltese secondary schools, served to re-open the racial identity issue. Nonetheless, the Nationalist Party, Labour’s successor in office since 1987, despite its early move to reduce the status of Arabic in schools, has proved itself reluctant to jettison the economic opportunities raised by these connections notably because its stated aim of full membership of the European Community remains, as yet, a distant prospect.

But it remains all too easy to emphasize the differences rather than the similarities. The ultimate objective of political modernization substantially overshadows the policy divergences between the two main political parties in Malta. Priorities have, and still remain, disparate in a way which can perhaps be significantly explained by the diverging core social class support that each political party commands. But the pursuit of a decent quality of life, and the overtures to Europe as the model to be followed in achieving that quality of life, has never really subsided from the local political agenda, irrespective of the political elite in power.3 Such an approach to Maltese political history is not only rewarding for highlighting the policy convergence across the political and ideological divide; it furthermore recasts, in a new light, the at times emotional and blown up issue surrounding the so-called language question as the catalyst of modern democratic political alignments in Malta.

A final note concerns one of the paradoxical outcomes of these political strategies and which is intimately related to the whole notion of political modernization, namely its democratic character. It may appear ironic that, in the at times slavish pursuit of “development’” in the institutionalized realm, with the espoused concerns for representative government and subsequently self-determination, there has beena disregard for certain values and attitudes which are as much an integral part of political modernity. Values such as tolerance, freedom of expression, the right to agree or disagree without coercion have not always been upheld by the parties involved. In recent years critical manifestations of this condition have also involved regrettable loss of life on three separate occasions. Perhaps, the extent and intensity of partisan political mobilization which Malta has seen over recent decades has at times led the parties to lose sight of their commonly valued goals of a modern, democratic - apart from a European - state.

If one can refer at all to the appearance of a possible thaw or de-alignment from a rigid bi-partisan political cleavage, this could be indicative of how alert the Maltese

3 An examination of the electoral manifestos of Maltese political parties will reveal that all parties have consistently subscribed to the European model.

59 Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization electorate has become to the threat which acute polarity may pose to increasingly accepted and appreciated democratic freedoms and civic rights. The pursuit of a European dimension cannot proceed without a parallel concern for European values. And the Maltese electorate needs no convincing to the appeals of political modernization; such overtures are none other than a case of preaching to the converted. That we are European is now a fact of life; the bone of political party contention is the substance to be derived out of European values. It is over such a “development” strategy that, both historically and contemporarily, the partisan battle lines are drawn.

References

Abela, A.M. (1991) Transmitting Values in European Malta, Rome and Malta, Pontificia Universita Gregoriana and Malta Jesuit Publications. Apter, D.E. (1965) The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Allard, L.E. (1983) Early Maltese Emigration: 1900-1914, Valletta, Gulf Publishing. Austin, J. & Lewis, G.C. (1838) Report Relative to the Employment of Maltese in Executive Offices, London, HMSO. Baldacchino, G. (1988) “The Dynamics of political restructuring in western Europe and Malta”, Hyphen, vol. 6, 2. Bertram, A. (1930) The Colonial Service, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Birch, A.H. (1970) The British System of Government, 2e, London, George Allen & Unwin. Blondel, J. (1978) Political Parties: A Genuine Case for Discontent?, London, Wildwood House. Duverger, J. (1955) Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, (trans. by North, B. & North, R.), London, Methuen & Co. Frendo, H. (1979) Party Politics in a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience, Valletta, Malta, Midsea Books. GALLUP Ltd. Malta (1984) Gallup Sample Survey. Lane, J. & Ersson, S.O. (1991) Politics and Society in Western Europe, 2e, London, Sage. Lee, H.A. (1972) Malta: 1813-1914, A Case Study in Constitutional and Strategic Development, Valletta, Progress Press. Malta Independent, The, (12 September, 1993) “Avis: The Key to Europe”. MISCO (1993) Survey on Local Councils. Pirotta, G.A. (1985) “Malta’s foreign policy after Mintoff’, Political Quarterly, vol. 56, 2.

60 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Pirotta, G.A. (1991) “The Administrative Politics of a Microstate: The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940”, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bath. Ryan, F.W. (1930) The House of the Temple, London, Burns Oates & Washbourne. Smith, G. (1972) Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, London, Heinemann Educational. Tabone, C. (1987) The Secularisation of the Family in Changing Malta, Malta, Dominican Publications. Schiavone, M.J.(1992) L-Elezzjonijiet f’Malta: 1849-1992, Malta, Pubblikazzjoni lndipendenza. Welch, C. (ed.) (1971) Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change, 2e, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth Publishing. Yorke, B. (1990) Empire and Race; The Maltese in Australia: 1881-1949, Australia, New South Wales, Wales University Press. Zammit, E.L. (1984) A Colonial Inheritance: Work, Power and Class Structure with Reference to the Maltese Labour Movement, Malta, Malta University Press.

61 The Malta Labor Party and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976

Introduction

his paper seeks to explore the origins and evolution of the quarrel between Tthe Church and the Malta Labour Party which came to a head in the 1960s. It will show that the issue was an extremely complex one with roots going back to the 1920s and reaching its climax in the 1960s. Personalities did play a part in this quarrel but they were not necessarily the principal reason for the quarrel. A case will be made that this quarrel revolved around issues touching on ideology, political freedom and democracy. The quarrel was made more complex by the political circumstances of the time and the socio-economic and political aspirations of the Maltese people. It will therefore be shown that the quarrel between the Labour Party and the church in Malta was inevitable and a natural outcome of the tensions that arise when an established power finds itself faced by new ideas and potential challengers to its leadership. The cut off point chosen was 1971 because in 1969 the two sides signed a historic agreement which was largely to condition relations between the two in later years. Furthermore, later quarrels, notably about church schools, cannot be examined properly as too little reliable source material is yet available.

The State of Play in 1920

In 1921, Malta was granted its first quasi-responsible government constitution. Until then power had been vested in the Governor and a Council of Government dominated by Heads of Departments. Although restricted in its powers, this constitution provided the framework for electoral competition between political parties and the formation of a Cabinet formed on the basis of a Parliamentary majority.1

In 1920 the Catholic Church in Malta was, with British blessing, a uniquely powerful political institution. From the beginning the British had understood the influence that the church could wield over the population and from the beginning too, British officers had grasped the strategic importance of Malta and the need to retain the support of the Maltese.2 In return for allowing the Church to continue to exercise its religious and social powers undisturbed, the latter would help Britain secure its strategic interests by its support for British rule. It was a win-win situation for both and as the strategic importance of Malta to Britain grew, so did collaboration between the British authorities and the Church in Malta.3 Britain, Koster argues, generally refrained from interference with both religious affairs and those strategic areas of life, such as marriage, the family and education, then under the control of the Church.4 On its part, the Church acted as

62 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration a channel of communication between the authorities and the population and, when needed, helped in the mobilisation and direction of the population in the defence of the fortress.5 Until the 1960s the British had continued, when outlining policy, with the annual Candlemas Day practice of addressing the parish priests rather than Malta’s elites.6 But, the British not only consulted the church on policy, but deferred to it on important social issues which had been left to its control. Hence, as Fenech points out, for all intents and purposes, the Catholic Church in Malta came to enjoy, under British Protestant rule, ‘all the privileges and status of an established church.’7 The most powerful weapon which the church possessed was its capacity to impose spiritual sanctions on all dissident Maltese thereby ensuring their social exclusion. No Maltese could, without paying a high social price, dissent or disassociate himself from the church. In the late 19th century, for example, the family of a Maltese person who had converted to Protestantism had to be protected by armed soldiers after a mob had gathered to disrupt the funeral. In this as in other instances the ringleaders tended to be the priests.8 Furthermore, no organisation, lay or spiritual, could hope to exist without the blessing of the church.

According to Koster too, in 1921, the church in Malta was unhappy with the British decision to grant Malta a modicum of democratic governance. Responsible government, he argues, was bound to impact on the cosy relationship between church and colonial authorities and ultimately to impinge on the powers of the church. By granting this constitution, he says, Britain had initiated a process which for the Maltese church meant the ‘emergence of a rival, the Maltese State,’ which would gradually penetrate all spheres of social life and thus usurp tasks, duties and competencies of the Church.’9 After all democratically elected governments are expected to demonstrate a close and direct interest in the welfare of the people and base their electoral manifestos accordingly. This meant eventually legislating on issues which the Church, until then, had believed within its complete control and untouchable. Predicting this, church representatives on the National Assembly10 pressed for the inclusion of a provision that would ‘automatically nullify any law passed by the legislature that directly or indirectly (my emphasis) impinged on the interests and conduct of the Church’11 on the grounds that Canon Law had the force of law for all Catholics.12 The logic of this assertion was that the church was dominant to the extreme that even elected governments were subject to its dictates. But the situation was complicated further by the fact that priests were directly involved in politics and the Church had its own favoured political party through which it sought to control the ideological content of politics, the agenda of government and the limits of that agenda. In these circumstances the clergy were unlikely to welcome a political movement, like the MLP, not wholly subordinate to their authority and in competition with their preferred party.

This preferred party was the Unione Politica Maltese which had a priest as its leader and several others as its candidates. Its entire rationale was to conform always ‘in

63 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 precise observance of the religious sentiments based on the teachings and precepts of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.’ (statute). Another party, which was not averse to using religion for electoral gain, was the Partito Democratico Nazionalista whose motto was ‘Forward in the name of religion and nation.’13 Indeed its leader, Enrico Mizzi, was the representative of the Gozo Parish Chapter on the National Assembly when the 1921 Constitution was being drawn up.14 Not surprisingly, these two parties did not take long to merge to form Il Partito Nazionalista. By contrast the other two parties in the field, the Labour Party and Strickland’s Constitutional Party, represented a more secular view of politics, limited as this was. These two parties understood that their political future lay in the hands of the church and were fully conscious of the need to make declarations demonstrating their willingness to submit to it. This political strait-jacket limited the agenda of these two parties and the options that could be placed before the electorate thereby giving a massive electoral advantage to the party of the church.

The church was determined that the limits of parliamentary government should be established within strict boundaries which proclaimed subservience to the Catholic faith and which acknowledged its privileged position in society. Thus, under its pressure, the first action taken by the 1921 Parliament was to make an act of faith in which MPs declared the institution’s subjection to the church. This was followed by the Religion of Malta Act of Parliament which recognised the Catholic faith as the sole religion of Malta and in later weeks the dedication of Parliament to God as dictated by the Bishop’s Pastoral Letter.15 The church also expected to be exempted from legislative provisions of every kind. For example, both the Aesthetic Buildings Act and the Protection of Antiquities Act exempted church properties from their provisions and any restrictions imposed were delegated to church commissions to oversee.16

This was in general terms the political situation into which the Labour Party was born in 1921 and in which it had to promote its agenda. From the beginning it faced the hostility of influential members of the church and the suspicion of the Curia itself. We may cite two reasons for this: first, the fact that the concept on which Labour was based was mainly British and that for economic reasons Labour was more favourably inclined towards Britain and the wider diffusion of English; and second that its aspirations had some parallels with those of emerging left-leaning parties in both the U.K. and Europe. Until 1914 the chief pre-occupation of the church in Malta was with the dangers posed by Protestantism. But after this period fear of Protestant influence among workers was compounded by fear of socialist ideas being sown by British personnel in Malta. News of how the new trade union movement in Britain and elsewhere had benefited workers was spreading among local workers.17 The message was clear: there was another alternative to subservience to the status quo. Others, people like and his Xirka ta’ l-Imdawlin, had also began preaching these new ideas and calling on Maltese workers to unite and stand-up for their rights.18

64 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Maltese sympathisers of labour politics had always opposed Italian and generally supported the diffusion of the English language, hoping that this would result in sustained economic development and the spread of “enlightened” British ideas into Malta. Hence their constant reference to the darkness or medieval aura that overshadowed daily Maltese life.19 By contrast, the church equated “enlightened” British ideas with Protestantism. This, on its own, provided the church with a good enough reason to try and stifle Labour’s chances of growth. Leading priest-politicians like Panzavecchia and Bugelli never lost an opportunity of questioning or attacking Labour’s rationale for existence. The former, the Leader of the UPM, for example, was adamant that Malta did not need a workers’ party or trade unions.20 What Maltese workers needed were greater employment opportunities for themselves and their families. Otherwise, workers were to keep their place within the existing social structure. Indeed, in April 1919, La Voce del Popolo, the Panzavecchian newspaper, decried the right of a union delegation, which it described as sooty faced, stinking of engine oil and their rough hands full of calluses, to meet with the Governor to complain about the cost of living, their small wages and emigration.21 The Labour Party did attract some priests to its fold the most prominent being Mgr Michael Gonzi who was to become its principal opponent. Gonzi had been approached to stand as a candidate for the Senate by the Labour Party but accepted the invitation after being ordered to do so by the Archbishop ‘so that there will be a member of the clergy on the Committee.’22 To this extent Gonzi cannot be seen as a labour stalwart as some have pictured him. Canon Bugelli, one of its detractors, also joined the Labour Party, but with the declared aim of wrecking any understanding between it and the CP.23

In 1920, however, it was the Constitutional Party and its leader Lord Strickland that presented the greatest concern for the church.24 As Chief Secretary, Strickland had worked tirelessly to ensure the supremacy of English over Italian in Malta. He represented all the things that the church opposed: potential Protestant influence and ideas; and greater emphasis on the supremacy of the state over society, including the church. Thanks to the wealth of its leader, the CP had ample resources to push its agenda forward making it a much more dangerous opponent than Labour. This support for the English language and tendency towards secularity, however, placed both these parties on the opposite side of the soon-to-fuse pro-church parties for whom Catholicism and Italianata were inextricably linked. Strickland saw the church as the main stumbling block to Anglicisation and often directed attacks against the clergy. On one occasion he called for the dismissal of the Bishop of Gozo and on another he offered prize money to those who exposed acts of immorality by members of the Gozo clergy.25 His secularist viewpoint was also coloured by his deep suspicions of collaboration between Fascist Rome and the Vatican over Malta and the role of the Nationalist Party in Malta as their agent. In fact, Strickland did not hesitate, on taking office in 1928 ‘to suggest that the Imperial Government might ask Pope Pius XI to stop Mussolini using the Church in Malta to promote Italian sentiment.’26 There was some

65 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 sympathy within Labour’s fold for this view but not on the scale upon which Strickland had established it, nor with the extent of his anti-clericalism which was to expand after 1928. Thus, when he spoke disparagingly about honours conferred by the Pope the Labour Party joined in his condemnation.27 But, the issue of papal titles created divisions within the Labour Party too, a clear indication that, at least in the mind of some, a strong connection between Vatican and pro-Italianism did exist in Malta. This and other actions by Strickland made him, in turn, in the 1920s, the target of the clerical establishment. Eventually, by associating with his party in a so-called “compact” Labour were forced to join battle with him against the church establishment.

Another issue driving a wedge between the church and the Labour Party was ideology. In Malta, the church stood for the status quo while the Labour Party was for change. By the middle of the 19th Century the excesses of the Industrial Revolution had provoked a wave of revolutions with a clearly socialist perspective and the publication of the Communist Manifesto. According to Agius, ‘in the absence of trade unions, which were considered a hindrance to individual freedom, capitalists imposed miserably low wage rates on their employees,’ thereby resulting in the emergence of a proletariat with ‘inadequate wages, inhumanly long hours and excessive toil, extracted not only from men, but also from women and children.’28 In 1891, Pope Leo XIII published his encyclical Rerum Novarum setting out the church’s response to this exploitation as well as seeking to stop the spread of socialism among Catholics. The document, however, was beset by the very difficulties it set out to answer. Rerum Novarum sets out to re-affirm the status quo in respect of class relations and structures while at the same time calling for reform. It reiterates the divine right of rulers to rule, the absolute right to property and the Christian obligation of employers to be generous and just towards their employees. It expresses a preference for mutual help societies over trade unions but endorsed the right of workers to form associations of their own to look after and promote their interests. The state, it says, must not absorb the individual or the family and should allow both ‘free and untrammelled action so far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others.’ Furthermore, the state would be unjust if ‘under the name of taxation’ it deprived the private owner of more than is fair. This was, for a generally anti-liberal institution, a classical liberal position and brought with it the accusation that the Church was trying to protect its extensive privileges and wealth. However, as a last resort, when employers failed in their Christian duty to give workers what was their due or oppressed them, the state was obliged to intervene. It was its duty to ensure a living wage and to legislate to remove ‘in good time’ the causes which ‘lead to conflicts between employers and employed.’ But Rerum Novarum did not envisage any departure from existing political arrangements which excluded workers, as a natural course of things, from power. It preached the wisdom of accepting the fact of mutual economic interdependence between classes but saw no alternative to what the church believed a divinely ordained social structure which placed the traditional rulers, (including the Church) at the top, then the employers and at the bottom the working classes.29 66 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Thus, while the Vatican had seen the need for some re-appraisal of established norms, the church in Malta remained steadfast in its belief that these should be continually re-affirmed. Submission by Catholics to the position assigned to each one of them by God was godly. Nothing better exemplified this then the words of the hymn, now our National Anthem, written by Dun Karm for school children, which calls on the Maltese to pray to God to imbued their rulers (hakkiema) with wisdom, their employers with mercy and the workers with the physical strength needed to persist in their toil. For this reason, the clergy and the confessional parties had opposed the inclusion of Trade Union representatives in the Senate as keeping workers out of decision-making was in line with maintaining existing social hierarchies. The church believed that the only response to the difficulties facing workers and their families was prayer and Christian charity. This explains the impact that an English priest, Fr Charles Plater, was to have in Malta and why his memory continues to be revered in histories of the MLP. Appalled by existing working and living conditions, the educational backwardness of the Maltese working class and its deep sense of resignation, he urged them to unite and work together to better their material existence. He was all in favour of trade unions and encouraged the leaders of an emerging Labour Party to work to advance the education of workers and to improve their lives.30

Agius claims that the Church was perhaps over patronising towards Maltese workers treating them little better than children.31 But true as that may be in the case of workers, its approach to their would-be leaders was one of hostility. This was demonstrated, for example, in its hostility to Manwel Dimech. Another example was its readiness to attack or raise suspicions about the labour movement on any pretext useful for the purpose. Labour’s existence raised the suspicions of a Church fearful both of socialism and of losing its own political constituency. Labour’s founders sought to legitimise the right of their party to exist by declaring the party’s intention to follow the teachings of Rerum Novarum. They also strongly denied claims by their opponents that they intended to work against religion or to introduce socialism into Malta. What they wanted was to advance the social and economic condition of all working people and to do this on the basis of Catholic social teaching.32 Thus in promoting one of its favourite policies, compulsory education, the Labour Party promised to introduce this under the complete control and direction of the church. But their clerical opponents would not be appeased and the alleged call by two Labour speakers for workers to work to break their chains was quickly followed by a Circular Letter from the Archbishop deprecating ideas that could lead to the eternal damnation of his flock. Although the speakers denied having ever uttered words intended to promote ‘class hatred’ the attack on them continued. This attack by the church was far more serious than any attack other parties could make leading Labour leaders to consider dissolving the party.33 Both the speed of the reaction and the tone of the Bishop’s Circular Letter, does suggest a desire to deal Labour a crushing blow as quickly as possible and it almost succeeded. If a Labour Party could not speak out against existing injustices and

67 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 exploitation, for fear of being accused of inciting class hatred, what could such a party speak about?

However, in the 1920s the Labour Party was by and large a moderate party seeking only to find ways of implementing its social agenda and after the 1921 election allied with the UPM clerical party in the new legislature. This is not to say that anti-clericalism did not exist within the Labour Party. The church’s belief in a rigidly God ordained social structure was viewed by many as a key obstacle to social change. Many also believed too that clerical opposition to Labour arose from the desire of the church to maintain its power and privileges. Clerical exponents continually stressed these powers and privileges in speech as well in practice and those who publicly disagreed with these privileges risked facing sanctions. Thus referring to the quarrel between Strickland and the church in 1928, the Pope made the claim that what was happening in Malta was ‘contrary to the interests of the Catholic religion,’34 and in virtue of the supreme apostolic ministry it expected those in disagreement with the church to submit. For many, even within Labour, this dictatorial approach constituted nothing but a denial of freedom of expression and democratic liberties.

First Labour – Church Clash 1928

The threat which Labour posed was that it might eventually usurp the leadership of working people from the church and which until then had been unchallenged. However, at this time it was Strickland and the Constitutional Party which posed the greatest threat to church power in Malta. The relationship between the two had always been tense as the former was unhappy with the enormous political power enjoyed by the church, its sympathies with Italian, and its close connection with the UPM and PDM. This is seen, for example, in Strickland’s attack on the Nationalist Government TUC Bill which he argued was intended to take representation in the Senate away from real trade unions and vest it in ‘little village societies run by the priests.’35 But similar indications, undesirable from the church point of view, could also be seen within the Labour Party. As Fenech notes, by its strengthening of the power of the district committees at the expense of parish band clubs and other parish social clubs, that until then formed part of it, Labour managed to reduce the influence of the clerical establishment significantly.36

Labour was a party with a social mission and its members had no wish to meddle in spiritual matters but were concerned with the here and now. They were entirely happy to leave the former to the church but the latter constantly blurred the lines between politics and religion subjecting the party to constant reprimands even on matters which they believed not quite within its competence.

68 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

That the church wanted the Labour Party out of the way can be seen in the events of 1927-32 when church and state clashed for the first time. For the church in Malta the unthinkable happened in 1927 when the Constitutional Party, in “Compact” with the Labour Party, won the general elections. For the Labour Party this was a giant step forward as the compact agreement included all the social measures favoured by this party. Unfortunately, the compact parties did not enjoy a clear majority in the Senate and the fate of government measures hinged on the vote of the two clergy members nominated by the Archbishop. In July 1928 these two members sided with the Opposition to defeat the Government’s Appropriation Bill including the social measures favoured by Labour. The government side argued that the representatives of the clergy ought not to vote against the government when the issues before the House did not involve religious matters attributing to them political malice. Given what Koster repeatedly states that the vast majority of the clergy were staunch nationalists, a political motive cannot be dismissed. After all, these measures, if implemented would have strengthened the ‘compact’ government thereby attracting greater support for these two secular parties. For the clergy these may have been good enough reasons to obstruct the government. The quarrel that ensued was consequently a bitter one and which ultimately involved the British government and the Vatican.

Labour, while unhappy with the behaviour of the two clergy representatives, did not wish the quarrel to escalate. It tried, therefore, to try and calm the situation and to demonstrate that it had no quarrel with the church. Thus, in August 1929 it set up a commission to see if the battle raging in the press could be toned down significantly. It eventually succeeded in procuring promises from both Strickland and the Curia that their respective newspapers, and those of the MLP, would refrain from launching further attacks on each other.37 Lehen Is-Sewwa eventually broke this agreement but Labour did not rise to the provocation.

It also appointed another commission to discuss reconciliation with the Curia. The party was not strong enough to take on the Church given that nearly all of its supporters were fervent Catholics depending on the church for many services, both spiritual and temporal. Nevertheless, the quarrel did raise a number of issues which, for Labour, went to the very heart of responsible government and therefore could not be ignored. These were raised by Dr Boffa, the Labour leader, when he replied in the House to an attack on the ‘compact’ Government by Mgr. Robinson, the Apostolic Delegate. In his speech Boffa reaffirmed his party’s full devotion and obedience to the Vatican, but noted that this obedience was restricted to matters entirely religious. He also affirmed the exclusive right of Malta’s self-governing legislature to freely decide all issues pertaining to its competence without outside interference and deplored the Vatican’s call for the British government to remove Strickland from power. Mgr. Robinson, he said, had told the Labour Party in a meeting that ‘he was completely convinced that there was no anti-Catholic party in Malta’

69 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 and he understood that in Malta as in Britain there were those who had a vested interest in blackening the reputation of the worker’s movement.38

However, back to the discussions between the MLP and the Curia, what emerges questions the sincerity of the church to come to an understanding on the issues involved. In fact, just when Labour thought that the talks were progressing well it found itself, along with the CP, condemned by the Curia in the Pastoral Letter of st1 May 1930. This Pastoral Letter strictly forbade Catholics in Malta, on pain of mortal sin, from voting for candidates of the Constitutional Party and the MLP. Those who refused to follow these directives were to be refused the sacraments and a Christian burial if the case arose.

To have these sanctions lifted the labour Party was required to submit to eight humiliating conditions. First, the party was to do away with the red flag as its party symbol. Apart from the fact that the red flag was not its flag, it is questionable whether the church had any right to demand this. Labour had been condemned because of its association with the CP not the colour of its flag. Second, its MPs had to publicly apologise for having seconded and voted in favour of a motion of confidence in Strickland’s government. Third, the Labour Party was to abandon its compact with the CP during the elections and in Parliament. Fourth, it demanded that certain MPs and other members of the party publicly express their regret in respect of certain actions and writings and promise to make reparations. Fifth, that in drawing up its electoral programme the party follows the directives of the church and especially Rerum Novarum. Sixth, that the party agrees that ‘Il-Cotra’ will be its only official publication. Seventh, that the party publicly declares its readiness to abide with the letter and the spirit of these conditions. Eight, the party obliges itself to publish this communication in ‘Il-‘Cotra.’

These demands increased the existing tensions within the Labour Party but a sizeable part of the Executive rejected these conditions. These were utterly humiliating terms and many of them entirely beyond the competence of the church. Why, for example, should the party bind itself that Il-Cotra should be its sole official organ? And why should the party bind itself to follow the dictates of the church when drawing up its electoral programme? Clearly what the church wanted was to assert its authority over the political process while making a show of its power. Despite the difficulties, including the secession of those in favour of submitting, the party stood its ground. As John Marks later wrote the Labour Parliamentary group had supported the confidence motion in order to protect the social reforms which the government, with its support, had enacted. The Labour Party, he said, had declared its readiness to state its intentions were sincere and that it never had the slightest desire to injure religion, but the offer was refused. It was therefore clear, he states, that the intention was to foist on Labour conditions which it could not accept. Nor could Labour agree to the Vatican’s demand for the removal of Strickland from the government of the Island. What was the sense of having a self-governing Constitution,

70 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration asked Marks, if church dignitaries were to dictate who should or should not hold office? The party, he said, was ready to refrain from supporting the CP on purely religious matters but was not prepared to give up a compact which had proved favourable to its social agenda. As for adherence to Rerum Novarum, Marks notes that it was the Labour Party that had consistently publicised its tenets while most members of the clergy either ignored it or continued to oppose the setting up of trade unions as approved by the encyclical.39

The church’s condemnation of a party that was grappling to find ways of reaching some sort of understanding with it needs stressing. What the church wanted, however, was complete submission not understanding. It hoped to humiliate the party in the eyes of the electorate thereby re-asserting its own complete authority over its constituency. Its quarrel with Strickland presented it with the opportunity to strike at two birds with one stone. It also provided it with an opportunity to strike a blow at ‘democratic’ government rendering it, through its religious sanctions, irrelevant. Church authorities must have also known that their action would favour the PN, their favoured party.

The British government understood this and was forced to cancel the elections scheduled for 1930. The Labour Party remained steadfast in its belief that the issue was not religious but political and was convinced that the intention of the church was to wreck the Constitution and force its withdrawal. In a memorandum presented to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Labour said that it had been in expectation of what happened since the promulgation of the 1921 Constitution. It also had no doubt that until the clergy accepted that under the Constitution priests enjoyed the same rights as every other citizen, matters could only be resolved temporarily. The powers unleashed against the Constitution were tremendously powerful and included the Vatican. It is interesting to note that although Labour was implicated in the condemnation by the Archbishop, unlike Strickland, Boffa never proffered any apology. Nevertheless, the church’s sanctions against the party were also withdrawn in the wake of the elections held in 1932. The MLP had not submitted to the conditions imposed by the church. So why did the church not press for its submission? Did the church hold back because it would have appeared intransigent given the efforts being made in Malta, London and Rome to resolve the political crisis? Or did it hold back because it was aware that Labour had received a major blow and was no longer a potential political force. Koster notes that the Labour Party had suffered badly because of this quarrel and became rather insignificant within the political process with only Boffa retaining his seat. But the whole affair had shown that, despite the sanctions imposed by the church, 38% of those voting voted for the compact parties. The church and its satellite party may have won but the result indicated that, even at this early stage, already a hardcore of voters had begun to resent the church’s intrusion into politics However, the tensions growing in Europe soon overshadowed local politics and its was not until 1945 that political activity could be fully resumed.

71 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976

The Political-Religious Conflict 1961-71

The war had a devastating effect on Malta adding to the social and economic difficulties of the island. Labour, however, emerged from the war stronger and in alliance with the newly established General Workers Union, as the party to beat. Labour was also the only party with a vision capable of addressing these difficulties and the determination to match it. This vision and this determination in turn were complemented by a new and young membership that was ready to resist all efforts to obstruct its programme. It was the restitution of self-government which, in 1947, provided Labour with the opportunity to try and implement its vision.

By contrast, the church remained rooted in its belief that change was bad and hence opposed to the Labour Party. The old order had to be preserved because in that scheme of things the church played an overwhelmingly dominant role and as Pirotta notes it ‘had no intention of renouncing it.’40 He argues that the church, while acutely aware of the poor social condition in which large numbers of its flock lived, ‘was too conservative to be innovative in their interests, and too suspicious of all new developments and trends once it suspected that this might be prejudicial to its own power, and therefore (for in the eyes of the church the two were synonymous) of the people’s faith.’41 In other words there could be no other leader but the church. But he goes on to stress that this attitude served to advantage the other parties and to ensure its identification with their vested interests. Koster reiterates that even at this stage the vast majority of the clergy supported the Nationalist Party. Briefly, therefore, the scenario that presented itself in 1945 was this: Labour was bent on bringing radical changes to Maltese society while the church was equally determined to resist them or dilute them out of existence. The two could, consequently, never live amicably together while the church had no intention of being the first to stand down.

Skirmishes between the two over crucial political and social issues can be evidenced from the very beginning. Koster, for example, points to the clash between clergy and GWU about the church’s prohibition of contraception, a clear indication of divergent mind-sets on how the social implications of an excessive birth-rate (and child death rate) could be addressed. Another early example is that associated with Labour’s drive to extend the franchise to women as well as to all adult males. Labour believed in the right of women to vote and participate in politics; the church believed that enfranchising women would lead wives to assert their independence from their husbands resulting in the break-up of the family. Labour eventually won its point but this did very little to endear it to the church.

The clergy also ran an extensive media campaign seeking to demarcate the political and economic parameters within which Labour could implement its electoral

72 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration programme.42 All articles had one thing in common: a warning to Labour that they would forcefully oppose its policies if it did not adhere to their strictures. Thus, for example, one writer argued that the church was not opposed to the nationalisation of industries when the common good was a stake but opposed it on ideological grounds.43 Another, Serafin Zarb, a Dominican Friar, wrote that the ‘social question’ was a religious issue and as such came under the authority (my italics) of the church. If the state did not agree with the position of the church, he wrote, it was not the church that was in conflict with the state but the state in conflict with the church and therefore with God. The church, Zarb wrote, will live in peace with all concerned as long as these do not oppose its teaching.44 Others hinted that to go beyond what the church proscribed was to imitate what communists were doing elsewhere. There was no room for debate or disagreement with the church’s interpretation of economic issues and not to unconditionally submit to it put one immediately at fault for resisting God and being anti-catholic. For the church it did not matter what a democratic electorate wanted and it is interesting to note that in all the articles written by members of the clergy in the 1940s or even later, in the 1960s, the concept of democracy does not receive any consideration. The church had an important advantage: it had power but not responsibility but nonetheless believed it could dictate the options available to elected governments. Koster claims that a parish priest told him that ‘it was the church which dictated – in theory at least, but sometimes also in fact – to the government of the day.’ It also meant that by itself defining what constituted politics in a very narrow sense it could avoid the accusation of interfering too much in politics. Politics was what the church said it was. Take for example this statement from Lehen Is-Sewwa which editorially wrote that the church does not interfere in politics, (an expression repeatedly used by bishops and clergy), but when political parties (meaning Labour) touch such issues as taxation, education and health then the church was duty bound to interfere.45 One would have thought that such policy issues fell directly under and not outside the remit of policy-makers and that the final authority over them lay with the civil authorities and the electorate and not the church. But here too the church claimed precedence over the state by cleverly restricting the area open to politicians for policy- making. This meant that, where the church was concerned, the field for action was very wide while that allowed to political parties very narrow. On rare occasions even PN leaders found themselves ensnared by this philosophy. In the 1950s Borg Olivier was rebuked by Gonzi for opposing the Child Migrant Scheme on the ground that this involved religious aspects and therefore he had no right to override his spiritual authority.46

The church was supremely confident that it could win any battle with a political party so much so that in 1950 the Archbishop could claim that ‘were any party to attack the church in the open it would be sure to get no votes.’47 And it may not be inconceivable to conclude that some of the skirmishes that took place between Gonzi and the MLP in the years following the war were intended to draw out Labour’s radical element into the open in order to better crush it. One such skirmish was over the so-called singing of the

73 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976

‘Red Flag’ at St Paul’s Bay at a dinner attended by Mintoff. It provided an opportunity for Gonzi, the clergy and their allies to attack Mintoff and to associate the incident with a growing threat of Communism in Malta and its entrenchment within the Labour Party.48 Mintoff had been the candidate who during the 1947 election, despite his young age, had polled the highest number of votes and who as early as 1933 had called on ‘the progressive elements to group together and change Malta’s medieval social system.’49 He was also clearly the favourite among Labour’s more radical supporters and the most likely to succeed to the leadership. This was recognised by The Bulletin and by Herbert Ganado. The first in an editorial dedicated to Mintoff which outlined his qualities while at the same time advising him against impatience50 and the second in his challenge to Mintoff to openly declare himself. Mintoff, he wrote, ‘is either a Catholic and thus not a true socialist, or he is a socialist and thus not a true catholic.’51

The clergy and their allies in the PN knew that Mintoff and the Labour Party could not easily fend-off accusations of this sort. What they wanted to achieve in Malta –compulsory education, better public health provision, pension schemes, social housing – was similar to what other socialist parties elsewhere also wanted. This made them easy targets since their opponents cared little for such policies. We see, therefore, after the red flag incident, an upsurge of activities to combat the alleged threat of communism in Malta by both the church and the PN. Thus, we see Gonzi, on one occasion, preaching against communism to dockyard workers and on another telling GWU delegates about his concerns about the spread of class hatred by certain individuals. In a speech to the Young Christian Workers he went further claiming that ‘instructions from MOSEN to oppose were being closely followed in Malta.’ These comments quickly gave rise to anti-communist rallies in towns and villages.52 But, as Koster notes, the Labour Party ‘could never have numbered many communists among its members’ acknowledging, however, that it had become a great deal more radical.53 He agrees with Pirotta that Gonzi’s campaign against communism ultimately stood to benefit the PN and undermine the MLP.54

Gonzi’s strategy was intended to put the MLP and GWU in a political straight- jacket. Fear of being tainted with communism was bound to make them, at least, restrict their ambitious reform agenda to the disappointment of their grass root support. Take for example his opposition to Labour’s National Health Scheme and the introduction of income tax. In the first case he based his opposition ‘on the interests of the principle of individual liberty which, nationalisation of the Health Services sooner or later, directly or indirectly will be evoked.’55 He claimed that in other countries Catholics ‘have generally resisted such manoeuvres as being the precursors of an imposition of moral principles in opposition to Catholic morals.’ This reference to individual liberty, however, jars significantly with the position of the church in later years when it accused the MLP that its demand for freedom of conscience and worship were intended to oppose the Catholic Church.56

74 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

The approach to the income tax issue was rather similar. In its 1947 electoral manifesto the MLP had promised to introduce income tax in Malta. The rate envisaged under the new tax law was that of 10s in the pound for the highest income earners. Gonzi opposed this tax arguing ‘that such a tax would have been anti-catholic and would have met the full and public condemnation of the church.’57 According to Koster, to placate the Archbishop, the tax was reduced to 9s.6d while the church was exempted from its provisions. Here again, in the hope of discrediting the Labour government and undermine its legitimacy, Gonzi raises the spectre of anti-Catholicism. Gonzi must have known that the government’s failure to raise the necessary revenue would have severely restricted its social policy agenda. At the same time forcing the government to retreat, even a mere 6d, helped to re-affirm the overall power and doctrinal authority of the church even in fiscal matters.

Hardly anyone in the MLP believed that there was anything anti-catholic in the government’s reform programme but rather the contrary and they were understandably angered by this constant harassment. Nonetheless, Labour, despite its overwhelming electoral mandate tried at all stages to allay the fears of the church and to reach a compromise. Several examples can be found to prove this point. For example, Labour went out of its way to allay church fears over compulsory schooling.58 Among other things it entrusted the new teacher training colleges to two religious orders; appointed spiritual directors in every school; employed a large number of priests, on a salary, to teach various subjects in the new secondary schools; and retained the qualification in religion for admission to the teaching profession.59 Nevertheless, everything Labour did in this sphere was treated with suspicion. Koster suggests, as a reason, that education for all would, in the long run, impact on the authority and power of the church stripping it of its monopoly over knowledge.60 One must remember that the church dominated all the state censorship boards in Malta and nothing which touched our shores escaped its scrutiny and control. The right to freedom of expression or information had as yet no legal status in Malta.

Thus, after 1955 the clashes and disagreements between Labour and the church were to multiply. Labour could do very little without incurring the church’s displeasure. An example can be found in the church’s constant harassment of the 1955-58 Labour government over the latter’s drive to make Malta a tourist destination on the ground that a large influx of sun-seekers would lower moral standards.61 Labour’s policy of integration with Britain or self-determination was a far more serious issue, however, for it threatened to break the glass bubble in which the church had kept Malta enclosed. The PN’s demand for Status also raised similar fears but the church believed it could always manipulate this party. The church consistently claimed that it did not interfere in politics but its attempts to remove Borg Olivier from the leadership of the party and to replace him with its own candidate betrays this claim.62

75 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976

Both of Labour’s alternatives, integration or independence from Britain, threatened to radically change the political scenario in which the church had exercised its near absolute power for nearly 150 years. Labour’s alternative policies, especially integration, had been extensively debated during the 1955 general elections and had not been sprung on an unsuspected electorate once Labour had gained power.63 Labour rightly believed that it had secured a mandate to explore this option in discussions with the British government. That is the basis of democratic representation. But the proposals alarmed the church and by hindsight one can see that she had quite early determined to wreck them.

Its fears were based on two elements: first its fear that integration would make Malta subservient to the British Parliament in issues touching marriage laws in Malta; second that its status as the dominant church, as well as its political influence would be greatly diminished if not swept away completely.64 It feared that with integration Britain would no longer need its support to protect its strategic interests in Malta and the ‘protective shield’65 they had extended the church would be removed. The church, therefore, demanded constitutional guarantees that would ensure its status and that it would continue to retain control over many areas of Maltese life.66 However, despite repeated assurances from the British and Maltese governments that domestic affairs will remain under the jurisdiction of Malta’s Parliament, Gonzi refused to budge. At one stage Mintoff went so far as to state that in Malta mutual understanding between church and state was indispensable.67 Mintoff and the government delegation to the Round Table Conference had also kept the bishop fully informed of the discussions.68 Nonetheless, in January 1956, Gonzi issued a Pastoral Letter in which he set out the church’s opposition to integration claiming that the guarantees they had demanded had not been given. In doing so, however, he once again resorted to a political argument claiming that economic aid was not dependent on integration.69 This was not for the church to say and was said because the church needed to respond to the overwhelming desire of the vast majority of the Maltese for a better life. It was a desire that at the time a good majority of the Maltese believed in, seeing integration with Britain as the only practical solution.

In response the Labour government published the correspondence that had taken place between its side, the Maltese church and the Vatican. Despite its overwhelming electorate mandate Labour hard striven to satisfy Gonzi on most issues but the latter was adamant that only the status quo could do that. Consequently, he allied with Labour’s political opponents to ensure that the integration proposal was defeated in the subsequent referendum. While the church had every right to hold a different opinion on the issue from the government and to campaign to defeat it, it was not ready to accord the same rights to those who disagreed with it. Thus it felt aggrieved when the government, in response to its Pastoral Letter claiming that it had not received the guarantees it had asked for, published the correspondence on the subject.70 Once the church had spoken all others

76 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration had to hold their peace. Mintoff and the MLP refused to do this thereby increasing Gonzi’s determination to crush them.

Labour’s strategy was to push first for integration: it was the least politically controversial of the two it since it had no cause to alarm Britain, but rather the opposite and seemed to provide the quickest route out of Malta’s economic difficulties. When this proposal collapsed, Labour moved swiftly towards its other alternative: independence. This scenario frightened the church even more driving Gonzi more and more on to the British side.71 Independence had also been endorsed by the Nationalist Party in the so- called Break with Britain Resolution.72 Although important differences existed between the two parties as to the kind of independence each wanted the church feared its very concept. This flew in the face of what the vast majority of the Maltese electorate wanted and the church’s attempt to derail the independence project served imperial rather than Malta’s interests.

When in 1958 Britain withdrew the Constitution and relegated Malta once again to the status of Crown Colony the church supported the move. At one stage Gonzi even encouraged Harold Macmillan to maintain the status quo in Malta.73 It wanted the Governor and his administration to implement the necessary reforms in order to demonstrate that British colonial rule was better able to deliver prosperity for Malta than the island’s own political parties.74 In a personal interview Duncan Campbell, Malta’s last Chief Secretary, told the author that the plan was to implement Labour’s policy programme in order to undermine its public standing.75 British-church co-operation became even stronger after the riots of 1958. Labour had instigated the riots as it wanted to send Britain the message that it could no longer hold Malta against its will. It also wanted to bring international attention to Malta as a first step before seeking international support. Labour paid a high price for its actions with some of its prominent members and many from its rank-and-file going to prison. Gonzi was delighted with the outcome and ‘believed that labourites had learnt a lesson at the hands of the police and would not riot again.’76 For Labour, Gonzi’s support for Britain and his attacks against it were totally unacceptable and unpatriotic.

Labour wanted independence as early as possible but wanted also an economically viable independent Malta. It was therefore determined to use all avenues and assistance it could get from would-be international allies. So after 1960 we see the MLP joining international organisations, such as the Socialist International and AAPSO. The first included left-wing parties even from Western European states, including the UK Labour Party. The second was a more restricted affair but included such countries as India and Yugoslavia which were to become the founders of the non-aligned movement. There were allegations that AAPSO was receiving funds from the Soviet Union. Labour also sought to initiate contacts with such countries as Poland and Hungary hoping that these would offer their support in international fora such as the UN, which they did.77 Labour

77 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 also hoped that, after independence, the government would be able to use these new contacts to attract investment and markets. It sincerely believed that Malta’s best hope for the future lay in its ability to attract aid and investment from any country willing to provide it. However, membership of these organisations provided its opponents, including the church, with an opportunity to accuse it of being tainted with communism. Indeed, Labour was often accused, by the church too, of indirectly helping the Soviet Union to expand its influence and of wanting to turn Malta into another Cuba.78

Gonzi joined with the colonial authorities to attack the alleged spread of communism in Malta and used every occasion offered to attack Mintoff.79 He earnestly hoped that Mintoff would do something illegal resulting in his arrest and elimination from politics. He also tried to undermine the MLP by depicting it as anti-catholic and anti-church. Take for example his warning that no Catholic ‘could join a party that goes covertly or openly against the faith, the church’ and Christian morality.80 He further cautioned against support for a party that based its programme on a materialistic concept of life81 as if life in the here and now was not the realm of all political parties. In the face of these constant attacks Labour’s options were once again limited: either to withdraw and abandon its push for independence, in which it believed implicitly, or in addition to facing up to the British take on the church as well. Choosing the first would have compromised independence and finished Labour. The second promised a fight which could still finish Labour butif won opened up the possibility of economic development for all Maltese. Labour chose the second.

Although Labour consistently denied that it was a communist party and continued to explain its position, Gonzi had no qualms with accusing it of wanting to destroy Christianity in Malta.82 But Labour did manage to internationalise its campaign for independence and Malta’s case was raised from time to time in the United Nations and other international fora. Gonzi was opposed to Labour’s insistence that, to achieve full independence, it would accept aid from wherever it was offered.83 It was the right of a political party to propose directions and the right of the electorate to accept or reject them. By contrast Gonzi wanted to keep Malta a British colony, preferably a Crown Colony and was prepared to use spiritual sanctions not persuasion. Labour would have much preferred that the church was on the side of the people but the attacks of the church against independence and Gonzi’s avowed aim to stop it could no longer postpone the time when the two sides must array themselves openly against each other. That came in 1961.

Unable to accept the rules of democratic society which gives to all the right to defend itself, to give back as much as it receives, and to legitimately press forward its own political agenda, the Archbishop moved to silence Labour and to ostracise its leadership. In February 1961, he issued his Lenten Pastoral Letter in which he attacked Labour’s association with AAPSO, stressing the latter’s ties with the Soviet Union. But,

78 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration he also, ‘warned that anyone criticising or commenting adversely on the Letter would be committing a mortal sin’ absolution for which was reserved to him only.84 The faithful had no option but to submit or face the consequences. Earlier the Diocesan Federation of Catholic Associations had decreed that none of the members of these organisations could be members of the MLP under its present leadership or give it any support as this party was defying the Catholic Church.85 Two things emerge from this: first that as in 1930 the church demanded complete submission on the ground that everything ultimately came under its spiritual direction, including independence; and second that it was ready to strike at members of the electorate with all the weapons in its spiritual armoury.

However, while the church could still mobilise the masses against a political party and rein in the PN and the Strickland Press, it could not stop the journey towards independence. Its major allies, the PN, wanted it as did the vast majority of the Maltese. Hence, the only option left for the church was of finding ends and means for retaining its stronghold over the polity. Gonzi knew that the MLP would never willingly concede this given the church’s forty years of opposition to its very existence. Thus, this also meant restricting the democratic rights and freedoms of those who opposed its claim to its near absolute authority. This becomes even clearer after 1962 when independence began to look inevitable. Knowing that this would remove Britain’s protective shield, it now redoubled its efforts to crush Labour and to force the inclusion of certain clauses in the draft Independence Constitution that would retain the status quo as far as its political and spiritual powers were concerned. An opportunity to act on the first came after Labour issued a statement ‘to answer the most serious calumnies’ daily thrown at it by the clergy, Mabel Strickland and Herbert Ganado, and the British authorities, whom it all accused of wanting ‘to keep Malta as a colony.’86 The response of the Bishops was to call for ‘public reparation’ and to threaten the MLP’s executive with interdiction, which it inflicted in April 1961.87 An opportunity to move against Labour’s media came soon after when Il-Helsien ‘invited’ the Bishops for a public debate with Mintoff and Anton Buttigieg and these too were interdicted. Labour’s rank and file also felt the full weight of the church’s sanctions against them. They were denied the sacraments and their families, including their children, were excluded from parish societies, almost all of which were under church control. Labour supporters who died risked being buried in the mizbla and some eventually were.88

The entire focus of the church was now on an independence constitution that would allow it to retain its full powers notwithstanding the inclusion of human rights provisions. The PN Government obliged and clauses 9 and 10 were included in Section 28 of Chapter 3 of the draft Independence Constitution.89 According to Clause 9 ‘nothing done (my italics) by the Roman Catholic Church in the exercise of its spiritual powers (again my italics) and duties shall be held to be in contravention of any of the provisions of this chapter’ on human rights. This clause placed the church entirely above the constitution and was intended to give it a blank cheque in its campaign against the MLP. Clause 10

79 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 was more insidious as it aimed to make it possible for the PN Government to collaborate with the church in the suppression of human rights on the pretext of protecting religion in Malta while placing its actions beyond the reach of the Constitutional courts. The PN’s government justification for this was that the ‘Government respected the church and its institutions’ and that ‘in this respect theirs was not a liberal state.’90 It could, therefore, never agree with the MLP’s opposition to its plans to give the church supremacy over human rights provisions.

That this policy was to the PN’s Government electoral advantage needs no clarification. What is perhaps shameful is that it tried to give a semblance ofpseudo- legality to a clearly undemocratic policy. And although it failed to have clauses 9 and 10 included in the Independence Constitution the PN did manage, after striking a secret deal with the British government, to retain the existing electoral law which allowed for corrupt practices.91 Consequently, both the 1962 and 1966 general elections were conducted under the shadow of mortal sin. Despite these handicaps the MLP continued to work for the creation of a more liberal-democratic state but remained open to reconciliation with the church. In February 1963, Mintoff explored the possibility of conciliation with the church through Father Prospero Grech, a Maltese Augustinian priest living in Rome, a fact which gives the lie that Labour was purposely attacking the church to undermine religion. A secret meeting between the two was held in Rome in that month and Father Grech relayed his discussions with Mintoff to Vatican officials. Mintoff was, Koster notes, ‘ready to co-operate’92 in any face-saving formula for both sides but did not feel that Labour had any cause to offer an apology. What Mintoff wanted was that discussions between the church and the MLP should be held in an atmosphere free from moral pressure. He also wanted the issue of church-state relations settled for the long term and made a number of proposals intended to achieve this aim. These were separation of Church and State as in any modern state; no religion should have preference over another; civil marriage to be recognised and possibly divorce for those who believe in it; in State schools religious instruction to be given only to those who desired it; to be eligible for state funds private schools had to submit to inspection thereby guaranteeing that standards are being maintained; social services to be the same for everyone without discrimination, including illegitimate children; the church to make some financial contribution and privilegium fori to be restricted; State censorship of the arts to be free from church intervention; the church was not to interfere in political matters.93

Although these proposals could be found in most liberal-democratic states of the time they remained unacceptable to both the church and the Nationalist government. Indeed, no response was forthcoming until May 1963 to these proposals when the church launched its attack on what became known as Mintoff’s six points. Worse still, from time to time, they were given slants that Labour never intended. Thus, Catholic Action said that what Labour wanted amounted to profanation of Catholic cemeteries; hindering

80 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration of religious functions; and anti-catholic morality.94 Others redoubled their efforts to ensure that the power of the church in Malta remained absolute. Thus, an amendment was pressed forward to amend paragraph 2 of the draft Independence Constitution to include the words that after Independence the church ‘shall continue to enjoy all those rights, privileges and prerogatives, in accordance with the laws of Malta and the Code of Canon Law (my italics) obtaining on the appointed day.’95 This went further from what was proposed in Clauses 9 and 10 for now an attempt was being made to incorporate Canon Law into Malta’s legal system.96

Thus, both during the 1964 referendum and the elections of 1962 and 1966 Labour had to face the combined forces and resources of the other parties and the church. Every means were used to silence Labour: church bells were rung during meetings to drown out MLP speakers; pilgrimages of every sort; censorship on the broadcasting media; banning of its newspapers from public offices and other places; and at times, physical violence as happened in Gozo when MLP supporters were stoned and subjected to all kinds of humiliation. Nevertheless, the MLP never closed the door on conciliation and, in contrast to Gonzi, readily agreed to new talks chaired by the Apostolic Delegate.97 At this meeting Gonzi agreed to lift the interdict from the MLP executive and the talks continued in Rome. At one stage hopes were raised that mortal sin would not be imposed again during the 1966 general elections but these hopes were dashed. A new Irish Apostolic Nuncio did not press the two sides to conclude their talks and when the 1966 elections came round the quarrel had remained unresolved. Koster believes that the replacement of the Apostolic Delegate with a new Nuncio was part of a ploy by the PN government to interrupt the negotiations between church and MLP.98

Borg Olivier had counted on the continued support of the clergy for his party and this was fully forthcoming. The Diocesan Gunta, which had co-ordinated the church’s campaign against the Labour Party in 1966, came out openly in favour of the PN calling on the electorate to support this party. Nevertheless, the results of the 1962 and 1966 general elections demonstrated unequivocally that a large portion of the electorate agreed with the position and policies of the MLP. Despite burdened with obstacles Labour won 33.8% and 16 out of 50 seats in 1962 and 44% and 22 seats in 1966. If anything, the 1966 result demonstrated that the church was increasingly losing the argument and more and more of the electorate were prepared to vote according to their conscience. This result and the changes taking place in the universal church, were to bring agreement closer. Only a few months after the 1966 elections the abolition of the Index by the Pope provided the local church with the opportunity to lift the interdict from Labour’s newspapers.99 Matters were also speeded up by the appointment of Mons Emmauel Gerada as Auxiliary Bishop of Malta. Following long and torturous discussions and negotiations an agreement was finally concluded. In this historic four point agreement the principles for better relations between Labour and the church were sketched out.100 First, the agreement noted, in a modern

81 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976 society it was necessary that a distinction should be made between the political community and the church. It was the very nature of the church that made non-interference in politics necessary. Second, that the church had the right and duty to safeguard its spiritual and temporal interests and when necessary to teach which principles are good and which are bad. But the church will not impose mortal sin as a means of censorship. Third, it declared, ‘with great joy’ that in the spirit of Vatican Council II the relations between the church and the Malta Labour Party had considerably improved. It was hoped that ‘with God’s help’ this good will in the future will ensure peace between the two sides. Thus, on the basis of this terse statement came to an end the political-religious conflict of the 1960s. That Labour cared only for Malta’s future can perhaps be seen during the conflict with Britain in the 1970s over the rent for military facilities in Malta. On that occasion Gonzi had intervened to help the Maltese government achieve its aims and Mintoff not only publicly expressed his gratitude to him but on his subsequent birthdays sent him a big bouquet of roses as a token of his respect.101

Conclusion

The thesis pressed forward in this article was that the conflict between the church and the MLP had historical and ideological reasons behind it. The church wanted, whatever Malta’s constitutional evolution, to remain the dominant spiritual and political power. It could do so only if the status quo could be indefinitely maintained. Labour was for change and was determined to work to bring changes to the existing social order, which the church opposed. Consequently, for the church, Labour had to be eliminated or at the very least rendered politically impotent. We have seen that it had quickly tried to taint Labour with accusations of class hatred and communism. History has shown that the church rarely spoke out against reforms proposed by the PN but was always outspoken about similar reforms when proposed by Labour. Labour was constantly harassed whether it was about education, taxation, tourism, and the opening of a Casino. The church was always there to lead the resistance. The Labour Party had also favoured radical solutions which, while intended to raise Maltese society from the poverty in which it was mired, threatened to remove the protection and deference which the church had enjoyed under British rule. Integration made the church fear for its dominant status while independence under a constitution which would include human rights provisions that could result in unfavourable court judgements was equally unthinkable. The fact that it was the MLP that always came up with radical proposals made it more important that this party should be defeated and crippled politically. Spiritual sanctions were employed for this purpose on a number of occasions. In time, however, the MLP began to win the political argument and the election result of 1966 demonstrated that Labour might win an election in spite of the imposition of mortal sin. To avoid this happening, the church increasingly found itself under pressure to reach an agreement with the MLP.

82 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

This article has also laid to rest the common perception that the MLP-church quarrel was at heart one based on personalities. Gonzi and Mintoff were leaders of their respective institution and their personality did play a part but the quarrel was about national freedom and tradition, between existing privileges and democratic liberties and the right of an electorate to freely make choices about competing policies. The church continually sought to present the quarrel as one about religion stressing that it did not interfere in politics. This claim too has now been laid to rest. In the 1920s the clergy regarded Boffa as an extremist and he suffered the condemnation of the church. This view of Boffa changed only when it appeared that Boffa could be used to crush Labour. But close inspection would show that little had changed from the 1920s. It was Labour that ultimately laid the foundations for the development of a democratic state.

Endnotes

1 Pirotta, Godfrey A., Malta’s Parliament: An Official History,Malta, 2006, 59-62. 2 Koster, Adrianus, Prelates and Politicians: changing power balances between Church and State in a Mediterranean Island Fortress (1530-1976), Netherlands, 1981,55. See also Pirotta Godfrey A., The Maltese Public Service: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-state 1800-1940, Malta, 1996, where the issue of British strategic interests is constantly reaffirmed. 3 Ibid., 55. 4 Ibid., 39. 5 This collaboration came to its climax during World War II when the contribution made by the church towards the war demonstrated the closeness that existed between Britain and the Maltese church. It also helped to elevate Mons Michael Gonzi to Archbishopric of Malta. 6 Ibid., 39-42. 7 Fenech, Dominic, Responsibility and Power in Inter-War Malta, Book One, Malta, 2005, 72-73. 8 Azzopardi, Geraldu, “Meta tkasbar il-kadavru!” , Il-Hsieb,1981, 4-5. 9 Koster, 75-76. 10 The National Assembly can be described as a congress of Malta’s civil and political societies which had met in 1919 through the personal initiative of Filippo Sceberras to propose a new constitution for Malta. 11 Koster, 73. 12 Ibid., 74. 13 Fenech, 91. 14 Ibid.,72. 15 Pirotta, Godfrey, 2006, 64-65. 16 Fenech, 2005. 17 Pirotta, Godfrey, ‘The growth of trade unions under British colonialism – A comparative perspective’, Economic and Social Studies, vol.1, 1983, 30. 18 Cutajar, Mario, Storja tal-Partit Laburista,Malta, 2011, 24-29. 19 Azzopardi Geraldu, “Hamsin sena ilu,”, Il-Hsieb, Jannar 1993, 2-3. 20 Agius, Emmanuel, Social Consciousness of the Church in Malta 1891-1921: The

83 The MLP and the Church: Building the Democratic State: 1921-1976

Impact of Rerum Novarum, Malta, 1991, 140-46. 21 ‘wicchom, imgemmed, mahmugin biz-zjut u jdejhom bil-kallijiet…’ quoted in Azzopardi, Geraldu, ‘F’hiex konna u f’hiex wasalna’, Il-Hsieb, April 1978. 22 Quoted in Pirotta, Joseph M., Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945-1964, vol. 1, 14. 23 Fenech, 147. 24 A number of studies focusing on this period and on Strickland’s quarrel with the church exist. Four prominent ones are Fenech, 2005; Smith Harrison Lord Strickland Servant of the Crown, Two Volumes, Malta 1984 & 1986; Catania Cesare, Strickland, Britain and the Vatican 1929-1932,Malta, 2011; Camilleri Edwin, John F. Marks 1894-1954, Malta, 2000. 25 Camilleri, 132. 26 Ibid., 353. 27 Bonnici, Guze`,[1931], Storja tal-Partit tal-Haddiema, 1990, Malta, 73. 28 Aguis,12. 29 For an extensive discussion on this Encycical see Agius, 1991. 30 Bonnici, , 36-37. 31 Agius, 1991. 32 Bonnici, 34-5. 33 Ibid., 34-35; and also Azzopardi Gerald, “Tbezbiza mill-Kurja”, Il-Hsieb, 1979, 15. 34 Malta Royal Commission Report, London, p.60. 35 Quoted in Fenech, 181. 36 Ibid., 163. 37 Ibid., 135, Camilleri, 68. 38 Bonnici, 118-23. 39 Camilleri, 438-444 40 Koster, 139. 41 Ibid., 42 See for Example, Rev. Camilleri, Frans, ‘Responsabbiltajiet u Rikostruzzjoni Socjali’, Lehen Is-Sewwa, 18th January 1947; Galea, Pawl, O.P., Kontroll fuq il-Propjeta, a reprint of his talk on Rediffusion in Lehen Is-Sewwa, 5th February 1947. 43 Rev. Gambin, Ugo, Taghlim mill-Pastorali ta’ Mons. Arcisqof: Il-Fantazma tal- Komunizmu in Lehen Is-Sewwa, 12th March 1947. 44 Zarb, Serafin, O.P., ‘L-Istat u l-Knisja fil-Kwistjoni Socjali’, Lehen is-Sewwa, 12th march 1947. 45 Editorial, ‘Religjon u Politika’, Lehen Is-Sewwa, 11 June 1947. 46 We all know what the outcome of that policy was and that time proved Borg Olivier perfectly right in his opposition to the scheme. 47 Koster, 153. 48 Borg, Joe, Il-Bandiera Hamra, Malta, 1991, 21-39. 49 Koster, 148. 50 Editorial, ‘Master Mintoff’, The Bulletin, 2 April 1947. 51 Koster, 148. 52 Borg, 25-38. 53 Koster, 159. 54 Pirotta, Joseph M., vol.1, 212. 55 Ibid., 155. 56 Koster, 192. 57 Ibid., 148 -9. 58 Ibid., 159. 59 Ibid., 159.

84 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

60 Ibid., 158. 61 Pirotta.Joseph M., vol.2, 483. 62 Ibid.,76, 92-93. 63 Koster, 165. 64 Ibid., 165-69. 65 Pirotta, Joseph M, vol.3, 76. 66 Koster, 167-68. 67 Ibid., 172. 68 Ibid., 165. 69 Ibid., 166. 70 Ibid., 167-68. 71 Pirotta, Joseph M., 586-91, 601. 72 Pirotta, Godfrey A., 2006, 131-32. 73 Pirotta, Joseph M., vol 3. 601. 74 Ibid., 590. 75 The interview took place in March 1985 at Mr Campbell’s residence. 76 Pirotta, Joseph M., vol.3, 590. 77 Ibid., 631. 78 Koster, 192. 79 Pirotta, Joseph M., vol.3, 591. 80 Ibid., 594. 81 Ibid., 595. 82 Ibid., 773. 83 Ibid., 730. 84 Koster, 183. 85 Ibid., 183. 86 Quoted in Koster, 183. 87 Ibid., 184. 88 Ibid., 186. 89 Malta Independence Conference 1963, U.K., 62 -63. 90 Pirotta, Godfrey A., 2006, 154. 91 Pirotta, Godfrey A., ‘L-Indipendenza fid-dell ta’ l-armi nukleari’, L-Orizzont, 21 Sept. 2010. 92 Koster, 197. 93 Ibid. 196-97. 94 Ibid., 198-99. 95 Ibid., 199. 96 Ibid., 201. 97 Ibid., 219. 98 Ibid., 223. 99 Ibid., 223. 100 Cutajar, Mario, Storja tal-Partit Laburista, Malta, 2011, 220. 101 Koster, 238.

85 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta

(Published in FEMA Research Bulletin, Vol 1, No 1, University of Malta, 2005)

n its 1990 Report, the Hansard Society’s Commission on Women at the Top made a Itwofold observation. First, that in Britain, women were seriously under-represented in Parliament. And second, that Britain was almost at the bottom of the league table of modern democracies in respect of the proportion of women serving as MPs or in the Cabinet. `For too many women’, the Report states, `there is a glass ceiling over their aspirations – it allows them to see where they might go but stops them getting there.’1 The Report concluded that `the interests of women are not properly represented in Parliament, in Government, or in Opposition,’2 and that this tended to deprive society of women’s talents and experience.3 The point here is that the conclusions of this Commission were being voiced at a time when Britain had had a women Prime Minister, had had a number of women ministers and still had a female monarch that has been on the throne since 1953. Furthermore, in Britain, women over the age of thirty were able to vote in elections as early 1918 and this right was eventually extended to all women of twenty-one years or over, merely a decade later.4

The 1996 Annual Report of the Department for the Equal Status of Women made very much the same point about Malta. ‘The representation of women in decision-making is one of the most critical issues for Maltese women because, as yet, the number of women in high level positions is inadequate. The strategic objective is to achieve equal participation of women and men in decision-making, which will provide a balance that reflects the composition of Maltese society more accurately.’5 In Malta, so far, only two women have held office as ministers, one of them also having the distinction of serving as President of the Republic.6 In recent years women have made new inroads into that traditional men’s club: Parliament; hold seats on Local Councils; and chair a number of government boards. However, by and large, the glass ceiling is still firmly in place.

This contribution has four main objectives. First, it seeks to outline the road to political emancipation for . Second, it explores their participation in the electoral process. Third, it examines their contribution to Maltese politics in the twentieth century. And finally, it discusses the evolution and present state of gender politics in Malta. Space, of course, does not allow for more than a brief exploration of these themes.

Political Emancipation

Maltese women, like many others of their gender in other countries, gained the right to vote in the aftermath of World War Two. Until then they had been excluded from any

86 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration share in Maltese politics, even though many of them, had they been male, would have fulfilled all the qualifications for voters as laid down by the Constitution of 1921, the first responsible government constitution conceded to Malta by Britain. The 1921, Constitution had granted the vote to any male person who was a) a British subject; b) twenty-one years of age or over; c) who was able to read and write; and d) `who is, in his own right or in the right (my italics) of his wife’ in receipt of an income of twenty pounds per annum or pays rent to that amount.7 Thus, while a woman’s income could help confer the vote on her male partner, the wife enjoyed no such benefit, however well qualified she was. Indeed, many women would have fulfilled these voter qualifications as an increasing number of them were in receipt of an education and an increasing number of them were wage earners. The number of female teachers was increasing rapidly and every year a large number of girls were opting for training as teachers.8 Other women had demonstrated their abilities by qualifying as state registered nurses after formal training in Malta and the U.K. A tiny number of women had also secured a toehold in the island’s civil service.9 These observations are of some importance as it was customary to argue in those days that participation in politics, even as mere voters, required a certain standard of education and, at least, some degree of financial independence. Indeed, the lack of similar qualifications had seemed justification enough to exclude from the franchise a vast proportion of the male population too and to concede a plurality of votes to a minority of educated and/or propertied males.

The issue of granting the vote to Maltese women was first raised by Manwel Dimech in his newspaper ‘Il-Bandiera tal-Maltin’10 but the subject was not formally broached until 1921. In January of that year Eva Hubback, Secretary of the British civil rights movement the National Union of Societies for Equal (NUSEC), wrote to Viscount Milner at the Colonial Office to ask whether the British Government would be bringing the draft 1921 Constitution before Parliament for ratification. Her Society, she informed Milner, was `anxious to have an amendment moved to the effect that women also should be enfranchised.’11 She was informed, however, that the new Constitution will be created by Letters Patent and will not, therefore, come before Parliament. NUSEC’s, for their part, protested this exclusion of Maltese women from the franchise, especially ‘in view of the fact that Women Suffrage has now been granted in all the Dominions and that the Legislative Council in India have the right to grant the Franchise to Indian women’. It appeared to NUSEC to be ‘a most retrograde step that the women of Malta should not be enfranchised.’12

The Colonial Office placed the responsibility for this exclusion on Maltese politicians. Hubback was told that the new draft was based on ‘proposals submitted by the National Assembly and other local bodies and persons, in none of which was found any proposal to grant votes to women.’13 Nonetheless, the Maltese legislature was to have full power to decide such issues and would doubtlessly do so when `local future opinion declares itself in favour of the change.’ The issue was raised again in 1924 when a draft Bill purporting to extend the vote to women was presented to the Maltese Legislative Assembly. But the Bill never progressed beyond the First Reading.14

87 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta

In 1931, however, an extraordinary event happened when Maltese women spoke up publicly for themselves on the matter for the first time. A petition, demanding the vote for women and signed by over 400 of them, was presented to members of a Royal Commission that had been sent out to Malta to investigate the existing political crisis and to advise H.M.’s Government on its resolution.15 The case for the petitioners was presented by Miss Mabel Strickland who, despite her exclusion from the franchise, was one of Malta’s leading political activists. She was at the time Assistant Secretary of the Constitutional Party, journalist and a frequent intermediary in the conflicts between State and Church on the issue of language. However, according to Harrison Smith, ‘the Royal Commissioners took little note of Miss Mabel’s testimony.’16 Arguing that women suffrage `did not appear to have support from any political party,’17 the Commissioners concluded that given the political crisis in Malta, it was not opportune to admit women to the franchise. They also rejected the suggestion that two women, with the right property qualifications, ought to be nominated to sit in the Senate. The Commissioners noted that they were not aware of any other colony in which women had been granted access to an upper Legislative Chamber before being allowed to canvass for the lower.

And there, for the time being, the matter rested. In the 1930s women were still not seen as significant contributors to the economy. The Report of the Department of Education for 1937-8 states that `with the exception of such as join the Education Department, the girls in Malta do not aim at any employment and their centre of interest is their home. The necessity of the study of Domestic subjects is, consequently, obvious.’18 Several women were employed in cottage industries while a smaller number were employed in one or two factories, such as the button factory situated in Gzira. In most cases women were expected to leave their employment on marriage and required to do so in the case of public servants. However, few women were in paid full-time employment. This was borne out by information given by the Lieutenant Governor in reply to a question from Enrico Mizzi. Mizzi had asked how many women were employed by the Government in both the industrial and the general service grades and whether their conditions of employment were equal or inferior to those of other male employees in similar categories?19 It emerged from the reply that only eight women were employed in the civil service while another 292 were employed in departmental grades. The latter included 276 employees of the Medical and Health Department but excluded teachers. None of these women employees enjoyed equivalent conditions with those of men. As one female campaigner for women rights noted, `it was an exception for women to earn their own living in Malta.’20 The years leading to the war, and the war itself, were to have some impact on this state of affairs.

Britain had acquired Malta because of its magnificent natural harbours and its strategic location at the very heart of the Mediterranean and had transformed it into a veritable fortress. Events in the 1930s pointed to the likelihood of a major war and a war that would not spare Malta, as other wars in the past had done. The lessons learned from the Great War of 1914-18 and the Spanish Civil War left no doubt that when war came women, and not just men, would have to play a prominent role in the defence of their country. ‘Gone are the days’, wrote the Times of Malta, ‘when the men marched forth to battle while the womenfolk stayed at home and prayed. Their prayers are still needed – more perhaps, than ever before – but their active cooperation must also be forthcoming in the defence of

88 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration themselves and their families.’21 The newspaper admitted that, in Malta, women had not achieved the same degree of emancipation as women in other countries but felt sure that the response of Maltese women ‘will be immediate and wholehearted.’

The call for women to prepare themselves for the coming war was not long in forthcoming. By late 1938, a campaign to encourage women to enlist as Air Raid Precaution wardens was underway. It was hoped that each parish would have an ARP committee with at least one female member.22 To press home the need for female wardens it was strongly suggested that unless women joined up there was every likelihood that female casualties would have to be assisted by men. A number of women did join while several young unmarried women enlisted as female constables.23 In 1939 a Women’s Auxiliary Reserve was launched to help co-ordinate all voluntary war work being done by women in Malta.24 Given the closeted life that many women had lived until then, many of the young unmarried women who applied to join as female constables gave their status as `housewives.’ Some difficulties did present themselves. For example, the officer in charge of the ARP Department was constrained to emphasize publicly the Department’s view that `no woman [warden] would be asked to leave her home during an air-raid.’25 But the struggle for survival inflicted by the siege gradually swept away such sensibilities and many taboos. As more males were drafted into the armed forces more women were called upon to take their place and to fill many occupations, such as those of agricultural labourers, Victory Kitchen managers and supervisors, telephone operators, political censors and clerkships in the naval dockyards and military services.26 At one stage the authorities were pressed to consider the employment of females as bus conductors.27 It was felt, however, that not enough ‘women of the right type’ would be found, although they did not elaborate on this point.

The part played by Maltese women during the war received international recognition on the occasion of International Women’s Day and was to be the pivot on which the political emancipation of Maltese women would revolve over the next few years. That some among them were determined to achieve this goal was already evident in 1943. In that year, Lady MacRobert, President of the International Women’s Day Committee, had asked the Governor to procure from local women’s organisations a message to be read during a demonstration to be held in London on the occasion of International Women’s Day.28 The message was penned by the Lieutenant Governor’s Office and stated that the ‘Women of Malta’, while wishing every success to the demonstration, ‘affirmed their strong determination to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Men of Malta in the defence of this vital outpost of British Empire against the enemies of freedom.’29 It appears, however, that Maltese women organisations took some exception to the address being penned on their behalf by the LG Office and on the 7th March a deputation of women presented the Governor with its own message to be transmitted to London. In their message the signatories made no reference to men but stated that when `victory dawns, then only shall we know that our women’s liberty and ideals are safe….’30

One of the leading lights of this new movement was Josephine Burns Debono, one of the founding members of the General Workers Union.31 She was also one of the founders of the Women of Malta Movement, the Maltese suffragette movement, which had as

89 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta its principal aim the `object of securing equal political rights with men.’32 Untiringly, she campaigned for the extension of the franchise to include women. Writing in the Times of Malta, in January 1944, she outlined the case for the grant of the vote to women and their right to stand for election. `To the unbiased eye of the traveler’, she wrote, `the women of Malta are by no means behind their men either in ability or in education.’33 If they lacked administrative experience, she wrote, the fault lay with the historical environment in which they were forced to conduct their lives. The war years, however, had changed all that for women were now successfully employed in every department and earning their own living. If traditional patterns no longer held, the blame should not be attributed to women, but to that same tradition which had failed the test of the many social revolutions brought about by the war. Today, the yardstick for measuring a ‘country’s social status is the position which it accords to women.’ Furthermore, she went on, the devastation of the war had given rise to a large number of social problems, such as housing, education, public charities, all issues where feminine common sense, practical vision, insight and experience `could be well utilised to the public benefit.’ Women’s understanding of such matters was equal if not superior to that of men. She reminded readers that `if the home is the essential unit of Christian society’ and Malta was content to leave its homes in their hands, it could not now refuse them `a share in the shaping of social structures of wider participation.’ Burns Debono concluded, in a tone worthy of latter day feminists, that `Malta… can longer afford to regard its women as either beasts of burden, mere reproductive machines, dolls, slaves… or any of the other “lesser breeds”.’

Even so she did not call for an outright concession of the vote to all women. Perhaps conscious of the opposition that would be encountered from traditional quarters she demanded the extension of the franchise to married women who were 21 years of age or over and who were capable of reading and writing, and to similar unmarried women who `support themselves by their own work.’ She also defended the right of both categories of women to stand for election. Finally, she proposed that women should be allowed to send their representatives, in the same way and on equal terms with men, to the National Assembly which was then meeting to draft a new constitution.

Other female correspondents, however, thought differently and in letters to the newspapers opposed the idea that the vote should be restricted to a section of the adult female population and demanded the vote on behalf of all women. Daisy Agius, for example, took George Borg, the Chief Justice, to task for daring to suggest in a public lecture that the vote should only be given to women who were either literate or were landowners in their own right. Writing in the Times of Malta she pressed home the point, quite rightly, that many of the men who were about to be enfranchised under the new Constitution ‘were exactly in the same position as women in terms of practical training.’34 As a consequence of these differences, when the Women of Malta Movement was launched in February 1944, its demand was for equal rights with men, a demand which the movement claimed was `based on Justice’ and Constitutional practice within the British Empire.35

Quite understandably, strong support for the movement came from Mabel Strickland, owner and editor of the Times of Malta. As the daughter of Sir Gerald Strickland she had undergone a long apprenticeship in political affairs but who, nonetheless, could not vote nor

90 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration stand for election as a consequence of her sex. After reiterating many of the Movement’s views on the contribution that women could make to politics, especially over social issues, she went on to defend the views being expounded by the suffragette movement. ‘Women’s suffrage,’ she wrote, ‘should have the sympathy of all intelligent citizens’36 and on the strength of their contribution during the war ‘the grant of enfranchisement should be a corner stone in the return of Malta’s autonomy.’ She concluded by having a swipe at those men who were deriding the ability of women to deal with political matters in a serious, matter of fact way: ‘….a Constitution embodying women’s franchise,’ she wrote, `would stand a greater chance of survival and of benefiting the community than its predecessors.’ This was a jibe at the failure of a male dominated political system whose tendency to grind to a standstill or to create irreconcilable divisions had led first to a suspension of the 1921 Constitution and later to its withdrawal.

After protracted debate the male dominated National Assembly admitted Burns Debono and Helene Buhagiar to its meetings as delegates of the Women of Malta movement.37 The Malta Labour Party in its 1944 electoral manifesto had already affirmed its commitment to press for voting rights for women, a position shared by the General Workers’ Union.38 But the matter was far from resolved and the debate as to whether women should have the vote or not dragged on until November 1945. Nonetheless, even after the motion had been carried in the National Assembly, opponents of the measure continued with their relentless opposition to it. The Nationalist Party (PN) continued to insist that there was not a clear majority in its favour in the country at large or that it was not clear whether the majority of Maltese women wanted the vote as this was bound to impose on them burdens that they could not carry. In a last ditch attempt to defeat the measure the party proposed a referendum on the issue.39 The PN were supported by the clergy who feared that the enfranchisement of women would lead to wives asserting their independence from their husbands. The Church believed that the new measure would lead to divisions within the family and its eventual break-up. If the family unit was to remain secure it could only have one head and that had to be the man.40 The issue was finally settled by the British Government which decided to include women suffrage in the new Constitution, promulgated in 1947.

Electoral Participation

In 1947, under the new MacMichael Constitution, women were, for the first time, given the opportunity of participating in politics openly and in their own right. Contrary to what opponents of the measure had been predicting there was not a flood of women candidates, a fact which to some extent remains true today, although their numbers have increased significantly in recent years, especially with the introduction of Local Councils in 1993. But, in the 1947 General Elections, and in many subsequent elections, the number of women voters who actually voted exceeded that of men.41 On polling day in 1947 The Times of Malta reported that in some electoral districts long queues of women had gathered outside the polling booths well before they were due to open and that ‘the response of the women voters to the call to register their vote’ had been a strong one.42 The overall percentage of women candidates at general elections since 1947, when compared to that

91 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta of males, is roughly about or a little below 5%. Why it has been so low will be considered at a later stage.

What concerns us here are the facts and these show that until the 1996 General Elections no clear pattern had emerged in respect of women candidacies. There isno consistent rising curve but at best a curve that rises and falls, sometimes quite sharply. The facts also show that even when the number of women candidates rose significantly from one general election to another, the number of women who gained a seat in Parliament remained consistently low, if stable. A breakthrough of sorts occurred in 1996 when the number of women MPs rose to four and Parliament had its first woman Speaker. The 1998 General Elections have somewhat confirmed this trend with six women candidates gaining a Parliamentary seat.

There are a number of reasons why this has happened. Lane argues that, once nominated, female candidates had as much chance of being elected as male candidates.43 The problem for women was that of making it to the nomination stage. In 1947 two women contested the elections and one of them was elected. In 1950, nine women contested and three were elected. These were times when the active participation of women in politics was still frowned upon by many. Yet these figures suggest that women had, proportionately, an equal chance of being elected to Parliament as men. One may argue that today, with changing attitudes, greater support from political parties and more stress on the need for institutions that are more representative of all groups of society, the chances of success at the polls for women candidates are even better. Hence, one reason why to date we have had so few women representatives in Parliament stems from the fact that, until recently, we have had so very few women candidates ready or in a position to contest elections. For it has also to be remembered that elections cost money and the vast majority of women did not possess independent resources which could be used for such purposes.

It must be said, however, that even in those years when the number of women candidates at general elections was low, a large number of women did constitute a significant proportion of party activists. However, their role was generally that of ‘helpers’ than of equal participants in the setting of political agendas. Only a tiny minorityof women held positions of some importance. Women cleaned the party clubs and tended to other minor chores, although it has to be said that they did this quite willingly. Parties also depended, as they still often do today, on grassroots female activists to spread their message at street level: at the grocery shop, the market and the public garden. In parties that were traditionally more sympathetic towards women rights and had stronger democratic structures, as was the case with the Labour Party, there was nothing to prevent a determined woman from getting to the top. One such woman, Marie Louise Coliero, now sitting MP for the MLP, was elected MLP General Secretary in the 1980s.44 A more positive attitude towards women within political parties began to manifest itself with the creation of Women Sections. These sections helped to expand women participation at the General Conference, Executive and local committee levels. They also gave section leaders a guaranteed place on the national executives of political parties strengthening their representation and giving them a stronger, though still rather marginal, voice in the

92 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration running of political parties and the setting of their agendas. Women sections also provided some support for women candidates and offered a gateway for potential candidates. It is worth noting that these sections are often presided by women MP’s or women candidates of long-standing and help to provide them with some sort of constituency within their party. The above observations provide only a partial explanation. In 1962 the number of women candidacies had reached a high of thirteen but nonetheless only two women candidates managed to gain a seat in Parliament. The truth is that the 1962 General Elections represented an unusual moment in Maltese politics. In the first instance, the crisis in State – Church relations and the issue of independence had brought about important splits within the larger parties.45 Secondly, these same issues and splits had attracted a record number of candidates for elections - 302, a figure that has never been matched since. In 1987 twelve women candidates contested the general elections but once again only two women candidates managed to gain a seat in Parliament.46 But the 1987 elections may also be considered as exceptional given the Constitutional crisis which prevailed at the time and the extremely violent acts committed by the supporters of the two main political parties. Once again the number of candidates – male and female – contesting the elections was well above the normal. Hence, one may tentatively conclude that during times of grave and violent crises women candidates may find it more difficult to attract a substantial amount of votes.

One, perhaps, needs to look elsewhere for more meaningful explanations. It is a fact, for example, that until recently, educational opportunities for women had lagged seriously behind those for men. For a long time women were not conceived of as breadwinners. Consequently, parents, and governments, tended to invest more energy and resources in the education of males than in that for females. Hence, only a handful of women saw themselves as potential civic leaders and many of those that did, tended to exercise this leadership potential through organisations that had a “social” rather than a “political” mission.47

The burdens of caring for the family, at times of an extended type, imposed on women by society also tended to make it humanly impossible for them to pursue political or, indeed, other careers. However, as more women were attracted into the labour market and higher education, the pressure to give women an equal and meaningful say in societal decision-making processes grew also more strident. In the 1970s, for example, the first steps towards greater parity in wages between men and women were taken. In the early 1980s women employed in the public service were freed from the requirement to resign their posts on marriage. Towards the latter part of the decade women were granted a legal entitlement for maternity leave while in the early 1990s protection against discrimination on the grounds of sex was implanted in the Maltese Constitution.

That women were more determined to play a role in the politics of the island was demonstrated in the way women responded to the call to participate in Local Council elections in 1993. In the first elections held in 1993 one hundred and forty-seven women contested the elections.48 Of these, 55, or nearly one-third, were elected. It is also

93 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta interesting to note that the number of women candidates at local level has continued to increase with every election and consequently the number of serving women councillors. For many women political involvement at local level seems to fit more easily with their other more arduous responsibilities as housewives, mothers and, not infrequently, important contributors to the families’ income.49 Furthermore, for some women ( and men too), participation in local councils is seen as a good launching pad for election to Parliament. This is also demonstrated by the number of women councillors who have contested the general elections, some successfully, after a spell as councillors.

The two main political parties have embarked on a deliberate policy to attract more women candidates at both the local and the national level. Both parties agree that this is important for the future development of politics in Malta although they disagree as to the best way of achieving this.50 The media too has in recent years given greater attention to the issue of female representation and has helped encourage greater participation by women. It is certain that under existing conditions present, developments will not be easily reversed.

Women Politicians

Given the overall scarcity of women candidates at general elections, it ought to come as no surprise that the number of women that have left a lasting imprint on Maltese politics has been correspondingly very small. Since 1947, only fifteen women have served in Parliament. Of these, nine have represented the Malta Labour Party, four the Nationalist Party and two the Constitutional Party, which is now defunct. For the record these were: (MLP), Cecilia de Trafford Strickland (CP), Mabel Strickland (CP and later PCP), Fanny Attard Bezzina (MLP), Evelyn Bonaci (MLP), C Darmenia Brincat (MLP), Anne Agius-Ferrante (PN), Giovanna Debono (PN), Carmen Sant (MLP), Helena Dalli (MLP), Maria Camilleri (MLP), Dolores Christina (PN), Marie Louise Coliero (MLP), Helen D’Amato (PN) and Rita Law (MLP). Miriam Spiteri Debono (MLP) served as Speaker of the House of Representatives between 1996 and 1998. Of these women MPs two, Giovanna Debono and Helena Dalli have served as Parliamentary Secretaries51 while the former, with Agatha Barbara, are the only two women MPs to hold or have held Ministerial office.52 Of the fifteen, so far, only Mabel Strickland and Agatha Barbara have left an indelible imprint on Maltese politics.

“Miss Mabel”, as she was popularly known, was born in Attard in January 1899. The daughter of Lord Gerald Strickland she quickly found herself immersed in politics from a very young age. At the age of twenty-one she was both her father’s secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Constitutional Party, led by her father.53 As her father’s personal confidante she was entrusted with delicate negotiations in Malta, London, and the Vatican. They were difficult times with the Constitutional Party in conflict with the Church at the same time that the language question was taking on a new twist because of Mussolini’s irredentist and expansionist policies.54 According to Harrison Smith, during this period, when Mabel’s father was Head of the Maltese Ministry (1927-1930), ‘Mabel became more important on the Maltese political stage as she became her father’s constant companion at the Auberge

94 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration d’Aragon’, assuming a role which ‘he had once thought only a son could play.’55 When he was unwell and could not attend to the duties of his office Mabel held the fort, answering some of his correspondence under his direction. During his absences abroad she held unofficial talks with many of the main protagonists in the crisis on his behalf and later undertook trips to London and Rome as his envoy.56 Given the views of the time regarding the role of women in politics, the part played Mabel Strickland was extraordinary, to say the least.

In 1935, with her father, Miss Strickland founded the English language daily the Times of Malta and its once weekly sister The Sunday Times of Malta.57 She later launched “Il-Berqa”, a Maltese language daily. Editorship of, and managerial control over, these newspapers gave Miss Strickland enormous influence both within the Constitutional Party and the country as a whole. During World War Two “The Times” played a vital role helping to keep up the morale of the population while Strickland herself held office in a number of committees, mainly at local level.58 Despite the constant dangers – the Times building was hit several times – and the shortages, her newspapers never missed an issue. She was determined that Malta should resist to the bitter end and refused to countenance any talk of surrender even from the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Dobie.59 In 1944, in appreciation of her contribution to the war effort Strickland was awarded an OBE.60

With the war over Strickland turned her full attention to local politics and this with the zeal so characteristic of her family. She did not hesitate to employ her media power against either her opponents or her colleagues. In 1945, totally opposed as she was to fresh elections being called by the Governor, she defeated the understandings arrived at between Roger Strickland, leader of the Constitutional Party, and the Governor over the issue.61 In 1952 she broke completely with the Constitutional Party, of which she was Vice-Chairman and sitting MP in Parliament, opting to ignore party policy and support the minority Borg Olivier government.62 Her former colleagues retaliated by having her unseated from Parliament pointing to a contract which the Progress Press, of which she was both owner and managing director, had obtained from the government.63 Undaunted, by October 1953 Mabel Strickland had announced the formation of a new political party, the Progressive Constitutional Party.64 Nevertheless, it was not until 1962 that Miss Strickland succeeded in regaining her seat in Parliament.

During her political career Miss Strickland attended two Malta Round Table Conferences in London. The first, in 1955, concerned the Maltese government proposal for integration with Britain. The second, in 1963, was called to discuss the issue of a draft Independence Constitution for Malta. In these and other occasions, Mabel Strickland was driven by her consuming desire to ensure enduring links between Malta and Britain. She could not see this connection being cut or weakened in any way and this explains her statement at the 1963 Malta Independence Conference in London when she declared that her party was “not grateful for the suggestion that the Union Jack should cease to fly in Malta… .”65 Unfortunately, for her and her small party, times had changed and at its lasting showing at the polls in 1971 the Progressive Constitutional Party was crushed. Strickland

95 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta had failed to see that the issues to which she had dedicated all her political life were issues of the past and that the political ground had shifted enormously since those years. But in The Times and The Sunday Times Mabel Strickland has left an enduring reminder of an unstinted contribution towards political development in Malta.

Agatha Barbara’s family background contrasts sharply with that of Mabel Strickland. Born into a lower working-class family, Barbara drifted into politics without that sense of destiny that seemed to pervade the Strickland dynasty. Nonetheless, her contribution to Maltese politics was to be equally substantial. Born in Zabbar in 1923, as for so many other young women of her time, it was the war that provided Barbara with her first opportunity for involvement in Maltese affairs when as a sixteen year old she served with the Air Raid Precautions service and the British services.66 After the war she embarked on a teaching career at a time when illiteracy was extraordinarily high and the issue of compulsory schooling was being extensively debated. It was also a time when class, rather than language, was to become the principal rallying point for Maltese political parties. One reason for this was the impact of the war which had made thousands homeless, inflated prices and had given rise to greater social expectations. The experiences of the war had imbued the Maltese with a greater sense of urgency of the need for socio-economic development and the view that this was only possible under self-government. The war had, to some extent, exposed the fragility and superficiality of existing class relations and brought about greater demands for equality of treatment and rights.

Miss Barbara was not immune either to such developments or to the social and political disabilities under which her class, and more particularly, her gender had to labour. By 1947 she was, therefore, already occupying the post of Assistant Secretary of the Zabbar Labour Party Committee and contributing articles to newspapers.67 Not surprisingly her high profile soon attracted a reaction from those who either opposed the ingress of women into politics or from those antagonistic to her politics and was subsequently dismissed from her teaching job.68

As the 1947 General Elections approached Barbara came under increasing pressure from her colleagues in the Malta Labour Party to contest the elections as an MLP candidate for the Second District. She accepted and was elected on the first count, becoming the first women Member of Parliament in Malta’s history. At the first sitting of Parliament, on the 10th November 1947, when Miss Barbara’s name was called, her colleagues in the Labour Party gave her a round of applause.69 But by 1949 deep and irreconcilable splits over policy and personalities had brought about the resignation of the first Labour Administration.70 In the next five years one general election followed closely on to another but despite the divisions and the difficulties Agatha Barbara managed to hold her seat in Parliament.

In 1955 the Malta Labour Party, now under leadership of Dom Mintoff, was re-elected to office and Miss Barbara was to embark on her first ministerial experience. In this election Barbara had obtained the second highest number of first count votes, the highest being those obtained by Mintoff.71 She was given the Education portfolio and was responsible for the implementation of an ambitious programme of school building, illiteracy eradication

96 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration and child welfare schemes, some of the latter in collaboration with the Ministries of Health and Social Welfare. It is worth noting that when Barbara took office thousands of children attended school on a sort of shift-basis while thousands others did not attend at all.72 Yet, in the space of three years, these problems had been overcome.

But the collapse of the Integration with Britain proposal and British privatisation of the Naval Dockyard eventually led to serious disorders in the country and the resignation of Labour’s second administration. The events of 1958 remain significant because they were to result in the first clear-cut call for independence to emanate from Maltese political parties. Barbara, like several others in her party, was to experience the full weight of imperial authority when she was sentenced to 43 days in prison with hard labour for allegedly picketing during the General Strike of 1958.73

For the next thirteen years Agatha Barbara was to conduct her politics from the benches of the Opposition. They were difficult times as the Church and the Malta Labour Party had became locked in a bitter struggle for supremacy, a situation which mirrored closely that which Mabel Strickland’s father had had to face in the 1920s. But in 1971 the Malta Labour Party was returned to power and Agatha Barbara to ministerial office as Minister of Education. Although at the time some of her reforms were hotly contested time has allowed for a more sober assessment and as Sultana has pointed out her policies, especially where girls were concerned, were both progressive and educationally sound, based on values that were popular in the West.74

But in 1974, following a Cabinet re-shuffle, Barbara was put in charge of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. She was disappointed with this change and at first felt no inclination to enter into her duties.75 The Prime Minister, however, a strong admirer of her drive and capabilities, soon convinced her otherwise. In her new ministerial post Miss Barbara was to be entrusted with responsibility for an expansion of the welfare system and a reform of existing labour legislation. It was, in fact, during her time as Minister of Labour and Social Services that the concept of an equal wage for men and women became first established and the 40 hour week introduced. It was also during her tenure of office that the law relating to Industrial Relations was reformed. Over the next few years Barbara also piloted through Parliament an impressive array of social legislation that including that of a two-thirds pensions, pregnancy leave for mothers, improvements in children and maternity benefits and the adoption of regulations which gave women public officers the right to retain their employment on marriage. Until that time women public officers had to resign their posts on marriage.

In the period 1971-81 Barbara, like Strickland before her, shared in a number of historic occasions for Malta. These included the transition from a monarchical to a republican form of government (1974) and the closing down of the British military bases in Malta (1979). Subsequently, her portrait was to feature on the 10 Maltese Liri note. Following the 1981 General Elections Agatha Barbara was appointed President of the Republic, the first and, so far, the only Maltese woman to hold this office. It was not an easy role as the islands were once again gripped in a severe Constitutional crisis. But, unknown to many, Barbara quietly and unobtrusively played an important part in the resolution of this crisis.76 Her

97 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta readiness to act as an intermediary in an effort to keep the two political parties talking and searching for a solution is today acknowledged by those who had been involved. Judging by what Edgar Mizzi has written Barbara was involved right up to the final moment when the deadlock was finally broken and the path to agreement opened up.77

The Politics of Gender

The decision to give women the vote did in some ways help to re-define the political landscape in Malta but the process of that re-defining has been very slow. In 1947, even those parties which had opposed woman suffrage, now canvassed desperately for their votes. Even the Church, a bitter opponent of the measure now called on women to do their moral duty and vote.78 It was now necessary for political parties, whatever their opinion on the subject before 1947, to give some consideration to what they perceived to be the needs and aspirations of women. But at the time, and for long periods after, women were seen as somehow forming one collectivity, one undifferentiated social class. As all workers, especially manual workers, were seen as constituting the working class and thereby sharing in the same needs and rights, so all women were generally classed as actual or potential mothers and housewives. They had a perceived role to play and in the view of most politicians their happiness and well being depended on their ability and the capacity of the state to help them carry out that role satisfactorily. Some important changes have taken place over the past two decades in the way gender issues are perceived but their impact will be felt in the next ten to fifteen years when a new generation of women will have grown into adulthood shaped by these changes. Otherwise, progress has been slow.

To understand why this has been so one would need to briefly examine the political environment, (which also includes the social and economic), in which gender issues are debated and policies formulated. In the first instance, between 1947 and the early 1970s, the economic condition of Malta was such as to deter bold measures in the sphere of gender rights. What men and women wanted, were policies that would create employment while keeping inflation down. For a large part of this period, given the place and role assigned to women at the time, long-term full-time paid employment was held to be the domain of males, especially husbands and would be husbands. The welfare of the family, given the absence of adequate welfare provision by the state, depended almost entirely on the ability, or otherwise, of the husband to provide for it. As the focus of this responsibility and the one who every day went out to face up to his responsibilities, it was seen as natural that the man should also hold the position of head of the family. Other members of a family were mere extensions of the husband. This to some extent was the position of those who had opposed women suffrage and although their opposition was ultimately rejected it would be wrong to infer that social attitudes in Malta had undergone overwhelming change. The latter is borne out, to some extent, by the fact that the requirement that women should resign their employment on marriage was not strongly contested until the 1970s.

A married woman’s domain was principally, and unless circumstances so dictated, within the home where the wife was responsible for the proper administration of the

98 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration family’s income and territory.79 Hence, for a long period of time, when addressing gender issues political parties tended to focus on such issues as control of consumer prices, housing, defence of public morality, a sine qua non condition for the preservation of the family unit, and improvements to existing services for mothers and children.80 Even in the 1960s, when the battle for the female vote was at its fiercest because of the conflict between the Church and the Malta Labour Party, these were principally the weapons employed by the parties. What was perhaps different was the emphasis placed by individual parties on one or more of these issues. For example, on the one hand, the Nationalist Party and its partners in the Church sponsored “Giunta”, tended to portray themselves as the defenders of the traditional values of the Maltese family. The Malta Labour Party, on the other hand, for its part tended to argue that, without economic development, the very survival of the Maltese family was at stake and that only the MLP had the capacity to give the island that development. However, it was a question of emphasis rather than a departure on past approaches.

But an indication that changes in Maltese society were beginning to take place was already evident by the late 1960s and early 1970s as the number of women in employment, though still relatively small, began to grow. Tourism, light manufacturing, banking and the public service were by this time employing ever larger numbers of women, not least because of legal provisions which made it possible for these industries to pay them lower wages.81 Indeed, in the existing wage-structure women were placed immediately above minors and below, sometimes significantly below, men. As more women became wage- earners they became more politicised and their numbers helped to swell the ranks of the trade unions, until then almost exclusively male organisations. The unfairness of their unequal position at home, where the husband was the recognised head, and at work, and growing international awareness about the deplorable state of women rights throughout the world, soon began to filter through to Maltese women. Evidence of this isthe Memorandum presented to both parties by the National Council of Women of Malta a few weeks before the 1971 General Elections.82 In this memorandum the Council deplored the ‘archaic legal status of women in Malta in connection with the parental rights of mothers which are almost non-existent and totally incompatible with the needs of today and the principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights……’ The Council also reminded the Government that in 1969 it had expressed ‘deep concern’ at the fact that although ‘the International Year for Human Rights had come and gone, the discrimination against Maltese women in matters concerned with family law and property rights were still the same.’ It also noted that despite the interest aroused in the House of Representatives by the 1965 I.L.O. recommendations regarding the employment of women with family responsibilities, nothing had been done to give women their ‘fundamental right of work and for freedom of choice of employment.’ Furthermore, it deplored not only the lack of social amenities available to women workers but also the behaviour of government aided industries which were ‘providing jobs mostly for women, taking financial advantage on their comparative cheap labour, thereby exploiting them to the detriment of the Maltese family and national interest.’ The only just course for government was to implement the I.L.O. convention that called ‘for “equal pay for men and women workers for work of equal value” also in the private sector of industry.’ Finally, the Council deplored the fact that,

99 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta despite calls from politicians for women to take a more active interest in the government of the island, Maltese women were ‘almost entirely excluded from Government Boards’, even from those ‘where a woman’s influence and advice are manifestly called for.’

As we saw earlier, it took successive Maltese administrations over twenty years to concede many of the demands included this Memorandum. One reason for this emanates from the fact that women in Malta have not as yet asserted themselves enough on the political stage. Despite their expanded representation in Parliament and at Local Councils level the agenda on gender issues is still not women driven. Political parties have so far managed, without much impact from their women’s sections, to dictate the pace of reform even over life and death issues. Let us take once again the National Council of Women 1971 Memorandum. One of the items on that Memorandum spoke about the increase in cancer deaths among women and strongly urged the government to establish, as soon as possible, a cancer screening unit for women within the health service. Nearly thirty years later, and a spiraling increase in the mortality rate of Maltese women from breast and ovarian cancer, the proposal is still under consideration. Yet, there has been no outcry from women and women organisations, no threat of an electoral boycott or of protest voting. If anything, in the Local Council elections of March 2000, which to a large degree were fought on national rather than local issues, gender issues of this sort were hardly broached and no protest uttered.

The reason why parties have been able to dictate the pace of reform stems partly from the extreme state of political polarisation that pervades, and has always pervaded, Maltese politics. 97 per cent of the Maltese electorate casts its vote in the General Elections and this is done to express a preference for a political party. Few votes are ever spoilt and there is hardly any voting across parties. Furthermore, given that there is no legal obligation to vote, voting is a deliberate and calculated act. How politically polarised Maltese society is, has been demonstrated by Tabone in his study of the Maltese family where he demonstrated that 30% of Maltese families are ready to support their preferred party even when their policies go against their personal interests and opinions.83 It may be said that in such circumstances life outside political parties is hardly possible and many women organisations have found it extremely difficult to organise across party lines with the result that individual women organisations have often been accused of supporting one party or another. Consequently, women interests have suffered because of a lack of unity over issues that ought to cut across party lines.

Finally, one needs to consider the impact of cultural factors. Despite the important changes that have taken place within the last decade it has to be said that the prevailing culture still seems to imply that above all else the place of a woman is ultimately in the home. It is there that a woman can best fulfil her role. This is evidenced by the fact that the language employed by the media and by women candidates to justify their candidacy has changed very little over the years. Existing evidence shows that the prevailing culture demands that women candidates should restrict themselves to women issues or to social issues, which are somehow seen as related to the family.84 In a series of interviews with women candidates contesting the 1996 General Elections, in the case of candidates that

100 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration were married, particular emphasis was placed on the fact that each candidate was also the mother of x number of children.85 This rarely happens when male candidates are being interviewed. Fatherhood, on the one hand, does not have any political relevance for a candidate nor does it bring with it some relevant experiences to politics. Motherhood, on the other hand, denotes a caring nature and a grasp of family matters, two qualities that it seems only women are thought capable of representing on the political stage. Of the six women MPs currently serving in Parliament, only one is single.

This view is, quite frequently, reinforced by the candidates themselves. Their writings and statements generally tend to focus on family and social matters, mainly relating to social policy.86 The impression which these women candidates wish to convey is that because they are women and mothers, and therefore by nature more caring, their presence in Parliament will bring to politics more moderation and tolerance. The fact of the matter is that there is not enough evidence to support such claims. History has shown that women who have occupied positions of great political power have been quite prepared to lead their countries into war, curtail welfare services and refuse to commute death sentences passed by the courts or military tribunals.87 Existing evidence also suggests that male MPs are more likely to rebel and vote against the measures of their party than women MPs. A similar view to this was expressed by an irate female writer in an article to The Times entitled ‘What’s sex got to do with it?’ in which she challenged these claims and opposed the use of gender, by women, as an electoral marketing ploy.88

On the basis of the above evidence it would seem that, as yet, the space allowed for women in Maltese politics remains restricted. Women candidates, it seems, have a role in Maltese politics only if they represent or are prepared to speak about women issues, irrespective of their qualifications. Hence economic or international affairs, just to mention two other important political spheres, are domains over which Maltese women politicians are not expected to have strong views unless, of course, they somehow touch on, or have relation to, “women” affairs. That is the picture that presents itself today. However, the above evidence does suggest that women are themselves partly to blame for this. They have sought to work within the perceived culture rather than risk failure. Nonetheless, there is another body of evidence that shows that this state of affairs will not last indefinitely. For example, the number of women who have specialised in economics and international affairs, to retain our example, has now increased tremendously and it will only be a matter of time before some of them will seek election on the basis of their specialisation rather than their gender. Indeed, some of them are already holding, or have held, important positions in Maltese embassies abroad or the chairmanship of strategic business corporations, mostly in the parastatal sector of the economy.

Conclusion

Women were given the vote less than fifty years ago. Culture, lack of training and resources, and a political environment which was certainly not very women friendly, has made it difficult for women to make their mark on Maltese politics. Nonetheless, contrary to belief, once nominated women had as good a chance of being elected as men. Today, as political

101 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta parties remodel their party structures to make them more women friendly, women candidates are coming forward to contest elections in greater numbers. This has been unequivocally demonstrated in Local Council elections which have given many women activists the chance to run for office and to gain valuable political experience. Some of them have also occupied the office mayor or deputy mayor. All this makes one believe that politics in Malta will, in the not distant future, become much more representative than it is today.

Notes and References

1. The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Women at the Top, (1990), The Hansard society, London, U.K., p.15. 2. Ibid., p.29 3. Ibid., p.16 4. J. Burke, (1981), History of England, W. Collins, London, U.K., p.307. 5. ‘Equal Status of Women’, (1996), Annual Report, Department Equal Status of Women, Malta, p.56. 6. These are Agatha Barbara who in addition to holding a variety of Ministerial portfolios was also President of the Republic of Malta, and Giovanna Debono, who is currently Minister for Gozo. 7. The Malta Constitution of 1921. 8. ‘Report of the Department of Education’ (1937-8), in Reports on the Working of Government Departments during the Financial Year 1937-38, Malta, p.440, C.O.161/428, Public Record Office, (PRO), London, U.K. 9. See G. A. Pirotta, (1996), The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva Publications, Malta, Ch.12; see also LGO 1939/ 4360, National Archives, (NA), Rabat, Malta. 10. Dom De Giorgio, ‘A Survey of the Women’s Movement in Malta’ in The Dawn, 15 Jan. 1947. One of four articles on the issue of women suffrage. Notes that a number of women, including Mrs Levanzin, wife of the editor of “In-Nahla” were regular contributors of newspaper articles on the issue of women rights. 11. Hubback to Milner, 5 Apr. 1921, C.O.158/428, PRO, London. 12. Hubback to Churchill, 1 Feb 1921, C.O.158/428, PRO, London. 13. Churchill to Hubback, 17 Feb. 1921, C.O.158/428, PRO, London. 14. Dom De Giorgio, op. cit., 5 Mar 1947. 15. Malta Royal Commission 1931, Report, (1932), HMSO, London, p.90. 16. H. Smith and A. Koster, (1986), Lord Strickland. Servant of the Crown, Progress Press, Malta, Vol.II, p.506. 17. Malta Royal Commission, 1931, op. cit., p.90.

102 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

18. ‘Report of the Department of Education’ (1937-8), op. cit., C.O.161/124, PRO, London. 19. LGO 1939/ 4360, NA, Malta. 20. Josephine Burns, ‘Women’s Franchise’, letter in the Times of Malta, 25 Jan 1944. 21. Editorial, Times of Malta, 18 Jan. 1939. 22. LGO 1939/ 890, NA, Malta. 23. ARP Bundle 3.3, NA, Malta. 24. LGO 1939/3720, NA, Malta. 25. LGO 1939/829, NA, Malta. 26. LGO 1941/4023, LGO 1941/4222, LGO 1942/1854, and LGO 1942/3459, NA, Malta; see also ‘Calling the Fair Sex’, an advert which appeared in the Times of Malta, 20 Sept. 1938, inviting women to apply for clerkships at the Naval Dockyard. 27. LGO 1941/1270, NA, Malta. 28. LGO 1943/1039, NA, Malta. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. M. J. Schiavone and L. J. Scerri, (1997), Maltese Biographies of the Twentieth Century, Pubblikazzjonijiet Indipendenza, Malta, p.106. 32. Editorial, Times of Malta, 1 Feb. 1944. 33. Josephine Burns, ‘Women’s Franchise’, letter in the Times of Malta, 25 Jan 1944. 34. Daisy Agius, letter in Times of Malta, 27 Jan. 1944 35. ‘Women of Malta Association’,a report in the Times of Malta, 1 Feb. 1944. 36. Editorial, 1 Feb. 1944. 37. M. Vella, (1989), Lejn Gvern Laburista, Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti, Malta, pp.67-8. 38. Ibid., p.67. 39. Ibid., pp.68-9; see also J. M. Pirotta, (1987), Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945-1964, Studia Editions, Malta, Vol.I., pp.68-70. 40. The Catholic Action newspaper “Il-Lehen is-Sewa” conducted a four year long campaign against women suffrage and its position was being reiterated as late as 1947. See, for example, ‘Noti u Mummenti’, Lehen is-Sewwa, 25 Jan 1947. 41. M. J. Schiavone, (1987), L-Elezzjonijiet F’Malta 1848-1981, Pubblikazzjonijiet Bugelli, Malta, p.57. 42. Times of Malta, Report, 27 Oct. 1947. 43. J. C. Lane, in Democratization, Frank Cass, London, Vol.2, No.2, pp.140-157. 44. The first women to hold a top post in a political party was Mabel Strickland. In the 1930s she was Ass. Secretary of the Constitutional Party and in the 1940s held the post of Vice-Chairman. But by this time the party had become almost an all-family affair. In the fifties the Progressive Constitutional Party was her party, created by herself and sustained mainly by her efforts and her press. The Malta Labour Party was the first

103 Struggling for a Role: Women and Politics in Malta

political party to open sections exclusively for women and to give women delegates places on the Executive of the party. 45. For an extensive study of this period see J. M. Pirotta, op. cit., Vol.I & Vol II. 46. Giovanna Debono (PN) and Carmen Sant (MLP) made it to Parliament in 1987. 47. Dom De Giorgio, op. cit., makes a similar point about the period 1918-1947. 48. M. J. Schaivone, (1994), Il-Kunsilli Lokali 1993 – 1994. Storja-Fatti-Cifri, Pubblikazjonijiet Indipendenza, Malta, p.402. 49. ‘Spotlight on the women who count’, The Malta Independent, 22 Aug. 1998 & 29 Aug. 1998; ‘A Woman’s World’, Supplement, The Sunday Times, 3 Mar. 1996; interview with Marselle Delicata, the Times, 10 October 1996. 50. ‘Should a percentage of parliamentary seats be reserved for women?’ in The Political Agenda, The Times, 15 Apr. 1996. 51. Both Giovanna Debono (PN) and Helena Dalli (MLP) have served as Parliamentary Secretaries with responsibilities for family and/or gender affairs. 52. See Note 6 above. 53. Smith and Koster, (1986), op. cit., pp.384-5. 54. Ibid., pp.436-7, 507-510, and 512. 55. Ibid., p.425. 56. Ibid., pp.507-510. 57. Schiavone and Scerri, (1997), op.cit., p.528. 58. Ibid. 59. J Alexander, (1996), Mabel Strickland, Progress Press, Malta, p.121. 60. Schiavone and Scerri, (1997), op.cit., p.528. 61. Pirotta, (1987), op. cit., p.42. 62. Ibid., p.324. 63. Ibid., p.325. 64. Ibid., p.352. 65. Malta Independence Conference, 1963, HMSO, London, p.12. 66. E. Ebejer, (1999), Agatha Barbara, Unpublished Long Essay, Diploma in Social Studies, Dept. of Public Policy, University of Malta, Malta. 67. Ibid., p.16. 68. ‘The real issue – I’ve had the sack’, The Bulletin, 20 Aug. 1947. 69. ‘L-ewwel Laqgha’, Lehen is-Sewwa, 12 Nov. 1947. 70. See Pirotta, op.cit., Vol.I, Ch. 8. 71. Ebejer, op. cit, p.33. 72. E. Dobie, (1967), Malta’s Road to Independence, University of Oklahoma Press, U.S.A., p.163. 73. Schiavone and Scerri, (1997), op. cit., p.49.

104 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

74. Ebejer, op. cit., p.53. 75. Ibid., p.59. 76. Ibid., p.73 77. E. Mizzi, (1995), Malta in the Making 1962-1987. An Eyewitness Account, Beck Graphics, Malta, p.447. 78. ‘In-Nisa Wkoll Ghandhom Jivvutaw’ in Il-Lehen is-Sewwa, 11 Oct.1947. 79. P. Miceli, ‘The Visibility and Invisibility of Women’ in R.G. Sultana and G. Baldacchino, Maltese Society. A Sociological Inquiry, Mireva Publications, Malta, p.83. 80. A cursory examination of the electoral manifestoes of political parties will prove this point. It is also a well-known fact that prices and the cost of living are powerful propaganda tools for parties in opposition and the bane of governments in Malta. 81. The sixties saw an expansion in the number of textile factories operating in Malta. The labour force in these factories was predominantly female. The tourist industry also employed a large number of females as receptionists, waitresses, cleaners, and housekeepers. 82. ‘National Council of Women. Memorandum to political parties’ in the Times of Malta, 27 May 1971. 83. C. Tabone, (1987), The Secularisation of the Family in Changing Malta, Dominican Publications, Malta, pp.144-5. 84. See for example, ‘Woman’s World’ The Sunday Times, 3 Mar 1996; The Times issues of 10 Oct. 1996, 11 Oct. 1996 and 12 Oct. 1996; and ‘Issa li Qeghdin Sitta….’ In Taht il-Lenti, It-Torca 4 Oct. 1998. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 87. Women have been heads of state in several countries, including India, Israel, Bangladesh and Britain. In each one of these countries women Prime Ministers have led their countries into wars in the same way that some of their male predecessors have done. 88. C. Polidano, ‘What’s sex got to do with it?’ in The Sunday Times, 31 Mar. 1996.

105 Malta’s Foreign Policy after Mintoff

(Published in The Political Quarterly, Volume 56 No. 2, April-June 1985)

alf way through his third successive term as Mr Dom HMintoff announced his resignation in favour of Dr Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, an industrial relations expert and a University of Malta lecturer. Two years ago Dr Mifsud Bonnici was chosen by the Malta Labour Party (MLP) national conference to succeed Mr Mintoff, this decision being subsequently ratified by the General Workers’ Union (GWU) delegate conference, representing Malta’s largest trade union. The Labour Party and the GWU have been close allies since 1945. In the late 70s the two had agreed on a sort of fusion and from this time on decisions of national importance taken by one side require approval from the other. The GWU is also represented at Cabinet level through its two most senior officials.

Mr Mintoff, whose political career spans more than forty years, almost thirty-five of them as leader of the MLP, effected his departure from the government with almost timetable precision. In 1981, some months before the general elections, Mintoff confided in the author that now he had steered Malta away from its centuries of dependency on the military expenditure of other nations and as a perennial military base, he had accomplished what he had set out to do. This was in reference to the closure of the British and NATO base in Malta in March 1979. First indications of his eventual retirement from Maltese politics came about four years ago when he sponsored Dr Mifsud Bonnici’s nomination for the post of Deputy Leader for Party Affairs of the MLP at that year’s national conference. Few however took this to be a sign that Mintoff was preparing to abandon politics and that he was laying the ground for a smooth transition of the party leadership and, as events proved, for the premiership of the island. Indeed, well into 1984 and two years after Mifsud Bonnici’s choice as his successor, Western journalists were still making claims that Mintoff was seeking to turn Malta into a one-party state. For his part, Mintoff was desperately trying to create the right conditions for handing over the office of Prime Minister to Mifsud Bonnici, to give the latter sufficient time to impress his own distinctive style on the government of the island before the next general elections due in three years’ time.

Dom Mintoff, a Fabian socialist, has often been described as a poltical maverick but, analysed from a Maltese political standpoint which involves an understanding of the island’s economic, social and geographic factors, his actions can be seen to have been both logical and consistent. For they reflect the fact that the islands of Malta lack any

106 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration natural resources but contain a population of nearly 330,000 persons. When Mintoff came to power in the 1971 general elections, Malta’s economy was still mainly dependent on income and employment generated from Britains’s military and naval bases and the frequent visits of US naval squadrons. However, the economic structure associated with such an almost exclusive military role had proved, for more than a century, to be inadequate and in the post-war world a handicap for the development of trade and economic relations with North African markets. On the one hand, employment was scarce. Between 1964 (independence year) and 1971, more than one-sixth of the Maltese population migrated in search of better prospects, mainly to Australia and Canada. On the other hand, large areas of the island were under British military and naval control, stifling their use for industrial purposes and putting pressures on port facilities. Indeed, even the civil airport formed part of a Britsh military complex and was under the overall control of the Royal Air Force. Not surprisingly, under such circumstances, Malta was seen by Western powers as falling under the jurisdiction of Britain and what political relations Malta had were inevitably with NATO states and Australia.1

By 1967 it became clear to Mintoff and his Labour Party in opposition that, with the publication of the UK Defence White Paper, which proposed to throw thousands of Maltese employed with the Services in the island out of work, the whole political and economic structure of Malta would have to be radically altered. For this reason Mintoff outlined four major goals. First, that economic prosperity depended on exploiting fully those facilities which could be put to such a use, including Malta’s geographic location at the heart of the Mediterranean. Secondly, that Malta should be free to trade and conclude commercial treaties with any state irrespective of political ideology. Thirdly, that in order that trade could be conducted with countries generally hostile to the island’s traditional military role, all foreign military forces present in Malta should be gradually scaled down and finally phased out. Finally, that Malta should pursue a policy of strict neutrality and non-alignment while at the same time seeking international recognition and guarantees for its new status.

The New Look Policy

Mintoff and his government set about achieving these aims with a determination that surprised most observers. By March 1972, six months after his election, Mintoff had put up Britain’s and NATO’s payments for military facilities sixfold, took control of the civilian airport and port facilities, and asserted Malta’s independence by expelling Admiral

1 In 1967 NATO rejected Malta’s application for membership on the ground that Malta was under British jurisdiction despite the fact it had been granted independence in September 1964. Because of this rebuff in 1968 the government of Malta, then under the premiership of , sought openings with Eastern Europe and in 1968 established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia.

107 Malta’s Foreign Policy after Mintoff

Birendelli, NATO’s Mediterranean commander, for claiming that NATO would never relinquish its control of the island. Further, he forced Britain and NATO to agree, in a formal treaty, to vacate the island by March 1979 and to refrain until then from using their military facilities against any of Malta’s Mediterranean neighbours – echoes of Albania, Suez and the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.2

Next, Mr Mintoff turned his attention to the island’s problems of economic development. With aid from China, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Korea and Yugoslavia, he set into motion a vast programme of works designed to modernise old industries and promote new ones. The old naval dockyard was transformed into a more competitive ship-repairing and -building industry, a national airline was set up, port facilities modernised and available factory space for new industries quadrupled. Through an improved agreement with the EEC, Malta managed to secure a foothold for its exports in Europe. Its new relationship with North African states also attracted a good number of German industries to the island. Within three years, West Germany became one of Malta’s leading trade partners. Furthermore, Mintoff sought to take advantage of Malta’s location between the industrialised nations of Europe and the developing markets of North Africa and the Middle East. Between 1972 and 1979 Malta’s growth rate averaged between three and seven per cent a year. The new prosperity associated with this economic growth was complimented by new welfare services and a housing programme that made the Maltese working-classes among the best housed in Europe. For purposes of stable industrial relations, the government awarded and enforced annual cost-of-living increases in the private sector as well as within its own.

On the international scene, Mr Mintoff took every opportunity to advertise Malta’s new role as a neutral and non-aligned state. At Helsinki and every subsequent Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Malta took on itself the role of spokesman for the Mediterranean. Malta’s representatives argued that it was futile to discuss European security and stability while at the same time ignoring the threat posed to world peace by conflicts which had their origin in the Mediterranean. They deplored the exclusion from this political arena of North African Mediterranean states. Almost on their own they fought, sometimes with success, for the inclusion of these states into the process and for Mediterranean issues to be on the agenda.

Mintoff went further in demonstrating Malta’s determined status of non-alignment. At every opportunity Malta called for the withdrawal of the two superpowers from the Mediterranean basin and took the lead in trying to bring together other Mediterranean states for the purpose of co-operation at the social, economic and political level. Since

2 Malta had been both the training and launching base for the failed mission in Albania. In 1956 Malta based British personnel and weaponry were employed in the invasion of the Suez. In 1967 Arab states claimed that Maltese military facilities had been used against them during the so-called Six-Day War.

108 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

1971 Malta’s non-alignment has been frequently tested. Libya had hoped after the closure of the NATO base to replace the West with its own influence. It had provided Malta with vital capital and cheap oil, and was riled when Mintoff continued to resist its advances for a military station on the island. In 1979 it forced a Maltese licensed oil exploration vessel to abandon its search for oil in the Maltese-Libyan channel. Mintoff replied by signing a treaty with Italy in which the latter agreed to act as guarantor of Malta’s neutrality and non-alignment. On the diplomatic level Mintoff continued to impress on the Libyans the implications of their action on Maltese-Libyan relations, and after a time agreement was reached between the two states to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice. In recent months Malta and Libya have signed a new treaty of friendship and co-operation. In 1981 the Soviet Union opened an embassy in Malta after undertakings by the Moscow government of better trade relations with the island. Even as the talks between the states were in progress, Malta joined other countries in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since then, trade with the Soviet Union has expanded and Soviet merchant ships use on a regular basis Malta’s excellent bunkering facilities. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has already declared its intention to place orders for ships to be built at Malta’s newest shipyard. Nothwithstanding this, Dom Mintoff on his first ever visit to the Soviet Union in December 1984 and his final parting act, defiantly reasserted Malta’s non-alignment and called for the Mediterranean to be a nuclear-free zone, and for the withdrawal from this sea of the hardware of both the superpowers. But Mintoff’s message was directed as much to the Soviets as to the West. NATO politicians today accept that Malta takes her non-alignment seriously, but military chiefs have not forgiven Mr Mintoff for the loss of their Malta base and their lobby has had a disruptive influence on relations between Malta and other Western states. NATO chiefs would have dearly loved to teach Mr Mintoff a lesson but, unable to do so, they have evidently put pressures on their political counterparts to discourage relations with Malta and using the Western press to discredit Mr Mintoff’s government. More significantly, anti-Mintoff forces in Europe threw their weight behind the predominantly pro-West opposition party, the Maltese Nationalist Party. During the 1981 general elections, the Nationalist Party was provided with a private television and radio station in Sicily capable of transmitting to Malta. Mintoff retaliated by enacting a bill designated as the Foreign Interference Act 1982. Under the Act, the Maltese government has arrogated to itself powers similar to those enjoyed by the US Government against citizens who receive funds from political organisations abroad. The Act had also the effect of suppressing the Maltese office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Prospects For the Future

But now that Mr Mintoff has handed over the powers of government to a new man, would it be reasonable to expect a change in the foreign policy of the island? While

109 Malta’s Foreign Policy after Mintoff it is certainly true that Mifsud Bonnici is a man of contrasting temperament to that of Mintoff, it is equally true that the options open to him in this sphere remain virtually the same as those that confronted the latter at the general election of 1971. If Dr Mifsud Bonnici wishes to safeguard Malta’s independence and hard-earned markets, he must continue to steer Malta on a course of strict non-alignment. Even a partial change of policy would alienate most of the Middle East states and China, and lose the foothold established for Maltese products in the markets of Eastern Europe. It would also undoubtedly plunge the island into political obscurity once again. In recent years Malta has enjoyed a growing status on international bodies, being appointed as rapporteur on various issues. Two years ago Malta’s unflinching non-alignment was rewarded when the island was elected to serve on the UN Security Council. And, with Mintoff’s retirement, Western military chiefs may now feel more confident of accepting Malta as a neutral and non-aligned state. Their mistrust of his intentions dates back to the 1950s and, although Malta’s impeccable record of non-alignment can be safely attributed to Mintoff, Western strategists have never been capable of overcoming their caricature of him as a Nasser or Fidel Castro.

However, if relations between Malta and most of the Western European states are to improve, the latter would need to demonstrate to Dr Mifsud Bonnici their readiness to resolve some of the outstanding problems between the two sides. For example, Britain would need to aid new development projects in Malta by agreeing to help remove from Malta’s major ports wartime wrecks and highly dangerous explosives. Britain has so far consistently refused to do this. Italy for its part would have to honour its agreement with Malta to eliminate the massive trade imbalance that exists between the two countries to the disadvantage of Malta. It would also have to give effect to promises of technical and military aid made in 1979 in a formal treaty with the island. As far as the EEC is concerned, Dr Mifsud Bonnici would expect that his country’s demands for a new agreement, which would give Malta a special relationship with the Common Market, be re-explored and sympathetically treated. In other words, Dr Mifsud Bonnici would not be prepared to consider Western overtures for better relations unless they are also accompanied by practical gestures of goodwill.

Finally, Dr Mifsud Bonnici may feel more confident since the opposition Nationalist Party is increasingly coming round to Malta’s policy of neutrality and non-alignment. During the 1984 Budget debate which was televised, Dr Vincent Tabone, shadow spokesman on foreign affairs, declared that they too did not wish to see Malta revert to the status of a military base. However, the Nationalist Party has yet to suppress a powerful group of extreme right-wingers within its parliamentary party who desire to bring Malta back into the jurisdiction of NATO. However, this group is outside the general consensus that for Malta, independence and non-alignment are synonymous.

VGPV 110 The Challenge of European Membership: A Study of Malta’s Parliament Approach to the Issue 1962-87

(Published first in ‘Mill-Parlament’ as Parliament and the European Dimension and later in ‘Public Life in Malta’, Vol 2, Mario T Vassallo & Carmel Tabone O.P., 2017)

Abstract This paper traces how Maltese parliamentary parties approached the issue of Europe from 1962, the period immediately before Independence, and 1987 when a new government secured a clear electoral mandate to pursue EU membership. For this reason this study relies almost entirely on Parliamentary Debates and papers during this period. In doing so it brings to the fore the different emphasises that each party placed on the relationship they wished to see develop with Europe. We shall see that the PN were strongly inclined towards Europe from an ideological standpoint with the economic aspect appearing rather problematic. For Labour the issue was more economic in nature and its main policy was to see how much development aid could be extracted from this economic block. The PN saw the EU as Malta’s rightful home while Labour feared that EU membership would revert Malta to outside control. For the PN membership was a sine qua non issue while what Labour wanted were close relations but not membership.

Introduction

t was in 1957 that the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) Icame into existence for the first time, the very same year in which the Maltese launched their quest for independence. On December 30th Malta’s Parliament voted unanimously in favour of a historic resolution popularly known as the ‘Break with Britain’ resolution.1 Consequently, what the future for Malta should look like after independence became an important issue for debate. Should Malta break off completely from Britain, remain in the Commonwealth or seek association with the EEC? This paper looks at the way the debate touching the EEC unfolded in Parliament. Many commentators and students of Maltese politics tend to ignore Parliamentary Debates as an important primary source and focus on reports featured in newspapers. But Parliament is the ultimate policy arena not only where policies are debated and ultimately approved or rejected, but the place where vital information is disclosed and laid on the Table of the House. This paper will, hopefully, prove this point.

The paper, as noted, deals mainly with the way parties in Parliament approached the European dimension from the inception of the Common Market until 1987 when Malta

111 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87 had a government that made membership of the EU its main foreign policy option. In the first instance this paper will demonstrate what the parties’ position towards this emerging block was. Second, it brings out the different emphasis that each political party placed on relations with the EC. Since in the 1960s more than two parties were represented in Parliament the views of the smaller parties are also given some attention. Finally, the paper will demonstrate that, on the one hand, for the Nationalist Party (PN) the issue was mainly political and cultural with the economic aspect appearing sometimes as an obstacle for a closer relationship with the Common Market. On the other hand it will show that it was the economic factor, rather than the political, that intrigued the Malta Labour Party (MLP). In other words the PN’s main aim was to look for ways to bring Malta within the EEC sphere on the grounds that Malta’s European identity demanded this while that of the MLP was to extract as much economic advantages as possible.

Malta and the European Dimension

Geography has placed Malta not merely at the centre of the Mediterranean but at the border of two continents: Europe and Africa. Consequently, the history of Malta is characterised by the impact that these two continents had on Maltese life. It is tempting to say, for simplicity’s sake, that the Maltese got their language from the South and their religion from the North. While it is not that simple this dualism did create difficulties when Malta came under European rule: sometimes our language made Europeans define the Maltese as Arabs2 while the islanders increasingly saw themselves because of their Catholic faith and its cultural embodiments, as European. The author has already shown, in other published studies, the impact, politically and psychologically, that this duality had on Maltese historical and political development.3 One example, however, may suffice to show how this issue of identity was still exerting influence on the Maltese even after close to forty years of independence. In 1993, the European Commission, in its Avis on Malta’s application for EU membership, declared that Malta had a right to assert its vocation to join the EU because it was a European state. Some of the reactions to this statement clearly indicate that there were those in Malta who had waited a long time for this endorsement of Malta’s European identity from Europe’s leading states. This can be seen, for example, from the explicit declaration made by no other than the Council of Malta’s Institute of Directors which stated that the Avis ‘confirms what has always been assumed in Maltabut not always accepted outside it (my italics), namely that we are a European people living in a European country.’4 The European Commission statement had indeed touched a sore point and this will explain why, for some, the debate on the EEC in the 1960s and beyond sometimes centred on Malta’s cultural European identity instead of economic factors.

Although much has been written, mainly in the media and consequently of little substance, about Malta’s relations with North Africa, history shows that it was Europe which provided the political and economic model for all Maltese governments. A cursory

112 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration look at the political manifestos of all Maltese political parties will also reveal that all of them make explicit reference to our European identity.5 Some governments, perhaps more than others, understood better the necessity of establishing and maintaining strong relations with N. African states but the focus on Europe never faltered. In fact what Malta’s potential relationship with the EEC might one day become had featured in the Address from the Throne which inaugurated Malta’s new Parliament in 1962.6

Debating the EEC 1962-63

This occurred on April 26, 1962 when Sir Maurice Dorman, Governor of Malta, after setting out the government’s economic and political agenda, touched on the issue of Malta’s relations with the Common Market. According to Dorman, ministers were carefully considering the implications for Malta of eventual membership or participation inthe Common Market. Malta was still not independent and its economy enjoyed no industrial capacity allowing it to compete successfully within the EEC. It was still mainly based on British military spending and British goodwill, when this was forthcoming. Malta’s interest in the EEC at this time was sparked by a growing interest in EEC membership by Britain which, if followed up, would have impacted strongly on Malta. In fact, as we shall see progress on this issue was obstructed by British failure to move forward on its own membership application.

This was revealed by the Prime Minister, George Borg Olivier, himself later in the same day when he informed the House that Malta’s potential relations with the Common Market had featured during his government’s discussions in London.7 It was a surprising statement because Malta was not yet independent and its ability to join this association depended entirely on British consent. The 1961 Constitution8 had granted the Maltese Government greater freedom in respect of trade relations with other, notably non-Commonwealth, countries, but the Common Market concept also pointed towards a political dimension and this raised questions which could impact on British colonial relations with Malta and other British colonies. Nonetheless, this information served to kick-off a debate that demonstrates that in the run-up to Independence the Common Market experiment had already become an important theme for Maltese legislators. One reason for this was Britain’s own interest in the EEC. The latter’s fast growing interest in EEC membership raised questions of a fundamental character for Malta: what, for example, would be Malta’s political status if Britain joined the EEC? Would Malta’s exports to Britain, small as they were, be subjected to tariffs? Britain’s own membership was bound to impact strongly on Malta. Some addressed the economic benefits for Malta having some sort of relations with the EEC while others the idea that Malta’s European identity made it a sine qua non that the island should look for membership within the then six-member block.9

113 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87

At this stage one can say that there was no deep divide between Government and Opposition parties on the issue. All were intrigued by the possible benefits that a closer relationship with the EEC might bring to Malta. The PN government was ideologically inclined towards membership or associate membership and it was only economic difficulties and dependence on Britain that clouded its resolve. The abstract notion of a united Europe with Malta forming an integral part of it appealed to the Nationalist Party. The issue was also of importance to the Opposition parties which from the very beginning pressed the government to give more information on its intentions while, at the same time, expressing their own evaluation of developments within the EEC.

For the Labour Party, for example, membership of the EEC raised certain fears: would Malta at independence be merely exchanging one master for another? Indeed, there was a hint of this in Dom Mintoff’s first foray on the subject as Leader ofthe Opposition. Mintoff asked the government whether it shared his party’s view that the Common Market was shifting from an economic to a political block. Mintoff argued that in addition to economic matters the block was increasingly considering moving towards the idea of a united or federal Europe, strong enough to stand up to the two existing blocks. He observed that Switzerland had applied for Associate Membership but had been rejected because of its independent mindedness. What the countries of the Common Market wanted, he said, was to work for a Europe which would have one army and one Parliament. He doubted, therefore, whether Malta would succeed where Switzerland had failed. He ended by demanding that the government should keep the House informed of its intentions on the subject.10

Nonetheless, Labour saw the EEC as a potential future arena providing opportunities for economic development. Thus, a few days later, another MLP MP felt it necessary to raise again the Common Market issue in the House. This MP thought the issue very important for Malta and wanted the government to provide the House with an opportunity to discuss it. On how it was approached, he argued, depended the very future development of the islands. He stressed that it needed to be studied carefully because the island could not take certain directions in industrial development and then abandon them because these did not quite reflect market conditions within the EEC.11

Dr Herbert Ganado, leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party, agreed with this saying that the Common Market issue was a crucial one for Malta and though a relatively new economic block, one had to examine what advantages it might provide for Malta.12 Britain, he said, was also giving membership serious consideration and this would have implications for Malta. He insisted that Malta formed part of Europe and since Europe appeared to be moving towards greater unity he could not possibly see how tiny Malta could opt to remain outside this block. Malta, he said, had two resources of great importance: its strategic position and its harbour which could help bridge the commercial

114 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration routes between Europe and Africa and the oil routes to the East. He therefore urged the government to support Malta’s industry and to bring to Malta Common Market experts to study the local situation and provide advice. He also urged that the Minister responsible for industry should himself go to Brussels to examine these important issues.

The Prime Minister admitted that Europe was indeed thinking of moving towards greater political integration but he claimed that the Opposition had not grasped the situation facing the government which in a short time might be called to a decision of great importance for Malta. At this stage he could only tell the House that the government was studying the implications of membership for Malta and MPs should not read too much into the Governor’s mention of the subject. The government still needed to learn what the advantages or disadvantages for Malta might be, he said.13

In Britain’s shadow

But pressure was mounting on the Maltese Government to decide, both from within and outside of Malta. In the House the Common Market issue was raised whatever the item under discussion while Britain was adding to the pressure because of its own membership aspirations.14 For example, towards the end of May 1962, when the House was debating the Financial Administration and Audit Bill, a member of the House brought to the attention of the government some of the implications for Maltese agriculture raised by membership of the EEC. He argued that even Britain was taking a cautious approach to membership because of this issue. He therefore pleaded with the government to study these issues carefully in order to avoid harm to the local agriculture sector and the people employed in it.15 In the meantime Britain too was applying pressure on the Maltese Government over the issue of membership since it wanted to gauge the reaction of other Commonwealth countries to its own possible membership of the Common Market. Britain had its own treaties and obligations with Commonwealth member states and had to take these into consideration when negotiating EEC membership.

Consequently, in September 1962, the Prime Minister was forced to make a statement in the House on the issue. He told the House that he would be leading a delegation to London for consultation with the British Government on the issue and to take part in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference on the Common Market. He admitted that he had come under insistent pressure from Britain to say what Malta’s position on membership was. He had finally replied that, in principle, the government intended to seek Associate Membership of the Common Market but without formal ties, whatever that meant.

The Leader of the Opposition demanded to know what was meant by the use of the phrase “in principle” when opting for association rather than membership. The Prime

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Minister replied that since Malta formed part of Europe in principle he thought Malta should come to form part of this block. He could not say what the impact on Malta would be if Britain joined or did not join the Common Market or, indeed, if Malta stayed out. It was for this reason that his reply to Britain had stressed that the Maltese position was merely one of principle rather than a full decision. He added, and this was an important revelation, that Britain had conceded Malta the right to deal directly with Common market countries collectively and individually. He promised that the House will have an opportunity to debate the issue fully and that his government would listen with an open mind.16

Yet the Prime Minister, on his return from London, was not forthcoming on the issue. Indeed, he merely limited himself to saying that it was not true that Malta had already submitted a formal application to Brussels. Nonetheless, he said, he was convinced that the way things were developing in Europe it would become eventually impossible for the island to stay outside of the EEC. Europe’s efforts at strengthening itself politically, economically and socially, he said, were meeting with success and despite a number of problems on Malta’s side these developments could not be ignored.17 This statement failed to satisfy the opposition parties in Parliament. They demanded to know in more concrete terms what the advantages and disadvantages of any form of membership were. Labour expressed the hope that the matter would not be allowed to become a contentious one but this could only be avoided if the government refrained from committing Malta one way or another before these issues had been clearly examined. The only principle at stake, Mintoff said, was what was in Malta’s interest and demanded to know the grounds on which the government had concluded that in principle it agreed with some form of association with the EEC.18

Ganado, for the DNP, concurred with Mintoff and stressed that this was a fundamental issue for the country. He said it was wrong for the Prime Minister to treat Parliament as if it was a nuisance to be got rid of. He doubted that the government really knew what the implications of membership were and while his party was in favour of the Common Market idea it wanted to ensure that Malta’s fledging industries would be protected. The government defended its position by arguing that it had not committed the country in any way and that it was too early, before any negotiations with Brussels had taken place, for any declarations to be made.19

There can be no doubt that the issue taxed the mind of the Maltese Government. In its view, if Britain joined the EEC, the possibility of tariffs being imposed on Maltese exports to Britain would become very real. So it was not a coincidence that on 27 November 1962 the Prime Minister made a statement in the House touching these two issues. Borg Olivier told the House that that same day Britain would be making a statement in respect of the government’s request for independence and that he had accepted an invitation from the Italian Government to visit Rome and discuss matters of concern to both sides,

116 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration including developments in connection with the Common Market.20 Yet, it was not until February 1963 that a full statement was made in the House by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Giovanni Felice, on the latter issue. In his statement Felice noted that the question had first arisen when Britain presented its own application for membership of the EEC on the 10th August 1961. In the discussions that had followed between London and Brussels, Malta’s eventual association with the Common Market was raised and it was argued by Britain that the Maltese case merited consideration as a special case because it was still constitutionally dependent on Britain and because of the island’s urgent need for economic development. Brussels responded that Malta could choose one of two options: either applying to become an Associated Overseas Territory (AOT) of the EEC or press to become and enjoy the advantages of a “full” member under the patronage of Great Britain as contemplated in subsection 4 of Article 227 of the Treaty of Rome. Britain believed that entry under Article 227 may prove to be more straight forward and therefore more probable. Thus, the choice before the government, according to Felice, was either to push for membership and see what derogations the Six in Brussels would allow it, or to remain outside the EEC and try to obtain some sort of special protocol which would preserve access for Maltese products to the British market. Caught between these two alternatives the government, Felice admitted, had found it extremely difficult to decide which alternative was the best for Malta.

Furthermore, the Minister explained, the government was of the opinion that membership under Article 227 would involve two things: first that Britain was going to become a member of the EEC; and second that the Maltese Government was considering vesting Britain with responsibility for its foreign relations even in respect of our eventual application for membership. The first alternative, according to Felice was problematic. On the one hand, if Britain was admitted as a member before the government had decided which path to follow it was feared that Malta would be deemed to be a member of the EEC without the possibility of any negotiations over issues of interest to the island. On the other hand, Malta could be left out completely with the fatal consequences that Maltese exports would have tariffs imposed on them even in respect of the British market. The second alternative, he said, that of vesting Britain with responsibility for its foreign relations, went against the government’s constitutional aspirations. To answer these questions, he said, the government had set up a committee of experts, made up of Head of Departments, representatives from the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Industries and a certain Mr Vernon, an expert on Common Market affairs sent by the Colonial Office, to examine these issues. Having examined the conclusions of this committee and other aspects, including the necessary derogations required by Malta, the government decided to send a delegation to Brussels to investigate the best way forward. It resulted that Malta could not contemplate membership under Article 237 as this dealt with sovereign nations and because Malta was not economically and financially prepared. Nor was the government prepared to apply under Article 227 (4) as Malta was not like Monaco or San

117 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87

Marino. So the only avenue open to the government was that provided by Article 238 of the Treaty and which provided for “agreements of association between EEC countries and other non-EEC states”. Brussels, he said, had already concluded such an agreement with Greece and the Maltese Government had hoped that it would be allowed to proceed on this course even though it was still not a recognised sovereign state.

But this was rejected by Brussels and the Maltese Government sought and obtained from Britain the necessary delegation of powers to negotiate with the EEC. However, Brussels had stipulated a number of conditions: first, that arrangements were to be made for the establishment of relations between Malta and the Community; second that these relations should give rise to a customs union; third, that until Malta’s constitutional advance made an Association Agreement possible, the Commission would conclude a special protocol with Malta; fourth, that this protocol be negotiated with the British Government but with the participation of representatives from Malta;21 and finally, that the provisions of Article 227 (4) will not apply to Malta once Britain joined the EEC.

But while this was a useful exercise the whole process was brought to a standstill when negotiations between London and Brussels over British membership collapsed completely. France was at that time staunchly opposed to British membership and consequently there was little hope for progress during the negotiations.22 According to Brussels this denied the Maltese side the right to continue with the discussions and Malta would have to mark time on the issue. The government, Felice said, had not taken a final decision on the issue and was not going to neglect Malta’s interests in Europe as these related to the EEC. Independence, he concluded, would allow Malta to interact with other states and to take its place in the European Community without hindrance.

The Labour Party regretted the government’s decision to mark time on the issue. How, it asked, did the government intend to proceed with the formulation of an economic plan while at the same time not deciding how the EEC may fit into it? For such a plan to make sense one had to know the conditions which association of any form brought with it and the kind of aid which the EEC could offer Malta towards its development. The MLP favoured association under Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome which provided for those states which needed economic assistance for their economic development. This form of association, it was argued, allowed for the retention of customs duties asthe Common Market accepted that these states needed to protect their fledging industries. The Opposition, he said, disagreed with the government’s decision to stop negotiations with Brussels on a special protocol merely because the discussions between Britain and Brussels on membership had collapsed. What would happen if Britain failed to join the EEC? Were the Maltese to remain dependent on Britain? Worse still the government was discussing a defence agreement with Britain and seemed ready to commit itself to such a policy. The point, as Labour saw it, was not to commit oneself until what was in Malta’s interests was clearly defined. 118 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

And there the matter remained for some time. The issue of independence from this time on was to take greater prominence and Parliament was not to return tothe issue of Malta’s relations with the Common Market until after independence. Even then, as we shall see, Malta’s economic dependence on Britain and other Commonwealth states had to be taken into consideration. Malta’s level of economic development was another factor but the Government’s desire to locate Malta politically within Europe would remain a crucial aspect.

The Immediate post-Independence Scenario

With the acquisition of independence Malta gained greater leeway in its ability to negotiate agreements and treaties with other countries. Yet, the EEC issue did not feature at all during the opening of Malta’s first Parliament after independence or indeed during the remaining years of the Legislature. It was touched upon tangentially, a year later, when the House debated Malta’s membership of the Council of Europe but no more than that.23 In fact the matter was not raised again until April 1966 when in the Speech from the Throne the Governor-General said that it was the intention of the government to examine the advantages that may accrue from a closer relationship, or possibly membership of the EEC. But the matter did not evoke debate.24

However, it was decisions taken in London that once again pushed the government into looking at the issue. In 1967 the British government had decided to drastically reduce its military presence in Malta and throw thousands of its Maltese employees into unemployment.25 On 4th September 1967 the Acting Prime Minister informed the House that the Prime Minister had written to the EEC expressing Malta’s desire for a closer relationship with the Community. There was not much new in what Felice told the House. He said that the note called for an initial form of relations that would encourage greater commercial freedom between the two sides without excluding the possibility of future membership. An inter-ministerial committee had concluded, he said, that neither membership nor associate membership were at that point in time in Malta’s interest. As the EEC, he insisted, allowed for the establishment of such bilateral agreements the Maltese Government had thought it right to proceed in this manner.

The questions that this statement provoked had all been raised between 1962 and 1964: What were the motivations behind the government’s decision? What were the pros and cons for joining the EEC? Where was the technical data on which this decision had been based? Should not the government publish a White Paper outlining its case? This was what the British Government had done on the same subject. Since, it was said, this was not a partisan issue should not the government take into its confidence all the representatives of the people? But Felice, while stating that it was the Government’s prerogative to negotiate

119 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87 on behalf of Malta, denied the need for a White Paper and insisted that in addition to an economic dimension there was also a political one.

The issue re-appeared on Parliament’s agenda in October 1968 when Dr Vincent Tabone, Minister for Labour, informed the House that the Government had submitted Malta’s application for membership of the Community. According to Tabone the Maltese Government wished for a type of relationship, initially, which would focus on ‘special tariff arrangements leading to full free exchange of trade between the two parties’26 with full membership as the ultimate aim. The Government hoped that this ‘initial relationship might provide for a phased programme of stronger links between the two sides and of harmonisation of the various sectors and aspects of their economic and social activities.’ On completion of that period Malta would assume fully the obligations deriving from the Treaty of Rome and enjoy all the benefits accruing from it. Malta needed certain trade concessions from the EEC without conceding reciprocity at this stage. Malta’s dependence on Britain was out of economic necessity, he said, and existing agreements with this state ought not to provide an obstacle for the ‘establishment of an appropriate relationship with the Community.’27 Nor were Malta’s relationship with other Commonwealth states an obstacle since these were ‘loose and nebulous.’ The statement then went on to re-state the claim that Malta was European by history, culture, religious outlook, sentiment and way of life and that its support for Western Europe as a defence post of Southern Europe was ‘accepted as important and not entirely devoid of risk.’

The Opposition once again demanded to know the facts behind the government’s decision. It was no longer the case that the government was considering the issue but that it had made a formal application. The Opposition, Mintoff said, had always accepted the need for new markets and whether this was the Common market or not was immaterial. The issue was not a partisan one but the Opposition was not prepared to exchange one military master for another as the statement seemed to imply. Eventually Malta did sign an Association Agreement with the EEC which according to the Prime Minister stipulated, among other things, two five-year phases. Under the first phase the EEC and Malta were to lower duties by seventy percent and thirty-five percent respectively, while the second phase laid down that the two sides should consult again in order to see how to proceed towards a customs union. Agricultural products were excluded from this agreement while the Government’s appeal for financial aid did not feature at all. The MLP deplored the failure to acquire adequate financial aid for Malta describing the agreement as one-sided.

Labour and the Common Market

Relations between Malta and the EEC took on a more urgent dimension when in 1971 Labour replaced the PN in government. By September 1971 the government had addressed an Aide Memoire to the Commission outlining its case for an improved Association

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Agreement and in April 1972 Mintoff led a Government delegation to Luxembourg for a meeting with the EEC Council of Association.28 The Prime Minister told the House that the two sides had agreed that a detailed study of the trade effected between Malta and the EEC during the first year of the Association Agreement be undertaken to seehow Malta had fared and to explore ways of improving matters; that the Council of Ministers had mandated a Commission under the Chairmanship of Prof. Dahrendorf so that early discussions may be held on the points raised by the Maltese Government; and that after the results of these surveys and discussions are known and after internal consultation and in the framework of agreements offered to other Mediterranean states, the Community will seek to expand the scope of the agreement with Malta. But these discussions proved difficult and it was not until May 1975 that the Prime Minister could inform the House that an agreement had been reached.29 He told the House that the Government had been constrained to refuse a number of proposals and had indulged in extensive lobbying through its Foreign Affairs Department with Governments representing member states. Nevertheless, it was not until March 1976 that the new Association Agreement was signed.

In November 1977, the Prime Minister announced in a Statement in the House that the Government had concluded a new agreement with the EEC.30 During the negotiations, the PM said, the Government had pressed for more concessions in respect of exports from Malta and for an extension of the financial aid protocol. Under the new agreement, he said, the Community will be waiving all duties on products from Malta with the exception of some categories of textile and food products. However, the Community had agreed to increase the quotas for textile imports from Malta and to exempt them from duty as long as they did not exceed the agreed quotas. The Prime Minister also announced that the Community had agreed to continue aiding Malta after the present aid package expired in March 1979 and in the meantime was to inquire carefully into the kind of aid that Malta would need after this date.

Leader of the Opposition, , asked whether the government was considering closer links between the Maltese Parliament and that of the Community or in some way evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of membership. The PM replied that the policy of the Government was to act as a bridge between Europe and North Africa and membership would complicate that policy as the Community was a closed one. Furthermore, membership involved responsibilities, such as a Customs Union, which Malta could not burden and the agreement had extended the benefits without these onerous responsibilities.

But, as the MLP government wanted to extract wider concessions from the EEC negotiations tended to be prolonged and not always cordial. On one occasion, inMay 1979, for example, the Prime Minister was forced to give a detailed rebuttal of reports in the European media on why the negotiations had stalled.31 In July, however, the Prime

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Minister had good news to impart to the House when he laid on the Table the new agreement which had just been concluded with the EEC.32 According to the Prime Minister the agreement touched on three principal aspects: the implementation of the Financial Protocol, assistance to help Malta to recover from the impact of African swine fever, and agreement on Maltese textile exports to the EEC. In setting out the terms of this agreement the PM also gave a detailed account of the various initiatives which had been discussed between the two sides since 1976 and which of these initiatives had materialised or not. He explained that the Community had agreed to lend Malta funds at very low interest rates and was no longer insisting that Malta should pay commercial rates on the agreed amounts. The EEC had also agreed to foot half the expense necessary for Malta to re- establish its pig stock. Finally the PM explained the details of the agreement in respect of textile exports ending his Statement by a dig at Britain, which had obstructed agreement, inviting it to re-open the British Council centre in Malta. Once again one can see here that Labour’s focus in its relations with the EEC had been purely economic with no hint of future political ties.

The Opposition in its questions pointed to the fact that the amount agreed in the Financial Protocol exceeded the amount allowed by law for borrowing by the Government and wanted to know whether the said law will be amended. The Opposition also wanted to know what works had been carried out with the money loaned from the EEC agreement. To the first question the PM replied that if the financial aid to Malta would eventually exceed that stipulated by the law then the Government would move the necessary amendments. To the second question he pointed to the works that had been carried out in the Grand Harbour and to some of the roads that had been widened or built.

Malta’s relations with the EEC once again became the subject of debate in the House in July-August 1979 when in a televised debate the House debated a motion moved by the Prime Minister in reply to statements made by the Leader of the Opposition in which he alleged that the Government was keeping secret documents which related to the agreement that it had signed with the Community. The Motion, while calling on the House to approve the conduct of the Government in its relations with the European Community, also called for the laying on the Table of the House the documents relevant to that agreement.33 In moving the motion the PM gave a detailed account of Malta’s relations with the EEC since the 1960’s. He alleged that at the time two Ministers in Borg Olivier’s Government did not agree that Malta should become a member of the EEC but that on the whole the Cabinet was of the view that Malta should move gradually towards eventual membership. He further stated that the first representations made by the PN Government in the sixties were not for membership but for the establishment of the principle that Malta was eligible for membership. On its part, according to the PM, the Commission stated that it was not prepared to recommend membership but an association agreement that would eventually lead to a customs union between Malta and the EEC. He acknowledged that

122 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration this two-phased agreement had been presented to parliament but he also reminded the House of the criticism that the MLP had made at the time and its promise that once in government it would re-negotiate a new one, which it did.

He then elaborated on the changes which his Government had negotiated after 1971 which included the financial aid aspect, the inclusion of agricultural products and the inclusion of Malta under the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Mintoff said that the negotiations had taken a long time mainly because the EEC had thought that what Malta was proposing could also be offered to the Maghreb countries and because Britain had initially refused to endorse them. In 1974 Malta was admitted to the GSP and, in 1976, the discussions were successfully concluded and a new agreement signed. He also made reference to the 1978 agreement which led to the removal of all duties on Maltese products imported into EEC countries. This was in addition to other aid that Malta had received from the Community since 1971. The Leader of the Opposition, he said, had challenged him to make public the documents referring to the PN’s Government dealings with the EEC accusing him of hiding certain facts. To show that he had nothing to hide he was going to place on the Table of the House not only the documents referred to by the Leader of the Opposition but other documents too which showed exactly what the PN Government had asked for and how they had accepted without difficulty what the European Commission had offered.

The leader of the Opposition stated that he had expected a different motion, one that would set out what kind of relations Malta should have with the EEC over the next five years. The PN executive, he said, had already declared itself in favour of trying to establish the necessary conditions for Maltese membership of the Community. Since that time, he said, his party had worked hard to let the European Community know that there was a party in Malta whose policy was for closer relations with Europe, given the right conditions. He had gone to several member states where he had spelt out the message that the PN truly believed in Europe and not merely in extracting concessions from it. The reaction of the Government, he said, was that it possessed a document which indicated that the EEC had said no to Maltese membership and he then had challenged the Prime Minister to publish all the documents relevant to the issue. From them, he said, one would learn that the target of the PN Government had always been to move towards eventual membership of the EEC but advice it had received at the time had indicated the need for caution. He also argued that the agreement reached by the PN Government with the EEC in 1970 had remained in effect until 1976 and during that period exports to the Community had increased from £M10 to £M54 million and imports from £M48 to £M118 million. He further claimed that from the documents laid on the Table of the House it does not emerge that Malta had ever applied for membership and that this application had been rejected. What the documents said was that the question was premature.

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He then moved on to discuss some of the aspects of the 1976 and 1979 agreements between Malta and the European Community. He said that the financial protocol negotiated with Malta was as a result of the negotiations held by the previous Government which opened the eyes of the Community to the need of establishing a Mediterranean dimension to its foreign economic policy. He then moved an amendment to the Prime Minister’s motion which stated that it was in Malta’s interests that negotiations for membership should be embarked on. Furthermore, the amendment criticised the Government for not having an alternative policy to membership and called on the House to approve the amendment and to declare its desire that the Government should embark on a policy which would bring about full economic and political membership within the European Community.34 He emphasised that it was time to decide on Malta’s future relations with the Community. Extending the island’s existing agreement with the community, he claimed, was no decision at all but a dereliction of Malta’s interests. Membership would bring problems but there were advantages too, he said, especially the right to receive funds from the regional fund and the social fund, among others. Through membership Malta will also be at the centre where decisions affecting it are taken. However, negotiations for membership must take into consideration the special circumstances of Malta and he emphasised the fact that Malta’s smallness made it a special case. He concluded by taking a look at the political implications of membership and the role that Malta may play in the Mediterranean.

In his winding-up the Prime Minister reiterated his earlier position that the PN Government had applied for a declaration from the EEC that Malta would be eligible for membership and that it was told that no such declaration would be made. Malta had indeed formally applied for membership and the Commission had said that the matter was not opportune and that it was not prepared to bind itself in any way. Why, he asked, if it was true that the PN Government had such a policy did it not fight to achieve it? This was in contrast to the MLP Government which pursued its aims with vigour and determination and was prepared to tell the Commission that it was not prepared to accept everything it proposed. He said the Leader of the Opposition had boasted that he had visited several European personalities on the issue but he came back empty handed. This, he said, reminded one of the PN’s Government relationship with NATO who when asked to allow Malta to be a member turned it down, even though the Government had given the organisation facilities for free in Malta. Unlike the PN, the MLP Government was not prepared to tell the EEC that it wanted to be a member at all costs but it was prepared to first see what it was offered. The PN’s position, he argued, was doing untold damage to Malta by spreading the belief that the island had no alternative to membership. Not even in the case of independence could the PN obtain for Malta the best conditions but instead they had allowed Britain to consider the whole of Malta to be at its disposal. The Government, he said never told anyone in advance what arguments it was going to bring forward during negotiations, What it told everybody, however, was what it wanted to achieve. The Opposition had a right to know what the Government wanted to achieve

124 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration but not the right to know how it intended to arrive there, especially as it believed the Opposition would give this information away in order that the Government may fail in its mission. It was no use talking about the political aspects of membership of the Community, he said, for the Community had not as yet developed into a political union and its focus had remained economic. Europe, according to the Prime Minister, was still dominated by the USA and the MLP Government had made clear its position that it wanted Europe to have a soul of its own. He said that he agreed with the Leader of the Opposition that what the Government had achieved was not enough but they had done much more than his party had done when in Government. And it would be better if instead of criticising the Government the Opposition from time to time criticised the European Community and its actions towards Malta. The MLP’s policy, he stressed, was to pursue as many avenues as possible until it finds the one that was really in Malta’s interest. The Government believed in Malta’s Mediterranean role in fact not in words for it was the MLP Government that had stood up for the Mediterranean in Helsinki and told the Europeans that there can be no peace or security in Europe if the Arab countries remain excluded or the Palestinians do not secure an independent state. The Government was not prepared to abandon its neutrality policy or make vague declarations on membership as if this was what Malta required. And if his Government felt that it was necessary to tie Malta’s fortunes with those of the European Community he wanted to make it clear that his Government would never abandon all that it had achieved in its relations with Arab states. However, the Government had always made it clear too that it had nothing against anyone but all it wanted was the best for Malta. Following the Prime Minister’s speech, the Opposition’s amendment was rejected and the motion as proposed by the Government approved.

This first really extensive debate on Malta’s relations with the European Community, as the Common Market had now became known, demonstrated three things: first, that Labour believed that the time to bind Malta economically and politically to a regional block was not ripe; second, that in Labour’s view Malta’s economic situation demanded that it exploited every available opportunity and wanted to extract the largest amount of aid with as little commitment as possible on its part; and third that the Nationalist Party had become entirely convinced that membership in the European Community would answer its political and economic aspirations.

This state of affairs was emphasised in February 1982 when the new Parliament opened its doors after the contested December 1981 general elections. In his speech Dr Anton Buttigieg, President of the Republic, spoke of the Government’s readiness to conclude a new Association Agreement with the European Community which, while strengthening Malta’s economy, would help to bring the two closer together. However, the President said, the European Community did not have a policy of non-alignment and it was therefore not in Malta’s interests to seek membership. Nevertheless, it was in Malta’s interests that relations between Malta and the EC should continue to be consolidated and

125 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87 that Malta should continue to move closer to the Community. As the Opposition had failed to take its seats in Parliament there was no response to this statement.35

Malta’s relations with the European Community took a turn for the worse when the European Parliament voted a resolution asking the European Commission to withhold from Malta the financial aid already agreed between the Commission and Malta. The response of the Maltese Government was to pass through the local Parliament a resolution condemning the opposition that right-wing parties in the European Parliament were waging against the Maltese Government and threatening, if the Council of Ministers decided to adhere to the EC’s Parliament resolution, to withdraw Malta’s ambassador to the EC. In the debate that followed much of the flak was directed against the Opposition which the Government side accused of being behind these attacks. The Opposition, which had only just taken its seats in Parliament, abandoned the Chamber. One speaker after another accused Europe’s right-wing parties of wishing to obstruct Malta’s policy of neutrality and to force Malta to return to its old status of a British/NATO fortress colony.36

In March 1985, other resolutions on Malta in the European Parliament were the subject of a Statement by the Prime Minister, Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici. This was prompted by a visit to Malta of Roberto Formigoni, President of the Political Commission of the European Parliament. Formigoni had come to Malta to take part in a political activity organised by the PN but had paid a courtesy call on the Prime Minister. According to this Statement Formigoni had made some comments to the press prior to his departure from Malta in which he had claimed that the European Parliament, whenever it felt it necessary to intervene over political matters in Malta, had done so tempestuously. He was also alleged to have said that it was the custom of the European Parliament to speak out about such issues after it had investigated issues and spoke to all concerned. According to the Prime Minister Formigoni had stated during their meeting that he wanted to avail himself of this visit to learn from the Government about the matters raised in the resolution. The Prime Minister noted that the government had told the visitor that the Maltese Government expected better from people who occupied such important positions in the European Parliament then to condemn first and to seek explanations later. Judgements of the right sort could only be arrived at after and not before investigations had been made. If the European Parliament wanted explanations it should have reserved judgement until such explanations had been furnished. The Maltese Government now expected that before asking for explanations the European Parliament should offer its apologies for its behaviour.

The Prime Minister also stated that during the courtesy call Formigoni had informed him that a delegation from the European Parliament had been appointed and had been charged with cultivating relations with Malta by holding meetings with a similar delegation from the Maltese Parliament. A provision for such meetings between the two

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Parliaments existed, the Prime Minister said, in the Annexe to the Association Agreement that had been in force until a few years previously but that this agreement had not been renewed. Malta’s relations with the European Community were now on the basis ofa Council Regulation of the Community which every six months extended “the arrangements applicable to trade with Malta” and nothing more. The Government had already declared that it wanted better relations with the EC but, he said, this did not depend solely on the Government of Malta. If the Community really wanted better relations with Malta it should demonstrate this at that very moment when negotiations between the two sides were taking place over the second financial protocol. The ball, he said, was in the Community’s court. He concluded his Statement by telling the House that in his conversation with Formigoni he had made it clear that for the Government the concept of Europe included also those countries which did not form part of the European Community and he was making this declaration, he said, so that the public may clearly understand its concept of Europe.37 In the resolution of the European Parliament reference had been made to the dispute between the Government and the Church on the funding of Church schools in Malta. In May of 1985, nearly two months after the Formigoni visit, the Prime Minister made another Statement in the House this time about the agreement that the Government of Malta and the Vatican had concluded over the issue.38 This agreement seemed to help open up the way for better relations with the European Community which in the light of this agreement had voted a resolution which, among other things, noted with pleasure that the two sides had agreed on the introduction of free tuition in church secondary schools and the establishment of a joint committee between Church and State to further relations between the two. The resolution also called on the Commission and Council of Ministers to take urgent steps to improve political, economic and trading relations with Malta. The resolution also noted the EP’s decision to send to Malta a delegation to work for this purpose. The PM, Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, thanked the EP members that had sponsored this resolution and noted that relations between Malta and the EC may yet start a fresh chapter. He could not understand, however, that there were EP members who felt that they should vote against this resolution and this showed that a number of MEPs were still opposed to better relations with Malta. He also announced that a second positive step in the relations between the two sides had also been made with the start of negotiations on the Second Financial Protocol. He could say that from a Maltese perspective one could note that progress had been made in these talks and he hoped that in the not so distant future these talks will be concluded successfully. To questions from the Leader of the Opposition on the urgent need to re-negotiate the Association Agreement between Malta and the EC, given the latter’s expansion to include Spain and Portugal and possibly Greece, the PM replied that while current negotiations concerned solely the Financial Protocol, it did not mean that the subject of relations between the two had not been broached. What the Government wanted, however, was not a new Association Agreement but the establishment of a special relationship for Malta with the EC.39

127 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87

Towards Membership

In May 1987 the PN replaced the MLP as the government of the island and lost no time in making its position on EC membership clear. Speaking at the opening of the new Parliament the Acting President, Paul Xuereb, noted the determination of the Government to work for membership of the European Community provided that the conditions were right for Malta. One, therefore, he said, was to interpret the future economic policy of the Government as the mechanism that would eventually help it to achieve this aim. Furthermore, in a re-statement of the PN’s philosophy, he reiterated that Malta’s European roots were deeply entrenched and the island’s ties with Europe had grown deeper over the centuries. The Government believed in a Europe which one day will unite all European countries in a United Europe.

However, the process was to be a long and difficult one. Malta’s application for membership was not submitted until July 1990. Indeed, on July 16, 1990, the Prime Minister, in a Statement to the House, informed MPs that that same afternoon, in Brussels, Dr had formally presented Malta’s application for membership to this body. He said that he was proud that it fell to him to inform the House of what he called this necessary development in Malta’s political, economic and social history. He noted that while there was no agreement between the two parties over the issue of membership both sides were agreed of the need for closer relations with the European Community. He was convinced that it was the duty of his Government to embark on this first step. He would have liked that Malta was joining the European Community as from that date but all that had been done was to pave the way for discussions and the required preparations to begin. It was a process, he said, that one day will allow Parliament to give its final judgement on the issue and he was convinced that that judgement will be in favour of membership. Membership was a challenge which the Maltese people should face up to with confidence, he said. Time was required for the maturation of the process, years rather than months, but he hoped the number of years involved will be small.

The period proved to be longer than expected and membership was anything but assured. This paper shows that throughout this period the two parties maintained their respective positions for as we have seen their interpretation of what was best for Malta – implied or explicit - had been shaped by issues of cultural identity as well as Malta’s colonial experience. Labour feared the restrictions that membership would entail as it wanted the freedom to trade with the world if that was possible. Labour also feared that membership would subject Malta to a European Commission sitting in distant Brussels in the same way they had resented Malta’s subjection to Britain in the past. It did not believe that Malta could prosper in a setting in which the economic and political agenda was set in some remote capital. Malta’s ability to negotiate would also be reduced considerably

128 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration since membership would bind it with agreed rules. But what Labour feared most was the European Community evolving into a political union with a centralised military capability that would reduce Malta to its former status of a military outpost. This, in its view, would undermine all the efforts that had been made to ensure friendly political and commercial relations with North African states. Labour had tried to prevent this with its insistence that Malta’s neutrality be enshrined in the Constitution before conceding changes to the electoral system. But the above narrative does show that Labour wanted close relations with the EC and believed that this was in Malta’s interests but also wanted to retain freedom to manoeuvre according to how Malta interpreted its interests. This was made clear during the run-up to the 2013 EU membership referendum and general elections with the Labour Party pressing for a special relationship with the EU and not membership.

For the PN the debate on membership was no more than an extension of its century old claim that Malta was European culturally and politically and membership of the EC would consolidate that cultural and economic bond. We have seen in this paper how, even when faced with Malta’s weak economic status, it asserted its belief that Malta’s rightful place was in Europe. Europe was Malta’s natural home. It also saw Europe as a guarantor of Malta’s security and believed that Malta’s strategic value would facilitate EU membership. Hence, in 1987 it had accepted the inclusion of Malta’s neutrality in the Constitution with enormous reluctance. Indeed, the implication that arises from the above is that the PN saw Europe as its entire world and believed that Malta could achieve its status as a full state and fulfil its economic aspirations only within the European Community. Partnership could never satisfy its European aspirations and credentials. And it was on this platform that it campaigned in favour of European Union (the new name adopted by this time) membership during the 2003 referendum on membership and subsequent election. Labour, had opposed the idea of a referendum and argued that a decision on membership should be taken at a general election. Having lost that election, however, it accepted the outcome and to its credit has supported Malta’s role in the EU while in Opposition and has continued to advance Malta’s interests within this block while in Government. Malta joined the EU with nine other countries in May 2004.

Bibliography

Debates of the Legislative 1962-64 Debates of the House of Representatives 1964-87 G. A. Pirotta, (1993),“Maltese Political Parties and Modernisation” in Baldacchino, G., and Sultana, R., Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, Mireva Publications, Malta. G. A. Pirotta, (1996), The Maltese Public Service: The Administrative Politics of a Micro- state 1800-1940, Mireva Publications, Malta. G. A. Pirotta, (2006), Malta’s Parliament: An Official History, House of Representatives, Malta.

129 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87

G. A. Pirotta, (2012), “Mintoff, il-Helsien u n-Newtralita ta’ Malta 1947-1972” in Cutajar, Mario, (ed.) Mintoff: il-Bniedem u l-Istorja, SKS. The Malta Independent, 4 July 1993.

Endnotes

1 Pirotta, Godfrey, 2006, Malta’s Parliament: An Official History, p131. On that day Malta’s Parliament voted unanimously in favour of a resolution moved by Prime Minister Dom Mintoff and seconded by Opposition Leader George Borg Olivier calling for the independence process to begin.

2 For examples about this point see Pirotta, Godfrey, 1996, The Maltese Public Service: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-state 1800-1940, Chapters 8, 9 and 12, Mireva Publications, Malta.

3 See for example Pirotta, Godfrey, (1996), The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva Publications, Malta; and “Maltese Political Parties and Modernisation” in Baldacchino, G., and Sultana, R., (1993), Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, Mireva Publications, Malta.

4 The Malta Independent, 4th July 1993.

5 A study of electoral manifestoes in respect of this issue will be truly enlightening as an explicit reference to Malta’s European identity can be found in all of them, sometimes coupled with a reference to the Catholic religion.

6 Pirotta, 2006, p137.

7 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 26 April 1962.

8 The 1961 Blood Constitution, as it was commonly known at the time, introduced the concept of “the State of Malta” for the very first time and with this new definition of the constitutional position of Malta came wider freedoms. As added information one may also note that this Constitution also included, again for the first time, a Chapter on Human Rights.

9 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 2 May 1962.

10 Ibid.

11 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 7 May 1962.

12 Ibid.

13 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 10 May 1962.

130 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

14 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 21 May 1962.

15 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 21 May 1962.

16 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 5 September 1962.

17 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 26 September 1962

18 Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 26 September 1962.

19 Ibid.

20 Pirotta, 2006, p141.

21 One needs to remember that some Common Market member states still had colonies of their at this time and did not wish to grant a British colony more rights which they were not ready to concede to their own. Hence their refusal to negotiate directly with Malta irrespective of the fact that Britain had conceded Malta this right.

22 Franco-British rivalry was at its height during the 1960s and negotiations between Britain and the Six floundered on several occasions because of French opposition to British membership. Indeed, it was not until 1972 that Britain was finally admitted to the EEC.

23 Debates of the House of Representatives, 14 April 1965.

24 Debates of the House of Representatives, 23 May 1966.

25 For more information on this issue see Pirotta, Godfrey, 2012, “Mintoff, il- Helsien u n-Newtralita ta’ Malta 1947-1972” in Cutajar, Mario, (ed.) Mintoff: il-Bniedem u l-Istorja, SKS.

26 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 23 Oct. 1968.

27 Ibid.

28 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 29 Apr. 1972.

29 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 25 May 1976.

30 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 16 Nov. 1977.

31 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 7 May 1979.

32 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 2 Jul. 1979.

33 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 31 Jul. 1979.

131 The Challenge of European Membership: Malta’s Parliament Approach 1962-87

34 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 1 Aug. 1979.

35 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 15 Feb. 1982.

36 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 29 Mar. 1983.

37 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 11 Mar. 1985.

38 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 6 May 1985.

39 Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of 17 Jun. 1985.

132 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta

(Published in Teaching Public Administration, Vol XVII, No 1, Spring 1997)

This paper sets out to examine the history and current standing of politics and public administration education at the University of Malta, the island’s sole university. It will be argued that in the case of the discipline of politics, the greatest obstacle which has hindered its development has been the low esteem that politics as a whole has generally enjoyed among the Maltese. In respect of public administration, however, we shall see that the difficulties that this discipline has encountered, and which have inhibited its full inception into the curriculum of the university, have arisen mainly from the ambivalent attitude displayed in its regard both by governments and by the university. But, before proceeding with this discussion, the paper begins by outlining the political cultural milieu which has been a primary factor in the progress, or lack of it, that these two disciplines have made over the years.

The Political Cultural Milieu in Malta

n Malta politics is a very serious business. At the last general election, in October I1996, 97 per cent of those entitled to vote turned out to cast their preferences, despite being under no legal obligation to do so. And in the four weeks that preceded voting, tens of thousands of Maltese of every age, class or professional calling, thronged town squares and vast open spaces to listen to political leaders at noisy and colourful political meetings. There was nothing special or unusual about the 1996 elections. Voter turnout at Maltese elections has been consistently high - around the 95 per cent mark - for several decades (Schiavone, 1992). Even the scenes which characterised the electoral campaign and voting day were reminiscent of earlier elections: crowds of people carrying party flags, campaign tee-shirts and posters of party leaders or of their own favourite election candidates; long queues of voters waiting to cast their vote at polling stations which are not due to open for a number of hours; the sight of cloistered nuns mingling with voters away from the seclusion and shelter of their monasteries; and of sick people, some of them only a few days from death, being ferried from homes and hospitals to their designated polling stations (Pirotta 1994-96). Nor was the closeness of the final result a departure from past elections. By the end of the election the Malta Labour Party (MLP) had managed to gain a one-seat majority over its opponent the Nationalist Party (PN), until then the ruling party. A one- or two-seat majority in Parliament has been the norm in Malta since 1971 (Schiavone, 1992). What was noticeably different in this election was the relaxed atmosphere in which the electoral campaign and the voting took place. In Malta,

133 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta elections tend to be tense affairs and violence, sometimes of a minor nature, at other times more serious, has been a feature of nearly every election since 19211.

The picture that immediately presents itself is, therefore, one that compliments political parties on their ability to mobilise the voters and to bring out the vote on election day. It also presents a picture of intense party competition, extensive citizen participation in politics, and of a high degree of political polarisation. In Malta, an islandwitha population of 350,000 and an area of 360 sq km, political parties do not only maintain large bureaucratic organisations made up of paid officials and armies of volunteers but run 24-hour radio stations, television stations, and publish a number of daily and/or Sunday newspapers.2

The impact on voters of this vast activity has been quite remarkable and goes some way towards explaining the existing high levels of political polarisation. One study of the Maltese family (Tabone, 1987:142-5) has found, for example, that 42 per cent of the families interviewed had at least one member who was a card-carrying member of a political party. It also found that 72 per cent of Maltese families buy a political newspaper (44 per cent every day, 10 per cent every Sunday and 18 per cent occasionally), and that 46 per cent of them regularly attend political meetings or other political manifestations. Even more significant was the finding that just over 30 per cent of the families interviewed admitted that they were prepared to obey their preferred political party always and in everything, even when such obedience ran counter to their interests and opinions.

Given the pressing need for political parties to sustain their network of activities, one might have assumed that the demand for qualified individuals in politics, economics and other related disciplines is quite strong. One might also have assumed that the discipline of politics, one of the two disciplines under discussion in this paper, enjoys a respectable place on the curriculum of the university and other learning institutions; and that the demand for places on courses leading to qualifications in political studies, public policy and so on, is exceptionally strong. However, we shall see below that, by and large, the opposite presents a more accurate description of reality. Politics, as an academic discipline, has enjoyed and continues to enjoy, a much lower standing in comparison to other academic disciplines. This may seem rather contradictory given the extensive participation in politics in the state but this, as we shall see, is the paradox of Maltese politics.

The rather contradictory way that people in Malta view and relate to politics, and the importance that they ascribe to the public service while generally holding it in contempt, may seem rather strange. However, the principal reason for this is not difficult to find: it is the insensitivity displayed by public servants to the needs of their clients that lies at the root of this contempt (PSRC, 1989:10). Historically, government in Malta has

134 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration been a highly centralised and paternalistic activity and the signs are that the Maltese would resist wholesale changes to this system.3 In this sense, it is not a desire for less government (although this is true of some sectors of Maltese society, especially of big business) that motivates present criticism of the public service, but the low quality of services and customer care that it provides right across the board.

That issues connected with the public service are of importance to the Maltese can be gauged, once again, by reference to the 1996 electoral campaign. In this election, as with every other election since 1947, issues concerning the public service featured prominently in the election manifestos of both major parties and the campaign speeches and television appearances of their leaders. For example, the PN (until last October, the party in government) continually highlighted during its campaign the progress that has been achieved in in-house training; the vastly expanded application of information technology; and the substantially improved pay and conditions of public servants. It also promised, if re-elected, to introduce a Charter of Quality Standards for the public service; a number of incentive schemes, such as individual performance bonuses, team bonuses and efficiency dividend schemes; flexitime for married women officers and easier re-admission procedures for former female officers who had left the service because of marriage; early retirement schemes; and the grant of permanent pensionable status to a number of employees who, in October 1996, were employed on a casual part-time basis with government departments or public corporations.4

Labour, for its part, continually stressed that, despite government claims of how well-off public servants were or the progress that had been achieved in several areas, serious divisions existed at all levels of the public service. It also constantly stressed that user satisfaction with many of the services provided by public departments and utilities was at an all time low. In addition, it claimed that injustices had been committed during recruitment and promotion exercises, and that waste and corruption in government administration had reached unprecedented levels. Labour argued that what was required was a new and “modern” approach5 rather than the old traditional way of conducting government business. It promised, if elected, to introduce a Public Service Charter which would lay down the rights and duties of public servants and provide institutionalised mechanisms for the redress of grievances; to reform the Public Service Commission, a body sanctioned by the Constitution and charged with ensuring fairness and impartiality in the appointment, disciplining and dismissing of career public officers; to create a House of Representatives Select Committee responsible for overseeing the administration; and to introduce, in agreement with the unions, a consultative board responsible for the periodic review of salaries, productivity and staffing levels (Partit Laburista, 1996:110-4).

There are several reasons why public service issues enjoy such a high profile in Maltese politics. First, public servants make up nearly 40 per cent of the gainfully

135 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta occupied population and hence constitute an important voting constituency in their own right (Pirotta, 1997). Second, a consistent rise in the standard of living of the Maltese has increased public demands for greater efficiency and better quality services from government departments and public corporations. Hence, public service shortcomings and failings tend to serve as the proverbial stick with which opposition parties may beat the government. Finally, there is the role played by the public service and its agencies in the economy of the islands. In view of the near total absence of mineral resources, the rejection after 1970 of its traditional role as a strategic military/naval base,and the smallness of its economy, economic development in Malta has traditionally been a government-sponsored and -directed affair. Public expenditure remains, even today, one of the major mainstays of the Maltese economy. This can be seen from the fact that, in addition to the 40 per cent of gainfully occupied already depending on the public sector for their incomes, another 20 per cent or so tend to rely almost exclusively on income earned from government contracts and, since 1993, from the provision of municipal services to the newly created local councils (Warrington, 1995:5). Furthermore, the public service retains sole responsibility for the expansion, strengthening and maintenance of infrastructural support services in aviation, telecommunications, energy provision, tourism, banking and transport. Not surprisingly, public service efficiency is seen by all categories of Maltese society as inextricably linked to their socio-economic well-being.

The Discipline of Politics

Unlike other disciplines, such as economics, business management and accountancy, the academic study of politics in Malta has had few adherents and still fewer proponents. Today, the number of students following courses in management and in accountancy account for nearly one-seventh of the entire student population at the university. In the post-war period, the relentless pursuit of economic development policies by both local and colonial governments helped stimulate a demand for courses in economics and eventually a Department of Economics was created within the Faculty of Arts. This determined emphasis on economic development gave rise to long periods of sustained economic growth which, in time, generated a demand for business managers and accountants. Eventually, these two disciplines merged with economics to form what is today the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy.6 One may argue that a number of political developments, notably the granting of self-government in 1947, and that of independence in 1964, ought to have generated at least some interest in the study of politics, but these seem to have had only a marginal impact.

A number of factors have combined to distort the image that politics, in its generality, enjoys among the Maltese. These factors include the legacy of colonial rule, political polarisation and political patronage. It should not tax one’s imagination to understand that, in the colonies, it was in Britain’s interest that political activity should

136 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration either be strongly discouraged, or at least channelled into directions which did not undermine the authority of colonial governments. Perhaps one good example of this latter policy can be found in Lord Passfield’s 1930 directive which, while explaining that it was thought “desirable that legislation” should be introduced allowing for the legal establishment of trade unions in British colonies, pointed to the “danger that, without sympathetic supervision and guidance, organisations of labourers . . may fall under the domination of disaffected persons, by which their activities may be diverted to improper and mischievous ends” (Pirotta, 1983). For “disaffected persons” one should read political leaders and other activists, and for “improper and mischievious ends” one should read activities which might have endangered British interests or rule. By setting out the rules and boundaries of political activity colonial governments sought, therefore, to define what type or types of political behaviour were acceptable, and which were unacceptable. At times these rules were portrayed as having some ethical value: local politicians who allegedly infringed these rules were depicted as not merely acting in a dishonourable and ungentlemanly manner, but they might also be accused of deliberately setting out to sow division among the population, or of fermenting class-hatred, thereby undermining the unity of society (Chircop, 1991:37). Because of the strategic importance of the Maltese islands to Britain, the authorities had no qualms about pursuing this line of policy. One example may suffice. In the late 1920s, a number of Malta Labour Party activists were charged and convicted on a charge of sedition. The prosecution case rested on the fact that, during raids which the police had conducted in the homes of the accused, copies of The Soviet Weekly and of the works of George Bernard Shaw had been found (Chircop, 1991:71-103; I1-Ħsieb, 1979, 3:5). The message that the trials were intended to convey was that excessive interest in politics was not acceptable and that individuals with such an interest were either too ambitious or were dangerous.

That such a view may find favour with the population is not as unusual as it may seem. In Malta, education is not always seen as having an intrinsic value of its own. On the contrary, education is equated with skills rather than intellectual training skills which are intended to guide trainees to a designated career or sphere of employment. In other words, education is valid as an activity only if it leads to secure employment. By and large, the notion that there can be some joy in learning seems to be absent from the minds of many teachers, parents and students. In this sense, individuals keen on obtaining a formal qualification in politics are seen as individuals who intend making politics their principal source of livelihood.

Political polarisation has also contributed to the low esteem in which politics is held, both as an activity and as a discipline. Whilst there is extensive participalion in politics it is also true that, increasingly, individuals have voiced their concern at the methods adopted by local political parties in their efforts to mobilise voters. Parties have found it relatively easy and, perhaps, convenient to create lasting or enduring divisions

137 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta among the Maltese electorate. Language, religion, class, education and foreign policy have all been issues which have caused bitter divisions in Maltese society. Not infrequently these have resulted in violence, sometimes of a serious nature, as in the period 1978-1987 when the planting of bombs, the use of firearms, clashes between rival supporters and the police, and political strikes, became widespread. The excesses committed by both sides, and the inability of law and order bodies to avoid getting embroiled in these divisions, have served to lower considerably the status of both politicians and state institutions in the eyes of voters.

They also gave rise to the belief that it is impossible to find individuals with independent views who are prepared to place national above party interests. The result has been that “there is now ad hoc representation of Nationalist and Labour Parties on the Broadcasting, Employment, and Electoral Commissions [all conceived by the Constitution as independent of party influences] as well as on the Commission for the Administration of Justice which [. . .] plays a role in selecting and disciplining members of the judiciary” (Warrington, 1995:7). Given this situation, the notion that individuals can be found who can teach politics at university or secondary schools in a professional and non-partisan manner, enjoys little support. That this is now happening is, in itself, an indication of a growing maturity among a better educated Maltese population, especially the young. This is also seen in the growing tendency of voters to switch parties, a phenomenon relatively unknown until a few years ago.7

The extensive employment of patronage by the political parties has also helped to give politics in Malta a bad image. Indeed, so widespread has this practice become that it is now common practice for incoming administrations to institute inquiries into the way appointments, promotions, scholarships and government contracts have been granted by their predecessors in office. In 1987, a victorious Nationalist Party established the Commission Against Injustices, which had as its main aim the investigation of alleged injustices committed during sixteen years of Labour rule (Pirotta, 1991). InOctober 1996, it was the turn of a new Labour administration to propose the establishment of a tribunal to hear cases of alleged irregularities and injustices perpetrated by outgoing Nationalist ministers. Furthermore, in Malta, patronage is seen as being inextricably linked with corruption and the abuse of public funds for partisan purposes (PSRC, 1989). It is, therefore, often said that politics is a dirty business and that it is best left to politicians and their cronies.

Given the above, it is surprising that the academic study of politics has made any progress at all. But in addition to these handicaps, the discipline has faced another obstacle in the way that university authorities have traditionally defined the boundaries of the discipline. For example, courses in political philosophy and constitutional politics were considered to be appropriate subjects of study at university, although political philosophy

138 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration was shorn of any Marxist influences and was generally taught by clerics who exercised near dominance over the Department of Philosophy and its curriculum. Constitutional Politics was taught to students pursuing a degree in Law and involved a discussion of the legal implications of the doctrines of collective and individual ministerial responsibility, the Convention on Human Rights and other legal aspects of Maltese Constitutional Law. For all intents and purposes, it was political theory and constitutional law that constituted, until 1980, the discipline of political science in the minds of Maltese academics.

Such is the image of politics in Malta that the first course in proper political science to be organised at the university was intended to try to give Malta a new breed of politicians and political activists. The idea was conceived following a lecture given in Malta by Padre Sorge, a Jesuit priest who heads a small Jesuit College in Palermo, Sicily. According to its prospectus this college runs courses which seek to inculcate and equip participants with the necessary political knowledge and skills which would enable them to wrest political leadership positions from the existing corrupt and mafia-infested administration of Sicily.8 While there can be little comparison between Malta and Sicily, the increase in recent years in the number of cases in which crime and politics appeared to be tenuously connected has given rise to serious concern on all sides of the political divide. It was felt, therefore, that the time had come to adopt the Sorge model of political education to Malta. In the spring of 1991, three university academics visited the Jesuit college of Palermo and had talks with the staff.9 The outcome was a two-year evening diploma course of studies in Political Studies run by the Department of Public Policy, which was itself first established in 1988. In launching the course, course tutors and invited speakers emphasised the contribution that the university ought to be making to giving Malta a better trained and “morally” formed political elite.10 But although Political Ethics was one of the units taught in the diploma, the other units were identical, in content and organisation, to units taught in the Diploma in Public Administration (see below) and in the Bachelor of Commerce (Public Policy) major. These included Political Theory, Constitutional Politics, Government and Administration, Sociology, Policy Analysis, Political History, and Economics. The course was well attended and thirty-two participants were eventually awarded the diploma. The course also helped to lay to rest the beliefs that politics does not constitute an academic discipline and that individuals cannot be found who are capable of teaching the various areas in a professional and non-partisan manner. Paradoxically, although the course was judged by all concerned to have been a huge success, it was not repeated. Failure to continue with this diploma was seen by some academics as a lost opportunity to firmly establish political science as an integral component of university education in Malta.

Prior to the establishment of this diploma course, a number of course units associated with the discipline of politics were taught in different faculties. Reference has already been made to the teaching of Political Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy and of Constitutional Politics in the Faculty of Law. In time, the political philosophy unit was

139 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta extended to the Faculty of Law where it was felt that a training in political philosophy would enhance the intellectual and political skills of law students, which would be of benefit to them both as individuals as well as in the context of their respective legal careers. In 1987, a Department of International Relations was established within the Faculty of Arts, while a number of units in politics were included in some other courses. Since 1990, students taking the Planning Option of the Civil Engineering and Architecture Honours degree, and those studying for the Masters degree in Environmental Management, have been required to follow a fourteen-week course unit in Political Thought and Public Policy.

That these areas of study form part of the syllabi of particular university courses is due to the boost that the discipline of politics received from the introduction, in 1979, of an Honours degree course in Public Administration under the auspices of the Department of Management. Although, as we shall see a little later, this course was intended for prospective public servants, it allowed for the teaching of a number of political sciences units, such as Government and Administration, Policy Analysis, Political Development and Political Economy. However, for reasons also explained later, this course was wound up in 1988.

After the cessation of this degree, the study of politics was confined to a number of taught courses scattered over several degree and evening diploma courses. But in 1988, following internal discussions in the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy (FEMA) it was decided that a Department of Public Policy should be established within the Faculty. The new department was initially intended to take over responsibility for short courses contracted from the public service but it was also agreed that it should provide one of the majors - a public policy major - within the Bachelor of Commerce (BCom) degree run by the Faculty. The BCom, the main undergraduate qualification within the Faculty, is a general degree and students are expected to follow courses in two majors of their choice. Students who gain a second class (lower) grade may proceed to study for an Honours degree in one of the major areas which they had previously chosen.

The Department of Public Policy helped to extend the range of politics courses taught at the BCom and Honours level to include, Decision-Making, EU Institutions, International Relations and such specialisations as Government and Policy-Making in Micro-States. One of the problems faced in the teaching of these courses results from the acute shortage of available studies on Maltese politics. As a consequence most of the courses taught - although this is not a problem restricted to public policy courses - are based almost entirely on textbooks intended for other students, mainly in Europe.

Until two years ago there were serious difficulties in attracting students to the Public Policy Major or Honours courses. From 1988 to 1995 the annual average student intakes were four and one respectively. This was in such complete contrast to other

140 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration departments in the Faculty that, from time to time, discussions took place about the future of the Department. It was sometimes suggested that the Department should relocate itself within the Faculty of Arts where the demand for the type of courses provided by the Department was thought to be higher; or that it should be integrated with Sociology, Social Policy and Economics in a new Faculty of Social Sciences. The reasons behind the Department’s difficulties have already been indicated. Students tend to choose courses which have a clearly expressed vocational content. Business Management and Accountancy are examples of such courses. Public Policy appeared insufficiently vocational and although attempts were made to sell it as the key to a career in the public service, few students tended to view the latter as an attractive enough career option. But the prospects of the Department improved when it began to market itself as a real alternative to the mechanistic type of education being provided by the vocational departments. From 1995 onwards, it began to portray itself as the department for students who looked for academic excellence, especially those who hoped to continue with postgraduate studies overseas. This marketing ploy was helped by the success, over a number of years, of Public Policy students in competitions for prestigious scholarships to universities in Britain and Europe. Today, the Department’s average yearly student intake has risen to 35, up 31 on 1994, and it is expected to remain at this level over the next five years.

The Discipline of Public Administration

As observed earlier, the Maltese public service continues to occupy a central role in the life of Maltese citizens, both in terms of the contribution it makes to the Maltese economy and as a major provider of jobs and services. Yet, paradoxically, the public service has failed to command much interest either from governments, the principal users of its services and machinery, or from academics. Hence, public administration as an academic discipline has not as yet come to enjoy a distinguished place within the curriculum of the university.

Until the early 1950s, the general consensus among politicians, academics and even many civil servants was that public administration was a technical skill which required only limited intellectual ability. Practical experience was what counted. Consequently, except in cases where a recognised professional qualification was considered a sine qua non condition for office, a university education in public administration or any other field of study was not deemed relevant or necessarily essential to the needs of the public service. Hence, public administration education enjoyed no status at a university which catered mainly for those who desired a career in the traditional professions - law and medicine - or a life in holy orders.

But the grant of self-government in the immediate post-war period, the rapid implementation of an ambitious welfare programme and the need to diversify the economy

141 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta away from its traditional dependence on British defence spending, soon impressed on governments the need for better trained and educated public servants. This point was forcefully made, in 1955, by a Commission on the Civil Service appointed by the Prime Minister. “[. . .] Efficiency at the highest levels”, the Commission noted, “calls for officers of the highest quality and natural ability. The Maltese Public Service is no exception. Indeed, we think that with the expansion which has taken place in recent years, there is greater need for outstanding officers in the upper ranges” (Wilson et al, 1956:13). The Commission recommended, therefore, that greater efforts should be made to attract university graduates to the public service.

Nonetheless, a special admission examination for graduates to the executive class, held in the same year, proved to be a dismal failure: none of the candidates passed. A second examination, held in October 1955, met with slightly better results for one of the three candidates managed to pass. The reasons suggested by the Commission for the failure to attract the right candidates were twofold. First, that the existing salary scales were not attractive enough to attract good university graduates. Second, that the examination papers were not, as in Britain, “aligned closely enough to courses of study which the candidates had been pursuing at university” (Wilson et al, 1956). The solution to this latter problem, as suggested by the Commission, was closer collaboration with the university.

The first of several collaborative attempts between the university and the public service took place in 1956. In that year the Department of Economics, itself a product of the early 1950s, introduced (with support from the Faculty of Laws) a part-time course leading to a Diploma in Public Administration (hereafter referred to as DPA). The principal aim of this course was to help career civil servants gain a better understanding of economic principles, social administration and the social sciences generally. It was also hoped that the course would help make up for the lack of interest being shown by graduates in the public service as a career option. To this extent it was a policy which, while acknowledging that graduates were not keen to choose the public service as a career, sought to remedy existing difficulties by providing some form of access for civil servants wishing to go to university. For this reason lectures for this course were held twice a week in the late afternoon.

From its inception the course proved to be quite popular, with an annual average intake of students, especially in its first years, of about 35 participants. Spread over three years, subjects taught included Economics, Public Administration, Administrative Law, Social Policy, Sociology, History, Political Thought and Catholic Social Thought. The academic bias of the course was towards law and economics and it may be said that the course succeeded in its aim of providing the government with better educated and trained civil servants.

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After independence, the evident success of this diploma course encouraged the government to embark on a scheme which made it possible for public officers, through sponsorship, to pursue degree level courses at university. The response of public servants to this initiative was overwhelming and several DPA graduates returned to university to further their studies, mainly in economics and the humanities. Both the DPA and the sponsorship scheme were continued until 1971 when a new Labour administration cancelled both programmes.11

Until that happened, however, a new form of sponsorship had gained in importance. This was the practice of awarding, every year, a number of overseas scholarships to serving members of the public service. These scholarships were funded through several assistance programmes agreed with such donor agencies as the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the British Council and other international organisations. A small number of scholarships were funded by the Maltese government but these tended to be of small amounts, enabling their recipients to attend short courses at civil service training colleges or other training agencies. Professional members of the public service, such as lawyers, doctors and teachers, had enjoyed similar opportunities for a number of years before these were extended to general service grades.

It was, ironically, the same Labour administration which in 1971 had wound up the DPA and the local sponsorship programmes that, in 1979, instituted an Honours degree course in Public Administration. The circumstances which led to this development were anything but usual and involved every faculty at the university. In 1978, a dispute between the government and the union representing the medical profession resulted in the disruption of courses in the Faculty of Medicine at the university. The response of the government was to create a new university, which eventually absorbed the older one, and introduced what became known as the student-worker scheme.12

Courses run by the university were now to be strictly in line with manpower policies and targets as projected by the government and in those areas which the government considered necessary for the economic development of the islands. Under the new scheme, applicants for places on university courses were required to find employers willing to sponsor them for the duration of the course before they could be admitted to university. However, private industry proved unwilling to support the scheme, and the government was forced to shoulder responsibility for all would-be students. In fact, until the scheme’s demise in 1987, sponsorship of students came mainly from government departments, public corporations and industries in which the government was the major stakeholder. The academic year was divided into two half-yearly periods and students were required to attend university for six months and work for their sponsors for the other six. Furthermore, students were contractually bound to serve their sponsors for two years after graduation. In return, they were paid a monthly salary and had their employment guaranteed.

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The new degree in Public Administration was made the responsibility of the Department of Management in the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy, which was itself one of the new faculties established under the reform programme. By 1981, however, a semi-independent Division of Public Administration, with responsibility for the new degree, had emerged within the Faculty. As with every other degree course under the student-worker scheme, the Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Public Administration degree course was of five years duration. It was to prove one of the most successful degree courses run under the new scheme. Many of the students who pursued this course were eventually to win scholarships which enabled them to continue their studies outside Malta. Indeed, today, seven out of every ten Public Administration graduates hold a postgraduate qualification, mainly from a British university, including some with PhDs. Many of them hold key public service posts in training, information technology and offices connected with public service reform.

The course itself was divided into two parts. In Part One, which was divided into two semesters but (given the peculiar workings of the scheme) spread over two years, students were taught Basic Accounting, Principles of Economics, Sociology, Political Thought, Management Accounting, Elements of Maltese Law, Quantitative Techniques and Computing. In nearly every case these areas of study were taught to combined classes of students of Public Administration, Accountancy and Management. Students who failed Part One of the course were not allowed to proceed to Part Two.

In Part Two, with one or two exceptions, study units were restricted to students who had taken Public Administration as their option. Subjects taught included Econometrics, Economic Development, Public Finance, the Legal Framework of Administration, Human Resources Management, Industrial Relations, Social Administration, Project Evaluation, International Business, Government and Administration, Development Administration, Financial Management, Public Policy and Research Methodology. Part Two of the course was of three years duration with students required to attend classes for six months of each year. An average of five subject areas were taught every semester although, in their final year, students were expected to present a 10,000 word dissertation on a topic of their choice.

By the late Eighties, however, public opposition to the worker-student scheme had become rather strident while public service unions had become increasingly worried about the promotion prospects of their members. The large annual intake of graduates seemed (from their point of view) certain to affect the prospects of public officials who lacked degree qualifications. Because of the scheme, the number of graduates finding their way into the administrative class of the public service had never been higher and eventually strained the ability of the government to absorb them. In response to these

144 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration pressures, the intake to the BA (Honours) in Public Administration degree course was suspended in 1985 and the Public Administration Division was wound up in 1987.

The demise of the student-worker scheme in 1987, together with vastly improved employment prospects in the private sector, resulted in an exodus of graduates from the public service. Some attempts were made to stem the tide, mainly in the shape of improved salaries and working conditions, but the image of the public service as far as graduates were concerned remained poor and, despite every effort, this exodus could not be halted. But the need for graduates remained acute and following the publication of the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC), which once again stressed the need for better qualified public officers, attempts at collaboration with the university were re-instituted (PSRC, 1989:42). The outcome of these discussions was the re-introduction, in 1990, of the Diploma in Public Administration under the auspices of the Department of Public Policy. As far as the civil service was concerned this was a second best solution for, initially, public service leaders and the Office of the Prime Minister had shown great enthusiasm for a proposal to set up an Institute of Public Sector Studies at the university. But this enthusiasm was not matched by that of Deans and Heads of faculties and the proposal was abandoned.13

The new DPA course was intended and designed for civil servants at mid-career level, i.e., officers in the Administrative Assistant and Administrative Officer grade, whose ages ranged from 35 to 45 years. In 1994, eligibility for attendance to this course was extended to public officers in the Executive Officer grade. The course was of a two-year duration and those admitted - the selection of candidates being left entirely in the hands of the Department of Public Policy - were released from their respective departments for two days a week to attend classes. In Year One students were taught Principles of Public Administration, Principles of Politics, Legal Framework of Administration, Sociology, Economics, Statistics and some Computing. In Year Two subjects taught included Contemporary Administrative Issues, Decision-Making, Public Policy, Government and Policy-Making in Micro-States, Accountancy and a number of options from which students were required to choose two. The bias of the course, as the above subjects indicate, was towards politics and public administration, although efforts were made to present the whole in an inter-disciplinary manner. Towards the end of their course, students were also expected to write a 10,000 word dissertation on topics which were related to areas taught over the two years.

Like its predecessor, this DPA course was, at first, very popular with civil servants and the number of entrants was fixed at thirty students every two years. The course was also rated highly by trainers in the public service and a number of practitioners collaborated with the Department of Public Policy as lecturers and tutorial assistants. But by 1994 interest began to decline. The main reason for this arose from the fact that a new grading

145 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta structure had been agreed with the unions which guaranteed the promotion prospects of every public officer, without the need to obtain a university qualification. Consequently, in 1996, the number of diploma graduates fell to just sixteen.

There was no new intake of students in October 1996 and the future of the diploma is once again under discussion, but this time within the context of a wider attempt to establish public service/university relations on a sounder and more permanent footing. The most prominent item on the agenda is, once again, the creation of an Institute of Public Sector Management at the university. While it is difficult to assess whether this proposal will materialise or not, it is significant that this time round there is greater determination on both sides to proceed with the proposal. Funds for the institute have already been allocated by the government in the 1997 budget and a joint report has already been presented. However, given the setbacks in the past, it would be presumptuous for an observer to try and predict future developments. One may legitimately, however, seek reasons for this ebb and flow, this inconsistency, this uneven pattern in the development of the discipline of public administration.

In the first instance it may be said that, generally speaking, the university has shown very little interest in matters associated with the public service. It has not tried to assess public service needs or the ways in which the university might help the public service to address some, at least, of those needs. One example is sufficient to demonstrate this point. In 1988 the Maltese government appointed a Commission to examine every aspect of the public service and to suggest reforms. The Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) dealt, among other things, with the issue of the training and education of public officers. Nonetheless, the Commission, whose chairman was the Rector of the university, did not see it fit at any stage to assess the value of current or past courses in public administration run by university departments. That such an evaluation was necessary, if not quite obvious, should have been gauged from the fact that the Secretary to the Commission, and nearly all of its research and support staff, were all former graduates in public administration from the university. Furthermore, following the publication of its report, these same graduates were appointed to important and strategic offices concerned with training and the implementation of public service reform.

A second problem concerns the way that public service leaders have viewed the contribution that the university is capable of making towards developments in the public service. Public service leaders apparently feel that academics do not quite understand the unique problems of the public service and they are, naturally, reluctant to abdicate control over training and education. The way university authorities have dealt with the public service in the past has, in many ways, served to reinforce these fears. Such apprehensions have, from time to time, given rise to calls from within the public service for the establishment of a Civil Service College or some other institution of equivalent status.

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While this may be one solution to the problem, it can only be a partial solution. The input of academics will always be required and hence some modus vivendi with the university will always be necessary. More to the point, it cannot be considered entirely to the benefit of public servants that they should remain isolated or cut off from those resources which only the university can provide and from contact with the academic world. But if co- operation between the two sides is to become firmly established, the university must learn to be more sensitive to the needs of the public service and less patronising in its approach.

Conclusion

In tracing the history of the disciplines of politics and public administration, this paper has sought to examine the forces and pressures which have impacted or helped to shape their development as academic disciplines in Malta. The evidence presented leaves very little doubt that the existing political culture has exerted great influence on the way both disciplines have fared. The study of politics has been seen to lag behind that of public administration throughout the discussion. One reason for this, it would appear, may be found in the fact that the study of public administration is associated with a clear career option while that of politics is not. Another may be linked to the fact that economic development has featured more prominently in the minds of policy makers than political development, thereby creating some demand for qualified administrators. Whatever the reasons, however, the present status of these two disciplines is far behind that which they enjoy in most other European countries.

References

Il-Ħsieb (1979), 3:5, pp 24-30. Malta: Union Press. Partit Laburista, (1996), Iċ-Ċittadin L-Ewwel: Il-Politika Ġdida Laburista. Malta: Sensiela Kotba Soċjalisti. Pirotta, G.A. (1983), ‘The Growth of Trade Unions under British Colonialism: A Comparative Survey’, in Economic and Social Studies, New Series, I, pp 29-40. Pirotta, G.A. (1991), ‘First Observations on the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission’, in Economic and Social Studies, 6, Special edition, pp 49-64. Pirotta, G.A. (1994), ‘Maltese Political Parties and Political Modernization’ in R.G. Sultana and G. Baldacchino, eds., Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, Malta: Mireva Publications. Pirotta, G.A. (1997), ‘Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta’ in Public Administration and Development,17:1, pp 177-207. Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC), (1989), A New Public Service for Malta: A Report on the Organisation of the Public Service.Malta: Department of Information. Schiavone, M. (1992) L-Elezzjonijiet Ġenerali f’Malta: 1849-1992. Malta: Pubblikazzjoni Indipendenza.

147 The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta

Tabone, C. (1987), The Secularisation of the Family in Changing Malta. Malta: Dominican Publications. Warrington, E. (1995), ‘Introduction’ in Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile of the Public Service of Malta. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Wilson, A., Day, A., and Whitehead, A.S. (1956), Report of the Commission on the Malta Civil Service. Malta: Department of Information.

Endnotes

1 Political violence of a serious nature occurred in the 1962 election when Labour supporters were brutally assaulted in Gozo, Malta’s second island; and in 1987 when MLP supporters attacked and prevented PN supporters from holding a political meeting in the village of Zejtun, a Labour stronghold.

2 Since the beginning of the 1990s each party has had its own radio station. In 1991 the MLP went one step further and launched its TV station. The PN is currently running a fund raising campaign in support of its own TV project.

3 Attempts at privatisation have been strongly resisted in the past and even today government is expected to subsidise activities which in other European countries would be left to the private sector or market forces.

4 See In-Nazzjon Tagħna, of September 24, 1996.

5 The MLP has applied the term “modern” to each of its policy proposals as these were presented to the electorate. The intention of the party is to convey the message that the party is capable of reforming Malta’s creaking institutions and of launching Malta into the 21st Century.

6 The Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy came into being in 1978 when the New University was established. Within a year this university was merged with the older one but the faculty remained basically unchanged.

7 In 1992 the swing against the MLP was considered to be unusually high and many observers interpreted this development as the beginning of a gradual de-freezing of party loyalites. The swing against the PN during the 1996 election has been higher than that against the MLP in 1992, a development which seems to confirm earlier predictions.

8 This college, named after Padre Aruppe, another Jesuit priest, runs courses in economics, politics, ethics, law and Sicilian history. One of its former lecturers, Leolucca Orlando, is now mayor of Palermo and one of the leaders of La Rete, a political party which enjoys tremendous support among young Sicilian voters.

148 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

9 The delegation was made up of the Head of the Department of Public Policy, the author, the Dean of the Faculty of Theology, and another priest who though not an academic had shown great interest in the project.

10 This was the main gist of the speeches made by members of the Board of Studies of the Diploma in Political studies and the Secretaries of the political parties on the opening day of the course.

11 Labour under Mintoff proved rather hostile and distrustful of the civil service. It was a hostility that was based on the events that surrounded Labour’s last days in office in 1958.

12 This strike, the longest in Maltese history, lasted for over a decade. The student- worker scheme was intended to wrest control over the university from the hands of an anti-Labour, middle class academic body.

13 The proposed institute generated no enthusiasm among deans and heads of faculties at the university and the matter was not raised again until the summer of 1996.

149 Professor Pirotta participating in a conference on equal gender representation in Parliament, 2019.

Professor Pirotta with former Tunisian Ambassador to Malta H.E. Souad Gueblaoui, 2013.

150 Professor Pirotta with Graduates of the Institute of Public Administration and Management, 2011.

Professor Pirotta with Czech Republic Prime Minister the Hon. Andrej Babis and former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Malta the Hon. Carmelo Abela, 2018.

151 Professor Pirotta with the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Malta, the Hon. Evarist Bartolo, together with Professor Stephen Calleya, MEDAC, 2020.

Professor Pirotta, signing the visitors book of the Czech Republic Senate, 2015.

152 Mr. Anton Tabone, Speaker of the House of Representatives, President Emeritus and former Finance Minister, Hon. Lino Spiteri at the launching of Prof. Pirotta’s book titled “Malta’s Parliament. An Official History”, 2006.

Front cover of Prof. Pirotta’s book about the political history and evolution of Malta’s Parliament from 1800 to 2003 showing the Tapestry Chamber of the Grandmaster’s Palace.

153 Professor Pirotta (middle), chairing the eve of election debate between the leaders of Malta’s two major political parties Edward Fenech Adami (left) and Alfred Sant (right), 1996.

Addressing a conference at Malta’s House of Representatives, 2019.

154 Prof. Pirotta’s appointment as Member of Merit of the Republic of Malta by then President of the Republic of Malta, H.E. Marie Louise Coleiro Preca, 2016.

Professor Pirotta launching Malta’s EU Presidency agenda to EU Heads of Missions in Prague, 2017.

155 Professor Pirotta (2nd row, 1st from right) with fellow Ambassadors during the annual Ambassadorial meeting, 2017.

156 Part 2

1. Future of the Public Service 2. Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta 3. The Organization of Public Administration and Civil Society: Comments and Remarks 4. L-Istat u t-Tmexxija tal-Istituzzjonijiet. 5. Bringing Good Governance to Malta 6. A New Creation or an Image and Likeness? The Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Governance in a Centralized Micro-State 7. Public Administration Education and Training in Small States: The Case of Malta 1950-1995 8. A Farewell to Paternalism Through Public Enterprise? Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta 9. The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta The Future of the Public Service

(Presented at the Conference: Developing a Human Resources Agenda for the Mediterranean, 11-13 June 1996, Malta.)

think I would be right in assuming that my task today would be to talk about Itwo themes, that is, the future of the public service within the context of a Mediterranean agenda, which implies proposals for action; and a discussion of the future of the public service per se, but in terms of human resource development issues.

Public services tend to be the major employer of human resources in most of the countries that border the Mediterranean. They also account for a huge proportion of the Gross Domestic Product of their countries. More to the point, they tend to have a major impact on the quality of life that we enjoy. They must, therefore, be taken very seriously and it is right that we should be concerned about their future. Especially now that the economies of our countries desperately need to gear themselves up to face the challenges being posed by rapid globalisation in nearly every aspect of human activity. But before I venture on the task of addressing the issues which I believe ought to be addressed, two qualifications need to be made. First, there seems to be the tendency for people to assume that in some way the Mediterranean constitutes a region in any meaningful sense. It does not. Indeed, as I have had occasion to stress in the past at fora of this nature, the Mediterranean at best constitutes nothing more than a border where several regions come together, regions which are identifiable either by their political or economic systems or indeed by their religious or cultural characteristics. I need not dwell on this issue, for it does not require detailed analysis. All that one needs to do is to consult a reputable atlas to convince oneself of the soundness of this observation. But this tends to make it extremely difficult to talk about the future of public services in the Mediterranean given the marked differences in culture, tradition and raison d’être, which underpin the various public services that exist within the countries that border the Mediterranean. It is, hence, more difficult to try and conceptualise a future public sector agenda for the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, I shall try to do this as briefly and as cogently as possible.

However, before I do this, a second qualification needs to be raised. There is a tendency among academics and practitioners to adopt an ethnocentric approach when discussing issues concerned with politics, government and public administration, and it is very often the case that the concepts we employ and the systems we debate are those derived from the US-European tradition. Non-European variations are often dismissed without discussion. Given my British academic training and my area of specialisation, I too

158 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration must, at times, plead guilty to this charge. Having raised these two weighty qualifications I shall now endeavour to address the agenda before us.

The first point which I would like to stress, a point often forgotten in the current debate about the public service, is that no public service can be profitably or meaningfully discussed if it is viewed in isolation from its social, economic and political environment. The role of the public service in any given polity or society depends very much on such factors as the stage of economic or social development at which that particular polity has arrived. It is nonsense to seek to foist full-blown free-market concepts on a public administration which serves a society in which the market happens to be at a backward stage of development or, as in the case of Malta, where size imposes strong restrictions on the development of a full market economy. This is not to say that the market has no role to play but that we must be alive to the difficulties that small size imposes on our economy.

To press home this point one need only point to a number of examples where the role of the state was necessary, even though these are not really crucial areas for state intervention. I have in mind, for example, the determining role that the state has played in the advancement of the arts in Malta, a role far beyond that played by other governments. Even in such areas as participation in the Eurovision Song Contest and at Games without Frontiers, the state has played a determining role. At a much crucial level one need only point to the important role that our governments have played, and still play, in price and wage controls and in determining the level of food prices. In Malta, the government in fact spends about 5 million Maltese Liri a year in bread subsidies alone.

It is equally nonsense to discuss any public service within a framework which divorces it from the political system which it is bound to serve and with which it is required to interact. My own study of the forces that shaped the Maltese public service over a period of 140 years makes me wary of the way many reformers seek to apply lessons learned from the particular experiences of their own country to problems and situations in other countries. Turning solutions to particular problems in particular contexts into dogma may prove to be not only mistaken, but costly and dangerous in other particular contexts. In other words, given the differences that exist, one ought to be very careful to avoid turning particular solutions to problems in particular contexts into universal maxims of public administration. This is not to say that different countries cannot learn from each other’s experiences. I would be foolish to deny that, but the sharing of experiences is a significantly different exercise from what is currently taking place, i.e. a concerted attempt to impose one’s own experiences on others irrespective of whether the medicine being administered is what the patient really needs. The way to avoid this, in my view, would be the institution (on a formal or informal basis as the case may be) of some form of Mediterranean forum, where public administration practitioners and academics can discuss issues of mutual concern. There are, of course, areas of knowledge and expertise

159 Future of the Public Service in which one society may have an advantage over the other, but it is seldom the case that one society enjoys a monopoly of knowledge and expertise in all fields. This forum must not, if it is to be useful to all potential participants, develop along similar lines as those adopted by the European Union in some of its Mediterranean programmes whereby non-EU participants are expected to be mere recipients, rather than equal participants in the learning process. This we-Europeans-know-best approach is not only arrogant but misplaced.

I would think that areas of common concern would be training, especially in the field of intermediate technology and its diverse uses, the intellectual development of public administrators and prospective or potential recruits, and the strengthening of audit capabilities, audit being here defined in a wider sense to include policy analysis and the impact of current policies rather than just financial auditing. These concerns, I believe, are issues which strike at the heart of any public administration that is genuinely striving to be efficient and effective. Gone are the days when public servants could embark on the public service careers merely on the strength of a short, intensive induction training programme. Even in public administration, where the pace of change has been traditionally sluggish, innovation is proceeding at a rapid pace. One need only look at the swift process by which intermediate technology has been introduced in the Maltese public service and those of other neighbouring states over the last five years. Such rapid improvements, if they are to prove profitable, need to be sustained by well-defined training programmes and I can see here a great opportunity for collaboration between public administration trainers in the Mediterranean. Similarly, I can see a wide scope for collaboration among public administration practitioners from Mediterranean countries in the pursuit of excellence. Through the exchange of ideas and yes, intellectual discourse between practitioners, academics and politicians, the road to a more professional public service can be sustained and consolidated.

I shall now turn to the second theme of my presentation, namely that concerned with the future of the public service itself. I shall do this by the use of two examples, one taken from Britain, the other from the Maltese experience. In so doing I shall ask you to go back in time, but the reason for this stems from the need to demonstrate that some principles which relate to the public service remain basically unchanged.

In 1854 Charles Trevelyan and Stafford Northcote published a 20-page report on the reform of the British civil service. Until the publication of their report, recruitment to the service was through patronage or influence and, not infrequently, through the purchase of office. Promotion was by seniority of drawing men to the top, step by step from the bottom. Furthermore, there was no division between mechanical and intellectual duties. To remedy these grave problems, Northcote and Trevelyan proposed that henceforth, entry to the service was to be by open competition which was to be supervised by a Civil

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Service Commission, while promotion was to be based solely on merit. The superior and responsible offices of the civil service were to be staffed by individuals provenof intellectual ability, proven intellectual ability being here defined as successful completion of university education, or experience and success in some line of life. The eventual adoption of the Northcote-Trevelyan formula revolutionised the British civil service. Lord Fulton, reporting on the British civil service in 1968 noted - but it must be stressed not on a disparaging note - that “the Home Civil Service today is still fundamentally the product of the nineteenth century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report”. By positing competition, fairness, merit and intellectual ability as the new pillars of the British civil service, Northcote and Trevelyan transformed the civil service from a corrupt and inefficient organisation into an institution staffed with competent and capable young men, where professionalism was the dominant force, an institution with its own ethos. It was not an entirely new formula, for competition, merit and intellectual ability had already for some time found expression in the French and German public services.

In 1989 the Public Service Reform Commission, which had been appointed by the Prime Minister of Malta only a year earlier, published its own report entitled A New Public Service for Malta. Although in theory recruitment to the Maltese public service is by open competition, the Reform Commission found that the exercise of political patronage was prevalent to an excessive degree. “Politicians,” the Report stated, “have succumbed to the temptation to factor the service into the strategies of power politics. Willingly and unwillingly, the public service came to be associated with the use of public resources for partisan and private gain.” Consequently, public confidence in the service has been eroded and its internal cohesion severely damaged. “Its leadership”, the Report concluded, “has either been compromised or relegated to the side-lines.” The Report went on to list the ills facing the Maltese public service. According to the Report, to its members and to prospective recruits and the public in general, the service presented an image of declining prestige, of neglect and indifference. It was an image reinforced by its scandalously inadequate working conditions and outdated technologies; its lack of managerial expertise and limited planning, policy analysis and audit capabilities; and the absence or deterioration of mechanisms to discipline staff and to reward merit. All of these factors, as recent events in Italy and other neighbouring states have demonstrated, are not quite unique to Malta and are daily manifested in the poor quality of services which public service clients have had now to endure for a number of years.

But despite these problems, the report of the Reform Commission felt it necessary to highlight some of the strengths of the public service. “If our nation’s citizens are well- fed, well-clothed, well-housed, if they enjoy the benefits of education, good health and the protection of the law, if they participate in the creation of the nation’s wealth, they owe something to the ability, dedication and adaptability of the public service”. The Report went on to state – a view which I would endorse – that “within the public service today,

161 Future of the Public Service there are still thousands of competent, dedicated men and women whose contribution goes unrecognised and unrewarded” and concluded that “retaining their loyalty, rewarding their merit and above all developing their competence becomes the first task of reform”.

Thus, as you can see, the prescriptions of the Public Service Reform Commission are not so different from those advocated by Northcote and Trevelyan one hundred and forty-two years ago. They are not so different because the goal of attracting the best through fair and open competition, of retaining the best by rewarding merit, and by continuous development of their intellectual and operational skills, are sine qua non requisites for any well-functioning public service. And, therefore, the first point I wish to raise concerns the present mode of attracting recruits to the public service.

Open and fair competition has always been held to be one of the requisites for selecting the best recruits from among those applicants wishing to enter the service. Entry to the Maltese public service is said to be by fair and open competition and hence it should follow that only the best gain entry to the service. For this to be true, two assumptions must be satisfied. First, that the system of competition adopted is such as to allow entry to the service of candidates who are most likely to satisfy present and future needs of the public service. I do not believe this to be entirely the case. Rather, I do feel that greater attention needs to be paid to this important aspect of the recruitment process. It must be remembered that, in contrast to what happens in the private sector, the public sector is today probably the only employer which promises new recruits a lifelong career. Taken to its logical conclusion, this means that one ought to expect that one day these recruits, at least some of them, would be the successors to today’s leadership. The present recruitment system does not always take adequate stock of this fact. What is needed, therefore, is a studied assessment of the human resources needs of the public service in advance of the time when the notion of needs becomes in actual fact synonymous with the notion of acute human resources shortage. We must endeavour to break with the present system of ad hoc responses to staff shortages by longer term planning of human resource requirements.

A second assumption is that the competition is fair. But fairness is not secured merely by properly-conducted examinations, but by a system which gives the best candidates a proper chance of demonstrating unequivocally why they are the best. I was utterly shocked to see, for example, that a number of graduates, who from personal experience I would have had no hesitation in strongly recommending to any employer, failed the examination for entry to the Administrative Officer grade. And this at a time when the public service is desperately seeking to attract graduates of undoubted ability. This by itself should make us ask questions and seek solutions to those same questions. But if properly conducted competition is crucial to the future of the public service, the reward of merit is even more paramount. Seniority is, admittedly, a much

162 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration safer criterion for promotion than merit, especially as seniority can provide a strong defence against nepotism and political patronage. But the adoption of seniority as the sole criteria for promotion has some equally serious drawbacks, not least of which is its tendency to reward the undeserving at the expense of the deserving. It must also be said that at times the employment of merit as a criteria for promotion served merely to mask nepotism and political patronage, thereby discrediting the very essence of the concept. As a consequence, merit was employed to reward the undeserving and the politically acceptable among the candidates for promotion. Having said that, however, I must also stress that a study of the way promotions have been granted over the years will show that different political administrations have resorted to seniority in an effort to ensure that injustices are minimised.

What is required, in my view, is that the criteria which constitute merit should be clearly established and made known at the outset, both to those newly recruited to the service and to those already serving as public officers. Furthermore, these criteria must form an integral part of a well thought out system of continuous performance evaluation. Employees must be made to see and feel that those promoted deserved their promotion and that failure in their promotion bid need not be seen as loss of face, but as stimulus to improve their performance and, eventually, be equally deserving of promotion. In this sense, the criteria which constitute merit should not be vague statements but clear benchmarks by which employees themselves can judge their performance and hence their suitability or non-suitability, as the case may be, for promotion. Of course, there may very well be the need for the existence of a number of scrutinising agencies with executive powers to ensure that all promotion exercises have been carried out according to the agreed norms, and to further ensure that real grievances are remedied as early as possible. It is the unequivocal reward of merit coupled with intellectual ability, not codes of ethics, which will one day make of the public service a distinct profession in its own right.

The business of government grows daily more complex and costly. These two factors on their own should convince us of the need for a public service with a strong intellectual base. By this I do not mean an effective in-house training capability. Of course I mean that as well, and it is particularly heartening to see that a large number of Mediterranean public services are now investing more heavily in the introduction of, where these were lacking, and the expansion of, where they already existed, such a training capability. In Malta, where public service training has had such a troubled history, in-house training under the management of the Staff Development Organisation has not only expanded but is becoming increasingly more effective. Nonetheless, I have no hesitation in stressing the need for wider and more rigorous academic training for public servants. There are those who argue that what public servants require is practical training, not abstract theoretical concepts. They live and work in the real world not ivory towers. They further argue that their experience while working alongside graduates was that

163 Future of the Public Service these graduates did not know everything, or lacked proper administrative skills. People who argue in this fashion do not really know what a good university education consists of. Neither have they grasped what the proper role of the public service ought to be. Public servants, in a properly functioning public service, are not only expected to be capable of dealing with day to day problems and issues as they arise, but to act as advisers to those entrusted with power. They require, therefore, to be individuals capable of exhibiting a sharp intellect and sound judgement. They need to be able to decipher the nuances of current debate - be this about constitutional affairs, social policy, economic issues or just general politics. I know that I am on safe ground when I claim that, over the years, the University of Malta and other overseas universities have given the public service some of its most talented members. I am also on safe ground when I argue that the public service is in crying need of individuals with a strong academic background. This means that public services everywhere must learn to work closely with universities and other academic institutions in an effort not merely to upgrade the intellectual capabilities ofexisting members of the service, but as potential recruiting grounds. I need only say further on this point that local and overseas experience demonstrates that, without a shadow of doubt, the vast majority of public servants who have left their mark on the public service of their country are those that have managed, during their career, to combine academic training with their workplace experiences. It is professionals of this kind that the public service requires in order that it may carry out its numerous tasks to the satisfaction of their clients, the tax-payer, and their political bosses. And I would go so far as to dismiss as suicidal the notion, advanced by a not insignificant number of people, that the only way forward in the public service is to resort to the practice of appointing to its office individuals whose first loyalty is to the party in government. And to use a pun, the adoption of a spoils systems in the public service would result in the eventual spoiling of the entire service. In Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta and other countries, the decline in the intellectual capabilities of public servants has had a determining impact not only on the quality of service provision, but more so on the very fabric of the institutions of governance.

My final point will be addressed to issues relating to the current debate on public sector management. Briefly, what this school of thought calls for is the introduction of private firm management techniques to the public service. I am not one of those individuals who holds that the public service does not have anything to learn from the methods employed in the private sector. On the contrary, a clear understanding of how private firms conduct their business would result in undoubted benefits to the public service. A client-oriented public service would, for example, bring immeasurable satisfaction to consumers of public services. Greater accountability will also ensure that clients get their money’s worth for any service purchased or rightfully demanded from the public service. But one must also remember that ultimately the real needs of the public service are not its managers, but those entrusted with political power. There is evidence to suggest, evidence gained from current audit exercises of recent changes in the public services of several countries, that

164 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration rather than increasing efficiency and accountability, these very changes have resulted in greater political interference even in areas traditionally held to be the domain of public service managers. These changes have, in other words, served to mask the very same extension of political interference which they were intended to control or obstruct. It is for these very reasons that over the years I have called for serious political reform, while insisting at the same time that political reform ought to be a pre-condition for reform in the public service. Let me conclude by referring you to a recent study which purports to outline current good practices and developments in the Maltese public service. According to this study, the policy of re-erecting “large and important segments of the public service” as statutory organisations, the vast extension in the number of boards and committees, “as well as by placing parastatal corporations and agencies outside the constitutional safeguards for an impartial, merit-based public service” has resulted in wider opportunities for the exercise of political patronage. Thus, it would be fair to conclude that the future of the public service depends, to a greater or lesser degree, on the direction and the way political affairs are conducted. It is time, therefore, to re-adjust our focus and face the challenge boldly.

VGPV

165 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta

(Published in Public Administration and Development, Vol 17, 1997)

Summary

Administrative reform is inseparable from political reform, just as administration and politics share overlapping boundaries. This article reviews the goals for reform established in 1989 for the Maltese public service, against the political culture and administrative history of Malta. It argues that a small state’s size encourages certain dysfunctional characteristics of the political culture, and aggravates the difficulties inherent in administrative reform.

Introduction

Management, rather than administration, leaner public services, agencies and/ or authorities, privatization, merit, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability are some of the terms that dominate present-day debate about public sector reform. In truth, these terms are not as new as this debate tends to make us believe. Certainly, in the case of Malta and that of some other small states, such as , reference to, even emphasis on, such terms can be found in the numerous reports that characterize the history of these public services (Julyan, 1871; Pirotta, 1996). What is new today is the pronounced scientific approach being adopted, including the widespread use of advanced information technology, the transfer of private management techniques to the public service and a more generally market-oriented administration, and not least, the urgency with which public sector reform is being implemented on a near- global scale. Of course, in some countries a great deal of lip service is paid to “modern” notions of public service reform but the economic and social condition of these countries is such as to make their implementation quite impossible. However, there is also the tendency, among many of those involved in this debate, to decouple the public service from the political process, thereby giving the impression that these are two entirely independent spheres, as if one did not presuppose the other. There is much to the view, as expressed by a very senior Maltese public servant, that it is almost impossible to draw a line between politics and administration for it was very much a situation of one sector with two players.1

1 Dr. G. A. Pirotta is Senior Lecturer in Government and Policy Studies, Depart- ment of Public Policy, University of Malta. The Times of Malta (ToM), 16 April 1992, “Forum tackles dividing line between politics, public administration.”

166 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

In this necessarily brief exposition I shall address the interaction between politics and public administration as they relate to Malta using, as the basis fordoing this, the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission, A New Public Service for Malta, published in the summer of 1989. But, given the constraints of time, this article ought not to be regarded as a detailed critical assessment of the reform process in Malta since the publication of that report, (hereafter referred to as the PSRC Report).

Since the 1800s the Maltese Public Service has been the subject of several inquiries and reform commissions but these, by and large, had as their main focus pay, grading and conditions of service and, given the rather large size of the Maltese public service, retrenchment in offices and personnel (Pirotta, 1996). These aspects also constituted part of the brief of the PSRC appointed by the Prime Minister of Malta in 1988, but on this occasion the main focus of the Commission was “to examine the organization of the Public Service, and to recommend means by which the service can efficiently respond to the changing needs for effective government” (PSRC Report). One other important departure from the usual pattern of earlier commissions, “was the presence, side by side with the Commission, of an expatriate consultant seconded to the Maltese Government to carry out an Operations Review which examined, among other things, the governmental structures within which the public service operates, as well as management systems” (Warrington, 1993 p. 13). The report of this expatriate was, however, never published.

The Findings Of The Reform Commission

In its report, the Public Service Reform Commission laid down three main objectives:

- to review the priority issues affecting the public service at the time ofits appointment; - to identify an agenda of matters requiring decision and action; - to outline a framework of proposals for change in the public service.

The following paragraphs attempt, where possible, to relate these objectives to questions relating to small-scale polities, especially Malta.

Within the context of its first objective the Commission found that the development of democratic institutions, after a very long period of colonial government, and the progressive polarization of polities that followed soon after, had greatly affected the public service (PSRC, p.1). Two points need to be raised in respect of these claims. First, political polarization has been a constant feature of Maltese political life. Polarization is not, therefore, a post-independence phenomenon. Indeed, some of the conflicts that have characterized Maltese post-independence politics trace their origin at least to the

167 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta inter-war period.2 In recent years, especially between 1978 and 1989, political polarization did, however, take a seriously dangerous turn, although today, for reasons not without significance, many of the tensions of that period appear to have lost some of their edge.3 Second, while under colonial government, some political conflicts tended to revolve around a local-foreign axis, thereby providing some unity of action among competing parties, notably between the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Malta Labour Party (MLP), the island’s two main parties, after independence, contentious issues were mainly the product of the struggle for power being waged by local political parties and groupings. Hence, given their local character, post-independence conflicts tended to be more bitter and more enduring.

While political polarization is not a factor confined to small polities, it does appear that such polities tend to manifest a greater degree of polarization than their much larger counterparts (Payne and Clarke, 1987; Payne and Sutton, 1993). Indeed there is much evidence to suggest that in micro-states political polarization tends to be one of the main strategies adopted by political parties and other political groupings in their quest to gain power or to retain it or, indeed, to stake their claim to some portion of it. Small geographic size does, perhaps, tend to make for an unusually high rate of political participation among the population.4 Furthermore, in micro-states, whenever political conflict occurs, it tends to be both personal in form and strident in tone, thereby making political polarization more likely (Sutton, 1987). It cannot be expected that public service employees would for long remain immune to the pressures for partisanship that such strategies tend to give rise to. Nor are political parties likely to seek to shield public employees from the effects of such strategies, given the narrow margin of votes that divide the parties at election time and the fact that in micro-states public sector employees tend to constitute by far the largest voting constituency within the state. The history of the Maltese public service demonstrates unequivocally that as political polarization became more widespread, so did factionalism and political fragmentation become more visible and more deeply embedded among all levels of the public service (Pirotta, 1996).

The Commission also argued that neither the public service nor politicians have appreciated the implications that the transition, after independence, from colonial government to a democratically elected executive was bound to raise. As a result, the report argues, neither side has fully adjusted its expectations and perceptions of one 2 Conflicts between Church and State provide but one example of such conflicts. 3 From 1978 onwards, under new leadership, the opposition Nationalist Party as- sailed the Labour administration of Dom Mintoff. The result of the 1981 election in which Labour won the majority of seats but obtained a minority of votes than the NP (Malta hav- ing proportional representation as its electoral system), brought about a crisis. Tensions rose and supporters of both parties committed a number of criminal acts, most of which have gone unpunished. 4 In Malta up to 96% of the electorate voted in the last three elections despite the fact that there is, in Malta, no legal obligation to vote.

168 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration another. Since 1987 concrete steps have been taken to “refine, develop, and consolidate” this “historically difficult relationship between ministers and public servants” (Warrington, 1995, p. 12). Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that, even today, and despite the fact that our Constitution specifically affirms the classic Westminster/Whitehall pillar of a public service bound by the ethic of political neutrality and anonymity (Warrington, 1995, p. 6), distrust between ministers and public servants remains strong. It is often argued that what the Maltese Constitution affirms with respect to public service neutrality is nothing but a legal fiction. Large numbers of public servants openly take part in political activities, some having formal permission to do so, others on sufferance but in clear breach of public service regulations. There is also the tendency by political parties to complain, when in opposition, of the excessive resort to patronage exercised by the party in government. To date no party has fully abided, once in government, with its promise of restoring to the public service its non-partisan character. In recent years developments in the public service have largely been in an opposite direction with the creation of several hundred boards, many of them under the direction of individuals loyal to ministers or party activists. As a result there has been, over the years, increased and sustained pressure on governments, from within their own central organizations, either to amend the relevant constitutional provisions or, failing that, to circumvent them and secure the appointment of public servants whose first loyalty is to the party in government. Consequently, as Warrington (1995) has observed, over the years “both parties have systematically extended government patronage by multiplying boards and committees, as well as placing parastatals outside the constitutional safeguards for an impartial, merit-based public service”. This latter point needs some elaboration.

The Maltese Constitution makes provision for several independent authorities, which include the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Employment Commission. The Public Service Commission is charged with the responsibility for scrutinizing government decisions in respect of matters connected with the appointment, disciplining and removal of career public officers. A Public Service Commission has existed in Malta, in one form or another, since 1939 but it was in 1959, during a period of direct colonial rule, that its status was provided for in the Constitution. It is significant that in 1947, when a new self- governing constitution for Malta was being negotiated, the inclusion of this Commission in the Constitution was successfully opposed by nearly all of the parties and civil service unions. Politically parties claimed that the very existence of this Commission tended to infringe on the dignity of ministers while civil service union leaders feared that this Commission would provide a further mechanism by which the “palace clique” of senior civil servants could consolidate their own power (Warrington, 1994, pp. 32-33). Since independence in 1964, no party in government has openly proposed the abolition of this Commission and the tendency has been for government ministers to argue that the

169 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta public service exists to serve the public and not for partisan ends.5 But in recent years there has been a marked change in tone with respect to the PSC, with sustained criticism coming from the government, reform agencies and officials of the party in government. Its procedures are frequently complained of as laboriously slow thereby hindering management and obstructing discipline. Others, including the Prime Minister, have claimed that this Commission is anachronistic and inconsistent with modern day notions of public sector management.6 Its critics, however, fail to mention that this Commission has, since independence, been largely starved of the financial and human resources it requires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities effectively. Much the same can be said of the Audit Department, the independence of which is also provided for in the Constitution, and a number of other Commissions or Committees, such as the Permanent Commission against Corruption and the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives. Nor do its critics ever make reference to the fact that those who hold membership on the board of the PSC are, by and large, the nominees of the party in government, being as they are appointees of the Prime Minister.

The task of the Employment Commission is wider in scope, for it exists to ensure that no political bias is present in decisions affecting recruitment, promotion and other related matters within the whole sphere of employment and not merely in thepublic sector. This Commission has delivered some important decisions, one of which has led to the Prime Minister offering to resign, an offer rejected by the President of the Republic. In a recent debate in Parliament this Commission too came in for serious criticism with the Prime Minister describing its workings as something of a disaster.7

The executive of the Nationalist Party, currently the party in government, in 1992 came very close to realizing its demand for the formal appointment of one of its nominees, a former member of the civil service, to the office of Permanent Secretary. Although this nomination was strongly opposed by public service unions and public opinion, the government managed to gain its point by a complicated procedure that saw the individual concerned re-admitted to a public service office and appointed permanent secretary after a series of rapid promotions.8 But at least the notion that the government ought to be

5 See, for example, “Il-Poplu u ċ-Ċivil” leader article of the 14 July 1987 edition of In-Nazzjon Taghna, Nationalist Party daily in Maltese; and “Iċ-ċivil hu għas-servizz tal- poplu” a report of a speech by Dr. G. de Marco, acting Prime Minister, as reported in the In-Nazzjon Taghna of 15 October 1987. 6 See “MLP leader says MSU proposals threaten civil service independence” in The Sunday Times of Malta (SToM), 7 February 1993; “High time to review role of Public Service Commission – MSU” in ToM, 7 February 1994; and “PSC needs “radical change” – Prime Minister”, ToM, 18 November 1994. 7 Debates of House of Representatives. 26 March 1996. 8 See “Mistennija jinħatru nies minn barra ċ-Ċivil” in L-Orizzont, Maltese daily newspaper of the General Workers’ Union.

170 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration free to appoint to these senior and sensitive career offices individuals from outside the service was partially blocked. These and other actions by the party in government served merely to heighten the distrust between the parties in Malta and, in an effort to minimize conflict, the two sides now enjoy ad hoc representation on a number of Constitutional Commissions, such as the Employment Commission, the Electoral Commission, the Broadcasting Commission and the Commission for the Administration of Justice, allof which the framers of the Maltese Constitutions had conceived as independent and non- partisan authorities. The opposition MLP today also holds representation on the Planning Authority and during the year, in an effort to stem the tide of public criticism of waste and corruption in its administration, the NP government sought to give the opposition legally sanctioned representation on the boards of parastatal companies.9 But, “while to some extent this has settled recurring acrimonious disputes about appointments of members of these (and other) authorities, the price has been an acknowledgement that there is little room for independent views, and that partisan loyalty is valued more highly than national loyalty among the state’s guardians and servants” (Warrington, 1955, p. 7). Hence, the view of the Public Service Reform Commission that in the past politicians “have succumbed to the temptation to factor the service into the strategies of power politics”, and that “willingly or unwillingly, the public service came to be associated with the use of public resources for partisan or private gain” remains true also today (PSRC, p. 1). The PSRC Report had also argued that “the accelerated growth of the welfare state, compounded by the traditional view of government as patron, has placed enormous demands on the organizational capacity of the public service. As a result, it attempts unavailingly to reconcile unlimited demand for services with finite resources and limited delivery systems” (PSRC, p. 1). In Malta, and it appears to be the case in other small states, governments have quite often been called upon to take on responsibilities that in other much larger states would probably have been left to other groups or bodies. The onset of the welfare state in the post-Second World War period has, in many ways, served to institutionalize this process. More significantly, while in many large states significant aspects of welfare provision remained contested issues, in Malta and many other micro- states, rival political parties have sought not merely to claim sole responsibility for the introduction of the welfare state in their countries, but also to arrogate for themselves the role of sole defenders of the welfare system. Consequently, in their efforts to attract votes Maltese political parties have at times made extravagant promises, vowing to extend welfare benefits to any group irrespective of whether these promises could ultimately be kept.10 9 Debates of House of Representatives, 18 January 1996, 14 February 1996 and 15 February 1996. 10 During the 1987 electoral campaign the Nationalist Party argued that housework ought to be considered as productive work in the same way as that of other occupations and promised that, once elected, it would ensure that housewives were remunerated for their work. Needless to say this promise was never implemented.

171 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta

Finally, the Commission concluded that in “the economic sphere, partly to finance welfare expenditure and partly to generate further economic activity, the public service became the agent and instrument of government in the competition for resources with the private sector. As a result, the scope and nature of its activities became a matter of national controversy, and placed further demands on its limited resources” (PRSC, p. 2). There is a large measure of truth to this statement for in the period 1971-1987, a period of Labour administration, in a determined effort to speed up economic development, government activity invaded every sector of Maltese economic life. Indeed, over the years more and more activities came under the control of government to such a degree that private sector activity became stifled or deprived of any real incentive.11 Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume for one moment that Maltese government participation in the island’s economy has dramatically changed. On the one hand, about 42 per cent of all gainfully occupied still depend on the government for their employment. On the other hand, a further 20 per cent or so rely, almost exclusively, for their existence on income earned from government contracts and, increasingly, from the provision of municipal services to the 67 local councils created in 1993. Thus, it would be fair to conclude that private sector expansion, an important feature of Maltese economic development in the last decade has, in a large measure, been government-sponsored. But this is not an unusual phenomenon in the case of micro-states but the general rule. And the author has no hesitation in endorsing the view that “for a greater or lesser time span, public employment”, and the injection of public capital, “may have to be one of the safety nets offered to the population of small states” (Warrington, 1995, p. 14).

The Response of the Reform Commission

The response of the Reform Commission to these problems can be found in the eleven goals it proposed, some of which are briefly dealt with below. In approaching goal one: Winning Public Confidence, the Commission implied that the fault for the public’s loss of confidence in the service lies, largely, with the public service itself. The report states, for example, that because of the extent of the public’s loss of confidence in the service, politicians and organized interests have become predisposed to carry on their “business through the ‘networks’ ” thereby “justifying this unsavoury feature of the national way of life” (PSRC, p. 9). Furthermore, the Commission emphasized, that public servants tend to “demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the needs of consumers” (PSRC, p.

11 After 1979, in its efforts to control and direct economic development, Mintoff’s Labour administration took near physical control over the importation of what it described as ‘essential commodities’ and which included timber, cement and a range of essential foodstuffs. It also intervened heavily, through public investment or joint ventures, in indus- trial activity. By this time also, for one reason or another, all the banks active in Malta came under government control.

172 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

10). The PSRC’s response to these problems was to urge the development of improved customer relations, the rooting out of patronage, corruption and incompetence, and the gradual introduction of open government. According to the report, in order that these many problems may be successfully tackled, especially where negligence, patronage and corruption are concerned, three steps were required. First, that quick and effective action should be instituted, by means of inquiries, against officials suspected of impropriety or incompetence. Second, that adequate provision for the speedy audit of administrative measures be instituted. And finally, that the scope of judicial review of administrative discretion be extended beyond acts that areultra vires, or clearly in violation of an explicit provision of a written law (PSRC, pp. 9-13).

One cannot help but agree that a large number of civil servants are insensitive to the needs of the citizens they are employed to serve. But one cannot accept the view that the system of doing business through networks has arisen in Malta as a result of the existing mistrust of public servants. This system has in fact been, for centuries, an ingrained feature of our social and political culture; a product of the intense competition for resources in a dependent economy; a competition that very often has made the difference between a comfortable and secure way of life or a mundane existence. It is also a system encouraged by smallness, where face-to-face interaction is the norm and where ties of kinship and friendship are generally enduring. It is a system that has gained in strength and importance in post-war Malta with the introduction of mass electoral politics and the growth of an extensive system of state welfare (Pirotta, 1993, pp. 52-53). Furthermore, candidates for political office and established politicians have secured for this system an even greater degree of entrenchment thereby endorsing the view of the Commission that over the years ministers have systematically employed the public service - and to this extent public monies - to advance their political careers, the interests of their party and the fortunes of their supporters (PSRC p. 1). It is perhaps for these reasons that the remedies suggested by the Reform Commission have encountered staunch resistance from many quarters and that the notion of open government remains unrealized. Moving on to its second goal, the Commission reiterated its view of the existing “disquieting reputation of the Service” and stressed the often overlooked fact that today “the risks of corruption, waste, inefficiency and the abuse of administrative discretion are large and growing” (PSRC, p. 14). Public expenditure in Malta has, over the past few years, grown in a manner hitherto unknown but the powers and competence of the supervising and scrutinizing agencies have been neither significantly expanded nor developed on a similar scale (Pirotta, 1993, p. 55). Reference has already been made to the inadequate resources that hinder the work of the Permanent Commission against Corruption and of the Public Accounts Committee, while one daily local newspaper observed that “calls for the audit office to be given sharp teeth - so far it has been practically toothless - go unheeded year after year”.12 12 “Checks and Balances” leader article in The Times of Malta, 23 April 1992. 173 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta

The solution proposed by the Commission was two-fold: it proposed the creation of a culture of integrity and excellence. By integrity the Commission meant ethical behaviour that could be explained by reference to agreed standards of conduct. The Commission felt that these ethical standards should apply to public servants and politicians alike. Since 1992 Codes of Ethics have been promulgated for public servants, ministers, members of parliament and local councillors. Whether such codes have had any impact is hard to say but they have as yet failed to dispel the feeling, a rather popular one at that, that waste and the abuse of administrative discretion are still widespread in Malta.

Excellence the Commissioners took to mean “the quality of performance of tasks” (PSRC, p. 16). This involved, according to the Report, the introduction of departmental corporate plans, which identify priorities, set goals and targets, allocate resources and assign responsibilities; performance standards and a performance evaluation system are to serve as basis for the evaluation of outputs, and there is to be the introduction of rewards for good performance based on a system of performance evaluation (PSRC, pp. 14-18). While a reward system based on performance evaluation has not as yet filtered further than the upper echelons of the service and secretaries to local councils, it is worthwhile noting that all Permanent Secretaries hold office on a three-year contract, which may or may not be renewed on the basis of performance evaluation. Some have argued that, given the prevailing dominance of ministers over nearly every aspect of Maltese public administration, such practices would inevitably lead to a further consolidation ofthe system that has, in the past, either compromised or relegated public service leaders to the sidelines, depriving the institution of the authority to direct its affairs or to renew itself (PSRC, p. 1). But, as no independent reports exist of how this contractual system has worked up to now, it is quite impossible to reach conclusions on the basis of such statements. In Britain recent studies have found that changes of this kind have resulted in greater political intervention. In a survey of public sector managers, almost half of those surveyed claimed that their ability to resist political interference in operational decisions has declined over the last three years (Dickson, 1994).

Integrity and excellence would, in the view of the Commission, serve to make the Maltese public service a distinct profession in its own right. The author would be the first to admit of the need for the public service to have its own ethos. The notion that the public service constitutes a profession in its own right is today far removed from the public mind. From the point of view of the PSRC report, goal two should be examined in the light of what the same report proposes with respect to goal five, which discusses staff development. For without proper training, neither integrity nor excellence is possible. Codes of ethics on their own tend to mean very little and much of what they propose does little to protect civil servants from the army of relatives, friends, acquaintances and political intervention that seem to be their lot in small-scale polities. One has to admit that

174 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration a great deal has been achieved in the field of training, traditionally the Cinderella of the public service. The Staff Development Organisation, despite its limited funds, continues to expand and upgrade its training programmes and in recent years has also helped to establish a number of departmental training units.

Goal four stressed the need for new management structures that would promote efficiency, facilitate action and secure accountability. The notion has persisted thatas ministers are held to be constitutionally responsible for their actions and the actions of those employed in the departments under their charge, civil servants are exempted from any accountability. This is not the case. Civil servants are accountable to the ministers they serve. Heads of departments and ministers are fully entitled to initiate disciplinary procedures against civil servants who are guilty of negligence or impropriety. If this does not happen enough the fault does not lie with the Constitution or the doctrine of ministerial responsibility but with the leadership of the civil service. Ministers, therefore, ought not to be divested from responsibility to Parliament for the acts of their subordinates, not merely because it is laid down by our Constitution, but for fear that discipline in the public service would become even more lax. But this is not to deny that the whole issue of discipline in the Maltese public service is in great need of reform. The present system serves merely to encourage delay and not infrequently to discourage action.13

Goals five to nine have as their aim the building-up of the organizational capacity of the public service. With respect to goal five, reference has earlier been made to staff training. To that, one might add that while in-house training may be necessary, it is not sufficient. It may be argued, therefore, that more needs to be done to develop the intellectual abilities of public servants. The author’s experience as tutor and coordinator of courses in Public Administration suggests, that while course participants tend tobe in every way capable administrators in matters of routine, they do not possess, because of their lack of academic training, the necessary critical abilities that go to make good decision-makers. For this to be possible a closer working relationship, much closer than that at present, ought to be developed between the university and the public service. On its part, the university must work harder to promote the study of public administration as a discipline in its own right. Until now the study of public administration, like that of politics, has failed to gain a secure foothold in the curriculum of the university.

Goal six proposes ways by which the public service could attract and retain the services of competent men and women. Apart from calling for effective mechanisms for

13 The fact that in discipline procedures before the PSC respondents are able to employ lawyers to defend them, even in minor cases, makes for long and elaborate hear- ings. In cases that end up before the courts delays may even be longer, in some cases, even years. One case involving bribery and extortion by a number of public servants took a full decade before it came to sentencing.

175 Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta selecting candidates for entry or for promotion, the report calls for attractive salaries and benefits. There have been developments in the way promotions to certain grades, nearly all of them in the higher grades of the service, have recently been effected. Merit and proven ability have now been established as the criteria for promotion, but recent controversies relating to promotions to the grade of Senior Principal are indicative of certain difficulties in the way such criteria have been applied. Those in charge of the exercise failed to adequately explain what constituted merit and proven ability or to satisfy promotion hopefuls that a written examination was the best way of testing for these criteria. Consequently, public service unions hinted at industrial action, while a large number of civil servants took up the matter before the courts.14 The whole issue did very little to enhance the public image of the civil service, and the impression that was conveyed to its customers was of a service divided within itself. The Senior Principal case showed, among other things, how relatively inexperienced the public service is when it seeks to depart from long-established criteria for promotion, though not necessarily helpful or indeed fair criteria, such as seniority. Promotion on the basis of merit needs to have clearly established and known criteria if candidates for promotion are to be made to feel that they have been fairly treated.

Goal seven was concerned with the need for the public service to have effective leaders at every level of its operation. This is a sine qua non if the public service is ever to regain public confidence. But, given the experience gained over nearly 160 years of a local public service, it should be clear that competent public service leadership cannot flourish under a system where political intervention is frequent and invasive. The PSRC Report seems to imply that it was a result of such interference that the Maltese public service lost, decade after decade, some of its most talented leaders and high-fliers.

Finally, it is desirable to address goal eight, which calls for investment in technology and plant. For nearly 50 years the public service had been starved of resources that could have greatly enhanced its performance. As a consequence, offices, workshops and facilities have either become shabby and unattractive as places of work or completely inadequate. While some minor improvements have been carried out in the physical environment, major changes, notably in the sphere of information technology, have been recorded. A number of small states, such as Malta and , see development in information technology as means for successful participation in the expanding financial services market. Others, such as Jersey and Guernsey, look to information technology in order to consolidate their traditional dominance over this economic sector. It needs to be said that the advances made in this field are quite significant and have helped the public

14 A large number of public servants, candidates for promotion to the grade of Se- nior Principal, attempted through the courts to force the Management and Personnel Of- fice to abandon its declared aim of assessing candidates through a written examination. The action failed, though in the judgment delivered by the courts the door was left open for these public servants to contest the validity of the assessment exercise after it was held. 176 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration service, technology wise, to propel itself towards the year 2000 with greater confidence than ever before. It has not been an easy process, but it has been by far the most successful of all the initiatives taken so far. Conclusion This review, in seeking to assess the reform process in Malta demonstrates, quite unequivocally, that the major obstacle to reform lies in the fact that political reform has failed to take root in the island. Despite the rhetoric of reform, there is still no guarantee that the best will make it to the top or that the best candidates are selected or, indeed, that those most capable of managing will be allowed to do so. Two years ago the chairman of a parastatal company, chosen because of his proven managerial expertise, did not have his chairmanship renewed as a result of his opposition to political patronage in appointments and promotions and his readiness to resist ministerial interference in matters of administration.15 One may conclude, therefore, by suggesting that public service reform, in Malta and other micro-states such as , will never become meaningful until the political problems that assail them have been faced and resolved.

References

Clarke, C. and Payne, A. (eds) (1987). Politics, Security and Development in Small States, Allen & Unwin, London. Dickson, T. (1994). ‘Trouble with children . . . and with politicians too’, Financial Times, London, 8 July. Julyan, P. (1871). C.O. Confidential Print, C.O. 882/2,Public Record Office, Kew, London. Payne, A. and Sutton, P. (1993). Modern Caribbean Politics, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Maryland. Pirotta, G. A. (1993). ‘First Observations on the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission’, in Economic and Social Studies, Special Edition, University of Malta. Pirotta, G. A. (1996). The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State: The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940, Mireva Publications, Msida, Malta. Public Service Reform Commission (1989). A New Public Service for Malta: A Report on the Organisation of the Public Service. Malta Government, Malta. Sutton, P. (1987). ‘Political Aspects’ in Clarke, C. and Payne, A. (eds) Politics, Security and Development in Small States, Allen & Unwin, London. Warrington, E. (1993). ‘A Review of the Reports of the Public Service Reform Commission’ in Economic and Social Studies, Special Edition, University of Malta. Warrington, E. (1994). The Making and Un-Making of a Great Estate, Staff Development Organisation, Valletta, Malta. Warrington, E. (ed) (1995). Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Sector Management. A Profile of the Public Service in Malta,Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

15 See “ ‘Enquiries’ by Energy Secretary on Petrol Station” in The Malta Indepen- dent, 24 October 1993 and “Konferma tat-tbagħbis” in Alternattiva, 5 November 1993.

177 The Organisation of Public Administration and Civil Society: Comments and Remarks

(Presented at the conference in the -Mediterranean Region (Workshop 1), The Hague, 17-18 March 1997)

t was with some trepidation that I accepted the invitation from the organisers of Ithis conference to comment on the keynote paper prepared for this workshop by Prof. Etzioni-Halevy. She is an academic of international standing and this is reflected in her paper. Much of what she says in her paper does not need any clarification from me. Nonetheless, there are a number of points which I think have not been stressed enough in her presentation and on which I would like to elaborate. Having done that, I shall then proceed to give some examples from Malta which I think have enhanced governance in this Mediterranean island-state. I do believe that much of the evidence presented here will support, in a general sort of way, Prof. Etzioni-Halevy’s conclusions in respect of the relationship between state and civil society.

The message of this conference is that we should learn from each other; from our experiences and our differences, and not least from our respective difficulties. Learning presupposes openness. A readiness to hear and ponder, and not merely to listen; a readiness to explore new ideas and to avoid dismissing out of hand what does not readily fit nicely or comfortably with our established view of things. A readiness to allow others to transport us, at least temporarily, into their view of things, without the need to feel threatened. Every society, no matter how large or small, how powerful or weak, has something to teach others and something to learn in return. Having said that, let me now turn to a number of points which I think deserve attention in Prof. Etzioni-Halevy’s paper.

In the first instance, the views expressed in this paper reflect, in a pronounced manner, the present ongoing debate about civil society taking place in Western Europe and the United States, but also in many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as the peoples of these states seek to re-define the relationship between civil society and the state.1 In Western Europe and the United States, the debate is being spurred on by a desire to curtail some of the increased powers which the state has allegedly acquired in the post-war period at the expense of citizens and civil society generally. In Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, the debate has focused on the urgent need for a complete re-fashioning of the state and its governing institutions, and of a re-definition of the relationship between state and civil society. In the vast majority of them, the rapid demise of the monolithic structures that had characterised communist government and society has given rise to a dangerous vacuum which has allowed criminal organisations an opportunity to exert a suffocating stranglehold on their societies and in some cases, it is feared, on their governments. It is proving, in the case of many of these latter states, and

178 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration as we have had the misfortune to witness in recent years, a painful process. In Malta too, our search for a balance between state and civil society has had its difficult moments, but it has not been as painful as that of some of these countries.

However, the latter also holds true of the United States and Western Europe, and recent difficulties have prompted a renaissance in respect of issues concerning civil society on one hand, and the role of the state on the other.2 It is a debate, however, which is rooted in the historical traditions of European political thought and social philosophy. It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that it is a debate which seeks to give a contemporary meaning to the age-old principles of classical liberal-democratic government. As a debate, it also faces the same age-old difficulties that the concept of liberal-democracy has given rise to, i.e., how to reconcile the liberal stress on individualism and the democratic stress on the collectivity. How to reconcile the notion of freedom from the state, so central to liberal thought, and of freedom within the state, the freedom that comes only from the widest possible participation of the citizen in the life of the state, a freedom so dear to democrats. And how to reconcile the very notion of elites to liberal-democratic systems of governance without, however, unnecessarily jeopardising or endangering the freedoms of ordinary citizens, or indeed, rendering them as mere pawns in the struggle for power between competing elites.3

Prof. Etzioni-Halevy’s paper seeks to do just that, for she seeks not merely to establish a sphere relatively autonomous of the state, but tries to do this within a framework which allows for a class-oriented perspective which, as she implicitly states, “implies a commitment to progress towards greater equality”(p.3). But having outlined her perspective she deliberately excludes the market, or the economy, from her definition of civil society, and hence from a full and proper consideration of its effect on equality and civil society generally. I do think that such an exclusion serves merely to tilt the bias away from the kind of equality she desires to see, and away from the “people power” (the loss of which she laments on p.16), and towards such liberal doctrines as those associated with laissez faire, which have generally rejected or at least opposed any commitment towards greater socio-economic equality. For classical it is the market which carries all responsibility, in any given society, for the allocation of resources and wealth, and notions of equality have hardly any place at all within its conceptual framework.

I do believe that recent developments in the world economy - notably the rapid trend towards globalisation and its impact on individual societies - has made consideration of the role of the market and its impact on civil society more pressing. For societies that have endured colonialism and whose economies were long ago rendered dependent on markets beyond their control - be they in London, Tokyo or Chicago - the ramifications of globalisation cannot be said to be a new phenomenon or in some way a new process. For decades the prices of their primary products have been decided in relation to demand for

179 The Organization of Public Administration and Civil Society these products in industrialised societies, and the fact cannot be ignored that what these societies produce today has, not infrequently, been determined decades ago by policies decided in London, Paris, Washington or Brussels, i.e., in imperial capitals. In these ex- colonies too, the impact of international markets has had some severe consequences for their civil society. There are cases in which it can be categorically stated that the workings of international markets have hindered or retarded the development of civil society in several of them.4 Indeed, in a number of countries, movement towards democratisation has been obstructed by such international market forces, not only with harm to the civil societies concerned, but also with serious and dangerous implications for regional or international peace and stability.5

But even in Western societies we cannot claim that the market has played only a minor part in the way civil societies have developed. There is, indeed, general consensus that the market has played a determining role in the emergence and development of liberal systems in these societies. Liberal systems which have been instrumental in their promotion of the notion of a sphere of individual action independent of the state, a sphere which allows for individual choices. We also know of the impact that the market has had, and is increasingly having today, on such concerns as education and cultural development. Globalisation has made these influences more invasive and it would be a grave mistake to ignore or exclude the market from our exploration of civil society. I shall, at a later stage, by reference to Malta, demonstrate the importance that the economy has in the development of a modern democratic society with a strong participatory civil society.

My second difficulty with the keynote paper in this workshop is with a second arbitrary exclusion from the definition of civil society which it proposes. This time, excluded from the definition of civil society, are groups or organisations which promote racism or which adopt violent or non-democratic methods when pursuing their ends. Whether we like it or not, groups of this sort exist, in differing degrees, in nearly all of our societies. Recent events have demonstrated that the values that some of these groups or organisations represent are much more strongly entrenched in our civil societies than many of us would like to admit. It takes only a marked rise in unemployment, or an argument over fishing rights, or some other issue to bring them to the fore with a certain degree of force. And what is certainly of significance and of concern is the fact that quite often support for such values, if not for the groups themselves, is not restricted to one class of civil society but can be found, albeit in different degrees, throughout its breath. In some countries, the leaders of such groups form an integral component of the elite of civil society in much the same way as leaders of other, more democratic groups, do. That is why, despite her inclination to exclude racist and violent groups from her definition of civil society, Prof Etzioni-Halevy ultimately found it necessary to make reference to recent developments in France, where racist groups are influencing government policy in relation to minorities in that country. One can also make reference to certain developments in

180 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Germany, where new legislation has been implemented which targets even the German- born children of certain ethnic minorities. Hence my own reluctance to exclude them from our discussion. Indeed, I shall go a step further and say that if we are truly serious in our desire to promote lasting cooperation between our societies, then we must not only assess the impact of such groups on societies in individual countries, but we must also examine how the doctrines propagated by such groups may be, even now, serving to undermine or obstruct that very same cooperation that we are so desirous to see develop across the Mediterranean divide for the mutual benefit of all our societies.

My final difficulty with the keynote paper centres around the issue of elites as presented. Implicit in Prof Etzioni-Halevy’s analysis, as far I can tell, is the notion of a permanent elite, what in Marxist terms is called a ruling elite. This is only implied for at no stage does the paper make clear who might constitute this ruling elite, or categorically states that one exists. But the warnings about the dangers that arise for freedom and democracy when civil society’s elites are co-opted or somehow integrated within the state’s own elite, abound throughout the paper. In fact, the attempt to define the relationship between the state and civil society, or more precisely between state elites and civil society’s elites, is based on the premise that these are two entirely different groupings, naturally antagonistic of each other, and with the state’s elite enjoying a greater degree of power. Hence, freedom and democracy are possible only if civil society’s elite can keep the power of the state’s elite in check or if they do not allow the latter to absorb them. Had I the time, I would have demonstrated that the notion of a ruling elite is completely incompatible with that of democracy. This is not to say that elitism is absent in a democracy, but that the concept of democracy implies, at least as a minimum, the very notion of a circulation of elites and certainly not that of a permanent ruling elite. Hence the need for greater clarity with respect to the definition of elites employed in the keynote paper.

Having raised these difficulties, however, I have to say that I share many of Prof. Etzioni-Halevy’s fears with respect to the dangers that present day democracies are facing. They are fears born and sustained by the terrors and excesses which an ever growing concentration of power in the hands of the state is likely to produce. So what we have been presented with is a vision - an ethical vision for that matter - that has, as its point of departure, that age-old truth that power corrupts and that the greater the power the greater the tendency to its abuse. What is required, therefore, according to this paper, is a system of government which would allow for the widest diffusion of power possible. That system, we are told, is the liberal-democratic system which equates good governance with as much freedom from the state as is humanly possible and with as large a measure of equality as is compatible with that freedom. It is for this reason that Prof. Etzioni-Halevy’s paper calls for a large measure of autonomy for the elites of civil society from the state. This point, as presented in this paper, deserves further consideration but time does not permit it. Nonetheless, my discussion of developments in Malta will demonstrate that

181 The Organization of Public Administration and Civil Society the emergence of groups and organisations which enjoy relative autonomy from the state, has contributed towards greater freedom and democracy. But, as we shall see, there is a need for certain conditions to exist before it becomes possible for the role of the state to decrease and that of civil society to expand. These conditions are closely related to economic development. Having said that, however, it is worth stressing that as long as the notions of social justice and solidarity remain of value to large sectors of our societies, it would be unrealistic to expect the state to restrict its role to that of the night-watchman state, so beloved by classical liberals. Furthermore, given that in market-dominated societies such social problems as unemployment, homelessness and poverty are from time to time aggravated rather than resolved, it would be also undesirable for the state to abdicate entirely its role of provider and protector for those of its citizens who may be in need. In this sense, the end of state welfare is not a realistic or desirable option.

Malta is, comparatively, a young state and a young democracy. Historically, its government and its society have been shaped and influenced by the island’s strategic location, its small geographic size, and its economy.6 It was the first of these three features that made of Malta, on the one hand, a desirable colony and which helped implant in Malta a tradition for centralized government. A near total absence of mineral resources and a large population have, on the other hand, given rise to a tradition of paternalism. Socio- economic growth and development have been, by and large, government directed and sponsored. State and civil society were hardly distinguishable in Malta, except perhaps, in those periods when British imperial/strategic interests dominated the policy agenda, but even in this sphere, not infrequently, British and Maltese interests coincided.7

After independence in 1964, but especially from around the mid-Seventies, as the pace of economic development gained momentum, the role of government in Malta became increasingly questioned. How and what kind of decisions governments could take became increasingly challengeable. It was no longer the case that the state knows best. Economic development had, in fact, given Maltese civil society a second, and perhaps, more powerful mechanism than political enfranchisement had done some years earlier. For while political enfranchisement had given the Maltese a determining role in the choice of governing elites, economic growth brought with it a demand for greater choice in several spheres of life, including education, health and old-age provision, and hence a demand for greater participation in economic decision-making. Experiments in worker-participation were but one highlight of this demand. A second feature has been the growth of interests groups, such as trade unions and employers associations which, while still somewhat partisan in their approach, are beginning to learn to prize their independence from the state rather highly. Recent decades have also seen the emergence of an ever increasing number of self and voluntary organisations which, though in some ways dependent on state aid of some sort, seek to conduct their affairs in as independent a manner as possible. Among these groups one finds organisations which are concerned with the environment

182 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration and gender-related issues, but they also include others, many of which are concerned with giving voice and substance to the aspirations of various groups within Maltese civil society, such as the disabled, the elderly and the emarginated. While in the past state leaders may have viewed such organisations as would-be usurpers of their paternal role, today a greater understanding exists on the need for such organisations. And what is interesting in its own way is the fact that, while in the past the leaders of these organisations demanded greater government responsiveness and accountability in the spheres in which they themselves were active, similar demands, especially on the way they themselves use public funds, are now being exerted on them by both the state and the public.

The growth of these groups has widened the number of items now admitted on to the social, political and economic agenda. It is no longer the case that the agenda of the state is the agenda of Maltese civil society. On the contrary, this agenda is reflective of the demands that emanate from the various groups that constitute Maltese civil society. Today, a political party that hopes to win electoral contests must pursue a process of dialogue and consultation with nearly all of these groups.8

The determined efforts of these groups or sectors of Maltese society to influence the policy agenda has coalesced in a greater demand for accountability at both the political and the administrative level. Over the last decade or so, an ongoing debate has been taking place which seeks to re-evaluate crucial aspects of our governing system in a bid to extend and entrench accountability in government decision-making, and to widen the opportunities which would allow citizens and organisations in civil society to secure accountability and to influence decision-making. Recent developments in these areas include the creation of Standing or Permanent Committees of the House of Representatives, even in areas, such as the operations of some parastatal bodies, which were previously closed to public scrutiny. Indeed, the House Public Accounts Committee, which is chaired by a Member of Parliament nominated by the Opposition, is the principle highlight of this breach into executive privilege. A second important development has been the institution of the Office of . While at present there is only one Ombudsman Office responsible for scrutinising administrative aspects of government, the concept is about to receive a further boost by the intention to create sector specific ombudspersons for insurance, the University and other public utilities.

Another ongoing experiment is that of Local Councils. In 1993, sixty-seven elected local councils were established in Malta. Prima facie these represent, given Malta’s small geographic size, rather a large number. There has been in Malta, over the last two decades, growing pressure from the grassroots of Maltese society for a demand for local control over matters which were of an entirely local concern. People wanted the capacity, not merely to register a preference over local issues, but to exercise meaningful control over decisions which affect them directly. The powers of these local councils are still quite limited,9 but

183 The Organization of Public Administration and Civil Society their very existence demonstrates Maltese concern with the role of the state in their daily lives. Their development may also be construed as a greater desire for more freedom and democracy by the Maltese. Concern with political accountability has logically led to calls for greater accountability in the administration of the island. Each of the developments outlined above have contributed in some way to greater public service accountability. But we have had now, over a period of years, a sustained effort at reform in the public service. Individual and team performance schemes, the identification of clear targets, enhanced training for public servants are but some of the many initiatives being taken in an effort to create a more responsive, customer-oriented, and accountable public service. There is still a great deal to be done in this sphere and we are still at the initial stages of reform.10 But public insistence for reform has become much more strident in recent years and no government can hope to retain power unless consumer satisfaction with public services is significantly improved.

I believe that a crucial factor, though by no means the only one, in Malta’s leap forward towards better governance has been sustained economic development. Itis economic development that has created the environment, and provided the resources, for the emergence of relatively autonomous organisations in Maltese society, and it is their emergence that has allowed for the growth of a wider political culture which places greater emphasis on freedom, equality, the rule of law, human rights and democracy generally. I conclude, therefore, by reiterating my earlier point that it would be a grave mistake if we try to exclude the economy, or the market, whatever one wishes to call it, from our examination of the relationship between the state, public administration and civil society.

I conclude too by expressing support for Prof Etzioni-Halevy’s call for greater Euro- Mediterranean cooperation. Coming from Malta, I cannot but endorse that call. Malta has, over several decades, played a positive role in its bid to place Mediterranean concerns on the international agenda, even at times when these calls were overshadowed by super- power rivalries and bloody conflict in the region. It was at Helsinki that Malta first stated the now widely accepted truth that peace and security in Europe cannot be achieved without peace and security in the Mediterranean. Peace can never be achieved unless a serious desire for open dialogue exists between all parties, combined with a corresponding desire for confidence- building measures through joint action on common problems. This conference provides another opportunity for all of us to embark seriously on this path. We are free to throw away this opportunity, but not to renounce the price that we must ultimately pay for doing so.

184 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Notes and References

Endnotes

1 See, for example, A. Seligman, (1992), The Idea of Civil Society, The Free Press, U.S.A.; and S. Berglund & J.A. Dellenbrant, (eds), (1994), 2nd edit., The New Democracies in Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar, U.K. 2 The work of environmentalist groups and civil rights associations may have been instrumental in developments of this nature. 3 This debate has been an ongoing one. For a comprehensive survey of its many aspects, see B. Holden, (197), The Nature of Democracy, and J. Schwarzmental, (1987), Structures of Power, Wheatsheaf Books, U.K., Chs.1 & 2. 4 An examination of the case of several West African states may prove quite indicative of the impact that imperial economic policies and interests have had, and still have, on the difficulties faced by these states since their independence. 5 The case of Iran in the post-World War II period represents an irrefutable example of this statement. See B. Lapping, (1985), End of Empire, Granada Publishing/ W. Collins and Sons, U.K., Ch.4. 6 For a comprehensive survey of the impact of these factors on Malta’s system of government, see G.A. Pirotta, (1996), The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva Publications, Malta. 7 Ibid. As Malta’s economy became increasingly dependent on the British military and naval base in Malta, so Maltese interests became inextricably linked to British strategic interests. The closure of the military and naval base, at the request of the Maltese, in 1979, signalled Maltese determination to put an end to this dependence and to seek to build an economy designed to satisfy Maltese aspirations for regional peace and security and economic development. 8 Today, Maltese political parties have established sophisticated organisations which spend a great deal of their time consulting with different societal groups and assessing public opinion on various issues of public interest. 9 Local councils, whose members are elected at three year intervals, are responsible for street cleaning and the maintenance of selected municipal facilities in their locality. So great, however, have been the pressures on them from local voters to do more, that many of them have sought to intervene in matters connected with drug addiction, bus services and so on. 10 See G.A. Pirotta, (1997), “Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta”, in The New Public Administration: Global Challenges - Local Solutions, a special edition of Public Administration and Development, Vol.17 No.1, February 1997. (Also here: p. 164)

185 L-Istat u T-Tmexxija tal-Istitutuzzjonijiet

(Keynote Speech: Fondazzjoni Ġużè Ellul Mercer, October 1998)

eta jiġu mitluba biex jgħidu x’inhi, fl-opinjoni tagħhom, “il-politika” ħafna Mnies, speċjalment il-politiċi, iwieġbu li l-politika hija l-arti ta’ dak li huwa possibbli. Din mhi spjegazzjoni xejn għaliex ma tgħidilna xejn la dwar ir-raġunamenti li fuqhom huwa mibni l-Istat u lanqas dwar l-istituzzjonijiet pubbliċi li jagħtu espressjoni prattika lill-ħidma tal-Istat. Lanqas ma tgħidilna xejn dwar il-valuri soċjali u politiċi li jservu ta’ gwida u kejl għall-ħidma politika u amministrattiva ta’ dawk kollha involuti fil- ħajja politika tal-pajjiż, kemm jekk dawn huma ġurnalisti, politiċi jew uffiċjali pubbliċi. Ma tgħidilna xejn dwar il-poteri tal-Istat u l-limiti, jekk hemm, imposti fuqu fl-attività pubblika tiegħu. Imma forsi, aktar minn kollox, din l-ispjegazzjoni ta’ x’inhi politika ma tgħidilna xejn dwar is-sistema politika li fiha jkunu qed jiffunzjonaw l-istituzzjonijiet tal-Istat. Fi ftit kliem, din id-definizzjoni ma tagħmilx distinzjoni bejn ħidma u amministrazzjoni politika fi Stat demokratiku u f’wieħed anti-demokratiku. Għalhekk, definizzjoni tajba ta’ x’inhi politika tinvolvi numru ta’ elementi bħal ma huma: valuri, poteri, sistemi u istituzzjonijiet.

Għaliex l-Istat u l-Istituzzjonijiet tiegħu?

L-Istat jeżisti biex jaqdi numru ta’ funzjonijiet. L-ewwel, l-Istat jeżisti biex iħarisna minn għedewwa barranin. Kull soċjetà għandha bżonn ta’ sigurta biex tħares lilha nnifisha minn attakki jew theddid minn forzi barranin.

It-tieni, fil-ħajja tagħna ta’ kuljum, l-Istat iħarisna wkoll meta jara li fil-pajjiż tirrenja l-ordni pubblika, u meta jorganizza l-ħajja b’tali mod li jagħmilha possibli biex iċ- ċittadini tiegħu jkunu jistgħu jaqdu l-ħtiġijiet tagħhom ta’ kuljum fil-libertà, mingħajr biża u perikli żejda. Għalhekk insibu, li fil-parti l-kbira l-Istat jipprovdi ħafna servizzi bħal ma huma l-pulizija, il-ħabsijiet, is-servizzi tad-dawl u l-ilma, it-trasport pubbliku, l-ajruporti u t-toroq.

It-tielet, f’kull soċjetà nsibu wkoll nies li huma għal xi raġuni jew oħra batuti u li mingħajr l-għajnuna tal-Istat ħajjithom tkun ferm aktar diffiċli milli hi. Din kienet ir-raġuni li għaliha twaqqaf il-Welfare State, u għalkemm ir-responsabbiltà tal-Istat twessgħet qattiegħ bl-iżvilupp tas-servizzi soċjali, anki qabel il-miġja tal-Welfare State, l-Istat kien jara kif jagħmel biex jgħin lill-aktar nies batuti tas-soċjetà.

Fl-aħħarnett, l-Istat jeżisti biex jirregola r-relazzjonijiet li jeżistu bejn persuna u persuna oħra. Mingħajr l-Istat, minħabba n-natura tagħhom, il-bnedmin ma jkunux kapaċi

186 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration jgħixu fil-paċi u fis-sliem, imqar għal ftit żmien biss. II-bnedmin jafu jkunu ġenerużi, jafu jħennu u jafu jimxu ma’ ħaddiehor b’sens ta’ ġustizzja, imma jafu wkoll ikunu egoisti, kattivi u qarrieqa. Il-fatt li mhux kulħadd huwa ugwali daqs ħaddieħor jagħmilha aktar faċli biex min hu l-aktar b’saħħtu jesplojta lil min hu batut. Biex min għandu l-aktar poter – jew għax għandu l-flus, jew għax għandu t-tagħlim, jew għax għandu l-kariżma, jew għax għandu iktar saħħa – juża dak il-poter kif jaqbel lilu. Il-bniedem ma jistax jgħix f’soċjetà mingħajr il-kontrolli li jipprovdi l-Istat. Huwa għalhekk li r-relazzjonijiet bejn persuna u oħra huma ukoll soġġetti għal-liġijiet li jkun għadda l-Parlament. Fil-fatt ma hemm ebda relazzjoni umana li mhix soġġetta għal xi liġi. Jekk nieħdu r-relazzjoni bejn żewġ miżżewġin insibu li hemm numru kbir ta’ liġijiet li qegħdin hemm biex jevitaw li xi waħda mill-partijiet fiż-żwieġ teżerċita poter iktar mill-parti l-oħra, jew biex kemm jista’ jkun jiġi evitat li jseħħ xi abbuż fuq persuni f’dak iż-żwieġ. Illum f’ħafna pajjiżi, il-Qrati saħansitra qed jirrikonoxxu l-kunċett ta’ stupru anki bejn il-miżżewġin. Għalhekk, anki dak li jseħħ wara bibien magħluqa jista’ jitqies bħala abbuż minn persuna fuq oħra, u għal din ir-raġuni mhuwiex ’il fuq mil-liġi.

Biex jiġi żgurat li persuna tkun tista’ tħares lilha nnifisha minn xi abbuż kontra tagħha, is- soċjetà ħolqot fi ħdan l-Istat numru ta’ istituzzjonijiet. Eżempju ta’ waħda minn dawn l-istituzzjonijiet huma l-Qrati. Istituzzjoni oħra hija l-Parlament li bħala l-ogħla istituzzjoni fil-pajjiż, kontinwament jeżamina l-operat tal-istituzzjonijiet l-oħra, ujieħu passi rimedjali biex isaħħaħhom jew jirfinhom. Eżempju ta’ dan huma l-liġijiet li ntroduċew lit-Tribunal Industrijali, it-Tribunal tal-Konsumatur u, meta jidħol fis-seħħ, it-Tribunal tal-Familja. Il-Parlament igħaddi wkoll liġijiet li l-għan tagħhom ikun li jħares setturi tas-soċjetà, bħal ma huma t-tfal u persuni bi bżonnijiet speċjali, minn abbużi li jistgħu jitwettqu kontrihom minn partijiet oħra tas-soċjetà jew minn individwi. Għalhekk, kemm jiffunzjonaw tajjeb l-istituzzjonijiet tal-pajjiż huwa ta’ importanza kruċjali għall-istabbilità soċjali ta’ kull soċjetà.

Prinċipju ewlieni f’kull soċjetà ċivilizzata huwa li ħadd ma jista’ jieħu l-liġi f’idejh. Meta membri ta’ soċjetà jibdew jieħdu l-liġi f’idejhom u jwettqu atti li l-ebda Stat f’sikktu ma jittolera li jiġu mwettqa barra mill-ġurisdizzjoni tiegħu, allura ċ-ċittadini ta’ dikis- soċjetà għandhom għalfejn jitħassbu dwar il-ġejjieni tagħhom. F’Malta, in-numru ta’ persuni li jieħdu l-liġi f’idejhom qiegħed dejjem jiżdied u mhux l-ewwel darba li l-Istat Malti ta l-impressjoni li huwa impotenti li jaġixxi kontra dawn il-persuni. L-impressjoni twassal persuni oħra biex jargumentaw li l-istituzzjonijiet tal-Istat ma tistax tafda fuqhom biex iħarsuk u li dawn jieħdu azzjoni kontra xi wħud u mhux kontra oħrajn. Jgħidu li mhux kulħadd huwa suġġett l-istess għal-liġijiet tal-Istat u hemm min huwa protett. F’pajjiżna nisimgħu akkużi bħal dawn kontinwament, u ta’ kuljum tkompli tixxellef il-kunfidenza taċ- ċittadin onest fl-istituzzjonijiet li suppost jirregolaw ir-relazzjonijiet tiegħu ma’ ħaddieħor fis-soċjetà.

187 L-Istat u T-Tmexxija tal-Istitutuzzjonijiet

Il-Poter fi ħdan l-Istat

Jekk il-poter jeżisti bejn persuna u oħra, u jista’ jiġi abbużat, daqstant il-poter jeżisti bejn l-Istat u ċ-ċittadin, u bl-istess mod jista’ jiġi użat għad-dannu taċ-ċittadin. Kien Lord Acton li tana l-frażi famuża: “Il-poter jikkorrompi u l-poter assolut jikkorrompi b’mod assolut.” Fi kliem ieħor, kull forma ta’ poter għandha t-tendenza li twassal għal xi abbuż u għalhekk wieħed jista’ jkun ċert li poter assolut iwassal għal abbuż assolut.

Kemm il-bniedem fehem il-perikli li jagħti lok għalihom l-eżerċizzju tal-poter, turih l-istorja ta’ dawn l-aħħar mitejn sena. Żewġ sekli ta’ ħidma bla waqfien, biex il-poter jiġi demokratizzat permezz ta’ Kostituzzjonijiet miktuba li, fost affarijiet oħra, jiddefenixxu l-limiti tal-poteri li għandu jkollu Stat demokratiku. L-iżvilupp jew l-irfinar ta’ numru kbir ta’ istituzzjonijiet governattivi, li l-għan prinċipali tagħhom huwa li jsaħħu d-demokrazija waqt lijgħassu l-operat tal-gvern u l-uffiċjali tiegħu. L-introduzzjoni tal-kunċett ta’ vot għal kulħadd– nisa u rġiel, għonja u foqra, suwed u bojod, morda jew b’saħħithom; it-tisħiħ tal-kunċett ta’ Oppożizzjoni, bil-poter formali li tiddomanda mingħand il-gvern tal-ġurnata tweġibiet u spjegazzjonijiet dwar l-operat tiegħu; u ta’ Kumitati tal-Kamra intiżi biex jinvestigaw l-aspetti l-iktar importanti tal-politika tal-istess gvern. Ma’ dawn nistgħu ninkludu wkoll il-Konvenzjoni tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, l-Ombudsman, it-Tribunal Kontra l-Inġustizzji, u numru ta’ Kummissjonijiet jew Awtoritajiet sanzjonati minn Kostituzzjonijiet demokratiċi. Iktar ma jiffunzjonaw tajjeb dawn l-istituzzjonijiet governattivi u pubbliċi, aktar jinżamm mbiegħed l-abbuż tal-poter minn fuq iċ-ċittadin, għalkemm wieħed irid jgħid li anki dawn l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom bżonn li jiġu mgħassa u x-xogħol tagħhom skrutinizzat, għaliex huma wkoll jistgħu jaslu biex jabbużaw mill-poteri fdati lilhom. Daqshekk huwa kumpless il-poter. Kemm huma effettivi l-istituzzjonijiet tal-pajjiż biex iħarsu liċ-ċittadin mill-abbuż tal-poter tal-Istat u l-uffiċjali tiegħu, għandu jservi ta’ kejl dwar kemm hija b’saħħitha d-demokrazija fil-pajjiż. Mhux biżżejjed li pajjiż ikollu l-istituzzjonijiet kollha li għandu jkollha kull demokrazija, jekk imbagħad dawn l-istituzzjonijiet ikunu ineffettivi jew inkella morda.

L-Istituzzjonijiet Pubbliċi f’Pajjiżna

F’Malta ukoll dawn l-istituzzjonijiet mhumiex nieqsa. F’Malta ukoll il-poplu jrid igħix f’demokrazija li tirrispetta d-drittijiet tiegħu u li tipprotegih minn abbużi ta’ poter li jistgħu jiġu pperpetrati kontra tiegħu minn membri tal-gvern u uffiċjali pubbliċi. Imma l-mistoqsija li jeħtieġ li nsaqsu llum, għada u fil-futur, hija: kemm verament qegħdin jilħqu dawn l-għanijiet l-istituzzjonijiet ta’ pajjiżna? F’Malta, f’liema kundizzjoni jinsabu l-istituzzjonijiet tal-pajjiż? Ma nistax ngħid li huma kompletament ineffettivi, bħal ma nistax ngħid li huma għal kollox morda. Li nista’ ngħid, iżda, huwa li hemm għalfejn nitħassbu serjament. Minn żmien għal żmien, kif sejjer nuri, jiġru affarijiet li għandhom għalfejn jinkwetaw kull ċittadin Malti bis-sħiħ.

188 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

1. Il-Kostituzzjoni

Il-Kostituzzjoni, f’kull pajjiż liberali-demokratiku, hija meqjusa bħala l-ogħla liġi tal-pajjiż. Huwa fil-qafas tal-Kostituzzjoni li l-istituzzjonijiet pubbliċi jsibu l-leġittimazzjoni legali tagħhom. F’kull pajjiż fejn is-sistema demokratika hija kkurata bil-għaqal, il- Kostituzzjoni tiġi mogħtija rispett u mħarsa bl-ikbar għożża. Sfortunatament id-diskussjoni li ssir fil-gżira tagħna f’dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal-Kostituzzjoni, hija ħafna drabi mċappsa b’elementi qawwija ta’ partiġjaniżmu. Diskussjoni, li mhux l-ewwel darba li tkun intiża mhux biex tinforma, iżda biex iddgħajjef il-fiduċja tal-poplu f’dawk il-provedimenti li jkunu taħt il-mira politika. Naghti eżempju. Kważi d-diskussjoni kollha li saret s’issa dwar il-provedimenti kostituzzjonali li jiddefenixxu l-istatus ta’ newtralità ta’ Malta kienet ikkaratterizzata b’dan il-partiġjaniżmu. Qiegħed hawnhekk nirreferi għad-diskussjoni li dejjem tqum dwar jekk in-newtralità ta’ Malta, kif imfissra fil-Kostituzzjoni, toħloqx diffikultajiet biex Malta tidħol membru tal-Unjoni Ewropeja, jew biex Malta tonora l-kriterji ta’ sħubija meta tidħol. Ċertament, sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropeja, fil-ġeneralità tagħha, ma tmurx kontra l-Kostituzzjoni ta’ Malta, imma dan ma jfissirx li xi politika li tista’ taddotta minn żmien għal żmien l-istess Unjoni Ewropeja ma tistax twassal biex tagħmel dan. Dażgur li tista’, u jkun wisq iżjed għaqli li nirrispettaw il-Kostituzzjoni milli nidħlu f’konflitti nterni li ma jagħmlulna l-ebda ġid waqt li jnawru l-istabbilità politika ta’ din il- gżira. Minn żmien għal żmien tqum ukoll diskussjoni dwar il-Kummissjonijiet sanzjonati mill-Kostituzzjoni, bħal ma huma l-Kummissjoni dwar is-Servizz Pubbliku, il-Kummissjoni tal-Impiegi, u l-Awtorità tax-Xandir. Dawn il-Kummissjonijiet ma daħlux fil-Kostituzzjoni ta’ Malta b’kumbinazzjoni imma għaliex kien hemm bżonn li l-poteri tal-gvernijiet Maltin ikunu, b’xi mod jew ieħor, ikkontrollati. Tant hemm bżonnu dan il-kontroll, li anki b’dawn il-provedimenti kostituzzjonali, it-tendenza ta’ gvernijiet Maltin li jmorru lil hinn minn dak li huwa demokratikament aċċettabbli, ma tonqos qatt. Jekk dawn il-Kummissjonijiet jew Awtoritajiet mhumiex jaħdmu skond kif titlob minnhom il-Kostituzzjoni, u mhux għal xi raġuni oħra oskura, allura ejjew nagħmlu t-tibdil li hemm bżonn. Imma jekk mhumiex jaħdmu għaliex ma rriduhomx jaħdmu kif suppost, allura dik storja oħra. Li nista’ ngħid jiena huwa li l-parti l-kbira ta’ dawn il-Kummissjonijiet rarament jiġu mogħtija r-riżorsi finanzjarji u umani biex jaqdu d-doveri tagħhom bil-mod professjonali u imparzjali li titlob minnhom il-Kostituzzjoni. Jekk tridu konferma ta’ dan aqraw ir-rapporti annwali tal-Uffiċċju tal-Awditur, il-Kummissjoni għas-Servizz Pubbliku u oħrajn. L-eżempji ma jispiċċaw qatt.

Li wieħed minn żmien għal żmien jiffoka fuq elementi differenti tal-Kostituzzjoni u jiddiskuti jekk hemmx bżonn ta’ riforma fihom, ma fiha xejn hażin. Anzi, sakemm id- diskussjoni ssir fuq bażi miftuħa u mingħajr mottivi moħbija, mhux talli ma hemm xejn ħażin talli hija bżonnjuża. Iżda meta jkun hemm mottivi ulterjuri, allura l-perikli għas- soċjetà jkunu tassew serji. Il-Kostituzzjoni hija bħal kuntratt bejn il-gvern u l-poplu, u jekk kull politiku jibda jaħseb li jista’ jinterpreta l-kuntratt (il-Kostituzzjoni), kif u meta jfettilu, allura l-kuntratt lanqas ikun jiswa l-prezz tal-karta li jkun inkiteb fuqha.

189 L-Istat u T-Tmexxija tal-Istitutuzzjonijiet

2. Il-Parlament

II-Parlament, f’kull pajjiż demokratiku, huwa meqjus bħala l-ogħla istituzzjoni. II-Kostituzzjoni biss hija meqjusa ogħla minnu, u sakemm ma jmurx kontra dak li tippermetti l-Kostituzzjoni, il-Qrati mhux sejrin jostakolawh. Il-Parlament jiġbor ġo fih ir-rappreżentanti tal-poplu, eletti minnu kull numru ta’ snin f’elezzjonijiet ħielsa u miftuħa. Il-Parlament huwa l-unika istituzzjoni li għandha l-poter li tagħmel il-liġijiet u tagħmel tibdil fil-Kostituzzjoni. Huwa ukoll l-unika istituzzjoni li għandha l-kapaċità li tiskrutinja u tgħarbel l-operat tal- gvern. Għalhekk il-membri tagħha jgawdu numru ta’ privileġġi biex ikunu jistgħu jaqdu d-dmirijiet tagħhom mingħajr biża u tfixkil.

Madankollu, huwa fatt li llum il-Parlament m’għadux igawdi l-istima li tixraqlu u għalkemm fl-apparenza baqa’ l-post fejn il-politika tal-gvern tal-ġurnata tiġi leġittimizzata, x’aktarx li postu ħaditulu l-Mass Media. M’għadux Parlament, ħlief f’okkażjonijiet verament rari, il-post fejn jitħabbru l-aktar miżuri importanti tal-gvern tal-ġurnata. Hemm iktar ċans li dawn issir tafhom mill-gazzetti jew mit-televiżjoni milli mir-rapporti Parlamentari. Numru ta’ proċeduri parlamentari, bħal per eżempju, il-ħin għall-istqarrijiet, saru kważi superfluwi. Għandhom isiru sforzi biex il-Parlament jerga’ jiġi rejabilitat f’għajnejn il-poplu. Dan m’hemmx għalfejn isir billi s-seduti tiegħu jieħdu l-aġenda televiżiva minn filgħodu sa filgħaxija. Imma lanqas mhu sewwa li kwistjonijiet ta’ natura nazzjonali, bħal dibattiti dwar id-dħul ta’ Malta fl-Unjoni Ewropeja, jitħallew il-boghod minn dan il-mezz ta’ informazzjoni daqshekk influwenti. Il-poplu għandu dritt li jiġi nformat u li jiġi mogħti ċ-ċans li jgħarbel hu stess materji bħal dawn.

F’dawn l-aħħar snin, biex forsi l-Parlament jerġa’ jikseb lura xi ftit mill-istima li tilef, twaqqfu l-Kumitati tal-Kamra. Dan kien żvilupp importanti iżda jidher ċar li dawn il-Kumitati għadhom il-bogħod ħafna milli jibdew jaqdu l-funzjonijiet li għalihom twaqqfu. Bhas-soltu nagħti eżempju biex nissostanza dak li qiegħed ngħid. Kulhadd sema li fi ftit xhur, (hekk qiegħed jingħad), l-Unjoni Ewropeja sejra tiftaħ in-negozjati mal-pajjiżi applikanti, inkluża Malta. Madankollu, minkejja l-importanza ta’ dan l-iżvilupp, il-Kumitat dwar l-Affarijiet Barranin baqa’ ma jiffunzjonax. Fuq naħa oħra, il-Kumitat dwar in-Nefqa Pubblika, minkejja l-problemi kbar finanzjarji li għandu l-pajjiż, u għalhekk il-bżonn ta’ sorveljanza stretta tan- nefqa tiegħu, baqa’ bla snien. Hemm bżonn urġenti li dawn l-affarijiet jinbidlu u li tiġi mplimentata riforma serja li tassigura li l-Parlament jibda jaqdi d-doveri tiegħu bl-aħjar mod possibli għaliex il-futur ta’ dan il-poplu żgħir, li jgħix fuq blata bla riżorsi, jitlob dan.

Fuq kollox għandha tispiċċa l-ideja li hemm xi materja li l-Parlament, jew il-Kumitati tal-Kamra, ma għandhomx jitħallew jiflu, bl-iskuża li din hija ta’ natura kummerċjali. Il- partijiet konċernati fuq kull naħa tal-Kamra għandhom ikunu liberi li jeżaminaw id- dokumenti rilevanti, jekk hemm bżonn fil-magħluq, waqt li jintrabtu li sakemm ma jinstab

190 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration xejn li mhux kif suppost, jonoraw kunfidenzjalità tal-materja. Il-poplu għandu dritt li jkun jaf jekk kull ċenteżmu li qed joħroġ hux qiegħed ikun amministrat sewwa jew le.

Żvilupp ieħor importanti huwa li numru ta’ uffiċjali pubbliċi, bħal mahuwa l-Awditur Ġenerali, saru jirrapurtaw direttament lill-Parlament. Dan huwa żvilupp li għandu jiġi estiż għal entitajiet oħra li għandhom id-dover li jiskrutinaw l-operat tal-gvern tal-ġurnata.

3. Il-Qrati

Il-Qrati, f’kull pajjiż immexxi sew, għandhom ikunu t-tarka li tħares liċ-ċittadin minn kull abbuż. Ma’ dan, kważi kulħadd jaqbel. Għalhekk, wieħed mill-prinċipji ewlenin huwa li ma jkunx hemm indħil politiku fix-xogħol tal-Ġudikatura. Mhuwiex possibbli li kulħadd jaqbel ma’ kull deċiżjoni li jieħdu l-Qrati u lanqas m’għandna għalfejn niskantaw jekk kultant il-Qrati jieħdu deċiżjonijiet żbaljati. Ikun ta’ dispjaċir meta jiġri dan tal-aħħar, speċjalment għal min jintlaqat ħażin minn dawn id-deċiżjonijiet. Imma l-fatt li l-Qrati jistgħu jiżbaljaw huwa aċċettat mill-istess proċessi gudizzjarji li jipprovdu għall-appelli mid- deċiżjonijiet tal-Qrati, u f’każijiet dwar drittijiet fundamentali, għal rikorsi kostituzzjonali u appelli anki barra minn xtutna.

Li għandu jinkwetana huwa meta dawk id-deċiżjonijiet żbaljati isiru tort ta’ tmexxija ħażina jew riżorsi inadekwati fl-amministrazzjoni tal-ġustizzja. Dawn huma l-affarijiet li jtellfu l-fiduċja taċ-ċittadin fil-Qrati. F’Novembru tas-sena l-oħra, Maġistrat ħareġ digriet fejn qal li huwa se jipposponi s-smiegħ ta’ kawżi li jaqgħu taħtu biex jipprotesta kontra n-nuqqas ta’ serjetà u disprezz lejn il-Qrati li kien hemm fost l-amministrazzjoni tal-Qorti. Ġimgħa wara, l-istess Maġistrat ħabbar li kien qed jirtira l-protesta tiegħu għaliex din ma kellha l-ebda effett fuq l-awtoritajiet. Il-mistoqsija li tqum hija waħda: lanqas l-awtoritajiet tal-pajjiż m’għandhom rispett lejn il-Qorti?

Iżda dan mhux kollox. Kważi xagħrejn ilu sar il-ftuħ ta’ dik li tissejjaħ is-sena forensika tal-Qrati Maltin. Għal numru twil ta’ snin din iċ-ċerimonja serviet biex nisimgħu kif il-problemi fil-Qrati tagħna qegħdin jikbru. Wasal biex intqal, dan l-aħħar, lihemm periklu serju li l-Qrati tagħna jikkollassaw.

Minn riċerka li saret fil-passat diġa nafu li l-Qrati ma jgawdux stima għolja fost il-poplu Malti. Infatti, numru kbir ta’ nies ma jemmnux li l-Qrati tagħna huma imparzjali u li aktar jiffavorixxu lil min hu b’saħħtu jew sinjur, milli lid-dgħajjef. Jekk dan hux veru jew le ma jistax jiġi stabbilit hawnhekk. Il-fatt jibqa’, li parti sostanzjali mill-poplu jaħseb hekk u dan għandu għalfejn iħasseb lil kulħadd. Huwa fatt ukoll li l-affarijiet li qed iseħħu jew jingħadu, jikkonfermaw li mhux kollox hu sewwa fl-amministrazzjoni tal-Qrati.

191 L-Istat u T-Tmexxija tal-Istitutuzzjonijiet

Il-problemi li qed jherru l-Qrati tagħna ma bdewx ilbieraħ. Jidher ċar li xi wħud minnhom ġejjin minn sistemi antikwati li messhom ilhom li nbidlu. Problemi oħra ġejjin mill- fatt li hemm min għandu interess, minħabba l-kompetizzjoni qawwija li teżisti għax-xogħol fil-Qrati, li jtawwal u jikkomplika l-affarijiet. Iżda huwa fatt ukoll, li l-Qrati tagħna, bħall- istituzzjonijiet kruċjali l-oħra f’pajjiżna, qed jiġu mċaħħda mir-riżorsi li għandhom bżonn biex jaqdu d-dover tagħhom skond kif għandu jkun. Per eżempju, kuntrarju għal dak li jiġri f’pajjiżi oħra, il-Maġistrati u l-Imħallfin tagħna m’għandhomx l-għajnuna professjonali li tista’ tgħinhom biex ikunu iktar effiċjenti u professjonali f’xogħolhom. II-Ġudikanti tagħna iridu jagħmlu kollox huma, inkluża r-riċerka meħtieġa f’ħafna kawżi.

Jista’ jkun li wasal iż-żmien li nagħtu wkoll ħarsa sewwa lejn il-mod kif membri tal- Ġudikatura jiġu appuntati. Sal-lum biex wieħed jilħaq Maġistrat jew Imħallef, il-kwalifika, barra l-lawjra, hija n-numru ta’ snin li persuna tkun ilha tipprattika bħala avukat. F’numru ta’ pajjiżi Ewropej is-sistema biex wieħed jidħol mal-Ġudikatura jkun jehtieġlu li jirċievi taħriġ speċjali, intenzjonat biex jippreparhom għal dawn il-karigi. Ikun jeħtiġilhom ukoll, li jitrawmu fix-xogħol tal-ġudikatura billi jservu ta’ assistenti tal-Maġistrati u l-Imħallfin. Fi ftit kliem, din hija sistema li tobbliga lill-membri tal-Ġudikatur biex jispeċjalizzaw fil-qasam tagħhom minn kmieni ħafna u mhux jikkwalifikaw għal din il-professjoni għax ikunu ħadmu ta’ avukati għal numru ta’ snin. Ċert li din is-sistema fiha d-difetti tagħha, iżda jkun tajjeb jekk aħna nagħtu ħarsa lejn sistemi li jeżistu f’pajjiżi oħra u naraw x’riżultati qed jagħtu. Madankollu, forsi kull ma hemm bżonn huwa li nżidu r-riżorsi umani u finanzjarji. Jekk dan huwa l-każ, x’qed nistennew?

4. Kummissjonijiet Oħra

Matul is-snin il-ġlieda kontra l-abbuż tal-poter wasslet biex jitwaqqfu numru ta’ Kummissjonijiet jew Korpi oħra. Fost dawn insibu l-Kummissjoni Kontra l-Korruzzjoni u l-Ombudsman. Waħda mill-problemi li għamlet ħsara lil xi wħud minn dawn il- kummissjonijiet ġiet mill-mod kif il-membri tagħhom jiġu maħtura, u mill-inċertezza dwar għand min għandhom jirrapurtaw. Fil-parti l-kbira tagħhom, dawk appuntati biex iservu f’dawn il-Kummissjonijiet huma maħtura mill-Prim Ministru tal-ġurnata fuq responsabilità tiegħu biss.

F’pajjiż bħal tagħna, fejn il-polarizazzjoni politika hija daqshekk ħarxa, jiena nħoss li dan huwa żball. Mingħajr l-ebda intenzjoni li nitfa’ xi dell fuq xi ħadd, ngħid li l-esperjenza turi li jkun ferm aħjar jekk il-ħatra, jew it-tneħħija tal-membri ta’ dawn il- Kummissjonijiet, titneħħa minn idejn il-Prim Ministru u tingħata lill-Parlament jew titħalla f’idejn il-President tar-Repubblika. Fil-każ ta’ dan tal-aħħar, huwa jkun liberu li jagħmel konsultazzjoni wiesgħa u sħiħa ma’ dawk kollha li jaħseb li jistgħu jagħtuh parir. Huwa veru li taħt is-sistema preżenti, il-President innifsu jaf il-ħatra tiegħu lill-partit fil-Gvern, iżda huwa veru ukoll li s’issa, kull persuna li okkupat din il-kariga dejjem ġabet ruħha kif jixraq

192 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration dik ta’ Kap ta’ Stat. Għalhekk, forsi wasal il-waqt li ninvestu ftit aktar poter f’idejn il-Kap tal-Istat. Biex dan iseħħ ikun jeħtieġ tibdil tal-Kostituzzjoni tagħna u jiena naħseb li jekk dan isir fl-ispirtu ġust, għandu jservi biex ikollna żvilupp politiku f’pajjiżna.

L-uffiċċju tal-Ombudsman twaqqaf f’dak l-ispirtu ta’ konsultazzjoni u kooperazzjoni li bih kull istituzzjoni nazzjonali għandha titwaqqaf, u r-riżultat jitkellem waħdu. M’hawnx, u lanqas qatt kien hawn, istituzzjoni li kisbet il-fiduċja tal-poplu bħal ma ġara f’dan il-każ. L-eżempju tas-suċċess li kiseb l-uffiċċju tal-Ombudsman għandu jsaħħaħ mhux biss il- kunċett li uffiċċjali għal dawn għandhom ikunu maħtura b’tali mod li jintrefgħu ’il fuq minn kull suspett ta’ partiġjaniżmu, iżda li għandhom ikunu responsabbli fl-operat tagħhom lejn il-Parlament. Hekk jagħmlu llum, l-Ombudsman u l-Awditur Ġenerali. Għalkemm mhux għal kollox, anki l-Kummissjoni Kontra l-Korruzzjoni resqet xi ftit lejn dan il-prinċipju. Iżda dan waħdu mhux biżżejjed għaliex huwa fatt li anki dawn l-istituzzjonijiet, kważi mit- twaqqif tagħhom, tħallew imxenqa mir-riżorsi umani u finanzjarji li għandhom bżonn biex jaqdu d-dmirijiet tagħhom kif jixraq.

5. Is-Servizz Pubbliku

Naħseb ma hawnx istituzzjoni pubblika f’dan il-pajjiż li tqajjem daqshekk emozzjonijiet daqs is-servizz pubbliku. Żgur li waħda mill-problemi kbar li ġabet lis- servizz pubbliku fil-qagħda li qiegħed fiha llum hija n-nuqqas, għal bosta u bosta snin, ta’ investiment konsistenti fit-taħriġ tal-ħaddiema tiegħu, fl-ambjent li jaħdmu fih,u fil-makkinarju li jeħtieġu biex ikun effettiv u effiċjenti. Fid-dinja tal-lum it-taħriġ, kemm f’metodi kif ukoll fil-ħsieb, huwa essenzjali għaliex mingħajru ebda membru tas-servizz pubbliku mhu sejjer ikun f’qagħda li jiffaċċja d-dinja komplessa li dejjem qed tevolvi. Wieħed jeħtieġ li jżomm f’moħħu li l-gvernijiet jiġu u jmorru, u għalhekk huwa s-servizz pubbliku biss li jista’ jsostni l-kontinwità u stabilità li kull pajjiż għandu bżonn. Hawnhekk wieħed malajr jifhem kemm huma kbar il-perikli għas-soċjetà meta l-iżvilupp intelletwali tal-membri tas-servizz pubbliku ma jkunx mogħti l-importanza li jixraqlu. Għalkemm dan l-aħħar twaqqaf fi ħdan l-Università Istitut apposta biex jieħu ħsieb dan l-aspett, ikolli nistqarr li diġa ninsabu tard u ta’ kuljum il-biċċa qed issir aktar urġenti. Ngħid mingħajr l-ebda intenzjoni li nallarma, iżda fuq raġuni sodi, li fil-kundizzjoni li jinsab fiha llum is- servizz pubbliku Malti, dan mhuwiex f’qagħda li jiffaċċja l-isfidi li sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropeja iġġib magħha.

Raġuni prinċipali għal dan ġejja mill-fatt li ma kienx hemm rieda politika biex ir- rakkomandazzjonijiet li kienu ħarġu mir-Rapport tal-Kummissjoni għar-Riforma tas-Servizz Pubbliku jiġu mplimentati. Għaxar snin wara għadna nisimgħu dwar xi attentat biex dan isir. U x’inhi r-raġuni prinċipali għaliex ir-riforma ma seħħitx? Jiena ngħid li dan ġara għaliex l-iktar affarijiet bażiċi li kienu meħtieġa biex jiffaċilitaw ir-riforma baqgħu ma sarux. Qiegħed nirreferi għall-fatt li fis-servizz pubbliku baqa’ ma ġiex implimentat il-kunċett tal-

193 L-Istat u T-Tmexxija tal-Istitutuzzjonijiet

“mertu”. Jiġifieri l-modi kif jiġu reklutati ħafna mill-impjegati ġodda, u kif jiġu mqassma l-premjijiet u l-promozzjonijiet, għadhom ma ġewx stabbiliti fuq il-prinċipju ta’ min ħaqqu, u mhux ta’ min għandu influwenza. Qabel ma l-affarijiet fis-servizz pubbliku jibdew isiru u jidhru definittivament qegħdin isiru b’ġustizzja, kull tibdil li jista’ jsir jibqa’ jirrendi lilu nnifsu kosmetiku. Ma jistax ikollok servizz pubbliku effiċjenti jekk dawk li inti poġġejt fuq ma jgawdux il-fiduċja tan-nies li jeħtiġilhom jikkmandaw. Minħabba kif isiru l-affarijiet f’dan il-pajjiż, dawk li kien jistħoqqilhom jilħqu jiġu mċappsa bl-istess tajn li għandu jkun riżervat għal min ma jistħoqqlux. Lanqas ma tista’ timxi, kif ġieli ġara, billi tipprova tingħoġob ma’ kulħadd. L-ideja li kulħadd għandu, wara numru ta’ snin fl-impjieg, għamel x’għamel, dritt għal promozzjoni, hija ideja falluta u l-gvern għandu jara kif jagħmel u jirranġa din il-kwistjoni fil-ftehim li jagħmel mat-trade unions. Prinċipji bħal dawn ma jgħinux biex jimmotivaw, iżda biex joħolqu sens ta’ diżiluzzjoni fost dawk l-impjegati li huma effiċjenti u produttivi.

Lanqas ma jista’ s-servizz pubbliku jibqa’ jservi ta’ sponża li tixrob il-qgħad kull meta dan jerfa’ rasu. La l-finanzi tal-pajjiż ma jippermettu dan u lanqas il-ġustizzja, għaliex huwa fatt li ħafna drabi dawk akkomodati b’dan il-mod ikunu nies tal-qalba tal-partit fil- gvern. Mhux biss metodi bħal dawn iwasslu biex is-servizz pubbliku ma jkunx effiċjenti, iżda biex lanqas jimxi b’mod ġust ma’ kulħadd, bil-konsegwenza li anki s-servizzi tal-gvern jiġu mqassma fuq linji partiġjani. Fi ftit kliem, ikunu l-istess istituzzjonijiet tal-Istat li jaħmu l-abbużi ta’ poter li huma mħallsa minn flus il-poplu biex jikkumbattu. Dawn huma kollha raġunijiet għaliex is-servizz pubbliku Malti qatt ma ġie miżrugħ fih sens ta’ ethos professjonali bħal ma ġara f’pajjiżi oħra.

Konklużjoni

Minn dak li għidt hawn fuq joħroġ ċar li l-istituzzjonijiet ta’ pajjiżna mhumiex jilħqu l-għanijiet li għalihom twaqqfu. M’hemmx biżżejjed ilqugħ għaċ-ċittadin meta dawk fil-poter jiddeċiedu li jabbużaw mill-poteri tagħhom. Lanqas ma hemm ilqugħ biżżejjed biex iħarsu liċ-ċittadin onest minn individwi oħra li għal xi raġuni igawdu saħħa iktar minnu. In-nuqqasijiet huma kbar u l-problemi m’humiex problemi li tfaċċaw ilbieraħ. Xi wħud minn dawn il-problemi huma riżultat dirett tal-istint partiġjan li jaħkem it-tmexxija politika Maltija. Problemi oħra jirriżultaw mill-inkapaċità tat-tmexxija politika li tipprovdi r-riżorsi li jinħtieġu l-aktar lill-istituzzjonijiet sensittivi tal-pajjiż biex jaqdu d-dmirijiet tagħhom, xi wħud minnhom dmirijiet assenjati lilhom mill-Kostituzzjoni. Meta wieħed iqis li din is- sitwazzjoni kienet teżisti anki meta l-finanzi tal-pajjiż kienu ferm aħjar milli huma illum, wieħed forsi jiġi skużat jekk jissuspetta li din l-akkarija ma’ dawn l-istituzzjonijiet ġejja minn intenzjonijiet mhux daqshekk onorevoli. Problemi oħra ġejjin mill-fatt li waqt li ħafna huwa mistenni mis-servizz pubbliku, it-taħriġ li ġie mogħti dan is-servizz matul is- snin kien dgħajjef għall-aħħar. Madankollu jiena ninsab konvint li anki jekk inżidu r-riżorsi lill-istituzzjonijiet l-aktar importanti tal-gvern, u ntejbu b’mod radikali t-taħriġ li nipprovdu

194 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration lis-servizz pubbliku, qabel ma nkunu maturi biżżejjed u nelevaw lil dawn l-istituzzjonijiet ’il fuq mill-politika partiġjana, l-isforzi tagħna mhu se jservu għal xejn. Iservu biss biex nitfgħu aktar riżorsi f’dak il-bir bla qiegħ li donnu għandu pajjiżna. Din hija l-verità.

VGPV

195 Bringing Good Governance to Malta

(Originally published in First Monthly, a publication of the Malta Independent on Sunday in 2003, and reprinted in Public Life in Malta, Vol. I, 2012)

ower,’ Lord Acton once wrote, ‘corrupts and absolute power corrupts ‘Pabsolutely’. The issue here is that power does not only corrupt when it is exercised in a situation where few or no constraints exist, but that power at whatever level and in whatever degree, has a tendency to corrupt. It is like a drug which, once tasted, can quickly lead to addiction. Power brings with it a number of advantages, status and influence and it is for this reason that John Locke, as early as the seventeenth century, warned against the attractions of power. His solution, as well of that of Rousseau and Montesquieu, was to create a political system were power was constitutionally limited and diffused rather than concentrated in the hands of a small circle of people. These great political thinkers placed little faith in individuals. They cared very little for the Churchills, the de Gaulles or, indeed, the Mintoffs and the Fenech Adamis of the political world. Instead, they looked to the creation of governing institutions that would serve as a check on power and which would make the covert abuse of power more difficult. Hence the emergence of such concepts as a those of human rights, limited government, a separation of powers, the rule of law, and constitutional government. In turn, these concepts found expression in such political institutions as parliaments, independent commissions and agencies, such as Public Service Commissions, Ombudsmen and Audit agencies and others. It was these ideas and institutions that came to form the intellectual tradition of Western society and which gave practical expression to modern liberal-democratic governance. According to this tradition, it is folly to trust in the good intentions of those vested with power.

Thus, in liberal-democratic states good governance is not measured merely by how much or how often people vote or whether those that are elected to govern represent the majority of votes cast, but also by how accountable those so elected are towards those that elected them. Or by how effective scrutinizing agencies are in uncovering abuses of power and granting remedies or forcing the resignations of politicians and officials found guilty of a gross abuse of power. That is what counts in liberal-democratic societies, for to be vested with power is to be given a trust, no more and no less. In a so-called democratic society, where one scandal follows upon another or where incompetent people are allowed to live off the public purse, as if nothing has happened, abuse of power tends to be the norm and not the exception.

196 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Hence, in liberal-democratic societies the health of the body politic is measured by how responsible and accountable governments are and not by grand speeches and the macho politics of political leaders. Accountability was also expected to lead to a more efficient system of government where scarce financial and human capital resources are employed to their capacity and to the benefit of the whole body of citizens and not to line the pockets of speculators, relatives of politicians and / or political associates. In properly managed and governed liberal-democracies there is no politician too big or too powerful who is exempted from scrutiny and whose political life may not be brought to a premature, or indeed, ignoble end because of some abuse of power. I think a good example of this can be seen in former German Chancellor’s Khol fall from grace. A hero who had brokered the early re-unification of Germany his involvement in a financial scandal did not exempt him from investigation and ultimately removal from the political scene. Much the same can be said about Richard Nixon’s case whose abuse of power in the notorious Watergate Scandal would have led to his impeachment had he not resigned his Presidential office voluntarily.

Malta, it is often said, is a state which claims to be a liberal-democracy with a Constitution to match. This Constitution contains an entire Chapter on human rights, sets limits on the power of the government and provides for a number of independent institutions with power to investigate and restrain political abuse or maintain a politically level playing field for party competition.

Given this, why is it that in Malta accountability is so frequently conspicuous by its very absence? Why do we still have, after decades of responsible government, a semblance rather than the substance of liberal-democratic government? Why is it that our media continues to be inundated with situations of alleged abuses of power but nonetheless heads do not roll if not fall? Take the case of our so-called independent bodies specially sanctioned by the Constitution such as the Electoral Commission and the Broadcasting Authority. Their entire proceedings have become so enmeshed in controversy that for a number of decades their membership has been shared out between the political parties in direct opposition to the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution itself. In the case of others, such as the Public Service Commission and the Permanent Commission for the Investigation of Corruption, these have been so denuded of resources that they have forfeited much of the public trust which they might have enjoyed. Even the Public Accounts Committee of the House is still to demonstrate that its bite is stronger than its bark. And, the fact that public trust is lacking at every level of governmental activity can be seen from the fact that almost every award of tender by public departments or corporations inevitably ends up before the Courts for review. The case of Mater Dei Hospital is one recent example when the entire timetable for bringing it into operation has been disrupted by a challenge in the Courts from disaffected providers of medical equipment claiming serious shortcomings (and worse) in the award of the relevant tenders. Worse, much worse, the confidence of

197 Bringing Good Governance to Malta the public in our Courts of Law was in August last year rocked by allegations of bribery by senior members of the Judiciary.

So, where can we go from here? Hopefully up and not further down. The reform of the National Audit Office and the institution of the Office of Ombudsman have both made a significant contribution to an improved system of governance. But even in the case of these two offices compliance by the government of recommendations emanating from them has been both patchy, and to put it mildly, often half-hearted. The case of these two scrutinizing agencies has also shown that whenever the Opposition was genuinely taken into confidence by the Government of the day the institutions that emerged enjoyed greater public confidence and genuine independence allowing them to carry-on their assigned tasks efficiently and professionally. In other words, whenever a genuine effort was made to raise the status of public agencies above partisan politics a significant step forward has been registered.

In other liberal-democratic countries the office, be it of Prime Minister or senior civil servant, is held to be more important than its holder and it is for this reason that those who breach accepted rules of governance or convention are mercilessly hounded out of office. The integrity of that office must be jealously defended and protected. In recent years members of Parliament and Ministers have found themselves on their way to prison because they lost sight of this fact and thought that their status, and their colleagues support, would protect them from such a fate. In Malta such an event is seen as inconceivable. Our politicians, and many of their hangers on and some officials, see themselves and are seen by their electorates and the public in general to be above the law. No matter the seriousness of the scandal they are certain that the “Go to Jail” card in their game of Political Monopoly was never inserted in the pack.

What is to be done? Certainly, we should not be taken in by the platitudes put in the President’s mouth by the Prime Minister at the recent opening of Parliament. Given the temptations that power tends to put in the way of politicians and administrators it would be unlikely to expect them to be in a hurry to seriously reform the system. Many politicians would not make it to Parliament were it not for their ability to satisfy constituency demands on them through the bestowal of political patronage. They have little if anything to qualify them for such a post. Indeed, a number of politicians who in a politically sane society would have been booted out by the electors long ago, still grace our premier institution. But, the present tragic state of public finances may (hope is the last to die) serve as an inducement to speed up reform and put into place the necessary reforms.

What is required in the first place is a re-examination, between all parties and civil society organisations, of the fundamental principles of liberal-democracy and how these may be re-affirmed or properly introduced within our system of governance. We have

198 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration claimed to have grasped these principles long ago but the evidence, such as the current inability of people to debate issues within the framework of these principles, demonstrates the contrary. Without exception every issue is debated from a partisan standpoint and with vehemence. The departure point must be a public debate which seeks to re-define these principles. We have taken them for granted for so long that they have become rather blurred if not meaningless.

Secondly, we must ensure that our institutions of government are raised up above party political level. This means that the idea of the State as distinct from party government is re-affirmed and the two entities currently so totally enmeshed separated. These institutions are financed by every member of the citizenry and must be in the service of all. Parties must learn to tell wrong doers in their midst that there is no longer a place for them in the party. The tendency under every governing administration for its supporters to excuse blatant abuses of power must be resisted. A slight change has indeed taken place: the establishment of a Vigilance and Discipline Commission within the Malta Labour Party was a step forward. The decision by the PN to bar certain individuals from contesting general or local elections in the name of the party because of some alleged wrongdoing is also worth noting.

Thirdly, we must give scrutinising agencies greater powers to institute investigations independently of the Executive and the executive powers to ensure that the decision to prosecute or punish abuse of power is not left to the discretion of the Prime Minister or some individual minister. Once the National Audit Office or some other investigating agency has given strong indications of abuse or certain serious accusations are made within Parliament and elsewhere, certain executive agencies, such as the police, must be free to launch investigations without waiting for authority from Castille or any other Auberge. Of course, if these are to carry forward their task efficiently they must be staffed with professionally trained investigators and not politically appointed individuals whose first loyalty is to the state and not the party in government.

Fourthly, we must establish a system of governance based on transparency and openness. This ought to involve an expansion of the powers of Parliament, notably through House Committees, to investigate abuses whenever these are alleged. Governments must be made to account and the former practice of asking ministers to place the relevant papers on the Table of the House or before a House Committee should become more the norm rather than the exception that it is now. Under no excuse, except for reasons of ethics, should ministers refuse to answer questions put to them in the House or to present the requested papers. As Jefferson once put it public leaders are by their very nature public bodies. In the case of matters which may be of a sensitive nature to the security of the Island or which can do unnecessary harm to individuals, arrangements could be made between Government and Opposition for the relevant papers to be viewed

199 Bringing Good Governance to Malta privately. The notion that governments have too much to hide must be put to rest once and for all. Present practices rather than helping to dispel suspicion tend to aggravate those very suspicions and to impress on the public mind that abuse did take place and that it is rampant.

Fifth, we need a truly independent press capable of investigating and exposing wrong doing. Despite protestations to the contrary the local media operators wear their political allegiances on their sleeve and provide only token comment when their favourite party is the accused party. In Malta media bosses do not see themselves as guardians of democracy (although they would never admit to this) and do little to continually challenge governments to explain, let alone resign. Politicians have no need to fear the press as they expect that at least half the media will somehow come to their support, either through its silence or by diversionary tactics. But freedom and democracy cannot truly exist without a reasonably, if not truly, free press. Loyalty to the liberal-democratic state must transcend loyalty to party.

Finally, and this is perhaps the most controversial recommendation that I am going to make, the present system by which the taxpayer is made to carry the burden for blatant abuses of power must stop. Those who are found to have, with intent, abused of their position and the public trust vested in them should be held personally liable for damages suffered by the victims of their abuse or by the public purse generally. This is the case in many liberal-democracies and serves as a potent deterrent against politicians who seek to extend their electoral base or that of their party by recourse to public funds or political patronage. Not long ago members on the Council of the Borough of Westminster were asked to personally make good the sum of £32million British Pounds. The Conservative majority had implemented a policy by which housing facilities under their charge were allocated to individuals and families who were more likely to vote for the Conservative Party at election time. Investigators from the Audit Office had found that properties had been left empty until the “right” sort of applicants had come forward with a subsequent loss of £32 million pounds in revenue to the Council. The money has to be paid and no Queen’s Pardon will be forthcoming to frustrate the bailiffs.

There is no doubt that the propensity towards corruption and abuse of power has become a world-wide problem. The pressures on policy-makers and politicians to accommodate particular interests in return for payments of some sort have increased dramatically. In Western countries the threat that those who succumb may expect to pay the price acts as an important deterrent and public confidence in state institutions remains, therefore, reasonably high. In contrast, in Malta, people believe that rules are merely the starting point for bargaining and feel hard done when their demands are resisted. They are convinced that the reason why their demands have been rejected lies not in the fair administration of rules but in their distortion in the interests of others. Decisions by

200 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration the Tribunal against Injustices tend to give some credibility to such beliefs. That there is a problem of a certain magnitude has been attested by certain comments made by EU officials since Malta’s application for membership was first made. The challenges facing Malta are equally great. In a globalised world where information can be accessed at the touch of a button, investors will find it increasingly difficult to commit funds in countries where the institutions of the state are weak and incapable of providing even the most basic forms of protection for their investment. Today, investors do not need to rely on information about Malta on the Malta Development Corporation or the Malta Enterprise Board when this comes on line. The information is there for the taking. What goes on in Malta is no longer restricted to Malta and unless we clean up our act, and rather fast at that, we shall soon discover that few serious investors will be prepared to sink funds into our economy. In contrast those that should be less welcome will come flooding in. The choice is ours to make.

VGPV

201 A New Creation or an Image and Likeness? The Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State

(Published in Public organisation Review: A Global Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 2, June 2001)

Abstract

Small states vary among themselves as to whether they have significant local government systems. While government in Malta has been historically a very centralized activity, a network of local councils was established in the early 1990s as part of a more general public sector reform movement. Unlike some other small states, Malta has strong political parties, and they have played an important part in the affairs of the local councils as well as of the central government. Their establishment has therefore done little to reduce political polarization or promote decentralist values, as was hoped when they were first established.

ithin the context of studies of small jurisdictions of the type examined in Wthis symposium, local government systems have received little systematic attention from scholars in the field. Some studies that explore local government processes in the South Pacific do exist, two examples being the work of Larmour and Qalo (1985) and Alailima et al (1994). In recent years the issue of local government also featured prominently at British Commonwealth meetings both at Heads of Government level in Edinburgh in 1997 and within its subsidiary organizations, as in Malta in 1999. Since the promulgation, in 1985, of the Council of Europe’s European Charter on Local Government, member states have given greater attention to the subject, although from a small state perspective only tangentially. A number of European small states, such as Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus, are full members of this organization.

The existing picture as it relates to small states presents widely differing variations. There are states where some form of local administration has existed for more than a hundred years (Dominica, Fiji and the Channel Islands) and others where local government has either practically withered away (St Lucia) or has been abolished (St Vincent, ). However, in recent years, a significant number of small states have shown renewed interest in local government and schemes for its reform have been under consideration by their governments (Cyprus, Fiji, Mauritius). In others, such systems have only recently been introduced (Seychelles, Bahamas, Malta). But, generally speaking, this press interest in local government by small states has been closely associated with public service reform programs that place stress on the virtues of decentralization (Wright and Bertucci, 1999, pp. 8-19). 202 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

There are issues, however, which are relevant to a discussion of local government whatever a state’s size. In the first instance there is at heart the character of the central governments on which the local governments depend (Larmour, 1985 p. 353). For example, important differences exist between former British and former French colonies. The British tended to enjoy a greater degree of formal autonomy than their French counterparts, especially the smaller ones, as these tended to form part of the local government structures of France itself. Secondly, in newly independent states, small ones included, local government systems may help to strengthen the ties that bind society and the state. They can do this, for example, by providing stakeholders with some influence over decision-making processes (Pirotta, 1993), while at the same time helping to “fit the state more closely to the contours of the society by providing a way for its policies to be adapted to local sensibilities and circumstances” (Larmour, 1985, p. 354). The latter may be true of small states whose population is scattered over a large archipelago. Thirdly, local government may help ensure that public services are delivered in a more effective and efficient manner, reducing waste and reaching those for whom they were mostly intended. Finally, local government may contribute significantly to the success of sustainable development policies helping to promote economic, social, cultural and political development (Wright and Bertucci, 1999, p. 4). It is within the context of these mainly prescriptive criteria that the issue of local government is being debated in small state fora. In many ways this also applies to Malta, the focus of this paper. For example, many of these criteria were also raised in Malta in 1992 when the Maltese government launched its proposal for the setting up of local councils (Malta Government, 1992). The general thrust of this paper, however, is to examine whether the introduction, in 1993, of local government has had any impact on selected issues of governance in Malta.

The Maltese Islands: Government and Politics

In terms of their geography the Maltese Islands consist of three inhabited islands — Malta (the largest), Gozo and Comino — which together cover an area of just 316 square kilometres, but host a population of about 390,000. Because of its long association with Britain, Malta’s system of government and administration resembles in many of its structures and features that of Great Britain, but having a President elected by a 65-member Parliament as its titular head. The control and direction of government is vested in a Cabinet, while the Constitution makes provision for a number of scrutinizing agencies, such as the Broadcasting Authority, Audit Office, Public Service Commission and Employment Commission.

Government in Malta has been, historically, a very centralized activity. The island of Gozo, however, with its district court and area offices of nearly all the major departments of government and, since 1987, its own ministry, has at times managed to chip away at this centralization. Between 1961 and 1973 Gozo even had its own local council which was

203 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State established at a time when Malta was under direct British rule. The Ordinance that created this council deliberately excluded political parties from competing in its elections (PRO, 1960). This rankled strongly with the parties and partially explains why the Gozo Council, which for a decade had carried out its devolved functions satisfactorily, was dissolved soon after independence (Gingell, 1996, p. 11). It also partially explains why the issue of what role parties should have in local government has remained such a sensitive issue to this very day.

But there were other reasons why the Malta Labour Party (MLP) and the Nationalist Party (PN), Malta’s two dominant parties, tended to shy away from the idea of local government. Of first importance was the question of economic and social development. The limited financial resources at the disposal of Maltese governments generally called for strict central government control over planning and public expenditure. Second, as competition for power between the two parties has always been very intense and the difference in votes between them slight, local issues until recently exercised only marginal influence on politics. The focus of political activity still tends to be fixed firmly on winning general elections. Smallness does play a part in all this for it allows for the political loyalties of each and every individual to be so well known that independent activity outside the parties is not always possible. Illustrative of the above were voluntary local civic committees that mushroomed across Malta and Gozo during the 1960s but which very quickly came to be dominated by party activists. This has given rise to the belief, which is reflected in many areas of government, that it is almost impossible to find individuals who can distance themselves from partisan interests (Warrington, 1995, p. 7). Thirdly, in the first four decades of representative government, both parties had spent time, effort and money building up their party branches in nearly every locality of Malta and Gozo, and wanted these clubs to remain the principal point of reference for residents in the localities. Finally, there was the question of whether local government made economic and administrative sense given Malta’s small size. The prevalent view in Malta, until the mid-1970s, was that in an area the size of Malta local government would unnecessarily duplicate existing structures and functions thereby leading to a waste of scarce resources. To be fair this view is not restricted to Malta but continues to assert itself elsewhere. During the 1999 Malta conference of the Commonwealth Local Government Forum this issue was brought up repeatedly by nearly every speaker (Wright and Bertucci, 1999, pp. 8-19). None concluded that smallness is an obstacle to development in this sphere, but the fact that the issue was raised so consistently does prove that doubts still persist even among small states.

The 1992 white paper

In Malta, local government became an electoral issue in 1987 when both the MLP and the PN included it in their respective manifestoes. But it was not until 1992 that the PN government first outlined its plans when, in January, it released a White Paper explaining

204 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration its decision to establish local councils and indicating, rather vaguely, what structure it hoped to give them. This document, entitled “Local Councils: Bringing the Citizen Closer to Power” (Malta Government, 1992) also included a draft of the law and an indication of what the functions of these councils would be.

Both from the timing of its publication, a few days before the PN called a snap general election, and from its content, it is clear that the government was hoping for some electoral advantage from it. Two reasons may be cited. First, the draft, law as published was closely based on the 1961 Gozo Civic Council Ordinance and hence conveyed the impression that political parties would be excluded from the new local councils. Candidates, it was thought, would have to canvass on their own merits and not political affiliation. This was bound to be popular with the public because of the stifling control that Maltese political parties had come to exercise over many areas of life (Pirotta, 1997). Secondly, the White Paper claimed that local councils would have a salutary effect on the most important problem areas in Maltese governance, i.e. excessive concentration of power at the centre, too many infringements of the democratic process, and an abnormally high level of political polarization.

• Economic centralism

The causes — strategic and economic — which have given rise to this highly centralized system of government have been adequately explored elsewhere and need not concern us here (Pirotta, et al., 2000, pp. 115-9). What needs to be said, however, is that despite greater affluence the system had, since independence in 1964, become more centralized. This was mainly due, though not entirely, to Labour during its 16 years in office (1971-87). In its determination to speed up economic and social development, the government took over several key areas of the economy, including banking, insurance, air and sea transport, telecommunications, tourism and the importation of a number of essential commodities that included staple foods, timber and cement. As a result, by 1987 the state was not only omnipresent, as is generally the case in small states, but it now employed almost 42% of all gainfully occupied citizens (Pirotta, 1997).

Neither the fact of a strong state presence in their lives nor the large numbers employed by the state bothered the Maltese. Indeed, there is still widespread agreement in Malta that the existing high standard of living would not have been possible without the active participation of the state in the economy (PSRC, 1990, p. 4). What eventually became an issue was the fact that the government had intruded into areas of the economy that until then had been adequately served by private initiative and in which government had neither the experience nor the expertise required to ensure either quality or choice. Matters were made worse, however, by the inability of public departments to deal efficiently with tasks traditionally in their domain and by the failure of public corporations,

205 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State not only to maintain minimal standards, but to guarantee services.1 As a result, by the middle of the 1980s the image that tourism-dependent Malta came to present was one of neglect, shabbiness and unsafe roads. Thus, by the time Labour was returned to the opposition in 1987, the debate as to what role the state should play in the economy had become a politically sensitive one.

In 1987 the PN was elected on a programme that promised to address these problems and in its first five years in office embarked on a limited and cautious policy of liberalization and privatization. Through the appointment of a Public Service Reform Commission, it also made a bold bid to revitalize an overburdened and battered public service. The decision to establish local councils was viewed as an important element of this reform. Decentralization, it was thought, would ultimately help resolve past mistakes by taking away from government those tasks that would be better left to the people in their locality (Malta Government, 1992, p. 5).

• Political polarization

The two other problem areas — democratic governance and political polarization —which the White Paper claimed local councils would also help to address, were equally longstanding. They were, and remain, closely inter-related. Since the inception of party politics, in 1921, elections have proved to be close-run and tense affairs punctuated, until recently, by vandalism and violence, sometimes of the most serious kind.2 Both the MLP and the PN constitute formidable electoral machines in their own right, publishing daily newspapers and managing their own television and radio stations. Thriving party clubs can be found in nearly every locality and accredited activists in almost every street. Political activities are organized on a weekly basis and full-scale campaigning is carried on from one election to another.

Smallness has worked to the advantage of parties. It allows leaders almost daily contact with their electorates and party headquarters the opportunity of exercising strict control over members and every aspect of their campaign strategy. It also makes it easier for parties to get their message across and to mobilize their supporters whenever this is required. Given all this, it is not surprising that in Malta loyalty to one’s party is very strong and this is borne out by research (Tabone, 1987, pp. 142-45) and voter turnout at elections, which hovers around the 96% mark.

The democratic process and the rule of law have often been the victimsof such deep-rooted political polarization. Acts of violence and vandalism have often gone unpunished and party leaders have been quite ready to excuse, though not approve, such acts. This state of affairs has been further compounded by the way smallness tends to undermine law enforcement efforts. Law enforcement officers often feel inhibited about

206 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration applying sanctions against offenders either because they know them, or are related to them in some way, or are members of the same club or locality. In some cases, officers know that action against certain offenders would provoke interference from politicians, either because the individuals concerned are active in one or the other of the political parties, or because they are constituents whom politicians seek to protect. The potential interference can range from serious crimes to minor offences such as traffic violations and littering. Furthermore, parties in government have frequently used senior offices in the public service, including directorships in public corporations, to reward activists and/or close family members, while less important posts have been used to gratify constituents. In recent years, to overcome the mistrust generated by such practices, both parties have reached an informal agreement that allows them permanent representation on commissions or authorities conceived by the Constitution to be independent of partisan interests. As Warrington (1995, p. 7) has observed, the result is a political culture that places “a premium on conflict, mobilization and a ‘winner takes all’ attitude towards public affairs.” What the White Paper seemed to be implying, therefore, was that the transfer of a number of municipal services to local councils would answer these grave difficulties.

Seven years of local councils

In April 1993 the draft bill proposing the setting up of local councils in Malta and Gozo was presented in Parliament. While presenting it the Prime Minister claimed that local councils were going to be “a landmark and powerful sign in the political and social development” of the islands. There was, in other words, a lot riding on this reform. The benefits were implicit in the Act itself. Among its most important features one finds: the number of councils to be established; a clear distinction between the roles of elected officials and executive officers; a stress on balanced budgeting; the requirement to contract out for services and works; and the question whether or not political parties should be represented on local councils.

• Number of local councils

The White Paper had given the impression that each local council would consist of a number of towns and villages grouped together. Given their miniscule size and indistinct borders, this seemed to make practical sense. But there were difficulties too. The rivalry that existed between the different localities was sometimes so great that it would have been difficult for the government to produce a scheme of representation that would satisfy each locality. It was decided, therefore, that each locality, or nearly so, would have its own council. The result was the creation of 67 local councils having an elected membership that ranged from five to thirteen councillors, depending on population. This decision had two advantages: first, that of extending public participation by providing a greater number of council seats; second, that of giving residents in a locality greater control over decisions that affected them more closely. 207 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State

• Elected officials and executive officers

It is apparent from the 1993 Local Councils Act that the government saw local councils as an integral component of its public service reform strategy and a catalyst for widespread change. The driving force behind the reform programme was the Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) that was appointed in 1988 and reported in 1989. Its report was largely, though not fully, inspired by the new managerial concepts that were blowing hurricanes in many a public administration. Among other things, the Report called for a clearer distinction between the roles of ministers and public service managers (PSRC, 1989, pp. 9-13). The 1993 Local Councils Act sought deliberately to follow in its path setting out the powers and duties of mayors and councillors and of the secretaries who were to be “the executive, administrative and the financial head of the Council” (Gingell, 1996, p. 14). Many of the difficulties faced by the public service since independence had arisen from excessive interference by politicians even in the day-to-day affairs of administration, a point stressed by the PSRC Report. This, of course, is not something restricted to Malta, as studies of small states find that it is a general characteristic (Lowenthal, 1987). But in Malta ministers quite frequently sought to circumvent rules and procedures on the grounds that they were too bureaucratic. What the framers of the Act clearly wanted, therefore, was to create adequate space between these two distinct but complimentary roles of elected councillor and manager. The PSRC Report had also recommended that officers of certain importance should in future be appointed on fixed-term contracts, with the possibility of renewal, rather than permanent tenure (PSRC, 1989, p. 58). The 1993 Local Councils Act also included these provisions in respect of council secretaries.

Did these provisions work? These two provisions together had placed secretaries in what one former local council secretary has called a master-servant role (Gingell, 1996, p. 5). On one hand, the secretary had “more powers and responsibilities than the mayor himself and his fellow councillors,” whilst on the other, as their paid employee, he or she was dependent on them for the renewal of his/her contract. It proved not to be an easy relationship. Between 1993, the year local councils came into being, and 1995, forty secretaries (59%) had resigned their posts. According to Gingell half of these resigned because of interference in their work and disregard by councillors and mayors of statutory council procedures for which secretaries were mainly responsible. Of those who remained, asked what major problems they faced in their work, 16% pointed to interference in their work by mayors, 58% to disregard of statutory provisions, and 22% to lack of consultation by mayors. Secretaries are in the disadvantaged position that the renewal of their tri- annual contract depends on elected councillors. The law provides some protection in that the Minister responsible for Local Councils will have to approve the dismissal and appointment of a secretary, but this has not always proved protection enough and one or two secretaries have had to turn to the courts for proper protection. Difficulties of this nature are bound to increase in the future, for today’s secretaries are in a different position

208 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration from those who were serving in the period 1993-95. 95% of those appointed in this period were seconded from government departments and returned to their former offices on resigning the office of secretary. The vast majority of those in office today, however, have been recruited privately and the chances are that many of them would be less inclined to resist mayors and councillors as it might lead to the loss of their employment. This tendency is already being confirmed by current research (Buhagiar, 2000, pp. 46-8). It is clear from the above data that, despite attempts to steer councils away from past difficulties of this sort, local councils have not escaped from the problems traditionally associated with central government.

• Local councils at work

As they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The responsibilities devolved by government to local councils included garbage collection, street cleaning, upkeep of pavements and public facilities such as public gardens, road maintenance, fixing of traffic signs, pedestrian crossings and so on. After 1997 their responsibilities were extended to include, among other things, the upkeep and running of old age centres and local health clinics. Councils also had a right to be consulted on traffic arrangements in their locality and to make submissions to planning bodies. In theory, therefore, whether or not local councils have so far fulfilled public expectations can be gauged from how well they have performed these functions. In practice, it is not so straightforward.

Local councils had inherited huge problems from the central government. Despite its large workforce and resources, the central government had allowed many of the services now devolved to local councils to decline in quality: several localities, if not most, presented a picture of abandon and neglect. Traffic signs and road markings were practically non-existent in many localities, pavements and roads in a pitiful state and street cleanliness left much to be desired. To expect local councils, in the space of eight years, to redress these problems is, perhaps, to ask too much. So the question that should be asked is, given this state of affairs, have local councils made a difference? If one follows the performance assessments made by the Department of Local Councils (DLC) over the period 1994-2000, the picture that emerges is a mixed one. In some areas, such as upkeep of pavements, traffic signs and pedestrian crossings, the situation in many townsand villages is much improved. If, however, one looks at street cleanliness or the upkeep of sanitary facilities in localities, then the overall simplistic answer is no.

One of the initial problems faced by councils in their first two years of existence arose from the fact that they could do very little without some degree of co-operation from central government departments. But for various reasons this co-operation was either not always forthcoming or could not be given. In the first instance, according to a study of the central-local relationship (Vassallo, 1995, pp. 45-75) many government departments had

209 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State not been prepared for the work that 67 new councils would demand of them. They were themselves in the process of introducing some sort of customer care provision for the first time. Another reason was that these departments had not been given any new resources to cope with the new work created by local councils. But the study found too that public servants mistrusted local councils mainly because some of the proposals made in the PSRC Report (e.g. three-year contracts instead of fixed tenure, which the government was hoping to extend to its own departments) had already been implemented in local councils. They feared that local councils might yet prove to be a Trojan horse allowing governments to strike at their existing work conditions and benefits. There was also a feeling of annoyance with local councils whose mayors, in a bid to consolidate their position in their respective localities, were interfering in areas not devolved to them. This in a way heightened mistrust as many felt that local councils were trying to score points with the public at their expense.

But the problem went further. The study also found that ministers, fearing for their position in their electoral districts, were also not so keen on co-operation. Until the creation of local councils there were no intermediaries between ministers and constituents, but now many constituents were going to mayors and councillors for their immediate needs. We shall return to this point later when we examine the impact of politics on local councils.

Another factor raised by this study was the effect of smallness. Councils were under pressure not only to deliver services, but to be seen as delivering. In Malta it is possible for a person going about his/her daily routine to pass through at least six or seven localities having their own councils. Consequently, within the first six months of their existence local councils found themselves the subject of comparisons in letters to the media or on phone-ins on radio and television. With elections being held every three years, many mayors wanted quick progress on issues affecting their locality and became scathing about the support they received from central government.

The performance assessment report released by the DLC in 2000 points to other difficulties. For example, the point is often made that most local councils have performed better in areas criticized in earlier reports but fell back in those in which they had been praised. Unfortunately, the report does not try to explain why this situation has come about. It merely states the facts. Had the department done so, however, it would have discovered at least two reasons for its results. First, generally speaking, councils do not have enough resources with which to carry out their responsibilities. When criticized about their operations in one sector they simply transfer resources from other areas, generally those where they have been seen as performing well. Consequently, the situation is reversed in the following year. Second, their resources are very often not adequate to allow them to embark on new embellishment projects where these are necessary, while at the same time being able to maintain works already concluded. So, as one part of a locality gets spruced up, other areas remain without any maintenance whatsoever. Nonetheless, irrespective

210 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration of the picture presented by these reports, local councils have made a difference to their localities, even if at times it appears to be marginal. And that is why they still enjoy a large measure of popular support among their communities, as surveys of residents’ opinions show (Aquilina, 2000). Local councils have also made a difference in ways not reported by the DLC performance reports. For example, the elderly feel that they are now better served, as local officials help them access services without their needing to leave their locality. The local officials have also become outspoken defenders of residents’ interests against encroachments by public corporations and private industry. However, party leaders and some politicians also feel that local councils have helped contribute solidly to improvements in their locality and have often called on councils to take over more responsibilities. Nevertheless, in doing so, they have conveniently turned a blind eye to existing problems, as shown below.

• Contracting out In carrying out their responsibilities the 1993 Act laid down that local councils must contract out for all works and services required by them. This was an important departure from the White Paper with implications for the entire public service. That document had stated that government employees would be transferred to the control of local councils as required. Many people, however, had opposed this proposal, as the reputation for sloth by public servants, especially industrial workers, was legendary. But this meant that government employees would continue to receive salaries for work that was being carried out by private contractors. Government believed, however, that the 67 new councils would provide extensive opportunities of work for small contractors and that many of its own employees would be encouraged to set up in business to compete for it. It had even tried to encourage them to do this through the setting up of co-operatives in government departments (Malta Government, 1994). The government believed too that, if such schemes worked, the re-structuring necessary in many government departments and corporations would be facilitated. Hence, the system of contracting out introduced at local level was seen as crucial for future developments at central level. Although a number of co-operatives were set up and government continues to preach about their usefulness, these schemes have made little headway so far. When Labour was in government (1996- 98), it proposed that government workers should be seconded to local councils and that councils should consider the idea of joining together under the aegis of some form of regional council. Labour thought that these proposals would save money and, as some councils had already discovered the need to provide some services jointly, that it would make them more cost-effective. But it lost office before it could implement them.

• Balanced budgets

The Local Councils Act also stipulated that local councils would not be allowed to incur budgetary deficits but that they were to work with the means at their disposal.

211 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State

Funds are allocated to councils by government on a formula based on area and population size. In time local councils were to be allowed to generate some revenue of their own but not through local taxation. The law did make provision for the latter but this part of the Act was not made operative. A similar clause had been inserted in the 1961 Gozo Council Ordinance but was never brought into force. In 1993, as in 1961, the government feared that public opinion would turn against local councils if they were perceived as adding to existing tax burdens.

The question of funding proved a thorny issue from the start. The formula originally adopted tended to penalize the smaller councils and since 1993 several adjustments have been made. But the issue of financial management by the councils themselves has been equally problematic since several of them have failed to comply with financial regulations. The reports of the National Audit Office (NAO) from 1995, when the first audit was made, until that for 1999, provide substantial evidence of non-compliance. In 1995, the Report noted that a number of irregularities had taken place in nearly all local councils but found no evidence of wrongdoing and concluded that as local councils were “new entities”, this was to be expected (NAO, 1995). By the following year, however, only six of the 67 councils had presented their accounts by the date established by law, and irregularities in tendering procedures, over-budgeting and failure to keep proper accounts had been pointed out to several councils (NAO, 1996). By 1999 the alarm bells were truly ringing. Of the 69 councils (their number increased by two in that year), only 10 had sent in their financial reports; while the number of items requiring investigations had grown threefold. In several cases local councils had ignored NAO recommendations/directives. But still more worrying was that 22 councils, or nearly one-third of them, were operating with a deficit, which went against the 1993 Act (NAO, 1999). The government had included this provision in order to ensure that local councils did not go the way of central government. This very point was made in Parliament by the Opposition spokesman on Local Councils and endorsed by the minister responsible for the sector (The Sunday Times, 2000). But the minister was unusually revealing in his statement. He said that a number of irregularities had become quite evident and, by way of example, pointed to councils that were giving donations to associations that were not on the official list of approved societies, and to others that were disguising these donations under payments for contracted works. He gave two examples: one of a contract given by a council to a soccer association for the cleaning of public sanitary facilities; and another given by another council to a religious organization for grass-cutting in its locality. Only a week earlier the minister had written to another council threatening to dissolve it unless it complied with the law. The minister concluded his speech by agreeing with the Opposition spokesman that the finances of the councils needed to be tackled seriously and warned that he will be stamping down hard on all future irregularities. In Malta, however, much depends on politics.

212 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

• The role of political parties

The decision to allow political parties to contest local elections provoked strong debate. Opposition was both strident and vocal and brought even the bishops into the fray. An opinion survey, published by one newspaper under the banner of “A plague upon both your houses,” also showed a large majority against the decision (MISCO 1993). The reasons for this hostility were clear. Many tended to attribute the political difficulties of the past 15 to 20 years to the way parties had monopolized and polarized Maltese society and were convinced that mistakes committed at national level would in future be repeated at local level. Fears were heightened by the fact that the method of election adopted was the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, the same one used at general elections, and which had contributed greatly to existing problems.3 Hence the government’s decision to allow parties to compete was seen to fly in the face of its own declarations that local government would help to depolarize and democratize Maltese society.

The MLP, for its part, declared that it would not participate in local elections and would leave the field open “for the participation of free, independent citizens and local organizations” (Gingell, 1996, p. 14); but it would use its resources to support all independent candidates, irrespective of their political sympathies (Kullhadd, 1993). The PN, however, remained adamant, arguing that it had a constitutional right to participate and parties were allowed to do so wherever local government existed (ln-Nazzjon, 1993). The Prime Minister also claimed that, with the introduction of local councils, elections would become like everyday events and would no longer provoke the heat and tension that they normally generated.

What has been the overall impact of party politics on local councils? In the 1993 and 1996 local elections, when of the two main parties only the PN fielded candidates, the voter turnout was 34% down on that of general elections. One positive outcome was the number of women who contested and won a seat (13%) on local councils. Women standing for the PN and able to make use of its machinery did far better than female candidates standing as independents (Schiavone, 1994, pp. 425-436).

Another impact was within parties themselves. Despite the existing consensus among parties over local councils, their inception has generated a degree of uneasiness within the parliamentary groupings of both parties. As noted earlier, ministers have not always been keen on co-operation with local councils, for like other members of parliament they expected some mayors and local councillors to use their offices to launch a sustained bid for their seats. Such fears were not without foundation, for in the 1996 general elections, the first since the inception of local councils, candidates that had served on local councils managed to capture16% of parliamentary seats. Hence, local councils can expect to continue to face degree of covert obstructionism from established politicians.

213 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State

The decision by the MLP to stay out of local councils had helped, generally speaking, to maintain relations between councillors on a cordial footing. But Labour was becoming increasingly irritated by PN efforts to gain political mileage out of local councils. Labour could not quite exploit the independent vote in the same way that PN could for its own candidates, especially since some of those elected as independents were known PN sympathizers (Schiavone, 1994, pp. 456-457). Labour were also unhappy with the fact that there was more discipline among PN candidates than independents and that the PN tended to exploit divisions among the latter to control councils where it did not have a majority (Schiavone, 1994, p. 456). As the frustration among pro-MLP independent councillors began to grow, the façade of unity within councils began to crack, with obstructionist tactics becoming more common. Press statements by one block of councillors against another were also becoming frequent, leading to a number of libel cases. Matters came to a head in 1998 when the MLP, ousted from government, declared that it was no longer prepared to leave the local field free for the PN and, on the grounds that a democratic deficit existed, announced that it would be contesting the 2000 round of local elections. Since then two developments have become apparent from this decision. First, independent candidates or representatives of local groups have been practically swept away from council membership. Councils are now directly under the control of parties and local affairs have come increasingly under the direction of the central office of both parties. Democratization, in its wider meaning, has therefore not materialized.

Second, voting percentages have gone up by almost seven percentage points to nearly 70% and are expected to climb higher as parties apply the pressure on voters. This does not augur well either for the future of councils or for the reduction of political polarization which local councils were expected to help eliminate. The evidence for this comes from the way both parties conducted themselves during the local elections of 2000. Both campaigned very strongly, using their media to promote their candidates and attack the other side. On polling day both employed their extensive electoral machines to get the vote out, calling on voters at their homes and arranging transport for the sick and elderly, normal practice during national elections. After the results were announced both party leaders held a press conference to give their reaction, with councillors elected by their parties sitting behind them. Both sought to interpret the results, not in relation to local politics, but to national issues. Both made the claim, in between acrimonious comments, that the result of the elections gave their party a majority in the country.

But a good indicator of how partisan politics has impacted negatively on local council affairs concerns the local warden service. Introduced in 1999, it had as its principal aim the enforcement, at local level, of existing traffic and other municipal legislation. As observed earlier Malta has not always been strong on law enforcement and politicians have often used their influence to restrain law enforcement agencies in the performance of their duties. Politicians of both sides have normally done this to curry favour with

214 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration constituents. When introducing the local warden service, therefore, great care was taken by government to prevent such practices and to ensure that local councillors did not fall prey to similar temptations. Traffic and other petty violations were to go directly into a central computer, access to which was restricted. Initially, enticed by the prospect of an increase in revenue from fines levied by local wardens, local councils were all in favour of the new service and collaborated closely with government on its implementation. But once the service went into operation and protests began to emanate from residents in every locality, local councillors became alarmed at the political damage that such a system could inflict on them and their party at election time. This led several of them to lodge warnings with their respective party central offices, while at the same time seeking ways of undermining the system.

Speaking in parliament the Minister responsible for Local Councils pointed to examples of councils that had flagrantly done so. Some councils, he said, had purposely scaled down the hours of operations of local wardens to as little as two hours, while others had deployed them in non-urban areas where the likelihood of parking offences were remote. Others proceeded to create parking bays at points where traffic regulations did not permit them to do so. The Minister warned that if councils intended to pursue their present quasi-illegal behaviour, government would withdraw its delegation from them (The Sunday Times, 2000). Significantly, however, no public support was forthcoming for the minister, either from his colleagues on the Cabinet or the PN group of local councillors. Ironically, too, such a move would strike a severe blow to the very process of decentralization on which so much has rested.

Conclusion

Very few measures have enjoyed such widespread support among the public as the establishment of local councils. The PN had placed great hopes on their smooth development and wanted them to become a model for a more decentralized and democratic system of governance. It also saw them as an integral part of its process of public service reform. Nevertheless, the government’s inability to restructure its own departments meant that funds which could have gone to sustain the work of local councils remained committed to paying workers whose work had been devolved. Thus, progress within the localities could not be maintained and, in order to retain the loyalty of their constituents, local politicians begun having recourse to financial deficits, a policy prohibited by the 1993 Local Councils Act. The practice has now become so widespread that the government feels that it cannot go on closing its eyes, especially as this undermines the very rationale for the creation of local councils. But the fact remains that the government has shown itself to be weak and was prepared, as Maltese governments have been prone to do, to drag its feet when it came to enforcing the law. This has sent the wrong message to councils, which are now themselves defaulting on law enforcement in their localities. Finally, the

215 Maltese Experience of Establishing Local Government in a Centralized Micro-State

PN’s insistence that parties should contest local elections has done little to reduce political polarization and much to aggravate it. Local concerns have now become embroiled in national politics and are increasingly being factored into the strategies of party politics.

The above discussion of local government in Malta, however, also points to another important conclusion. This is that a state’s political culture and governing institutions tend to establish both the template for newly-created subordinate levels of government, as well as powerful, informal mechanisms of control that act to prevent local government from evolving in response to local conditions. The result is that newly established local government is not a “new creation” in terms of either its values or its politics. Rather, it replicates and reinforces patterns of behaviour (even dysfunctional behaviour) that have previously evolved in national politics. Whether these are responses to smallness can only be established through further comparative research in the field of local governance.

References

Alailima, L. et al. (1994). New Politics in the South Pacific. Suva: University of South Pacific. Aquilina, V. (2000). Pieta Residents and their Relations to the Local Council. Research Report. Malta: Pieta Local Council. Attard, A. (1995). Local Councils: A critical appraisal of their last two years. Unpublished Dissertation. Malta: University of Malta. Buhagiar, A. (2000). Local Councils: A Critical Review of their Organizational Structure. Unpublished Dissertation. Malta: University of Malta. Department of Local Councils. (2000). Rapport dwar 1-Efficcjenza tal-Kunsilli Lokali. Malta: Ministry of Justice and Local Councils. Gingell, N. (1996). The Ambivalent Role of the Secretary of the Local Council: Master and Servant. Unpublished Dissertation. Malta: University of Malta. Kulħadd, Editorial, 3 Nov. 1993. Malta: Malta Labour Party. ln-Nazzjon, Editorial, 21 Apr. 1993. Malta: Nationalist Party. Larmour, P. and R. Qalo. (eds.). (1985). Decentralization in the South Pacific: Local, Provincial and State Government. Suva: University of South Pacific. Larmour, P. (1985). “Decentralization in the South Pacific: Common Issues and Problems” In Larmour P, and R. Oak) (eds.), Decentralization in the South Pacific: Local, Provincial and State Government. Suva. 1985. Lowenthal, D. (1987). “Social Features.” In Clark, C. and T. Payne (eds). Politics, Security and Development in Small States. London: Allen and Unwin p. 43. Malta Government (1992). Kunsilli Lokali: lċ-Ċittadin Jersaq lżjed lejn il-Poter. Malta: Department of Information. Malta Government (1994). Koperattivi u Kunsilli Lokali F’Malta u Għawdex. Malta: Ministry of Education and Human Resources.

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MISCO (1993). Survey on Local Councils. Malta: Misco International, p. 10. NAO (National Audit Office) (1995). Report of the Auditor General. Malta: National Audit Office, pp. 20-23. NAO (National Audit Office) (1996), Report of the Auditor General, pp. 32-34. NAO (National Audit Office) (1999), Report of the Auditor General, pp. 66-149. Pirotta, G. A. (1993). “II-Kunsilli Lokali” In It-Torċa, 23 October 1993. Malta: Union Press. Pirotta, G. A. (1997). “Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta.” Public Administration and Development. 17(1), 197-207. Pirotta, G. A., Polidano C., and Warrington, E. (2000). “The Case of Malta: Public Administration Education and Training in Small States.” In M. Davies, J. Greenwood, L. Robins, N. Walkley (ed.), Serving the State. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 115- 119. Public Service Reform Commission (1989). A New Public Service for Malta: A Report on the Organization of the Public Service. Malta: Department of Information. Schiavone, M. (1994). II-Kunsilli Lokali. Malta: Pubblikazzjonijiet lndipendenza. Tabone, C. (1987). The Secularization of the Family in Changing Malta. Malta: Domincan Publications, pp. 142-145. The Sunday Times. (2000). “Gatt hits out at Mayor and other Councils over law enforcement”, 10 December. Malta: Progress Press. Vassallo, M. (1995). Local-Central Relationship in the Malta Experience. Unpublished Dissertation. Malta: University of Malta. Warrington, E. (1995). “Introduction.” In Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile of the Public Service of. Malta London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Wright. C. and G. Bertucci. (1999). “Local Government and Civic Society in Small States.” Report of a Conference organized by Commonwealth Local Government Forum. Malta: 1999.

Endnotes

1 During the 1980s shortages became a common experience and the use of such essential utilities as water was restricted for a number of hours per day. 2 The 1960s and the 1980s were characterized by a great deal of political violence. In the ‘80s, in addition to a spate of bombings, there were at least three murders, one of a thirteen year old girl by a letter-bomb, one of a suspected bomber at Police Headquarters, and one of a PN activist. 3 The Single Transferable Vote system provides for the multi-member electoral district type of proportional representation and tends to encourage competition not only among political opponents but also among candidates of the same party. This leads to intensive canvassing and not infrequently to scuffles between candidates of the same party.

217 Public Administration Education and Training in Small Island States: The Case of Malta 1950-1995

(Published in ‘Serving the State: Global Public Administration Education and Training, Vol. 2, Diversity and Change’, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, UK, 2000)

cademic interest in the study of small island states has gained in importance over Athe past three decades. Much of this interest has been greatly encouraged by the emergence, since the 1960s, of a large number of such societies as independent sovereign states in their own right. Initially, much of the focus of the research was chiefly concerned with the question of their economic viability as independent states and tended to be rather prescriptive in character.1 This has not completely changed but the fact that many of these states have managed to enhance their standard of living far beyond what was expected of them at the time of their independence, has helped to shift attention to other aspects, mainly concerned with issues of governance but notably public administration.2 The Commonwealth Secretariat, whose membership consists in its vast majority of such small island states, the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) and more recently the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management (CAPAM), have all contributed significantly towards this change in focus.3 Other academic studies, with an emphasis on the politics of small island states, have also become more widely available.4

This chapter takes Malta as its case study. The Maltese Islands constitute, in terms of population (396,000) and geographic size (316sq.kms), one of the smallest sovereign states in the world. Yet, although very similar in their characteristics to many other small island states that have emerged from under British and French colonialism in the post-war period, Malta presents some interesting differences. For example, because of its magnificent natural harbours and its strategic location at the very heart of the Mediterranean Malta, unlike many other small island states, has over the centuries enjoyed an importance which is quite disproportionate to its size. Furthermore, since independence from Britain in 1964, Malta has played a role in international affairs which has been the envy of many other small states and which most of them cannot hope to sustain.5 One reason for this stems from the fact that Malta, despite its long history of foreign rule, has an experienced public service which can trace its roots to the Middle Ages. But for a brief period between 1813 and 1836, Maltese public administration was nearly always vested in the hands of local public officers.(Pirotta, 1996) It is, perhaps, this which makes the Maltese public service unique and distinguishable from those of other small states and indeed from that of many other former larger colonies. Nonetheless, like most of these latter states, Malta has a largely dependent economy, its

218 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration most important mainstay being tourism. Similarly, like many other small island states, Malta is poorly endowed with natural resources and as in their case this factor, more than others, has generally helped to shape or condition its economic and foreign policy options. (Warrington 1995) Over the centuries strategic considerations and the needs of a relatively large population have combined to give the Maltese public service a central and determining, at times even crucial, role in the life of Maltese citizens. Indeed, given Malta’s near total lack of natural resources, economic development in Malta has been by and large state sponsored and directed. (Pirotta, 1997) And, in the context of this developmental process, the contribution made by the public service of Malta has been quite significant. The Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC), appointed in 1988, observed in its Report, that

‘if our nation’s citizens are well-fed, well-clothed, well-housed, if they enjoy the benefits of education, good health and the protection of the law, if they participate in the creation of the nation’s wealth, they owe something to the ability, dedication and adaptability of the public service.’ (PSRC 1989, p.3)

Of equal importance is the fact that the Maltese public service has been, itself, of old, a major provider of employment to a substantial proportion of the working population. Even today, at a time when expansion in private sector employment is at its highest, nearly 35 per cent of all those gainfully occupied are employed with the public sector, while a further 20 per cent or so of those employed in the private sector rely for their livelihood, almost exclusively, on income earned from government contracts and the provision of municipal services to the 67 local councils created in 1993. (Pirotta 1997)

Yet, paradoxically, despite its central role the public service has, over the years, failed to command sufficient interest either from governments, the principal users of its services and administrative machinery, or from academics, or indeed, its clients. We shall see therefore that, in Malta, government commitment to public service education and training has been both inconsistent and, until recently, inadequately funded. We shall also see that, as a discipline, Public Administration has not as yet acquired a distinguished place within the curriculum of Malta’s sole university. The reasons for this are numerous and have been adequately explored elsewhere. (Pirotta, 1997a)

This paper cannot answer all the questions raised by these apparent contradictions. What it can and will do, is to examine the attempts made since the early 1950s, and their outcomes, in the sphere of public administration education and training in Malta. It will do so in three stages. This paper begins by briefly outlining the basic institutional features of Maltese government. It then moves on to examine the ebb and flow that has characterised public administration education and training in the period 1956-1990. The third and final part of the paper explores two main issues: the position and career progression of public administration

219 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 graduates in the public service of Malta; and in-service training for public officers since 1990. The recruitment of public administration graduates to public bodies and corporations outside the public service will also be touched upon towards the end.

Government And Administration In Malta

Malta’s system of government and administration resembles that commonly known as the Westminster/Whitehall model. Power, for all intents and purposes, is vested in the Prime Minister, even though Malta has a President as its Head of State. Elected to office (and removable), by a simple majority vote in the House of Representatives, the President holds office for a single term of five years. The House of Representatives consists of a single chamber of sixty-five members, elected by direct universal suffrage, at five-yearly intervals, from thirteen electoral divisions under a system of proportional representation. The number of Members of Parliament may, however, vary from time to time because of constitutional provisions which seek to ensure that the party obtaining a majority of first preference votes also holds the largest number of seats in the House.6

Since 1947 Maltese parliamentary politics have been dominated by two political parties, the Malta Labour Party and the Nationalist Party, which have alternated in office at intervals of approximately ten years. Competition for power between the two parties tends to be exceptionally strong; for long periods the parties were under the sway of strong leadership figures, while over the last two decades both parties have constructed sophisticated party machines.

The direction and control of government is vested in a Cabinet of ministers appointed and dismissable by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. All members of the Cabinet are members of the House of Representatives and hold their portfolios as long as they retain a seat in the House. Ministerial portfolios are composite: their contents are modified to a large extent with every ministerial reshuffle; the inauguration of a new administration generally means that the portfolios of the outgoing administration are dismantled and re- assembled in entirely new groupings.(Warrington, 1995) Ministers are bound by the doctrines of collective and individual ministerial responsibility, doctrines recognized by the Constitution of Malta. The Constitution also legitimates the existence of a loyal opposition giving the Leader of the Opposition a consultative role in the appointment of members of certain independent authorities sanctioned by the Constitution, such as the Broadcasting Authority and the Public Service Commission.

The Judiciary consists of tenured judges and magistrates, who may not be removed from office except on grounds of proved incompetence, misbehaviour or inability to perform the duties of their office. However, such removal can only take place following an address supported by no less than two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. As

220 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration noted above, apart from the Judiciary a number of constitutional authorities with powers to scrutinise and/or exercise executive authority in sensitive areas of public policy also exist. Others not mentioned include the Director of Audit, the Electoral Commission, the Employment Commission, and the Attorney General, but the latter only in so far as criminal prosecutions are concerned. A number of other Commissions or authorities, but which are not provided for in the Constitution, and which also have a scrutinising role, such as the Permanent Commission Against Corruption, and the Ombudsman, also exist.

The Maltese public service is one of the oldest of its kind within the . In its modern history the administration may be said to have experienced four main waves of expansion. The first occurred in the period after 1565 when an Ottoman attempt to capture Malta was successfully repulsed. From this period onwards the responsibilities of the administration extended to include the running of a number of hospitals and other related charitable establishments, a University of Studies, a national pawnbrokerage, a theatre, a printing establishment, several churches and the procurement, distribution and sale of essential food items such as grain. As the great landlord of the islands - one-third of all urban and rural property belonging to it - the government also exercised considerable influence on housing and land rents. (Pirotta, 1996)

A second expansion took place in the period 1885-1938 at a time when the islands were under British colonial rule. British strategic interests, Malta being an important British military and naval base, and grave population pressures were at the base of this second expansion. The role of the administration now extended to include public health and sanitation, emigration, public transport, provisions of electric power and a wider provision of education. This new and expanded role for the public service was consolidated in the years 1921-33 when Malta experienced its first brief period of self-government. After 1947, during a second phase of self-government, the establishment of the Welfare state gave rise to a third wave of expansion in public service activities. Now hospitals and schools came to form part of a wider scheme of social provision which included old age pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits, and preventative health policies, notably in the field of polio, tuberculosis, dental care and infant health care.

The fourth and final wave of public sector expansion took place in the period which spans from 1964, the year of Malta’s independence, to 1987, eight years after the closure of the British military base in the island. It arose as a consequence of Maltese governments’ efforts to change the islands’ economy from one almost entirely dependent on British/NATO military spending to one based on light manufacturing industries and services, such as tourism. These efforts gave rise to new public corporations in the sphere of communications, energy, transport and economic development. They also gave rise to a substantial government stake, either through direct public ownership or in partnership with private investors, in tourism, manufacturing and service industries.

221 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95

Although historically, government in Malta has always been a highly centralised activity, since 1987 a number of measures intended to redimension the role of the state, have been taken. These included a limited programme of privatisation and the creation of 67 elected local councils - nearly one for every locality - with responsibility for the provision of municipal services.

The Maltese public service is also constitutionally bound by the classic Westminster/ Whitehall doctrines of political neutrality and anonymity. The service is staffed by career officials mainly recruited through open competition and appointed, disciplined or removable by the Prime Minister acting on the recommendations of an independent Public Service Commission. It is divided into approximately fifteen major occupational classes and comprises over sixty departments, the Departments of Health and Education being the largest with over 6,000 employees each. Overall the public service employs in excess of 30,000 employees with another 3,000 serving in the armed forces. Another 15,000 or so are employed by the so-called `parastatal sector’ which includes within its ambit such public utilities as energy provision and telecommunications. Departments of government are under the executive authority of heads of departments and, since 1992, under the supervision of permanent secretaries. In the past heads of departments worked direct to ministers. (Warrington, 1995)

However, despite the approximation that Malta’s system of governance bears to the Westminster/Whitehall model, significant differences do exist in the way Maltese politicians administer existing governing institutions. Thus, irrespective of the existence of a number of Constitutional and non-Constitutional bodies and commissions, the aim of which is to obstruct political patronage and discrimination in appointments, promotions and government procurement, both of these features remain strongly entrenched in the way the administration is carried out. Both political parties have, for example, `systematically extended government patronage by multiplying boards and committees, as well as by placing parastatals outside the constitutional safeguards for an impartial, merit-based public service.’(Warrington, 1995) They have also colluded in carving out permanent ad hoc `representation in bodies which the Constitution conceived as being independent and above party interests’(Warrington, 1995), such as the Broadcasting, Employment and Electoral Commissions as well as the Commission for the Administration of Justice which has among its responsibilities a role in the selection and disciplining of members of the judiciary.

This state of affairs went against the recommendations of the Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) which was appointed in 1988 and which reported in July 1989. This Commission had clearly outlined the debilitating effect that such policies had had on the Maltese public service. Having done so, it then went on to recommend three vital changes: first, the restoration of the institutional fabric of the public service; second, the building of its organisational capacity; and third, the safeguarding of employees rights.

222 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Progress towards these goals cannot be said to have been evenly spread. For example, citizens have seen few improvements in the delivery of economic, municipal and social services by the public service. Nor has accountability in the so-called parastatal sector been significantly improved. Furthermore, it does not appear that public service management has become more effective. But substantive progress has been recorded in the field of information technology and human resource development, the latter having some relevance for this study. Indeed, one of the outcomes of the reform process was the establishment of the Staff Development Organisation, which has responsibility for staff training across the service.(Warrington, 1995) A more detailed examination of the role being played by this department will be made at a later stage of this chapter.

Public Administration Education and Training: 1953-90

Until the early 1950s entrants to the civil service were expected to have an ordinary or advanced, depending on their class, proficiency in such subjects as English, Mathematics, Maltese, typing and shorthand, and, but mainly at executive grade level, in Physics, Geography, History, Book-keeping, and additional languages. Italian was included as a core subject in the 1960s while handwriting was also an examinable area. Candidates’ proficiency in each of these study areas was tested under a system of open competition. A degree or another university qualification was accredited no weighting in civil service recruitment processes. Nor did public administration education enjoy any status on the curriculum of the university and very few graduates demonstrated enthusiasm for a career in the public service. Nonetheless, until the 1960s, employment in the public service was eagerly sought after by secondary school leavers because of the job security it provided, in stark contrast to other forms of employment, and the high esteem in which the service was generally held by the Maltese. Given this, in-house training was what new entrants could hope to get, although even in this sphere a short induction course was generally what constituted in-house training.

But the rapid implementation, after 1947, of an ambitious welfare programme and an equally ambitious economic development programme to sustain it, placed new demands on the Maltese public service. In the circumstances, governments became increasingly impressed by the need for a better educated and better trained civil service. This point was forcefully made by a Commission on the Civil Service appointed by the Prime Minister of Malta in 1955. This Commission noted that `efficiency at the highest level calls for officers of the highest quality and natural ability. The Maltese Civil Service is no exception. Indeed, we think that with the expansion which has taken place in recent years, there is the greater need for outstanding officers in the upper ranges.’(Wilson et al.) The Commission thought that one way of addressing this need would be by attracting university graduates to the service.

The introduction, in 1955, by way of an experiment, of a competitive examination for the recruitment of graduates to the executive class, proved, however, `a dismal failure.’ (Wilson

223 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 et al., 1956) In the first of two examinations held early in that year, none of the candidates passed; while in the second only three candidates sat for the examination. The reasons for this failure, according to the Commission, were mainly two. First, that existing salary scales were not inducement enough to attract good university graduates to the service; and second, that the examination papers were not, as in Britain, `aligned closely enough to the courses of study which the candidates had been pursuing at university.’(Wilson et al.) The Commission felt that a solution to these problems could be found in improved salaries for public servants and closer collaboration with the university in the setting of public examinations.

To date, neither of these issues have been satisfactorily resolved. While since the 1950s various reorganisation exercises and salary adjustments have been effected, graduates have, by and large, continued to look elsewhere for a career. Even in the sphere of examinations no significant collaboration has taken place between the university and the public service and the performance of university graduates in public examinations has continued to be below expectations.

• Public Administration education and the University

Given this state of affairs government ministers and senior officials came to the conclusion that a partial solution to the problem lay in a policy which encouraged serving members of the service to take up studies at the university. It was this policy which in 1956 gave life to the first of several fitful collaborative attempts between the University of Malta and the Civil Service. In that year the Department of Economics of the University, with support from the Faculty of Law, introduced a 3-year evening Diploma course in Public Administration aimed mainly at serving civil servants. It proved to be quite popular with an average annual intake of students, especially in its first years, of about 35 candidates. The general aim of the course was to help career civil servants gain a better understanding of economic principles, social administration and the social sciences. Hence, subjects taught included economics, public administration, administrative law, social policy, sociology, history, political thought and Catholic social thought. The academic bias of the course was towards law and economics but, given that an unusually high proportion of the lecturers were clerics, Catholic social doctrine came to exercise a strong influence on the entire content of the curriculum.7 This notwithstanding, the course succeeded in its aim of providing the government with better educated civil servants and it is significant that many of those who had followed the DPA course, eventually proved to be some of its most competent and efficient leaders.

The success of the Diploma served to convince both politicians and public service leaders of the benefits of greater collaboration between them and the university and by 1969 a new scheme was in place. Under this scheme civil servants wishing to pursue studies deemed relevant to the needs of the service were, if accepted by the university, to be released from their departments on study leave with full pay for the duration of their course. The response

224 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration of public servants was, once again, very encouraging and several of them, including a number of former DPA graduates went to university to further their studies, mainly in economics and the humanities.

This scheme was eventually discontinued early in the 1970s when a new Labour administration withdrew the sponsorships. A second form of sponsorships, which was already gaining in importance, was not stopped but severely curtailed. This was the practice of funding, through such agencies as the British Council, the Commonwealth Universities scholarship programme and other international organisations, a number of overseas scholarships for serving members of the public service. Under this scheme a number of officers who had been successful in their degree or diploma studies eventually gained an opportunity to study in foreign universities, notably in Britain. Doctors, teachers and other professional members of the public service, had long enjoyed such opportunities before these were extended to general service grades.

Public administration education once again found itself on the curriculum of the University of Malta in the late 1970s, although under somewhat unusual circumstances. In 1977, a dispute between the government and the Medical Association of Malta resulted, in among other things, the disruption of courses in the Faculty of Medicine at the university. The government’s response to the medical profession’s action was to create a second state- funded university and to introduce what became known as the student-worker scheme. The new scheme was eventually also extended to the older of the two universities leading to their merger. (Pirotta, 1997a) Under this scheme candidates for university places needed to find employers willing to sponsor them for the duration of the course before they could be admitted to university. As it turned out private industry was not prepared to participate in the scheme and the great bulk of would-be students were eventually sponsored by government departments, public corporations and other industries in which the government was the major stakeholder. For students the academic year was to be divided into two half-yearly periods, students being required to attend university for six months and to work for their sponsors for the other six. Furthermore, students were contractually bound to serve their sponsors for two years after their graduation. In return students were paid a monthly salary and had their employment guaranteed.

One outcome of these changes was the creation of a Public Administration Division in the Faculty of Management, itself a product of the new scheme, and the introduction of an undergraduate course in Public Administration. This course, as with nearly every other degree course under the new scheme, was of a five year duration. It was to prove to be one of the most successful courses under the new regime and many public administration graduates were eventually to win scholarships which enabled them to pursue post-graduate studies in foreign universities. A large number of them also came to hold key public service posts in training, information technology, and offices concerned with public service reform.

225 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95

The B.A Honours Public Administration degree course, as it became formally known, was divided into parts. In Part One, which was divided into two semesters, but which given the peculiar workings of the scheme was spread over two years, students were taught basic accounting, principles of economics, quantitative techniques and computing, sociology, elements of Maltese Law, political thought and management accounting. With few exceptions these areas of study were taught to classes which also included students of accountancy and of management, in addition to students of public administration. Students who failed in Part One were barred from proceeding to Part Two of the course. Assessment in both parts of the course was by course work and by examination at the end of each semester.

In Part Two of the course, with one or two exceptions, study units were restricted to students of Public Administration. Subjects taught included Econometrics, Economic development, Public Finance, Legal Framework of Public Administration, Human Resources Management, Industrial Relations, Social Administration, Government and Administration, Development Administration, Project Evaluation, International Business Financial Management, Public Policy and Research Methodology. Part Two was spread over three years with students attending university for six months each year, the duration of each study semester, and their allotted department or corporation for the other six. In each study semester students were expected to cover an average of four subjects and in the final year of their studies to write a dissertation on a topic of their choice. Students were encouraged to choose a research topic which had some direct relevance to the work place in which they had been placed during their work phase and to which most of them were to return after their graduation. But given the excessive secrecy prevalent in Malta and the reluctance of heads of departments to collaborate, very few students chose this option. And in cases where they did, the results were not always encouraging.

The introduction of the worker-student scheme gave rise to heated public opposition. It was criticised because it restricted access to university education and because a rigid numerus clausus forced students to take up courses in areas of study in which they had only a secondary or even passing interest. The so-called work phase was said to be of little advantage to students, for except in a limited number of cases, few students were given tasks which had any relevance to their chosen field of study. In fact it was not uncommon for departments to engage students under their sponsorship on purely routine tasks or, indeed, menial tasks. Finally it was criticised because it tended to overburden the public service with graduates of all sorts, given the fact that the government was the overall sponsor of students. Public administration education was to be the first to suffer the effects of this latter development. Between 1983 and 1989, the year when the worker-student scheme was finally abandoned, the annual intake of graduates into the public service totalled about five hundred. But with the passing years the ability of the Maltese government to absorb the entire annual crop of university graduates into the administrative and professional classes of the civil service, became increasingly strained. Furthermore, public servants who had served

226 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration time in the service began to see their promotion prospects threatened by this massive intake of graduates. These fears were soon taken up by public service unions in their drive to ensure that at least half of those promoted to the higher classes came from among non-graduate public officers. In 1985, in response to these several pressures, the intake to the BA Honours Public Administration degree course was halted.

In 1987, following a change in government, the student-worker scheme was abolished. Students were to continue to receive a stipend but the concept of employer sponsorship was scrapped. The Public Administration Division was replaced by the Department of Public Policy. Courses run by this department came to form a Major within the Bachelor of Commerce degree, which had replaced the individual honours degrees in Management, Public Administration, and Accountancy previously offered by the Faculty of Management, now re-christened the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy.

With the demise of the student-worker scheme students no longer had guaranteed employment with the public service and it would be fair to say that the vast majority of them did not see it either as financially attractive or as intellectually challenging. As the economy improved and challenging occupations became available the annual trickle of graduates leaving the civil service turned into a flood. Attempts to stem the flow were made, especially with large scale improvements in salaries and work conditions, but the image of the civil service among graduates remained poor. Despite every effort made the exodus of graduates from the service could not be halted.

This state of affairs gave rise, in 1990, to yet another attempt at collaboration with the University. On this occasion, however, the preference of the public service was for the re-institution of the Diploma in Public Administration course rather than for a degree course. Initially, civil service leaders had proposed the setting up of an Institute for Public Sector Studies, but the university demonstrated little enthusiasm for the proposal. From a civil service point of view the re-introduction of the DPA course was a compromise solution. The new DPA course was intended and designed for civil servants at mid-career level, that is, for serving officers who were in the Administrative Assistant and Administrative Officer grades and whose ages ranged from 35 to 45 years of age. In 1994, however, eligibility for admittance to the course was extended to those in the grade of Executive Officer. The course was run by the Department of Public Policy and was of a two-year duration. Those admitted to the course were released by their respective departments for two working days every week. In year one of the course students attended classes in Principles of Administration, Principles of Politics, Legal Framework of Administration, Sociology, Statistics, Computing and Economics. In year two subjects taught included Contemporary Administrative Issues, Decision-making, Policy Analysis, Government and Policy-making in Micro-States, Accountancy and a number of options from which students were obliged to choose two subjects. The bias in this course, as the range of subjects taught indicate, was towards politics and public administration, although

227 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 the approach adopted was an inter-disciplinary one. As with other courses in the department, students was obliged to write a 10,000 word dissertation on a relevant topic of their choice.

The DPA course, as was the case with its predecessor of 1956-69, was initially very popular with civil servants and the number of candidates accepted was limited to thirty. The course was also rated highly by public service trainers and a number of practitioners collaborated with the Department of Public Policy as lecturers and tutorial assistants. But, by 1994, interest in the course had declined. One reason for this was the failure, by government, to grant diploma holders either an annual financial bonus on the strength of their qualification, as was the case with degree holders, or to give this qualification adequate recognition during promotion exercises. Consequently, by 1996, the number of diploma graduates had dwindled to thirteen. Since then no new intake of students has taken place.

• In-House Training

In the period 1955-1990 a parallel could be drawn between the history of public administration education at the university and in-house training within the public service itself. During this period both suffered from a lack of consistency in their regard either from ministers or university authorities. It was the 1956 Commission on the Civil Service, the same Commission which had recommended greater collaboration with the University, which first stressed the need for a greatly expanded in-house training capacity for the public service. (Wilson et al.) The setting up, in 1957, of a Training and Education Division under Establishments in the Office of the Prime Minister demonstrated, as the launching of the Diploma in Public Administration course at the university had done in 1956, that at the time the political will to implement these recommendations existed. But the political turmoil which was unleashed in Malta in 1958 and the subsequent Emergency undermined these first developments and by 1967 very little progress had been registered.8 Throughout that period the Training Division had only one full-time and one part-time officer engaged on staff training. The primary task of the former officer was to supervise induction training for recruits to the lower grades of the general service and for new appointees to the foreign service. In addition he was responsible for the coordination of a number of courses dealing with aspects of personnel administration, financial administration, and the conduct of public business. It was not until 1968, four years after independence, that a more determined approach to training emerged. The catalyst for this new approach was Edward McCrensky, a United Nations regional advisor. The Maltese government had sought McCrensky advice on the quality of existing in-service training arrangements and future needs. In a report presented in June 1968, McCrensky argued that Establishments Division, `should devote more staff and other resources to identify training needs and to develop appropriate courses’(McCrensky, 1968) to meet those needs which were service wide. Establishments was also to work for the appointment of a qualified training officer in each department and to provide them with training, guidance and support.

228 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

He further recommended that all new entrants to the executive grades of the general service should undergo, on appointment, as interns in a variety of departments, a six months orientation programme involving both study in specialised courses and work placements. He also suggested that `as part of the programme for training of public officials.... planned interaction with officials of other countries’ (McCrensky, 1968) should be established. McCrensky thought that this could be achieved through seminars involving interaction between senior government officials and overseas experts from selected countries; by planned visits to other countries for an examination of policies and methods relating to management issues and processes; exchange arrangements with public services in selected countries; and through government membership of such international societies as IASIA. McCrensky concluded, however, that such was the immediacy and the magnitude of the training requirements for the public service, that outside technical assistance was urgently required both in the identification of these training needs and in the drawing up of training programmes aimed at answering those needs. Following McCrensky’s departure from Malta attempts were made to enhance existing training programmes. In 1970 the Training Branch of the Establishments Division held a full-time, month long intensive training course for officers in the Higher Executive grade. The content of the course was, by past standards, innovative and included sessions on modern management techniques, with practical demonstrations of the techniques in operation; visits to various industrial and commercial establishments, the purpose being to examine how these establishments are managed; and practical sessions which gave participants the opportunity to participate in group discussions and practical team exercises. The training division had also initiated a number of training courses for clerical grades and had, for the first time, organised an orientation course for candidates who had been successful in a special examination for university graduates. The novelty and the usefulness of these training exercises did not, however, mask the fact that, with one exception, Departments were not conducting formal training courses and that systematic on the job training was practically absent. (Foster, 1970, pp.2-3)

Eventually, responsibility for the drawing up of a national training programme devolved on John Foster, another U.N advisor. In his report to the Government of Malta, Foster distinguished between the training needs of administrative, professional and executive grade members, and those of departmental grades and clerical staff. He also differentiated between those types of training which should be the responsibility of the central training agency and those which were to be delivered at ministry or departmental level. He also proposed that the training programmes to be undertaken by the Training Branch of Establishments should consist of courses in management, financial administration, accounting, induction and personnel courses, registry training and, significantly, of training courses for would-be trainers. (Foster, 1970a, pp1-12)

The public service was about to embark on the implementation of these recommendations when a change of government, in June 1971, as so often happens in Malta,

229 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 put the whole programme on hold. It was to remain practically so until another change of government in 1987. From this period onwards, as we shall see below, but especially after the publication of the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) in 1990, the Maltese public service was to experience its first and best sustained training initiative in its entire history.

Public Administration Education and Training Since 1990

The remainder of this chapter is primarily devoted to two issues: the position and career progression of public administration graduates in the public service of Malta; and in service training for public service officers since 1990. The recruitment of public administration graduates to public bodies outside the public service is also touched upon at the end of this section.

• Public Service graduates in the Maltese public service.

In dealing with the first mentioned issue, it is necessary to outline the career structure of the public service. This is the fundamental determinant of the fortunes of public officers with degrees in public administration.

In the Maltese public service, staff have traditionally been placed in a number of broad categories according to their grade. The categories to which graduates may be assigned are: • the general service grades (office support and middle management grades common to all departments); • professional grades (lawyers, doctors, architects and engineers); • departmental and technical grades (specialised career streams particular to one or a few departments);

The general service consists of around a tenth of the total strength of the public service. It is the group to which graduates in public administration are recruited, and is therefore the focus of this part of the chapter. At middle level management, its members perform a wide variety of general management functions throughout the public service. In addition, management specialisations such as personnel, accounting, finance and audit have traditionally been this group’s preserve.

The general service stands out from the other occupational categories in that it is a single career stream rather than a loose grouping of separate streams. Being a single stream, it does not formally recognise its various management specialisms by, for example, placing accounts or personnel officers in a district branch. Moreover, a reorganisation of the general

230 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration service in 1974 opened a single promotion path practically from the lower to the upper grades. Advancement was either by examination or seniority.

• Paths to top management levels

The career path from the general service to top management positions depends on the organisation. One may, however, generalise in relation to ministries on one hand and departments on the other. These two organisational forms are the primary building blocks of Malta’s post-independence public service.

The general service has been the traditional recruiting ground for most top positions in the permanent structure of ministries. Indeed, the grades of Head I, II, and III (the latter being the highest level in most ministries, equivalent to permanent secretary level) were until recently considered an extension of the general service. Generalist dominance of ministries is, however, less than it seems: most ministries are transient umbrella structures within which departments - organisationally separate entities - carry the greater weight in both policy- making and implementation.9 The only truly institutionalised ministries are the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance - central agencies with a service-wide brief over personnel and financial management respectively - and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, effectively a department in its own right.

Generalists are less predominant in departmental headships, though they still occupy around half of all these positions. Generalists dominate those departments that have not traditionally been seen as requiring any specialist expertise. Senior positions in other departments, including some of the largest, tend to be filled from among the predominant specialist stream: for example, medical doctors in the department of Health, architects and civil engineers in Works, and teachers in Education. Headship positions in such departments were until recently classified outside the Head I, II and III hierarchy, effectively reinforcing the territorial demarcation at top management level between generalists and specialists.

• Graduates in the general service

Following the 1974 reorganisation of the general service, external entry at middle management level was opened to university graduates. Throughout the 1980s, graduate entry was linked specifically to holders of degrees in public administration, business management, and accountancy under the student-worker scheme.

Graduates in middle management encountered a degree of resentment from lower grade staff who saw graduate entry as cutting off their own promotion prospects. There are indications that the ill-feeling was also shared by some senior staff. (Polidano, 1992) Such tensions are only to be expected during a period of flux and uncertainty brought about by changes to long-

231 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 established patterns. The resentment towards graduates now appears to have abated due to both the passage of time, leading to greater acceptance of graduates, and the fact that - for reasons to be explained later - fewer graduates are being recruited to the general service.

By 1989, around 17 per cent of staff in the basic middle management grade of principal10 were graduates recruited through the student-worker scheme. None of these had yet made it to the level of assistant head - the level from which most department heads have been drawn - since promotions to this grade depended entirely on seniority until recently. This has meant that assistant headships and headships were, again until recently, the preserve of the rankers who were drafted into the grade of principal before the external recruitment of graduates began on a regular basis. (Spiteri Gingell, 1990, pp. 29-57)

The net effect of this career structure, which has been described as it existed up to 1993, was to place strict limits on the importance or influence of public administration and management training at middle and senior levels in the Maltese public service. The first of the public administration graduates who were recruited in the 1970s and 80s are only now beginning to appear in headship positions, following the changes of 1993. These changes are described next.

• Recent changes

From 1988 to 1990, a wide-ranging review of the public service was undertaken by a specially-appointed Public Service Reform Commission. The Commission found deficiencies in management, going so far as to say that `There seems to be little understanding of management concepts, and such management talent as has been retained is dissipated in `crisis management’ arising from the predominance of short-term considerations.’(PSRC, 1989, p.2)

It would be over-simplistic to pin a problem of such magnitude down to insufficient training in administration and management, and the Commission recognised this. Its recommendations did refer to training, but they also extended to career structures and promotions mechanisms. Considerable change has taken place within the public service in response to the Commission’s recommendations. Two major reforms are examined here: the reclassification of top positions and the restructuring of the general service. A further element of the reform programme, the major expansion of training, is the theme of the penultimate section of this chapter. (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995; Polidano, 1996)

• Reclassification of top positions

Over 1992 and 1993, a new top-level structure was set up consisting of three levels - director, director-general, and permanent secretary. These correspond directly to the

232 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration old Head I, II and III grades, but incorporate most “specialist” headships in addition to the generalist ones. A system of annual performance bonuses based on three-year renewable performance agreements was also made applicable to most positions in the new structure. New appointments are subject to renewal along with the agreement. It remains to be seen how the new structure will influence the career and educational backgrounds of future appointees to top positions.

Along with this change went a tightening of reporting relationships between permanent secretaries and their department heads. Permanent secretaries have a more clearly defined authority than the old Head IIIs, and the system of performance bonuses should strengthen their hands since their evaluation of heads’ performance is a major influence on the award of bonuses to heads.

• Restructuring of the general service

At the same time as top positions were being reclassified, an overhaul of the classification structure at lower levels was also under way. An agreement with public service unions on the restructuring of the general service was reached in November 1993. The agreement effectively split the general service into two classes, one comprising middle management grades and the other office support staff. A university degree is a mandatory requirement for entry to the middle management stream. However, staff in service at the time of the agreement continue to enjoy the right of entry to the middle management stream: entry to this stream is, in fact, guaranteed to serving officers who complete eight years’ service at the top of the office support stream.

The middle management stream consists of two grades: that of principal and the newly-created promotion grade of senior principal (the promotion mechanism being a written examination and interview). Officers in the latter grade are eligible for promotion to assistant director and, in addition, directly to the grade of director. This is a substantial improvement over the previous situation in which only assistant heads were promoted to directorships. Contemporaneously, though for reason unrelated to the reform programme, external recruitment to the grade of principal was linked to a written examination in English and Maltese open to graduates in all disciplines. The opening of recruitment to all disciplines is a retrograde step for public administration, but it has to be seen in the light of prevailing circumstances: the termination of the University of Malta’s public administration degree programme; its replacement by a public policy programme that produced only a handful of graduates each year; and an increasingly tight labour market, pushing private sector salaries into an upward spiral and making it difficult for the public service to attract and retain graduates in management or - even more so - accountancy. The new general service structure gives explicit recognition to officers’ qualifications and training. Qualification allowances are payable to officers who hold first degrees, master’s

233 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 degrees, or doctorates. These allowances are independent of career progression, except that the first degree allowance is not payable to officers in the middle management stream on the grounds that a first degree is already a basic requirement for entry to this level. Salary progression beyond the first four years at principal level is, in the case of new entrants to the grade, conditional on either possession of a post-graduate qualification or participation in an in-service management development programme. Only staff in the higher salary scale can compete for promotion to senior principal.

There are two problems with these arrangements. First, the concept that a first degree should not be recognised at middle management level as it is an entry requirement is dubious given that non-graduates make the majority of staff in the stream and retain the right of entry via the eight-year rule. Second, equating a post-graduate degree with a short in-service training course can give the impression that the public service ascribes low value to university education. This is unfortunate considering the paid and unpaid leave facilities, unparalleled in Malta, available to public servants following degree programmes in Malta and abroad; and the announcement in early 1996 that five MBA scholarships are to be awarded to public officers each year.

These problems illustrate the difficulty of tying training and education to career development in a situation where staff at the same level had widely different educational backgrounds and the interests of the less qualified are protected by a powerful union. The net effect of the reforms are mixed in so far as graduates, particularly in public administration and related fields, go. The creation of the new top management structure is certainly to the advantage of the graduates who joined the service in the 1970s and 60s; this group is well represented among the new cadre of senior principals and is poised to make significant inroads to the top management structure over the coming years. In sum, the 1993 reforms have opened an accelerated route to senior positions for graduates already in the general service; but the recruitment of new graduates has been restricted and the balance of entry to middle management level has been shifted in favour of serving non- graduates. Unless the situation is rectified, a serious skills gap at middle management level will open up in the general service in coming years.

• Expansion of In-Service Training

If changes to the general service structure have had mixed results, the same cannot be said of the expansion of training. Training has been one of the major success stories of Malta’s post-1990 public service reform programme. Prior to 1990, the Organisation and Training Branch at the Office of the Prime Minister was the central training agency of the public service. Given that this unit was around half a dozen strong, it was not well funded, and it was occupied with organisational reviews and other extraneous work in addition to training, it was hardly surprising if the organisation of training programmes was occasional rather than

234 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration a constant activity. In 1989, 44 per cent of principals and assistant heads reported that they had not undergone any form of training in the previous ten years.(Spiteri Gingell, 1990, p.38)

In 1990, following a recommendation of the Public Service Reform Commission, the Organisation and Training Branch was expanded, tasked solely with training, and given a more distinct organisational identity as the Staff development Organisation. The new organisation was able to considerably expand the volume and breadth of training provided to public officers. In 1991, the SDO’s first full year of operation, a total of 37 different programmes were organised for 2,313 participants. To put the latter figure in perspective, it is equivalent to 16 per cent of the total strength of the public service.

Training courses organised by the Staff Development Organisation cover a very wide field, going from word-processing to “pure” academic subjects such as economics, although the emphasis is very much on “practical” skills and procedural knowledge. Nevertheless, it is difficult to arrive at a hard-and-fast categorisation of courses in terms of knowledge or skills owing to the wide variety of courses and the difficulty of defining these terms with sufficient precision. Instead, the following categorisation was felt to better reflect the diversity of training being provided:

• academic subjects such as economics, public administration, and law, or management disciplines that would be a central part of a university degree programme, such as personnel, financial, operations and project management, or aspects therefore; • aspects of management that are more properly considered “skills”, though even they may well form part of a university degree programme, such as leadership, supervision, change management, or time management;11 • other skills (language, report writing, making presentations, office support, and customer services); • training related to major government policy initiatives (gender issues, TU familiarisation, VAT, and local council management); • familiarisation with administrative systems specific to the Maltese public service (budgeting, business planning, financial and personnel administration procedures, the archiving of records, and various department-specific work procedures); • training in the use of IT applications (word processing, spreadsheet, databases, and more specialised software).

These groupings are fairly loose and involve an element of arbitrariness as many courses do not clearly fit into any one category. Taken together, however, they give a fairly good overview of the extent of SDO training. Many of the courses are developed and delivered using the SDO’s own resources, while others rely on inputs from other government

235 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 organisations such as the Management Systems Unit or are commissioned from private training organisations. The chart below provides a percentage breakdown of participants according to the categories set out above, though the percentages should be taken as indications rather than precise figures owing to the difficulty of precise categorisation.

Table 1: Participating in SDO training, by percentage / year according to category

Category of Training 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Average

Academic Discipline 9 4 2 1 8 5

Management Skills 15 14 9 5 5 8

Other Skills 4 13 5 7 16 10

Policy Related 5 1 14 17 3 9

Administrative Systems 43 40 11 14 20 23

IT Applications 24 28 59 56 48 45

Numerical Total of 2313 3409 4049 5873 5341 20,985 Participants

It is apparent that, going by the percentage of participants, the weight of SDO’s training effort is concentrated in two main areas: IT training and familiarisation with administrative systems. The large effort put into IT training reflects the scale of the investment in information technology and systems development in government departments as well as long pent-up demand for such training. Before the post-1990 reform effort got under way, the use of information technology in government was very limited. The changes currently taking place in this area represent what is probably the outstanding success story of the post-1990 reform programme. In the case of familiarisation with administrative systems, the bulk of participation actually represents induction or promotion courses for newly appointed staff. But around a third of the activity in this area represents training in support of the introduction of new systems, such as business planning or performance management, that are a direct outcome of reform initiatives. The SDO’s activities are conditioned mainly by the public service effort, out of which the organisation itself was born. • Training for senior and middle management

An important early focus for the Staff Development Organisation’s activities was management development training for senior staff, though this does not show up in

236 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration the figures owing to the relatively small numbers involved compared to, say, IT training. Again, this was in support of a key priority of the reform programme - the strengthening of departmental management. At the outset, the decision was taken not to distinguish between managers with a general service or a specialist background: both groups were exposed to the same training. The training in question revolved around two programmes, Developing Leadership Skills and Managing Change. These programmes were later extended to lower levels and finally halted when the potential target population had been covered. Currently, there is no specific programme of in-service management training which each officer in a senior or middle management grade can expect to undergo, though training opportunities continue to be offered to such levels on an ad hoc basis. Participation in courses is either voluntary (IT, and skills)’ or on the nomination of heads of department (many “academic” and management skills programmes)’ or according to functional role (policy-related training and system familiarisation).

• Training and reform

The closer relationship between in-service training and public service reform in Malta raises the issue of whether or to what extent training can be considered as a catalyst of reform. A number of authors discount this idea, saying that training on its own is a weak lever for change.12 Malta’s experience confirms this general tenet, if confirmation is needed. To be effective, training must take place in a context of systematic change: the SDO’s IT training, for example, succeeded because it took place in the context of investment in equipment, computerisation of major departmental systems, and the provision of technical support. Reform is all about providing that context, and providing it requires the investment of considerable funds, effort and political capital. In the absence of that investment, new skills will remain unused and may be forgotten in short order.(Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995)

Another dubious notion is that of training as a catalyst - that change will take place on its own if a critical mass of trained staff is built up. In practice, this is a very doubtful proposition. The concept assumes that those trained will automatically accept the new ideas to which they are exposed: inconvenient attitudes or beliefs are not so easy to educate away. Even aside from this problem, the mere gathering of people with new ideas will rarely lead to change except over a very long time-frame - generations rather than years - and with the help of other contingent factors, such as the emergence of a leader who can unify those in favour of change, translate their ideas into a tangible set of proposals for change, and focus their energies on the realisation of those proposals.13 Training alone is no painless shortcut to change.

• Public Administration Education in the Wider Public Sector

The discussion so far has centred on the public service itself - the core of the public sector. This is with reason. Little importance has been attached to education in public

237 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95 administration outside that core, that is to say in statutory public corporations, non-statutory public bodies outside the public service, state-owned limited liability companies, and local councils. When recruiting general management staff, the most common practice among these organisations appears to be that of asking for business management or related qualifications, or else not to specify what disciplines are sought. This is not to say that graduates in public administration or public policy are excluded from such organisations: many, especially of the first-named disciplines, are to be found throughout the public sector. It does mean, however, that prospective university students may opt for a commerce or business management programme in the belief that this will offer them more job opportunities even within the public sector.

The situation where local councils are concerned remains too fluid three years after their establishment for an assessment to be made. Council secretaries (chief administrators) were initially mainly seconded public officers from the general service, though few if any graduates were among those seconded. An extensive programme of training in council operations and management was organised for this group by the SDO. Since then, many councils have begun advertising publicly to fill secretaryships that fell vacant. The norm here appears to be not to indicate any preference as qualifications. The tight labour market may be leaving the councils with no other option: one council had to advertise repeatedly to find any suitable candidates at all.14

The special problems of councils apart, there may be a chicken-and-egg situation with respect to the establishment of public administration as a viable discipline for those seeking a career in the public sector. In the absence of a well-established BA or master’s degree programme producing a sizable group of graduates each year, employers will not include the discipline in their graduate-level recruitment plans; but unless they do so, it will be difficult for a university programme in the field to attract enough students and establish itself on a secure footing.

Conclusion

In small states public services tend to play a vital and central role in the socio- economic life of their communities, a fact which is also true of Malta. But, as this account has demonstrated, in Malta there was neither a systematic nor a consistent approach to public administration education and training. The University of Malta, though willing to assist the public service in the development of its officers, proved most of the time to be a disinterested partner. This may also explain the attitude of graduates towards the public service. Graduates failed to conceive of the public service as a profession in its own. Indeed, many of them saw it merely as an employment which appealed to secondary school leavers and sixth formers. But, even in the case of in-house training, we have seen that despite a number of earlier

238 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration attempts, until the 1990s and the creation of the Staff Development Organisation (SDO), very little had been achieved. The attitude of different governments as to the importance, or lack of it, of training has not helped and it will be a some time before the long term impact of present training strategies can be fully assessed, provided that present programmes are maintained and expanded.

Notes and references

1. See, for example, J.M.Lee, (1967), Colonial Development and Good Government, Claredon Press, Oxford; B. Benedict, (ed.), (1967), Problems of Smaller Territories, Athlone Press, London; Commonwealth Secretariat, (1985), Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Village, Commonwealth Secretariat, London; and J. Kaminarides, L. Brigulio, H. Hoogendonk, (eds), (1989), The Economic Development of Small Countries: Problems, Strategies and Policies, Nl:Euburon, Delft.

2. See R. Baker (ed.) (1992), Public Administration in Small and Island States, Kumanarian Press, West Harford, U.S.A.; E. Dommen & P. Hein (eds), (1985), States, Microstates and Islands, Croom Helm, London; and Y. Ghai, (ed), (1990), Public Administration and Management in Small States: Pacific Experiences, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

4. See, for example, C. Clarke and A. Payne, (eds), (1987), Politics, Security and Development of Small States, Allen & Unwin, London; and A. Payne and P. Sutton, (1993), Modern Caribbean Politics, John Hopkins University Press, Maryland, USA.

5. Since its independence Malta has been an active member of several international organisations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Within each of these bodies it has been responsible for a number of world- wide initiatives such as the International Law of the Sea Convention, the Rights of Future Generations initiative and the Mediterranean Dimension clause in the Helsinki Treaty on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Malta is also a central player in the Euro-Mediterranean process currently underway between the European Union and other non-member states.

6. Despite having a system of proportional representation, frequent changes to constituency boundaries have eroded this proportionality resulting in Constitutional provisions which aim to ensure that the party polling fifty-one percent of the votes casts gains at least a one seat majority in Parliament.

7. This observation is based on information obtained from public servants who had followed the DPA course.

239 Public Administration, Education and Training in Small Island States: Case of Malta 1950-95

8. In 1958 serious rioting occurred in Malta after the British Government declared its intention to privatise its naval dockyard Malta. The dockyard was at the time Malta’s largest single employer. The riots led to the resignation of the island’s elected government and the re- imposition of direct British rule.

9. This reflects the institutional history of Maltese government: many departments date back to the early British colonial era and their heads, main Maltese, played an instrumental role in colonial governance, whereas ministries are essentially creatures of independence. For a full account of the development and the role of the Maltese public service see G. A. Pirotta, (1996), The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva Publications, Malta.

10. Strictly speaking, the grade of principal was known as administrative officer prior to 1993. In this chapter grade titles have been standardised to avoid confusion.

11.University programmes may place emphasis on theory and research findings, whereas in- service courses - even though they may draw on the same materials - tend to focus more on “how to” skills that can be applied in the workplace.

12. Among others, P. Wilenski, ‘Administrative Reform - General Principles and the Australian Experience’, Public Administration 64 no. 3, (1986); M. Holmes, `Public Sector Management Reform: Convergence or Divergence?’, Governance 5 no. 4 (1992); and G. Hofstede, (1991), Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill, London.

13. In Britain, for instance, the ideas propagated by the Fulton Committee in its 1968 report only found fruition in the management reforms of a decade and a half later. See A. Gray et. al., `The Management of Change in Whitehall: The Experience of the FMI’, Public Administration 69 (1991), pp 41-59.

14. This was stated by Paul Fenech, the elected Mayor of Swieqi, in Malta, in a letter to the Sunday Times of Malta of the 4th February 1996.

References

Foster, J. W., (1970), First Periodic Report by the United Nations Civil Service Training Advisor, Malta Government, Malta.

Foster, J. W., (1970a), A National Programme for Training in Public Administration, Malta Government, Malta.

240 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

McCrensky, E, (1968), Report of the Special Advisor on Training in the Public Service of Malta to the Prime Minister, Malta Government, Malta.

Pirotta, G. A., (1996), The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva Publications, Malta.

Pirotta, G.A., (1997), `Politics and Public Service Reform in Small States: Malta’, Public Administration and Development 17 no. 1, pp. 177-207.

Pirotta, G. A., (1997a), `The Disciplines of Politics and Public Administration in Malta’, Teaching Public Administration 17 no 1, pp1-20.

Polidano, C., (1992), `Caught in a Double Bind: The Cultural Pitfalls Facing Public Service Reformers’, Administrative Review no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp.15-18, London.

Polidano, C., (1996), `Public Service Reform in Malta, 1989-95: Lessons To Be Learned’, Governance 9 no. 4, pp.459-480, London.

Public Service Reform Commission, (1989), A New Public Service for Malta: A Report on the Organisation of the Public Service, Malta Government, Malta.

Schein, E., `The First Job Dilemma: An Appraisal of Why College Graduates Change Jobs and What Can Be Done About It’, in J. B. Ritchie and Paul Thompson, (eds), 3rd edn., Organisation and People: Readings, Cases, and Exercises in Organisational Behaviour, West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Spiteri Gingell, D., (1990), `Survey of General Service Officers: A Preliminary Report’, inA New Public Service for Malta: Supplementary Papers, Malta Government, Malta.

Warrington, E. (ed.), (1995), `Introduction’ in Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile of the Public Service of Malta, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

Wilson, A., Day, A., and Whitehead, A. S., (1956) Report of the Commission on the Malta Civil Service, Department of Information, Malta.

241 A Farewell to paternalism through Public Enterprise? Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta

(Published in International review of Public Administration, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2001)

This article was presented at an International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) symposium in Beijing and considers the end of state paternalism in Malta. Such paternalism through the extensive use of public enterprises and other arrangements had become an accepted and expected way of life. In 1999, however, the government declared its commitment to a policy of widespread privatisation, to a large degree in response to a sizeable public deficit and the country’s bid to join the European Union at the next round of EU enlargement. The unions and local entrepreneurs in particular remain unconvinced that, given the country’s small size and a lack of strong foreign investment, privatisation will deliver the various benefits envisaged bythe government.

he first paragraph of a Government White Paper entitled Privatisation: A TStrategy for the Future, published by the Nationalist Party (PN) Government of Malta (GM, 1999:1), states that:

The Government is committed to privatise public enterprises. However, it is mindful that there are particular features and characteristics of Malta’s society and economy that need to be factored into a privatisation programme. It also wishes to address the common concerns over competition, concentration of ownership and employment.

For those who are involved in the economic and political affairs of Malta, whether in Malta or the corridors of EU power in Brussels, it is an introduction pregnant with meaning. Take especially the first sentence. It sets out in an unequivocal manner the government’s commitment of privatisation and, in doing so, it was intended as a clear signal toall concerned, unions, industry, investors and the government’s own activists and back- benchers, that this time the government will not be deflected from its aims.

Not so long ago mention of the word privatisation was taboo, leading one MP to ask whether it was a “dirty word” (Borda, 1992). But this also explains, perhaps, why the government promises to take into consideration the “particular features and characteristics of Malta’s society and economy”. It may be an admission that some aspects that are particular to Malta may influence the kind of options that are available to the government, or it might be an attempt to quell the fears that the prospect of privatisation holds for

242 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration thousands of workers, consumers and entrepreneurs. Privatisation on the scale envisaged by the government will not only serve to reshape the State but will also profoundly alter the very way of life of the entire Maltese community. Hence, too, the final sentence of the paragraph which refers, obliquely, to some of the concerns that arise because of Malta’s small size: a restricted market, economies of scale and the tendency towards public or private monopoly, and the prospect of unemployment to which these may give rise.

A Tradition of State Paternalism

The Republic of Malta consists, principally, of two inhabited small islands with a population of just over 390,000 inhabitants. Malta, the larger of the two islands, is merely 17 miles long and 9 miles wide and is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. There are no rivers, lakes or mountains and the provision of water for consumption and irrigation is incredibly costly. The islands have no natural resources, almost everything has to be imported, and political and economic events in the countries that are traditionally Malta’s trading partners can have important, if not catastrophic, implications for the island’s economy (Ramboll Report, 1996:15). For centuries its military strategic importance and its harbours constituted its only resources and, until 1979, an extremely important source of foreign income and employment. A policy of diversification away from this dependence on British/NATO spending and towards tourism and light manufacturing industry has been in place, however, since the 1960s. The local currency is the which presently has an exchange value of between US$2.25 and $2.5.

Historically, for reasons that were sometimes strategic and at other times economic or social, the existence of an extensive paternalistic state and the welfare of the Maltese have always been seen as being inextricably linked (see Pirotta, 1996). Indeed, in Malta, the phrase from the “cradle to the grave” has meant literally that and is reflected in an extraordinarily large bureaucracy. Even today, just over 40 percent of all gainfully employed are employed by the state, while another 15 to 20 percent are largely dependent on contracts from the state for the profitable conduct of their business (Pirotta, 1997). In Malta, the vast majority of private business firms are family-owned and operate mainly within the import/retail sectors and in activities related to tourism (GM, 1999:15).

Yet, a casual visitor to the island may be excused for thinking that the Maltese economy is immune to the dangers and difficulties facing other more developed economies. According to official statistics, unemployment stands at just over four percent. New cars are driven out on to Malta’s already congested roads by the hundreds every month, while the latest technology commodities are flooding the market. The quality of housing for the average Maltese family is well above the average of that of other more prosperous countries, while university students receive a stipend for attending university. The United Nations has ranked Malta 27th in its annual Human Development Report for the year 2000,

243 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta and the World Health Organisation has ranked it 7th in terms of quantity and quality in health care provision.

This level of social and economic development was only possible because of the kind of active role traditionally played by the state. The state has, for example, been prepared to step in and either bail out or physically take over companies in order to maintain people in employment. It has controlled and subsidised the price of staple foods and continues to play some role in the importation of grain, which is also stored in state-owned silos. The state is also responsible for such diverse activities as song and jazz festivals, art exhibitions and artistic development, and a major sponsor (through its corporations) of beauty contests and other events. It also holds a majority or monopolistic position in banking, tourism, insurance, transport and communications.

Malta does have a thriving private sector, but its existence owes a great deal to the state which has helped to promote it directly through subsidies, grants, tax-free holidays and rigid protectionist policies, and indirectly through capital projects, government investment and international agreements. One example is in the sphere of tourism, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of all economic activity. In this highly competitive sector, many hotel operators would find it difficult to compete were it not for government schemes that allow tour operators to buy their package holidays at rates of exchange fixed a year in advance.

Perhaps the best judgement on the role played by the state and the public service in the socio-economic development of Malta is in a Report of the Public Service Reform Commission (1989:3), which states that “If our nation’s citizens are well-fed, well-clothed, well-housed, if they enjoy the benefits of education, good health and the protection of the law, if they participate in the creation of the nation’s wealth, they owe something to the ability, dedication and adaptability of the public service.” The present government now proposes to withdraw completely from its present role and to restrict its activities to a narrow range of services such as education, health, and law and order. It plans to do this during its present five-year term of office (1998-2003). There are two main reasons for this policy. The first is an increasingly unsustainable financial deficit. In the last fifteen years, public expenditure has been financed through an ever-widening budget deficit and public sector borrowing. The public debt now stands at over 2 billion US dollars (Central Bank, 2001). The second reason is Malta’s bid to join the European Union (EU). In order that Malta may align itself with the free market policies of the EU, it is necessary that all existing protective policies, existing subsidies and aids to industries be removed and that the size of the public sector be reduced. Given these two factors, the options before the government are greatly restricted.

244 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Cautious Privatisation 1988-98

In its 1999 White Paper, the Government claims that a policy of privatisation has been in place since 1988 and that until 1996, when it lost office, it had liquidated about 40 very small companies and privatised another 22. Liquidation is not privatisation and the reference to these companies is irrelevant. Many had been insolvent for a number of years but the government hoped to find a buyer for them. None of their employees was made redundant; they were merely transferred to other public sector corporations.

With respect to the other 22 companies, the claims made by the government are somewhat exaggerated. Some of these so-called “companies” included government departments which had been transformed into agencies, authorities or corporations, but which remained fully government owned and administered. They included the Post Office which in 1995 became Posta Limited, the Water Works Department which was reconstituted as the Water Services Corporation and the Ports Department which was placed under the control of a newly established Maritime Authority. In some cases, new agencies were set up taking over some of the duties previously performed by some government department, with the departments themselves being nonetheless retained. For example, the Department of Labour remained even though it had many of its responsibilities hived off to a newly created Employment and Training Corporation.

These reforms had been largely inspired by the changes taking place in other countries, especially Britain, and had featured in the report of the Public Service Reform Commission (1989: iii; Pirotta, 1992). The government had claimed that these changes would lead to less political interference, greater flexibility in human resource management, a greater degree of accountability, and greater efficiency. But, in their case too, employees who did not wish to transfer to the new entities were integrated into the general service grades of the public service. Furthermore, as these “new” agencies and corporations recruited new staff to replace those that had left, the public service ultimately became a little fatter rather than leaner. Hence, privatisation was not really a consideration.

Another strategy adopted by the government was that of fostering the development of co-operatives within government departments. The creation, in 1993, of 67 local councils with a statutory requirement to contract out for all services and works required by them (Gingell, 1996:10) was intended as an encouragement for large numbers of public employees to form co-operatives to compete for contracts (Pirotta, 2001). To facilitate matters, the government even provided a number of schemes and subsidies. For example, in the case of the Department of Refuse Collection and Disposal, it gave a co-operative established for the purpose the contracts for all 67 councils and an annual subsidy of nearly 1.5 million Maltese Liri (LM). Although a number of departmental co- operatives were set up, these schemes have not enjoyed the success hoped for by the

245 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta government (The Times, 5 July 1996). Nonetheless, government corporations are still using similar schemes in trying to privatise parts of their operations, as the recent case of Maltacom demonstrates (L-Orizzont, 8 December 2000).

Between 1988 and 1996, a number of noteworthy exercises in privatisation did take place. These included the selling-off of Pharmamed (a pharmaceutical company) to a foreign buyer, Lombard Bank in which the government owned 60 percent of the shares, and Bank of Valletta in which the government retained a 25 percent shareholding and the right to nominate the chairperson. Sometime later, the government sold a small quantity of its shares in Mid-Med Bank, the island’s largest bank. For the government, these share sell-offs had three principal aims. First, they sought to satisfy private sector calls for a more liberalised and competitive financial environment. Second, they aimed to earn badly needed revenue. The government had just embarked on a costly modernisation programme of a number of utilities and needed the funds. Third, the sell-offs were intended to introduce a culture of share-ownership among the wider public. The then Minister of Finance, echoing Mrs Thatcher, described them as popularisation not privatisation (It-Torċa, 1 August 1993).

The general public welcomed the privatisation of the banks as it offered attractive opportunities for secure investments. This encouraged the government to proceed with its plan to establish a Stock Exchange in Malta, even though trading was initially restricted to the shares of these banks and government stocks and bonds. No one, however, expected earth-shaking changes to take place either within the banks or banking practices generally, and none occurred. Nor did union fears materialise about the privatisation of the banks depriving the government of its capacity to sustain its paternalistic role (It-Torċa, 1 August 1993).

In October 1996, the Malta Labour Party (MLP) returned to power after nine years in opposition. It made it clear that its conception of the role of the state had changed and that it would aim to reduce government involvement in the economy and develop some form of partnership with the private sector. However, its manifesto also made it clear that in important areas such as energy and water provision and telephony, the government would retain its existing control (MLP, 1996). But in the face of the financial difficulties that it inherited, Labour too, although hesitatingly, embraced privatisation. This did not please the unions, especially the General Workers Union (GWU), its ally of old, which demanded that the government would retain a 60 percent majority shareholding in all government- owned companies. The government conceded the unions’ demand by selling only 40 percent of its stake in each of Telemalta (the national communications corporation, which was re- christened Maltacom plc) and Posta Limited (which became Maltapost plc). But other austerity measures soon led to disagreements within the MLP parliamentary group and eventually to early elections, which Labour lost.

246 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Privatisation as Policy

The return of a Nationalist Party government in September 1998 brought with it a more aggressive approach to privatisation. It was dictated by the existing financial deficit and the need aggressively to drive forward Malta’s application for membership of the EU, which the MLP had frozen as it thought membership would be against Malta’s best interests (MLP, 1993, 1996). Indeed, one of the PN government’s first acts was to sell (in 1999) Mid-Med Bank, Malta’s largest bank, to HSBC. This gave a clear signal to all, including Brussels, that the government was determined to carry out its policies.

The events that followed this sale point to problems that are bound to re-surface in the privatisation of other public corporations and companies. The cloak and dagger way in which the whole process was conducted raised a storm and a number of successful challenges in the courts from minority shareholders seeking to protect their shareholding. The claim that the bank had been sold too cheaply was also forcefully made. More worrying was the accusation that the bank had been sold off quickly because of the desperate need for funds by the government or to please the EU (Spiteri, 2000). Others worried about the dangers to a small state like Malta of the dominating influence on economic policy making that a financial giant like HSBC could come to exert. The MLP promised that once back in office it would take “the necessary corrective measures” (It-Torċa, 2 May 1999) to remove this dominance. Still others pointed to the fact that in Malta public banks, while not excluding the need for profits, had always followed policies that kept social aspects in full view, and feared that this factor would now be lost sight of (It-Torċa, 28 May 2000). In Malta smallness, combined with the fact that most businesses are family-owned, has produced a sort of cosy relationship between entrepreneurs and financial institutions. The sudden introduction into this cosy relationship of a financial giant of HSBC’s stature with a management imported from abroad could not but provoke unease.1

The government sought to defend itself by claiming the HSBC would help put Malta on the international financial map and bring competition in banking to Malta. The government’s case has proved to be weak and even staunch supporters of privatisation, like the Federation of Industries, have warned the government against repeating the HSBC process in the privatisation of other public entities (L-Orizzont, 6 April 2000). The unions also reacted aggressively and demanded certain guarantees: no compulsory redundancies and recognition of existing agreements until a new collective agreement was concluded. Trade unions in Malta are very strong, if sharply divided, but the Mid-Med Bank sale brought about an unusual show of unity that forced HSBC to concede their demands. This is a point of some importance for the future of privatisation. Selling privatisation to a public that needed convincing as to it benefits and the government’s ability to do a good job of it, became a priority for the government.

247 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta

A Strategy for Privatisation

In the face of this battering, the government needed a strategy. The outcome was the Privatisation Unit (set up in 1999) which included businessmen, academics and civil servants, and the publication of a White Paper on privatisation. These two measures would allow the government to regain the initiative and possibly gain the high ground over this issue. The Privatisation Unit helped because it gave representatives of the business community a formal channel through which to present their case and their anxieties (GM, 1999:1). But the unions were excluded despite the fact that they, more than others, need to be convinced that privatisation would, despite some pains, reap tangible rewards for their members. The White Paper also provided the government with an opportunity to state its case in some detail, to stress its determination to proceed with its policy, and to extol the virtues of privatisation.

The government’s case for privatisation differs very little from that invoked in many other countries. According to the White Paper (GM, 1999:3-4), privatisation in Malta has eight principal objectives:

1. to raise public enterprise efficiency; 2. to improve service to the public; 3. to re-deploy national resources efficiently; 4. to develop the local capital markets; 5. to strengthen the local private sector, by encouraging competition and modernisation; 6. to allow the government to concentrate on core activities by limiting its economic role and encouraging an “enterprise culture”; 7. to increase foreign and domestic private investment in infrastructure and in enhancing technology transfer through strategic partnerships; and 8. to consolidate public finances.

A number of these objectives require comment, not because they are intrinsically flawed, but because some of the issues they raise may have important implications for the entire privatisation process.

According to the government, public sector corporations and companies are over- staffed; their resources are used inefficiently, leading to significant wastage; theyare hindered by outdated management and work practices; and they lack controls over spending and human resources. Statistics are employed to support these views. The

248 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration enterprises employ 10 percent of the entire workforce, of which 80 percent are engaged in the infrastructure sector. In 1999, they had a combined debt of LM531 million. The government’s transfers to them amounted to approximately 5 percent of GDP and they accounted for the bulk of the government deficit (GM, 1999:8). But neither the government’s views nor its related statistics should be taken at face value.

On the one hand, some public enterprises are very efficient. Air Malta, the national carrier, enjoys both a tremendous track record in terms of profits and competitiveness, and a strong reputation. On the other hand, other public enterprises, such as Enemalta (which is responsible for all electricity and petroleum provision), are grossly inefficient. Why the contrast? As a first explanation, it is necessary to point out that those public corporations which have done consistently well operate in a strong competitive environment, while those which have done consistently badly enjoy a monopolistic position in the market. For example, Enemalta holds the monopoly for the importation and sale of car and aviation fuels, industrial and domestic gas products, and the provision of electricity.

A second explanation is that provided by the Federation of Industries, which argues that the problem is mainly political and is evidenced by ministerial interference in the management of these enterprises and the appointment of both their management and their personnel (The Times, 12 April 2000). Almost, without exception, those who have been appointed as directors and/or chief executives of the enterprises have had some close affinity with the political party in office at thetime(Alternattiva, 3 November 1995). Quite often their position in a company is secondary to some full-time occupation elsewhere. On rare occasions, governments have sought to appoint individuals who had cut their management teeth in the private sector, but the record shows that whenever these tried to resist ministerial interference, they were either forced to resign or their contracts were not renewed.2

Political interference takes place in the day-to-day management of enterprises at the operational level. Ministers and their secretariats are known to interfere in such mundane areas of administration, as who should do overtime or who should be selected for a vacancy or promotion, as well as in more crucial operational decisions (Pirotta, 1997). For example, in 2000, Enemalta had to fork out an extra LM52 million in payments for fuel supplies after the minister responsible for it forced it to abandon a hedging agreement arrived at under the previous government. Ministerial interference also explains why many of the enterprises are burdened with excessive labour. In addition to being used to reduce unemployment during recessions, they have always been the main recipients of extensive ministerial patronage. Important outcomes of such policies and practices are partisan divisions among their personnel, which very often lead to tensions on the shop-floor and a general lack of discipline.

249 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta

The privatisation of public enterprises will involve the loss of an important leverage in the competition for votes between the parties in a political system which is highly polarised and in which it is unusual for one party to gain more than a one- or two-seat advantage at election time. Voters know this and frequently use their vote to blackmail political parties. So far no party has dared take any drastic privatisation measures and the public may be excused for misreading the intentions of the government. Despite the rhetoric, the government is still busy appointing its stalwarts and supporters to posts and offices within enterprises (Kullħadd, 18 March 2001).

The issue of public enterprise debt is not as simple as the government portrays it. Nearly one quarter of the debt, which now stands at LM593 million, is owed by the Malta Freeport Corporation and was incurred when the company began extending its container terminal facilities in its bid to make Malta the shipping transhipment hub of the Mediterranean. This debt was incurred for development purposes. It contrasts sharply with the debt of LM137 million owed by the Malta Drydocks Corporation. This corporation has been in decline since the 1960s but it still employs 3000 workers, making it the largest public corporation in Malta. The main remaining debts are owed by the Water Services Corporation (LM70 million) and Enemalta (LM125 million (The Times, 1 June 2000).

The White Paper outlined the various options, methods and strategies before the government. But while it claimed (GM, 1999:17) that “at this stage, no decision has been made on the preferred privatisation method” or combination of methods that might be adopted, it nonetheless identified the five major enterprises on which the government intended “to start” immediately. It also noted that “the preliminary privatisation strategies” for these candidates had already been prepared (GM, 1999:17). It is contradictory statements like these that are of concern for unions and entrepreneurs.

The Reaction of Stakeholders

The final section of the White Paper listed the organisations that were consulted by the government before the Paper was published. There was no indication of the issues raised, but from speeches made by officials from the Federation of Industries (FOI) and the Unions before and after publication, it is clear that the issues at stake have not been resolved.

The business community is in favour of privatisation but readily admits that, given Malta’s very small size, “the overall situation on privatisation is a complex one” (The Times, 12 April 2000). It wants the government to get its priorities right; it thought the White Paper was rather vague. For example, the FOI has criticised the government for its failure to introduce management structures within its corporations that would help prepare them for privatisation. Nor has the government addressed issues related to employee

250 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration skills, retraining and their possible redeployment. For the FOI, this is an indication that the necessary studies of individual enterprises have not been conducted.

The FOI is also concerned about such crucial issues as regulation, the implications in respect to present debts, and the dangers of turning public monopolies into private ones. Hence its warning that privatisation does not automatically equal liberalisation and that, unless properly undertaken, “privatisation of a monopoly can create more problems than it solves” (The Times, 12 April 2000). For this reason, the FOI is demanding that, in the case of public enterprises which are natural monopolies (e.g., Enemalta), the government should impose a 5 percent limit on any private shareholder or corporate body. It recognises, however, that this limit may be waived in the case of companies where a strategic partner is required, provided that this partner brings to the enterprise not only an injection of “fresh capital, but also new technologies and markets” (The Times, 12 April 2000). The FOI reminded the government that foreign direct investment (FDI) had declined sharply and that the claims made in the White Paper that FDI had increased were incorrect, for the government had included the proceeds from the sale of Mid-Med Bank and other shareholdings.

The threat of industrial unrest is a source of worry to the FOI (The Sunday Times, 21 May 2000). It views the anxieties of the unions as legitimate and has counselled the government on the need for consensus building. In the White Paper, the issue of unemployment was dealt with in two lines, with the conclusion being that “the privatisation process will significantly improve the competitiveness of the economy which will in turn encourage and generate new investment and jobs” (GM, 1999:22). Business leaders do not agree that the matter is that simple, and point to the difficulties encountered by the government in the cases of Maltapost, Maltacom and HSBC, where it was forced to give guarantees that no employees would be made redundant. In the case of the sale of Mid-Med Bank to the HSBC, the unions forced the government to extract from the HSBC an agreement in writing that no compulsory redundancies would take place after the completion of the transfer of the bank. The FOI believes that the imposition of such pre-conditions on the private sector will ultimately “make all the difference between a successful privatisation and a disastrous one” (The Times, 12 April 2000). Nonetheless, it understands that the government cannot just embark on a programme of redundancies, as this would lead to a rapid upturn in the rate of unemployment and, inevitably, social and political instability. Hence, the need for the government to take the unions on board.

In Malta, trade unions are very strong and attempts by the two major parties to factor them into their parties’ partisan strategies has merely made them stronger. The island’s two major unions, the General Workers Union (GWU) and the Union Ħaddiema Maqgħuda (UĦM), are not in principle opposed to privatisation, but both are wary of what the impact may be on their members. The UĦM has declared its readiness to withhold

251 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta cooperation with the government unless it is fully consulted (The Times, 16 March 2000). Until now this union has been very restrained in its public position, but this mayvery well be due to the difficult position that it finds itself in. It is strongly in favour of Malta’s membership of the EU, and privatisation is one of the conditions imposed on Malta by Brussels. Hence, it knows that the two issues cannot be easily separated.

By contrast, the GWU has already declared itself against EU membership. Unlike the UĦM, it is also very militant and in August 1999 its entire leadership was arraigned in court on charges arising from a strike at the airport. During 2000 it was also engaged in a campaign against the government’s austerity drive.4 Its position on privatisation was set out in a statement published in 2000 in the union’s Maltese language Sunday paper (It-Torċa, 28 May 2000). The statement pointed out that in the area of services, recent experience of privatisation had not been encouraging. As evidence, it cited the failure of arrangements entered into by the government when it outsourced cleaning services in hospitals. Rather than proving more efficient, the service provoked widespread criticism. The union also questioned the government’s policy on co-operatives, pointing at their failure as exercises in cost cutting.

The GWU’s main concern was on the likely impact of privatisation on unemployment. It was not prepared to accept redundancies and stressed that it would be “demanding” guarantees from the government that no employees would lose their jobs because of privatisation. If these guarantees were not given, then it promised to resist privatisation with all the means at its disposal (L-Orizzont, 17 March 2000; The Times, 17 March 2000). Furthermore, like the FOI, it was concerned that the government did not seem to be proposing a strong regulatory framework and was convinced that this will lead to problems of a social character. Its view is that, because of Malta’s smallness, privatisation will merely serve to transform public utilities into private monopolies with dire consequences for consumers, pensioners, and industry. For this reason, it is against the privatisation of public corporations which it considers to be strategic, such as the Water Services Corporation, Enemalta and the Malta International Airport. It firmly believes that the government should continue to hold a controlling interest in these corporations.

A Progress Report

The government, as already stated, has set itself a five-year deadline in which to carry out its privatisation programme. It identified the five enterprises that it wanted to privatise first – the International Airport, the Malta Freeport Terminal, the Public Lotto Department, the Libyan Arab Maltese Holding Company and the Bank of Valetta – presumably because, in the words of the FOI, they are “either money spinners or have no effect whatsoever on the government budget” (The Times, 12 April 2000). This may only be partially true. It is likely that the government believes that these five are more likely

252 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration to attract investors and are diverse enough to allow it to explore the different methods of privatisation outlined in the White Paper.

The Privatisation Unit has been in existence for a year and half and it is legitimate to ask, what has been achieved in this period? A proper assessment is not easy, as the government is not willing to discuss progress, or the lack of it, openly. One reason it gives is that it wants to avoid speculation, especially in the case of companies quoted on the Stock Exchange (Malta Independent, 16 December 1998). Of the five, however, only the Bank of Valletta is quoted on the Exchange and, with the exception of the Libyan Arab Maltese Holding Company, the other three are fully owned by the government. But words do not often match actions, for in January 2001 the government hinted that it might very soon be ready to sell its shares in the Bank of Valletta, but then did nothing of the sort. From time to time, government statements are released to the press that hint on progress being made but they either give little hard information or are quickly challenged by one of the social partners. For example, in March 2001, although not for the first time, the government announced that the privatisation of the Freeport and Malta International Airport had both reached an advanced stage (The Times, 14 March 2001). This brought a reaction from the GWU which claimed that either this statement was untrue, or that the government is proceeding behind the backs of the unions. The GWU claimed that only a week before the announcement was made, it had been invited to a preliminary meeting on the subject.

This all suggests that the government intends to proceed with the process and then present the public and the unions with a fait accompli. But at the same time it wants the public to know that it is not back-tracking on its position on privatisation and, in fact, is steaming ahead; hence the periodic statements. It also wants to send a message to Brussels that the government is on track with the reforms being demanded of it.

Some privatisation decisions have already been taken. For example, a decision has been made on which sector of the Malta Freeport should be privatised. The government has set up an operating company and it will be this company (at least at this stage) that will be privatised. This means that responsibility for the existing debts in respect of development works at the Freeport will not be passed on to the new investors, but will be retained by the government. This, however, does not seem to indicate that the privatisation of the Freeport is imminent. In fact, it contrasts sharply with the case of Malta International Airport (MIA) where the process appears to be at a more advanced stage. In 2000, an ad hoc committee was appointed within the Privatisation Unit and, on advice from the World Bank, it proceeded to seek to appoint an advisor to help it identify the best approach to be adopted and to assist in the actual privatisation of the MIA. Following a call in the international press in February 2001, the government announced that a consortium headed by NBP Paribas of France had been appointed to lead the exercise (The Times, 17

253 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta

February 2001). Barring any difficulties, it is expected the government will make some decision towards the end of 2001, probably just before the budget is due or on budget day itself.

The privatisation of the MIA and the Freeport may very well set the scene for future developments, especially as they will serve as a test of the government’s ability to proceed rapidly with its programme. The government cannot expect to carry the FOI with it unless it can deliver on the issue of regulation. The FOI has stated clearly that the privatisation of these two companies “could become a major problem if they are turned into private monopolies. MIA and Freeport are essential in the infrastructure of the island and affect industry directly. The FOI must insist that if these two entities are privatised, serious independent regulatory authorities are instituted.” Otherwise, “there could be a conflict as to how to balance out interests of shareholders and of users” (The Times, 12 April 2000). The unions, on the other hand, especially the GWU, will resist the government with all its might unless solid guarantees are given about jobs. A showdown over privatisation will probably not be in the interest of any side and, from the government’s point of view, unless handled properly, it might scare off potential investors.

The third enterprise on which there has been some progress towards privatisation is the Public Lotto Department. This department, a revenue department for the government, is reasonably small as most of the work is done by government licensed Lotto Receivers, who run their own Lotto booths and receive a commission from the department on sales. As may be expected, there is not a shortage of interested local and foreign buyers for this service and the government must tread carefully. If it does not, it can expect its plans to be delayed by challenges in the courts or before the Permanent Commission against Corruption, as has happened in the past over the award of tenders and the sale of government property.� So far the Receivers Union has been consulted by the government, but its members’ mistrust of the government remains high. Many of the people involved earn their living solely from the sale of lottery tickets and weekly lotto draws, and now fear that privatisation will result in loss of employment. Once again, however, barring difficulties, it is expected that the privatisation of this department will be finalised by the end of 2001.

While public attention has been fixed on the privatisation process ofmajor corporations, a parallel process has been going on in areas in which a public-private mix seems more practicable. The Prime Minister himself has made speeches about the matter (e.g., The Times, 13 November 1998), and it also featured in the Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance in November 2000 (GM, 1999). One such area is primary healthcare, with the Department of Health considering proposals for the formation of a co-operative by health centre doctors and another co-operative with a private health organisation for the running of government health centres (The Times, 5 March 2001). Other areas where

254 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration the private-public mix is presently at work include computer services and research facilities at the Public Registry.

Concluding Comments

What are the prospects for success? The process of privatisation has generally been very uneven and a policy of sorts has been in place only since 1999. The government has set itself a five-year deadline by which time it hopes to have successfully concluded its negotiations for membership of the EU. Indeed, the EU will be watching eventsin Malta very closely to see how prepared the island is for membership. The government, unlike the opposition, has staked its whole political future on the premise that there is no alternative to EU membership and, therefore, it must try to see its policies through to the end. There are, in practice, three weighty factors standing in the way of successful privatisation: time, a lack of financial resources, and a socio-political environment that is largely hostile to rapid wholesale change.

What the government is being asked to do in such a short time frame is not merely to restructure the public sector but to overhaul the entire role of the state: effectively to reverse a process built over more than two centuries in just five years. There is general agreement about the need for a thorough restructuring of the Maltese economy among the parties, trade unions and business, but many feel that the government is trying to do too much too quickly. Indeed, a recent survey on Maltese support for EU membership has shown a marked swing in favour of a no vote (It-Torċa, 11 February 2001). If the government, however, manages to do what it has set out to do, then the Malta of five years from now will be unrecognisable from the Malta of today. To call it a revolution would be perhaps to understate the changes.

But to succeed, the government needs resources that it does not have. It needs to attract to Malta, over the next three to four years, huge amounts of foreign investment. So far it has failed to do this and industry chiefs have warned that existing foreign investment is actually migrating to other countries, notably to Eastern and Central Europe, where the cost of services and labour are significantly lower than those of Malta. Fortunately for the government, the level of savings in Malta is very high and it will find willing local investors in the outsourcing and sell-offs of some of its smaller enterprises. The FOI has already stated its readiness to join the government in public-private partnerships in a number of spheres. However, without a very large injection of foreign investment, industrial restructuring and privatisation on the scale envisaged by the government are bound to fail.

Finally, there is the socio-economic environment in which these reforms have to be implemented. The policies of the government, including that of privatisation, strike at the very heart of present living standards. Admittedly, those standards are way above

255 Privatisation in the Small Island State of Malta the resources of the island and can only be maintained through public expenditure. The Governor of the has recently made the point that the country has been living beyond its means for far too long and the moment of reckoning has now arrived (The Malta Independent, 23 February 2001). True as this is, it is also true that the expectations now held by the public have been nurtured over many years by the readiness of successive governments to feather-bed the electorate and to squander resources. The outcome has been that the government and the public now find themselves completely out of depth and struggling. In 1998, Labour fell from office after just two years because of the austerity measures that it had imposed. The PN government that replaced it has now imposed a much harsher tax regime than Labour and is frantically trying to stamp out tax evasion. During the March 2001 round of local elections, the Prime Minister called on the electorate to use the poll to express a vote of confidence in the economic policies of his government and its bid for EU membership, which to some extent are connected. The poll went against the government, which suffered heavy losses. The Prime Minister’s reaction was that the electorate had sent his party a clear and strong message, which it will heed. If it does, what future then for privatisation?

References

Borda, M. 1992. “Is privatization a dirty word?”, The Sunday Times, 11 October, Malta

Central Bank of Malta. 2001. Annual Report for 2000, Malta

Gingell, N. 1996. The Ambivalent Role of the Secretary of the Local Council, unpublished disserta­tion, University of Malta, Malta

GM (Government of Malta). 1999. White Paper—Privatization: A Strategy for the Future, Government Printing Office, Malta

____. 2000. Budget 2000, Government Printing Office, Malta

MLP (Malta Labour Party). 1990. Malta u Is-Suq Komuni (2 Vols), Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti, Malta

_____. 1996. Iċ-Ċittadin l-Ewwel: Il-Politika Ġdida Laburista, Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti, Malta

Pirotta, G. A. 1992. “First observations on the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission”, Economic and Social Studies, 6 (Special Issue): 49-63

_____. 1996. The Maltese Public Service 1800 - 1940. The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Mireva Publications, Malta _____. 1997. “Politics and public service reform in small states: Malta”, Public

256 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

Administration and Development,17(1): 197-207

_____. 2001. “A new creation or an image in likeness? The Maltese experience of establishing local government”, Public Organization Review: A Global Journal, 1(2/3), forthcoming

Public Service Reform Commission. 1989. A New Public Service for Malta, Government Printing Office, Malta

Ramboll Report. 1996. A Study and an Action Plan for the Restructuring of Malta’s Manufacturing Industry, Federation of Industry, Malta

Sant, A. 1995. Malta’s European Challenge, Sensiela Kotba Socjalisti, Malta

Spiteri, L. 2000a. “Making privatization seem dirty”, The Times, 19 January, Malta

_____. 2000b. “Privatising public baronies”, The Times, 6 March, Malta

Endnotes

1 Although banks were expected to operate within a business framework, it was widely known that individuals and businesses could count on a sympathetic ear and some support in difficult times. Indeed, banks were known to hold their hand, sometimes at the risk of losses, rather than take action. The introduction of a foreign bank with a foreign management did upset this relationship. The increase in the number of homes repossessed by the bank is one indication. 2 A former chairman of Enemalta who had been attracted to the company from the private sector but whose contract was later not renewed, testified in a libel case that the Minister responsible interfered in the final selection for a petrol attendant. 3 The GWU embarked on an anti-austerity campaign with the slogan “Enough is Enough.” It included mass demonstrations, lightening strikes and a nationwide petition signing exercise. 4 Mistrust in the way government awards contracts or tenders is so great that many businesses often seek judicial review of the whole process. In some cases claims of wrongdoing are so strong that the matter is either referred to the Permanent Commission Against Corruption or to a Commission appointed for the purpose.

257 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta

(Published in Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 46, No. 1, 128–141, February 2008, with Prof Maurice Mullard)

ABSTRACT This study offers an ‘insider’ perspective on the politics of public expenditure in Malta between 1996 and 2001 focusing on a five year period which, in a number of ways, represented a major watershed in the history of Malta’s politics. Two elections led to changes of government and to the adoption of two radically different styles of public expenditure management. A short period of Labour Party Government, distinguished by comparatively tight public expenditure control, was swiftly followed by the return of the Nationalist Party. In contrast, the Nationalist Government downgraded the importance of public expenditure control. These developments are found to be indicative of a characteristic pattern of politics defined by clientelism. Outcomes are frequently paradoxical. Analysis of public expenditure evidence reveals that government room for manoeuvre can be substantial at programme level but is significantly more limited and constrained in relation to overall expenditure parameters.

Introduction

alta presents a series of paradoxes. On the one hand public expenditure Mamounts to over 42 per cent of GDP while on the other, despite these high levels of spending, the perception is of disillusionment with the quality of public sector provision. The popular view seems to be that private is good and public is bad. Parents prefer to send their children to church schools than government schools. In health care people prefer to see a GP at his private practice and pay a minimum fee because this creates a feeling of continuity, of having a family doctor in contrast to waiting to see a GP in the impersonal settings of public sector polyclinics.

Although government expenditure averages around 42 per cent of GDP there is widespread disillusionment about the quality of public services. Such perceptions reflect a growing discrepancy between the high costs and the low quality of public sector provision. In practice, 85 per cent of public sector costs are related to wage costs. Unsurprisingly, increases in public expenditure do not necessarily result in better quality services when such a large proportion is absorbed by wage costs.

Malta is in European terms a poor country with per capita incomes of around $8000 dollars. Nevertheless, levels of personal consumption are similar to those of wealthier economies in terms of housing, cars, mobile phones and travel. This indicates that there are major discrepancies between the official data and the size of the informal

258 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration economy. For large numbers of people in Malta the outcome is low pay: 25 per cent of families in Malta are in receipt of unemployment benefit or social assistance. The minimum wage seems to be an instrument for sustaining a low wage economy. There is a problem of structural unemployment. The duration of long term unemployment is four years. The minimum wage, social assistance, child benefit and unemployment benefits combine in their impacts to create poverty traps for families with children (Mullard, 1999a). Furthermore, although large segments of the social security system are means tested, this process has not deterred the number of claimants of child benefits and unemployment benefits. Overall, about 71 per cent of businesses in Malta are family owned and employ between five and seven people while only 3 per cent employ 100 people or more. Employment in tourism, a major sector of the economy, also tends to be part time. These processes have contributed to the growth of the informal sector, which, in turn, underlies and explains the nature of tax evasion and also the frequency of abuses of the social security system.

Politics and the Politicisation of the Public Space

Malta is both highly politicised and polarised between the two major political parties – the Malta Labour Party and the Nationalist Party (Pirotta, 1994). Electoral turnouts are high at 96 per cent compared with European average of 70 per cent and the US of 49 per cent. Turnout at local elections is 60 per cent compared with the UK average of 30 per cent. The two political parties can each claim the support of around 40 per cent of the voters (Tabone, 1987; Pirotta, 1994), so that very small changes in voting intentions can bring about a change of government.

Land ownership is of major importance in determining the nature of the distribution of income. Investments in land and property are creating a new monied elite. Inevitably, the lobbying of the planning authorities has become highly politicised (Ombudsman Report, 2005). There are distinct insider and outsider groups involved in the planning process with insider building contractors having easier and quicker access to decision makers. Large building companies involved in major projects are more easily heard since these are seen as key actors in the shaping of Malta’s economy in terms of capital investment and employment. Not infrequently they also defy attempts by the planning authorities to control them. To date there have only been limited attempts to provide regulatory frameworks that protect consumer interests. Not only has the government embraced neoliberal thinking in economic policy making, but the size of Malta makes it easier to create monopolies. Consequently, Malta is exposed to land and property speculators who are involved in major building projects. Houses on the seafront are demolished and replaced with multi-story blocks and hotels owned by multinational chains such as Radisson, Westin and Corinthia. Cashfl ows into the banking sector, not least

259 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta through the government’s overseas investment repatriation schemes, have facilitated such major property and land speculations.

Malta’s wage rates compared with Europe are also relatively low. Employees covered by the minimum rates receive wages of about LM4000 per annum. Malta’s rates of taxation have made the island attractive to the new global entrepreneurs encouraging them to buy properties and build yacht marinas in Malta. A new elite in financial consultancy, building contractors, importers, lawyers and clinicians are involved in the shaping of the debate on the future of social policy, urging the government to privatise public utilities and to further liberalise financial institutions. The danger is that Malta’s membership of the EU will inflate housing costs even further and this will have a major impact on young Maltese families with average incomes of LM6000 per annum. Average house prices are equivalent to LM60,000, which is creating a major discrepancy between earnings and housing costs. In the 1970s and early 1980s the Labour Government had invested heavily in social housing in a bid to curb inflation and maintain wage competitiveness in a scenario of near virtual dependence on imports even of basic necessities. This policy was, however, abandoned by the Nationalist administration between 1987 and 1996. There are now major problems for first time buyers as property is diverted towards high priced luxuryfl ats aimed at potential EU residents with very high incomes. This has given to rise to a situation whereby luxury apartments, which in terms of price are outside the earnings of the local population, have remained unsold for over a decade. In the meantime the gap between incomes and property prices continues to widen.

Despite the fact that Malta is highly unionised, with a trade union density of about 60 per cent of the workforce, the unions have little autonomous impact on government policy. The trade unions have followed a hybrid of a British and a continental model. The General Workers Union, which seeks a wide membership among all grades of employees, also recruits civil servants and professionals. A close ally of the Malta Labour Party in the 1980s, it was briefly statutorily fused with the party. The other major trade union, the Union Haddiema Maqghudin (Workers Together), supports the Nationalist Party. Trade union intimacy with the two political parties weakens their role as the permanent counterbalance to government since trade unions appear to be fragmented and very seldom provide a means of solidarity. Wages in Malta are indexed to the cost of living so that wage negotiations tend to be highly centralised. The government, as the major employer, provides the leadership in national wage settlements, in line with a characteristic pattern of governmental attitudes and approaches toward public expenditure.

Public Expenditure and Clientelist Politics in Malta

This paper examines the characteristically Maltese pattern of governmental control over, and utilisation of, public expenditure by looking at the outcome of attempts

260 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration to capitalise on that control. Specifically, it is suggested that in the case of Malta the politics of public expenditure is best understood via the disaggregation of programmes by economic category. Public expenditure in Malta has been defined as either capital or recurrent expenditure. However, in practice these disaggregations have very often become blurred. For example within the category of capital expenditure are included the ‘subsidies’ to public corporations and the wages of public sector employees. There is therefore little attempt to fide ne capital expenditure as infrastructure investment or to separate current expenditure from transfer payments. This apparent confusion allows discretion for spending ministers and senior civil servants at the Ministry of Finance to vire revenues between different spending totals so that, overall, departments would appear to be spending within their limits. However the system makes it difficult to bring aggregate spending under control. The ability to vire creates continuous crises which in turn creates pressures for ministers to apply for supplementary estimates and therefore results in the overspending of budget allocations with the minimum of public scrutiny.

The study of public expenditure in Malta also points up the question as to whether public expenditure decisions in a micro-state are qualitatively different to those in other types of state. The politics of micro-states are often described as exhibiting a form of clientelist politics characterised by a high degree of predictability over decisions made between government and the client groups which are involved in specific expenditure decision (Pirotta, 1997). Within such clientelist states, therefore, the expectation is that there will be little change in overall expenditure allocations. This overall stability prevails largely irrespective of changes in government since governments tend to get elected on the basis of very marginal changes in the expectations of the electors. Within such a clientelism-dominated state, therefore, it is in the interest of the incumbent government to retain a policy framework founded on consensus building among strategic groups.

In turn, maintaining this consensus over time leaves little room for any major shifts in policy. According to this clientelist politics perspective the state is, in fact, more vulnerable to problems of political paralysis and stalemate. There is certainly evidence which suggests that this is the case in Malta where important changes take several decades before being implemented. This paper argues that the specifics of public expenditure reflect the influence of a pattern of clientelist politics that involves the provision of subsidies, and control over capital investment projects and public sector employment. Outcomes do not necessarily equate to high quality public provision.

First, public expenditure processes and the nature of politics in Malta are strongly linked. Public expenditure decisions often reflect the influence of the island’s characteristic pattern of clientelist politics. Size is an important factor in accounting for this pattern. Malta is a very small country, a microstate, 18 miles long by 7 miles wide (360 square kilometres) with a small population of around 400,000. People tend to know each other intimately

261 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta because of long historical ties in families and villages which have remained relatively static since the large migrations of the early 1950s. Hence, a great deal of interaction is based on highly sophisticated personalised face-to-face networks (Boissevain, 1974). Both geography and demography contribute to the country’s unique political landscape. Ministers and MPs have personal knowledge of all their constituents and make it their business to meet with their voters on a regular basis. They are invited to, and do attend, family weddings, funerals and christenings, sometimes taking on leading roles as witnesses or godparents. MPs make it their business to keep track of changing family biographies with their personal secretaries sending greeting cards at appropriate moments.

Ministers utilise their secretariats for similar purposes. fi Theof ce of the secretariat is formally to give the minister political advice – it is his/her political fiof ce. The personal secretary to the minister is a political appointee enjoying direct access to the higher civil servants in the ministry. He is the individual that provides the minister with his daily political agenda and therefore strives to ensure, not necessarily successfully, that the policy process reflects the political priorities of the minister. The secretariat acts as the buffer between the minister and his civil servants and frequently interferes even in the minutiae of daily administration (Pirotta, 1997). Repeated attempts to separate the administrative from the political sphere have so far failed mainly because of the reluctance of ministers to abandon opportunities for political patronage. Crucially, the fiof ce is also an essential part of the job creation process available to the minister. Through this fiof ce come the telephone calls for favours for jobs, and for queue jumping for hospital admissions and schooling. The task of the secretariat is to ensure that friends and constituents of the ministers are directed to the appropriate ministry through their inside knowledge of current employment opportunities and the policy process.

As in every patronage system the process is a two-way street. Constituents seek and expect direct access to their ministers. It is taken for granted that political patronage and favours are in the hands of ministers (Pirotta, 1997). It is well understood that ministers have the potential to create employment opportunities in the public sector for close friends, relatives and constituents A study of school budgets revealed a number of employees costed directly against school budgets when most of the time these employees were working directly for the Ministry of Education (Mullard, 1999b). The appointment of cleaners, porters, drivers and messengers are all part of the minister’s privilege. The blurring of the definitions between what is current and capital expenditure allow ministers to switch public sector employees to the capital account and vice versa when public expenditure comes under public scrutiny.

Second, the study of public expenditure both points to the politicisation of the civil service and highlights the entrenched nature of the inertia involved in the expenditure process. Senior civil servants involved in the expenditure process operate within a system

262 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration that represents a civil service village of long-standing friendships and career progression. However, at its highest levels the impact of partisan politicisation is more marked. Despite the fact that Malta boasts a Whitehall version of the civil service it has become highly politicised, with recruitment, promotions and careers increasingly shaped by party loyalty (PSRC, 1989; Ombudsman Office, 2005) Within an overall policy process whereby clientelist politics shapes policy outcomes, senior civil servants have become integral elements in this system, further entrenching it into political practice.

The Labour Party in Power, 1996–98

The Labour Party’s brief period in power, 1996–98, illustrates the problem. Labour had come to office in 1996 faced with a budget deficit of 9 per cent of GDP. During the election campaign Labour had pledged to remove VAT and replace this with a more selective purchase tax (Malta Labour Party, 1996). Debt servicing, which amounted to LM57 million, was the third largest government expenditure programme (Central Bank of Malta, 1997). Shortly after the election of 1996 visits by both the IMF and World Bank recommended that the priority of the new Labour Government should be to reduce public expenditure by around 3 per cent of GDP. Their recommendations were to phase out subsidies but also to make commitments to bring forward reforms in social policies including health and social security.

The previous Nationalist Government had reduced income tax thresholds while at the same time failing to reduce public expenditure to fund the tax reductions. On taking office the Labour Government therefore was faced not only with a growing public sector deficit but also with the pledge of removing a major source of revenue, VAT. The advice given to the Labour Minister of Finance, Lino Spiteri, was to ask spending ministers to come up with plans that would achieve 3 per cent reductions in the November 1996 budget. It was also agreed that a central pillar of the budget was to remove supplementary estimates from the public expenditure cycle.

For the Treasury Civil Service and also for civil servants in the spending ministries, the policy response was to urge on their ministers the view that such a policy was ‘unworkable’. The policy making community in Malta had always worked on the assumption of supplementary estimates. The idea that the government could fide nitively plan public expenditure at the November Budget represented a break with previously held assumptions. The Labour Government in its second budget attempted to phase out some of the existing subsidies on electricity and water but the two budgets taken together were criticised by some of its own MPs as being antisocial and the Labour Government was eventually defeated in a vote of confidence. Entrenched interests in the maintenance of clientelist arrangements ensured that attempts to control public expenditure via subsidy reduction would fail. Similarly, while the Labour Government was able temporarily to

263 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta remove supplementary estimates from the budget process, the incoming Nationalist Government simply reinstated these on taking office in 1998.

Policy and expenditure inertia were reinforced by partisan bias within the civil service, a pattern reinforced by appointments and promotions. During the period of Labour Party rule papers presented to cabinet were often leaked by senior civil servants to shadow ministers. The memo on the three year budget cycle was made available to the shadow finance minister. When he became Minister of Finance under a new Nationalist administration he was able to declare that his government was to adopt a threeyear budget cycle even though this policy had not gone beyond the level of a ‘political statement’ within the Labour cabinet. Furthermore within a few days of the Nationalist Government taking office the Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office had lost his job, as did the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Health. As part of the government reshuffle senior civil servants that had served the outgoing Labour Government were moved from the inner core of policy formulation to outreach posts while their key positions were staffed by civil servants with close links to the Nationalist Government.

Nationalist Government, 1989

The fall of the Labour Government in June 1998 after less than two years in office was a historic moment for Malta’s politics. The Nationalist Government won the September 1998 election with a five seat majority – a political landslide for Malta. Although issues related to public expenditure control had been central to the fall of the Labour administration, they continued to be high on the political agenda of the incoming government. Specifically, the decision by the incoming Nationalist Government to re- open membership negotiations with the EU increased the pressures for a reform of public expenditure since the new government was necessarily committed to meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria of reducing deficits to 3 per cent of GDP and reducing the National Debt.

Further pressures for public expenditure reduction came from the IFIs. Like other developing countries Malta has experienced the IMF/World Bank ready-made, one-size-fits-all, policy prescriptions of privatisation, liberalisation of financial services, deregulation of labour markets and removal of subsidies on essential goods; prescriptions which collectively tend to hurt poor families. Whilst the short-lived Labour Government had focused, unsuccessfully, on the removal of subsidies, the Nationalist Government chose to pursue privatisation. The sale of Mid-Med Bank, an entirely publicly owned bank, to HSBC Bank led to major protests, even from the commercial community, when the government enforced the sale of shares at a much reduced value, well below current market values (Pirotta, 2001). More recently the government has also privatised Malta International Airport, the Malta Freeport, Maltacom and its Lottery department and is at

264 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration present planning the further privatisation of other major assets including its shareholding in the Bank of Valetta. The minister in charge of public corporations also claims that the government intends to sell off all of its utilities.

Largely uncontrolled, Malta’s public expenditure in 2000 reached LM598 million, which was equivalent to 43 per cent of GDP, a level commonly achieved only among much wealthier countries – at present UK public expenditure is around 40 per cent of GDP, in Germany 44 per cent and France 43 per cent. One reason for this is the present government public sector debt servicing which, at around LM70 million a year amounts to a Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) of 12 per cent of GDP and a national debt of around 120 per cent of GDP. On social protection expenditure, defined to include health, education, housing and social security, the EU average is 25 per cent of GDP while the rate for Malta is about 23 per cent. Yet Malta’s public expenditure on health is low by EU standards at 3.7 per cent of GDP in contrast with the EU average of 8 per cent. Education expenditure in Malta is around 4.7 per cent. Social security expenditure, on the other hand, is around 17 per cent of GDP.

Budgetary Policy Processes in Malta

The Budget process in Malta is under the control of the Ministry of Finance and the Budget Office. There are approximately 12 people involved in the public expenditure process at the Budget Office. This means that this small group needs to have a relationship of trust with its counterparts in the spending departments. Nevertheless, the latter’s knowledge and expertise makes it fi dif cult for the Budget Office people to provide competing projections. There is no research or study of policy options within the Budget Office, which again means that the Ministry of Finance lacks independent forms of expertise and advice. The Budget Office talks directly with civil servants in spending ministries and negotiates budgets between spending ministries and the Ministry of Finance that are accommodating to both the Ministry of Finance and the spending ministries. This creates a climate of stability for expenditure programmes in that spending ministries receive their annual budgets and can therefore maintain their existing commitments.

Budget discussions between senior civil servants confirm the existence of a policy community of senior civil servants who are of a similar age cohort who went to the one grammar school, the Lyceum, and who graduated from the University of Malta. Most of the higher civil service, politicians and academics share this common educational background. The approach to public expenditure is therefore about detailed knowledge of departmental budgets by personnel who have been working together over a number of years, people who with long-standing ties, who have no histories of migration but who have made careers in the civil service in Malta. In such a context civil servants establish ties, friendships and loyalties which go beyond the place of work. The Director of the Budget

265 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta

Office went to school with the directors for the budgets in the spending departments for health and education.

Budget negotiations are therefore always carried out on a highly informal first- name basis. The day-to-day negotiations are established between the Budgetfi Of ce and the civil servants in the spending department. The civil service represents a village community of shared values and ethics based on long friendships. This approach to public expenditure creates a climate of inertia since it makes it difficult for ministers to bring about change and alter expenditure programmes to reflect changing political priorities. The study of public expenditure over time, for example, confirms that during the last 15 years health expenditure has remained stable at around 4 percent of GDP while education expenditure has received around 3.7 per cent of GDP.

The public space is occupied by different interests. Clientele-based politics suggests that politicians may have less autonomy in making decisions because of the increased awareness of the different client groups and their sensitivity to perceived winners and losers from policy. Politicians are careful about their client groups and their constituents who exert pressure to win favours ‘when their government is in power’. As already noted, the ministers’ secretariat plays a crucial role in this process and existing evidence suggests that politicians and ministers who are unable or unwilling to favour their constituents in the distribution of social benefits, such as social housing, fail to hold on to their seat.

Trends in Public Expenditure 1985–1998

This section is concerned with explaining the trends in public expenditure during the period 1985 to 2005 – a study of two decades that included five elections and three major changes in government. The period allows for judging the impact of politics on changes in public expenditure and to ask whether changes in government did make a difference. The period includes the last two years of the Labour Government prior to 1987. The Nationalist Government won the elections of 1987 and 1992 but Labour was returned to power in 1996. The Nationalists were again returned to power in 1998 and 2003. In a recent study of public expenditure Mullard and Swaray (2006) have pointed out that politics makes a difference at the programme level. The study of UK public expenditure for the period 1948 to 2003, for example, has confirmed that Labour governments have tended to spend more on health and education while Conservative governments have tended to favour defence and law and order.

During the period under study public expenditure in Malta has fluctuated from around 48 per cent of GDP in 1985, rising to 52 per cent of GDP in 1991, accompanied by a sharp decline to 44 per cent of GDP in 1993 and then rising again year on year from 1993 to reach around 48 per cent in 2003. The fluctuating experiences of public expenditure

266 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration confirm the view that the boundary between public and private has been continuously redefined during this period. While during the years of the Mintoff Labour governments the size of the public sector remained static at around 48 per cent of GDP, between 1987 and 1996 the public sector expanded rapidly and then contracted sharply. In 1990 and 1991 total expenditure reached 52 per cent of GDP but then contracted sharply to 44 per cent of GDP before again being allowed to expand.

The Mintoff governments had been highly regulative. The economy was mainly driven through the public sector. The concern was to strengthen Malta’s manufacturing sector to increase exports while at the same time holding down domestic consumption. Imports were regulated – there was little consumer choice which in turn increased the savings ratio to around 20 per cent of GDP. By contrast, after 1987 the principal concern of the Nationalist governments was to free markets and encourage household consumption. While under Mintoff there had been ‘forced’ savings, these savings became the motor of economic growth after 1987. The priority of the Nationalist governments was to reduce personal taxation, however, the problem for the government was the lack of political will to reduce the size of the public sector to finance the tax reductions. While during the years of the Labour Government there had been a balanced budget – by the time the Government of Fenech Adami had left office in 1996 the deficit had increased to over 7 per cent of GDP.

Capital and Recurrent Expenditure

In 1985 capital expenditure represented about 8 per cent of GDP – this continued to expand until 1991 when expenditure peaked at around 14 per cent of GDP. Since 1992 capital expenditure has been held constant at around 6 per cent of GDP. The analysis of capital expenditure confirms that there was no relationship between capital spending and the economic cycle. Secondly, as already pointed out earlier, there was the problem of definition as to what constitutes capital expenditure in the Malta context – while in normal circumstances capital expenditure is equated with investment in capital formation – in Malta capital expenditure included wages, loans and subsidies to public corporations. The major increase in capital expenditure in 1991 reflected a shift in fi de nition with a number of programmes that contained current expenditure being shifted under the capital account (Figure 1). This obviously benefited the government since it now could point out that current expenditure had fallen which in turn provided the climate to increase current expenditure in the form of hiring more public sector employees.

In 1985 recurrent expenditure amounted to around LM180 million, which was equivalent to 38 per cent of GDP (see Figure 2). In 1997 recurrent expenditure totalled some LM500 million, which amounted to 39.5 per cent of GDP. This comparison of data seems to lead to contrasting interpretations. Expenditure did regain an expansionary path in 1993 and has continued to expand. The year on year analysis shows major expansions

267 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta in 1993, 1994 and 1996. The data for 1996 and 1997 shows the attempt by the Labour Government to put a lid on the growth of current expenditure.

Getting and Spending: Implications and Conclusions

In 1996 total expenditure amounted to 48 per cent of GDP, while revenue has totalled some 45 per cent of GDP. Throughout the period of this study total revenue to government has never increased beyond 45 per cent of GDP while at the peak of 1991 and 1992 public expenditure has risen to 52 per cent of GDP. After the budget of 1995, which contained major reductions in direct taxation, revenue declined to 42.5 per cent of GDP while total expenditure stood at 48 per cent of GDP. The Labour Government of Alfred Sant inherited a growing public sector deficit because the tax reductions of the previous government had not been properly financed. If the strategy of the Nationalist Government had been to starve the beast of the public sector by reducing taxation, the second part of the equation, the reduction of public expenditure was left to the incoming Labour Government.

The comparison of year on year changes in public expenditure and changes in revenue are very revealing. The comparison shows the political dimension in the making of decisions around public expenditure and taxation. Taxation has been reduced in relation to the electoral cycle.

Taxation was reduced in 1987 but had to be increased in 1990. It was reduced again in 1991 and 1992 prior to the 1992 election and again before the 1996 election. By contrast public expenditure was expanded in 1989 and 1990. The sharp decline in

268 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration taxation of 1992 was accompanied by a decline in public expenditure, however the tax reductions of 1996, which amounted to nearly 6 per cent of GDP, were accompanied by a public expenditure profile which remained stable. As the tax base was declining the level of public expenditure was held constant.

In 1996 Labour had been elected to office after a period of 10 years in opposition. Over the course of the two budgets of 1997 and 1998 the Labour Government was able to increase revenues while at the same there were no major increases in public expenditure. Yet by June 1998 the Labour Government had been defeated by a backbench revolt of Labour MPs. This in turn led to further elections in September 1998 which resulted in the re-election of the Nationalist Party. The Nationalist Government won the subsequent election in 2003. Quite simply the latter had demonstrated superior understanding of the political constraints on possibilities for more effective public expenditure control in Malta.

To reiterate, Malta presents a number of paradoxes. The island’s entrenched politics of clientelism restricts governments’ room for manoeuvre, yet detailed study of public expenditure by programme over time demonstrates significant adjustments in expenditure priorities as successive government sought room for political flexibility within this overall framework. Crucially, however, overall constraints are tight even though successive governments may appear to dominate bargaining arrangements and processes. In practice, longstanding clientelist arrangements create expectations that governments must meet if they are to retain support. The collapse of the Labour Government at the hands of its own backbenchers in 1988 demonstrates the limited possibilities for the imposition of policies that politicians and their constituents are likely tofi de ne as a major threat to the status quo, such as tight expenditure control. Inevitably, governments are,

269 The Politics of Public Expenditure in Malta for the most part, reluctant to become unpopular with strategic pressures groups due to fear of losing votes. In the context of social policy, clientele-focused politics explains the inability of government to deal with major and long-standing problems in the health and education sectors, despite the negative public perceptions of state provision occasioned by these problems.

Acknowledgements

For the duration of the study one of the authors, Maurice Mullard, was the full time advisor at the Ministry of Finance and therefore had an insider view of the expenditure process.

References

Boissevain, J. (1974) Friends of Friends (Oxford: Blackwell). Central Bank of Malta (1997) Annual Report 1996–1997 (Valletta: Government of Malta). Malta Labour Party (1996) The Citizen in Malta-Malta Labour Party Election Manifesto, Malta Labour Party Hamrun Malta. Ministry of Social Security (2000) Interim Report of Commission on Social Welfare (Valletta: Government of Malta). Mullard, M. (1999a) The Review of Social Security (Valletta: House of Representatives, Malta). Mullard, M. (1999b) The Education Expenditure Review (Valletta: House of Representatives. Malta). Mullard, M. & Swaray, R. (2006) Does politics make a difference? Comparing the Thatcher and Blair governments, Policy and Politics 34(3), pp. 495–515. Ombudsman Office (2005) Annual Report (Valletta: House of Representatives, Malta). Pirotta, G.A. (1994) Maltese political parties and political modernization, in: R. Sultana & G. Baldacchinno (Eds) Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, pp. 95–112 (Malta: Mireva Publications). Pirotta, G.A. (1997) Politics and public service reform in small states: Malta, Public Administration and Development, 17(1), pp. 121–134. Pirotta, G.A. (2001), A farewell to paternalism through public enterprise? Privatization in the small island state of Malta, International Review of Public Administration, 6(1), pp. 96–127. Public Service Reform Commission Report (PRSC) (1989) (Malta: Government of Malta). Tabone, C. (1987) The Secularization of the Maltese Family (Malta: Dominican Publications)

270 Pirotta – Malta: Selected Essays in Governance and Public Administration

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