Bayes' Theorem 1 Bayes' Theorem
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DSA 5403 Bayesian Statistics: an Advancing Introduction 16 Units – Each Unit a Week’S Work
DSA 5403 Bayesian Statistics: An Advancing Introduction 16 units – each unit a week’s work. The following are the contents of the course divided into chapters of the book Doing Bayesian Data Analysis . by John Kruschke. The course is structured around the above book but will be embellished with more theoretical content as needed. The book can be obtained from the library : http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780124058880 Topics: This is divided into three parts From the book: “Part I The basics: models, probability, Bayes' rule and r: Introduction: credibility, models, and parameters; The R programming language; What is this stuff called probability?; Bayes' rule Part II All the fundamentals applied to inferring a binomial probability: Inferring a binomial probability via exact mathematical analysis; Markov chain Monte C arlo; J AG S ; Hierarchical models; Model comparison and hierarchical modeling; Null hypothesis significance testing; Bayesian approaches to testing a point ("Null") hypothesis; G oals, power, and sample size; S tan Part III The generalized linear model: Overview of the generalized linear model; Metric-predicted variable on one or two groups; Metric predicted variable with one metric predictor; Metric predicted variable with multiple metric predictors; Metric predicted variable with one nominal predictor; Metric predicted variable with multiple nominal predictors; Dichotomous predicted variable; Nominal predicted variable; Ordinal predicted variable; C ount predicted variable; Tools in the trunk” Part 1: The Basics: Models, Probability, Bayes’ Rule and R Unit 1 Chapter 1, 2 Credibility, Models, and Parameters, • Derivation of Bayes’ rule • Re-allocation of probability • The steps of Bayesian data analysis • Classical use of Bayes’ rule o Testing – false positives etc o Definitions of prior, likelihood, evidence and posterior Unit 2 Chapter 3 The R language • Get the software • Variables types • Loading data • Functions • Plots Unit 3 Chapter 4 Probability distributions. -
Effective Program Reasoning Using Bayesian Inference
EFFECTIVE PROGRAM REASONING USING BAYESIAN INFERENCE Sulekha Kulkarni A DISSERTATION in Computer and Information Science Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2020 Supervisor of Dissertation Mayur Naik, Professor, Computer and Information Science Graduate Group Chairperson Mayur Naik, Professor, Computer and Information Science Dissertation Committee: Rajeev Alur, Zisman Family Professor of Computer and Information Science Val Tannen, Professor of Computer and Information Science Osbert Bastani, Research Assistant Professor of Computer and Information Science Suman Nath, Partner Research Manager, Microsoft Research, Redmond To my father, who set me on this path, to my mother, who leads by example, and to my husband, who is an infinite source of courage. ii Acknowledgments I want to thank my advisor Prof. Mayur Naik for giving me the invaluable opportunity to learn and experiment with different ideas at my own pace. He supported me through the ups and downs of research, and helped me make the Ph.D. a reality. I also want to thank Prof. Rajeev Alur, Prof. Val Tannen, Prof. Osbert Bastani, and Dr. Suman Nath for serving on my dissertation committee and for providing valuable feedback. I am deeply grateful to Prof. Alur and Prof. Tannen for their sound advice and support, and for going out of their way to help me through challenging times. I am also very grateful for Dr. Nath's able and inspiring mentorship during my internship at Microsoft Research, and during the collaboration that followed. Dr. Aditya Nori helped me start my Ph.D. -
1 Dependent and Independent Events 2 Complementary Events 3 Mutually Exclusive Events 4 Probability of Intersection of Events
1 Dependent and Independent Events Let A and B be events. We say that A is independent of B if P (AjB) = P (A). That is, the marginal probability of A is the same as the conditional probability of A, given B. This means that the probability of A occurring is not affected by B occurring. It turns out that, in this case, B is independent of A as well. So, we just say that A and B are independent. We say that A depends on B if P (AjB) 6= P (A). That is, the marginal probability of A is not the same as the conditional probability of A, given B. This means that the probability of A occurring is affected by B occurring. It turns out that, in this case, B depends on A as well. So, we just say that A and B are dependent. Consider these events from the card draw: A = drawing a king, B = drawing a spade, C = drawing a face card. Events A and B are independent. If you know that you have drawn a spade, this does not change the likelihood that you have actually drawn a king. Formally, the marginal probability of drawing a king is P (A) = 4=52. The conditional probability that your card is a king, given that it a spade, is P (AjB) = 1=13, which is the same as 4=52. Events A and C are dependent. If you know that you have drawn a face card, it is much more likely that you have actually drawn a king than it would be ordinarily. -
The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology
THEOPENHANDBOOKOFFORMALEPISTEMOLOGY Richard Pettigrew &Jonathan Weisberg,Eds. THEOPENHANDBOOKOFFORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY Richard Pettigrew &Jonathan Weisberg,Eds. Published open access by PhilPapers, 2019 All entries copyright © their respective authors and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. LISTOFCONTRIBUTORS R. A. Briggs Stanford University Michael Caie University of Toronto Kenny Easwaran Texas A&M University Konstantin Genin University of Toronto Franz Huber University of Toronto Jason Konek University of Bristol Hanti Lin University of California, Davis Anna Mahtani London School of Economics Johanna Thoma London School of Economics Michael G. Titelbaum University of Wisconsin, Madison Sylvia Wenmackers Katholieke Universiteit Leuven iii For our teachers Overall, and ultimately, mathematical methods are necessary for philosophical progress. — Hannes Leitgeb There is no mathematical substitute for philosophy. — Saul Kripke PREFACE In formal epistemology, we use mathematical methods to explore the questions of epistemology and rational choice. What can we know? What should we believe and how strongly? How should we act based on our beliefs and values? We begin by modelling phenomena like knowledge, belief, and desire using mathematical machinery, just as a biologist might model the fluc- tuations of a pair of competing populations, or a physicist might model the turbulence of a fluid passing through a small aperture. Then, we ex- plore, discover, and justify the laws governing those phenomena, using the precision that mathematical machinery affords. For example, we might represent a person by the strengths of their beliefs, and we might measure these using real numbers, which we call credences. Having done this, we might ask what the norms are that govern that person when we represent them in that way. -
Lecture 2: Modeling Random Experiments
Department of Mathematics Ma 3/103 KC Border Introduction to Probability and Statistics Winter 2021 Lecture 2: Modeling Random Experiments Relevant textbook passages: Pitman [5]: Sections 1.3–1.4., pp. 26–46. Larsen–Marx [4]: Sections 2.2–2.5, pp. 18–66. 2.1 Axioms for probability measures Recall from last time that a random experiment is an experiment that may be conducted under seemingly identical conditions, yet give different results. Coin tossing is everyone’s go-to example of a random experiment. The way we model random experiments is through the use of probabilities. We start with the sample space Ω, the set of possible outcomes of the experiment, and consider events, which are subsets E of the sample space. (We let F denote the collection of events.) 2.1.1 Definition A probability measure P or probability distribution attaches to each event E a number between 0 and 1 (inclusive) so as to obey the following axioms of probability: Normalization: P (?) = 0; and P (Ω) = 1. Nonnegativity: For each event E, we have P (E) > 0. Additivity: If EF = ?, then P (∪ F ) = P (E) + P (F ). Note that while the domain of P is technically F, the set of events, that is P : F → [0, 1], we may also refer to P as a probability (measure) on Ω, the set of realizations. 2.1.2 Remark To reduce the visual clutter created by layers of delimiters in our notation, we may omit some of them simply write something like P (f(ω) = 1) orP {ω ∈ Ω: f(ω) = 1} instead of P {ω ∈ Ω: f(ω) = 1} and we may write P (ω) instead of P {ω} . -
The Bayesian Approach to the Philosophy of Science
The Bayesian Approach to the Philosophy of Science Michael Strevens For the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition The posthumous publication, in 1763, of Thomas Bayes’ “Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances” inaugurated a revolution in the understanding of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses—two hun- dred years later. Such a long period of neglect, followed by such a sweeping revival, ensured that it was the inhabitants of the latter half of the twentieth century above all who determined what it was to take a “Bayesian approach” to scientific reasoning. Like most confirmation theorists, Bayesians alternate between a descrip- tive and a prescriptive tone in their teachings: they aim both to describe how scientific evidence is assessed, and to prescribe how it ought to be assessed. This double message will be made explicit at some points, but passed over quietly elsewhere. Subjective Probability The first of the three fundamental tenets of Bayesianism is that the scientist’s epistemic attitude to any scientifically significant proposition is, or ought to be, exhausted by the subjective probability the scientist assigns to the propo- sition. A subjective probability is a number between zero and one that re- 1 flects in some sense the scientist’s confidence that the proposition is true. (Subjective probabilities are sometimes called degrees of belief or credences.) A scientist’s subjective probability for a proposition is, then, more a psy- chological fact about the scientist than an observer-independent fact about the proposition. Very roughly, it is not a matter of how likely the truth of the proposition actually is, but about how likely the scientist thinks it to be. -
The Bayesian Approach to Statistics
THE BAYESIAN APPROACH TO STATISTICS ANTHONY O’HAGAN INTRODUCTION the true nature of scientific reasoning. The fi- nal section addresses various features of modern By far the most widely taught and used statisti- Bayesian methods that provide some explanation for the rapid increase in their adoption since the cal methods in practice are those of the frequen- 1980s. tist school. The ideas of frequentist inference, as set out in Chapter 5 of this book, rest on the frequency definition of probability (Chapter 2), BAYESIAN INFERENCE and were developed in the first half of the 20th century. This chapter concerns a radically differ- We first present the basic procedures of Bayesian ent approach to statistics, the Bayesian approach, inference. which depends instead on the subjective defini- tion of probability (Chapter 3). In some respects, Bayesian methods are older than frequentist ones, Bayes’s Theorem and the Nature of Learning having been the basis of very early statistical rea- Bayesian inference is a process of learning soning as far back as the 18th century. Bayesian from data. To give substance to this statement, statistics as it is now understood, however, dates we need to identify who is doing the learning and back to the 1950s, with subsequent development what they are learning about. in the second half of the 20th century. Over that time, the Bayesian approach has steadily gained Terms and Notation ground, and is now recognized as a legitimate al- ternative to the frequentist approach. The person doing the learning is an individual This chapter is organized into three sections. -
Probability and Counting Rules
blu03683_ch04.qxd 09/12/2005 12:45 PM Page 171 C HAPTER 44 Probability and Counting Rules Objectives Outline After completing this chapter, you should be able to 4–1 Introduction 1 Determine sample spaces and find the probability of an event, using classical 4–2 Sample Spaces and Probability probability or empirical probability. 4–3 The Addition Rules for Probability 2 Find the probability of compound events, using the addition rules. 4–4 The Multiplication Rules and Conditional 3 Find the probability of compound events, Probability using the multiplication rules. 4–5 Counting Rules 4 Find the conditional probability of an event. 5 Find the total number of outcomes in a 4–6 Probability and Counting Rules sequence of events, using the fundamental counting rule. 4–7 Summary 6 Find the number of ways that r objects can be selected from n objects, using the permutation rule. 7 Find the number of ways that r objects can be selected from n objects without regard to order, using the combination rule. 8 Find the probability of an event, using the counting rules. 4–1 blu03683_ch04.qxd 09/12/2005 12:45 PM Page 172 172 Chapter 4 Probability and Counting Rules Statistics Would You Bet Your Life? Today Humans not only bet money when they gamble, but also bet their lives by engaging in unhealthy activities such as smoking, drinking, using drugs, and exceeding the speed limit when driving. Many people don’t care about the risks involved in these activities since they do not understand the concepts of probability. -
Posterior Propriety and Admissibility of Hyperpriors in Normal
The Annals of Statistics 2005, Vol. 33, No. 2, 606–646 DOI: 10.1214/009053605000000075 c Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2005 POSTERIOR PROPRIETY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPERPRIORS IN NORMAL HIERARCHICAL MODELS1 By James O. Berger, William Strawderman and Dejun Tang Duke University and SAMSI, Rutgers University and Novartis Pharmaceuticals Hierarchical modeling is wonderful and here to stay, but hyper- parameter priors are often chosen in a casual fashion. Unfortunately, as the number of hyperparameters grows, the effects of casual choices can multiply, leading to considerably inferior performance. As an ex- treme, but not uncommon, example use of the wrong hyperparameter priors can even lead to impropriety of the posterior. For exchangeable hierarchical multivariate normal models, we first determine when a standard class of hierarchical priors results in proper or improper posteriors. We next determine which elements of this class lead to admissible estimators of the mean under quadratic loss; such considerations provide one useful guideline for choice among hierarchical priors. Finally, computational issues with the resulting posterior distributions are addressed. 1. Introduction. 1.1. The model and the problems. Consider the block multivariate nor- mal situation (sometimes called the “matrix of means problem”) specified by the following hierarchical Bayesian model: (1) X ∼ Np(θ, I), θ ∼ Np(B, Σπ), where X1 θ1 X2 θ2 Xp×1 = . , θp×1 = . , arXiv:math/0505605v1 [math.ST] 27 May 2005 . X θ m m Received February 2004; revised July 2004. 1Supported by NSF Grants DMS-98-02261 and DMS-01-03265. AMS 2000 subject classifications. Primary 62C15; secondary 62F15. Key words and phrases. Covariance matrix, quadratic loss, frequentist risk, posterior impropriety, objective priors, Markov chain Monte Carlo. -
Most Honourable Remembrance. the Life and Work of Thomas Bayes
MOST HONOURABLE REMEMBRANCE. THE LIFE AND WORK OF THOMAS BAYES Andrew I. Dale Springer-Verlag, New York, 2003 668 pages with 29 illustrations The author of this book is professor of the Department of Mathematical Statistics at the University of Natal in South Africa. Andrew I. Dale is a world known expert in History of Mathematics, and he is also the author of the book “A History of Inverse Probability: From Thomas Bayes to Karl Pearson” (Springer-Verlag, 2nd. Ed., 1999). The book is very erudite and reflects the wide experience and knowledge of the author not only concerning the history of science but the social history of Europe during XVIII century. The book is appropriate for statisticians and mathematicians, and also for students with interest in the history of science. Chapters 4 to 8 contain the texts of the main works of Thomas Bayes. Each of these chapters has an introduction, the corresponding tract and commentaries. The main works of Thomas Bayes are the following: Chapter 4: Divine Benevolence, or an attempt to prove that the principal end of the Divine Providence and Government is the happiness of his creatures. Being an answer to a pamphlet, entitled, “Divine Rectitude; or, An Inquiry concerning the Moral Perfections of the Deity”. With a refutation of the notions therein advanced concerning Beauty and Order, the reason of punishment, and the necessity of a state of trial antecedent to perfect Happiness. This is a work of a theological kind published in 1731. The approaches developed in it are not far away from the rationalist thinking. -
The Deviance Information Criterion: 12 Years On
J. R. Statist. Soc. B (2014) The deviance information criterion: 12 years on David J. Spiegelhalter, University of Cambridge, UK Nicola G. Best, Imperial College School of Public Health, London, UK Bradley P. Carlin University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA and Angelika van der Linde Bremen, Germany [Presented to The Royal Statistical Society at its annual conference in a session organized by the Research Section on Tuesday, September 3rd, 2013, Professor G. A.Young in the Chair ] Summary.The essentials of our paper of 2002 are briefly summarized and compared with other criteria for model comparison. After some comments on the paper’s reception and influence, we consider criticisms and proposals for improvement made by us and others. Keywords: Bayesian; Model comparison; Prediction 1. Some background to model comparison Suppose that we have a given set of candidate models, and we would like a criterion to assess which is ‘better’ in a defined sense. Assume that a model for observed data y postulates a density p.y|θ/ (which may include covariates etc.), and call D.θ/ =−2log{p.y|θ/} the deviance, here considered as a function of θ. Classical model choice uses hypothesis testing for comparing nested models, e.g. the deviance (likelihood ratio) test in generalized linear models. For non- nested models, alternatives include the Akaike information criterion AIC =−2log{p.y|θˆ/} + 2k where θˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate and k is the number of parameters in the model (dimension of Θ). AIC is built with the aim of favouring models that are likely to make good predictions. -
1 — a Single Random Variable
1 | A SINGLE RANDOM VARIABLE Questions involving probability abound in Computer Science: What is the probability of the PWF world falling over next week? • What is the probability of one packet colliding with another in a network? • What is the probability of an undergraduate not turning up for a lecture? • When addressing such questions there are often added complications: the question may be ill posed or the answer may vary with time. Which undergraduate? What lecture? Is the probability of turning up different on Saturdays? Let's start with something which appears easy to reason about: : : Introduction | Throwing a die Consider an experiment or trial which consists of throwing a mathematically ideal die. Such a die is often called a fair die or an unbiased die. Common sense suggests that: The outcome of a single throw cannot be predicted. • The outcome will necessarily be a random integer in the range 1 to 6. • The six possible outcomes are equiprobable, each having a probability of 1 . • 6 Without further qualification, serious probabilists would regard this collection of assertions, especially the second, as almost meaningless. Just what is a random integer? Giving proper mathematical rigour to the foundations of probability theory is quite a taxing task. To illustrate the difficulty, consider probability in a frequency sense. Thus a probability 1 of 6 means that, over a long run, one expects to throw a 5 (say) on one-sixth of the occasions that the die is thrown. If the actual proportion of 5s after n throws is p5(n) it would be nice to say: 1 lim p5(n) = n !1 6 Unfortunately this is utterly bogus mathematics! This is simply not a proper use of the idea of a limit.