Blood Year: the Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism
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ests in a multigenerational war against that the United States has lost its will, violent extremism. commitment, and sense of collective Reader alert: this is not a feel-good sacrifice for the latter. But what “victory” book for military officers, civil servants, looks like in this age of global insurgency or government officials (of either party) remains as elusive in the real world as it who want to rationalize the Iraq War and does in the book. its putative contributions to the broader Nevertheless, Kilcullen is at his best global counterterrorism campaign. when sharing his strategic thoughts, Kilcullen calls Iraq “the greatest strate- which are presented around five major gic screw-up since Hitler’s invasion of themes. Russia,” and the start of a great strategic Kilcullen contends that by 2005 the unravelling that continues unabated United States should have been in full today. As he puts it, “The West’s strategy stride implementing a counterterrorism after 9/11—derailed by the invasion “disaggregation” strategy that he helped of Iraq, exacerbated by our addiction write. The strategy’s core tenet was that to killing terrorist leaders, hastened by the defeat of al Qaeda required linkages precipitate withdrawal from Iraq and between various groups in the al Qaeda Afghanistan, opportunism in Libya, and global network to be systematically passivity in the face of catastrophe in broken by targeting the “central players’ Syria—carried the seeds of disaster within ability to control their franchises, and it. And until that strategy changes, those partner with local governments to defeat disasters will continue.” This from a man threats in their own jurisdictions.” These Blood Year: The Unraveling of who advised General David Petraeus in partnerships would involve “calibrated ca- Western Counterterrorism Iraq and served as counselor to Secretary pacity building” with local governments of State Condoleezza Rice. On this note, to help reduce or eliminate preexisting By David Kilcullen readers looking for a primer on how to grievances used by al Qaeda to attract re- Oxford University Press, 2016 speak truth to power will not be disap- cruits and elicit support from sympathetic 288 pp. $24.95 pointed. Kilcullen is unsparing in his populations—in other words, nation- ISBN: 978-0190600549 criticism of senior leaders, U.S. partners, building. Kilcullen, however, refrains Reviewed by Thomas C. Greenwood and those who believe selective strategic from calling it that. engagement (my terms, not his) versus The disaggregation strategy was never active containment (his words) is possible fully implemented, however, because the tudents of strategy and defense in a world without drawbridges. twin insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan policy who have closely tracked Kilcullen quickly hooks the reader dominated the policy debate, becoming, S the war on terror since 9/11 by recalling the capture of Mosul, Iraq’s in Kilcullen’s words, “a hole in the heart will find David Kilcullen’s new book second-largest city, by ISIL in June of Western strategy” because it distracted both enlightening and discouraging. 2014, a mere 12 days after President leaders from focusing on other virulent It is enlightening because he carefully Barack Obama announced to West Point al Qaeda franchises around the world. weaves years of field study, scholarly cadets that they might be the first class Perhaps. Given that Iraq and Afghanistan research, and thoughtful analysis into a since 9/11 not to see combat in Iraq or were where our troops were engaged, compelling work that is rich in insights Afghanistan. Kilcullen is perplexed, if though, it is possible that both countries and brutally honest in its judgments. not aghast, that the President thought would have remained the top priorities Yet it is discouraging nonetheless. After the war against al Qaeda was largely of the day, receiving a preponderance of taking the reader on a rich journey over. President Obama, in fact, failed to attention and resources irrespective of the through the rise and fall of al Qaeda, mention ISIL—the new threat that was proclaimed strategy. the emergence of the Islamic State of already wreaking havoc in Syria, Iraq, and Kilcullen also criticizes the tactics Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an analysis the broader Middle East—a single time in and operational design used to fight al of the inconclusive campaigns in Iraq his speech. How could any commander Qaeda and ISIL. He argues that the and Afghanistan, the collapse of order in chief with the largest intelligence ap- light counterterrorism footprint initially in the Middle East, the brutal civil war paratus in the world be so naïve about an used with success by the George W. in Syria, and the largest dislocation of ongoing conflict? Bush administration in Afghanistan was refugees since World War II, he offers The West Point speech serves as not the correct approach in Iraq, Libya, the reader few policy recommendations Kilcullen’s backdrop for one of the Yemen, and elsewhere. Why? Because of on how we might rediscover strategic book’s key observations: leaving a war its over-reliance on the use of unmanned clarity and advance U.S. national inter- is not the same as winning it. He posits aerial vehicles, surveillance, and raids to 108 Book Reviews JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 kill or capture high-value targets. Instead, to ISIL’s sophisticated use of social media Kilcullen believes more robust ground to mobilize mass support. New from forces were essential to helping protect Moreover, the description of ISIL’s local populations from terrorists, training warfighting tactics alone is worth the pur- NDU Press and advising indigenous security forces, chase price of the book. Here, Kilcullen for the Center for the Study of and bolstering host-nation capacity for is masterful in illustrating the combined Chinese Military Affairs self-governance. In his view, more boots arms prowess of an army that employs Strategic Forum 289 on the ground would have engendered guerrilla (irregular) operations to entice An Empirical Analysis of Claimant trust-based interpersonal relationships its enemies to mass into lucrative targets Tactics in the South China Sea within and among tribes. This would before striking with the speed, shock, and by Christopher D. Yung and have provided more space for security firepower traditionally ascribed to only Patrick forces and local governing structures to the best modern ground forces in the McNulty acquire increased legitimacy with the West. Given that no military force in the China, local populations, thereby marginalizing Middle East today is capable of matching Taiwan, shadow governments being established ISIL in combined arms operations, by Vietnam, the by the terrorists. what mechanism do we seal its defeat? Philippines, Kilcullen cites the 2007 Iraq Surge As noted previously, Kilcullen con- Malaysia, as evidence that light counterterrorism cludes his book with the discouraging and Brunei operations are ineffective. He correctly (but accurate) assessment that U.S. have used notes that the Surge, rather than the vic- counterterrorism strategy has failed and a a wide variety of tactics to protect tory it is often portrayed as, was instead complete re-think is therefore warranted. and advance their maritime territo- a moral and tactical necessity, as Iraq True enough. And while the insights rial claims in the South China Sea. and the United States were unable to he outlines in the epilogue serve as use- China is the most active user of the convert military success into political ful maxims, they are not realistic policy nine categories of tactics identified stability. Nonetheless, he contends that if prescriptions for a nation that has other in this paper, with the exception of the United States had not left Iraq pre- priorities, including rising strategic pow- legal actions, and accounts for more maturely, a different outcome may have ers, to worry about. At the same time, than half of all military and paramili- emerged. the country remains war weary enough tary actions since 1995. This reflects wishful thinking on the to stay in denial about what will be re- The unclassified database used author’s part because political stability quired to defeat ISIL, and averts its eyes in this analysis undercounts military was never attainable so long as Nouri al- from a humanitarian crisis that threatens and paramilitary actions, but cap- Maliki, then the prime minister of Iraq, European unity. Given these forces at tures enough activity to provide a remained in office as Tehran’s surrogate. play, any future counterterrorism road- representative sample. A classified Furthermore, it is not self-evident how map should start with the proposition version that captures more activ- the United States could have deposed offered by security expert Audrey Cronin: ity would improve the potential him earlier had the decision to do so “Wars pursued at odds with political real- to develop the database into an been made. This is the dark side of coun- ity cannot be won.” To do otherwise risks Indications and Warning tool to terinsurgency and nation-building: the repeating the folly of the last 15 years. JFQ assist in monitoring and managing reliance upon weak or corrupt leaders. tensions in the South China Sea. The chapters dealing with an adap- tive enemy are among the book’s best. Colonel Thomas Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), is on the Editorial Board of Joint Force Quarterly. Kilcullen describes how ISIL emerged He served 31 years as a Marine Infantry Officer, from the ashes of al Qaeda, found sanctu- including in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and has ary in Syria, and began waging war to served on the staff of the National Security Council for three Presidents. establish its “Caliphate.” Equally riveting, however, is his analysis of guerrilla terror- ism (that is, infiltrating attackers into a target country rather than organizing and training them first in other countries), urban siege, remote radicalization, and leaderless resistance.