Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level by Dr. David Kilcullen, Lieutenant Colonel,

Editorial Abstract: The author presents a tactical-level preparatory guide, based on lessons learned from personal campaign experience. He emphasizes the necessity of proper mental and situational preparation, and offers a series of recommendations for applying concepts and ideas in the real world of personal-level influence operations.

Introduction than you. But you have more combat it every night before sleep, and re-draw power than you can or should use in most it from memory every morning, until our company has just been warned for situations. Injudicious use of firepower you understand its patterns intuitively. Ydeployment on counterinsurgency creates blood feuds, homeless people Develop a mental model of your area—a operations in or . You and societal disruption that fuels and framework in which to fit every new have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence perpetuates the . The most piece of knowledge you acquire. Study and Robert Thompson. You have beneficial actions are often local politics, handover notes from predecessors; better studied FM 3-24 and now understand civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. still, get in touch with the unit in theater the history, philosophy and theory of For your side to win, the people do and pick their brains. In an ideal world, counterinsurgency. You watched Black not have to like you but they must intelligence officers and area experts Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, respect you, accept that your actions would brief you. This rarely happens: and you know this will be the most benefit them, and trust your integrity and even if it does, there is no substitute difficult challenge of your life. and ability to deliver on promises, for personal mastery. Understand the But what does all that theory mean, particularly regarding their security. broader “area of influence”—this can be at the company level? How do the In this battlefield popular perceptions a wide area, particularly when insurgents principles translate into action - at night, and rumor are more influential than the draw on “global” grievances. Share out with the GPS down, the media criticizing facts and more powerful than a hundred aspects of the operational area among you, the locals complaining in a language tanks. platoon leaders and non-commissioned you don’t understand, and an unseen Within this context, what follows officers: have each individual develop enemy killing your people by ones and are observations from collective a personal specialization and brief the twos? How does counterinsurgency experience: the distilled essence of others. Neglect this knowledge, and it actually happen? what those who went before you learned. will kill you. There are no universal answers, and They are expressed as commandments, 2. Diagnose the problem. Once insurgents are among the most adaptive for clarity—but are really more like opponents you will ever face. Countering you know your area and its people, folklore. Apply them judiciously and you can begin to diagnose the problem. them will demand every ounce of your skeptically. intellect. But be comforted: you are Who are the insurgents? What drives not the first to feel this way. There are Preparation them? What makes local leaders tick? Counterinsurgency is fundamentally tactical fundamentals you can apply, to Time is short during pre-deployment, a competition, between each side, to link the theory with the techniques and but you will never have more time to mobilize the population in support of procedures you already know. think than you have now. Now is your its agenda. So you must understand chance to prepare yourself and your what motivates the people and how What Is command. Counterinsurgency? to mobilize them. You need to know 1. Know your turf. Know the why and how the insurgents are getting If you have not studied people, the topography, economy, history, followers. This means you need to know counterinsurgency theory, here it is in religion and culture. Know every village, your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. a nutshell: this is a competition with the road, field, population group, tribal leader The enemy is adaptive, resourceful and insurgent for the right and the ability to and ancient grievance. Your task is to probably grew up in the region where you win the hearts, minds and acquiescence become the world expert on your district. will operate. The locals have known him of the population. You are being sent in If you don’t know precisely where you since he was a boy—how long have they because the insurgents, at their strongest, will be operating, study the general known you? Your worst opponent is not can defeat anything with less strength area. Read the map like a book: study the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood,

29 it is the charismatic follow-me warrior counterinsurgency is inter-agency. And or RPG, a shemagh and a water bottle who would make your best platoon everything important—from policing to if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly leader. His followers are not misled or intelligence to civil-military operations lighten your load and enforce a culture naïve: much of his success is due to bad to trash collection—will involve your of speed and mobility, the insurgents will government policies or security forces company working with civilian actors consistently out-run and out-maneuver that alienate the population. Work this and local indigenous partners you cannot you. But in lightening your load, make problem collectively with your platoon control, but whose success is essential sure you can always “reach back” to call and squad leaders. Discuss ideas, for yours. Train the company in inter- for firepower or heavy support if needed. explore the problem, understand what agency operations—get a briefing from Also, remember to harden your CSS. The you are facing, and seek a consensus. If the State Department, aid agencies and enemy will attack your weakest points. this sounds unmilitary, get over it. Once the local Police or Fire Brigade. Train Most attacks on coalition forces in Iraq you are in theater, situations will arise too point-men in each squad to deal with in 2004 and 2005, outside pre-planned quickly for orders, or even commander’s the inter-agency. Realize that civilians combat actions like the two battles of intent. Corporals and privates will have find rifles, helmets and body armor Fallujah or Operation Iron Horse, were to make snap judgments with strategic intimidating. Learn how not to scare against CSS installations and convoys. impact. The only way to help them is them. Ask others who come from that You do the math. Ensure your CSS assets to give them a shared understanding, country or culture about your ideas. are hardened, have communications, and then trust them to think for themselves See it through the eyes of a civilian are trained in combat operations. They on the day. who knows nothing about the military. may do more fighting than your rifle 3. Organize for intelligence. squads. In counterinsurgency, killing 6. Find a political/cultural the enemy is easy. Finding adviser. In a force optimized him is often nearly impossible. for counterinsurgency, you Intelligence and operations might receive a political/ are complementary. Your cultural adviser at company operations will be intelligence level: a diplomat or military driven, but intelligence will foreign area , able to come mostly from your own speak the language and navigate operations, not as a “product” the intricacies of local politics. prepared and served up by Back on planet Earth, the Corps higher headquarters. So you and Division commander will must organize for intelligence. get a POLAD: you will not, so You will need a company S2 and you must improvise. Find a intelligence section - including political/cultural adviser from analysts. You may need platoon among your people - perhaps an S2s and S3s, and you will need a Australian Civil-Military Team in officer, perhaps not (see article reconnaissance and surveillance (MOD Australia) 8). Someone with people skills element. You will not have and a “feel” for the environment enough linguists—you never do—but will do better than a political science consider carefully where best to employ How would you react if foreigners came graduate. Don’t try to be your own them. Linguists are a battle-winning to your neighborhood and conducted cultural adviser: you must be fully aware asset: but like any other scarce resource the operations you planned? What of the political and cultural dimension, you must have a prioritized “bump plan” if somebody came to your mother’s but this is a different task. Also, don’t in case you lose them. Often during pre- house and did that? Most importantly, give one of your intelligence people deployment the best use of linguists is to know that your operations will create this role. They can help, but their task train your command in basic language. temporary breathing space, but long- is to understand the environment—the You will probably not get augmentation term development and stabilization by political adviser’s job is to help shape for all this: but you must still do it. Put civilian agencies will ultimately win it. the war. the smartest soldiers in the S2 section 7. Train the squad leaders—then and the R&S squad. You will have one 5. Travel light and harden your trust them. Counterinsurgency is a less rifle squad: but the intelligence CSS (Combat Service Support). You squad and platoon leader’s war, and often section will pay for itself in lives and will be weighed down with body a private soldier’s war. Battles are won effort saved. armor, rations, extra ammunition, or lost in moments: whoever can bring 4. Organize for inter-agency communications gear, and a thousand combat power to bear in seconds, on a operations. Almost everything in other things. The enemy will carry a rifle street corner, will win. The commander

30 Summer 2006 on the spot controls the fight. You must sure you can easily transition between to learn what normality looks like. The train the squad leaders to act intelligently phases, both forward or backward in insurgent commander also wants to goad and independently without orders. If case of setbacks. Just as the insurgent you into lashing out at the population or your squad leaders are competent, you can adapt his activity to yours, you making a mistake. Unless you happen can get away with average company must have a simple enough plan to to be on the spot when an incident or platoon staffs. The reverse is not survive setbacks without collapsing. occurs, you will have only second-hand the case. Training should focus on This plan is the “solution” that matches reports and may misunderstand the basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, the shared “diagnosis” you developed local context or interpretation. This security on the move and at the halt, basic earlier—it must be simple, and known fragmentation and “disaggregation” of drills. When in doubt, spend less time to everyone. the battlefield—particularly in urban on company and platoon training, and areas—means that first impressions are more time on squads. Ruthlessly replace The Golden Hour often highly misleading. Of course, you leaders who do not make the grade. But You have deployed, completed cannot avoid making judgments. But if once people are trained, and you have a reception and staging, and (if you possible, check them with an older hand shared operational “diagnosis”, you must are lucky) attended the in-country or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or trust them. We talk about this, but few counterinsurgency school. Now it is time two officers from your predecessor unit company or platoon leaders really trust to enter your sector and start your tour. for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid their people. In counterinsurgency, you This is the golden hour. Mistakes a rush to judgment. made now will haunt you for the rest of have no choice. 12. Prepare for handover from the tour, while early successes will set 8. Rank is nothing: talent is Day One. Believe it or not, you will not the tone for victory. You will look back everything. Not everyone is good at resolve the insurgency on your watch. on your early actions and cringe at your counterinsurgency. Many people don’t Your tour will end, and your successors clumsiness. So be it: but you must act. understand the concept, and some who will need your corporate knowledge. do can’t execute it. It is difficult, and in 10. Be there. The most fundamental Start handover folders, in every platoon a conventional force only a few people rule of counterinsurgency is to be and specialist squad, from day one— will master it. Anyone can learn the there. You can almost never outrun the ideally, you would have inherited these basics, but a few “naturals” do exist. enemy. If you are not present when an from your predecessors, but if not you Learn how to spot these people and put incident happens, there is usually little must start them. The folders should them into positions where they can make you can do about it. So your first order include lessons learned, details about the a difference. Rank matters far less than of business is to establish presence. If population, village and patrol reports, talent—a few good men led by a smart you cannot do this throughout your updated maps, photographs—anything junior non-commissioned officer can sector, then do it wherever you can. This that will help newcomers master the succeed in counterinsurgency, where demands a residential approach—living environment. Computerized databases hundreds of well-armed soldiers under in your sector, in close proximity to are fine, but keep good back-ups and a mediocre senior officer will fail. the population, rather than raiding into ensure you have hard copy of key the area from remote, secure bases. 9. Have a game plan. The final artifacts and documents. This is boring, Movement on foot, sleeping in local preparation task is to develop a game tedious and essential. Over time, you villages, night patrolling: all these seem plan: a mental picture of how you see will create a corporate memory that more dangerous than they are. They the operation developing. You will be keeps your people alive. establish links with the locals, who see tempted to try and do this too early. But 13. Build trusted networks. Once you as real people they can trust and do wait: as your knowledge improves, you you have settled into your sector, your business with, not as aliens who descend will get a better idea of what needs to key task is to build trusted networks. from an armored box. Driving around be done, and of your own limitations. This is the true meaning of the phrase in an armored convoy—day-tripping like Like any plan, this plan will change “hearts and minds”, which comprises two a tourist in hell—degrades situational once you hit the ground, and may need separate components. “Hearts” means awareness, makes you a target and is to be scrapped if there is a major shift persuading people their best interests are ultimately more dangerous. in the environment. But you still need served by your success; “Minds” means a plan, and the process of planning will 11. Avoid knee jerk responses to convincing them that you can protect give you a simple robust idea of what first impressions. Don’t act rashly, them, and that resisting you is pointless. to achieve, even if the methods change. get the facts first. The violence you see Note that neither concept has to do with This is sometimes called “operational may be part of the insurgent strategy, it whether people like you. Calculated design.” One approach is to identify may be various interest groups fighting self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. basic stages in your operation: e.g. it out with each other or settling personal Over time, if you successfully build “establish dominance, build local vendettas. “Normality” in Kandahar is networks of trust, these will grow like networks, marginalize the enemy.” Make not the same as in Seattle—you need time roots into the population, displacing

31 the enemy’s networks, bringing him out victory depends on the enemy being to keep the enemy off balance, and the into the open to fight you, and seizing stupid enough to present you with population reassured, through constant the initiative. These networks include a clear-cut target, a rare windfall in and unpredictable activity—which, over local allies, community leaders, local counterinsurgency. Instead, you may time, deters attacks and creates a more security forces, NGOs and other friendly achieve a victory by resolving long- permissive environment. A reasonable or neutral non-state actors in your area, standing issues your predecessors have rule of thumb is that one to two thirds and the media. Conduct village and failed to address, or co-opting a key of your force should be on patrol at any neighborhood surveys to identify needs local leader who has resisted cooperation time, day or night. in the community—then follow through with our forces. Like any other form 17. Be prepared for setbacks. to meet them, build common interests of armed propaganda, achieving even Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, and mobilize popular support. This is a small victory early in the tour sets the as in every other form of war. You your true main effort: everything else tone for what comes later, and helps seize will make mistakes, lose people, or is secondary. Actions that help build the initiative—which you have probably occasionally kill or detain the wrong trusted networks serve your cause. lost due to the inevitable hiatus entailed person. You may fail in building or Actions—even killing high-profile by the handover-takeover with your expanding networks. If this happens, targets—that undermine trust or disrupt predecessor. don’t lose heart. Simply drop back to your networks help the enemy. 16. Practise deterrent patrolling. the previous phase of your game plan 14. Start easy. If you were trained Establish patrolling methods that deter and recover your balance. It is normal in in maneuver warfare you know about the enemy from attacking you. Often company counterinsurgency operations surfaces and gaps. This applies to our patrolling approach seems designed for some platoons to be doing well, while counterinsurgency as much as any other to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks. others do badly. This is not necessarily form of maneuver. Don’t try evidence of failure. Give local to crack the hardest nut first— commanders the freedom to don’t go straight for the main adjust their posture to local insurgent stronghold, try to conditions. This creates provoke a decisive showdown, elasticity that helps you survive or focus efforts on villages setbacks. that support the insurgents. 18. Remember the Instead, start from secure areas global audience. One of the and work gradually outwards. biggest differences between Do this by extending your the counterinsurgencies our influence through the locals’ fathers fought and those we own networks. Go with, not face today is the omnipresence against, the grain of local of globalized media. Most society: first win the confidence houses in Iraq have one or of a few villages, and then see more satellite dishes. Web Remember the global audience who they trade, intermarry or bloggers, print, radio and (DefenseLink) do business with. Now win television reporters and others these people over. Soon enough are monitoring and reporting the showdown with the insurgents will This is counter-productive: it leads to a your every move. When the insurgents come. But now you have local allies, raiding, day-tripping mind-set or, worse, ambush your patrols or set off a car a mobilized population and a trusted a bunker mentality. Instead, practise bomb, they do so not to destroy one more network at your back. Do it the other deterrent patrolling. There are many track, but because they want graphic way round and no one will mourn your methods for this, including “multiple” images of a burning vehicle and dead failure. patrolling where you flood an area bodies for the evening news. Beware 15. Seek early victories. In this with numerous small patrols working the “scripted enemy”, who plays to a early phase, your aim is to stamp your together. Each is too small to be a global audience and seeks to defeat you dominance in your sector. Do this by worthwhile target, and the insurgents in the court of global public opinion. You seeking an early victory. This will never know where all the patrols are— counter this by training people to always probably not translate into a combat making an attack on any one patrol bear in mind the global audience, assume victory over the enemy: looking for such extremely risky. Other methods include that everything they say or do will be a victory can be overly aggressive and so-called “blue-green” patrolling, where publicized, and befriend the media. Get create collateral damage—especially you mount daylight overt humanitarian the press on-side: help them get their since you really do not yet understand patrols, which go covert at night and story, and trade information with them. your sector. Also, such a combat hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is Good relationships with non-embedded

32 Summer 2006 media—especially indigenous media— versus those initiated by insurgents; in your area, or a narrative of national dramatically increase your situational longevity of friendly local leaders in redemption to undermine former regime awareness, and help get your message positions of authority; number and elements that have been terrorizing the across to the global and local audience. quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity population. At the company level, you 19. Engage the women, beware the that originate spontaneously from the do this in baby steps, by getting to know children. Most insurgent fighters are population; economic activity at markets local opinion-makers, winning their men. But in traditional societies, women and shops. These mean virtually nothing trust, learning what motivates them and are hugely influential in forming the as a snapshot—it is trends over time that building on this to find a single narrative social networks that insurgents use for help you track progress in your sector. that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This support. Co-opting neutral or friendly Groundhog Day women, through targeted social and is art, not science. economic programs, builds networks of Now you are in “steady state.” 22. Local forces should mirror the enlightened self-interest that eventually You are established in your sector, and enemy, not ourselves. By this stage, undermine the insurgents. You need people are settling into that “groundhog you will be working closely with local your own female counterinsurgents, day” mentality that hits every unit at forces, training or supporting them, and including inter-agency people, to do this some stage during every tour. It will building indigenous capability. The effectively. Win the women, and you probably take people at least the first natural tendency is to build forces in our own the family unit. Own the family, and third of the tour to become effective in own image, with the aim of eventually you take a big step forward in mobilizing the environment, if not longer. Then handing our role over to them. This is the population. Conversely, though, in the last period you will struggle a mistake. Instead, local indigenous stop your people fraternizing with local against the short-timer mentality. So forces need to mirror the enemy’s children. Your troops are homesick; they this middle part of the tour is the most capabilities, and seek to supplant the want to drop their guard with the kids. productive—but keeping the flame alive, insurgent’s role. This does not mean But children are sharp-eyed, lacking and bringing the local population along they should be “irregular” in the sense of in empathy, and willing to commit with you, takes immense leadership. being brutal, or outside proper control. atrocities their elders would shrink from. 21. Exploit a “single narrative.” Rather, they should move, equip and The insurgents are watching: they will Since counterinsurgency is a competition organize like the insurgents—but have notice a growing friendship between to mobilize popular support, it pays access to your support and be under the one of your people and a local child, and to know how people are mobilized. firm control of their parent societies. either harm the child as punishment, or In most societies there are opinion- Combined with a mobilized population use them against you. Similarly, stop makers: local leaders, pillars of the and trusted networks, this allows local people throwing candies or presents to community, religious figures, media forces to “hard-wire” the enemy out of children. It attracts them to our vehicles, personalities, and others who set trends the environment, under top-cover from creates crowds the enemy can exploit, and influence public perceptions. This you. At the company level, this means and leads to children being run over . influence—including the pernicious that raising, training and employing local Harden your heart and keep the children influence of the insurgents—often takes indigenous auxiliary forces (police and at arm’s length. the form of a “single narrative.” This is a military) are valid tasks. This requires 20. Take stock regularly. You simple, unifying, easily-expressed story high-level clearance, of course, but if probably already know that a “body or explanation that organizes people’s support is given, you should establish a count” tells you little, because you experience and provides a framework company training cell. Platoons should usually cannot know how many for understanding events. Nationalist aim to train one local squad, then use that insurgents there were to start with, how and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian squad as a nucleus for a partner platoon, many moved into the area, transferred creeds, provide such a narrative. The and company headquarters should train from supporter to combatant status or Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al- an indigenous leadership team. This how many new fighters the conflict Qaida and the Taliban. To undercut their mirrors the “growth” process of other has created. But you still need to influence you must exploit an alternative trusted networks, and tends to emerge develop metrics early in the tour and narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing naturally as you win local allies—who refine them as the operation progresses. narrative that excludes the insurgents. want to take up arms in their own They should cover a range of social, This narrative is often worked out for defense. informational, military and economic you by higher headquarters—but only 23. Practise armed . issues. Use metrics intelligently to form you have the detailed knowledge to Counterinsurgency is armed social an overall impression of progress - not tailor the narrative to local conditions work; an attempt to redress basic social in a mechanistic “traffic light” fashion. and generate leverage from it. For and political problems while being shot Typical metrics include: percentage of example, you might use a nationalist at. This makes civil affairs a central engagements initiated by our forces narrative to marginalize foreign fighters counterinsurgency activity, not an

33 afterthought. It is how you restructure 26. Build your own solution - the environment to displace the enemy only attack the enemy when he gets from it. In your company sector, civil in the way. Try not to be distracted, affairs must focus on meeting basic or forced into a series of reactive needs first, then progress up Maslow’s moves, by a desire to kill or capture hierarchy as each successive need is the insurgents. Your aim should be met. You need intimate cooperation to implement your own solution - the with inter-agency partners here— “game plan” you developed early in national, international and local. the campaign, and then refined through You will not be able to control these interaction with local partners. Your partners—many NGOs, for example, approach must be environment-centric do not want to be too closely associated (based on dominating the whole district with you because they need to preserve and implementing a solution to its their perceived neutrality. Instead, you systemic problems) rather than enemy- need to work on a shared diagnosis centric. This means, particularly late in of the problem, building a consensus the campaign, you may need to learn to that helps you self-synchronize. Your negotiate with the enemy. Members role is to provide protection, identify of the population that supports you needs, facilitate civil affairs and use Practicing armed civil affairs also know the enemy’s leaders—they improvements in social conditions as (MOD Australia) may have grown up together in the leverage to build networks and mobilize small district that is now your company the population. Thus, there is no such cheap and tailored to local conditions— sector—and valid negotiating partners thing as impartial humanitarian assistance as the situation allows. sometimes emerge as the campaign or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. progresses. Again, you need close Every time you help someone, you hurt 25. Fight the enemy’s strategy, inter-agency relationships to exploit someone else—not least the insurgents. not his forces. At this stage, if things opportunities to coopt segments of the So civil and humanitarian assistance are proceeding well, the insurgents enemy. This helps you wind down the personnel will be targeted. Protecting will go over to the offensive. Yes, the insurgency without alienating potential them is a matter not only of close-in offensive—because you have created an local allies who have relatives or friends defense, but also of creating a permissive situation so dangerous to the insurgents, in the insurgent movement. At this stage, operating environment by co-opting the by threatening to displace them from the a defection is better than a surrender, a beneficiaries of aid—local communities environment, that they have to attack you surrender is better than a capture, and a and leaders—to help you help them. and the population to get back into the capture is better than a kill. game. Thus it is normal, even in the most 24. Small is beautiful. Another successful operations, to have spikes of Getting Short natural tendency is to go for large-scale, offensive insurgent activity late in the mass programs. In particular, we have a campaign. This does not necessarily Time is short, and the tour is tendency to template ideas that succeed in mean you have done something wrong drawing to a close. The key problem one area and transplant them into another, (though it may: it depends on whether now is keeping your people focused, and we tend to take small programs that you have successfully mobilized the preventing them from dropping their work and try to replicate them on a larger population). At this point the tendency guard and maintaining the rage on all scale. Again, this is usually a mistake. is to go for the jugular and seek to the multifarious programs, projects and Often programs succeed because of destroy the enemy’s forces in open operations that you have started. In this specific local conditions of which we are battle. This is rarely the best choice at final phase, the previous articles still unaware, or because their very smallness company level, because provoking major stand, but there is an important new kept them below the enemy’s radar and combat usually plays into the enemy’s one: helped them flourish unmolested. At the hands by undermining the population’s 27. Keep your extraction plan company level, programs that succeed confidence. Instead, attack the enemy’s secret. The temptation to talk about in one district often also succeed in strategy: if he is seeking to recapture home becomes almost unbearable toward another (because the overall company the allegiance of a segment of the local the end of a tour. The locals know you sector is small), but small-scale projects population, then coopt them against him. are leaving, and probably have a better rarely proceed smoothly into large If he is trying to provoke a sectarian idea than you of the generic extraction programs. Keep programs small: this conflict, go over to “peace enforcement plan—remember, they have seen units makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key mode.” The permutations are endless come and go. But you must protect the and (importantly) recoverable if they fail. but the principle is the same: fight the specific details of the extraction plan, or You can add new programs—also small, enemy’s strategy, not his forces. the enemy will use this as an opportunity

34 Summer 2006 to score a high-profile hit, re-capture the allies in this: they know what matters Conclusion population’s allegiance by scare tactics to them more than you do. Be honest This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the that convince them they will not be with them, discuss possible projects folklore which those who went before you protected once you leave, or persuade and options with community leaders, have learned. Like any folklore it needs them that your successor unit will be get them to choose what their priority interpretation, and contains seemingly oppressive or incompetent. Keep the is. Often they will find the translators, contradictory advice. Over time, as you details secret, within a tightly controlled building supplies or expertise that you apply unremitting intellectual effort to compartment in your headquarters. And need, and will only expect your support study your sector, you will learn to apply resist the temptation to say goodbye and protection in making their projects these ideas in your own way, and will add to local allies: you can always send a work. And the process of negotiation to this store of wisdom from your own postcard from home. and consultation will help mobilize observations and experience. So only their support, and strengthen their one article remains; and if you remember Four “What Ifs” social cohesion. If you set your sights nothing else, remember this: What if you get moved to a different on what is achievable, the situation can 28. Whatever else you do, keep area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and still work. the initiative. In counterinsurgency, studied Dulaim tribal structures and What if the theater situation shifts the initiative is everything. If the enemy Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to under your feet? It is your worst is reacting to you, you control the Najaf and will be surrounded by al- nightmare: everything has gone well environment. Provided you mobilize Hassani tribes and Shi’a clerics. But that in your sector, but the whole theater the population, you will win. If you work was not wasted. In mastering your situation has changed and invalidates are reacting to the enemy—even if you first area, you learned techniques you your efforts. Think of the first battle of are killing or capturing him in large can apply: how to “case” an operational Fallujah, the Askariya shrine bombing, numbers—then he is controlling the area, how to decide what matters in the or the Sadr uprising. What do you environment and you will eventually lose. local societal structure. Do the same do? Here is where having a flexible, In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates again—and this time the process is easier adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the and faster, since you have an existing insurgents drop down to a lower posture most attacks, targets you unexpectedly mental structure, and can focus on what when things go wrong, now is the time and withdraws too fast for you to react. is different. The same applies if you get to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain Do not be drawn into purely reactive moved frequently within a battalion or your balance and prepare to expand again operations: focus on the population, brigade area. when the situation allows. But see article build your own solution, further your What if higher headquarters doesn’t 28: if you cede the initiative, you must game plan and fight the enemy only when “get” counterinsurgency? Higher regain it as soon as the situation allows, he gets in the way. This gains and keep headquarters is telling you the mission or you will eventually lose. the initiative. is to “kill terrorists,” or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base- camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company- grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers.

In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage “first do no harm.” Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities: they own the indirect fires. What if you have no resources? You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, you have a low priority for civil affairs. You can still get things done, but you need to . focus on self-reliance, keep things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritize effort. The local population are your

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