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Separation of Powers: Framework for Freedom

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NYLJ.COM | TUESDAY, MAY 1, 2018 | 9 Separation of Powers: Framework for Freedom Our Commitment To Excellence Helps Keep Our Judiciary Strong and Independent Janet DiFiore Chief Judge State of New York his year’s Law Day theme, the much that we can do to keep our T“Separation of Powers: Frame- branch of government strong and work for Freedom,” invites us to resilient. Even with all the issues reflect on the vital role of the courts dividing Americans today, we should in our democratic system of govern- all be able to agree on the need for ment. The founders of our nation fair, accessible and well-functioning established three separate branches courts. Indeed, that is the vision and of government in a unique power- objective of our Excellence Initiative sharing arrangement that requires in the New York State courts, which each branch to serve as a check I announced as our top institutional on the power of the others. Their careful calibration of balanced PHOTO ESSAY powers, intended to avoid tyranny and ensure liberty and freedom, Legislative Assaults has served our nation well from Innovation its inception. However, this proven On State Courts formula for democracy will surely 2018 legislative trends that In New York fail if any one of the branches of pose the a threat to the role or government is weakened at the independence of the courts: State Courts expense of the others. And so there is cause for concern when we read • Injecting Politics Into Judge Selection about executive officials and legis- Photographs • Politicizing Judicial Rulings, lators who engage in vitriolic per- by David Handschuh Discipline, or Court Rules sonal attacks on judges in order to publicly malign and punish them • Reducing Resources or Establishing ith the alarming num- for unpopular decisions. Michael More Political Control in Exchange Wber of opioid overdose Wines, “Judges Say Throw Out the For Resources fatalities in the Bronx and Map. Lawmakers Say Throw Out the • Altering Judicial Term Lengths and throughout New York state, Judges,” New York Times, Feb. 14, Limits Chief Administrative Judge 2018. Of equal concern are legisla- • Protecting the Legislature From Lawrence K. Marks, in part- tive proposals pending in 16 states Court Rulings nership with Bronx County to diminish judicial independence • Changing Size of Courts District Attorney Darcel D. by giving governors and legislators Clark, announced the launch more power over judicial selection, Source: Brennan Center for Justice in Bronx County Criminal authorizing legislatures to override Court of two specialized court decisions on the constitution- court parts that specifically ality of statutes, and enacting retal- target low-level offenders at iatory budget cuts. Brennan Center priority upon assuming the position George Grasso, above, supervising judge for Bronx Criminal Court, presides over the first case in the high risk of overdose. for Justice, Legislative Assaults on of Chief Judge in February 2016. The Overdose Avoidance and Recovery program at the Bronx County Criminal Court on Jan. 29. Bronx Coun- State Courts—2018. Excellence Initiative is focused, as The first such drug courts ty District Attorney Darcel Clark, below, announces two new specialized drug courts in Bronx County in New York City, the Over- Criminal Court on the same day. As judges, lawyers and citizens a threshold matter, on improving dose Avoidance and Recovery who care about the vitality of our the efficiency, timeliness and qual- (OAR) tracks, under the democracy, we must be vigilant ity of justice services delivered by direction of Bronx County in defending against unjust and our courts. It seeks, ultimately, to Criminal Court Supervising irresponsible attacks that erode promote excellence in all aspects Judge George A. Grasso, public confidence in the judiciary of judicial decision-making. By deliv- offer intensive treatment and impair its ability to serve as an ering high-quality justice services in lieu of incarceration to independent check on overreach that meet the modern-day needs misdemeanor offenders by the other branches. Judges, of and expectations of our litigants, the charged with criminal course, are ethically prohibited courts earn respect and credibility possession of a controlled from responding to criticism of their in the eyes our citizenry and our substance in the seventh decisions under the Rules of Judicial partner branches of government. degree who are at high risk Conduct. New York Code of Judicial When the public values the work of overdose. Eligible Conduct, Rule 100.3(B)(8). They of the judicial branch, we are far offenders who complete depend on their partners in the Bar better able to withstand the inevi- the OAR program will have to stand up for them so that they can table criticism that comes with our their cases dismissed continue to uphold the rule of law role as the arbiter of society’s most and sealed, averting the free of outside pressures and fear of contentious disputes. By contrast, collateral consequences retaliation. Fortunately, New York’s when we fail to meet core obliga- of a potential conviction— judges have enjoyed the vigorous tions, such as the delivery of timely, a strong incentive for partici- support of many statewide, local, affordable justice, we become easy pation in this voluntary court ethnic and specialty bar associa- prey for demagogues who seek to initiative. tions (as well as many public offi- subvert judicial independence for The Bronx program is the cials) who understand the impor- their own political ends. second such program estab- tance of keeping our judiciary strong As Chief Judge, the issue of pub- lished in the state. The earlier and independent. Mark H. Alcott, lic confidence is never far from my Opioid Intervention Court, “Defending Judges, Standing Up mind. On February 6th, I delivered opened in Buffalo last May, for the Rule of Law,” NYSBA Journal, the State of Our Judiciary Address was the first of its kind January 2018, pp. 20-24. and summarized the encouraging in the nation. While judges may not be able to progress we are making to improve engage in the rough and tumble of the fairness, efficiency and effec- political and civic debate, there is tiveness of our entire » Page 12 its mission and also fits properly Inside within the overall fiscal plan for Working Together to Achieve Excellence the state. Separation of Powers: Juvenile justice reform is anoth- A Tribute to My Father er example of the cooperative rela- by Rolando T. Acosta ...................10 support one another to be suc- budget. Each year our branch of tionship among the three branch- Lawrence K. Marks cessful. government drafts a comprehen- es. For far too long, New York was CPLR Article 78— Responsible for administra- sive financial proposal, taking into one of only two states that treated Central to the Rule of Law Chief Administrative Judge tion of the court system, the New consideration the fiscal climate of all young people under the age of by Alan Scheinkman ...................10 New York State York State Judiciary’s mission is New York state at the time, and 18 as adults and processed them Unified Court System to promote fair and efficient jus- presents it to the Governor on in criminal court for even the Separation of Powers: tice. Chief Judge Janet DiFiore December 1st for the upcoming lowest-level crimes. For close to A Judicial Balancing Act has made this the singular focus fiscal year (beginning April 1st). a decade, the Judiciary had been by Elizabeth A. Garry ..................10 of her Excellence Initiative. In striv- In mid-January, the Governor a strong advocate for raising the ing for excellence, it is apparent transmits the Judiciary’s budget age of criminal responsibility in Protecting Our Country that, yes, we are an independent proposal, with any comments he this state. Addressing this prob- From Momentary Passions eparation of powers is a doctri- with each assigned responsibili- government entity, but to achieve may have, to the Legislature, along lem as best we could on our own, Snal element of both the federal ties and functions so that no one our goals we must receive support with the Executive Branch’s bud- we created Adolescent Diversion by Gerald J. Whalen ....................11 and New York state constitutions. branch is omnipotent. Separation and assistance from the two other get proposal. Representatives of Court Parts, designed to improve Derived from principles espoused of powers was designed to bind branches of government. Indeed, the Judiciary then have extensive the criminal courts’ treatment of Ensure That All Understand the by Montesquieu, the 18th century governmental authority by creat- the Judiciary must foster and discussions in the ensuing weeks 16- and 17-year-olds charged with Importance of an Independent French philosopher, the United ing tension among the branches, encourage cooperation among the with members and staff of the Leg- non-violent offenses. Although this Judiciary States from its very inception has with each limiting the others. Nev- three branches if we are to admin- islature and with Executive branch program yielded successes, it was by Sharon Stern Gerstman ........11 strongly embraced this doctrine. ertheless, to accomplish impor- ister justice effectively. officials. This culminates in legisla- not enough. We recognized that Essentially, governmental author- tant goals and necessary reforms, Perhaps the leading example tive enactment of a budget by the there was only so much we could ity is divided into legislative, the three branches of government of the need for this collabora- start of the fiscal year that meets do independently of the other two LAW DAY: Angela Turturro, Sections Editor executive, and judicial powers, frequently must collaborate and tive exchange is the Judiciary’s the Judiciary’s needs in fulfilling branches, and that the » Page 12 Monika Kozak, Design 10 | TUESDAY, MAY 1, 2018 | NYLJ.COM Separation of Powers: A Tribute to My Father CPLR Article 78— of powers was not a lofty concept where appropriate.
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