Elite Kinship Network and State Strengthening: Theory and Evidence from Imperial China* Yuhua Wang Harvard University
[email protected] Last updated April 8, 2020 xisting theories of state strengthening focus on macro-level factors. We know less about the micro-level Eincentives for elites to support or oppose state strengthening. I develop an argument in which elites choose the most efficient governance structure (public or private) to provide services for their kin. When elites’ kinship networks are geographically dispersed, they prefer to strengthen the state because it is more efficient to “buy” services from the state. When their kinship networks are geographically concentrated, they prefer a weak state because they can “make” low-cost private services and avoid paying taxes to the state. I map politicians’ kinship networks using their tomb epitaphs from 11th-century China and show that, even facing severe external threats, politicians exhibited polarization in their attitudes toward state strengthening, which can be explained by the geography of their kinship networks. The findings point to the importance of social structure in understanding state building. *I greatly thank Matt Blackwell, Carles Boix, Stephen Chaudoin, Greg Distelhorst, Yue Hou, Sarah Hummel, Horacio Larreguy, Dan Mattingly, Jen Pan, Pia Raffler, Molly Roberts, Jon Rogowski, Dan Smith, David Stasavage, Yiqing Xu, Congyi Zhou, and seminar and conference participants at Harvard, Northwestern, NYU (QCSS-3 and -4), Princeton (Center on Contemporary China; State Capacity Workshop), Stanford, and UPenn for feedback; Xiaohe Ma at the Harvard Yenching Library, Lex Berman at the China Historical GIS Project, and Hongsu Wang at the China Biographical Database for assistance; and Yuqian Chen, Cheng Cheng, Yusi Du, Ce Gao, Maggie Huang, Jialu Li, Shiqi Ma, Jia Sun, Patricia Sun, Yihua Xia, and Siyao Zheng for research assistance.