To: Leaders of the City of Jefferson and Interested Citizens From: Jay Barnes Re: The Marker on Moreau Drive Date: August 20, 2020 Jefferson City in the Civil War was a divided state in the Civil War. But Jefferson City was different. From near the very beginning to finish, it was a Union town – occupied and controlled by the with support from a large group recent anti-, pro-union immigrants from Germany. Of course, things were not simple. Our community was Union enough that the Union Army could take control without a fight – indeed Harper’s Weekly wrote about a warm welcome by local residents. But there were enough Confederate sympathizers in the area that Union commanders were worried the entire time they were here about the potential for an uprising. Historian Gary Kremer tells stories of the Civil War in Jefferson City in his essay “We Are Living in Very Stirring Times.”1 On April 26, 1861 – just two weeks after Fort Sumter, German immigrant Henrietta Bruns (wife of Bernard Bruns) wrote relatives in Germany that, from her vantage point on High Street directly across from the State Capitol, she could see “a tremendously large secessionist flag that has been flying,” while “in ironic contrast, a German immigrant church not far from her home proudly displayed the stars and stripes of the Union, which its congregation was pledged to uphold.”2 In January of 1861, incoming Missouri Governor declared that

Missouri had a common interest with other slave states and should side with the South in a potential conflict. He recommended a state convention to determine the course. The convention took the side of the Union, voting 98-1 against . After Fort Sumter in April, President called for states to activate and provide troops to the Union. But Jackson refused, instead creating a , appointing as , and ordering the State Guard to resist “invasion” by

1 Gary R. Kremer, “We Are Living in Very Stirring Times”: The Civil War in Jefferson City, Missouri, Missouri Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 2, January 2012, pp. 61-74. 2 Kremer, Stirring Times at 61. Page 1 of 32 the Union. In effect, Jackson was pushing Missouri into the Confederacy whether the people and its representatives wanted to go there or not. On June 11, 1861, Gov. Jackson met with Union commander Nathanial Lyon in St. Louis. It did not go well for Jackson. General Lyon told Jackson that his action amounted to war with the Union. Gov. Jackson fled St. Louis by train to Jefferson City – and literally burned at least two bridges behind him to slow an expected advance of Union soldiers.3 Once back in Jefferson City, he joined with his cabinet and several legislators and fled to Boonville and eventually Neosho. Jackson’s bridge burnings did not work.4 General Lyon sent troops upriver by and began arriving at the Missouri State Penitentiary wharf on June 13, 1861 with two thousand soldiers, almost all of whom “were German-speaking immigrants, a fact that no doubt especially galled a majority of the city’s residents.”5 The landing was featured in Harper’s Weekly magazine, which reported:

On the morning of the 15th, ten miles below Jefferson City, General Lyon transferred his regulators to the Iatan, and proceeded with that boat, leaving the Swan to follow in his wake. As we approached the city crowds gathered on the levee and saluted us with prolong and oft-repeated cheering. Thomas L. Price (no relative to the rebel, Sterling Price), a prominent Unionist of Jefferson City, was the first to greet General Lyon as he stopped on shore. A bar was formed at the regular landing, and we were obliged to run out our gang plank below the penitentiary, at a point where the railroad company has placed a large quantity of loose stone, preparatory to forming a landing of its own. The steep, rough bank prevented the debarkation of our artillery, but the infantry scrambled up in fine style. First was the company of regulars formerly commended by General Lyon, but no led by Lieutenant Hare. These were sent to occupy a high hill or bluff near the railroad depot and commanding the town. The went forward in fine style, ascending the steep acclivity at the ‘double-quick step.’ In one minute from the time of reaching the summit they were formed in a hollow square, ready to repel all attacks from foes, whether real or imaginary.

Next came the left wing of the First Volunteer under Lieutenant- Colonel Andrews, five hundred strong. These soldiers were formed by sections and marched to the tune of ‘Yankee Doodle’ with the Stars and Stipes conspicuous, through the principal streets to the State House, of which they took possession amidst the cheers of the people of the town.

3 Kremer, Stirring Times at 63. 4 Jackson’s efforts to force Missouri into the Confederacy did not work either. A state convention declared the Governor’s office vacated and formed a pro-Union state government. 5 Kremer, Stirring Times at 63. Page 2 of 32

After some delay in finding the keys, which had not been very carefully hid, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews with a band, color bearer, and guard, ascended to the cupola and displayed the American flag while the band played the Star Spangled Banner and the popular and troops below gave round after round of enthusiastic applause.

This was the ‘sacred soil’ of Missouri’s capital invaded by Federal troops, and the bosom of ‘the pride of the Big Muddy’ desecrated by the footprints of the volunteer soldiers of St. Louis. She rather seemed to like it.6

The issue featured two drawings of Jefferson City that are familiar today:

The Iatan steamboat is featured on the bottom of the Seal of the City of Jefferson:7

6 The War in Missouri, Harper’s Weekly Magazine, July 6, 1861 7 Picture taken from the blog of former Mayor John Landwehr. Page 3 of 32

Despite the reported warm welcome, not all was easy for Union troops here. Our town was Union enough that Union troops could take it without firing a shot – and hold it for four years. But there were enough Confederate sympathizers in the area to make Union commanders nervous the entire time. Kremer writes, “For the remainder of the summer of 1861, indeed, for the remainder of the war, Jefferson City residents lived with the constant fear of being attacked.”8 And it was not

8 Kremer, Stirring Times at 64. Page 4 of 32 just Confederate troops. “Fear of guerillas and caused Jefferson City residents to curtail their travel, to suspect strangers, and generally to live in a state of constant anxiety.”9 In August 1861, Ulysses S. Grant was sent here to command the troops in anticipation of an attack by General Sterling Price. Grant was underwhelmed by their preparedness. “I found a good many troops in Jefferson City, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were.”10 Grant was relieved on September 26, 1861, by Union General John C. Fremont and 15,000 troops moved to protect our city after a Confederate victory at the Battle of Lexington.11 While Gen. Fremont stayed at the Dulle House located on a hill near the National Guard building today, the 15,000 soldiers camped between the present-day location of the intersection between Highway 50 and Missouri Boulevard – just outside the Capitol Plaza Hotel. With war came political change. Initial settlers in Jefferson City came from Tennessee, , and Virginia. Many held slaves. As a group, the old guard dominated local government.

In the 1850s, German immigrants began arriving, “most of whom harbored an intense opposition to slavery, create[ing] a chasm between ‘old’ and ‘new’ residents of the city.”12 On the eve of the Civil War, Jefferson City had 3,000 residents – of which one in five were immigrants – and the old, pro-slavery guard still dominated local government.13 But war brought a new law requiring voters and officeholders to take a loyalty oath before participating in elections or holding office. The old-guard in Jefferson City refused to take the oath, disenfranchising themselves in the process. Thus, in April 1862, pro-Union, anti-slavery, German Catholic immigrant Dr. Bernard

Bruns was elected mayor of Jefferson City.14 Another major change was an influx of runaway slaves. With anti-slavery German immigrants and Union soldiers to protect them, Jefferson City stood as a beacon of freedom for slaves in the Missouri River valley. On January 1, 1863, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation

9 Kremer, Stirring Times at 68. 10 Kremer, Stirring Times at 68. 11 Kremer, Stirring Times at 68. 12 Kremer, Stirring Times at 62. 13 Kremer, Stirring Times at 62. 14 Kremer, Stirring Times at 65. Bruns’ son Henry Bruns was the first Jefferson Citian killed in the Civil War, and Dr. Bruns himself died in 1864. Page 5 of 32 and Proclamation and Union officers began enlisting black soldiers in Missouri. Slaveholders and guerillas in Missouri were enraged, and “began a campaign of whipping, beating, and even lynching black men of military age who threatened to leave their masters to join the Union army.”15 But Jefferson City was beyond the reach of the slaveholders and bandits – so slaves fled here. In May 1863, the Jefferson City Missouri State Times reported “a sable stream of contrabands have been flowing into this city and neighborhood, for the last few weeks … principally from

Boone and Callaway counties.” Their method of transportation speaks to their desperation and the safety that our community offered; “Saturday and Sunday nights appear to be the most favored time for their travel, and as many as fifty have crossed the Missouri river of a night.”16 Keep in mind the obvious. They were not boating across the river – they were swimming to freedom. By the summer of 1864, there were so many runaway slaves that the city’s board of alderman considered what should be done. As winter 1864 approached, the local Republican newspaper feared a humanitarian tragedy, asking, “How are the colored people here, (who are mostly women and children) to live through the coming winter?”17 Price’s Raid: The Confederacy’s Failed Slingshot By the fall of 1864, it seemed obvious that the Confederacy could not defeat the Union ia the war. In May 1863, General Grant won the Battle of Vicksburg and control of the . In June and July 1863, General Lee was turned back at Gettysburg, marking the highpoint of the Confederacy’s military efforts. In November 1863, the Union took Chattanooga. In the summer of 1864, General Grant “won” the Wilderness Campaign stalemate through attrition. While the Union suffered more casualties, the Confederates had no replacements. In the spring and summer of 1864, recognizing the dire needs of the Confederate Armies of Northern Virginia and Tennessee, Confederate leaders had attempted to transfer resources from its Trans-Mississippi division to help the war in the east. Confederate General and

15 Kremer, Stirring Times at 70. 16 Kremer, Stirring Times at 70. 17 Kremer, Stirring Times at 70-71. Page 6 of 32 the Confederate Secretary of War believed “the best use for the troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department, if practicable, would be to operate” on the east side of the Mississippi.18 In a sign of lack of true nationhood, soldiers and politicians from , Louisiana, and Missouri balked. One Arkansas Confederate Senator threatened, “Our troops here will not go. They will throw down their arms first.”19 Nevertheless, Bragg directed Confederate Trans-Mississippi General Kirby Smith to transfer troops to the East. It did not matter. The Union Army controlled the Mississippi

River. While some small units could sneak across, “a crossing of major united was not viable and the Trans-Mississippi lacked the resources to force a crossing against Union opposition.”20 With Confederate Trans-Mississippi troops stuck in the west, things grew worse for the Confederates in the East. In August 1864, General Sherman set out for Atlanta. On September 1, he captured it and began his March to the Sea, cutting a path through the heart of the Confederacy. Even still, wars are not won by military victories alone. They require political support. As a result, the outcome remained in doubt. President Lincoln was fully committed to restoring the Union – and fighting until the Confederacy had no choice but to surrender. But 1864 was an election year and many Union voters were tired of war. The election was a four-way scrum, but Lincoln’s main competitor was former Gen. George McClellan, who Lincoln had removed from command of the Union army in November 1862. McClellan supported the war and restoration of the Union (but not the abolition of slavery). However, McClellan’s Democratic Party adopted an official platform that called for the immediate end of the war and a negotiated peace.

With the official platform of Lincoln’s main competitor in their favor, Confederate leaders recognized that, if they could hold on through the election, and help beat Lincoln at the polls, they just might win the war through politics. The runaway politicians for Missouri were pushing for a campaign in their former state. Confederate appointed Governor-in-exile Thomas Reynolds

18 Charles Collins, Jr, Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864, prepared for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute in 2016, at 28, citing The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XLI, part II, 1022-1023. Confederate Sec. of War Seldon correspondence with . 19 Collins, Battlefield Atlas, at 28, citing Ark. Sen. Garland correspondence with Jefferson Davis. 20 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 27. Page 7 of 32

“suggested another raid into the state. He hoped for a general uprising … [and] justified the raid with a more attainable goal of pulling Union resources away from Georgia and Virginia.”21 Gen. Sterling Price pushed for a campaign as well, claiming, “the Confederate flag floats over nearly all the principal towns of North Missouri and large guerilla parties are formed and operating in the southern portion of the State.”22 Price’s claims were hyperbole. “Guerilla activity was rampant … but a significant portion of Missouri’s population no longer supported guerilla activity. The population just wanted to be left alone … [,] were not willing to rise up in revolt against Federal authorities, and few openly flew the Confederate flag.”23 With the exiled politicians chomping at the bit, in September 1864, the Confederacy recognized one longshot chance to “win” the Civil War. If the Confederacy could take Missouri, it would give Union voters the impression that there would be no quick end to the war. And maybe, just maybe, they could swing the election to McClellan. Confederate Gen. Smith’s initial choice to lead the Missouri campaign was Lt. General . But Taylor had been transferred out of the department and was no longer available. “Reluctantly, Smith turned to Major General Sterling Price.”24 Price’s task: take Missouri, swing the election, win the war for the South.25 Price was ordered to move north through Arkansas to St. Louis. If he was able, he was ordered to take St. Louis. If the city was too heavily defended, he was instructed to move on to Jefferson City. He was accompanied by Thomas C. Reynolds, the Confederate-proclaimed governor of Missouri. Reynolds hoped to be installed as governor if Jefferson City was taken.26

21 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 27. 22 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 28. 23 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 28. 24 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 28. 25 Confederate leaders were pessimistic, stating that the campaign was “larger in its aims than our resources may suffice to compass.” Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 28, citing Conf. Sec. of War Seldon correspondence to Bragg. 26 Maj. Dale Davis, Guerilla Operations in the Civil War: Assessing Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid, at 51. Reynolds was Lt. Governor at the time Gov. Clairborne Fox Jackson abandoned Jefferson City – and his office. He left Missouri briefly to practice law in South Carolina under Union occupancy. Then Gov. Jackson died in 1862, and he was declared the Confederate Governor of Missouri. The Jefferson City Missouri State Times described Reynold’s presence in October 1864, “The gaseous Ex. Lt. Gov. Thos C. Reynolds is also along, a general object of contempt amongst the rank and file, who say that he always goes to the rear when there is any fighting going on – probably because he is afraid he might get his spectacles broken. It is said he dresses very genteelly and thus distinguishes himself from ‘the vulgar herd.’” Jefferson City Missouri State Times, Oct. 15, 1864 at 2. Page 8 of 32

Price gathered 12,000 to 20,000 men and divided his group into three divisions, then headed north. On September 19, Price and Reynolds entered Missouri. Price did not have a great reputation in the Confederacy. By 1864, he rarely rode his horse, instead being pulled in a buggy, and he was constantly sick. He claimed it was from . His detractors said it was a “perpetual hangover.” 27 President Jefferson Davis is reported to have called Price “the vainest man I ever met.” Confederal Gen. Smith, Price’s commanding officer who had chosen him for the task, deemed Price “good for nothing.”28 Trust in Price was so low that Confederate leaders suggested Reynolds accompany the invading army in its dangerous endeavor because they were concerned that, if he succeeded, Price would claim the governorship for himself.29 Reynolds himself said price was “devious, insincere, petulant, and arrogant.”30 When Union commanders learned of Price’s entry into the state, they reinforced , located in Ironton, to stop his advance. On September 27, Price attacked at the Battle of Pilot Knob. Union soldiers abandoned Fort Davidson, but Price lost lost between 800 to 1,500 men with 200 to 500 killed.31 There was no military or propaganda value to holding Fort Davidson. The Union troops had inflicted heavy casualties on Price and escaped to fortify St. Louis.

The Battle That Never Was “May the Alligators of the Southern Bayous Devour Price” Jefferson City Missouri State Times, December 17, 1864 Recognizing that St. Louis was now out of reach, Price set his sights on Jefferson City. Union Major General concentrated forces at Kirkwood in case Price turned around, but also sent reinforcements and order local militias here to fortify the town. Price’s pace helped. His train, “originally about 300 wagons, grew to over 500” as his group slowly moved west.32 The towns along the way were defenseless. As Price’s Confederate forces moved west,

27 Mark A. Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign at 3. 28 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 28, citing Albert Castel, General Sterling Price (1996) at 202. 29 Dale Davis, Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid, at 52. 30 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 28, citing Albert Castel, General Sterling Price (1996) at 166. 31 Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign at 53 32 Charles Collins, Jr, Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864, prepared for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute in 2016, at 53. Page 9 of 32

“they not only foraged for subsistence to maintain their force, they also plundered many of the small towns along the way”33 and “executed several Missouri citizens.” Of those, some were known “‘Union men,’ others were German immigrants (hated by some Rebels), and at least one man was murdered because he wore blue pants.”34 On September 28, Union General Clinton Fisk reached Jefferson City from St. Joseph, and took command from General E.B. Brown. Fisk prepared for nine days without reinforcements. His biography explains:

He had but a handful of men, for his own force at St. Joseph was originally small, and had been depleted by military desertions. The men he had were chiefly and raw recruits. With these and with the help of willing townspeople, he proceeded to throw up such defenses as would convey an impression of large numbers and much strength. Then he brigaded his 2500 infantry into several brigades, as if they were 25,000, which were purposely let fall into the enemy’s hands, at the proper time, through an avowed deserter who bore them.35 Another general explained that Gen. Brown also “called out the three companies of the ‘Citizens’ Guard’ of Jefferson City, and all the able-bodied men, white and black, residing or found in the city were set to work digging rifle pits and building or completing fortifications.”36 Together, Union soldiers and the people of our community “repaired the two partially constructed forts, built three substantial new ones” and constructed “nearly three miles of entrenchments, palisades, rifle- pits,” and other obstacles.37

Preparations for Price’s looming attack destroyed the city. Kremer writes, “Price’s presence on the doorstep of the city engendered fear and elaborate preparations[.]” Kremer reviewed hundreds of letters and claims for significant damages and expenses made to the local provost marshal that were filed by local residents after Price had left.38 For example, the publisher of a local newspaper made a claim for Union soldiers taking “between 800 and 1000 fence rails”

33 Davis, Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid at 50. 34 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 53. 35 Protecting the Capital, The Life of Clinton Bowen Fisk, at 83. General Fisk went on to start a school for freed slaves in Tennessee, and the HCBU Fisk University is named in his honor. He also later ran for president for the Prohibition Party. 36 General Sanborn, The Campaign in Missouri in September and October 1864 at 17. 37 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 57, citing Report of Union Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown. 38 Kremer, Stirring Times at 69. Page 10 of 32 at his property to build fortifications somewhere near the present location of Immaculate Conception Church.39 Others “reported that soldiers cut portholes in the walls of their houses so that they could fire rifles through them.”40 Indeed, in a town with only 3,000 citizens, “hundreds of such complaints were made, evidencing widespread disregard for personal property rights in the face of an attack threatened by Confederate forces.”41 As late as October 4, General Fisk and General Brown had fewer the 5,000 men to defend

Jefferson City – and half of those were “untrained and ill-equipped Enrolled Missouri Militia.”42 Fortunately, help was on the way. Brigadier General John McNeil, commander of Union forces in Rolla, reported that, on the evening of October 3, he became convinced Price was gunning for Jefferson City. “All communications with St. Louis being cut off,” Gen. McNeil “was compelled to act in the premises without consultation with headquarters.”43 McNeil explains:

It became known to me that one prominent object of the raid on the part of the enemy was the capture of the political capital of the State and the installation of Thomas C. Reynolds as the constitutional Governor of Missouri, and the inauguration of a civil government that, with the assistance of this rebel army of occupation, would be enabled to arouse the latent spirit of rebellion which still unfortunately existed in the minds of many citizens of Missouri. Determined if in my power to foil this rebel scheme, I marched from Rolla to Jefferson City on the morning of the 4th of October, 186. … I had previously directed General Sanborn, then in camp at Cuba, to join me at Vienna and proceed with me to the rescue of Jefferson City.44 As Generals McNeil and Sanborn raced for Jefferson City, Price neared the city. On October 5, Confederates entered the county. Union forces from Jefferson City engaged briefly the

Confederates at Price’s Ford, “where the main road from St. Louis to Jefferson crossed the Osage, and at Castle Rock,” near present-day Wardsville, four miles above.”45 Gen. Sanborn reports Union forces were driven back, but also “considerable loss to the enemy,” including the wounding

39 Kremer, Stirring Times at 69. 40 Kremer, Stirring Times at 69. 41 Kremer, Stirring Times at 69. 42 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 53. 43 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 53, citing The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the O.R., Series I, Vol. XLII, part I, 375. McNeil’s report. 44 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 53, citing Compilation of O.R. 45 Gen. Sanborn at 17. Page 11 of 32 of Col. David Shanks, who became a prisoner of war.46 The Confederates then paused to allow the rest of their outfit to catch-up, including Price, who reached the rest of his crew during the night.47 Gen. Sanborn and McNeil were still proceeding northwest from Vienna, while Price was nearing the city. Gen. Sanborn describes the end of the race on October 6, “As I neared the capital, a column of the enemy was seen advancing over the hills on a parallel route. Hastening forward, I reached the goal with not an hour to spare.”48

Battle Map - Collins Battlefield Atlas at 54. On the eve of battle, Gen. Sanborn claims that Gen. Fisk confessed “that he had never been under fire once [and] should depend wholly upon me for everything.”49 Sanborn states:

46 Gen. Sanborn at 17-18. 47 Gen. Sanborn at 18. 48 Gen. Sanborn at 15. Sanborn claims Gen. Fisk arrived on October 4 with “a few hundred men.” Id. at 17. 49 Gen. Sanborn at 18. Page 12 of 32

[A]s the commander of the post and forces at Jefferson City, my position was one of grave responsibility. I did not have under me more than 6,000 men, horse, foot, and dragoons, volunteers, militia and citizens, while the enemy number fully 16,000 men. But I had the advantage of some fairly good fortifications, plenty of ammunition, men in whose fighting qualities I had confidence, and I determined that Jefferson City should not be re-entered until my command had been fairly and utterly whipped. The Missouri River was at my back, and I could not well have retreated if I had even entertained the thought. The appeals of women and non- combatants to me to remain and save their lives were most touching.50

The stage was set for a mighty battle. With fortifications in place, including gun turrets cut into homes, the fight would be block-by-block, house-by-house, and more closely resembled urban battles of World War II than the typical open field battles associated with the Civil War. One can imagine the fear of German immigrant families and freed slaves who remained in the city as Price’s band of outsiders threatened our city. Even beyond the three companies of the Citizens Guard, were they taking up arms themselves? Would they survive the battle and its aftermath?

Civil War Era Map of Civil War Defenses in Jefferson City

50 Gen. Sanborn at 18. Page 13 of 32

Gen. Sanborn described the bravery of one batch of recruits who had just arrived from Pike and Lincoln counties just north of St. Louis. They were led by “a smooth-faced young lawyer” named D.P. Dyer. Col. Dyer was blunt.51 He said his troops were raw and “all green in the tactics, but all fine shots and good fighters.” They had never been in battle, he said, “but they will obey orders to the best of their knowledge and they will fight to the last before the will run.” Dyer asked for Sanborn to ignore their inexperience, telling Gen. Sanborn, “Now I want to overlook our ignorance and awkwardness, and in the fight put us where you think we will do the most good, either in the front or in the rear, and we will do our very best for you.” When Gen. Sanborn gave Dyer and his green troops a position in one of the outer trenches to defend our community, Dyer pledged, “Now, General, when this fight is over, you will find us right there, dead or alive, unless you order us away.”52

Representative, Colonel, Senator, Congressman, Judge David Dyer

51 Col. Dyer was also a Missouri state representative at the time. 52 Gen. Sanborn at 19. Col. Dyer eventually became Congressman Dyer and a prominent lawyer in St. Louis. From 1907 to 1919, he served as a Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, passing away in 1924. Page 14 of 32

Fighting resumed on the morning of October 6 as Price and his large band of Confederates crossed the Moreau River. Then there was another pause until the day that lives in our history:

Early on the morning of the 7th, Gen. Price moved against us, with Fagan’s division in front and Cabell’s brigade in advance. Our forces, chiefly the [Missouri State Militia] dismounted, met them in good style, fighting them pluckily and falling back slowly. A part of the 6th Regiment, under Maj. E.S. King, and the 8th Regiment – which I had brought from Springfield – commanded by Col. J.J. Gravelly, were perhaps the most actively engaged and suffered most. Fagan lost pretty severely, and we now know that many of his best officers and men were killed and wounded. I was out to the field and I know that the skirmishers were stubborn and the fight was very fierce and deadly.53

Gen. Fisk’s biography explains:

On the 7th, Price moved across the Moreau, after sharp fighting there with the Union cavalry force, and, as his resistance fell back within the defensive line, advanced upon the town. He was surprised to find an enveloping system of earthworks, which, by their extent and apparent strength, implied a large garrison and ample equipment. He was misled, too, by the fictitious orders that had been brought to him from General Fisk. Not to assail the place meant abandonment of his errand, in large part, and to make assault might mean utter destruction. Price had got a taste of fighting earthworks at Pilot Knob, and was not eager for more. These were formidable beyond all previous hint, and apparently so well manned that capture was out of the question.54 But Price was not finished. He did not immediately leave the area. Instead, they surrounded the city. A military historian explains what happened next:

Having forced a crossing of the Osage River, Shelby (a Confederate subordinate of Price) ordered the into the attack. The brigade pushed back Federal forces sent to regain the fords and pushed Sanborn’s pickets back to the Moreau River just south of Jefferson City. As Shelby formed his division south of the Moreau River, Sanborn’s brigade withdrew into the defenses of Jefferson City. Two calvary of the MSM and a detachment of the EMM conducted delaying operations at the ford site along the Moreau River repulsing two attacks before being dislodged by artillery. With Shelby across the Moreau, Fisk organized the Federal defense to meet the coming assault, Brown’s brigade to his left, Sanborn’s brigade in the center, and McNeil’s brigade, to the right. As Shelby’s division continued to push back the Federal delaying forces, Fagan’s division arrived on his right flank and a Confederate battery of artillery began suppressing the Federals in their entrenchments. Federal artillery quickly returned fire forcing the Confederate battery to withdraw. While Fagan prepared for an assault, Shelby moved his division to the northwest

53 Gen. Sanborn at 20. 54 The Life of Clinton Bowen Fisk at 84. Page 15 of 32

of town in front of McNeil. By nightfall [on the 7th], [Price’s] Army of Missouri was prepared to make an assault on Jefferson City.

However, having received information about the arrival of Sanborn and McNeil’s force and estimates doubling the size of the defending force, Price met with his subordinate commanders on the evening of 7 October. Still reeling from the defeat at Pilot Knob, and believing that they faced superior forces, the commanders decided not to make an assault on Jefferson City.

Early on 8 October, Shelby and Fagan left a small covering force in contact with the Federal defenders and withdrew to the southwest toward Russellville en route to Boonville, a town known for its Southern sympathies.55 One military historian, Maj. Dale Davis, explains, “Price spent two days developing the situation, committing two divisions in preparation for the attack, but based on reports of the Federal strength in Jefferson City, he did not order the assault on the capital, failing to achieve the second major objective of the raid.”56 The decision to move on was not Price’s alone, and it was not made from any location in eastern Jefferson City. Instead, it was made at the Wallendorf cabin near the intersection of 179 and West Edgewood.57 On October 8, Price’s army “formed in full view of the city as if to attack but then withdrew and departed to the west.”58 Although outmanned, the Federal forces in Jefferson City were the favorite to win the battle. As Maj. Davis put it, “Price made the right decision and bypassed Jefferson City because he lacked sufficient force to take the capital.”59 Here’s how Price himself described the decision:

I had received positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had arrived on the opposite bank of the river by the North Missouri Railroad before I withdrew my troops to the encampment selected, whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges and destroy the railroad on the west of Jefferson City in the direction of California, the county seat of Moniteau County, and after consultation with my general officers I determined not to attack the enemy’s intrenchments, as they outnumbered me nearly two to one and were strongly fortified but to move my command in the direction of , as instructed in my original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Boonville, Sedalia, Lexington, and Independence.60

55 Maj. Davis, Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid, at 51. 56 Maj. Davis, Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid, at 49-50. 57 Jefferson City News-Tribune, September 9, 2010. The cabin was moved to the Missouri Farm Bureau when the El Jimador restaurant was built near its location. 58 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 57. 59 Maj. Davis, Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid, at 51. 60 Collins, Battlefield Atlas at 57, citing O.R., Series I, Vol. XLI at 632. Price Report. Page 16 of 32

The Jefferson City Missouri State Times took stock of some of what was lost:

In regard to the devastation brought upon the country through which Price’s army of robbers has passed, we can judge of the region south of the Osage only by what has occurred on this side. For several miles in width along his route the crops are almost totally consumed, the people have been robbed of their money, and their houses plundered of everything valuable that the robber-army could use, or in any way convert into available means. Watches, trinkets, jewelry, silver ware and all availables easily carried, were uniformly appropriated. All male wearing apparel worth anything has been taken, even from off the persons of the owners, and frequently hats and boots. In many instances, the women’s clothing also has been taken. And every horse, saddle, and bridle worth having has been taken – worn out, sore-backed and crippled horses, in many instances, having been left in their places. Hundreds of such animals, almost valueless, were left in this region of country, which the military authorities, we learn, are gathering up, even though, as in many instances, they were left with parties in exchange for better ones forcibly appropriated. But many of them were turned loose upon the commons, probably where fresher horses were found. Horned cattle and sheep have also been killed or driven off, stripping the country bare, where they could be found, of all farm stock. Many farmers have lost everything, some to the extent of several thousand dollars. One man, Mr. Ottmeyer, a feeder and drover, in Westphalia, in Osage County, we are told, lost eight hundred head of cattle, and Charles Thompson of this county lost about five thousand dollars in farming stock and crops. … And nothing is too sacred to escape the pilfering hand of this army of thieves. In the pockets of a prisoner brought in, was found a silver watch, a lot of jewelry, a number of little keepsakes possessing very little intrinsic value, but highly prized, doubtless, by the owner, and even a string of Catholic beads – worth nothing, of course, to the graceless scamps who took it.61 Price and his Confederates were then chased west across the state, eventually getting whipped at the , then retreating to Arkansas. Price never returned to Jefferson

City. It would likely have been dangerous for him to do so. As he left the state, the Jefferson City

Missouri State Times expressed the sentiments of many, noting that “[t]he results of Price’s raid into Missouri, military and political, ought to cure him of any further desire to pollute the soil of our State by his presence.”62 And, wishing him ill, “May the alligators of the Southern bayous devour Price and his horde of ruffians, rather than that they be permitted to return to Missouri.”63

61 Jefferson City Missouri State Times, October 15, 1864 at 2. 62 Jefferson City Missouri State Times, Dec. 17, 1864 at 2. 63 Kremer at 70, citing Jefferson City Missouri State Times, December 17, 1864. In another article, the paper described him as follows, “Sterling Price was the next Governor of Missouri. He was a native of the state of Virginia. In the year 1861 he fled from the State, and is now a fugitive from his home and an unhappy wanderer – broken down in fortune, ruined in character and wrecked in reputation and political standing, with old age creeping upon him.” Jefferson City Missouri State Times, December 10, 1864. Page 17 of 32

Confederate soldiers who returned were met with hostility by local residents, “some of whom threatened to lynch the former soldiers.” The city papers warned, “We really think the responsible people of Jefferson [City] should take this matter in hand, and give notice to men who have rendered themselves obnoxious by their past bad conduct, that they will not be permitted to live here. … We cannot expect men who have been insulted and robbed by rebels to receive them very kindly on their return.”64 After a fight in a city hotel a few weeks later between a former

Union office and several veterans of Price’s Army, the Confederates were reported to have said, “Union men have the power now, but our day will come before long.”65

The United Daughters of the Confederacy The United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) was formed in 1894 for the purpose providing aid to Confederate veterans and promoting a Southern view of the Civil War, its aftermath, and American society. Despite the name and agenda, UDC organizations were not limited to the Confederacy. Missouri was not a Confederate state and Jefferson City was a Union town in the Civil War. Nevertheless, the Winnie Davis chapter of the UDC was formed here on April 29, 1899, where Mrs. Mattie W. Gannt was elected President.66 By the time the Jefferson City chapter was formed, the focus of the organization turned to what the UDC described at the time as “historical, educational, memorial, benevolent, and social” purposes. Mrs. Jas. B Gantt, the “Historian” of the Missouri Division of the UDC explained:

Hawkins Collection, Missouri State Archives, Winnie Davis Brach of UDC

64 Jefferson City Missouri State Times, July 4, 1866, cited by Kremer at 71. 65 Jefferson City Missouri State Times, July 28, 1866, cited by Kremer at 71. 66 Robert L. Hawkins, III Collection, Record Group 998.280, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City Page 18 of 32

This UDC history was devoted to the “Lost Cause” theory of the Civil War – and more. It extended to Reconstruction and the Klu Klux Klan. In 1912, the Historian General of the UDC, one Ms. Mildred Rutherford argued the KKK was a necessity and source of pride to the UDC:

The UDC’s embrace of the KKK was not an aberration. In 1913, UDC members at its national convention “unanimously endorsed” a children’s book named “The or Invisible Empire” and “pledged to secure its adoption as a Supplementary Reader in the schools and to place it in the Libraries of our Land.” The author dedicates the book to “Youth of the Southland, hoping that a perusal of its pages will inspire them with respect and admiration for the

Confederate soldiers, who were the real Ku Klux, and whose deeds of courage and valor, have never been surpassed, and rarely equaled, in the annals of history.”

Page 19 of 32

The book is chilling in its descriptions of newly freed slaves and its glorification of violence and terror. It spews the following:

The negro considered freedom synonymous with equality, and his greatest ambition was to marry a white wife. Under such conditions the negro clothed with all authority and outnumbering the white, two to one, open resistance would have meant instant death, or being sent to some Northern dungeon, there to languish and die, leaving loved ones exposed to dangers too terrible to contemplate, at the hands of these brutish despots. Under such conditions there was only one recourse left, to organize a powerful Secret Order to accomplish what could not be done in the open. So the Confederate soldiers, as members of the Ku Klux Klan, and fully equal to any emergency, came again to the rescue, and delivered the South from a bondage worse than death.67 The UDC then details methods, admitting that “some negroes were killed by the Ku Klux Klan, but in every instance, it was because they offered resistance.” The book describes what it means: It is true that some negroes were killed by the Ku Klux, but in every instance, it was because they offered resistance. The Ku Klux would visit a negro who had been guilty of wrong doing, and who had been repeatedly warned to conduct himself in the proper manner, they would carry him out to give him a severe whipping as a punishment, and in order to scare him into behaving himself, and the negro would make an attack on the Ku Klux, who were then forced to kill him in self-defense. The truth about it would never be known, and the report would go out that the Ku Klux had murdered a negro in cold blood, the truest facts in the case always being suppressed.68 Even in the absence of outright violence, the book paints a detailed picture of the terror that the KKK spread. In one chapter, with the UDC’s admiration, a Mississippi Klansman regales the UDC audience with a story about breaking up a large meeting at a water well: We had true and tried negroes, who had been with us, and ministered to our wants, faithful as Newfoundland dogs to their trusts. These negroes were our spies. They would tell us where the negroes, , and Carpet- baggers, were going to hold their meetings, and “Pow Wows” as they were called. Upon the night the meeting took place we would be there.69

One particular night, this Klansman set out on horses to confront a group meeting at a water well. The Klansman had put contraptions under their white robes into which they could pour water that, when released, made a hissing sound. The UDC history relays the story:

67 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 17. 68 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 28. 69 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 57. Page 20 of 32

As I rode up, there were about one hundred negroes around this well, and in the quarters were several thousand negroes, yanks, and scala-wags. The negroes were laughing, and making a noise, that could be easily heard half a mile away. When I came in sight, there was dead silence around the well. I rode straight up; an old white-haired negro had just drawn a bucket and it rested on the covering of the well. In a deep, sepulchral tone, I said, ‘Uncle Tom, give me a drink of water, I have not had one since the first battle of Manassas.’ He poured the water into a bucket, and handed it up, and down I poured it into my seemingly open mouth. The escaping air sounded like steam escaping from a surcharged boiler. I called for another, and another, until I had disposed of my thirteen buckets. The eyes of the negroes in that crowd were stretched in abject terror, and they were as dumb as oysters. For long years afterwards, after nightfall, not a negro could be induced to go to one of these wells that we had visited; and before the last one of us on one of these night rides had been water, not a white man or negro, who did not live in these quarters, could be found within a mile of them. Such a stampede as would take place, beggars my powers of description. The further they got from the scene, the greater became their fears; and the more rapid their flight; for distance, in reality, seemed to lend enchantment to their view.

We could rest assured, that there would never be another ‘Pow Wow’ in any quarter lot, church, or gathering place, that the Ku Klux Klan had paid a visit.70 To the author and the UDC it was all in good fun that the KKK could and would invoke this fear, and it was only the “superstitions” of their victims that prevented them from meeting. But, hold on, a black or white person meeting in Mississippi knew exactly what a group of men with white hoods, robes, crosses, and horses meant. It meant a significant threat of violence – or death – for the mere wrong of holding a meeting or being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The UDC details that the violence and threats were not limited to blacks or night, but also included whites who believed in the rule of law. The UDC’s book explains:

Down in Mississippi, during the high tide of Reconstruction, a Carpet-bag Justice of the Peace was trying a white man for assaulting a negro. One of the Ku Klux leaders of that State walked into court, and placed a pistol on the table in front of him, and moved, ‘that the court adjourn.’ It immediately did adjourn, and that Justice never held court again, although he remained in office more than a year longer.71

All of this was necessary, said the UDC, to prevent blacks from enjoying equal rights: The negro population was largely illiterate, and most of the negroes holding office during Reconstruction could neither read nor write, and yet they sat

70 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 57-59. 71 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 29. Page 21 of 32

upon petit and grand juries, were elected magistrates and constables when they did not known even the meaning of words. As members of the Legislatures, many of the negroes could only sign their pay rolls by means of signs and marks. This was the galling yoke that was to be thrust upon the necks of the white men of the South, in whose veins coursed the purest and best blood of the ages. Relief from this desperate and humiliating condition came through the Ku Klux Klan and the South was redeemed from Carpet- Bag, Scala-wag and Negro rule.72

The UDC’s book provides further examples – extolling the Klan’s breaking up of a meeting at a church – and stating that, the Klan taught the lesson of “the inevitability of Anglo-Saxon supremacy, … [when] the sturdy white men of the South, against all odds, maintained white supremacy and secured Caucasian civilization, when its very foundations were threatened within and without.”73 The UDC concluded with its description of how history should “think, then, of the Ku Klux Klan as a great circle of light, illuminated with deeds of love and patriotism, and holding within its protected and shining circle, the very life and welfare of our beloved Southland.”74 The

KKK, in the eyes of the UDC, was “a ray of light,” a “star of hope … [that] appears upon the scene with its avowed purpose to preserve and uphold the white civilization of the South. It was a creation born of necessitous times, of pure and patriotic impulses, and to relieve a dire and humiliating distress.”75 The KKK, says then UDC, “has just been called the Salvation of the South and its history should be written in letters of light.”76 A group that endorses such things rarely repents or renounces them. Such was the case with the UDC. In 1914, the Missouri UDC’s official “Course of Study” called for members to learn and teach about the history of the Klan as their task for September. In 1916, the president of the Los Angeles Chapter of the UDC penned another ode to the Klan, instructing that “Every clubhouse of the United Daughters of the Confederacy should have a memorial tablet dedicated to the Ku Klux Klan; that would be a monument not to one man, but to five hundred and fifty

72 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 32-33. 73 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 51. 74 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 77. 75 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 77. 76 UDC Unanimously Endorsed, The Ku Klux Klan or Invisible Empire at 77. Page 22 of 32 thousand men, to whom all Southerners owe a debt of gratitude; for how our beloved Southland could have survived that reign of terror is a big question.”

And in the 1920s, the Columbia Chapter of the UDC proudly announced that it was using the Klan book for program purposes:

In Alabama, UDC chapters sold “a beautiful Ku Klux Klan frost-card … for the benefit of the

United Daughters of the Confederacy work.”77 Another UDC group placed copies of the UDC’s KKK book in “all the school and public libraries of the city.”78

77 Alabama History of the UDC at 271. 78 Alabama History of the UDC at 305. Page 23 of 32

The Klan in Jefferson City The Klan had a presence in Jefferson City and its activities were both anti-black and anti- Catholic. The Klan established itself in Missouri in 1921 – first in Joplin and St. Louis, with Kansas City soon to follow. There is evidence that UDC members in Jefferson City were interested in the Klan’s growth. Among other newspaper clippings in the UDC scrapbook maintained at the Secretary of State’s office is a fraying copy of an article from the Kansas City Star in May 1921 titled, “The Fiery Cross Flames as in the Days of Old.”79

79 Robert L. Hawkins, III Collection, Record Group 998.280, OB35, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City Page 24 of 32

Klan newspapers claimed Jefferson City was “swarming with citizen-Klansmen.”80 In August 1923, the Klan “set fiery crosses at locations throughout the city and rumors circulated about a planned Klan parade.”81 At the time, the Fulton Daily Sun estimated there were 300 to 500 Klansmen in Cole County.82 In 1924, as the state came together to dedicate the new Capitol building, “rumors circulated in the press that John P. Gordon, a prominent Jefferson City Klansman and member of the capitol dedication committee, objected to a scene” with a positive portrayal of Catholic contributions to Missouri.83 Seating was segregated and the Klan made its presence known. It placed recruiting flyers throughout town, “including on the front of the pageant stage, advertising an upcoming ‘patriotic’ rally and a food stand run by” the KKK along the parade route.84 The statewide Klan used the state Capitol for its meetings. In July 1924, it organized a meeting (a “Klonvokation”) in the chamber of the Missouri House. Once inside, the Klan locked the doors to keep its meeting private. Gov. Arthur Hyde acted quickly – ordering the doors unlocked or for the Klan to leave the building.85 The Klan complied – and merely crossed the Capitol lawn and High Street to the Merchants Bank Building, where the headquarters of the Jefferson City Klan was located. Ironically, this is next door to the present location of the Missouri Chapter of the NAACP. In November 1924 of that year, Klan-backed L.C. Withaup ran the race for sheriff. When he took over, he allowed the Klan to ride along on liquor raids targeted mainly against area

Catholics. Leading the Jefferson City Tribune to ask, “Is the law of the klan above the law of the

80 Sean Rost, A Call to Citizenship: Anti-Klan Activism in Missouri – 1921-1928, July 2018 at 160, 204, citing Jefferson City Tribune, Nov. 25, 1925 and The Patriot, July 12, 1923. 81 Rost at 201, citing Cole County Rustler Weekly, Aug. 24, 1923. 82 Rost at 204, citing Fulton Daily Sun, Aug. 18, 1923. 83 Rost at 22. As fate would have it, Gordon was forced to introduce Catholic Archbishop John Glennon for the opening invocation. Cardinal Glennon “called on God to bless the capitol so that corruption might never be found within its walls and ‘the black clouds of bigotry might never darken its dome.” Id., citing St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 7, 1924. 84 Id. 85 Gov. Hyde had been criticized for a Klan event in the House chamber in February 1924, which the Jefferson City Klan had advertised by posting “fliers for the event throughout the community, including on the front door of the nearby St. Peter’s Catholic Church[.]” Id. at 266. Page 25 of 32 land?”86 In July, the Klan held a picnic with 400 attendees on the outskirts of Jefferson City, including sheriff’s department deputies.87 In November 1928, on the eve of election day, a series of crosses were burned along Lafayette Street – which then, as now, ran by Lincoln University.88 Democrats and Republicans blamed each other. But ultimately, the guilty party was never identified. By the mid-1930s, the Klan had largely died out in Jefferson City and throughout the country. But, of course, racism and Jim Crow had not. The Marker and Race-Relations in Jefferson City in 1933 In November 1932, the UDC decided it would place a Civil War marker in Jefferson City.89 Plans were made to place the marker at the intersection of Moreau Drive and Hough Park Road, and the ceremony was ultimately set for April 6, 1933 – Holy Thursday that year. In 1933, it was not easy to be black and living in Jefferson City. The late history Prof.

Lorenzo Greene from Lincoln University described what it was like to arrive in 1933: As I lugged my bags off the train, I had one overriding desire: to reach the university as quickly as possible. Fortunately, several taxes were parked near the station. I hailed one. The first white driver ignored me. The next let me have it straight: “We don’t haul niggers. Get that ‘nigger’ cab over there.” Stifling my anger, I took my bags to where two taxis, driven by blacks were parked.90 The cab then took Greene to campus, where there was a restaurant just across the street. By this time, it was late and Greene was hungry – but they would not serve him at the restaurant across the street. He was directed down the street to a drug store. Greene describes what happened next: The drugstore had a lunch counter. It was now nearly ten o’clock and I was hungry. I sat down at the counter. A young man asked me what I wanted. “A hamburger and a vanilla malted milk,” I said. “I’m sorry,” he replied, “but we don’t serve colored here.” I felt both angry and embarrassed, particularly since several white customers were intently watching me with smirks on their faces. Ignoring them, I asked the clerk whether he had any

86 Id. at 304, citing Jefferson City Tribune, June 5, 1925. 87 Id. at 305, citing Jefferson City Tribune, July 22, 1925. 88 Id. at 325, citing Jefferson City Post-Tribune, November 5, 1928; Jefferson City Daily Capital News, November 6, 1928. 89 UDC members themselves would likely never refer to it as the “Civil War,” but instead as either “The War of Northern Aggression” or “The War Between the States.” 90 Lorenzo Greene, Gary Kremer, and Antonio Holland, Missouri’s Black Heritage, at 1. Page 26 of 32

vanilla ice cream. He replied that he did. “You can sell a colored person a pint of ice cream, can’t you?” I asked sarcastically. “Yes,” he answered. “Well, give me a pint of vanilla, and you do have wooden spoons?” Again an affirmative reply. “Then please put two of them in the bag with the ice cream!” He did so. I left the story, carrying my “supper” with me. Lonely and angry, I retraced my steps to the university. It was my first experience with racism in Jefferson City.91 It was in this atmosphere that the UDC gifted the city a marker to the city focused on the Confederacy. On April 2, 1933, the Sunday before the unveiling, the Jefferson City Tribune ran a feature article on the unveiling. The article noted that Missouri Gov. Guy Park was expected to speak and that the Missouri red granite boulder and bronze plaque purchased by the UDC was “to mark the spot where Gen. Sterling Price … decided he would not try to capture Missouri’s Capital City and subject it to the Southern cause.”92 The paper noted that there was no marker anywhere else in the city, and “the UDC started a movement to keep alive in the city’s memory at least this one historic and far-reaching decision which historians agree did much toward hastening the close of the conflict and probably saved the Capital City from much bloodshed and destruction.”93 The article, likely written from a template or press release provided by the UDC, is an incredible testament to the UDC’s effort to rewrite history. It starts by claiming that Jefferson City was “in effect,” Price’s “hometown” and that Gov. Clairborne Fox Jackson was “driven out of Jefferson City” and established “the state capital temporarily at Neosho and there the administration of government was carried on.” In fact, what happened is that Missouri’s convention in 1861 (called by Jackson), voted 98 to one against secession, Gov. Jackson refused to provide support to the Union, and he fled Jefferson City in fear of advancing Union troops that were supporting the state convention’s rejection of secession. It also ignores that a later convention declared Jackson’s office vacated because he had abandoned the State Capital, and new officers were appointed.

91 Greene, Missouri’s Black Heritage at 2. 92 Jefferson City Tribune, April 2, 1933. 93 Id. Page 27 of 32

The article laments that a new Gov. Tom Reynolds “was powerless to return to Jefferson City.” But it omits that Gov. Reynolds had abandoned the state altogether – going into the private practice of law in South Carolina after the Federal government had established a provisional government there after retaking control of the state.94 It also omits that Reynolds had established a Missouri state in Marshall, – not Neosho.95 Next, the article asserts, “With this condition existing in Missouri, General Lee asked Price to invade the state as a raiding party and if possible, capture the capital.” This too is revisionist. General Lee did not task Price with invading the state. Gen. Lee was the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. General E. Kirby Smith was the Confederate commander of the Trans- Mississippi Department. Price’s orders were given by Gen. Smith, not Gen. Lee.96 Then the article claims, “While Lee knew the cause of the South was hopelessly lost, historians quote him as believing such a strategic move would do much toward strengthening the courage of the Confederacy and bolster a badly shaken morale.” So, if this article is to be believed, in September 1864, Lee was still fighting hard in northern Virginia and thousands of his men were still dying, even though he “knew the cause of the South was hopelessly lost.” So, to bolster the Southern spirit, he ordered an invasion of a state in which he had never set foot for a task that he knew to be hopeless? This conflicts with any argument that Gen. Lee was honorable. What honorable man would subject his troops and fellow citizens to months of further deprivation, despair, and death just so he could temporarily “strengthen the courage” and bolster morale?

Here’s how the write-up on the UDC’s marker unveiling 67 years after the fact described the events of October 6, 1864: The Union army was intrenched behind their stone fortifications, plainly in view of the valley below. These fortifications were spread out over the entire district which now includes Vineyard Square, Moreland and Elmerine Avenues and Moreau Drive as far north as Fairmount Circle. Many of the beautiful cobblestone houses in this section and the buildings at the State Park were built from the old stone walls that stood until recent years.

94 Mark A. Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign: The 1864 Invasion of Missouri, at 14-15. 95 Lause, Price’s Lost Campaign at 14-15. 96 Maj. Davis, Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid, at 31. Page 28 of 32

With the two forces facing each other, excitement in Jefferson City ran high. Every citizen, whether Southerner or Northerner, was barricading his home for the battle that seemed inevitable.

At sunrise, both sides were ready for the order to attack. The capitol dome was plainly in view of the Confederates who confidently expected to capture it by nightfall. Several hours passed, and no word came from the tent of the commanding general. Finally at 10 o’clock the staff officers were called to headquarters and the order to march westward was given. Jefferson City would not fall to the Confederates.

…

While many reasons have been advanced as to why Price passed up Jefferson City, it is believed the real reason for his decision was his love for the city and his affection for its citizens with whom he had spent four of the happiest years of his life as governor of the state.

…

A bronze tablet, identifying the spot and the event, is being placed on the granite marker to be unveiled Thursday.97

And this, it appears, is where the myth that Sterling Price “spared” Jefferson City because of a romantic notion that he “loved the city too much to attack” appears to have been born and gained acceptance by our community. I can remember hearing that explanation growing up here. And yet, there is no basis for that claim. Try to put yourself in Price’s shoes – or buggy – if you will. Here he is in 1864 on the outskirts of Jefferson City. Things are looking bleak for the Confederacy. He is a slave-owner. He is incredibly ambitious and self-absorbed. He has thrown his lot in with the Confederacy. He has suffered several failures as a general. Now, against the odds, he has been given charge of a last- chance sling-shot effort to win the entire war by swaying the election of 1864 against Abraham Lincoln. If he succeeds in taking and keeping Jefferson City, Price must believe he will be a hero for all of Confederate history. But Price and his men had just been whipped at Pilot Knob. And when he reaches the spot where he could claim his mantle as the man who saved the South, he is met with fierce resistance

97 Historic Marker to Be Unveiled Thursday: Gov. Park to Speak on Spot Where General Price Made Momentous Decision in Civil War, Jefferson City Daily Capital News, April 2, 1933 Page 29 of 32 and the prospect of fighting through earthworks and block-by-block, house-by-house through what he believes to be a thoroughly fortified and defended city. He also knows that, even if he happens to gain control of the town, the lesson of 1861 is that, with control of the river, Union reinforcements can arrive from St. Louis within days – and he will have to win yet another battle. Rather than choosing not to attack because he loved our city, the clear facts are that Price decided he could not take it without a bloodbath to his own men and that, even if he could take the city, there’s no way he could hold it for long after incurring heavy losses. Sterling Price did not turn away from here because he was a gentleman who loved Jefferson City. He turned away because he knew he could not win. The combination of the Union Army, German immigrants, freed slaves and others in our community were going to give him the fight of his life. He was going to lose, perhaps die, and he knew it. Even with his decision to leave without attack, the city was in shambles – and it is safe to say he was the most hated man in the city: “may the alligators of the Southern bayous devour Price and his horde of ruffians, rather than that they be permitted to return to Missouri.”98 Those are not words reserved for an honorable man. Yet, here we are, seven score and 16 years later, and it is only General Price who has a Civil War marker in our community with his name – securing his memory but not the actual facts of what happened in October 1864, much less any other time during the Civil War. While purporting to be neutral, the marker is anything but. By only stating, “Deciding against attack, the

Confederate Army under Gen. Sterling Price turned from Jefferson City October 7, 1864,” the

UDC made Price the hero and his decision the center of the story. Price was no hero. Nor was his Confederate army. To Jefferson Davis, Price was “the vainest man” he ever met. To his commanding officer, Price was “good for nothing.” He was so untrustworthy with power that his superiors sent Thomas Reynolds along to ensure Price would not name himself governor. To Reynolds, Price was “devious, insincere, petulant, and arrogant.”

And his campaign was ultimately described by one prominent fellow Confederate as “the stupidest,

98 Kremer at 70, citing Jefferson City Missouri State Times, December 17, 1864. Page 30 of 32 wildest, wantonest, wickedest march every made by a general who had a voice like a lion and a spring like a guinea pig.”99 The UDC’s marker makes a hero out of a man of whom our community said should never “pollute the soil of our State by his presence” again. But worse, the UDC marker purposefully ignores our community’s history as a Union-town, a German-immigrant town, and a refuge to freed slaves so desperate that they were willing to swim across the Missouri River in droves to get here. In doing so, the UDC helped perpetuate the myth that still lives on today – that Jefferson City was “spared” by Price’s chivalric notions. The opposite was true. Jefferson City was nearly ruined by his mere presence in the vicinity and he was hated here. In one sense, the marker, as currently placed, is ahistorical. There is no historical value to the rock. There is no historical value to the concrete block on which it sits. There is no historical value to the plaque that is pinned upon it. And there is no historical value to the place where it sits today. Worse, the marker is anti-historical. It perpetuates a myth, not historic truth. And it puts the focus on the Confederacy when, in our town, the focus should be on the Union, the anti-slavery German immigrants, and the freed black residents who worked together to stave off an attack. Our community has a tremendous, truthful story to tell about its place in the Civil War. While that history is complicated by Confederate sympathizers, we were a Union city from start to finish. Instead of celebrating the outsiders who our city’s forebears thought should be devoured by alligators, we ought to celebrate the Union troops, German immigrants, and freed black residents who made our community their refuge from racial violence just outside our borders.

99 Id. at 4. Page 31 of 32

Proposed Actions for the City of Jefferson

1. Remove the United Daughters of Confederacy marker to Sterling Price as soon as possible. The men who wore the grey were wrong. That should not be a controversial statement. Eighty- seven years of UDC fiction is long enough. This is not the Deep South. Our history was complicated, but ultimately our city was on the right side of history. We can and should honor our city’s rich heritage – its true history. Let’s celebrate our Union, not our divisions.

2. Begin a process for placing historically accurate markers to honor our City’s actual history. The City should consult with community leaders, organizations, stakeholders, and historians to create several spaces to celebrate our actual history. These could include: a. McClung Park – An exhibit on entrenchments and the City’s effort to save itself.

b. Munichburg – Highlighting Civil War contributions of German immigrants. c. North Jefferson City / Bridge / Adrian’s Island – A marker to commemorate Missouri’s status as a beacon and refuge for slaves escaping to freedom in 1863. d. Jackson Street by MSP – A marker recognizing the Iatan’s landing in 1861. e. MSP – A museum with the full, honest history of Jefferson City in the Civil War.

Page 32 of 32