Non-Natural Ruthenium Isotope Ratios of the Undeclared 2017
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ARTICLE https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16316-3 OPEN Non-natural ruthenium isotope ratios of the undeclared 2017 atmospheric release consistent with civilian nuclear activities ✉ ✉ Timo Hopp 1,3,4, Dorian Zok2,4, Thorsten Kleine 1 & Georg Steinhauser 2 Understanding the circumstances of the undeclared 2017 nuclear release of ruthenium that led to widespread detections of the radioisotope 106Ru in the Eurasian region, and whether it 1234567890():,; derives from a civilian or military source, is of major importance for society and future improvements in nuclear safety. Until now, the released nuclear material has merely been studied by analyzing short-lived radioisotopes. Here, we report precise measurements of the stable isotopic composition of ruthenium captured in air filters before, during, and after the nuclear release, and find that the ruthenium collected during the period of the 2017 nuclear release has a non-natural isotopic composition. By comparing our results with ruthenium isotopic compositions of spent nuclear fuels, we show that the release is consistent with the isotopic fingerprints of a civilian Russian water-water energetic reactor (VVER) fuel at the end of its lifetime, and is not related to the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. 1 Institut für Planetologie, University of Münster, Wilhelm-Klemm-Str. 10, 48149 Münster, Germany. 2 Institute of Radioecology and Radiation Protection, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Herrenhäuser Str. 2, 30419 Hannover, Germany. 3Present address: Origins Laboratory, Department of the Geophysical Sciences ✉ and Enrico Fermi Institute, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA. 4These authors contributed equally: Timo Hopp, Dorian Zok. email: thorsten. [email protected]; [email protected] NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 11:2744 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16316-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 1 ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16316-3 nuclear accident may become a serious hazard for during the production of a highly radioactive 144Ce source humankind and exhibit long-lasting consequences for the commissioned for the European sterile neutrino project SOX- A 2,11 environment. Decades ago, and especially in the aftermath Borexino in the Gran Sasso National Laboratory (GSNL) . of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, global networks of monitoring The degree of burnup of the reprocessed fuel is key for stations were established for atmospheric radioactivity surveil- understanding the fuel’s past use prior to the release. High lance. They now have the sensitivity and precision to identify burnup would imply a civilian purpose of the spent fuel. Low atmospheric releases of even small amounts of anthropogenic burnup, by contrast, may indicate a military purpose, such as radionuclides1. In September and October 2017, these monitoring production of weapons-grade Pu or even utilization of low- stations detected a radioactive cloud over a wide swath of Europe burnup fissile material in a nuclear-powered missile17. With fi 106 = containing the ssion products Ru (T1/2 371.8 d) and traces increasing burnup, nuclear fuel will increasingly accumulate 103 2 240 of Ru (T1/2 = 39.2 d) . The characteristics of the release (e.g., Pu, which thwarts its applicability in nuclear warheads. lack of concomitant radionuclides) suggested that the source was Any use of low-burnup fuel would also affect the model age of a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. The source term of the the released material. The above model age of 1.5–2 years after release was estimated at 250 TBq 106Ru, and atmospheric mod- neutron irradiation applies only to high-burnup fuel. In parti- eling indicated that the cloud originated in the southern Urals in cular, if low-burnup fuel had been used to produce the 144Ce the Russian Federation2,3. This area hosts one of the largest source above mentioned, the measured ratio of 103Ru/106Ru nuclear facilities in the world, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise would make the released material appear younger than its actual (FSUE) Production Association Mayak in Ozersk, Russia. age. In other words, low burnup could also mean that the fuel that Currently, no country has assumed responsibility for this was used for the 144Ce source was in fact “older” than the sug- considerable release, which is likely the single-largest accidental gested ≤2 years. This could mean that it underwent the estab- release from civilian nuclear reprocessing4. Despite a large lished and safe reprocessing scheme with ~3 years of cooling. As number of meteorological indications3,5–8, Russian authorities outlined in ref. 18, the compact design of the 144Ce source and institutions have repeatedly denied any involvement of the required exceptionally high specific activity, which is only Mayak facility in the release9–11. In their official statement9, the achievable either by reducing the minimum cooling time from 3 Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation emphasized that to 2 years (high-burnup scenario) or by reprocessing fuel that has there were not any incidents at any of the Rosatom sites during undergone only approximately one-third of its nominal burnup the period of September–October 2017. The FSUE Production (i.e., prior to reaching the end of its lifetime), while allowing 3 Association Mayak is a subsidiary of Rosatom. The Russian years of cooling (low-burnup scenario). In any case, since Mayak authority also referred to this statement in response to a query not only hosts a reprocessing facility but also has an explicit concerning the release of 106Ru from the International Atomic military history, it has until now not been possible to rule out a Energy Agency (IAEA) to its 43 member states in the region12. military context or another low-burnup scenario of the release. According to IAEA, none of the countries reported an event that The circumstances of the incident cannot be assessed solely by could be the cause of the release of 106Ru in the fall of 201712.In analyzing the detected radioactive Ru isotopes, because the an interview with Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, resulting 103Ru/106Ru ratio is a function of neutron flux, energy the deputy director of the Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian spectrum, fuel type that varies by reactor type and burnup, and Academy of Sciences (IBRAE) argued that “if the Mayak facility decay time. Since none of these variables are known, the 103Ru/ [were] the source, then we would have found concentrations 106Ru ratios do not allow the direct distinction of the provenance hundreds of thousands of times the norm around it and in the of the released material. The stable isotopic composition of soil10.” The IBRAE also set up an International Independent fission-generated Ru also depends on the fuel type, hence, varies Scientific Commission for the investigation of the release of by reactor type and burnup, but not on radioactive decay. 106Ru. The Commission gathered two times, in January and April Therefore, precise measurements of the stable isotopic composi- 201813,14. The Commission agreed on an estimated release source tion of fission-generated Ru can serve as an indicator of whether term of the event of ~100 TBq13. Science reported that a repre- the released material was produced in a civilian reactor or during sentative of the Russian nuclear regulator Rostechnadzor who a low-burnup scenario, e.g., the production of weapons-grade inspected Mayak in November 2017 told the Commission that he Pu19–21. saw no anomalies in the Mayak facility from a month earlier11. Here, we show that precise stable isotope analyses of Ru in Early alternative attempts at explanation of the release, such as a environmental samples can be used to constrain the provenance release on Romanian territory9 or the burning of a satellite’s of nuclear material released into the atmosphere. We present the radionuclide battery containing 106Ru10 had been addressed first high-precision measurements of stable Ru isotopic compo- previously2 and were essentially dispelled. While it is difficult to sitions of particulate matter collected in air filters including one imagine that a private facility could routinely handle such con- sample that contains material from the 2017 Ru release. We siderable activities, it is clear that nuclear facilities (both private conclude that the stable isotopic composition of the 2017 nuclear and state-run), including reprocessing facilities, must be operated release is consistent with fission-generated Ru produced in reg- under strict governmental regulatory control15 and report any ular, high-burnup spent fuel; hence, the nuclear release was most events to the regulator. likely related to an accident during reprocessing of spent fuel used Previous studies have focused on tracking the cloud across in civilian nuclear activities. Europe and have provided chemical insights, suggesting that the release occurred at an advanced stage of the reprocessing, when the Ru species had been transformed from initially produced Results Ruthenium isotopic compositions of air filter samples gaseous RuO4, at least in part, into one or more soluble com- . Isotopic pounds with medium volatility2. One of the released chemical anomalies caused by the decay of anthropogenic radioisotopes are species was identified as a polychlorinated Ru(III) form16. The extremely difficult to observe in regular environmental samples as release carried a 103Ru/106Ru signature of very young spent fuel the additional input of the decay products