New Directions

Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 4

4-1-1976 The .SU . Involvement in Courtland Cox

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Recommended Citation Cox, Courtland (1976) "The .SU . Involvement in Angola," New Directions: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 4. Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/4

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Cox: The U.S. Involvement in Angola WORLD WIDE PHOTOS Before Independence-MPLA's , (left) who now heads the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, is seen here with FNLA's Holden Roberto (center) and UNITA's during January 1975 unity talks in Mombasa, .

"European" - the ru lers; 5 "African"-minimally, 95 percent of the population of Angola, oppressed, THE U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA exploited, and angry.

By Courtland Cox In 1954, the Bakongo tribe of Northern The internal struggle in Angola has a policy decision to improve relations with Angola chose Holden Roberto as its new relatively long history. The long standing the white regimes in Southern Africa. chief in a secession quarrel that was tied differences between the leaders of the (According to State Department aides at up with reform issues and Catholic-Prot- National Front for the Liberation of Angola a hearing before the Subcommittee on estant religious conflict. What Roberto (FNLA) and the Popular Movement for the Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Com- stood for at this point was separation of Liberation of Angola (MPLA) are both mittee, February 5, 1976, the CIA kept the Bakongo from Angola, and tribal self- ideological and personal. As far back as Roberto on the payroll [reportedly at a determination through the reestablishment 1964, the Organization of African Unity sum of $10,000 annually] as an intelli- of the old "Bakongo Empire" of the 15th (OAU) tried to mediate the differences gence source). Century, which stretched between Angola between the two factions, but gave up in In January, 1975, when it became clear and what is now . The organization 1966 without success. that Angola would receive its independ- formed for this purpose was UPNA-the Given the long and bitter ideological ence, this time the Ford administration Popular Union of Northern Angola. and personality differences between turned Roberto back on by granting him a During this same period, men like NFLA head Holden Roberto and MPLA surn of $300,000. According to testimony Agostinho Neto, Marcelino Dos Santos, head Agostinho Neto, it should not be too by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Amilcar Cabral, all "assimilado" surprising to see them opposing each before the Senate Subcommittee on from Portugal's African colonies, were other in the Angolan conflict. Africa, January 29, 1976, the funds were returning to Africa after university educa- given to Roberto for the purchase of tion and political involvement in. the The American Role supplies and bicycles. Portuguese left. The played a dual role in In the early spring of 1975, President Neto, who returned to , had Angola from 1961 to 1969. It supplied Gerald Ford made the decision to also already been jailed in Portugal for his Portugal's military needs for the colonial fund the National Union for the Total militant anti-fascist poetry. As a gynecolo- wars in Africa; at the same time, hedged Independence of Angola [UNITAl, which gist, he set up practice in Luanda's slums, its bets in Angola .by supporting FNLA was founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi. but also maintained political commitment, with funds for political and logistical The 40 Committee-a body in the Execu- becoming involved in the formation of the purposes. tive branch that approves large scale MPLA-the Popular Movement for the Ostensibly, the United States sold covert operations (chaired by Kissinger), Liberation of Angola- in 1956. This move- millions of dollars in arms- including approved $300,000 in secret subsidies ment at this time was primarily urban- based and different from UPNA in its bombs, napalm, munitions-to Portugal for UNITA. Both President Ford and Sec- for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- retary Kissinger were aware that bring ing non-tribal orientation as well as in its leadership which, while "nationalist," was tion) purposes. However, during hearings UNITA to the American side constituted by Congressman Charles Diggs (0- a major step-close to a commitment that also pol itically leftwing - borrowing much, Mich.) in March, 1973, it was revealed the United States would not allow MPLA though not blindly, from Marx and Lenin. that the United States had indeed con- to control Angola. At the persuasion of a number of African tributed to the prosecution of the counter- An official of the Ford administration leaders attend ing the 1958 All African insurgency warfare in Angola, Mozam- told John Marks, an associate at the .Peoples Conference in , Roberto bique and -Bissau. Center for National Security Studies, dropped the "N" from UPNA and rede- Also, the United States subsidized-at that Kissinger pushed hard for increased fined the movement as a movement for a much reduced level-Holden Roberto's CIA intervention. "Henry wanted to be national liberation.UPA, however, never FNLA through Zaire and CIA conduits told why we should intervene," said the lost its tribal image or its hostility to the from 1961 to 1969. (New York Times, official,"not why not." (Intelligence "urban elites" of MPLA. In political terms September 23, 1975). But, in 1969, the Report, Vol. 1, No.1, December 1975). this translated into an anti-communist Nixon administration decided to end the Many within the State Department were hostility-communism being the rather covert aid program to FNLA as a part of Continued on Page 40 inaccurate view by UPA of MPLA's objec- Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, tives. Though ill-defined politically, UPA's 1 New Directions, Vol. 3 [], Iss. 2, Art. 4

40 The U. S. Involvement in Angola Before the FNLA military demise, U. S. The United States, it would (Continued from Page 5) transport planes C-141 and C-130, flying seem, perceives itself as the on behalf of the CIA, would land regularly opposed to the United States interven- number one power in the tion in Angola. in , Zaire, disgorging tons of Nevertheless, America and its Euro- military supplies, including rifles, world and, in pursuit of its pean allies provided arms to FNLA and machine guns, light arti Ilery, rocket superpower status, has UNITA. Official sources indicate that the launchers and munitions; these fn turn engaged in a form of perma- were flown to the Angolan town of United States alone spent $32 million for nent war. Richard Barnet, in arms in Angola during 1975. A closer Ambriz by smaller planes. In addition to figure to the truth would be between $125 the arms and munitions, the United States his book Roots of War, and $150 million. The White House has flew artillery spotter planes, piloted by points out that since' 1945 suppressed the House Intelligence Com- Americans, into the Angolan battle zones. con- Mercenaries were either trained or paid the United States has mittee report which points out that the ducted a major military Ford administration undervalued arms for with funds from the United States. sent to Angola from four to ten times Despite the opulent airlift of French, campaign in paramilitary CIA their actual value. (New York Times, Belgian, German and American arms, operations in a former January 20,1976). FNLA lost ground steadily. By the end of September, 1975, FNLA suffered major colonial or dependent country in Africa, Asia, Before the FNLA military military defeats. On the other hand, MPLA controlled the Angolan capital of Luanda, Middle East, Latin America, demise, U. S. transport planes all the major ports, both ends of the stra- South America and Europe C-141 and C-130, flying on tegic Benguela railway and, most impor- on an average of once every behalf of the CIA, would land tantly, 12 of Angola's 16 provinces. FNLA had been forced back into the two north- 18 months. regularly in Kinshasa, Zaire, ern provinces of Uige and Zaire, and in disgorging tons of military early October, 1975, was being pressed even there. morning of November 2, FNLA and UNITA supplies, including rifles, forces-led by South Africans- attacked machine guns, light artillery, In the southern part of Angola, FNLA had formed an uneasy alliance with Benguela, which is less than 300 miles to rocket launchers and muni- UNITA, which at that time controlled the the north of Mocamedes. By November tions; these in turn were provinces of Huambo and Bie. UNITAhad 11, in less than three weeks, MPLA had lost control of most of the coast of Angola flown to the Angolan town of joined the fighting with reluctance in August and recruited, along with' FNLA, and all of the southern provinces. The Ambriz by smaller planes. In foreign mercenaries to stiffen resistance South Africa-United States-UNITA-FNLA addition to the arms and against MPLA forces. military objective of pushing the MPLA munitions, the United back from most of the provinces in south- The South African Offensive ern Angola was accomplished. On States flew artillery spotter In the last week of October, 1975, the November 11, MPLA had control of only planes, piloted by Americans, military situation in Angola drastically 6 of 16 provinces, and its claim to rule into the Angolan battle changed. According to wire service Angola as the sole political entity was effectively discredited. zones. Mercenaries were reports, unidentified forces-South Afri- can troops-moved into Angola from While the South Africa-United States either trained or paid for Namibia (South West Africa). The South offensive succeeded militarily, it was a with funds from the United African troops took Pereira de Eca, a disaster politically. Many African nations States. major road junction just north of the that had adhered to the OAU's call for a border. government of national unity sided with Sa da Banderia, the capital of Huila MPLA. Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana and province, some 150 miles to the north- others recognized the government of the west, fell two days later. Mocamedes, a People's Republic of Angola as a direct port just to the west of Sa da Banderia, result of the South African offensive. Fora was occupied on October 20. On the time it seemed that most of Africa would http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/4 2 Cox: The U.S. Involvement in Angola

join in a condemnation of South Africa at Southern Africa would be threatened. trend continued, would be isolated and 41 the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, January .Arnerican policy, as outlined in the 1970 vulnerable. To retard the forces of Iibera- 10-12, 1976.To prevent a political rebuke National Security Study Mernorandurn tion, a four part strategy was advanced. of United States-South Africa policy in No. 39, was based on the assurnption First, South Africa would not take an overt Angola, President Ford sent Assistant that the white governrnents of Southern belligerent stance toward Mozambique; Secretary of State William Schaufele, Jr., Africa were going to rnaintain their power instead South Africa would try to strangle to confer with five African heads of state. in the area. The United States, therefore, Mozambique econornically. Second, Personal messages from the President could depend on South Africa, the Por- Rhodesia should be given majority rule were sent to 38 other African heads of tuguese governrnent, and the Ian Smith under a responsible (to South Africa) state. regime in Rhodesia to maintain stability Black government, so as to forestall The OAU meeting stalled in a 22-22 in the area. revolutionary armed struggle. Third, South deadlock, with Uganda and Ethopia The United States governrnent was not Africa would try to end its diplomatic abstaining. overjoyed when Portugal gave in to the isolation through its detente efforts. The Since the OAU conference, the military demands of Frelimo to govern Mozam- South Africans, through loans and other situation has turned again dramatically bique. Frelimo was socialist, it had re- inducements, would split Africa's hostil- in MPLA's favor. FNLA has been made ceived substantial military aid from ity to its apartheid regime. Finally, South ineffective as a military force, UNITA is in and the in its struggle for Africa and its allies wanted to be certain retreat and South Africa has pulled back independence. Mozarnbique could also that only a governrnent favorable to them -or was pushed back-by a combined serve as a rear base for African militants would corne to power in Angola. The gov- Cuban-MPLA military force. in South Africa. To prevent Frelirno frorn ernment of Angola had to be approved by heading the government of Mozambique, both President Mobutu of Zaire and Why did the United States intervene the CIA tried to cause civil strife by giving Prernier Vorster of South Africa. FNLAmet covertly in Angola? money and arms to a small group called the qualifications. During Angola's pre- The United States, it would seem, per- Ceremo. But Frelimo proved too strong independence transition period, the ceives itself as the number one power in and popular; the CIA's covert operation United States gave covert aid and arms' the world and, in pursuit of its super- failed. Both the United States and South to FNLA so that it might have overwhelrn- power status, has engaged in a form of Africa reluctantly accepted a Frelimo ing political and military advantage. permanent war. Richard Barnet, in his government in Mozambique, well aware book Roots of War, points out that since that Mozarnbique's economy was deeply Unlike most of Africa, 1945 the United States has conducted a and unavoidably tied to South Africa's Angola's independence came major military campaign in paramilitary economy. CIA operations in a former colonial or during a state of civil strife. dependent country in Africa, Asia, Middle In the 1960s, most of the A Long Struggle East, Latin America, South America and decolonization process in On the other coast of Southern Africa, the Europe on an average of once every 18 Africa was peaceful. Occa- months. Angolan people achieved independence In all of the above campaigns, the after a 14-year liberation struggle. During sionally, when hostilities United States, according to former U. S. the independence struggle, the move- occurred, the fighting was Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, had "no ments received arrns and monetary sup- between the former European sinister design, no hidden purpose, cer- port from either the Soviet Union or China. tainly no imperialist ambitions in our SWAPO (South West Africa People's colonial power and the policy, but simply moved to answer a Organization) received support from both African nationalists. The challenge." UNITA and MPLA in the struggle for the lines were sharp, and the liberation of Namibia from South African choices were clear. Why did the United States intervene rule. However, the Angolan economy, covertly in Southern Africa? unlike that of Mozambique's, was not so The Portuguese governrnent, after the heaviIy dependent on the South African April 25, 1974 coup, decided to decol- economy. onize in Africa. Some United States for- The trend in Southern Africa, after the eign policy planners and national Portuguese coup, was toward independ- security experts feared the stability of Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, ence and liberation. South Africa, if the 3