New Directions

Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 3

4-1-1976 : An Analysis of the Conflict Charles E. Cobb

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Recommended Citation Cobb, Charles E. (1976) "Angola: An Analysis of the Conflict," New Directions: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 3. Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/3

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4 By Charles E. Cobb, Jr. After years of strugg Ie against a brutal colonial system, Angola finally gained its I ,,< independence a few months ago. The road to nationhood for Portugal's last ~,¥~. ) colony in Africa was tough and ridden with much heralded bloody encounters l .;! among the various factions in the Angolan conflict. ANGOLA "'U :! Like Vietnam before it,Angola's struggle for national liberation constitutes a focal -, . ;J, point of an international conflict involving power, politics and economics. In part, it f represents a major clash of world views. Here, a brief history is in order. In mid-1950s, much of the colonial world was in the process of decolonizing. Much of Africa was in the beginning stages of political struggle that would lead to a burst of independence in the 1960s. The Vietnamese had defeated the French; was consolidating its hard won independence, armed struggle was beginning in Algeria; and stirrings of a new phase of Black struggle here in the could be felt. Angola was not isolated from these "winds ofchange." Relatively unorganized pol itical ferment and pressure for reform had begun there. Some of the roots of this ferment lie in what conditions in Portugal - then a fascist state- had produced. Poverty in Portugal accelerated migra- tion to Angola in the post World War Two period, heightening in Angola, already existing European-African land and labor tensions. The post war period also saw the devel- opment of a "Luso-tropical" notion. This idea defined Angola, Mozambique, and -Bissau as part of a greater Portu- gal with all inhabitants being Portuguese. This intensified the importance of various class and caste categories: "Assimilado"-a tiny minority of edu- cated Africans given legal status that enabled them to enter into professions; "Mestico"-offspring of Africans and Europeans, usually African women and Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, European men; 1 ------

New Directions, Vol. 3 [], Iss. 2, Art. 3 WORLD WIDE PHOTOS Before Independence-MPLA's , (left) who now heads the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, is seen here with FNLA's Holden Roberto (center) and UNITA's during January 1975 unity talks in Mombasa, .

"European" - the ru lers; 5 "African"-minimally, 95 percent of the population of Angola, oppressed, THE U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA exploited, and angry.

By Courtland Cox In 1954, the Bakongo tribe of Northern The internal struggle in Angola has a policy decision to improve relations with Angola chose Holden Roberto as its new relatively long history. The long standing the white regimes in Southern Africa. chief in a secession quarrel that was tied differences between the leaders of the (According to State Department aides at up with reform issues and Catholic-Prot- National Front for the Liberation of Angola a hearing before the Subcommittee on estant religious conflict. What Roberto (FNLA) and the Popular Movement for the Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Com- stood for at this point was separation of Liberation of Angola (MPLA) are both mittee, February 5, 1976, the CIA kept the Bakongo from Angola, and tribal self- ideological and personal. As far back as Roberto on the payroll [reportedly at a determination through the reestablishment 1964, the Organization of African Unity sum of $10,000 annually] as an intelli- of the old "Bakongo Empire" of the 15th (OAU) tried to mediate the differences gence source). Century, which stretched between Angola between the two factions, but gave up in In January, 1975, when it became clear and what is now . The organization 1966 without success. that Angola would receive its independ- formed for this purpose was UPNA-the Given the long and bitter ideological ence, this time the Ford administration Popular Union of Northern Angola. and personality differences between turned Roberto back on by granting him a During this same period, men like NFLA head Holden Roberto and MPLA surn of $300,000. According to testimony Agostinho Neto, Marcelino Dos Santos, head Agostinho Neto, it should not be too by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Amilcar Cabral, all "assimilado" surprising to see them opposing each before the Senate Subcommittee on from Portugal's African colonies, were other in the Angolan conflict. Africa, January 29, 1976, the funds were returning to Africa after university educa- given to Roberto for the purchase of tion and political involvement in. the The American Role supplies and bicycles. Portuguese left. The United States played a dual role in In the early spring of 1975, President Neto, who returned to , had Angola from 1961 to 1969. It supplied Gerald Ford made the decision to also already been jailed in Portugal for his Portugal's military needs for the colonial fund the National Union for the Total militant anti-fascist poetry. As a gynecolo- wars in Africa; at the same time, hedged Independence of Angola [UNITAl, which gist, he set up practice in Luanda's slums, its bets in Angola .by supporting FNLA was founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi. but also maintained political commitment, with funds for political and logistical The 40 Committee-a body in the Execu- becoming involved in the formation of the purposes. tive branch that approves large scale MPLA-the Popular Movement for the Ostensibly, the United States sold covert operations (chaired by Kissinger), Liberation of Angola- in 1956. This move- millions of dollars in arms- including approved $300,000 in secret subsidies ment at this time was primarily urban- based and different from UPNA in its bombs, napalm, munitions-to Portugal for UNITA. Both President Ford and Sec- for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- retary Kissinger were aware that bring ing non-tribal orientation as well as in its leadership which, while "nationalist," was tion) purposes. However, during hearings UNITA to the American side constituted by Congressman Charles Diggs (0- a major step-close to a commitment that also pol itically leftwing - borrowing much, Mich.) in March, 1973, it was revealed the United States would not allow MPLA though not blindly, from Marx and Lenin. that the United States had indeed con- to control Angola. At the persuasion of a number of African tributed to the prosecution of the counter- An official of the Ford administration leaders attend ing the 1958 All African insurgency warfare in Angola, Mozam- told John Marks, an associate at the .Peoples Conference in , Roberto bique and Guinea-Bissau. Center for National Security Studies, dropped the "N" from UPNA and rede- Also, the United States subsidized-at that Kissinger pushed hard for increased fined the movement as a movement for a much reduced level-Holden Roberto's CIA intervention. "Henry wanted to be national liberation.UPA, however, never FNLA through Zaire and CIA conduits told why we should intervene," said the lost its tribal image or its hostility to the from 1961 to 1969. (New York Times, official,"not why not." (Intelligence "urban elites" of MPLA. In political terms September 23, 1975). But, in 1969, the Report, Vol. 1, No.1, December 1975). this translated into an anti-communist Nixon administration decided to end the Many within the State Department were hostility-communism being the rather covert aid program to FNLA as a part of Continued on Page 40 inaccurate view by UPA of MPLA's objec- http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/3 tives. Though ill-defined politically, UPA's 2 Cobb: Angola: An Analysis of the Conflict

6 In July 1964, Jonas Savimbi tration on the other hand, while having a Province; from Zambia, it had access to basic commitment to Portuguese coloni- who [in 1966] was to form Angola's eastern zone. alism, especially in terms of NATO-North That sameyear (1964),yet another coup UNITA - the National Union Atlantic Treaty Organization- interests, in Congo established Moise for the Total Independence felt it necessary to provide support for Tshombe as prime minister. Tshombe had UPA. of Angola - in breaking with led the Katanga Province secession UPA, was to tell the OAU The OAU Connection attempt and had received support from In July 1964,Jonas Savimbi who [in 1966] Portugal and South Africa. He returned the (Organization of African favor by closing the boundary to UPA- was to form UNITA-the National Union Unity) that UPA was FNLA-GRAE. This collapsed the already an for the Total Independence of Angola- in American creation aimed at breaking with UPA, was to tell the OAU shaky organization so far as military activity was concerned. splitting Angolan nationalists (Organization of African Unity) that UPA and assuring that if decoloni- was an American creation aimed at split- As mentioned earlier, Savimbi in 1964 ting Angolan nationalists and assuring broke with UPA-FNLA-GRAEand created zation did occur, neo- that if decolonization did occur, neo- UNITA in 1966. And, according to one colonial relations would colonial relations would be maintained. Portuguese official, Portugal looked with be maintained. Nevertheless, in 1961, despite contra- favor on this development in the hopes dictions, UPA had the appearance of a that the same kinds of conflicts that char- hostility was rightly placed in the sense potentially effective national movement; acterized FNLA-MPLA relations would that MPLA was for the elimination of the while MPLA was caught up in internal de- develop and continue to disrupt the devel- kinds of feudal remnants reflected in bate. Events in Congo Kinshasa assisted ment of a unified national liberation UPA's desires for a new ancient "empire." Roberto's UPA. was movement. There is no hard evidence that In the north, in Bakongoland, and in assassinated and Roberto was able to UNITA was "created" by the Portuguese. Luanda, there were sporadic political parlay tribal kinship into close ties with Though conflicts continued both inter- protests partly spurred by events in one of the contending factions there: the nally and with the rival movements,MPLA neighboring Congo Kinshasa (now Zaire). Cyri lieAbdou la.Joseph Kasavubu.Joseph managed from the latter part of 1964 to In February 1961,there was an MPLA-Ied Mobutu faction, which was America's fac- maintain fairly consistent guerrilla warfare, uprising in Luanda, basically. a failure, tion. A right-wing government in next-door helped by its close political ties to the certainly a military failure. A month Congo Brazzaville was another assist. stronger movements of PAIGC in Guinea- later, there was a UPA uprising in the MPLA also in Congo Kinshasa was very Bissau (its head, assassinated by the north. Both triggered massive Portuguese much a political pariah. Portuguese shortly before independence, repression. When the OAU was formed in 1963,UPA was Amilcar Cabral who was also one of Inside MPLA, the Luanda uprising which had by now formed an official fight- the founders of MPLA) and FRELIMO in intensified an already begun debate over ingwing called FNLA-the National Front· Mozambique. MPLAwas handicapped by strategy and goals. This debate was for the Liberation of Angola-also formed the fact that unlike PAIGC with a strongly handicapped by the fact that a significant a government, GRAE-Revolutionary An- committed Republic of Guinea neighbor- part of the MPLA leadership was in jail- golan Govemment in Exile. With this, they ing Bissau, and Mozambique with an Neto included. convinced the OAU Liberation Committee equally as committed Tanzania on its UPA was in a better military position to that they were the sole representative of border supporting FRELlMO,Angola had fight in a heavily forested area of Angola, the Angolan people. The Abdoula regime a hostile Congo Kinshasa then being run and won political and financial support expelled MPLA from Congo Kinshasa. by Mobutu in 1965, and a wishy-washy from some African states through the Agostinho Neto had escaped prison in Zambia to the east fearful of its copper efforts of Frantz Fanon-and interestingly, 1962 and was trying to rebuild MPLA. routes through Angola being disrupted. from the Kennedy adm inistration.Although Despite problems in Congo Kinshasa, a Meanwhile, Savimbi, after having Fanon felt closer politically to MPLA, he coup in Congo Brazzaville in 1964 moved broken with Roberto's UPA-FNLA-GRAE believed that UPAwas ready to start fight- that country leftward and enabled MPLA organization (Savimbi was foreign minis- ing immediately. In his view, at least at the to establ ish a base there. That same year, ter of GRAE) over that organization's lack time, it was most important for fighting to Zambia became independent and MPLA of fighting, and the tribalistic content of begin which would act to define a revolu- was able to locate there also. From Braz- its politics, went to Cairo and then spent Publishedtionary by Digital movement. Howard @ The Howard Kennedy University, adminis- zaville, MPLA had access to Cabinda a year in Switzerland, where he had done3 New Directions, Vol. 3 [], Iss. 2, Art. 3

most of his college education. During this tins didn't even mention UNITA.Also, like It is most important to 7 period, he also went to China, and to MPLA,the organization was hampered by mention at this juncture that Congo Brazzaville, where he held discus- internal differences, specifically in sions with Neto and MPLA UNITA's case, differences between the the United States had more Although Savimbi proclaimed a Marxist- regional commissioners of peasant origin than just a passive involve- Leninist line with Chinese orientation, in and the political commisioners of urban ment and concern with these 1963 he blocked the admission into GRAE origin. These intemal conflicts dovetailed events. First, the implications of Viriato da Cruz, who had broken with with an MPLA drive into eastern Angola the MPLA and who had good relations which sparked clashes between MPLA of independence for this area with the Chinese. This appears to be part and UNITA. of Africa were viewed with of a power strugg Ie between the two men Consequently, while UNITA was in much more interest than in for leadership of the left factions within Angola fighting and organizing, itcouldn't other areas of Africa. In trade MPLA and FNLA.Forapparently.Savirnbi's convince anybody that it existed. and investments, from Zaire main reason for not coming into MPLA In 1972, MPLA attempted to enter into after his break with Roberto,was his belief a military alliance with FNLA in the hopes to Africa's southern tip, that Neto's politics was "revisionist." Neto, that the Zaire border would become open billions of dollars were and for his part, seems to have considered to its forces, and also because there was are there. The area's potential Savimbi an unstable ultra leftist. political debate inside MPLA over the On March 19,1966 UNITA was formed necessity of at least operational unity with in terms of raw material was, and almost immediately began armed other Angolan movements. Part of the and is, of major significance; struggle. UNITA also called for a united pressure was also coming from inde- and the potential for capital front against the Portuguese,which MPLA pendent African states, most of whom investment crucial to the did not consider serious in light of were pledging (at OAU Conference in Savimbi's refusal to come into MPLA Morocco), to downplay political differ- financial and industrial .before forming UNITA. The FNLA for its ences among independent African states complex that runs the United part insisted that UNITAdissolve, and that in the interests of advancing the liberation States. The U. S. strategy for Savimbi write a letter of apology for his of Southern Africa. The clearest sign of the region had two prongs: denunciation of Roberto in 1964. this effort was in Tanzania's swallowing UNITA's fighting was on a front south its misgivings about Mobutu's role in the 1) moderate African buffer . of Luso in Angola and along the Zambian Lumumba murder and warming up its states around the white-ruled border. Though small in scope, it was relations with Zaire. states; 2) the permanence of consistent. One account has it that the internal white rule in the Southern Zambia's independence also helped MPLA debates were serious enough to region. UNITA in establishing an extemal base disrupt the Angola fighting, enough for there. But UNITA was expelled in 1967 Portugal to begin shifting troops to Mo- with an attempt to assassinate Neto, and following accusations by the Portuguese zambique. As this report has it, Tanzania Chipenda fled to FNLA with a portion of that it had blown up sections of the vital and Zambia were concerned enough MPLA's eastern military force. And it was Benguela raiIroad,and Portuguesethreats about this to ask the Chinese to provide Chipenda who was one of the major links to cut rail line access to Zambia unless military support to FNLA in the hopes that in the relationship established last year action was taken. Also, since MPLA was they wouId add to the fighting - thus keep- among UNITA,FNLA,and South Africa. on good terms with Zambia's ruling party, ing the troops in Angola. China, at any UNITA found itself allying with the Zam- rate, was giving some support to UNITA The American Connection bian opposition in Lozi Province which in southern Angola. It is most important to mention at this borders Angola. There was in 1973 an apparent shift of juncture that the United States had more Kicked out of Zambia, UNITA found it- support away from Neto by both Tan- than just a passive involvement and con- self without means to receive material zania and Zambia, and the , cern with these events.First, the implica- support and consequently its fighting toward Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda, how- tions of independence for this area of effort suffered. By 1970, the small amount ever, lacked the internal support inside Africa were viewed with much more in- of support from the Chinese had virtually MPLA and support swung back to Neto. terest than in other areas of Africa. In vanished, and Portuguese military bulle- The Chipenda-Neto break became final trade and investments, from Zaire to http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/3 4 Cobb: Angola: An Analysis of the Conflict

8 Independence was now strictly military terms. The U. S. had of StateHenry Kissinger, the latter sparked inevitable in the near future. counted the forces of MPLA, UNITA, and by the Midd Ie East and Cyprus. even FNLA and came up with less men In American policy-making For Angola, however, the key date is and material than the Portuguese had, January 1975. On January 15, the Portu- circles, comfortable assur- and therefore concluded there was no guese government and Angola's three ance of permanent white rule prospect for an African victory. movements signed an agreement setting in Southern Africa crumpled, Nevertheless, for all the difficulties, Angola's independence for November 11 , Portugal was faced with wars of major 1975. At just about the same time, the 40 and the major question proportions thousands of miles away on Committee which coordinates U.S. in- became what kind of African three separate fronts, the fronts them- telligence voted $300,000 for Roberto's government. Similar concern seIvesthousands of miles apart. Portugal's FNLA. Secretary Kissinger (chairman of existed about Portugal itself rulers tried to argue that the wars were in the 40 Committee) told the Senate Foreign the national interest, but as casualties Relations Committee recently that the in relation to the "Atlantic mounted into the thousands among Por- money was for "office suppl ies." The Alliance" and Southern tugal's young men to protect a colonial amount of money was actually small rela- Europe. exploitation that benefited only Portugal's tive to America's capacity, but almost own ruling elite, the wars had the effect 30 times what Roberto had been getting of heightening the contradictions within as a C.IA retainer; and dramatically visi- Africa's southern tip, billions of dollars Portugal. ble within the Angola context. Interest- were and are there. The area's potential ingly, the C.l.A. wasn't completely sold in terms of raw material was, and is, of Through contact with both the Portu- on the idea: Its reluctance apparently major significance; and the potential for guese left and the African movements, based on its assessment of Roberto. The capital investment crucial to the financial younger officers began to identify the C.IA was more interested in UNITA, but and industrial complex that runs the aspirations of the African movements UNITA's strength (political) and potential United States. The U. S. strategy for the with their own aspiration of seeing Portu- was relatively unknown. region had two prongs: 1) moderate gal free of fascist dictatorship. In this African buffer states around the white- respect, the underground among Portu- The significance of the 40 Committee ruled states; 2) the permanence of white guese that both FRELIMOin Mozambique decision lies in the fact that Angola's rule in the Southern region. and the MPLA had, were crucial points movements had already agreed to a coali- The pol itical map of independent Africa, of contact in the flow of political ideas. tion, albeit uneasy. And, though MPLA and particularly the experience in Congo As the African wars increasingly wreaked had for more than a decade been getting Kinshasa in the earlY'1960s, gave assur- havoc on Portugal's economy and killed support from the Soviets and other so- ance that the kinds of political units which off or chased away much manpower, the cialist countries, the question ofamassive would be fraternal at least to capitalism, regime fell, and the SouthernAfrica equa- Soviet presence was not a factor. Kissin- could be cultivated. Despite the pressure tion changed. ger's own African experts-whom he of guerrilla movements in Angola, Mo- Independence was now inevitable in ignored-saw Iittle if any chance of Angola zambique, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) Nami- the near future. In American policy-mak- becoming a "Soviet satellite." bia, (SouthWest Africa) and South Africa, ing circles, comfortable assurance of The decision harks back to 1960, 1961 white rule seemed permanent for the for- permanent white rule in Southern Africa and 1965-to the Congo Kinshasa con- seeable future. Indeed, a review of South- crumpled, and the major question be- flict. Inthe Congo of Lumumba, the United ern Africa policy ordered by then National came what kind of African government. States felt threatened by a genuine African Security Affairs' Henry Kissinger in 1969 Similar concern existed about Portugal nationalism, and with alternative political which posed the assumption that armed itself in relation to the "Atlantic Alliance" units (African) eliminated Lumumba and political struggle by Africans could not and Southern Europe. cuItivated a takeover by someone more re- win, was accepted, and not changed until These concerns were intensified by sponsive to American interests. This was 1974. the pending defeat in Vietnam, other set- achieved by 1965 with Mobutu's ascend- What changed White House opinion backs in Europe, and post-Watergate ency. Like in Angola, great wealth was at was the Portuguese coup of Apri 11974.As domestic pressures that ranged from stake. in Vietnam, the United States had made a challenges to the illegal use of the C.IA Kissinger's need in Angola was made serious error in attempting to gauge the to Congressional challenges to the per- especially urgent in his mind because so potential of armed political warfare in sonalization of foreign pol icy by Secretary much of the apparatus of his tenure in Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, 5 New Directions, Vol. 3 [], Iss. 2, Art. 3

American foreign policy-making was dis- passed on. The Congressional storm MPLA soon found itself faced 9 integrating around the world. At the meet- actually broke when Senate Africa Sub- ing in January, a decision was made to committee Chairman Dick Clark (D-Iowa) with fighting on two fronts; encourage Zaire's intervention in Angola discovered the growing U. S. involvement UNITA in the south, and FNLA, -a decision made more significant by a in Angola while visiting Zaire. in the north. It's at this proposed increase in military aid to Zaire Meanwhile, in Angola, although the moment that MPLA began to from $4 million in 1975 to $19.9 million MPLA had successfully met the FNLA get the dramatic increase in in 1976; and a total increase in aid to challenge in Luanda, driving Roberto's Zaire during the same period of from $9.3 men out of the city, and driving UNITA Soviet aid, and manpower million to $64.5 million. out, it was losing in the countryside. support from . The One thing emerges clearly. Contrary An important question occurs here.The context in which this support to Kissinger's Senate testimony in Jan- main confl ict was between FNLA and arrives escalates support for uary 1976, the $300,000 was not to "stale- MPLA. UNITA adopted a stance of neu- FNLA and UNITA from the mate" an escalated Soviet or Cuban "in- trality, which from the MPLA point of view, tervention," but was to establish FNLA acted to assist America's attempted take- United States, and the dominance, and perhaps was deliberately overthrough its FNLAproxy. This, coupled entrance of South Africa into designed to shatter the tentative effort at with deep and long-standing suspicion the conflict. a coalition. The money certainly sparked of UNITA, led to the abandonment of any a series of FNLA-MPLA armed conflicts attempt to work out at least an operational ences were secondary to what was seen throughout the summer of 1975. It also relationship. This was in fact what the as the tactical advantage within the guaranteed an escalated Soviet involve- UPA-FNLA-GRAE had done to MPLA in Luanda context. ment. Again in the area of speculation, the middle 1960s. it's entirely possible that Kissinger saw The consequence was to push UNITA The Soviet-Cuban Connection it not only in terms of a regional strategy formally into the FNLA camp. Would it MPLA soon found itself faced with fight- for Southern Africa, but also as a means have been better for there to have been ing on two fronts; UNITA in the south, and of testing what latitude he had still re- an MPLA-UNITA alliance? Probably, FNLA in the north..It's at this moment that maining in light of recent restraints im- certainly in a tactical sense. Politically, MPLA began to get the dramatic increase posed by the Congress. Here, there is a the distance between MPLA and UNITA in Soviet aid, and manpower support striking resemblance to the Tonkin Gulf. was not that far- not as far as the distance from Cuba. The context in which" this For the U. S. administration in April between FNLA and UNITA,as the earlier support arrives escalates support for 1975, another traumatic disaster occurs. conflicts between the two factions reflect. FNLA and UNITA from the United States, Saigon falls and becomes Ho Chi Minh However, since this is not an academic and the entrance of South Africa into the City. In May, in a burst of Macho, the May- question, it is largely unanswerable from conflict. aguet raids occur, and Kissinger and outside of the conflict's own pressure. Senator John Tunney (D-Cal.) told the Ford are apparently encouraged by The MPLA conflict was not determined Senate Foreign Relations Committee in general acceptance on Capitol Hill, in by a summer's events, but by a decade's. February 1976, that, in October 1975 the press, and by the public. In essence, the summer break between Savimbi received-through President The ante was upped in Angola in June. MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA was political, Mobutu of Zaire-van explicit commitment The C.l.A proposed $30 million for FNLA. with MPLA viewing a just-about-to-be- of U. S. military aid. Two months earlier, In July, at least $14 million was approved independent Angola already under as- South African troops occupied a border for FNLA and UNITA; and another $15 sault by imperialism, whose agent was strip inside Angola near the Namibian million for Zaire and Zambia-to aid the FNLA; and UNITA increasing Angola's border. In the north, Zaire committed four two movements. These figures were vulnerability either consciously or by to five battalions of about 12,000 men to leaked by the Ford administration, ap- opting out in the name of "unity." An as- fight with FNLA. Daniel Chipenda, who parently in an effort to win public support sessment of MPLA's choice to push away earlier broke away from MPLA, formed a for the covert operation. UNITA would have to be weighed care- mercenary unit inside Namibia, and was Certain members of the Senate were fully to determine how much was ideo- beginning a thrust into Angola by mid- briefed by C.IA Director William Colby, logical and how much of it was the taking October. Behind that unit were UNITA Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.) for in- advantage of a tactical opportunity. Its troops who occupied the towns taken. stance, but the information was not really appearance is that ideological differ- Continued on Page 38 http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/3 6 Cobb: Angola: An Analysis of the Conflict

38 been more destructive to the progress of An Analysis of the Conflict instructed to be ready to fly tactical air Blacks than 1975. Though it can be ar- (Continued from Page 9) support strikes over Angola. gured with complete justification that Additionally, in November, spotter An aide to SenatorTunneywho met with other Americans also sustained losses planes believed to belong to the U.S. Savimbi in Silvo Porto told me that Sa- during the year, Blacks lost more and flew missions over Angola from Zaire, vimbi acknowledged direct South African every loss represented a major set- and cargo planes dropped supplies to assistance. back from which it will take them years to South African troops in central Angola- By Novemb-er 11, Angolan independ- recover. flying from a Zaire base shared with ence day, a formal FNLA-UNITA alliance The hour is late. But there is stiII time to South African aircraft. set the house in order. 0 had been formed, with a capital at Nova Lisboa, now called "Huambo," and FNLA But there were two factors that allowed forces were just 10 miles north of Luanda the beseiged MPLA to turn the situation whi Ie UNITA forces, apparently spear- around: 1) Political pressure in the United headed by the "Chipenda Brigade," were States. An alarmed Congress with visions about 150 miles south of Luanda. of another Vietnam-type debacle halted At no time during these FNLA-UNITA the flow of covert money. [All of the rea- successes-as far as is known-did the sons for this success can't be explored United States approach the Soviet Union here, but it is sufficient to say that the to discuss a de-escalation. There were reasons had less to do with sympathy press accounts of the growth of Soviet for MPLA than with a broader conflict assistance, and of the growing South between Congress and the Ford admin- African-American assistance. However, istration over the procedure and conduct the U.S. felt its clients would win. They of foreign policy.The challenges came were in fact winning at the time. from both the left and the right.] 2) MPLA's South Africa's presence grew as Con- stance was boosted by Cuban-Soviet gressional objections to covert U.S. aid assistance. In late October, the Cubans intensifed. By November 15, there were began a massive airlift of troops, and the at least two South African units of ap- Soviets began providing sophisticated proximately 2000 men in Angola, ac- weapons. Intelligence sources have put companied by Allouette helicopters, the estimated cost of the operation at French and American tanks. Additionally, $200 million, but as Senator Tunney mercenary units organized by Chipenda pointed out, some $120 million was the were being supplied from Namibia by cost of logistical support such as trans- South African C-130 aircraft. By the end portation to Angola. The value of actual of November, there were almost 6000 equipment was about $80 million. regular South African troops as far as As far as the Cuban support is con- SiIva Porto in Angola's center. Everymajor cerned, the decision seems to have victory by the FNLA-UNITA forces re- grown out of political support for MPLA sulted from the SouthAfrican involvement. and a long relationship with the move- It's within this context that the massive ment. As for the Soviets, certainly they Cuban involvement begins, and with it, seek to generate influence in Africa, and the squeals from the Ford administration. see MPLA as a potentially important ally. In a political sense, Angola's civil war The Soviet role is complex, and not always had been transformed into a war against principled (as in the case of flip-flopping external invasion. In an operational sense, support for Chipenda and Neto, or the the war was not a guerri lla war, but a con- intrusion of Sino-Soviet conflicts in their ventional one. Nowhere is this more dec ision-making). evident that in the contingency alert The important qualitative difference orders given to the U. S. Sixth Fleet. Spe- between Soviet-Cuban involvement and cifically, the carrier Independence and South African involvement is: MPLA ad- Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, the guided missile cruiser Boston were mits it asked the Soviets and Cubans in; 7 New Directions, Vol. 3 [], Iss. 2, Art. 3

UNITA and FNLA consistently deny ask- by MPLA of a popular Luanda radio pro- The motivating factor inZambia's concern 39 ing in the South Africans. Thus, if there gram because it "inflamed" racial and is economic necessity in terms of copper is a criticism of the Soviet-Cuban pres- tribal antaqonisrn, and the protest that exports and consumer imports, which ence, that criticism must be focused at followed, indicate that there are deep traditionally have been routed through MPLA. South Africa, if one accepts the difficulties ahead. The MPLA decision Angola and South Africa. Zaire to the UNITA-FNLA position, is clearly an invad- in February to set up a party school and north fears a radical political entity, with ing force. And arguing that UNITA does to become more selective in allowing comparable material resources to itself, not have the capacity to take on the South membership in the MPLA, is another sign as threatening to its perceived hegemony Africans does not alter the difference in of still-existing problems with internal over the independent African states in South Africa's presence as compared to definition and structure. the region; and like Zambia, is concerned the Cuban presence. MPLA's own overtures to South Africa, to moderate relations with South Africa. Between December 1975 and February with respect to the Cunene River hydro- The two immediate focuses of the 1976, the combined MPLA-Cuban effort electric project, and to the United States Southern Africa concern are: Namibia clearly defeated South Africa-an im- with respect to Cabinda oil, also under- and Rhodesia. Guerrilla activity in both portant victory for Africa. cuts some of its own criticism of UNITA. places is on the rise. The growth of cap- italist penetration in "the white South," The Road Ahead The other side of this same political question is the prospect for continued which has been rapid since the mid 1960s Now, the question is whether MPLA can military pressure in the form of guerrilla - based on the assumption that armed tum military victory into an effective na- activity waged by UNITA.Despite the dim political struggle by Africans was not tional political consolidation. This is prospects of aid from either Zai re or Zam- viable- is made insecure by a radically more difficult than the military conflict, bia, it does seem possible for UNITA to nationalist Angola, which along with despite outward signs of breakthroughs maintain the same level of harassing pres- Mozambique moves the battle lines 2000 such as recognition by OAU and the rec- sure on MPLA that it maintained against miles nearer to South Africa. (See Com- onciliation with Zaire, and possibly with the Portuguese. UNITA's base area is also mentary, Pg. 10) 0 Zambia, and overtures to the United Angola's "breadbasket." As the conven- States. Charles Cobb, the Congressional reporter for tional warfare winds down, guerrilla ac- The answer tums, in part, on MPLA's WHUR-FM, the Howard University radio station, tivity may grow. Of potentially major sig- lived in Tanzania for two years where he wrote on own political dynamic. In 1973 and 1974 nificance is mercenary involvement with South African Politics. He also worked for a year with Congressman Charles Diggs' (D-Mich.) - even as the first effort at inter-movement at least covert support from South Africa. coalition was being attempted-MPLA Subcommittee on Africa. Last November, he spent a week in Angola covering the independence was in the midst of internal debate. There MPLA's task of consolidation thrusts to celebration for WHUR. were at one point in 1974, at least three the forefront the question of economic separate MPLA factions (one being the organization. In Luanda, steps are being Chipenda group). These rivalries and taken that appear to be leading towards political debates, in part, reflected ques- worker control of factories. On the other tioning of the Neto leadership growing hand, Angola's oil and mineral wealth out of frustration with both the tactic of places it on the target of multi-national fighting and political organization. Some corporate interest.Coupled with MPLA's of the specific focuses of the debates urgent need for skilled manpower (de- were strengthening collective decision- pleted by the fl ight of Portuguesesettlers), making, the question of coordinating developing Angola's resources poses the with UNITA-which was fighting a limited dangerous and difficult task of balanc- but successful struggle in the south-and ing immediate needs with political how to deal with Angola's ethnic realities. objectives. On this latter point, for instance, MPLA Yet another question for the future is was much more hostile to existing tradi- the remaining struggle against white tional tribal structures than UNITA. rule in Southern Africa. The battle lines Three kinds of issues have always are closing in on the. Republic of South been troublesome to MPLA.Although they Africa. Zambia fears a political-military are resolved in the sense of an "official thrust that disrupts its own "detente" http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol3/iss2/3line," events such as the recent stoppage efforts with South Africa and Rhodesia. 8