2017/4/6 March 1987 22 Pages Department of Foreign Affairs
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Reference Code: 2017/4/6 Creation Dates: March 1987 Extent and medium: 22 pages Creator(s): Department of Foreign Affairs Accession Conditions: Open Copyright: National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives. ConfJden t i a l Northern Ireland Secur ity Brief 1. Strength of the security forces The total establishment strength of the RUC at present is 8250, with 2755 in full-time reserve. The present strength of the British Army is 10190, while the strength of the UDR (June 1986) is 6708 (2719 full-time and 3889 part-time ). 2. Estimated strength of paramilitary organisations The Provisional IRA has been estimated to consist of fewer than 500 committed activists of whom r oughly 250 may be "on the run terrorists" from Northern Ireland currently resident in the South. The INLA currently in a state of disintegration, is a considerably smaller group , numbering possibly as few as SO. The Official IRA continues to exist but focusses on criminal activities and is not involved in direct paramilitary activity. The UDA has an estimated 1,000 active members of whom, however, only about 200 are available for paramilitary activity. The UVF is believed to have less than 50 regular members available for paramilitary activity. 3. Violent deaths, injuries, incidents Detailed information on the number of deaths, injuries, incidents and other statistics relating to the security situation are contained in a series of annexes attached to this note. In the period 1969 to date (28 February), 2532 people have been killed, 1750 of them civilians . The Provisional IRA is the organisation/ group responsible for the greatest number of deaths in that period (944). ©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e e - 2 - I 4. Sectarian violence and intimidation It is difficult to quantify precisely the level of I sectarian violence and intimidation. In January 1} 8 7 t he Northern Ireland Housing Executive announced t~at 110 2 tenants from Northern Ireland had complained of intimidation and applied for alternative accommodation during 1986. The Executive said that the worst affected areas had been Belfast and Lisburn. While ther e were periods of particularl y seve~e sectarian violence ar1d i o t i mid a t i on 1 a s t ye a r and Ca t :1 o 1 i c fa mi 1 i es i n Nor t i1 Be 1 f a s t a n d L i s b u r ri u n. d o u \) t e d 1 y b o r e t h e b r u n t o f i t ( 1-1 i t h a small pe rcent~ge of RUC families and som e Protestants also claiming victimisation), the figures quoted by the I Housing Executive ace, we a re reliably ·informed, exaggerated. It m11st also be said that the peak periods in this regard were Easter and the summer of last y ear and there have been consid ~rabl y lower c 0mplaints of sectarian violence since then. 5. Security Situation in Norti1ern Ireland A number of elements characterise t he se curity situation in Northern Ireland at present: continued Provisional IR.A attacks on me, nbers o f t:1 e security forces and on RUC / Army insta ll a ti ons; P r o v i s i on a 1 I RA ' p u n i s h men t s 110 o t i n g s ' ; I the INLA internal feud; I sporadic Loyalist paramilitary activity (in particular UDA fire-bomb attacks in Dublin and Donegal); I sectarian violence and intimidation; I a generally satisfactory performance by the RUC in I responding to the various threats posed to law and order. ©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e - 3 - e 6. Provisional IRA / Sinn Fein The Provisional IRA, which is a proscri~ed organisation, has continued its campaign 1gainst the security forces on various fronts. It has carried out in recent months a number of mortar- bomb and/ or mac~inegun attacks on RUC / Army bases, particularly in border areas. In addition, indi,;idu:11 R.UC / Army patrols and ci1eckpoi:lts in border areas ~ave bee n the object of mortar or landmine attacks. T he P r o v Ii s i on a 1 R. A \,J a s a 1 s o r e s po n s i 0 l e f o r t :1e mu r d e r o f UVF leader John Bingham on 14 Sept e mber. The Provisionals' campaign against contractors and other p e op 1 e wo r \ i n g f o r t l1 e s e c u r.i. t y f o r c e s c on t i n u e s . Ho 1-J e v e r , it is essen tiall y confined to the Derry/ Tyrone area and t,ere have been les s r epo rts of intimidation recently. There have be en only two killings since the campaign was announced on 5 August last. The Provisional IRA has also murdere J o r injured peopl e alleged to have acted as informers f o r t1e R.UC. In r e cent \.,reeks, particularly, there :1av e iJeen n,rnero us :Z nee-cappings and otl1er punishment shootings. The Provisional IRA is also interest -=d iri " ·-=conor.i ic targets". During t i1e Cuist:nas / ~~ew Yea r perio.J t i1ey attacked pubs and hotels and more r ec.::ni::ly (30 Jan~1ary) they carried out ~omb attacks in Belfast city centre and in Lisburn which. 1.,rere obviously aimed at ')usiness enterprises. The general level of IRA violence over the last few mont~s would suggest that the leadership is anxious to demonstrate that the 'armed struggle' has not been weakened eithe r by the Anglo-Irish Agreement or by Sinn Fein's ending of the abstentionist policy. ©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e - 4 - e Sinn Fein, unlike the Provisional IRA, is not proscribed in Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State recently indicated through the Conference framework, however, that the British Government has been considering the introduction of a requirement on prospective candidates for local elections in Northern Ireland to make a declaration at the time of their candidature in which they would undertake not to participate in, or support, proscribed organisations. r;1e declaration idea would be included in a ''const1ltation document'' as one of a number of options for I deali!1g 1.,rith the problem 0f Sinn Fein members '.1ip of local councils. The Secretary of 3tate indicated that nis I primary consideration in proposing such a~ initiative at this time ~as to find a way out of the dilemma constituted I by t :1e lJ n i on i s t r e 111 c tan c ,:; to s i t in the s am e ch am be rs as Sinn Fein councillors. T~e idea in fact had originally I been placed on tne Conference agenda in December 1985 when t :1e I r i s h s i d e s a i d t 11a t i t \va s o p e 1 t o d i s c u s s i on . I t wa s n o t t a k. e n f u r t '. 1e r a t t h e t i. me . The I r i s h r e s po n s e to t :1e I S e c r e t a r y o f S t ;:i t e r e c e n t 1 y h a s o e e ,1 t '.1a t , wh i 1 e we c o u l d u n d e r s t a n j t :1e l3 r i t i s h Go v e r n o1 en t ' s d e s i r e to f i n d a way I around c:1is problem, we believed that c:1e ma tter s l1ould be discussed in the Conference before an y public action was taken. (The Secretary of State had :)e e ri considering publis'.1ing the consultation document ve r y s:1ortly after t:ie general election here). It was also s ,1ggest~d to c:1e Sec re tar y of S tat e that t :1e pub 1 i cat i 'J n o f t :1e cons :1 l ta t iv e document ~efore the Westminster general ~lection c0uld give Provisional Sinn Fein a considerable pr Jpaga~da bonus. It i s u n d er s t o o d th a t , i n t :1e l i g h t o f t \ e s e o b s c r v a t i on s , t he I British side is now reconsidering the ini tiative. A mo v e b y En o ch P o \J e 11 i n t :1 e Ho u s e a f Com mon s o n 2 S February 1987 to have Sinn Fein added to the list of proscribed organisations given in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act was turned down by Nicholas Scott "on the grounds of principle and also because it ©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I - 5 - would not be practical". Labour MPs and Seamus Mallon supported Scott's stance.