2017/4/6 March 1987 22 Pages Department of Foreign Affairs

Reference Code: 2017/4/6

Creation Dates: March 1987

Extent and medium: 22 pages

Creator(s): Department of Foreign Affairs

Accession Conditions: Open

Copyright: National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives. ConfJden t i a l

Northern Ireland Secur ity Brief

1. Strength of the security forces

The total establishment strength of the RUC at present is 8250, with 2755 in full-time reserve. The present strength of the British Army is 10190, while the strength of the UDR (June 1986) is 6708 (2719 full-time and 3889 part-time ).

2. Estimated strength of paramilitary organisations

The Provisional IRA has been estimated to consist of fewer than 500 committed activists of whom r oughly 250 may be "on the run terrorists" from Northern Ireland currently resident in the South. The INLA currently in a state of disintegration, is a considerably smaller group , numbering possibly as few as SO. The Official IRA continues to exist but focusses on criminal activities and is not involved in direct paramilitary activity. The UDA has an estimated 1,000 active members of whom, however, only about 200 are available for paramilitary activity. The UVF is believed to have less than 50 regular members available for paramilitary activity.

3. Violent deaths, injuries, incidents

Detailed information on the number of deaths, injuries, incidents and other statistics relating to the security situation are contained in a series of annexes attached to this note. In the period 1969 to date (28 February), 2532 people have been killed, 1750 of them civilians . The Provisional IRA is the organisation/ group responsible for the greatest number of deaths in that period (944).

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e e - 2 - I 4. Sectarian violence and intimidation It is difficult to quantify precisely the level of I sectarian violence and intimidation. In January 1} 8 7 t he Northern Ireland Housing Executive announced t~at 110 2 tenants from Northern Ireland had complained of intimidation and applied for alternative accommodation during 1986. The Executive said that the worst affected areas had been Belfast and Lisburn. While ther e were periods of particularl y seve~e sectarian violence ar1d

i o t i mid a t i on 1 a s t ye a r and Ca t :1 o 1 i c fa mi 1 i es i n Nor t i1

Be 1 f a s t a n d L i s b u r ri u n. d o u \) t e d 1 y b o r e t h e b r u n t o f i t ( 1-1 i t h a small pe rcent~ge of RUC families and som e Protestants also claiming victimisation), the figures quoted by the I Housing Executive ace, we a re reliably ·informed, exaggerated. It m11st also be said that the peak periods in this regard were Easter and the summer of last y ear and there have been consid ~rabl y lower c 0mplaints of sectarian violence since then.

5. Security Situation in Norti1ern Ireland

A number of elements characterise t he se curity situation in Northern Ireland at present:

continued Provisional IR.A attacks on me, nbers o f t:1 e security forces and on RUC / Army insta ll a ti ons; P r o v i s i on a 1 I RA ' p u n i s h men t s 110 o t i n g s ' ;

I the INLA internal feud; I sporadic Loyalist paramilitary activity (in particular UDA fire-bomb attacks in Dublin and Donegal);

I sectarian violence and intimidation;

I a generally satisfactory performance by the RUC in I responding to the various threats posed to law and order.

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e - 3 - e 6. Provisional IRA / Sinn Fein

The Provisional IRA, which is a proscri~ed organisation, has continued its campaign 1gainst the security forces on various fronts. It has carried out in recent months a number of mortar- bomb and/ or mac~inegun attacks on RUC / Army bases, particularly in border areas. In addition, indi,;idu:11 R.UC / Army patrols and ci1eckpoi:lts in border areas ~ave bee n the object of mortar or landmine attacks.

T he P r o v Ii s i on a 1 R. A \,J a s a 1 s o r e s po n s i 0 l e f o r t :1e mu r d e r o f UVF leader John Bingham on 14 Sept e mber.

The Provisionals' campaign against contractors and other p e op 1 e wo r \ i n g f o r t l1 e s e c u r.i. t y f o r c e s c on t i n u e s . Ho 1-J e v e r , it is essen tiall y confined to the Derry/ Tyrone area

and t,ere have been les s r epo rts of intimidation recently. There have be en only two killings since the campaign was announced on 5 August last.

The Provisional IRA has also murdere J o r injured peopl e alleged to have acted as informers f o r t1e R.UC. In r e cent \.,reeks, particularly, there :1av e iJeen n,rnero us :Z nee-cappings and otl1er punishment shootings.

The Provisional IRA is also interest -=d iri " ·-=conor.i ic targets". During t i1e Cuist:nas / ~~ew Yea r perio.J t i1ey attacked pubs and hotels and more r ec.::ni::ly (30 Jan~1ary) they carried out ~omb attacks in Belfast city centre and in Lisburn which. 1.,rere obviously aimed at ')usiness enterprises.

The general level of IRA violence over the last few mont~s would suggest that the leadership is anxious to demonstrate that the 'armed struggle' has not been weakened eithe r by the Anglo-Irish Agreement or by Sinn Fein's ending of the abstentionist policy.

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e - 4 - e Sinn Fein, unlike the Provisional IRA, is not proscribed in Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State recently indicated through the Conference framework, however, that the British Government has been considering the introduction of a requirement on prospective candidates for local elections in Northern Ireland to make a declaration at the time of their candidature in which they would undertake not to participate in, or support, proscribed organisations. r;1e declaration idea would be included in a ''const1ltation document'' as one of a number of options for I deali!1g 1.,rith the problem 0f Sinn Fein members '.1ip of local councils. The Secretary of 3tate indicated that nis I primary consideration in proposing such a~ initiative at this time ~as to find a way out of the dilemma constituted I by t :1e lJ n i on i s t r e 111 c tan c ,:; to s i t in the s am e ch am be rs as Sinn Fein councillors. T~e idea in fact had originally I been placed on tne Conference agenda in December 1985 when t :1e I r i s h s i d e s a i d t 11a t i t \va s o p e 1 t o d i s c u s s i on . I t wa s n o t t a k. e n f u r t '. 1e r a t t h e t i. me . The I r i s h r e s po n s e to t :1e

I S e c r e t a r y o f S t ;:i t e r e c e n t 1 y h a s o e e ,1 t '.1a t , wh i 1 e we c o u l d u n d e r s t a n j t :1e l3 r i t i s h Go v e r n o1 en t ' s d e s i r e to f i n d a way I around c:1is problem, we believed that c:1e ma tter s l1ould be discussed in the Conference before an y public action was taken. (The Secretary of State had :)e e ri considering publis'.1ing the consultation document ve r y s:1ortly after t:ie general election here). It was also s ,1ggest~d to c:1e

Sec re tar y of S tat e that t :1e pub 1 i cat i 'J n o f t :1e cons :1 l ta t iv e document ~efore the Westminster general ~lection c0uld give Provisional Sinn Fein a considerable pr Jpaga~da bonus. It i s u n d er s t o o d th a t , i n t :1e l i g h t o f t \ e s e o b s c r v a t i on s , t he I British side is now reconsidering the ini tiative.

A mo v e b y En o ch P o \J e 11 i n t :1 e Ho u s e a f Com mon s o n 2 S February 1987 to have Sinn Fein added to the list of proscribed organisations given in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act was turned down by Nicholas Scott "on the grounds of principle and also because it

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I - 5 - would not be practical". Labour MPs and Seamus Mallon supported Scott's stance.

7. I~LA

I The INLA, also a proscribed organisation, is currently in the throes of an internal feud which has resulted so far in five deaths. Three of t i1e I NLA's reputed four factions I have been try ing t '.) suppress t h e f ourth i:-i c1 n e ffort to ~ind up the I NLA t o its pres e nt f o rm. It is likel y t hat I there will ~e furt~ e r killings.

I The reca lcitr a nt f ourth gr oup ( formerl y l e d oy t h e late John O' Reill y) is be l i eved t'.) have be en responsible for a nu mo er of I ~LA a c t i v i t i e s i n rec en t ;no n th s i n t ;1e 1!ewry/ \rmagi1 are a , in c luding t ne d isplay o f 1veapons to journalists last Dece mber, att empted b om b a ttacks on the Newr y/ Dundal1< r oad 3.n d the a ttempt e.! killing of David Calvert in Lilrgan on 8 J a nuar y .

8 .

The UDA which is not proscribed, h as pl1yeJ a ro le, if not a leading one, in the Loyalist caopai gn 1gai nst t he Agreement. For most of 1985 it held bac\ , c l ear l y determined not to allow itself to be :i sed in orde r to strengthen the image of Uni onist pol iticians ( 3.s i ~ 197 ~). UDA members were involved in the ' da y ')f ac t iot1 ' on 5 ;"larch

1 ~ 8 6 and in o the r pro t es t a c t iv i t i es s ;Jc :1 a s t he I Hillsborough anniversary rallies b ilt 0;1 t '.1e .vhnl e kept a fairly low profile and concentrated on l~crative racketeering operations. Earlier this month, however, John ~cMichael of the UDA unveiled some proposals (in a document entitled "Common Sense") for a power-sharing devolved government which attracted considerable interest.

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I - 6 - In one area, however, the UDA has been quite active I recently. Using its codename UFF, the UDA claimed responsibility for the planting of a series of incendiary I devices in the centre of Dublin on 7-3 November 1~36 and again in Dublin and Donegal on 7-8 February 1987. The I devices were relatively unsophisticated, however, and those w~ich exploded did not cause much damage (except to a store in Donegal). It is our understanding that, despite intense I efforts to o~tain them, the UDA does no~ at present have I access to explosives. The UDA is also ~elieved to have been involved in some I sec tarian killings, in partic~lar the murder of an elderly Catjolic woman and her son near Ballynahinch on 15 October I 1986.

\I 9. UVF

A spate of sectarian assassinations of Catholics in No rth I Belfast during the first half of 1986 effectively came to an end ~ith the killing of UVF leader Join Bi~g!1am by the I Provisional IRA on 14 September. Since tien the UVF (w hich is a proscribed organisation) has been relatively quiet, I though it was initially suspected of involvement i~ the recent raid on a UDR base in Coleraine (~ith ~~ich, however, the UDA is now being linked ) .

10. Ulster Clubs

This organisation came into existence 1a Portado1in i~ the I summer of 1985. It tried to occupy the middle ground bet~een Loyalist politicians and p~ramilitaries. However, I under its Chairman Alan Wri·ght, it was poorly managed and failed to carve out an independent role for - itself. I Somewhat belatedly, it unveiled some days ago a strategy for the Loyalist campaign against the Agreement which envisages a Grand Committee comprising a mixture of I political and paramilitary representatives and a series of subordinate committees paralleling the N.I. Government Departments.

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I - 7 - 11. "Ulster Resistance"

On 10 November 1986 a new Loyalist organisation with this name was founded in the Ulster Hall in Belfast. It was the latest of Ian Paisley's attempts to mobilise a 'third force' (though many regarded Peter Robinson as tie driving force behind tiis one). While he and Robinson were careful not to describe the new body :is an 'army', others were less I careful. The paramilitary purpose of "Ulster Resistance" was clear from its military structure and trappings: nine I divisions, the unf,irling of divisional flags, uniformed participants a~ead of the rallies (whic~ took place over a I period of several ~eeks in Kilkeel, Enniskillen, Derry, L a r n e and e 1 s e wh e re ) . T 11 e mem b e r s h i p of " U1 s t e r Resistance" is the subject of much speculation. People associated wit,1. t'.le fJDA and the UVF have reportedly not been approached (in order to protect the new body from I· infiltration by the security forces ) . There ~ere suggestions that, with UDA and UVF members liable to be I watc~ed by the security forces, the bulk of the membership consisted of people who had ~een involved in tie I mid-seventies with lessor-known Loyalist groups such as Down Orange Welfare on the Ulster Volunteer Services Corps. I At present, "Ulster Resistance" is quiescent, pe1-haps due in part to Robinson's reported fall i n Loyalist esteem I following his appearance in the Special Criminal Court, and rallies are held only at long intervals. It is, however, I probably a force to be reckoned ~it~ in the event Jf an intensification of the Loyalist campaign against the I Agreem~n t.

·1 12. Sectarian violence and intimidation

I At different ·times during the past year, notably around Easter and during the Summer, Loyalist intimidation of Catholics occurred in mixed areas with Protestant I majorities such as North Belfast, Lisburn, Ballynahinch and I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I - 8 - Ballymena. This intimidation frequently involved petrol-bombattacks on Catholic homes, schools or business premises. There have also been sectarian attacks on Catholics living in outlying rural areas. Reverse sectarian violence (directed at Protestants) has been considerably less.

13. RUC

In dealing ~ith t)e various threats to law and order, the RUC has performed on the whole creditably. It has had some successes with arms and e xplosives finds in different ~arts of the ifort :1 and t :1e number of people charger! last year with terrorist-ty pe offences (655) was higner than it has been for some years pa st. The quality of their intelligence t e nds to be better in relation to Loyalist groups - t 11e speed wit 11 w:1ich they were able to make arrests and bring c~arges f o llowing the recent raid on the UDR base at Coleraine, for e xample, was stri\ ing. In contrast, the number of nationalist arrests is down and there have been no notable successes i .'1 t i1e pursuit of Provisional IRA activities.

Anglo-Irish Section, I March 1987. I I 2283m

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I Statistics on Security

I Contents I

I Annexes 1, lA, lB Casualties i n Northern Ireland I These tables show the total numbers of people killed and injured since the outb reak of violence in Northern Ireland I ia 19 63 together with a breakdown showing the num b er of civilians, members of the I RUC, British Army etc, killed and injured. I Annex 2 Annex 2 contains details of the numbers I of deaths in Northern Ireland, broken down as between a gents responsible, for t he period 19 69-1 )8 6. It also gives the I breakd own f o r 198 6 and f o r the period 15 November 19 85 (the signing of the I Agreement) to 31 Dece mber 1 9 86. I Annex 3 Security Statistics fo r Northern Ireland: I Terrorist Incidents 1)69 - 1J8 6 I This table illustr a t es the lev e l of terrorist violence i n Northern Ire land I for the period 1969 -1 J 86. I I I I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I e - 2 - Annex 4 Finds of Commercial Explosives in I Northern Ireland

I Annex 4 gives the origin of the co~mercial explosives found by security I forces in Northern Ireland during the period 1976-1986. I I Annexes 5 Finds of detonators in Northern Ireland

Annex S gives the origin of detonators I found by security forces in Northern I Ireland during the period 1976-1986. I Annex 6 Geographical pattern of fatal casualties 1980-86

I This Annex contains details of the geographical pattern of fatal casualties I between 1980-1986 (b roken down as between three areas - Belfast, "Rural non-border" I and border areas). I Annex 7 Violent incidents i~ border areas of Northern Ireland attrib~table to I Provisional IRA activities

I Annex 7 contains details of the number of violent incidents in border areas I attributable to IRA activities since the beginning of 1986. It also indicates I (with details for 1985 also) the number of deaths caused by these along with a I breakdown of the victims by category. I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I e - 3 - I Annex 8 Attacks on RUC/UDR barracks (1986-87) This Annex gives a month-by-month I breakdown of the numbers of attacks (carried out by the Provisional IRA and I the INLA on RUC / Army barracks during 1986 and to date (28 February) in 1987. I

Annex 9 Expenditure on security in Northern I Ireland oy UK exchequer (1974-36)

I Annex 3 is designed to give an estimate of the costs incurred by the UK exchequer I on security in Northern Ireland. The figures~~~ approximate rather than I definitive. I I Anglo-Irish Section, I March 1987. I I I I I I 2283m I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 ©NAI/DFA/2017/ 4 / 6

i\NNEX

Total

s Total

TOTAL

UDR

Army

RUC

------

S Forces

C C

ourc

- II

- r i r

!.r__F

N d

No.

Casua

casualti

RlJ

------

C of

(Res

Security

ivilian

a s

ti -

---

)

1 i t

( :-s

1 J

l )

:-s

2 n

f/\T/\1.

------

(I\

()

(i 80

U/\LTIE

1 I

)

:-S

---

Ir-J

':,

ti 2

I.Z

NORT!

7 ,

()

EliN

----

[l{El.i

-----

)

Nll

' :

)

·-

·· 23

) Vi

8 8

2 J

1 1

(

'.}

- 8 7

5 2 1

)

Tot

i 2

S-

386

236

7 8

a 1

5 3

6 9

©NAI/DFA/2017/ 4 / 6

· ·

i\NNEX i\NNEX

Total Total

Killed Killed Sccur!:.!L_Forces Sccur!:.!L_Forces

IJDR IJDR

TOTAL TOTAL

Army Army

RUC RUC

Forces Forces

Source: Source:

- -

e e

and and

lA lA

No. No.

Casualties Casualties

No. No.

casulties casulties

RUC RUC

R.U.C. R.U.C.

---

of of

(Reserv

(;jvilians (;jvilians

Security Security

----

-----

Statistics Statistics

· ·

Casualties Casualties

----

- - - - -

---

) )

-----

---

- - -

----

---

----

196 196

l2 l2

---

1) 1)

------

1 1

---

9 9

FATAL FATAL

~--

l l

') ')

z z

(I\

3 3

70 70

2 2

r:; r:;

2 2

- -

-~------

UJ\LTTF.S UJ\LTTF.S

----

- - - -

1 1 l

----

l l

---

9 9

13 13

r:;9 r:;9

7 7

I I

5 5

7 7

s s

I I

1 1

l l

- -

IN IN

- - - -

19 19

'1 '1

l l

l16 l16

0 0

2 2

-----

6 6

17 17

NORTlll:RN NORTlll:RN

7 7

'.} '.}

3 3

7 7

1 1

Z Z

------

- -

------

---

----

I I

250 250

(

7 7

:; :;

7 7

13 13

) )

7 7

,1 ,1

') ')

8 8

I I

3 3

tREl,,\ND tREl,,\ND

---

-----

---

- - - -

216 216

l l

I. I.

----

')71 ')71

28 28

50 50

1S 1S

1 1

h h 7 7

2. 2.

I I

Z Z

tl tl

31 31

L L

-· -·

I I

l l l l

> >

7 7

6 6

7 7

t t

----

------

- - - -

l l

5 5

- -

Z Z

297 297

Lg Lg

15 15

23 23

14 14

52 52

I-; I-;

7 7 6

- -

---

----

------

19 19

l l l l

69 69

- - -

13 13

LS LS

l l

,1 ,1

77 77

2 2

1 1

------

1978 1978

50 50

10 10

81 81

31 31

u u

7 7

. . -

©NAI/DFA/2017/ 4 / 6

AfNEX: AfNEX:

Tot:l.

Civil Civil

~a1r ~a1r

Total Total

J\ro¥

ru ru

forces forces

(/Reserve (/Reserve

------

l l

UDR UDR

ic111..s ic111..s

i i

18 18

~a.rrity ~a.rrity

1:l 1:l

e e

trcrl trcrl

Rm:~s Rm:~s

1,838 1,838

2,543 2,543

1Q71 1Q71

705 705

31.S 31.S

3'.)() 3'.)()

4,876 4,876

l,063 l,063

L972 L972

,185 ,185

578 578

l3 l3

2,65

l,812 l,812

973 973

839 839

Slf8 Slf8

291 291

1. 1.

l l

l971 l971

,68() ,68()

,183 ,183

235 235

718 718

)8 )8

1975 1975

,t1

Injuries Injuries

130 130

1">7 1">7

H H

3 3

1 1

2, 2,

2,729 2,729

L976 L976

261 261

303 303

5r-,7 5r-,7

l62 l62

i.n i.n

t'hrthcm t'hrthcm

l l

l,3()8 l,3()8

t)77 t)77

()

371. 371.

un un

27 27

88 88

Irelam Irelam

1978 1978

-137 -137

S,18 S,18

'18S '18S

135 135

2 2

1J7l 1J7l

1.079 1.079

r.,1;

875 875

31_q 31_q

Jr.,3 Jr.,3

0S 0S

7 7

1J86 1J86

530 530

271 271

..)00 ..)00

1.91 1.91

77 77

1 1

L L

,172 ,172

IP'-{ IP'-{

332 332

350 350

)81. )81.

L L

10 10

525 525

1.97 1.97

D{ D{

1)8 1)8

Y) Y)

2 2

5L0 5L0

2.'10 2.'10

13.q 13.q

3 3

() ()

2 2

113, 113,

8({) 8({)

267 267

3S3 3S3

86 86

I.'> I.'>

1 1

DfG DfG

- ,

91.6 91.6

'\,

us us

33 33

(

~ ~

8 8

1986 1986

,-15

622 622

773 773

677 677

55 55

0 0

Total Total

19 19

8,096 8,096

,25 ,25

,34

t183 t183

613 613

7 7 L L '1~/EX 2. I Table 1 Violent Deaths in Northern Ireland 1969 - 1986: agents responsible

2 3 4 5 6 7 g 10 11

•on- Provo. I~L\ Off. ~on- UDA. lNF 3ri t. IJDR RUC Unattriouted spec. IRA IRA .3 pee. UFF and Army RUCR ,-~P· toy. PAF

~ - 7 _;o ) 14 7 94-l 57 15 )) - 33 229 . -+ 6 159 I Table 7 Viole:-it Deaths i:1 :,iorthern Ireland 1)35 - age:1ts responsible

7 2 3 4 ) ') g 9 10 11

1·on- Provo. I'HA Off . \Jon- '.ffiA. iNF or it . UDR RUC Una ttr i'.)U tele I I l 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 L· ) ~ 1 Ion- ?rovo. I'.'HA Off. 'Jon- !JDA UVF Sri t. iJD? R.IJC :Jru ttri::,uted pee. IRA I~ spec. UFF ,1..nd Army '(I J;. } ·'-ep. toy. ?AF

1_ , - 44 7 -+ 4 3 3 ) I

I 23 of those were among members of the security forces. I I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 e ANNEX 3 I SECURITY STATISTICS F0R ~ORTHERN D.ELA'iD I Terrorist Incidents 1969 - 1986 I I I Categories Shootings Bor;i::,s* '.'-lalicious fires TOTALS

I l ·) 6) 3 8 1)70 2 L 3 170 383 I l ·) 71 1 , 7 3 6 l , 5 13 3,271 1) 7 2 10,)28 l , 3 S 3 12,481 I 19 7 3 3 , 0 13 l , .) 2 0 387 7 , 12 5 19 7 ,i 3,206 l , l 1 3 '·i36 4,955 1)75 l , ,3 0 5 S 3 3 2 +.g 2,688 I l ') 7 6 l, 9 08 l , 1 J Z -is 3 3 , 5 3 3 i - ) 1977 l , 0 8 1 3 3 5 . .) - 2,048 I 1-J 7 a 7 5 5 ·5 3 3 ~6) l , 6 5 7 1 9 7'.) 728 564 3 l 3 l, 6 07

' 7 - I l '.)80 6 +2 .i 00 - ) 1 , 31 7 19 81 1,142 529 J 3jx 2,207 3 .. 7 I D82 5 4 7 .) ~ i t) ) 1 , 3 7 8 1983 424 30 7 ) ~ 'i L , 319 1984 334 2 :1 8 3. i 0 l , +2 2 I l ') 8 5 13 7 2 15 -.io 1,092 I 1936 3 92 254 J OS 1 , 45 2 I I * includes devices defused x no figure for April-June 1)81 I I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 -ANNEX 4 Finds of Commercial Explosives in Northern Ireland I I Year I. I.E. Undyed I. I.E. Dyed Other Total 1976 KG. 505.23 38.41 54.6 608.24 I % 83.1% 6.3% 10.6% 100% 1977 KG. 166.11 22.95 47.02 236.08 I % 70.4% 9.7% 19.9% 100 %

19 78 KG. 50.93 1. 8 5 34. Z3 87.01 I % 58.5% 2. 2 % 39.2% 100 %

I 19 79 KG. S 1. 45 5.6 5.8 62.85 % 81 . 3 % 8. 9 % 9.2% 100 %

I 1980 KG. 28.79 0.8 29.59 I % ') 7. 2 % 2. 7 % 100% 1981 KG. 59.51 2 . 5 2.68 64.69 I % 91.'}% 3.8% 4.1% 100% 19 82 KG. 87.37 8 7. 3 7 I % 100% 100%

1983 KG. 3.06 0.35 0. 18 3. 5 9 I % 8 5,. 4 % 9. 7 % 5. 0 % 100%

I 1984 KG 16.80 0 . 4 7 1 7 . 2 7 % 97.23 2 .72% 100%

I 1985 KG 1.3.00 20.919 33.919 I % 38.33 51.67 100% 19 8 6 - KG 10.5 17.733 28.233 , I Oct 31 % 3 7. 2 % 62.8% 100% Key: IIE Undyed: Manufactured by Irish Industrial Explosives for use in the South. I IIE Dyed: ~anufactured by Irish Industrial Explosives for use in Northern Ireland. I Other: Manufactured elsewhere, of uncertain origin or not known if dyed. I Source: From statistics supplied by the British Embassy

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 ,l mx 5 e I Finds of Detonators in Northern Ireland I G. B. made for G. B. made fo r U.S. made - 11r the Republic N. Ire l and i llegal in U. K Urunarked Other Total

Qt y. 588 35 197 438 10 ·176 % 46.4% 2. 7% 15.5 % 34. 5% 0. 9%

Qty. 27 3 21 35 445 8 782 .177 % 34 . 9% 2.7% 4.5% 55 . 9% i%

') Qt y. 149 2 10 '- 83 24 .IJ18 % 60 . S% 0.8% 4.1% 0.3% 33 . 7%

I Qty. 58 10 6 212 15 301 .979 % 19.2% 3. 3% 1. 9% 70.4% 4. 9%

I Qty. 26 20 81 13 140 jqo % 18.5% 0% 14.2% 57.3% 9.2%

Qty. 59 2 26 119 13 219 ·In % 26 . 9% 0. 9% 11. 3% 54.3% 5. 9%

Qt y. 61 2 47 73 50 233 132 % 26.1% 0. 8% 20 .1% 31. 3% 21. 4%

Qty. 15 2 ..::, 36 37 95 I--~ 3 % 15. 8% 2.1 % 5. 3% 37 . 9% 38.9%

I Qty. 16 7 1S 30 .984 % 23.2% 0% 10 .1% 23 . 2% 43 . 5%

I Qty. 3 1 12 8 37 8 177 % 1. 7% . 56% 72. 3% 20 . 9% 4.54%

L986 - Qty. 7 1 52 24 84 _I % 8.3% 1. 2% 61. 9% 28. 6% 'lirce: From statistics supplied by British Embassy I

I Geographical Pattern of Fatal ~asualties 198 0 - Feb ruar y 1) 8 7 I Category 1 Ca t ego r y 2 Catego r y 3 To tal I Belfast Ar ea Rur ::i l \/o n Borde r Border :\re a

7 - I 1 ) 80 40 (55 .3 ?5) 6 ( 8 • 5 % ) ... .) ( 33. 2%) 7 1

( ,.. 7 8 S'< ) 11) 6 I 1 ·} 8 1 36 .) - • 0 12 ( l l . 3 %) 38 ( 33. 9%) 1'182 39 ( -i 1 %) 17 ( 18 %) 3 :) ( -i 1 %) 95 I 19 3 3 L ~3 ( 33 . 8%) l l ( 15 . 2%) 3 4 ( 50%) 63 1 )8 4 2 20 ( 3 5 %) l) ( 1 7 . 1%) 27 ( -i 7 .3 %) 57 , ( 13 ,q I 1 ) 85 .3 3 ( 13. 7%) \ , I 0 3 ,S (7 0. ,'5%) 5 l I 1986 2-i ( 3 3 %) 1 ') ( 1 S %) 29 (-i6%) 6 3 I TOT AL 229 (40 . 3%) 33 ( 14 . 6%) 236 (45 .1 %) 558 Ca t ego r y 1 3e lfa st Ar e a i ncli1 de s '.3elfas t, Lurgan, T.,i:sburn , ? or tadown , I Ho ll ywo od, Carric'< f e rg:1s :i 11 d Crai gJ.vo '1 , ard t '.1e a r e3. oounded a co ntinuous line d rawn c:1r0 ug i1 t :1ese to1./ns . .., I Cat ego r y - All rural areas including towns Got E~lling .Jithin Ca tegory 3,. Specificall y i11c l udes 1')• 1·1ganno'1 , Cooks toirn, Omag:-i, Ball ymena, Downpatrick, Banbrid ge, \e~ca stl~. Li~avady a nd Ennis \ ille11.

I Ca t egor y 3 All 3.r e as within 10 mile s o f c:1e ;)·)c ,Jer Lncl1di:1.g to~rns. Specific:1ll y i11 c luding Kid,.ee l , .-\r ::i1g'1 , 3t:-1J ,1r1r:, Derry a nd I Newr y . · Foot:1ote 1 Information i s onl y a vail a bl e o n l1caci0n E1 r S3 of 77 d eat~s I irt 19 83. Footnote 2 Information is onl y a vailabl ~ on lJc1tio 11 fJ r 37 out o f 6f deaths in 19 84.

I Foot:-iote 3 Information is o nly ava i lable on lo c ation fo r 51 of a tota l of I 54 deaths in 19 85. I I

©NAI/DFA/2017/4/6 I . A.NN EX 7 I Vi o lent I ncid en t s in border a r eas * of Northern Ire l and I attributable to Provisional IRA activities I I 19 8 5 1986 1'387 ( 2 8 Feb)

I 1. Total :'10. of violent incidents: ** 83 q

I 2. No . of

1 Army J. 4 I IRA i 1 INLA l*** I Ci v i 1 i ans 7 7

I 30 2 9 1 I Border area is taken as an area wit:1in a ten mi le ra,iius of I the border. I ** Figure not avail a b l e I *** Th i s de ath resu lted from the in t ernal I:'nA fued. I I

I Attacks* on RUC / UDR barracks 1~86 - 37 I

I 19 86 \I 0 of attacks

Jan 5 I Feb >la r l I A.pr >la y 1 I June -) .Jul y I Aug .i 3e pt l

Oct .) I 'fov ? Dec 2 I z -+ I 1~87 - To date (23 Feb) ::, I I * T :1 e P r o v i s i o n a1 I RA h a v e c l a i m ed , c s p 1) ,1 s iJ i l i t ;1 f o r a 11 but one of these attacks; responsi~ility fo r that other I attack was claimed by t~e I ~L A. I I I 22 83M .

I Expenditure on security in NI :)y UK Ex chequer , l 9H-1986 I I Expenditure on l aw, Ex tra costs Co st of NI 3ecur i t y or der and protec tive of Br i t i.. s:1 to UK Exci1equer per I se rvices and 'H Ar my in NI \ead of UK pop1lation

I S t. Em St. £m St. €/head

I U 7 4/ 5 1') 9 33 3 1973/ 6 130 60 1 I FJ75/ 7 158 ss -+ 1977 / 8 l73 69 -+

D78/ 9 206 81 ) I 1979/ 80 23::l :.i s 6 L980/ l 312 L11 8 I 198 1/ 2 344 U 9( 2) 8 1982 / 3 .36') l+3 9 I 1983 / Ci 393 UL 10 U8 -l / 5 .ios ;l , 1 . '1. -1 • I 19 85 / 5 t.33 n.a. 1.a.

I :-l' otes:

I 1. Estimates of NI e xpenditure on Lai;, Or der and Protect ;·.;'= s2 rvices J.re iri current prices and are derived from UK Suppl y- Estimates , ~lJ.ss 'Cl fo, l':174 ./ 5 I to 1977/ 78, and from 'the Government ' s Expenditure Plans, U 83- 34 t o D83- 36' I f or years 1978/9 to 1983 / 4. 2. Estimates of the extra costs of the British Army in ~H :1ave been derived I from a series of Parliafilentary Answers. A new basis of calculation was introduced in 1981 / 2.

I 3. Pop..1lation data from the UK are for 1 January each year as reported in Eurostat de1TDgraphic statistics, 1980.