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Fiscal System Analysis: Concessionary and Contractual Systems Used in Offshore Petroleum Arrangements

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Fiscal System Analysis: Concessionary and Contractual Systems Used in Offshore Petroleum Arrangements OCS Study MMS 2004-016 Coastal Marine Institute Fiscal System Analysis: Concessionary and Contractual Systems Used in Offshore Petroleum Arrangements U.S. Department of the Interior Cooperative Agreement Minerals Management Service Coastal Marine Institute Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Louisiana State University OCS Study MMS 2004-016 Coastal Marine Institute Fiscal System Analysis: Concessionary and Contractual Systems Used in Offshore Petroleum Arrangements Authors Mark J. Kaiser Allan G. Pulsipher March 2004 Prepared under MMS Contract 1435-01-01-30951-18178 by Center for Energy Studies Louisiana State University Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803 Published by U.S. Department of the Interior Cooperative Agreement Minerals Management Service Coastal Marine Institute Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Louisiana State University DISCLAIMER This report was prepared under contract between the Minerals Management Service (MMS) and Louisiana State University’s Center for Energy Studies. This report has been technically reviewed by MMS. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the view and policies of the Service, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute endorsement or recommendation for use. It is, however, exempt from review and compliance with MMS editorial standards. REPORT AVAILABILITY Extra copies of the report may be obtained from the Public Information Office (Mail Stop 5034) at the following address: U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Gulf of Mexico OCS Region Public Information Office (MS 5034) 1201 Elmwood Park Boulevard New Orleans, Louisiana 70123-2394 Telephone Number: 1-800-200-GULF 1-504-736-2519 CITATION Suggested citation: Kaiser, M.J. and A.G. Pulsipher. 2004. Fiscal system analysis: Concessionary and contractual systems used in offshore petroleum arrangements. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, New Orleans, La. OCS Study MMS 2004-016. 78 pp. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The advice, patience, and critical comments of Radford Schantz, Kristen Strellec, and Stephanie Gambino are gratefully acknowledged. Radford Schantz suggested the initial formulation of the problem considered in this paper, and special thanks also goes to Thierno Sow of the MMS for generating the cash flow parameters for the Na Kika and the Girassol field developments. This paper was prepared on behalf of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS region, and has not been technically reviewed by the MMS. The opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Minerals Management Service. Funding for this research was provided through the U.S. Department of the Interior and the Coastal Marine Institute, Louisiana State University. v ABSTRACT The manner in which the fiscal terms and parameters of a contract impact system measures are complicated and not well understood, and so the purpose of this report is to quantify the influence of private and market uncertainty on concessionary and contractual fiscal systems. An analytic framework is developed that couples a cash flow simulation model with regression analysis to construct numerical functionals associated with the fiscal regime. A meta-modeling approach is used to derive relationships that specify how the present value, rate of return, and take statistic vary as a function of the system parameters. The critical assumptions involved in estimation, the uncertainty associated with interpretation, and the limitations of the statistics are also examined. The report is divided into two parts. In Chapter 1, the concessionary system is examined and the deepwater Gulf of Mexico Na Kika field development is considered as a case study. In Chapter 2, the contractual fiscal system is considered with the deepwater Angola Girassol field development as a case study. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Figures.................................................................................................................. xiii List of Tables .....................................................................................................................xv Chapter 1: Concessionary Systems 1.1. Introduction..............................................................................................................1 1.2. The Stages of an Oil and Gas Venture.....................................................................3 1.3. Fiscal System Classification ....................................................................................5 1.3.1. Concessionary Systems..................................................................................5 1.3.2. Fiscal Components of Concessionary Systems..............................................5 1.4. Cash Flow Analysis of a Royalty/Tax Fiscal Regime .............................................6 1.4.1. After-Tax Net Cash Flow Vector...................................................................6 1.4.2. Cash Flow Components .................................................................................6 1.5. Economic and System Measures .............................................................................8 1.5.1. Economic Indicators ......................................................................................8 1.5.2. The Take Statistic ..........................................................................................9 1.5.3. Annual Government and Contractor Take...................................................10 1.5.4. Cumulative Discounted Government and Contractor Take.........................11 1.5.5. The Characteristics of Take .........................................................................12 1.6. Meta-Modeling Methodology................................................................................14 1.7. A Functional Analytic Approach to System Measures..........................................15 1.7.1. Development Scenario.................................................................................15 1.7.2. Regression Model Results............................................................................16 1.7.3. Valuation Strategy .......................................................................................17 1.7.4. Sensitivity Analysis .....................................................................................17 1.8. Elements of Fiscal Design .....................................................................................18 1.8.1. Equivalent Fiscal Regimes...........................................................................18 1.8.2. Feasibility Constraints .................................................................................19 1.8.3. Feasible Domain ..........................................................................................20 1.8.4. Progressive Fiscal Regimes .........................................................................21 ix TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page 1.9. Deepwater Gulf of Mexico Case Study: Na Kika..................................................22 1.9.1. Na Kika Deepwater Development ...............................................................22 1.9.2. Development Scenario.................................................................................22 1.9.3. Deepwater Royalty Relief............................................................................23 1.9.4. Regression Model Results............................................................................23 1.9.5. The Impact of Royalty Relief ......................................................................25 1.10. Conclusions............................................................................................................26 Chapter 2: Contractual Systems 2.1. Introduction............................................................................................................27 2.2. The Licensing and Negotiation Process.................................................................28 2.3. Background Information........................................................................................32 2.3.1. Contractual Systems.....................................................................................32 2.3.2. Fiscal Components of Contractual Systems ................................................32 2.4. Cash Flow Analysis of a Production Sharing Agreement .....................................32 2.4.1. After-Tax Net Cash Flow Vector.................................................................33 2.4.2. Cash Flow Components ...............................................................................33 2.4.3. Sliding Scales...............................................................................................36 2.5. Economic and System Measures ...........................................................................36 2.5.1. Economic Indicators ....................................................................................36 2.5.2. Government and Contractor Annual Take...................................................37 2.5.3. Government and Contractor Discounted Take ............................................38 2.6. Generalized Fiscal System Analysis......................................................................38 2.6.1. Terms of a Contract .....................................................................................38 2.6.2. System Functionals
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