Local Hazard Mitigation Plan

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Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Local Hazard Mitigation Plan City of Fullerton Final City Council Draft (Adopted) May 21, 2020 City of Fullerton TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 .............................................................................................. 1-1 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1-1 Plan Purpose and Authority ............................................................................................................. 1-1 Plan Organization and Use............................................................................................................... 1-3 Plan Goals......................................................................................................................................... 1-4 Planning Process .............................................................................................................................. 1-4 CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................. 2-1 2. COMMUNITY PROFILE ........................................................................................ 2-1 Setting and Location ........................................................................................................................ 2-1 History .............................................................................................................................................. 2-1 Demographics .................................................................................................................................. 2-2 Economy and Commute Patterns.................................................................................................... 2-4 Land Uses ......................................................................................................................................... 2-5 Development Trends ....................................................................................................................... 2-5 Infrastructure Assessment ............................................................................................................... 2-6 CHAPTER 3 .............................................................................................. 3-1 3. HAZARD ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................... 3-1 Hazard Identification ....................................................................................................................... 3-1 Hazard Scoring and Prioritization .................................................................................................... 3-4 Hazard Profiles ................................................................................................................................. 3-7 CHAPTER 4 .............................................................................................. 4-1 4. THREAT ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................... 4-1 Key Facilities ..................................................................................................................................... 4-1 Vulnerable Populations .................................................................................................................... 4-5 Other Community Assets ................................................................................................................. 4-7 Threat profiles .................................................................................................................................. 4-7 CHAPTER 5 .............................................................................................. 5-1 5. HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGY ...................................................................... 5-1 Strategy Development Process........................................................................................................ 5-1 Hazard Mitigation Actions ............................................................................................................. 5-11 National Flood Insurance Program ................................................................................................ 5-22 CHAPTER 6 .............................................................................................. 6-1 6. PLAN MAINTENANCE .......................................................................................... 6-1 Coordinating Body ........................................................................................................................... 6-1 Plan Implementation ....................................................................................................................... 6-2 Plan Maintenance ............................................................................................................................ 6-3 Plan Evaluation ................................................................................................................................ 6-3 Plan Updates .................................................................................................................................... 6-4 Public Involvement .......................................................................................................................... 6-5 i Local Hazard Mitigation Plan | Final City Council Draft City of Fullerton Point of Contact ............................................................................................................................... 6-6 CHAPTER 7 .............................................................................................. 7-1 7. REFERENCES AND IMAGE CREDITS ................................................................ 7-1 References ....................................................................................................................................... 7-1 Image Credits ................................................................................................................................. 7-12 APPENDICES APPENDIX A Meeting Materials APPENDIX B. Community Outreach Materials APPENDIX C Adoption Resolution APPENDIX D Key Facilities Inventory APPENDIX E Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Implementation Workbook FIGURES Figure 2-1: General Plan Land Use Map ....................................................................................................... 2-7 Figure 2-2: Water Sources in Fullerton ......................................................................................................... 2-9 Figure 3-1: Dam Failure Inundation Zones ................................................................................................... 3-9 Figure 3-2: Statewide Drought Conditions from 2013 to 2018 .................................................................. 3-17 Figure 3-3: Statewide Drought Conditions as of March 5, 2019 ................................................................ 3-19 Figure 3-4: Fire Hazard Zones ..................................................................................................................... 3-23 Figure 3-5: FEMA Flood Zones .................................................................................................................... 3-29 Figure 3-6: Landslide Hazards Map ............................................................................................................. 3-35 Figure 3-7: Oil and Gas Operations ............................................................................................................. 3-41 Figure 3-8: DTSC Hazardous Materials Sites ............................................................................................... 3-43 Figure 3-9: Local and Regional Fault Lines Map ......................................................................................... 3-55 Figure 3-10: Liquefaction Hazards Map ...................................................................................................... 3-57 Figure 4-1: Map of Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Fullerton ................................................. 4-3 Figure 4-2: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Dam Inundation Areas ........................................ 4-9 Figure 4-3: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Fire Hazard Severity Zones in Fullerton ........... 4-17 Figure 4-4: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Fullerton’s Floodplains ..................................... 4-21 Figure 4-5: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Landslide Zones in Fullerton ............................. 4-27 Figure 4-6: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern Near Hazardous Materials Sites in Fullerton ........ 4-31 Figure 4-7: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Liquefaction Zones in Fullerton ........................ 4-35 Figure 4-8: Critical Facilities and Facilities of Concern in Seismic Shaking and Fault Rupture Zones in Fullerton ........................................................................................................................... 4-39 ii Local Hazard Mitigation Plan | Final City Council Draft City of Fullerton TABLES TABLE 1-1: KEY RESOURCES FOR PLAN DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................... 1-9 TABLE 2-1: BASIC DEMOGRAPHICS, FULLERTON AND ORANGE COUNTY (2015) ........................................ 2-2 TABLE 2-2: RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION, FULLERTON AND ORANGE COUNTY (2015) ..................
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