WHY KILLING IN WAR IS TRAUMATIC: EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND A MODEL OF MORAL INJURY FROM ACTIONS WE HAVE NORMATIVE PERMISSION TO PERFORM. Timothy W. Shaw Primary Supervisor: Associate Professor Hans Pols Secondary Supervisor: Associate Professor Dominic Murphy School for the History and Philosophy of Science Faculty of Science The University of Sydney Australia [2018] A thesis submitted to fulfil requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge; the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. Signature: Name: Timothy W. Shaw Date: 22 JULY 2018 ii Abstract This investigation will provide a model to make sense of why it is so inherently traumatic to kill another human – independent of normative circumstances. It will examine the construct of moral injury, a term that has entered the diagnostic and social lexicons under the guise of an explanation of why certain acts may be psychologically deleterious, and has rapidly become the ‘signature’ war-wound of contemporary engagements. Current research agendas identify existential dissonance caused by perpetrative agency, specifically killing, as the most potent causal factor. While research into why perpetration appears so etiologically significant is available under various guises, these accounts have been unable, or unwilling, to unravel the normative assignations that surround the suffering experienced. The paucity of such approaches in providing a basis for understanding why we would feel bad for certain actions which we have normative permission to perform, is the basis for an alternative, phenomenologically driven investigation, informed by the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. Major topics such as death and suffering of ourselves and others, will be shown to play central roles in conceiving, and justifying, a compelling alternative to existing narratives. Through a disambiguation of the origins of one’s obligations, obligations that are inadvertently lain bare by agency, an ‘ethical model’ will be proposed that proffers a framework to accurately describe the previously unexplained distress pathway that arises from our agency (or lack there-of). In articulating a model which anchors both our ethical and moral sensibilities, a tool emerges with which to make philosophical and psychological sense of suffering that is buried deeper than normative determinations of moral expediency. iii Authors Note It may be tempting to think that long and personal projects such as this, are the product of an individual. Nothing could be further from the truth. The trust, friendships, and belief offered throughout the writing of this work is an immeasurable comfort in what must otherwise be a lonely, and at times excruciatingly frustrating, pursuit of knowledge and excellence. It’s a triumph of family that profoundly supports personal achievement for current and future generations. In recognizing such, and the opportunity it begets, I can think of no better place to sincerely thank my father, John Shaw, for understanding so gracefully. iv Table of Contents Title Page.…….……………………………………………………………………...……………... i Declaration………………………………………………………………………………………….. ii Abstract.…………………………………………………………..…………..…………………….. iii Authors Note……....………………………………………………………….…………………...... iv Table of Contents…………..………………………………………………….…………………… v Visual Adumbrates……..………………………………………………………………...………... vii Epigraph……...………………………………………………………………………….…………. viii Preamble Modeling the Morality of Perpetrative Agency……………………………..……... 1 i. Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….…….. 1 ii. Importance………………….....……………………………………….……………… 6 iii. Rationale.……………………………………………………………………………… 12 iv. Chapter Synopsis………………….……….……………………………………….…. 14 Chapter 1 Theoretical, Social and Clinical Genesis of Moral Injury…………………….…… 19 1.0 Introduction.….…………………………………………………………...…………… 19 1.1 The Morality of Perpetrative Agency: Trauma Theory……………...………….…...… 20 1.2 The Morality of Perpetrative Agency: Clinical Agenda………………….…..……….. 23 1.3 The Morality of Perpetrative Agency: Social Appropriation.….…………………....… 28 1.4 Concluding Remarks.………………………………………………………………….. 31 Chapter 2 Wartime Killing and Models of Moral Injury……………………………………… 34 2.0 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….……... 34 2.1 Perpetrative Agency In War: Killing……..…………..……………….....…….………. 35 2.2 Morality of Killing in War: The Just War Tradition.……………….….…………….... 39 2.3 Existing Models of Moral Injury………………..…………………………………….. 44 2.4 Concluding Remarks..………………………………………….……………………… 52 Chapter 3 Integration of Morality by the Psychological Tradition ……………………..…... 56 3.0 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….……... 56 3.1 Moralized Psychology…………………..………………………………………….…. 58 3.2 Psychologized Morality……………….…………………….….………….……..….… 62 3.3 Empathy and Morality…………………………….………………………………..….. 65 3.4 Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………………...…… 68 v Chapter 4 Empathy as the Catalyst of Moral Salience………………………...…………….… 71 4.0 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….……... 71 4.1 Empathy to Sympathy: Analytic Tradition.…………………………………………… 73 4.2 Intentionality: Transcendental Phenomenology.………………………………..…….. 82 4.3 A Special Hermeneutic of Empathy: Existential Phenomenology …………………… 87 4.4 Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………………..……. 92 Chapter 5 Levinas and an Ethics Against Empathy……………………….…………………… 94 5.0 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….……... 94 5.1 Heidegger and Levinas on Death…………………………………...…………..……… 96 5.2 Philosophy of Emanuel Levinas……..….…..….…..….…..….…..…...….…….…….. 105 5.3 An Ethics against Empathy………………………………………………..…………… 112 5.4 Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………………..……. 114 Chapter 6 Locating Ethics: Suffering as the Site of Moral Salience …….………………...….. 119 6.0 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….…..…. 119 6.1 Inescapable Suffering………………………………………………………..………… 120 6.2 Necessarily of Useless Suffering……………….………………………...………..….. 123 6.3 Useful Suffering: Articulating Inter-Human Transcendence ………………….…..….. 128 6.4 Moral Injury as Useful Suffering……………………………………………………… 130 6.5 Concluding Remarks………………………………………………….…………..…… 133 Chapter 7 The Ethics of Perpetrative Agency: A New Model…………………………..……... 137 7.0 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….……... 137 7.1 Levinasian Psychology……………………………………………….…..…………… 138 7.2 Existing Models of Moral Injury: Levinasian Impact………………………………….. 144 7.3 Reimagining Moral Injury: The Ethical Model.………………………………………. 151 7.4 Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………………..……. 157 Conclusion “Solidarity of the Shaken:” The Promise of the Ethical Model…….…………… 161 Bibliography.………………………………….……………………………………………….....… 174 vi Visual Adumbrates EXISTING MODELS OF MORAL INJURY ETHICAL MODEL OF MORAL INJURY vii Preamble Modelling the Morality of Perpetrative Agency i. Introduction The psychological sequela associated with wartime actions are not particular to contemporary military engagements; long having been a locus for social understandings of trauma. Ancient Greek tragedies, often written and performed by combat veterans, spoke of miasma — a moral pollution or defilement (importantly not necessarily implying moral or legal culpability) arising from participation in war, the cure of which was believed to be katharsis, or social cleansing.1 While the phenomenon of combat induced trauma appears to be ancient, contemporary research has only recently begun to investigate trauma arising from impacts to spiritual or moral sensibilities, generally preferring to stress the physical and/or psychophysical tolls of war.2 Contemporary investigations which attempt to bridge this gap between these two conceptualizations are evidenced in a burgeoning literature on the impact of experiences that precipitate various ethical and moral challenges faced during 1 Euripides, and Robert E. Meagher. Herakles Gone Mad: Rethinking Heroism in an Age of Endless War. (Northampton, Mass: Olive Branch Press, 2006): 20. 2 Jonathan Shay, “Learning about Combat Stress from Homer’s Iliad,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 4, no. 4 (October 1991): 561; Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002): 3. 1 deployment.3 Only recently has the salience of ‘existential dissonance’ - an inconsistency or contradiction arising from acts and one’s moral beliefs, been proposed as the significant factor to traumatic psychological sequela, as.4 Loosely classified and understood under the umbrella term of moral injury, this psychological assignation has rapidly become the ‘signature’ war-wound of contemporary engagements which has, in the process, captured the attention of moral theorists and clinicians alike.5 However it is uncertain whether current understandings of the term adequately describe such occurrences. The emergent literature on moral injury designates a construct in its infancy. An emerging consensus is starting to consolidate around the view that moral injury is associated with the disturbance, disruption or diminishment of a uniformed person's moral outlook; as well as the depletion, degradation or disorientation of their inner-moral compass as a consequence of operational service.6 Validation of this causal ascription is currently taking place along three principal line of research, grouped under the umbrella terms of cultural,