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Forbes Direct A4 Leaflet Piper Alpha 25 years on 25 years on, a wreck buoy is all that is visible of what in 1988 was the North Sea’s largest and oldest platform. Len McCluskey, Unite general secretary writes Built in 1976 as an oil platform and subsequently converted Twenty-five years on from the Piper Alpha disaster, condolences to gas production, by the late 1980’s Piper Alpha was and tributes are not enough. Each producing 10 per cent of the North Sea’s gas. Together day 30,000 people earn their living with the Tartan and Claymore platforms, Piper Alpha was on North Sea installations, working and living in a profoundly hostile connected to the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkneys. environment. They deal with raw energy in a magnitude and a On the night of the disaster the – 6 July 1988 – the seas 200 danger that is hard to comprehend, kilometres south east of Aberdeen were turned into a scene without them the lights would go out and the country would grind of total devastation. to halt. One death because of a health and safety failure is a tragedy and one Of the 226 people on the death because commercial gain is put before human life is a scandal. Corporations at home and abroad platform, 165 died and two still have to learn the lessons of 25 years ago, which is why Unite is at the forefront in holding companies rescue workers perished. to account and we work across the industry to drive up health and safety standards. The first blast occurred around 10pm due to a leaking gas We owe it to the 167 people who valve and started a major fire in the oil separation module lost their lives, their families and fed by the two other platforms, Tartan and Claymore. those who live with that fateful Because the platform was originally built for oil, the firewalls night in the North Sea, the safest in the accommodation block could withstand fire, working conditions that can be obtained. but not explosions. www.unitetheunion.org/joinunite Piper Alpha 25 Years on The Cullen inquiry In November 1988, the Cullen inquiry was set up to establish what had caused the Piper Alpha disaster. Lord Cullen was scathing about Piper Alpha’s permit to work system which he said was based on “informal and unsafe practice” and was knowingly and flagrantly flouted. On the day of the disaster, the pressure safety valve on one of Piper Alpha’s two large compres - sors was removed for an overhaul. At 6pm, with the job unfinished, the tube was temporarily sealed with a plate and the engineer completed a form stating that compressor A was not ready being operated correctly, relying on the absence and should not be switched on. of any feedback of problems indicating that all was well.” At 9:45pm the platform’s second compressor stopped and could not be restarted. Failing to He went on: “They failed to provide the training find the paperwork on compressor A’s safety required to ensure that an effective permit to valve because it was filed in a separate folder, work system was operated in practice. In the face operators restarted compressor A. The leaking of a known problem with the deluge system they gas found an ignition source and exploded. did not become personally involved in probing the extent of the problem and what should have Because divers had been working around the been done to resolve it as soon as possible. platform the fire water pumps had been switched to manual. As a result they did not start “They adopted a superficial attitude to the automatically as the disaster unfolded. Cullen assessment of risk of major hazard. They failed found that even if they had, the deluge pipes to ensure that emergency training was provided were so clogged with scale that they would not as they intended. The safety policies and proce - have worked anyway. dures were in place: the practice was deficient.” Cullen was damning of Occidental who owned Occidental was found guilty of having inade - Piper Alpha saying that: “They were too easily quate maintenance and safety procedures, but satisfied that the permit to work system was no criminal charges were ever brought against it. Has the industry learnt the lessons of Piper Alpha? Following the disaster Lord Cullen made 106 recom - 25 years on there are still questions over whether mendations, all of which were adopted by the gov - the global oil and chemical industry has fully learnt ernment and the North Sea offshore industry. But and understood the lessons of Piper Alpha. www.unitetheunion.org/joinunite Piper Alpha 25 Years on More recently the Buncefield explosion and fire, develop standards. In Europe, thanks to Unite’s and the BP Texas oil refinery and Deepwater work with other European unions, a draft EU Horizon disasters have raised concerns that directive has been improved so that it fits more process safety is being ignored or downgraded. closely with the current regulatory regime in Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster the the North Sea. The directive also explicitly chair of the US Chemical Safety Board, Dr maintains the health and safety rights of Moure-Eraso said: “Officials on the Mocondo oil offshore workers. rig were in the process of lauding operators and workers for a low rate of personal injuries on But as Unite national officer Linda McCulloch the very day of the April 20, tragedy. Company explains: “Twenty-five years on from Piper VIPs had flown to the rig in part to commend Alpha it’s evident that the industry still needs to the workforce for zero lost time incidents. learn the lessons, standing still is not an option. Cuts to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) “This similarity to the BP Texas City explosion, and the merging of HSE’s Offshore Safety which occurred on the day of a luncheon to cel - Division with the HSE’s mines inspectorate and ebrate low personal injury rates underscores gas and pipelines inspectorate is a real cause the need for industry to examine process safety for concern too. indicators to prevent future catastrophes.” “Not only does it break some of the key recom - A fresh analysis by Scottish academic Professor mendations of Cullen, there is a real fear that Charles Woolfson comparing the safety failures the restructuring will dilute the expertise that leading to the Piper Alpha disaster with the offshore safety inspectors have accumulated Deepwater Horizon disaster found that there over the last 25 years. We owe it to those who were “startling and wholly depressing similari - have lost their lives and their families to have a ties” between the two. These included lax properly resourced inspectorate backed up with regulatory regimes, weak inspection and enforce - a tough regulatory regime.” ment procedures, and prioritising commercial considerations over the safety of personnel and the environment. Unite’s action plan for a safer oil and gas industry He also noted that neither Occidental, the opera - tor of Piper Alpha or BP were “rogue companies” • Stronger laws operating outside industry standards at the time • Tough inspection and of the disasters saying: “Both companies were enforcement typical representatives of the industry of which they were part, an industry run by giant • Focus on process safety multinational organisations aggressively • Involve the workforce and pursuing the bottom line in a ruthless competitive environment.” act on their warnings • Only safe production In the UK, Unite is working with the Process Safety Leadership Group, the Chemical and • Increased checks Downsteam Oil Industry Forum and the National on ageing plant Skills Academy for the Process Industries to www.unitetheunion.org/joinunite DB/5889/6-13 Join Unite now – Return to: Business Reply Plus, Licence No: RLUE-YHBB-SBTY Unite the Union, 42/44 King Street ABERDEEN AB24 5TJ Membership Form - GB About You Direct Debit Details Instructions to your Bank or Building Society to pay by Direct Debit Mr Mrs Surname Ms Miss Dr Rev Originators ID Number 9 7 1 4 6 7 Forename Male Female / / NI No. Date of Birth Name of bank/building society House No./Name Street Town of the Bank City/Town – Sort Code – – Postcode On the selected day of the month: Home Tel. 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