— Feature Feature Piper Alpha: 25 years on

Iris Cepero

Many people vividly remember the The 106 recommendations of Lord UK waters to submit a safety case. summer evening in the Cullen’s inquiry into the disaster Safety Management marks the 25th when Piper Alpha, an significantly altered the regulatory anniversary of the Piper Alpha tragedy 120 miles northeast of , regime for the offshore oil and gas with a special edition that brings exploded, killing 167 men. It is industry in Britain. The inquiry found together testimonies and analysis the biggest work-related disaster that the rig’s operator, Occidental, had from those who recall the pain and , the United Kingdom, the inadequate maintenance and safety confusion of that fateful day and North Sea and the oil industry has procedures, but no criminal charges the consequences and significance seen in modern times. Everything were ever brought against it. The of the explosion for the oil industry, changed on the night of 6 July 1988 Department of Energy, which at the particularly its offshore operations. for the families of the victims, for time of the disaster was responsible for We scrutinise the effectiveness of the dozens that were lucky – no regulating offshore safety, shared the the goal-setting approach to safety other word but luck can express it blame. HSE was asked to oversee the management that the Cullen report more accurately – to survive, and implementation of 57 of Lord Cullen’s championed. We look at how the for the people onshore who can recommendations, including the practice has evolved and what still still hear, so many years later, the most important one: new regulation needs to be done to reduce to almost nil buzzing of the rescue helicopters requiring operators and owners of the chances of this kind – or any other over their heads. every fixed and mobile installation in similar – of incident happening again.

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that operators working in the offshore “it’s the way we do things round here”. Judith industry were legally required to take What I am absolutely sure of is that steps to continuously improve how they effective and committed leadership Hackitt managed offshore safety. The new EU from the very top of the organisation is directive on the safety of offshore oil crucial to achieving that safety culture. and gas operations will require that this Strong leadership has got to be key principle is adopted across Europe. placed at the front and centre – The extensive work done to successfully because without leadership other negotiate for a directive, rather than essential elements of the system a direct acting regulation, will help to – employee engagement, increased preserve this fundamental concept. competence – simply do not happen. Goal-based regimes and strong Everyone needs to recognise their leadership responsibilities and then play their Goal based regimes place the onus respective parts – regulators, on industry to ensure and demonstrate operators, employers, employees Chair to regulators that the risks of any and many more. Health and Safety Executive incident relating to oil and gas Strong leadership is also required to operations are reduced to ‘as low ensure that the resulting good practice as reasonably practicable’. is embedded within the industry But ensuring we have a safe Committing afresh to offshore industry is about much longer-term, no matter where the a global safety culture more than the regulatory framework. work is carried out. Strong leadership There are several other factors. will also ensure that organisations Being a chemical engineer, it is not For example, HSE believes that evolve to meet their new challenges often I find myself quoting Charles safety representatives are a real force and strive to continuously improve. Darwin but these words from the for improving health and safety in all If we are successful, our regulatory great naturalist illustrate an important workplaces, not least of course in the regime will remain robust, safety point: “It is not the strongest of offshore industry. standards offshore will continually the species that survives, nor the improve and we will create a culture most intelligent, but the one most where contractors and workers realise responsive to change.” the benefits of effective co-operation. Learning from the past is vital. Reading reports from past Strong leaders will also look beyond That’s why marking the 25th disasters, I am left with the their own company or sector to learn anniversary of the Piper Alpha feeling that in some respects disaster is important – using this as lessons, to pick up and share good there are no new accidents. an opportunity to reflect on how we practice with others. Rather there are old accidents need to get better at embedding that repeated by new people Committing to global safety culture learning from the past. But it is equally The principles of learning, reflecting important to recognise that being and adapting are as true for the trapped by the past and locked into a regulator as they are for the industry. single way of doing things is folly. Workforce involvement is just one To remain effective in regulating an I have read Lord Cullen’s report into aspect of a good organisational safety industry which continues to evolve, the 1988 disaster, and the reports on culture, and safety culture is one the regulator itself has to adapt and , Nimrod, Texas area where all offshore regulators City, Buncefield – the list goes on. change – while of course holding the agree is critical to securing long- While the precise circumstances key principles of the regime intact. term improvements. We cannot and contexts of these incidents differ The legacy of the Piper Alpha underestimate the difficulties of in some respects, at heart I am left disaster lives on with all of us addressing this offshore. In practice with the feeling that there are no connected with the offshore industry. it means trying to win the hearts and new accidents. Rather there are old There is no doubt that the changes minds of workers who are often not accidents repeated by new people. which were made to the offshore safety directly employed by the offshore regime following the tragic events of Goal-setting approach installation operator and who are 1988 have had a lasting impact. It is precisely because of that need to increasingly from different international I hope that on this most poignant of learn, adapt and improve that I believe cultures. Safety culture cannot be one of the most important principles achieved through legislation. Rather anniversaries we will be able to honour to emerge from Piper Alpha, from it is the combination of many factors those men who lost their lives 25 years a regulatory perspective, was the including leadership and competence ago by committing afresh to developing introduction of a goal-setting approach which translate into a set of behaviours a global safety culture in this industry to offshore oil and gas work activities. at all levels in an organisation. It is which responds to the challenges we all This approach was designed to ensure often encapsulated in the phrase face in the 21st century.

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and implemented in the five years board. To boost the robustness of Robert after. Firstly, responsibility for safety critical parts of installations, regulating offshore health and safety they are verified by independent, Paterson was transferred from the Department competent organisations as being both of Energy to the Health and Safety initially suitable for their purpose and Executive (HSE). remaining to operate as intended and Secondly, a new regime was in good repair and condition. established whereby a ‘safety case’ Proper planning and control of work for every production platform and activities is ensured by the permit to drilling rig operating in UK waters work system which authorises certain had to be submitted to the HSE for its people to do specific work at a certain acceptance. This regime is critical to time and place and sets out the main the systematic identification of hazards precautions that need to be taken to and the measures put in place to complete the work safely. In addition, reduce the hazards, allowing operators the reporting of incidents has improved to identify the gaps and therefore the hugely with a legal duty being placed Health, safety and employment safety controls required. on employers and beyond that, detailed, issues director voluntary information on offshore Oil & Gas UK The safety case hydrocarbon releases is submitted The safety case must demonstrate that by operators so that experiences can the company has a safety management be shared and lessons learnt across Workforce system in place to ensure compliance the industry. engagement is key with the law, has identified all hazards with the potential to cause a major Workforce engagement is the future to further progress accident and has evaluated the major Staggering improvements have Few will need to be reminded that July accident risks. The company must therefore been made in offshore this year marks the 25th anniversary then show it has put in place measures safety since 1988 as a result of to control these risks and ensure all these changes. But there is no of the Piper Alpha disaster. As the compliance with the law. They must room for complacency. Key now to world’s worst offshore disaster, it also demonstrate the provision and continuing further on the path of claimed the lives of 167 men and cast availability of a temporary refuge in case continuous improvement is promoting a dark shadow over everyone and of a major incident when the normal, the engagement of the workforce everything connected to oil and gas protected muster point is unavailable in their safety. for a long time afterwards. and provisions for safe evacuation and The introduction of regulations For those of us old enough to placing a duty on operators to consult remember, the stories from the with the workforce in the preparation survivors and the images on the news of safety cases and make available of the burning platform will stay with to them copies of the accepted us forever. A quarter of a century The design of platforms safety case resulted in the election of later, however, many of the younger now gives added protection safety representatives; there are now people working in our industry have to the people living and approximately 1,200 elected safety little or no recollection of the tragedy. working on board representatives for whom operators Many will also be unaware of the deep must fund and provide training, and impact it had on communities and the they cover some 250 installations and transformational effect it had on the 30,000 staff. rescue from the installation. industry and the way it is regulated. These safety representatives have Thirdly, goal setting requirements The same hazards which existed made and continue to make a valuable whereby regulations set the objectives back then still exist now – but how they contribution to safety offshore. Indeed, to be achieved without prescribing are regulated and how we manage they now sit on the leadership team of the detailed measures to be taken them effectively to reduce risk is now Step Change in Safety, the organisation replaced the legislation in use at crucially different and improved. with the goal of making the UK the the time. This allows the operator safest place in the world to work Lord Cullen’s recommendations to tailor the measures it takes to the offshore, along with representatives In the two years following the disaster, actual risks arising on his installation. from industry, HSE, trade unions and Lord Cullen was appointed to chair an The regulatory goals are supported trade associations. official public inquiry which aimed to by guidance based on current good establish the root causes of the disaster industry practices. and make recommendations as to the Other significant changes were Information on the UK oil and future safety regime for the industry. made in response to the lessons gas industry’s health and safety He in fact made 106 far-reaching safety learnt from Piper Alpha. The design of performance is available in Oil recommendations, based around a few platforms now gives added protection & Gas UK’s 2013 report at: key themes, all of which were accepted to the people living and working on /tinyurl.com/pywgvcb

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round and said, “There could be 100 And then, for us at Brent Delta at least, Jake dead or missing, Piper’s blown apart”. 1 January 1989 brought it to a head. We This obviously hit home to a lot had a massive gas blast which ripped Molloy of guys who, myself included, knew through the gas compression module and people that had been on there recently, destroyed a huge vessel. The vessel was maybe went on that shift. And of course probably two and a half, three metres in everybody was trying to phone home diameter and about five metres long. It then to reassure their own families and at looked like a Coke can; it had been torn the same time ask them if they’ve seen into shreds and thrown about the module. anything on the news about Freddy or There was one image that stuck out Billy or Bob or Tam or whoever. It was for me; some metal from the force of just desperate, desperate times. the blast had actually cut clean through I think it was probably the 8th when a four inch deluge line – a line providing the first papers started arriving with water to the sprinkler systems. It should the images of what was left, and that be full of pressurised water to suppress just wiped everybody out. You couldn’t any fire. There was a half inch wide bore Regional organiser imagine a platform the size of Piper through the middle of it and the rest of National Union of Rail, Maritime and Alpha disappearing and just leaving the pipe was full of dirty black, brown Transport Workers the well head. Piper was a big, big gunge which had solidified. That really platform. It was one of the biggest just ignited the spark of resistance for us Interview by Chris Warburton producers in the North Sea. as workers on that particular platform And then the lists started to appear and across the Brent field and then The anger and grief of in the newspapers. That was the beyond. It culminated in the stoppages middle of our work trip actually, so we of work on the first anniversary in 1989. the offshore workforce had another week to go on working. I was offshore on the Brent Delta Singing from the same hymn sheet plataform on the night it happened. The following year there were sit-ins That was a pretty desperate place on platforms by workers, not by any to be, Brent Delta. I’d gone there in particular union – it was the organisation It was the 8th when the first November 1986 after 45 lads were called OILC at the time, the Offshore papers started arriving with the killed in a Chinook; most of them Industrial Liaison Committee, a campaign images of what was left, and came off the Brent Delta. Two years group of offshore workers. But the trade that wiped everybody out later I think we were just getting unions, in real terms, weren’t there, over the grief. because Mrs Thatcher had seen to that. At the time everybody was working On certain platforms there were 15 hours a day; I finished at about 9pm trade union activists, but they very that night, I got into the shower and The trigger of anger quickly got removed for voicing their then came down the stairs to phone The day immediately after [the concerns. If you put your head above home. I walked along the corridor; explosion], we had another explosion the parapet and started shouting on there was a radio operator, Alec, who on the Brent Alpha, and that was your own you wouldn’t be coming back, I communicated with during the day probably the first trigger of anger. You that was the nature of the beast at the because I worked on the heli-deck. could phone from platform to platform time. NRB [not required back] was rife. He shouted to me: “Jake there’s a lot quite easily, and we knew guys who OILC subsequently went on to of chatter going on on channel 16 – were down the [Brent] Alpha. We spoke become an independent trade union in the emergency channel – looks like to guys, saying, “How bad was it?” December 1992, albeit sitting outside something’s happening down on Piper.” because we were being told it was just the TUC. And then subsequently OILC I phoned home and as I came a superficial blast. But then we started merged with RMT in May 2008, and back down the corridor I stopped to get pictures in the paper. You saw so came under for the first time the at the radio room again and I said, the state of the cladding on the outside umbrella of the TUC, which opened a “What’s happening Alec?” and he said, of the installation, the stairwells were lot of doors for us to access and exert “Apparently there’s been an explosion, buckled; you’re talking about big influence. I think we’ve proven over the they reckon there could be as many heavy stairwells. last five years the degree of influence as six guys dead.” And you think to yourself, ‘What’s we’ve had in bringing about change. I went up the stairs and climbed into going on with this industry?’ That was We campaigned along with our the bunk bed. I was up at 5.30am the the first trigger in my mind of this anger colleagues in Unite, HSE and indeed next morning for a 6am start. In the building. Do they really care about Oil and Gas UK for the first time. We all galley in the mess room there was a the workforce? Was safety practice sung from the same hymn sheet recently small lounge. There was a crowd of guys really as good as it could and probably to counter the proposals for an EU in there and the radio was at full blast. should be? It was only a couple of trips regulation which would have effectively I could tell there was something going later then in September that the Ocean rewritten almost everything that we’ve on. “What’s up?” One of the boys turned Odyssey suffered a . worked with for the last 25 years almost.

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It didn’t make sense to us because we workers. 75% of those surveyed Major work have seen significant improvements. believed that the creation of the energy So, there’s major work to be done there Piper Alpha was a watershed and division and the dissolution of the as far as I’m concerned. Especially Cullen’s subsequent inquiry and the specific offshore safety division would if we’re going to see this continual 106 recommendations have set a undermine health and safety in the attrition of proactive work on the part standard, and while it took a bit of North Sea. of HSE. If we’re not going to have a time to really get it working as it a robust regulator then we need an should, we were just about there. informed and empowered workforce HSE demonstrated its ability with to look after the day-to-day safety. the key performance inspection If the idea to create an energy I have just spoken to two or three programmes, so we were comfortable division had been put before safety reps this afternoon who have throwing our weight behind the the debate on EU regulation, we chosen to resign because of the campaign to bring about a directive. would’ve backed the regulation treatment they’re getting from operators. The European regulation mirrored I’ve known for some time that NRB still everything that we had, it just put a exists and that some safety reps get different title on it, a different name a bad bag, but to see the safety reps, On top of that I think it’s wholly on it and a slightly different approach, who are playing a key role in trying to insensitive to create the energy division but it was to all intents and purposes improve attitudes and culture, being in the 25th anniversary year of Piper everything we had. So why undo what treated the way they are I think is very when it was the Department of Energy we have just to reinvent the wheel? disconcerting. It’s going to send out all which was the regulating authority I think it was a tremendous result all those years ago. It just doesn’t sit the wrong messages and probably set us that we got that directive. Tremendous comfortably with me. back years in the development of a truly in as much as it maintains what we’ve I always go back to [John] Rimington, engaging safety culture. That coupled got with a few tweaks here and there. who was in charge of HSE during Piper, with what’s going on in HSE only gives But, moreover, it should bring about giving his evidence to Lord Cullen. me cause for more concern. So I’m not significant change across Europe Cullen had posed a question along the positive at this minute in time about the and hopefully in the Caspian region. lines of “What makes offshore unique?” future. I’d like to be. Because I’ve got real worries about And Rimington said: “I can sum it up in What we’ve got is, to my mind what’s going on over there. one word: inventory”. at least at this minute in time, being Unique and distinct There’s no other industry in that type undone, and we can’t allow that to So to me it was good news but I’ve of environment which has an inventory happen. We can’t go backwards, we’ve got to counter that with the bad news [of hazardous substances, which can got to keep going forwards; it’s about now, which is the restructuring of HSE. be] on any production platform at any continuous improvement as opposed to I’ve got a lot of concerns, but really the given time which has the potential to sitting on our laurels and saying, ‘we’ve primary one goes back to the European destroy installations and cause multiple achieved, we are all but the best in issue. I find it astonishing that having fatalities on the scale of Piper. That’s class’. You can’t get complacent, you’ve achieved what we did to secure a what makes it unique and distinct and got to keep driving it and you’ve got to directive, why restructure and create that’s why there should be a unique keep challenging, and if we don’t do the energy division? I just don’t get that. and distinct regulator looking after it. that then we’ve got serious problems. If at any time the idea to create an energy division had been put up before the debate around the EU regulation then we would’ve been backing the EU regulation. We were supportive because of the performance of HSE’s offshore safety division and worked on the basis that that would continue. I believe that it will dilute the effectiveness of HSE. That’s borne out of anecdotal evidence provided to me by inspectors, who are as upset as workers are about what’s gone on. And specifically around the fact that there was never any consultation, even with the inspectors. But what I think is neither here nor there; it’s what the offshore workforce thinks. In May there was a press release from the organisation oilandgaspeople. com, who had surveyed 5,000 offshore The Piper Alpha platform. Photograph: Sipa Press/Rex Features

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That has meant the North Sea has been writing the rules that operators and Alyn seen the hazards of rig operation workers would have had to implement. reduced; large-scale changes and My MEP colleagues and I worked hard Smith enormous improvements in the to amend the proposal; most notably immediate aftermath and incremental to turn it into a directive rather than a improvements since then. As a result, regulation, making it more adaptable for the North Sea now has one of the best the industry and the workers involved. safety regimes in the world. A 2011 No office in Brussels lets anyone see report by the Norwegian what happens in the North Sea and no- Safety Authority indicated that BP had one in any such office is better able to a good safety record in the North Sea influence safety procedure than a safety in spite of the catalogue of failures and rep on site. errors in the Deepwater Horizon blast. The unions and the industry were It’s not enough; there are still massively helpful to us as we worked improvements to be made. There are still towards that – the facts and figures workers at risk and there are concerns all came from them and the most Member of the European about ageing installations and the effects persuasive arguments we deployed Parliament for Scotland of less than rigorous maintenance and were given to us with all the weight of Scottish National Party poor investment records. There is a that knowledge and experience behind distance to go. Our offshore workers, them. We submitted amendments which though, have the knowledge and changed a lot of what was proposed and The lessons that must the experience to continue making we got a good result. never be forgotten improvements and show the way for the Victory was secured in May when the world to improve workers’ safety. full parliament voted overwhelmingly in It doesn’t seem like 25 years have favour of these new rules. We’ve now passed, not even for those of us who got a framework which brings legal were youngsters at the time and only force to bear on EU safety regimes as experienced Piper Alpha from news well as ensuring that operators take reports. Piper Alpha for us is no longer We’ve now got a framework steps to protect the environment. We the name of a rig; it’s the indictment which brings legal force to bear get to keep our world-class offshore of an industry that cared more about on EU safety regimes as well safety standards and we improve our profit than people, more about as ensuring that operators take environmental credentials. keeping the product flowing than steps to protect the environment These EU rules are inspired by keeping workers safe. Piper Alpha Scottish groundwork and they will wasn’t a tragedy, it was a disgrace. become the gold standard for operations It wasn’t the only incident in the worldwide. Scots offshore workers are North Sea at the time, either. The That’s why HSE was able to write in global leaders in this field and they can Ocean Odyssey blowout that killed Tea-Shack News (19 June 2013) that continue to show the way forward. There a radio operator sticks in the mind the goal-setting regulations it agreed may even be opportunities for them because it happened while attempts with the industry meant that “safety to act as advisors in other areas of the were being made to recover the bodies became the responsibility of those who world looking to replicate what has been of those who died on Piper Alpha. The create the risks” and how the election achieved here. North Sea was an extremely dangerous of safety representatives to investigate It’s been a quarter of a century; the place to work. and inspect installations and what pain will not have faded for the families There is nothing to be glad of in happens on them has improved safety. of the victims of Piper Alpha, the Piper Alpha but there is a benefit that The people best placed to make memories will not have faded for the workers have had since then which decisions are the people who are survivors of Piper Alpha, but the industry resulted directly from it. The safety there and know how the place works. has marched a long way. I don’t work in improvements in the North Sea have That knowledge and experience meant the industry so I can’t know for sure just not completely transformed the working that the story of improvement generated what conditions are like for workers, but I conditions but they may be responsible by the workers themselves was at the do follow developments and, while I have for saving many lives and the avoidance heart of the creation of the new EU rules some concerns, I’ve been impressed of as many serious injuries. on offshore oil and gas safety which with how safety has been improved in Certainly the Cullen report was recognises the quality of the North Sea the last 25 years. effective in forcing through changes but safety regime. The EU came to the issue Whatever else we take from Piper it seems clear that the strength of the after Deepwater Horizon and started Alpha and whatever else occupies our Families and Survivors Association and looking at how safety and environmental minds on this anniversary, we owe it to the impact of OILC were major drivers impacts were monitored. today’s workers to honour the memory behind the improvements in safety and It began with a proposal for a of those who died by doing our best to in forcing consideration of safety into regulation which would have meant make sure it never happens again. The the very heart of operators’ planning. that someone in Brussels would have lessons learned must never be forgotten.

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atmosphere. It had been known that contributed to or masked the problems Rona during the launch, 16 days earlier, a within the organisation. There was a large section of insulating foam had strong commitment to the concept Jamieson broken away from the area surrounding of safety but open communication the fuel tank. Loss of the foam was was not the norm. People did not not regarded as a significant hazard by always feel comfortable raising safety those managing the programme. It had concerns with management. People happened several times before with no within the organisation did not feel major consequences. Despite that, a respected by the organisation and so number of the technical engineers had the strong commitment they felt to their concerns and had requested satellite technical work did not transfer to the imaging of the shuttle to check for organisation. Excellence was treasured damage. That request was denied. in relation to the technical work but the The investigation into the loss of the same standards were not demanded for Columbia concluded that the primary management skills. Integrity in relation cause of the accident was damage to to the technical work encouraged Partner and head of health, safety critical thermal protection tiles healthy debate yet raising issues which safety and environmental division which failed when the shuttle was challenged management thinking was Burness Paull & Williamsons LLP exposed to the intense heat of re-entry. discouraged at least by some. It also concluded that the tiles were Do you have an probably damaged by debris when the section of insulating foam broke away. attitude problem? The report identified that “NASA’s In the years immediately after history and culture contributed as The importance of corporate culture Piper, the climate for change much to the Columbia accident as any in determining safety performance was favourable. But the technical failure”. Safety culture is not particularly easy aftermath of a disaster provides A memo, dated 22 January 2003 to define. The behavioural safety a limited opportunity. 25 years and saved to file but apparently never expert, James Reason has described on, we can no longer rely on sent, was found challenging the Piper to be the catalyst it as “what people at all levels of an decision to deny the satellite photo organisation do and say when their imaging request. The memo, from one commitment to safety is not being of the technical engineers, said “In my scrutinised”. For him everyone needs humble technical opinion, this is the What is clear from the NASA to participate and it is what you do wrong (and bordering on irresponsible) experience is that it is not always when you think no one is watching answer... I must emphasise (again) that obvious that a culture problem exists that really matters. severe enough damage... combined within an organisation. There may In his inquiry into the Piper with the heating and resulting damage be a gradual process of erosion of Alpha disaster, Lord Cullen found to the underlying structure at the values over time until the new norm that at the very heart of the failings most critical location... could present becomes self-reinforcing and self- there was an issue of culture. “I potentially grave hazards... Remember perpetuating. When there is a high do not fault Occidental’s policy or the NASA safety posters everywhere turnover among senior management organisation in relation to matters around stating ‘If it’s not safe, say so’? within an organisation, the corporate of safety. However... I have had to Yes, it’s that serious.” memory and values may be lost even consider a number of shortcomings more quickly. in what existed or took place on Piper. The NASA culture This calls in question the quality of Shortly before the Columbia accident, Changing the culture Occidental’s management of safety, a survey by the US Office of Personnel The NASA assessment highlights two Management rated NASA as ‘one and in particular whether the systems factors which were key to changing of the best places to work in federal which they had for implementing the the culture. The first, leadership, is well government’. An independent company’s policy on safety were being understood and documented. Leaders assessment (Assessment and Plan operated in an effective manner.” drive cultural change, intentionally or for Organisational Culture Change at Safety culture is still at the heart of the unintentionally through their behaviour. NASA) commissioned after the accident challenge to ensure safety 25 years on. The second factor is climate. identified many positive aspects of the Culture is deeply embedded but It’s not rocket science NASA culture. They had a long legacy climate reflects the current focus of Creating and maintaining the right of technical excellence and there was a the leadership team and may change corporate safety culture is not a high level of teamwork and professional more quickly. A favourable climate is problem unique to the oil industry. pride in what they did and in general a an essential condition for a successful On 1 February 2003, the space shuttle ‘can do’ approach to problem solving. culture change. Sometimes the right Columbia and its crew of seven were However the assessment also found climate is created by external events. lost during re-entry to the earth’s that some of these positives indirectly A major accident can act as a catalyst.

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The aftermath of the Columbia disaster In conclusion Self-examination created a positive climate for safety I began my career as a health and within NASA because people were safety lawyer in Aberdeen in 1988 a In a paper published in 2005 for deeply affected by the accident. For few months before Piper. I saw the the American Institute of Process the oil and gas industry, the catalyst introduction of the safety case regime Engineers, the lessons of the NASA was Piper. The safety case regime and I have watched the industry experience were considered in the implemented as a result of the Cullen develop and change. There is no context of the oil and gas process recommendations was a watershed. doubt that there have been many industry. The authors identified a We should be proud of the fact that it improvements in offshore safety over number of key organisational culture still sets the benchmark. There is no the last 25 years. But the battle in themes and created a detailed doubt that in the years immediately relation to safety behaviours and safety question set for self-examination. after Piper, the climate for change was culture has still to be won. The questions are challenging and very favourable. But the aftermath So, it is time to ask yourself a if answered honestly, may cause of a disaster provides a limited time question. Are the carefully crafted some discomfort. They include: opportunity. 25 years on, we can no systems and procedures in your • Is there a ‘bad news filter’ applied longer rely on Piper to be the catalyst. operations manual being implemented as communications move up the effectively at every workplace, on every management chain? Corporate manslaughter installation, on every day? • Is a ‘can do’ attitude encouraged? The Corporate Manslaughter and If you don’t know, perhaps you’ve ‘Don’t bring me problems bring Corporate Homicide Act 2007 has got a problem. me solutions’ can stifle debate. created a requirement for organisations • Is there regularly pushback to establish effective safety management during audit close-out meetings? and a positive safety culture. The need • Do risk assessments use words to establish that there has been some like ‘believed’ or appear to element of senior management failure accept risk based on previous in relation to the breach is essential to experiences? the offence. Whether or not the breach • Are operations monitored closely is sufficiently serious so as to amount enough to detect problems? to corporate manslaughter is a decision That last one is important. which is left to the jury. They may take Ignorance of the fact that a problem into account any matters which they exists is not a defence. And if you consider relevant to that decision but don’t know you’ve got a problem, the act specifically states that the jury you can’t fix it. may consider “the extent to which An Organisational Culture the evidence shows that there were Question Set For Improving attitudes, policies, systems or accepted Operational Excellence in HSE practices within the organisation that Management was developed by were likely to have encouraged any such David Jones (Chevron), Walt Frank failure... or to have produced tolerance (ABS Consulting), Karen Tancredi of it”. The safety culture of organisations (Du Pont) and Mike Broadribb (BP) will now come under scrutiny like in 2005. never before. Photograph: Way Out West News

Largest and gas incidents involving fatalities, 1970 – 2007

Accident date Installation/field No. of fatalities Nature of incident

July 1988 Piper Alpha 167 Explosion on production platform

March 1980 Alexander L. Kielland 123 Drilling rig capsized

November 1986 Brent field 45 Helicopter crash

June 1978 Statfjord field 18 Helicopter crash

August 1981 Leman field 13 Helicopter crash

November 1977 nr. Varhaug field 12 Helicopter crash

September 1997 en route to Norn field 12 Helicopter crash

March 1992 Cormorant field 11 Helicopter crash

July 2002 Leman field 11 Helicopter crash

November 1985 Concem 10 Construction barge capsized

Source: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), Risk Assessment Data Directory, (2010), Major Accidents, Report No. 434-17

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yet the same common connecting That each disaster was avoidable is, Charles thread of global corporations operating in retrospect, a truism. That each one in disregard of the wellbeing of their was foreseeable is equally so, but Woolfson employees and the environment repeatedly we find that workers in the continues seemingly unchecked. It is industry had just such fears for their as if the ‘offshore’ in offshore oil, is safety, although they lacked confidence emblematic of much more than simply to express these concerns without fear a proximate spatial separation. It signals of retribution. The question then is why something akin to a zone of exclusion, safety has remained an intractable beyond the horizon of effective issue in the offshore oil industry? oversight that we rely on government The pioneering scholar of offshore to exercise on our behalf as citizens. safety in the UK sector, Professor W. Business schools are now G. Carson, in his book The Other Price incorporating the Deepwater Horizon of Britain’s Oil, spoke tellingly of a disaster into their classic case studies ‘political economy of speed’ prioritising of corporate responsibility failures and, profits over safety in the interests of Professor of labour studies in the case of BP, of belated corporate rapid hydrocarbon extraction. That Linköping University, Sweden contrition in the cause of reputational same ‘political economy of speed’ is repair. The US Justice Department just as evident today in the industry. meanwhile has indicted BP for its Seven out of nine key choices over Management failure in “culture of corporate recklessness” procedures adopted in the conduct of amounting to ‘gross negligence and the drilling operation at the Macondo the offshore industry: willful misconduct’ resulting in the well concession that led inexorably to From Piper Alpha to largest fine in US criminal history, while eventual catastrophe, were identified company personnel continue to face by the report of the Presidential Deepwater Horizon – and seek to evade – serious criminal Commission as dictated by the desire As we commemorate the Piper Alpha charges, including manslaughter. to ‘save time’ (read ‘money’). The disaster we are reminded of the Regrettably, Commission spoke of “elevating the many disasters which have occurred was able to avoid accountability for its goal of expeditious... development since 1988 in the offshore industry. actions before the Scottish criminal above the requirements of safety and Most recently, a review of the causes justice system. One hopes that such environmental protection”. But there and circumstances of the loss of impunity is no longer the norm. is also the broader imperative which 11 offshore workers’ lives on the relates to the desire of governments Deepwater Horizon oil rig in 2010, the for lucrative oil revenues and the spillage of nearly five million barrels of rapid exploitation of ‘safe’ offshore oil into the Gulf of Mexico, brings with Today, the lethal legacy of the provinces, safe that is at least in it an almost overpowering sense of long era of deregulation in the relative geopolitical terms, as seen déjà vu and the feeling that once more, US, exported globally in the from the standpoint of the interests tragic loss of life was preventable. name of free enterprise and of the US government. Here again is to be found that lethal economic efficiency, continues Professor Carson identified what he cocktail of contingent circumstances to take its toll in workers’ called “institutionally tolerated non- and systemic underlying causes: lives and the environmental compliance” with respect to regulatory multiple safety systems that did not wellbeing of communities requirements, whereby weak regulators function at the crucial moments; either turned a blind-eye to regulatory managerial failures both in the violations or simply adopted shared immediate run-up to and during the assumptions that production trumps all unfolding disaster; organisational However, the focus on BP, and/or its other considerations. He predicted this failures that were embedded in partners Halliburton and Transocean, would inevitably lead to a major safety distorted information flows and as the new corporate villains obscures failure in the North Sea, a decade before the lack of coherence of safety a more fundamental question. How is it Piper Alpha eventually incinerated. It management systems; defective that the safety regime in the US offshore seems that in key respects not much regulatory oversight authorities with industry, in the very heartland of the has changed. In the memorable words contradictory responsibilities for global oil industry, seemingly remained of the Presidential Commission, “efforts both production and safety; and even impervious to the lessons of previous to expand regulatory oversight, tighten the outright ‘capture’ of regulatory disasters? Were the safety standards safety requirements, and provide processes by the industry itself. on this rig so far below the prevailing funding to equip regulators with the Yesterday, the North Sea, today norms in the industry? One suspects resources, personnel and training the Gulf of Mexico, tomorrow some that many operators and contractors, needed to be effective were either remote offshore province in a compliant as in the Piper Alpha disaster, are today overtly resisted or not supported by developing world state or outer reaches thankfully whispering in private ‘there industry, members of Congress, and of the former communist world. And but for fortune’. several administrations”.

July 2013 Safety Management 23