Aufklärung. Revista de Filosofia ISSN: 2358-8470 [email protected] Universidade Federal da Paraíba Brasil

Lubenow, Jorge Adriano THE PARADOX OF TECHNOCRATIC DEMOCRACY AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS BY JÜRGEN HABERMAS Aufklärung. Revista de Filosofia, vol. 2, núm. 2, octubre, 2015, pp. 103-122 Universidade Federal da Paraíba João Pessoa, Brasil

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How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative ISSN: 2318­9428. V.2, N.2, Outubro de 2015. p. 103­122 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18012/arf.2015.25907 Received: 22/07/2015 | Revised: 22/07/2015 | Accepted: 01/11/2015 Published under a licence Creative Commons 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

THE PARADOX OF TECHNOCRATIC DEMOCRACY AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS BY JÜRGEN HABERMAS1 [O PARADOXO DA DEMOCRACIA TECNOCRÁTICA E O DÉFICIT DEMOCRÁTICO DAS INSTITUIÇÕES EUROPEIAS, EM JÜRGEN HABERMAS]

Jorge Adriano Lubenow *

ABSTRACT: In the nineties, Habermas RESUMO: Nos anos 1990, Habermas redirected his political writings to the post­ redirecionou seus escritos políticos para a national constellation (global and constelação pós­nacional (global e European) and the possibilities of a society europeia) e as possibilidades de uma politically integrated through sociedade integrada politicamente por uma transnational democracy (or post­national democracia transnacional (ou democracia democracy). This thematic reorientation pós­nacional). Esta reorientação temática took place on two fronts. The first one is aconteceu em duas frentes: a primeira, the global transnational democracy, which uma democracia transnacional global, includes the impacts of the economic que inclui os impactos da globalização globalization on national democracies, as econômica nas democracias nacionais, well the proposal for a political bem como a proposta de elaboração de Constitution for a pluralistic world society, uma Constituição política para uma based on a constitutionalization of sociedade pluralista transnacional, baseada international law. The second one is the na constitucionalização do direito European transnational democracy, which internacional. A segunda, uma democracia includes the redefinition of the political transnacional europeia, que inclui a profile of European welfare state for an redefinição do perfil político da economic liberal profile, as well the comunidade europeia para um perfil paradox of democratic technocracy econômico­liberal, bem como o paradoxo operated by European institutions and the da tecnocracia democrática operada pelas proposal to overcome the decoupled instituições europeias, e a proposta de technocratic policy model. This paper will superação do desacoplado modelo político address only this last topic, describing the tecnocrático. Este artigo tem por objetivo reasons of the democratic deficit and the apenas este último tópico, e descreve as consequent delay of European political razões do déficit democrático e o Union. Despite numerous reforms, the consequente atraso político da União technocratic policies have not eliminated Europeia. Apesar de inúmeras reformas, as the discrepancy between centralization and políticas tecnocráticas não conseguiram democratization, and mistakenly indicate eliminar a discrepância entre a another direction further reinforcing the centralização e a democratização, e problem of European undemocratic equivocadamente indicam para uma outra institutions. In contrast, Habermas argues direção, reforçando o problema das * Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Centre for Research on Democracy at Federal University of Paraiba (UFPB), Brazil [www.ufpb.br/cepede]. m@ilto: [email protected] 104 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 ntttoal nbet oiieycrettemre n impose and services. regulation is political market public of Europe” weaking the poorly­legitimized a correct “market­oriented to and leads positively that a regulations to redistributive addition, of policy unable element is In democratic on which institutionally the decide (one of democracies. state corrosion to the welfare national and states the justice) of individual social dismantling on of the focused in ability results that is the This community action. and limit monetary of a markets of Europe economic consequence market­oriented purpose the The a of format. towards neoliberal shift the loss a emphasis a in EU meant the this with integration However, level. economic context national on a states, at transnational capacities of control national effects a political to in reaction on economic compensating an globalization also partners was market economic It as borders. States national Member EU beyond between rules obligatory organize o,teE a enetbihdadesrdeuleconomic equal ensured and established been EU has to the Up EU nature. of political the genuinely expansion a by now, have solely they the solved because be cannot means, by problems economic current accompanied The ability. action be political should institutions of failure political the demonstrates EU. integration the political and economic INTEGRATION T 1. “ og .Lubenow A. Jorge ulcshr depoliticization. deficit. sphere Public democratic Technocratic European democracy. democracy. Transnational vroerpaigtetechnocratic K of democratization institutions. deeper the European a by be replacing approach only could deficit overcome democratic the that MARKET EYWORDS EDSRPNYBTENEOOI N POLITICAL AND DISCREPANCY BETWEEN ECONOMIC HE T ncnrs,teepnino h eiiiigbsso European of basis legitimizing the of expansion the contrast, In ügnHabermas. Jürgen : ­ RETDGOVERNMENTORIENTED lmn fa cnmcsrtg osiuaecmeiinand competition stimulate support to a strategy be economic to an planned of was element union monetary and economic he E ; PAI NE MONETARY UNION EU ON MPHASIS ”. encáiopruaprofunda uma modelo P o por europeias. instituições das democratização substituindo tecnocrático superado poderia apenas democrático ser argumenta déficit o Habermas que democráticas. contrapartida, não Em europeias instituições encáia éii eortc da democrático pública. esfera da despolitização democracia déficit Europa, transnacional, tecnocrática, democracia ALAVRAS 2 h iceac between discrepancy The ­ CHAVE ; ügnHabermas, Jürgen : REDUCTIONISM TO The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions... freedoms, but now it also needs to decide on thorny political issues, such as labor market, unemployment, social security, inequality, social justice, immigration, and so on. The enlargement of democratic legitimacy base requires a refocusing away from the economic to the political level, which should integrate all Member States. Although this would not be possible without a feeling of belonging to the same transnational political community,3 the requirements to provide a transnational democratic legitimacy, which arises from a civil society 105 and finds resonance in a European public sphere, have not yet been fulfilled.4 For Habermas, the discrepancy between economic and political integration could be overcome by organizing political action 3­122 skills at a transnational level. In the same way, the European political crisis can only be overcome with a deepening of political integration in a European transnational democracy.5

2. THE PARADOX OF UNDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS; THE LACK OF TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

In the post­national constellation, supranational agencies are created in order to compensate for gaps in inefficiency and the loss of autonomy of national States. The transfer and supranational centralization of regulatory powers produces a legitimacy deficit of European decisions, because: the Member States give the monetary sovereignty to an institution, and thereby restrict the capacity to influence their economy; the imposition for resolutions in central areas of national Parliaments responsibility; the European agencies (as Commission and Council) sign contracts and international treaties

which work as equivalents for a political regulation; the EU AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 intergovernmental agreements are decoupled from the collective will and national Parliaments.6 Although the policies of the created institutions have an effect on citizens’ daily lives, they usurp democratic control. Not even the European Parliament seems able to establish a bridge between national political disputes and EU Commission decisions in Brussels. At the European level, there is a gap between the citizens’ political will 106 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 omn n h oiiin’dcsosadatos hc hw an shows which actions, – and policy decisions European politicians’ uncoupled the and forming nta fmr eorc,teei nfc oecnrlzto of centralization more fact in democratically is supranational there domination; democracy, post­democratic a decisions. and more bureaucratic of of a instead instead is there of project: idea community, federalism” original the European executive invert government “post­democratic of the Heads a mistakenly the Thus, informal of Parliaments model. of policy existence national imposition Council the on EU highlight agreements the as non­transparent well and as crisis, financial the be European the would at communities organized parties national political level. larger via of a articulated voices and because involved unequal), representative (less of inclusive democratic more number more on process and decision based EU legitimate) institutions the (more make EU rebalance would which a all power, will affect of with could EU Parliament deficit the The divided, agreements. democratic in intergovernmental equally Parliament a not and and sharing is Council Council keep procedure between European legislative power the ordinary the of the as roles long the So between Parliament. imbalance an is there omnt hw h evrecneune falmtto ymarkets by limitation of a of element consequences perverse and the the shows community undermining by citizens. centralization European institutions among democratic integration political EU to the necessary the between solidarity prevents control. of conduction democratic deepening technocratic the discrepancy usurped of the Instead institutions Consequently, institutions. EU EU the the of democratization, model technocratic the control of undemocratic eliminating because an just solved is been bias not has integrated. crisis democratically political not but The institutionally, is EU The institutions. is crisis. reform political the of for concept the reason Commission’s from real The project the citizens. European the the of of will decoupling democratic the permanent makes and og .Lubenow A. Jorge rn way Wrong nadto,teepai nmntr nta fpolitical of instead monetary on emphasis the addition, In undemocratic creating be would EU the of incoherence The 8 hsivrinol enocstehtet political hitherto the reinforces only inversion This h eetitroenetlareet osolve to agreements intergovernmental recent The . nkpet Europapolitik entkoppelte . 7 Moreover, modus The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions... of the political action abilities of the national states. The European economic union is institutionally unable to correct positively the market and impose redistributive regulations. From the normative point of view, growing social inequality makes democratic justice impossible. According to Habermas, “there is not democratic legitimacy without social justice”.9 In this sense, the question whether political communities can form a collective identity beyond national borders and thus fulfill the conditions of legitimacy for a post­national 107 democracy remains suspended. The conditions for a post­national democratic legitimation procedure have not yet been met. According to

Habermas, “the obstacle are the governments, not the populations. 3­122 Those avoid the offensive debate over the future of Europe”.10

3. THE TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNANCE MODEL: POST­DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM.

From the top. The technocratic model reveals a bureaucratic and elitist top down enterprise, because the EU is the Union of and among political elites of the EU Member States.11 Nontransparent. The lack of publicity regarding negotiations and agreements helps to undermine the legitimacy gap of the EU institutions.12 Informed opinions and calculated comments in the course of European integration have remained until now widely a matter for professional politicians, economic elites and interested scientists, not intellectuals. Surveys show that more than half of the legislative decisions taken and implemented from the Brussels bureaucracy are not exposed to public discussion in national states. The non­transparent decisions that affect everyone and the absence of AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 chances for European citizens to be integrated in the decision­making processes are some of the reasons for the growing scepticism among the European population.13 Tendency to self­immunization. The trend of self­immunization makes European policy increasingly inaccessible and it just reinforces a policy crisis that equips itself with the constitutional status and 108 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 eas aia hnei eaiu ol erequired. be would behaviour in population, the change with EU radical conducted the of a polls future political because opinion the discuss on to reluctant based the approach beyond selectively. situation administrative a handle to usual unable They elite, leadership. functional of merely lack become and maintenance power interests, opportunistic aemswords: Habermas .T 4. elitist union blatantly the a in of handled moments way. been bureaucratic decisive always and dangerous has the policy a the In European and developing them. process, Brussels to is in decisions indifference EU Parliament’s citizens’ EU the the and elites, between maintained asymmetry is political that by Now voices. monopolized critical against immunizes thereby og .Lubenow A. Jorge EAAH FPOLITICAL ELITES OF APATHY HE The nadto,the addition, In Habermas: write shamelessness, elites’ political the the On oiia ltshesitate elites political 14 ern oso oiia oe,pltcleie are elites political power, political of loss Fearing sa diitaiemd,b elcdb stronger and citizens. a project European elitist of their by guardianship in an continue the heads impassively replaced their at They stick sand. elites the be today now political until the itself mode, Instead, the participation. without finds administrative proceed, will, beginning cannot usual the it people’s because since the impasse, unification off European operated of process The economic in This capital and sphere. goods spaces. of public common movement monetary decisions, and the administrative from transnational by as intervention produced such be elitist a action, cannot an and for above escapes in capacity formation of get conscience political forms the theme cannot citizens’ a about Europe only on A the controversy without the turn process. answer the identity, can of self­understanding where to unification limits citizen’ European and have the of how they purpose on of First, reflect question should direction. elites bureaucratic political The oiia parties political nmdfigtetete,bcueof because treaties, the modifying in , OIIA ATE N MEDIA AND POLITICAL PARTIES r omr pc for space a more no are 16 17 15 . In The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions... politicization; the political spaces that gave cohesion to political parties are disappearing. Guided by commissioned opinion polls, opportunistic political parties avoid discussing unpopular issues; the priority is to win the next election. The political elites are afraid that the European project, until now performed behind closed doors, might have to take place in a political public sphere, which would require explanation, discussion, justification and persuasion with good arguments. On the apathy of the political elites, their fear of public opinion, and on 109 political parties’ defensive position, write Habermas:

Our apathetic political elites, who prefer to follow the Bild headlines, cannot argue that would be the people who stand 3­122 in the way of further European unification. Because they know as anyone that people opinions, captured in public opinion polls, are not the same thing as the result of a citizens’ democratic will, deliberatively formed ... Until now political parties have yet to configure politically the public through an offensive clarification.19 On the fear of political parties to thematise unpopular issues, and on the priority to win elections, also write Habermas:

For decades, the elections to the European Parliament are dominated by issues and people about which it is not for any decision. The fact that citizens have illusions about the importance of the events in Strasbourg and Brussels, subjectively distant, shows well a portable debt, which, however, political parties run away obstinately.20 Finally, the media (TV, journal, internet). Habermas also criticizes the existing mass media controlled by economic and political elites, unable to report about political controversies and positions. For a transnationalization of existing spheres, it would be preferable to change the current media, rather then increase the number of media AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 sources. The media restrict the public sphere as a space for discussion and subsequent formation of political opinion. Because the media earn more money by promoting the system winners, that affect the public perception and result less critical then before. In addition, the way which internet is structured not allow change the institutional framework. The primacy of economic instead of social and political issues in the media has resulted in the replacement of sociologists and 110 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 oiia cetsswt cnmsswoaecoe otecompetitive the to closer are and who ideology evolutionary economists with scientists political oiia lts oiia ate n ei idrtefraino a of formation the solidarity. civil hinder and media sphere and public parties European political elites, political eutneo oiia ltsadtemdat ics h oiia future political population: the the discuss with to EU media the the of and elites political of reluctance odto oeiiaetedfcto eortclgtmc.I il the fills It legitimacy. democratic of deficit the eliminate to condition .T 5. rt Habermas: write og .Lubenow A. Jorge EASNEO A OF ABSENCE HE uoendmcai ulcshr sa indispensable an is sphere public democratic European A ntedsa ihpltcleie,pltclprisadmedia, and parties political elites, political with dismay the On odta ol ls ihteronitrs npower in interest own their European with common the clash of by maintenance. would interest that the led would a for good in they incrementalism compete paradoxically, fight to inspiring addition, and have all In above sphere. sphere and public risky wider public a to between moving the combination experts, Europe, solidary usual in a the for abandon work people should their elites attract such to wanted they If prtds ltnl lts n ueurtclk this been like never bureaucratic and has elitist the process fearful at citizens’ blatantly unification the time. policy the so of European definitely from operated The points project formation. makes turning will European and and until the the opinion reinforces mode of that decoupling All policy political (...) decoupling populations character now the elitist and of now the Treaty fact events Strasbourg more Reform in reduced­scale in then a in sealed in made the Instead, citizens will­formation Brussels. national of political across involvement visible require stronger a should boundaries Constitution the Anyway, the of those character with bureaucratic today and by the legislation. essenctially until over intergovernmental explained works be project the can elite and which deficits, an populations democratic become of has heads union political The E 24 RPA EORTCPBI SPHERE PUBLIC DEMOCRATIC UROPEAN aae mindset manager 23 22 21 Bukos) nsot the short, In (Brunkhorst). nHbra od,the words, Habermas In . The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions... primary function for legitimacy of the democratic State of Law (base on / governed by the rule of law) that has until now only taken place within national states. However, a European public sphere still needs to be created.25 For Habermas, without a political public sphere and an organized civil society, the policy will not have the indispensable impulse able to redirect the race for profit into a social justice perspective:

Without feedback from the insistent dynamis of a political 111 public sphere and a mobilized civil society, political management lacks the drive to use the means of

democratically enacted law to redirect the profit­oriented 3­122 imperatives of investment capital into socially acceptable channels in accordance with the standards of political justice.26

Why the sleeve of the already established European citizenship should not fill in a similar manner with the consciousness that all European citizens now share the same political fate? However, for the formation of such and as always weak European identity it is of central significance the emergence of a European political public sphere, i.e., one on the relevant issues specialized, beyond national boundaries communications context. It is not sufficient that common policies in Brussels and Strasbourg are institutionalized and that European citizens could take on the election of a Parliament with its own fractions influence on these policies. In order for the citizens of their right to vote and make de facto use so that they can develop a sense of solidarity in the course of this practice, the European decision­making processes within the existing national public spheres must be made visible and accessible. A European public sphere can only arise if the national public spheres open for each other27. AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10

6. THE ABSENCE OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL SOLIDARITY.

Ironically, what approximate the European citizens are the eurosceptics voices.28 For Habermas, the unification process got stagnated due to the absence of a civil solidarity at the European level. However, this condition can only be satisfied with the expansion of the 112 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 ,o h eesr n osbefraino uoenidentity: European a of formation possible and necessary the on 6, r h odr fteErpa no?;i osnthv catalytic book a his have in not Habermas write does So it time. Union?); (Where European question the geographical effect. of the question or borders political want?) the the of we are States for Europe the account of and kind not citizens (What populations. the could been of Dutch Constitution name policy has and the the French it Europe”, and “in by prepared because economic was 2005 effect it in of into Although held come problems plebiscites not in the rejected has to to it seemed solution However, Constitution efficiency. this historical Thus, the way. democratic be most the in project lbrto fteCnttto,cagn ( the in changing citizens Constitution, involving identity, procedure European the political a a and of the forming of change of action elaboration development means could the collective a it sense, for as and this work capacity In could deficit. the Constitution The democratic strengthening to the Constitution. seeking by process, reducing unification European the respond it of to stagnation attempt a deepen the an of as challenges establish arises the Europe to for should Constitution a of Rome elaboration of Treaty R .T 7. (political European sense (origin, constitutional sense new and equality). ethnic political social European justice, the the this social is solidarity, in in abstractly but it understood and However, language), be so race, artificial not strangers. an constituted, should consciousness consciousness into were among national jump states only abstract consciousness to was national and now It when artificial necessary borders. strangers an national build among the to beyond possible solidarity citizens’ State og .Lubenow A. Jorge AOSFRTEDLYPOLITICAL INTEGRATION DELAY THE FOR EASONS EIEFCULADEAIEASEST H IACA CRISIS FINANCIAL THE TO EVASIVE ANSWERS INEFFECTUAL AND HE 30 rayo Rome of Treaty hti h h oiia nfcto eandsann tthat at stagnant remained unification political the why is That . uoenuiiainlosoc gi tgat The stagnant. again once looks the Convention, unification the agreement by an prepared European outline reach Constitution to the failed on governments European Since 20) ae ihtelgtmc rss the crisis, legitimacy the with Faced (2004). h iie west divided The 29 Umstellung . 20) chapter (2004), h elitist the ) . The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions...

mutual suspicion of nations and the Member States seems to signal that European citizens do not have a sense of political belonging and that Member States are further away than ever to achieve a common project.31 Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Because of the embarrassing result of the 2005 referendums in France and the Netherlands, the Treaty of Lisbon – initially known as the Reform Treaty – aimed a greater political integration and the democratization of the European Union, 113 trying to include more national Parliaments and citizens in the policy­ making process. In terms of European political integration, the Treaty

of Lisbon is the turning point. Innovations towards a constitutional 3­122 change are noticeable. Despite the legitimacy deficits in European decisions resulting from the bureaucratic style of governing, Habermas recognizes the important democratic step already adopted by the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon.32 An innovation is the primacy of European law: the need to apply European law by Member States as indispensable to the legal equality of the Union citizens. Another innovation is the introduction of the concept of “EU citizenship” with explicit reference to a European interest for the common good, becoming the basis of a politically constituted community.33 (in 2008) The EU responses to economic crisis in 2008 showed the original monetary construction failure: the individual acting of governments and the inability to a common European economic policy. This would be the weakness of the EU: there is not a common will formation around economic policy; there is not a European economic, fiscal, tax, labor and social policy; there is only a common currency. Common currency was confused with economic integration. Each

country reacted with own economic policy measures; each country AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 plays its own foreign policy.34 An EU relapse in the old power plays between national governments. One example was the reluctance of German government Head for a common European action for the countries of the eurozone before the in 2008 financial crisis outbreak. Here it could already be noticed with evidence the reactive features of Germany national isolation.35 Also the retard for weeks of the European assistance package for Greece in the first half of May 2010, 114 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 moigrsltosi eta ra frsosblt ftemember the of responsibility a of is areas Parliaments states central in resolutions imposing aemscness I a tti on htIbcm wr,frthe project”. for European aware, the of became failure I of that possibility the point of this time, at first economy’”. was the Habermas, “It for confesses: to government Habermas Monetary ‘a According International of the states). requirements unreasonable Fund member considers else of nobody coordinate “today policies jointly to economic competences of the establishment (the halfway halted lhuhlt,ti otra fpltclintegration” federalism”. political of executive “outbreak this “post­democratic of late, called Although intergovernmentalism Chiefs, politicized euroclub change towards a important the integration an stablish to is European and pact purpose in this and union competitiveness Habermas, the for monetary to with policies According the convergence. economic Government, the of of or coordination pillar by stronger Brussels State economic in 2011 the of March reinforce in Heads signed agreement eurozone an the is Euro the for pact ed fGvrmn n h omsinsitreto odiscipline to intervention Commission’s the and Government of Heads hc hudb atro ainlParliaments. national of policies, matter salary and be social economic, should financial, of which pressures. countries measures their of in systemic implementing list the to the committed because under are undemocratic Government towards place of is Heads and step solution” took “emergency the currency this a integration markets; Consequently, is common financial it political the However, by greater States. forced stabilize Member outbreak of to cooperation policies Council economic the European coordinate the of rais sthe as Treaties) peln oteeapeo h emnbde icpie a a was discipline, budget German the priority. issues of national the example of statement the to appealing rssadtecagsi h lue fteErpa no indicate Union European the the of to the clauses of aid the mechanisms a grant in the both to changes solve the to agreeing and agreements the by crisis aid to market The crestfallen Greece. the submitted indebted of government imperatives German onerous the reluctance, the og .Lubenow A. Jorge atfrteEuro the for pact A h uodcdsteft fteEU the of fate the decides euro The aaimchange paradigm osineo eeti design in defect a of conscience as method false i 2011). (in teCmiso’itreto fet the affects intervention Commission’ (the h nomlareet between agreements informal The . 40 locle Er lsPc” the Pact”, Plus “Euro called Also 36 i 2010). (in fapltcluinthat union political a of 37 41 oee,despite However, 43 a ninitiative an was 38 Furthermore, naddition, In 39 41 The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions... national budgets modify or disregard the Treaties increase even further the existing democratic deficit. That is why Habermas named this management mode as post­democratic domination responsible for intergovernmental emptying of democracy, a “post­truth democracy” democracy model.44 For Habermas, the alternative would be the Commission carry out its tasks through democratic means with the consent between Council and Parliament.45 Postponement of democratization. However, the Reform Treaty 115 did not solve the real problem of the democratic deficit because it does not change the hitherto political modus. On the contrary, it further reinforced the problem of the European agencies undemocratic control 3­122 model; European agencies continue by the technocratic bias, postponing the required democratization. As before, the problem is that the governments hope to cross economic regulations by the political level without changing the political institutions.46 In addition, when there is some suggestion of institutional change, it comes from the top down, from senior officials who do not have to be submitted by elections.47 From the legitimacy point of view, only strengthening the capacity for action of European agencies, although without democratic control, is problematic because only reinforces structurally the existing policy model. Despite the Commission plans to fill the gap between economic demands and what is politically viable, it does it by the technocratic instead of the democratic way. Instead of enlargement of the legitimacy base, which was promised as a light at the end of the tunnel, the Commission has prioritized the expanding of control mechanisms, thus serving the power interests of executives and relegating the issue of political integration and the consequent extension of the legitimacy basis to a shameful appendix: AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 In the plans proposed by the Comission, this precise expansion of the We­perspective of national citizens into one of European citizens, which is constitutive for a proper European polity, is discreetly hidden away in a kind of appendix. To be sure, instilling this twofold perspective in the citizens, as a result of which political Europe would first appear in a different light, must be regarded as a process. But the enlargement of perspective has assumed an anticipatory institutional form with the elections to the 116 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 nyb opnae ihatasainlzto fdmcay based Europe: democracy, of can change of integration deficit political transnationalization to gradual democratic a a The upon with crucial 85). compensated the 138; is be p. of only it (ST, failure institutions. deepening reason, democratic European the for of this model shows technocratic For the Lisbon replacing perspective, union. of political Treaty European the by democratization mobilized. politically society a in anchored the not resistance imperatives without market expose ideal would dubious which democracy, the market­oriented assimilate fully could Union European democ technocracy og .Lubenow A. Jorge alr fpltclintegration political of Failure oee,ti a hw h agro ute h a fa of gap the further of danger the shows way this However, losrigteuulitrs fteeeuiei expanding course, in of executive a the is, of of power. Comission end interest his the the usual over at the strategy light serving is a this also democratization of With manner priority delayed tunnel. the in the the promise Thus a capacities as term. also presented medium legitimation of the steering basis in the of the enlargement accords of corresponding Commission the groups. of expansion political proposal into of the Parliament formation Nevertheless, European the the with of especially Members and Parliament, European uoenPrimn raie noparliamentary citizens into EU the organized of We­perspective Parliament generalized of in A possible factions. generalization in European only is elected A borders national a deputies preferences. across cuts the party that interests of depend with decisions would but accordance majority other, on each political block equally on of who case, the representatives exclusively interests between national that the depend out of fought longer In compromises in dogged accountability no institutions. Council would equally both decision­making and democratically to and to Parliament Commission particular process order by in lawmaking in competences, involvement required corresponding equal Treaty are the the planning, of that legitimaze revisions Lisbon the framework second, of of and, executive liability political states; reciprocal member and the market­conforming joint payments transfer European corresponding from first, the of federalism: members Union, reasons the obvious only Monetary for include which initially Union, could European democratic the a of differentiate would version all above innovations Two aial potd nti ehortclr,the lure, technocratic this In uprooted. ratically 48 h otoeeto the of postponement The . fademocratic a of 49 The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions...

throughout Europe can solidify into institutionalized power only in the parliamentary process. Such a change in perspective is necessary if the rule­bound coordination of pseudo­sovereign single­state policies favoured until now is to be replaced by joint discretionary decision­making in the relevant policy fields.50

8. AFTER POST­DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM. 117 The Treaty of Lisbon has incorporated the European Council in

the institutional structure as a management agent, which should to 3­122 strength the acting ability of the European Union. However, paradoxically, the centralization of the political power in the European Council created a powers imbalance between Council and Parliament and, consequently, increased further the democratic deficit. The permission to the Council exercise an extraconstitutional power innovating institutional procedures and changing Treaties can be observed in decisions taken amid the financial crisis of 2008 and the “Pact for the Euro” in 2010.51 The imposition of non­transparent and legally informal agreements on national Parliaments mistakenly points to the direction of a central control by European Council in the form of “post­democratic executive federalism”. Therefore, it is necessary to amend the Treaty of Lisbon. To this end, the Council should convene a Convention for an authorized change in the Treaty. However, political groups have no interest in change again the Treaty of Lisbon/European Constitution.52 The Heads of government are scared just in think about their re­election from this unpopular step, and have no interest in disempowerment.53 In addition, while the President of the Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank are planning an AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 institutional design for a real economic and fiscal union, the Heads of government think about their election.54 Therefore, to the democracy in Europe do not be further eroded, is urgent to change the European Constitution as well as the national Constitutions.55 The European policy remain at a deadlock: it must be decided between democracy and technocracy.56 As we have seen, the problem are Governments and political 118 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 eesr eiebtenapltclrfudto fteEuropean the is of Therefore, refoundation fails. recipes. Euro political the the an leave austerity a or of than nucleus Merkel’ between more policies decide Angela meaning formal or necessary not the States will beyond Member Europe” change coordination will “more Nothing intergovernmental moto necessary. the is the is legitimation whether That represent democratic restricted. are more alternatives; not representation to why political open do of not channels are media EU traditional the the or of design constitutional parties The people. political politicians, parties; re oso hti o nypsil,btas eesr a necessary also but in possible, borders only national now. until beyond not happened it democracy that is way the another that of technocratic He show institutions. the transnationalization European (when replacing to the of out discouragement democratization tries deeper way a and a by approach theorizing) offers Habermas (when diagnosing). optimism between find perspective of to lack integration. the and Perhaps dismay: Habermas’ satisfied. society of yet reverse reason not main civil remains were the sphere, is from public this European possible arises a democratic the in post­national that resonance wheter a is question procedure of formation The legitimation of transnationalization state. conditions social The institutions suspended. the democracy European for the in course seem European chance political representation no the also political is to of there now, the channels For from blocked. away traditional run The both parties problems. political and Governments integration. oeeto oiia at sitrse npooigadsuso of discussion a provoking in interested is the party political or movement oiaiy ntesneo oiljsie.Ohrie aemsprojects Habermas (political Otherwise, solidarity justice). dissolution. European EU social the It the a of state. deeper sense deepening the welfare further by in solidarity, only European to possible a be be institutionalising would would by crisis process political integration and social European og .Lubenow A. Jorge finalité a out Way oee,we elo owrs oeErpa social European none forwards, look we when Hovewer, hsseai oadamr cnmcadls political less and economic more a toward scenario this rsrgl nimre oagetrErpa political European greater a to anti­market struggle or aemsde o fe ayotos eoscillates He options. many offer not does Habermas . 57 58 h nywyt eov the resolve to way only The to The paradox of technocratic democracy and the democratic deficit of european institutions...

Hovewer, Habermas position oscillates. Sometimes it seems that those responsible for the depoliticization are the same that should be responsible for the re­politicization. On the one hand, the expectation that referendums, political parties and European elections as an important step towards a gradual political integration:

My optimism in view of an adoption of such a referendum is based on, among other things, that the same parties who operate cautiously in government or with a view to future 119 participation in government, must fight with an open visor, once the question of the future of Europe will no longer be decided in private offices, but on the public spaces. Until

now, all European Parliament elections have been decided 3­122 by more or less national issues. It is time that also in Europe it should not only react for the people.59 On the other hand, however, the diagnosis of the reasons for the democratic deficit and stagnation of political integration: the bureaucratic conduct of the European Unification by political elites; the apathy, the reluctance of political elites from the public opinion and discuss the political future of the European Union with the population; the defensive position and the gradual death of political parties. In this sense, the answer on the subject (who will do it) of the repoliticization remains open here and seems to be the main methodological problem of Habermas theory of transnational democracy: the arduous task of an empirical anchoring of normative expectations of a European transnational democracy. Perhaps an alternative to answer this question could be some empirical studies that showed the increase of a European citizenship orientation to welfare state, despite the decreasing of trust into political institutions; something which, curiously, do not appear in the media and public debates and speeches 60 of politicians. AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10

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19 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 132­133. 20 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 140. 21 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 86­87. 22 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 88. 23 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 98. 24 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 99. 25 Cf. HABERMAS, Ach Europa, p. 91. 26 HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 91; The lure of technocracy, p. 15. 27 HABERMAS, Ach Europa, p. 106­107. 28 HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 83; The lure of technocracy, p. 121 4. 29 Cf. HABERMAS, The lure of technocracy, chapter 1 (German version chapter 5); on the concept of political solidarity, p. 20­24 (German version, p. 100­105); HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 75­76; 3­122 HABERMAS, Ist die Herausbildungs einer europäischen Identität nötig, und ist sie möglich?, in Der gespaltene Westen, p. 68­82. 30 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 74­75. 31 HABERMAS, Der gespaltene Westen, p. 68. 32 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 58. 33 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 66­67. 34 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 108; HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 86­87; see also chapters 5.1 and 5.2. 35 Cf. HABERMAS, After the bankruptcy ­ an interview, in On Europe’s Constitution, chapter 3.1. 36 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 116­117. 37 Cf. HABERMAS, The euro will decide the fate of the EU, in On Europe’s Constitution, chapter 3.2. 38 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 114. 39 HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 97. 40 Cf. HABERMAS, A pact for or against Europe?, in On Europe’s Constitution, chapter 3.3. 41 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 98. 42 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 120. 43 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 121­122. 44 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 126. 45 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 123. 46 Cf. HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 126; The lure of

technocracy, p. 74. AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN DE 2318­9428, N.2,OUTUBRO V.2, 2015. p. 10 47 Cf. HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 128; The lure of technocracy, p. 76. 48 HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 90­91; The lure of technocracy, p. 10­11. 49 Cf. HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 92­93; The lure of technocracy, p. 12. 50 HABERMAS, Im Sog der Technokratie, p. 147­148; The lure of technocracy, p. 93­94. 51 Cf. HABERMAS, Zur Verfassung Europas, p. 73­74. 122 AUFKLÄRUNG, ISSN 2318­9428, V.2, N.2, OUTUBRO DE 2015. p. 103­122 3C.HABERMAS, Cf. 53 5C.HABERMAS, Cf. 55 HABERMAS, Cf. 54 2SeHBRA,Telr ftcncay lafrErpa oiaiy in solidarity, European for plea a technocracy: of lure The HABERMAS, See 52 0C.GRAD;LENGFELD. GERHARDS; Cf. 60 6SeHBRA,Erpa oiisa nipse lafraplc of policy a for plea a impasse: an at politics European HABERMAS, See 56 9HABERMAS, 59 HABERMAS, Cf. 58 HABERMAS, Cf. 57 og .Lubenow A. Jorge technocracy technocracy h ueo technocracy of lure The technocracy rdae integration graduated raiain htaeognzda uoenlvl,a ela the as well Stanford at as consciousness, Communication HABERMAS, pro­European of level), Cf. the (Department California). University, Fishkin European of James extension at by the performed organized on other (civil research and are empirical spheres intellectuals, that lawyers, public parties, of organizations political transnationalization groups, political on interest German society, the Peters of Bernard studies empirical scientist the with expectations normative technocracy technocracy Gra eso hpe 9). chapter version (German abr)hv hw htteacpac fsldrt between public solidarity the in of assumed acceptance sometimes than the greater that is debate. of of countries (School shown aller University Lengfeld European Sciences, have Holger Social Gleichheit and and of Hamburg) Berlin) (Institut Economics der Gerhards Administration, of Jürgen Business University by Idee Spain Free and Sociology, Poland die Germany, in conducted und Bürger europäischen Europas Sozialintegration c Europa Ach .83. p. , 16. p. , .65. p. , .69. p. , 68. p. , mSgdrTechnokratie der Sog Im mSgdrTechnokratie der Sog TechnokratieIm der Sog Im mSgdrTechnokratie der Sog Im mSgdrTechnokratie der Sog Im , isae:Srne S 03 eetpolls Recent 2013. VS, Springer Wiesbaden: . .15 nti es,Hbra enocstheir reinforces Habermas sense, this In 125. p. , in hpe Gra eso hpe 5) chapter version (German 1 chapter , uoe h atrn project faltering the Europe: i,enerpice Volk? europäisches ein Wir, c Europa Ach .135; p. , .121; p. , 120; p. , .117; p. , .96; p. , .108 p. , h ueof lure The h ueof lure The h ueof lure The h ueof lure The of lure The hpe 6 chapter ,