CEU eTD Collection Hungary 9. Nadorutca 1051 Budapest, University Central European PROFESSOR: Dr. Ronan McCrea COURSE: EU Constitutional Law LL.M. SHORT THESIS CURE FOR DEMOCRATIC DEFICITCURE FORDEMOCRATIC IN THEEU:LISBON HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S “LISBON-JUDGMENTS” – COURT’S“LISBON-JUDGMENTS” HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL – WITH COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH, GERMAN AND – WITHCOMPARATIVE ANALYSISOFTHEFRENCH,GERMAN by Miklós Klenanc by Miklós TREATY? © Central © Central European University March 28,2011 CEU eTD Collection Chapter Four: The Lisbon Treaty – What 26 does it change?...... Chapter Three: Democratic deficitin action 17 – From a legalistic ...... point of view Chapter Two: Democratic deficitin 9 the European Union...... Chapter One: The democratic 4 deficit –Whatit is about?...... 1 ...... Introduction ...... iii Abstract 4.2 Democratic 28 deficit revisited...... 26 4.1 About the Lisbon Treaty...... 3.2 Localizing 19 the democratic ...... deficitin the EU 17 3.1 Introductory ...... remarks 2.2 Democratic deficit 14 in typical approach...... 9 ...... democratic deficit?” 2.1 Differentdemocratic deficits –“Why should public the be worried by EEC’s the 1.2 Rising concerns about democratic legitimacy 5 in the ...... European Communities 4 1.1 ...... Theoretical concept .. h oni...... 30 4.2.3 The Council...... 29 4.2.2 The ...... European Council 4.2.1 29 The European Parliament...... 23 3.2.4 The European Commission...... 3.2.3 The Council 21 of the European Union...... 21 3.2.2 The ...... European Council 3.2.1 20 The European Parliament...... Table of Contents i CEU eTD Collection ilorpy...... 60 ...... Bibliography 58 Conclusion...... judgments regarding the Lisbon Treaty – a comparative 33 analysis...... court constitutional andin German French, Hungarian Five: deficit the Democratic Chapter . umr ftecmaio ...... 56 5.3 Summary ...... of the comparison 40 5.2 Points ...... of comparison 34 5.1 Constitutional ...... framework .. h uoenCmiso...... 31 4.2.4 The European Commission...... ainlprimns...... 53 5.2.5 National parliaments...... 5.2.4 Legislative 51 process...... 48 5.2.3 Institutions...... 45 5.2.2 Powers...... 5.2.1 42 Democratic legitimacy...... 38 5.1.3 Hungary...... 36 5.1.2 Germany...... 35 5.1.1 France...... ii CEU eTD Collection courts of some of the EU member states. constitutional of reasoning the by underpinned be can my findings that proves them behind – court regarding Lisbon Treaty,in order to test my findings. The comparative analysis showed constitutional Hungarian and German French, of judgments the analyze to used are methods inmain comparative numerous third, secondary andthe constitutional sources, Ireferto part governments to supranational institutionsstrong without enough democratic legitimation. from control of real possibility the reposition sometimes processes decision-making the inmy todescribe democratic main deficit thatfindings: preparatory/drafting order theoretical question whether treaty this managedhave tocure EU’s democratic deficit. in decision-making before involved institutional structure Union’s European the of foundation democratic analyzing the and especially after the Lisbon Treaty – to get an legalistic based –institution concept. answer to the narrow the scope of examination briefly interpretations the evolution numerous of term describing the anddemocratic deficit I and choose to conduct After literature. in relevant the itis common than differently somewhat Union European the research focusing closely on a inter alia While in the first two main parts I work mostly with the method of systematization I introduce termsthe of unwanted andgovernmental outsourcing powers In the second part of my thesis I try to localize the possible democratic deficit by the in deficit democratic of question the approach to aim I thesis present the In – that although my concerns can not explicitly be read in the decisions, the logic the decisions, in the read be explicitly not can concerns my although –that Abstract iii CEU eTD Collection http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2010/06/AFSJ%2010%20years%20final.pdf FREEDOM 4 3 (2009). arguments for emphasizing the of inisexistence democratic deficit thewhere EU.This I commonly used integrations.followed bydescribing Thisismost the of course European the inissue the deficit democratic the of evolution and the legitimacy of democratic concept withtheoretical the I start describing givepicture, full andprecise enough be a to able fromthey, oflegally bindingnorms asthecreators to suffer a deficitdemocracy.of order In of view: Iwill theEU’sinstitution democraticin the foundation of check tosee whetherorder where a different method seems to be a good and worthy-to-try approach. notanalyzed widely or are are some which Still many there in details. been already discussed impossible useless for and aim the of some present thesis; aspects of particularthis topic have self-generating be to seems itraises and debate the can be imagined, that aspect every possible from almost approached highly discussed andanimportant articles one. Numerous deal itwith is question,this 2 democratic deficit, according to the „classical” European literature. that common and it is typical mostly for non-European academics. In present thesis I will operate with the form 1 heavily relying on the examination of democratic legitimacy of the Union courts delivered a ruling on the issue of constitutional conformity of the Lisbon Treaty Union’” Treaty’s preamble when stating that it aims “to enhance the ‘democratic legitimacy of the Kristine Kruma, J T Itshould be mentioned that inthe literature the notiondemocracy deficit isused aswell. Still, this term is not EAN AMARA -C In the present thesis I will approach the topic of democratic deficit from legal from a point deficit democratic topic of the approach I will thesis present In the The examination of issue democraticthe deficit from wouldevery aspect be It can not be contested that the issue of democratic deficit issue thatof democratic the can not becontested It LAUDE , 3 SECURITY AND SECURITY YEARS JUSTICE TEN ON . It has important implication in the member states as well: many constitutional many well: as states member the in implication important has It . T AKACS P IRIS Constitutional courts andLisbon the Treaty. Thefuturebased onmutual trust, , , P T ARTICIPATION IN ARTICIPATION HE L ISBON 2 . The importance of the topic is clearly showed in the Lisbon T REATY EU . A Introduction D L ECISION EGAL ANDEGAL 1 M AKING P OLITICAL . I MPLICATIONS ON THE A NALYSIS 1 in the European Union is a 112 (2010). 38(2010), 4 . N ATIONAL THE AREATHE OF L EVEL 25 CEU eTD Collection 14 C 5 Lisbon the regarding Hungary, and Germany France, from judgments court constitutional more successfully. deficit EU’sdemocratic the cured Treaty Lisbon whether the provide for answer anewI wasenabled toperspective examination question the and to andframework context anew By conceptualizing concept. new give theoretical a to terms) is forintroducing mentioned helpof sure.It boundaries beforethe (with present work of the and – in works the democratic deficit draftingthis procedure wouldthe overstretch this Icall unwanted outsourcinggovernmental of powers. leadingdemocratic deficit.making to The process triggers aso-called preparatory/drafting decision of stage preparatory/drafting the (especially) of control and influenceover a real have to governments) state member for (particularly institutions national the for possibilities as well states member the of function democracy-giver the them)just canbelegitimized by not electingdirectly the membersof European Union, butby of isa) theinstitutional Union the madeby WhatI argue structure that (andthusthedecisions studying EU-institutionsthe Lisbon. localizing after deficit with thedemocratic I continue hypothesis. my deal enablesimportant issues in but me onesfor with literature the overlooked to usually examinations andinstead Iinclude other, both EU and national institutions as well. This of center the into members) elected directly having EU-institution only the (as Parliament theEuropean approach the which puts institutionalof Union the I abandon structure complete the study to be able to order in well: as one usual the than deficit-notion different a more for using needthe but my of limitresearch, scope the to need the show See Stephen C. Sieberson, Stephen See OLUMBIA In addition a practical side of issueisgiven byhavingthe atthree acloserlook My isaim nottoexaminein how this practice outsourcing of governmental powers reformsby introduced the After thesituation before describing Treaty and Lisbon the J OURNAL OF E UROPEAN The TreatyLisbon and Impact of on its the European Union’s Democratic Deficit L AW 445(2008). 2 5 and b) that the ineffective the that b) and CEU eTD Collection English one. English Hungarian arewidelydecisions not in discussed literature,the and not absolutely in the courts; thisprovide isagaina where Iaim value, point added since to French the and constitutional Hungarian and German French, of decisions Treaty Lisbon the examine I ideas differentviewpoint of democratic deficit itisthen common. Tocheck thesustainability my of courts evaluated the Lisbon Treaty as one solving the democratic deficitissue. constitution national those whether finally and decisions, their of context the to fit can they if judgments, case isnotthe whether in this abovementioned the appear democratic deficit drafting/preparatory the and powers governmental of outsourcing findings concerningthe my theoretical whether check me to enables it helpful: much very is approach constitutional comparative the of points localizingcomparison the relevant After compare them. evaluateand butIcritically simplynot andanalyzethesedecisions Treaty.do examine I In my thesis I try (by introducing some new terms as well) to provide a somewhat 3 CEU eTD Collection 10 9 P 8 2005). 7 S objective” used as system a type of ashorthandpolitical simultaneously and presumed its indicating is predominantly … term democracy recognize“nowadays the itis that to concept: enough things in courseof the history very different meant “democracy” that becontested not can It democracy. term the with deal 1.1 Theoretical concept moreand hasbeen andmore integrations became frequent. started European the of in relation use its circumstances which under and when summarize briefly will I and deficit democratic of theory so-called the to introduction short a give will I following deficit” will be used further on and what will/will not be understood under this integrations, notion the can connection European the to vary term.significantly. In the democratic legitimacy of practices governance of legitimacy democratic common to refer to democratic deficit in international organizations ininternational democratic refer deficit to common to is nowadays) (especially integrations. It Union/European European the just to related 6 Id.61. G G T RACTICES WITZERLAND ANDWITZERLAND THE Id.7 and 74. HOMAS OVERNANCE ANDOVERNANCE THE LOBAL Chapter One: The democratic deficit – What it is about? In order to define the scope of the notion democratic deficit it seems necessary to first to necessary itseems deficit democratic define notion of scope the to the In order clarify “democratic the to is important it inwhatcontext Because of highly this, Issues regarding the topic of the democratic deficit are not neware not ones and not certainly deficit topic the democratic Issues the of regarding G 3 (VictorBekkers et. al. eds., 2007). D. 10 OVERNANCE AND OVERNANCE , the system, the being representative democracy “the (being dominantsystem of Z WEIFEL , U D NITED D EMOCRATIC EMOCRATIC P S UBLIC TATES 9 . The present thesis should not deal with the evolution of this of evolution the with deal not should thesis present . The A D 1 (2003). D CCOUNTABILITY EFICIT EFICIT ? . I A NSTITUTIONS ANDNSTITUTIONS SSESSING THE SSESSING 4 8 , etc. Then again, even if the term is used in isused term the if even again, Then etc. , 212 (DavidHeld Koenig-Archibugi &Mathias eds., D EMOCRATIC R EGULATIONS IN THE EGULATIONS L 6 EGITIMACY OF EGITIMACY , of global governance global of , E UROPEAN G OVERNANCE U NION 7 , , CEU eTD Collection with particular reference to Oireachtasthe 6 (1998) (unpublished thesis, University College Dublin). 15 14 13 12 11 government” legitimacy for thepeople”) quality the (“government and‘checks balances’”) andof output-oriented (“governmentby people”),the (“quality throughput-oriented by of participation citizens and Accordingsome to legitimacy authors hasthree main input-oriented components: happinessmaximum peoplethe of are guaranteed” Moravcsik, the democratic deficit is basically “partofitis democratichas the been basically Moravcsik, deficit andbeingso, system” the integration European the history. project’s of in thecourse less) or (more theychanged stone: into carved not itare certainly to attached Communities 1.2 Risingconcernsaboutdemocraticlegitimacyin the European integrations. in of yearsEuropean context the following introduce briefly how Iwill the concept of democratic deficitevolved through the In project. integration European the Union, European the nowadays: other any than isestablishment more before the much scrutinized outlined principles that heavily against political is one there Still, structures. political of sorts numerous analyzing for used Keith Michael Dara Purcell, The democratic deficit in the European Union: the parliamentary perspective parliamentary the Union: European the in deficit democratic The Purcell, Dara Michael Keith Id. 6. Id.6-7. Id.74. Id.72. In order to keep the democracy-model going, democratic legitimacy is needed democratic legitimacy keep In order todemocracy-model the going, According to one of the “intellectual heavy-weights” According of one to “intellectual the Issues regarding the topic of the democratic deficit are not new ones It is clear that this concept of democratic legitimacy and democratic deficit can be can deficit anddemocratic legitimacy of democratic this is that concept It clear 14 . If one (or more) of them is missing, we can speak about democratic deficit. 11 ) and“political thebeing objective in organisation,a liberties whichthe and 5 12 . 16 of the EU-topics,Andrew 15 and worries 13 . CEU eTD Collection 24 23 (1989). 22 21 20 19 18 (2006) (unpublished thesis, Central European University). 17 connex-C-05-02.pdf “immediately “immediately legally binding” Moravcsik unaccountable member states. Economic of Community European the parliaments alias of democratic deficit were affairs.” inworld will political unified of deficit the ones that related mosta of and, noticeably, adeficitvisionary has a deficit, asocial power deficit, democratic to the loosingCommunity Working”Is of power of national Europe. The firstterm appearsin work the Sommer,Theoof publishedin “The1973: of policy-making in the European Communities or, in the case of Manifesto, in whole democratic deficit” democratic havingof so-calledfirstFederalists, European titled Young chapter “Thethe Manifesto the not by “ParliamentDavid Marquand inhisbook for Europe” from 1979 integrations wasfirstly be The intoEuropean used acceptedastrue. expression to relation 16 changed and/or their from arenewor beginning; only presentvery key debates the points the B Id.15. M Id.747. Theo Sommer, Theo http://www.federalunion.org.uk/the-first-use-of-the-term-democratic-deficit/ Accessedon10 D 23 Myth? Powerful a as Deficit Democratic Union. European the in Democracy Understanding Jancarik, Peter Andreas Follesdal & SimonHix, ILL AVID ICHAEL N It was argued that sovereign powers of national legislators are transferred to the transferred are legislators national of powers sovereign was argued that It After very the appearance of in term,the beginningthe issues addressed under the The statement about the change in the discourse about the democratic deficit issue has issue deficit democratic the about discourse in change the the about The statement EWTON M 17 2 E ARQUAND . H ESELTINE UROPEAN D 22 The Community Is Working UNN , remote , P , 19 W , ARLIAMENT FORARLIAMENT . In these cases the term was used referring to the undemocratic process undemocratic the to referring used was term casesthe In these . T HY THE PUBLIC SHOULD BE WORRIED BY THE WORRIED BE PUBLIC SHOULD HY THE G HE OVERNANCE 23 20 D and secretly andsecretly Community-institutions,operating wherethefinal and . Here he writes that “the Community of the Nine, so we are told, EMOCRATIC Why aDemocratic Thereis Deficit A inthe EU? Response Majoneand to 24 decisions “are madebehind closed in doors Councilthe of E P UROPE APERS 51 (4) F D EFICIT 64 (1979). 4 (2005), http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-4 . OREIGN T 6 HE BALANCE IN 21 A FFAIRS 747(1973). EEC’ E UROPE FOR S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT S DEMOCRATIC 18 B , neitherin the 1977 RITAIN TO REDRESS RITAIN TO th March 2011. 1 (1988). 15 CEU eTD Collection C of Justice.” Carol Harlow, rely ona docile publiuc to support their decisions uncritically, including the low visibility decisions of the Court 31 and others. the ‘Democraticthe Deficit’ inEuropean the Union 30 29 28 27 26 25 Ministers” European Parliament” European morefeel Brusselsbureaucracyand slipping the tothe recently, then, away,first powers to particularin court constitutional German the of decision (the courts constitutional national of front gavein waschallenged later), year a one, second only a on be accepted (to Danish referendum alarming atthe debates,wasrejected public itraised considerable accepted: have treaty the sail to signalsparticularly in order to combat the democratic deficitissue. Nevertheless, it wasnot asmooth sinceprocess and as part ofit this introduced pillar-structure, namethe “European Union”, reformed the decision-making reformwas gave moreread and new powers asto the Europeana possible Parliament, picture. into the comingTreaty Maastricht becomebig onewith the to a started deficit issue the democratic of obstacle to furtherall. issuethe a heavilyhighly at topic wasnot debatedoneemphasized Nevertheless, a not was Parliament European the of weakness the integrations: European the of institutions all of to the in contrast parliaments national the weakening about concerns different European tothe Community” bynational transferred parliaments, of the EC; a black hole at the heart of the Community” OMPARATIVE As Carol Harlow defines it: “When the European project was seen as essentially an affair of elites who could See Jorgensen 317, supra note 29, at 7, Z H Id.19. D H Id. 1. ESELTINE ANDBOOK OF AVID The Maastricht Treaty came up with important novelties: it instituted the so-called the instituted it novelties: important with came up Treaty The Maastricht that on agree field the of researchers and scholars later on: a lot changed The situation As it can be seen, at this stage of the “history” of the democratic deficit, there were M ARTIN 25 14, . In other opinion “the frustration of national parliaments is very evident as they L AW supra supra note 22,at 6. E , 30 E UROPEAN 339343 (2002). UROPEAN The “permissiveso-called consensus” 26 Voices of Difference Pluralin a Community . Others saw the democratic deficitas a “gaping chasm at the centre U U NION NION AND NION THE P OLITICS WEIFEL 317 (Knud Erik317 (Knud Jorgensen et. al.eds., 2007). D EMOCRATIC 32 (2)J 2, supra note 6, at 4, Kevin Featherstone, 7 OURNAL OF D EFICIT 31 came to the end with it. 19 (1990). 27 C which “results from powers from the which “results OMMON 50 (2) T 28 . M ARKET HE A MERICAN S TUDIES Jean Jean Monnet and 149(1994)., J OURNAL OF OURNAL 29 . CEU eTD Collection 33 32 integration) tarnished.” it forbeen support and had aura of integration assumption inevitable the of popular been done. Thepolitical “the had damage inprocess: integration the long-run of the terms efficient research, I will narrow the spectrum lines. my spectrum along Iwillof the specific narrow research, examination efficient an conduct be ableto to in order much, very so vary concepts These democratic deficit. E Jorgensensupra 321, note 29,at 7. UROPEAN In the following I will present different approaches on formulating a notion for the for notion a formulating on approaches different present will I following the In 33 U 32 NION LAW . These developments led to have the democratic deficit as a constant issue on . C ASES AND ASES M ATERIALS . 27 (Damian Chalmers et. al. eds., 2 8 nd ed. 2010). CEU eTD Collection undemocratic structure, missingundemocratic structure, any of kind democratic legitimacy for exercising itsof concepts. dominant most the with be familiar to itis important Still them. all of enumerate to present thesis, for in purpose sureuselessfor the but the impossible,of probably topic the examination of deficit?” democratic EEC’s bythe beworried –“Whythepublicshould deficits 2.1 Differentdemocratic are discussedindeficit-concepts more details. is this why related viewpoint, a legal(istic) from deficit democratic the theissueof examining (strictly Inmycontext viewed) outsideand a legal developed Iam concept. of thesis arguments. What I eventually myof clarify context to the on tobe later inorder able This isnecessary is EU the contested. suggest is of foundation that democratic wherethe points main the summarize I will and deficit democratic most of the democratic deficit argumentssphere of social sciences they areare coming from, etc. followed by scholarsdifferent vary heavily depending on theirmethods, approach, their the concepts Union. The European the to related deficit democratic of notion the universal deficit striking conclusion one isemerges: least no there that Atregarding conclusion. a 34 D UNN Chapter Two: Democratic deficit in the European Union , According to According is most theEuropean to radical views the as such a Union completely There are numerous aspects of the democratic deficit in the literature. It would bewould It literature. in the deficit democratic ofthe aspects numerous There are In the following I will introduce some of theAfter literature reviewingthe–continuously on evolving – topicthe democratic of common attempts to define the supra note 24, at 6. at 24, note supra 34 9 CEU eTD Collection 44 43 42 41 40 M 39 2009), Follesdal & Hix 4, supra note 16, at6, P EU 38 37 (1994). integration and tocredibility andlegitimacy of the EU.” successful to obstacle an issue or aserious represents it and level supranational to national scholars influential sovereignty national the up” “watering thus the European Parliament andthe National Parliaments newpowers gains Parliament European when the bureaucracy Brussels-based the against sovereignty) national of depositaries the (being parliaments national weakens competences of not isproblematic of governance process level) democraticon in European legitimation appropriate decision-making the dominates 36 of growth inputa sufficientsphere of and accountability governance”public parallel the institutions, without totheEuropean states member from the sphere,regulatory occurs governance” of “transfer a project integration more is infrom of orof It followingarguedthatthe standpoints. one course the the 35 palette political the of side far-left or notable numberscholars, of is it much more opinion sounded by from politicians far-rightthe astructurewhere“apowers, rapeof popular will” H H Jancarik 16,supra note 17, at 6. SimonHix and Andreas Follesdal Jancarik 16 19,and supra note 17,at 6,H W D M Karlheinz Neunreither, Karlheinz Sophie Meunier, ATERIALS ESELTINE ESELTINE M AVID ICHELLE ARD EDIA 1,supra note 38, at 10. The most common criticisms about the EU’s democratic deficit approach the issue 38 W , thus the input-output balance tips over “by the transfer of governance in an output an in governance of transfer the “by over tips balance input-output the , thus P 133-134 (4 ARD OLICY C 14, 14, INI , supra supra note 22,at 6, M supra supra note 22,at 6. T & HE The French Exception 1 (2004),E N IEVES E 41 th UROPEAN ed. 2008), Purcell 5,supra note15, at 5. : “theis democratic deficit aby-productof shiftthe of from competences The DemocraticDeficit ofthe European Union: Towards CloserCooperation between P EREZ UROPEAN U -S NION OLORZANO ARTIN per se 79 (4) F D C ESELTINE EMOCRATIC 36 ONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND 19, supra note 27, at 7. . AUL 43 B ; it hand inhand with goes of transfer competences, . Some authors find problematic even the situation ORRAGAN OREIGN C 15, RAIG 10 40 D supra supra note 22,at 6. . As Jancarik summarizes opinions of some of opinions summarizes As Jancarik . EFICIT AND EFICIT A 19 (3) G & , FFAIRS 35 E G happens. This viewpointis notshared by UROPEAN RAINNE DE RAINNE 44 – it is a strange perception, since is astrange perception, –it 104110 (2000). 42 OVERNMENT AND 37 Mostly it is argued that the transfer the that argued is it Mostly T : the executive (which lacks the lacks (which executive : the HE U L NION P B ISBON UBLIC URCA P OLITICS 185 (Jan Wouters et.185 (Jan al.eds., , S EU PHERE O L PPOSITION AW 441 (3 . : A T 39 N EXTS . This transfer E rd ed. 2010). VALUATION OF 299,299-300 , C ASES ASES AND CEU eTD Collection 52 supra note 7, at 4, Purcell 5, supra note 15, at 5. 16, at 6, C at 16, 51 5, Featherstone 149, supra note 30, at 7. C 50 49 48 47 European Parliament will be dealt withunder the subsequent heading. 46 imbalance issues”, the judicial control of the legal instruments as final products is weakened, instruments as final products legal issues”,the of judicial control the imbalance “substantive raises argument”, “democracy the bypasses process this that out points Scholars integration itproject,is found be to presentin European the decision-making as process well. the of institutions the regarding EUor tothe memberstates from competence-transfer well as institutions European between but institutions, national and EU’s the between just not accountability a lackof triggers this situation 45 citizens European to relation in EU-institutions the of remoteness the of because holder assovereignty to provide thelegitimacy democratic impossiblehave to proper elections, since there is no “European-demos” which would be able elections Europe-wide on elected democratically not are for the Parliament) members (except their since legitimacy deficit institutional an from suffer integrations. of institution European democratic is usually seen as Parliament European only common the the accordingthe truly to approach, parties is mentioned as well ismentioned parties Featherstone 150, supra note 30, at 7. at 30, note supra 150, Featherstone W RAIG Neunreither 300, supra note 36, at10, W Neunreither300, supra note 36, at 10,Held 235,supra note 7, at4,Purcell 5,supra note 15, at 5. W Follesdal & Hix 5, supra note 16, at 6. Democratic deficit concepts dealing withlegitimacy-issues regarding institutions and particularly the Jancarik 16,supra note 17, at6, C ARD ARD 52 & . 8,supra note 38, at 10, Wouters 154, supra note 38, at 10, Held 235, supra note 7, at 4. Democratic deficit is localized not just related to the democratically not underpinned just not is tothedemocratically not localizedDemocratic deficit related A very common approach is the institutional one, saying that European integrations saying is European that one, A very institutional the approach common 1 and 7,supra 1and note 38,at10,Wouters 155 and239,supra note 38, at10, Follesdal &Hixsupra 4, note DE RAIG B URCA & DE 133-134, B URCA 47 133-134, . Regarding this deficiency itis emphasized thatit could be even supra note 38, at 10, H 49 INI . Numerous authors . Numerous is that suggest there ademocratic deficit supra note 38, at 10, H 10, at 38, note supra & 45 B . It is institutions. ItarguedthatEuropean ORRAGAN ARD 7, supra note 7, 38, at10,Follesdal &Hix 6,supra note 16, at6, ESELTINE 441, 11 51 . It is argued that there is apower-imbalance isthere arguedthat . It supra note 37, at 10. ESELTINE 15, supra note 22, at 6, Purcell 5, supra note 15, at 15, supra note 22, at 6,supra note 22,at 228, Held 214and 48 . The absence of of European absence . The 46 lackdemocratic 50 . (Partially) CEU eTD Collection 65 64 C 63 62 61 60 59 58 the forFuture 10 (2005) (unpublished thesis,Central EuropeanUniversity) 57 E 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference, T 56 55 54 to the institutional system of the EU”. the of system institutional the to from immigrant and ethnic minority groups in Union Member States” deficitisaccentuate “serve peoplea participatory markedfor that process also to especially of decision-making somefeatures EU’s claims that Andrewdemocratic deficit: Geddes the and policy immigration EU’s between link argued an is even There issue. omnipresent “biased policies” common, political science-type approach is not the one that can be used as starting point. the my intention) is (which viewpoint legal a from issue the examine to wants one If deficit. them focus on the framework, on the “catalysts” and on the political effects of the democratic If closely we examine listed theabove itshouldconcepts, deficitmostbe of striking that norms.” todemocratic correspond not does its decision-making andthat is undemocratic assuch (EU) deliberations about report to EU-media complex 53 law-making etc UROPEAN Id.299. Neunreither299, supra note 36, at 10. OMMON Andrew Geddes , C Id.233. Held 225, supra note 7, at 4. Neunreither300, supra note 36, at 10,Held 235,supra note 7, at4,Purcell 5,supra note 15, at 5. 10. at 38, note supra 153, Wouters Alma Basokajte, The Problem of Democratic Deficit in the European Union. Current Issues and Predictions C Wouters 10,C 209,supranote 38, at W C 53 RAIG RAIG RAIG ARD . It is. It said isno there that for possibility citizen-engagementin (direct) the pre-phases of 6,supra note 38, at 10, Held 212, supra note 7, at 4. According to the above introduced opinions EU’s democratic deficit seems to be opinionsintroduced an democratic abovethe to seems According EU’s deficit to As I already noticed “the most radical meaning would be that the European meaning wouldUnion the bethat noticed mostAs radical “the I already & & & 64 M 56 DE DE DE U Of course there is a “more limited use of the term” democratic deficit “in relation deficit the limited useof democratic term” isa“more Of there course ARKET and highly inefficient highly and NION 54 B B B , that the decisions are taken not transparently enough aretaken , thatdecisions the URCA URCA URCA 5(1996). S 61 TUDIES Immigrantand Ethnic Minorities andtheEU’s ‘Democratic Deficit’ , triggering a political deficitas well 133-134, 133-134, 133-134, 197213-215 (1995). supra note 38,at 10. supra note 38,at 10. supra note 38,at 10. 57 RAIG procedures, by officials by technocratic procedures, HE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT HE DEMOCRATIC & 65 DE Thismyfor important approachisespecially thesis. 59 . The results are usually bureaucratic deals bureaucratic areusually results . The B URCA 12 133-134, 62 . supra 10,Human note Rights the 38, at and . D EMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY ANDTHE ACCOUNTABILITY EMOCRATIC 63 . 58 , without a uniform , without 55 , using way too way using , 33 (2)J OURNAL OF 60 and CEU eTD Collection 67 66 level” national at democracy by representative “validated are they whether underpinned, aredemocratically legal instruments EU’s the whether check Parliament.” European tothe elections based buildingon mainly direct legitimacy of the hasbeen up, source second a Gradually … treaties. these to according institutions by Community the powers of exercise the and Union European the to powers of transfer partial the to amendments ECTreaty by the its of haveagreed ratification and national factthat the parliaments and member states of institutions democratic legitimacybased on isthe first legitimacy: the dual of system a on based is Union European the that maintain can “one Neunreither institutions, decision-making adopt and rules to legally bindinginstruments. According to haveits to own powers, Union the it for possible make that ones arethe These treaties these criteria. these fulfill decidehavingcompetenceThe EU’sdecision-making certainly them. rules toupon if publicly,“democratic deficit” and by enough they are prescribed clearly, certainly actors can be have not they institutions: not same forcan the procedures asfor democracy-criterion the view in my is that this for reason The detail. in much and closely be analyzed not will integrations’of law- institutions.European The and themselves decision-making procedures legally binding rules. adopt to having power the institutions the legitimacy of democratic examine the shouldone Harlow 343, supra note 31, at 7. Id.312. The European The isUnion European foundingbased ratified by on member treaties, its states. In the following I will explain my approach towards the analysis of democratic deficit 66 What is important for a legal analysis of the democratic deficit is to for deficit alegal democratic is the of Whatanalysis important 13 67 . In order to see if this is the case CEU eTD Collection Jancarik, 17,supra note 17, at6. 73 72 6. at 16, note 71 70 69 Intergovernmental Conference,supra note 55, at 12. 68 Authors well,which according to “deficit-issue”the (written in marks)quotation isnot anissue atall. overwhelming majority of authors issue of democratic deficit, the one related to the institutional deficitis present at the deficitintypicalapproach 2.2 Democratic institutional framework but its importance is overrated. just butits is It isnot importance framework by-product institutional overrated. an accidental them” over Parliament [European] elected the control the of leveland Community transferredtothe powers themselves” citizens of the through democratic participation the people or choices” political “basic the itmeans that deficit commonly defines democratic deficit as a “parliamentary deficit” “parliamentary a as deficit democratic defines commonly is mainit procedures of characteristic Butthe the of approach that the their adoption. in because deficit of democratic the of sovereignty the member-states the and undermining be contradictory to areargued characteristics These effect. direct have they that primacy, and interpretations of Court of European the Justice) have be to applied and directly with elections. It is also common basedon composed popular not whichare by EU-institutions areadopted acts because these to emphasize that these legitimacy democratic of miss the EU the acts legislative itis arguedthat usually concept pieces of legislation (according to the Andrew Moravcsik, Giandomenico Majone and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi being the most influentials. See influentials. most the being Koenig-Archibugi Mathias and Majone Giandomenico Moravcsik, Andrew Shirley Williams cited inJancarik 19, supra note 17, at 6. Follesdal Neunreither 185, 10,Wouters note 299, supra 10, note supra &Hix36, at 131and 38, at supra 5, Id.185. 10. at 38, note supra 185, Wouters See Purcell, supra note 15, at 5, H Although (as I tried to demonstrate previously) there are numerous approaches to the to approaches numerous are previously) there demonstrate to (asItried Although 73 sharing this view argue that “democratic deficit … might be a part of the EU’s 72 . Of course it should be mentioned that there are different opinions as 68 ESELTINE . According to the “classical” concept of democratic the of concept the “classical” According to . , supra note6, HumanRights andthe 22,at 1996-97 14 69 are not made “by a body representing the representing body a “by made not are 71 : “a gap between the : “agapbetween 70 . Under. this CEU eTD Collection D 76 75 74 process.” in lose out this (parliaments) institutions representative implies that It integration. of out European arising executives member state and to institutions European the to of powers causedby transfer the “thedemocracy is loss of democratic deficit work with a somewhat differentanalysis all the European institutions and not just the European Parliament seems rationally to notion of thewhether the Lisbon Treaty democraticcured successfully the problem. Forme to be able includeto in the deficit.analysis According toof this the notionlegalI willconduct a when that stating of the scope my previously narrowed already research EU’s institutions in order toefficient integration.”localizeenables that outcome intentional even or expectable an theis rather it but integration, the of democratic deficit and to check sovereignty national of holders andasthe as democracies states member the havingall member states, the through be given should EU the for necessary foundation democratic the followings, the in demonstrate and Iwill as try statements to itbe previous could seenfrom the as because, is especially important issuecontrol process? The governmental/national effective of wholeof the decision-making the course during there control aneffective for possibilities find do we real words Inother in EU? ofthe institutions the representatives/delegates/etc. by their followed are issues some regarding standings and policies if their control question being:which parliaments meansofnational are the effectivelyand governments to this of commonly defined, democratic deficitas clearly) concept operatingwiththe when so leastnot arise (at not does which aquestion deal with to itenables inaddition an research beneficialit becausemakes inclusion ofall possible the into scope institutions of the the C C Jancarik 16,supra note 17, at 6. EFICIT INI IVIL & ? 4-5 (Jens Steffekal. et. eds., 2008). In my thesis I am not accepting either of the above mentioned views completely. I S B OCIETY ORRAGAN 76 . P ARTICIPATION IN ARTICIPATION 441, 74 supra supra note 37, at 10. E UROPEAN AND 15 G LOBAL G OVERNANCE : 75 A Using this itdefinition is C URE FOR THE D EMOCRATIC CEU eTD Collection democratic deficit, after Lisbon. of EU’s the “status” and “place” the regarding my findings totest aim The Treaty. the with dealing court constitutional Hungarian and German French, the of analysis comparative with noveltiesthe introduced Lisbonin regard, in tofinallyTreaty order this conclude with a In the following chapters I will try to localize the democratic deficit, check what are what check deficit, democratic localize the to Iwill try chapters following In the 16 CEU eTD Collection (1997). 79 Europe?” 78 AND Castiglione, & Dario Bellamy Richard sphere.” public and society European integrated and developed fully of a lack the presently structured, does not lie inthe limited powers vested inthe institutions of direct representation, but in 77 structural, not institutional” is “thesubstance,deficit democracy to that arguing is related to this One kindof approach. foundations democratic necessary from a legal of point viewis it necessary check whether the to EU-institutions have the remarks 3.1 Introductory legitimacy-problems. the solve to able was Treaty done with revisitin Iwill followingthis issueincheckthe the chapterto ifthe order Reform into Lisbon Having force. inTreaty came before setting democratic the institutional deficit institutions.making/legislative decision- in the role their explaining briefly After Itliterature. in the is contested institutions should be emphasized that processin present chapter I continue I will try to localizewith one-by-one the examination of the relevant establish that it is less than we asked for.” weasked is less than it that establish and democracy of species European the measure we scaleby which democracy have some well: “In speaking about the ‘democratic deficit’ on the institutional level, we pretend that we Bert Van Roermund, Van Bert Steve J. Boom, J. Steve Contrary to some other approaches, for example: “The main democratic deficit in the European Union, as Union, European the in deficit democratic main “The example: for approaches, other some to Contrary Chapter Three: Democratic deficit in action – From a legalistic P HILOSOPHY As I showed previously, in order to conduct the examination of democraticconduct deficit examination the of to in order As Ishowedpreviously, EU- of legitimacy democratic the where key points those will review I chapter In this 43 (2) T Building the Union:TheNatureofSovereigntyPoliticalArchitecture inthe Europe of 421431 (1997). This view approaches much morefrom the side of political studies. HE The European Union after the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the “Virginia of A MERICAN Jurisprudential Dilemmas of European Law J 78 OURNAL OF OURNAL . There are contra-arguments as to the methodology itself as 77 . Of course it should be mentioned that there is criticism is there that mentioned be should it course Of . point of view C OMPARATIVE 17 79 I argue with these conclusions. If all the L AW 177 224 177 95). 16(4)L AW AND AW P HILOSOPHY 16(4)L 357375 AW CEU eTD Collection 83 236 241-242 (2003). 82 A 81 283 286 (2001).“… there is deficitno as long as national governments backedare by domestic majorities …” 80 exclusive “authority draftlegislation”,to Parliament the discusses andthe Council decides the holds Commission the where “triangle”, institutional an on based as described commonly of sovereignty holders astotheultimate states, member the of citizens the back to be traceable legitimacy to for their the possibility literature) relevant institutions’the democratic underpinning, is which it is(as recognised very broadly in the of measure” “general is a there yes, that said be can it Accordingly EU-institutions. just not well, as not or democratic are they whether valued are context national in the institutions that aswell becoming undemocratic is structure the enough, “legitimized” not is institution more or one If bewill democratic. institutionshavenecessary the institutional democratic underpinning, EU’s setting asawhole There were procedures where even consultation with the Parliament was not a prerequisite, not was Parliament with the consultation whereeven procedures There were draft. the to amendments suggest to possibility without but veto to right a held basically Parliamentthe procedure In assent the decision. unanimous Council’s by couldbe overruled cooperation procedureno wayssecured was this moreopinion placetying Underthe consultation the Parliamentprocedure the had possibilityto giveonly to its opinion butin handsmove of forthe Council,the Parliament who madeco-legislators, meaning that thethe consent of both of them was necessary final to havebut a draft passed. itsdecision. amendments The withinitiative,started having Commission’s the as and with and the Council the Parliament process the co-decision the different In procedure of types procedures. through be conducted Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. Decision-makinglike the well, role as wasconsultant) some (basically played institutional actors other Of to course S Ian Ward, Ian See Robert Rohrschneider, See Jos deBeus, MERICAN YLVIA Before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the decision-making process in EUwas the process decision-making force, the into came Treaty Lisbon the Before H J ARGREAVES OURNAL OF OURNAL A Decade ofA Decade Europe? Some Reflections onanAspiration Quasi-National Europeanand European Identity Democracy , P EU OLITICAL L AW The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support foran EU-WideGovernment 21(2009). S CIENCE 80 . As to the critics regarding methodology it should be stated 463(2002). 18 81 30(2)J . OURNAL OF 20(3)L AW AND L AW AND P HILOSOPHY S OCIETY 46 (2) 82 83 . CEU eTD Collection 88 B Caldeira, European Union 87 86 J P literature. Amy Verdun, 85 court) iscourt) partoflaw-making not itself process the 84 EU-institution. it a“full-time” becomes Treaty since Lisbon the with here, Council of European a look the significantly very EU-law shaped that institution an is which Justice, of role. specialized well,in but present thesis examine notI will thisinstitution, having its regardto highly as power haslegislative Bank theEuropean these Central Beside Commission. European andthe Union European Councilof the Parliament, making European are the process EU deficitinthe thedemocratic 3.2 Localizing mentioned that the European Central Bank had legislative powers as well. Finally it ofmember be should upfrom states. made representatives (partially)committees of scrutiny the under alone, Commission the but Council the is not measures) implementing (concerning legislator main the when procedures, comitology the being these of some after the Lisbon Reform and tosee what conclusions can be drawn. these institutions is contested, in order to (in the next chapter) check what the situation is OURNAL OF OLICY RITISH C The ECJ’s democratic legitimacy is contested as well, see Grainne de Burca, de see Grainne well, as contested is legitimacy democratic ECJ’s The B Althoughit should be mentioned that democratic legitimacy of the ECB is frequently contested in the L ASZLO LUTMAN ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF 107(1998)and David McKay, J As it can be seen from the previous introduction, the main actors in EU’s decision- inEU’s actors main the introduction, previous the from seen be can it As I proceed as follows: in the present chapter I show where the democratic foundation of foundation Ishow chapter democratic where the in asfollows: present the I proceed OURNAL OF Changes in the Legitimacyofthe European Court ofJustice: APost-MaastrichtAnalysis B LUTMAN P 67-68, OLITICAL 59(3) T 88 85 supra note 84, at 19. , P Neither will I check here the democratic legitimacy of the European Court EU- OLITICAL S CIENCE The Institutional Design of EMU: ADemocratic Deficit? JOG HE – M M S 463(1999). ODERN CIENCE ĥ T KÖDÉSBEN REATY ON REATY The Political Sustainability ofEuropean Monetary Union 63 (1998). L AW (EU- E R UROPEAN EVIEW LAW 19 – 349 Gibson& GregoryJames(1996) L. A. and 352 I U N 87 NION A . On the other hand I find it useful to take CTION , Article 13. ) 92 (2004). The Quest forLegitimacy in the 18(2)J 86 84 , although (being a OURNAL 29 (3) B O F 28 (1) P RITISH UBLIC CEU eTD Collection (3) I Unification 90 92 91 71 85 (1999). 89 for Union the legitimacy necessary democratic which could the provide it became a player with considerable itwas clearthat co-decision procedure the of introduction After the members. elected directly weight. By some with organ European justafter becoming only the introduction procedure, of the cooperation it is seen as the only possiblenothing-but-deliberative organ with delegated national members, receivingmore with power actor it started asa gradually most: the influence instrengthened was process decision-making the The3.2.1 European Parliament a collection of ‘member peoples’, less than half of whom bothered to vote invote to 2004EU the bothered whom less of half than peoples’, ‘member of a collection deficit’, andthere can be nofuture for its parliament, for thereis no‘European people’, only growing)member of The governments. EU wouldbe its nowhere without ‘democratic asmallnumber(albeit than other hasno electorate because it precisely structure effective Hobsbawm: “Amuchgain for differentreasons. too power, Much of them by are summarized well body like the European Parliament” Union (EU) could European of the formimpotence relative“in the the of democratic deficit the about developinstitution” ‘illusory’ essentially is] [it into a powerful theCouncil, or Commission than the either less andinfluence since “enjoys far power that it and itis argued that to strengthen its role is a must in the course of EU’s reform Michael Keating, Michael Mathieu Ward 239,supra note 82, at 18. Deflem & Fred C. Pampel, Alexander Ballmann et al., Ballmann Alexander NTERNATIONAL The European Parliament is the institution of the European integrations whose integrations European the of institution is the Parliament European The Although the Parliament’s competence continuously “evolved”, there are opinions are there “evolved”, continuously competence Parliament’s the Although Of course, different views can be found, according to which the Parliament should not 75 (1) S 92 . OCIAL O Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in anIntegrating Europe RGANIZATION F ORCES Delegation,Comitology, andtheSeparation ofPowers European inthe Union 119137 (1996). 551554 (2002). The MythofPostnational Identity: Popular SupportforEuropean 91 . Some authors speak more harshly when they talk 20 89 and because of this 90 . 29 (1)P UBLIUS 56 CEU eTD Collection 97 96 95 94 why, a particular minister voted in the Council. …At EUlevel, governmentministers act in a record” public without and secretively operating committees myriadthe unaccountable deficit’ dueto it:entail is “the Union highly a ‘democratic saidto AsJulia put European contested. Paley The3.2.3 Councilof the European Union underpinning which isin for sure(atleast my of point view) enoughtogenerate a democratic member states, the of possible representatives highest they are the directly elected, are not isCouncil One notdebatedin can other argumentalthough literature. the itsbe that members 93 agenda-setter. political a general but legislative process part it of was not the as well, present ministers foreign the and Commission the of president the with states, member the of government or heads of Treaty.state of the Composed in enumerated assuch was not Maastricht the The3.2.2 European Council of scope power. its is debate about the is contested, not Parliament elections.” parliamentary Ballmann 554, Julia Paley, Harlow 344, supra note 31, at 7. H Eric J. Hobsbawm, ARGREAVES Contrary to the situation described above, the democratic deficit of the Council is Council the of deficit democratic the above, described situation the to Contrary Before Lisbon the European Council was not a full EU-institution, meaning that itmeaninga that full not Council was EU-institution, LisbontheBefore European 96 . It is emphasized that because of “secrecy” of because this that . Itis emphasized Toward anAnthropology ofDemocracy 95 17, 94 supra note89, at 20. . Probably because of this feature the democratic legitimacy of European the of legitimacy democratic the feature of this because Probably supra note83, at18. Spreading Democracy 93 Still it can be concluded that the democratic legitimacy of the of legitimacy democratic the that beconcluded it Still can 114 F OREIGN 31 A 21 P NNUAL OLICY 4041 (2004). R EVIEW OF 97 “it is impossible to know how, or how, know to impossible is “it A NTHROPOLOGY 469470 (2002). CEU eTD Collection views in Veaceslav Balan, Place of the European Parliament in the Institutional Framework of the European of the Framework Institutional the in Parliament European ofthe Place Balan, Veaceslav in views 105 104 103 Newspapers v. EU Council 102 European University). 101 100 40 (4) J 99 democratic is underpinning present is longer than in the case of the members of European Parliament, that is true, but ultimately,questioned is not act governmental legitimacy of the – and power legislative have do governments national composing ministers same very these in setup it national beard placed, but be in mind that the should arebetter popularly elected the control-process of EU-legislation control-process the specifying norms legal other or parliaments national of procedures of in rules level, national on be regulated areto voted ministers particular why andhow to related Matters legitimacy. issue of core the influence haveultimate not do decision-making the of circumstances daily lives of the citizens of the Union”make in rights institutions to “remoteness problem the order of of from European the the 66 (3) T place taken members are members Council is that argument common information became an important issue EU- official to access that be stressed should it thedeliberation of nature” “secretive particular“unrepresented”. that country of nationals the having thus it, opposes government aparticular if even made be can decision 98 democracy” of a parliamentary mostsafeguards of procedural the capacity without Andrew Moravcsik, Andrew AdamCygan, See similar the reasoning of Hungarian the Constitutional Court under 5.2.1 Democratic legitimacy.Same See Keating 82, See T Kenneth Campbell, Kenneth Central thesis, (unpublished (2009) Documents to Access Law. EC in Transparency Mayr, SeeStefan Id. 3. OURNAL OF HE I find all abovementionedthe arguments standing on weak ground. Regarding the AKACS M ODERN 99 , supra note 2, at 1. . The qualified majority voting majority qualified The . Democracyand Accountability in the European Union.The View Housefrom the ofCommons C supra note 90, at 20, where the importance of “national political forums” is emphasized. is forums” political “national of importance the where at20, 90, note supra L OMMON AW In Defence of theIn Defence ’Democratic of Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacyin the European Union Access to European Community Official Information: John Carvel & Guardian R 46 (1) T EVIEW M ARKET 384386 (2003). HE S I NTERNATIONAL AND NTERNATIONAL TUDIES 105 103 . And finally, about the issue of majority qualified 603605 (2002). 102 101 . Accusations that ministers in the Council are not in are ministers Council the that . Accusations disappear. Even if this would not bethecase, if not Even the would this disappear. and nowadays there are appropriate information andare appropriate nowadays there 22 100 is seen as an issue as well, namely that C OMPARATIVE 104 . The chain of legitimacy in their case ex officio L AW Q UARTERLY , without popular vote 174 (1997). 98 . A CEU eTD Collection Central EuropeanUniversity) actors for the EuropeanCommission: Strongervoice of diffuse groupsinterest (2007) 52 (unpublished thesis, 109 (1998). 108 107 (Emiliano Grossman ed., 2008). 106 Central EuropeanUniversity) Community. StillDemocratic IsThere a Deficit the EuropeanCommunity? in 86-87(2002)(unpublished thesis, interests” beday “the by captured Commission process, vulnerability of working to special the itsinto every- center the put deficit regardingCommission’s democratic arguments Other the of Parliament the except institutions EU- like all other just legitimacy, lacks democratic it by Council, appointed the but elected arenot sinceits commissioners that members,the from approachinga viewpoint but the literature, at least not in a way that it wouldbe a specific characteristic for this institution, The3.2.4 European Commission in cases when qualified majority voting would be regularprocedure.the facilitate‘strongly the inclusive,universally compromise modedecision-making’” of formation of coalition of stable patterns a lack with combined to-day decision-making day- of nature iterative highly the where EU’, inthe norm strong “‘a is unanimity that seems it willof In andvotes madeaddition opposition. the are againstthe setting,decisions when likenational isjust inthe Thesituation process. inthe decision-making were notrepresented countries of bethose citizens can said not that It legitimation. democratic abolish not the does it against votes membernumber states ifof a decisionparticular bepassedeven that will eventhefact) (or merepossibility sincethe stand cannot in argument this my voting: opinion Ballmann 554, Ballmann Robert O. Keohane, O. Robert De Burca 352, supra note 87, at 19. F RANCE ANDTHE The possible democratic deficit of the Commission is commonly not emphasized in 109 and that through the Commission bureaucratic and technocratic elites are shaping supra 20, the same ideaTamara 89,at and note in Kafkova,Interest groups asimportant E UROPEAN International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? U NION . 107 A FTER THE , its “ties to the public are … very indirect indeed” indirect very … are public the to “ties its , 23 R EFERENDUM ONTHE EFERENDUM E UROPEAN 110 F OREIGN C ONSTITUTION P OLICY 106 , even 82 92 165 108 . CEU eTD Collection 114 AND biotechnology for healthcare committee” 11 (2009) (unpublished thesis, Central European University) European 112 Central thesis, (unpublished (2009) 11 committee” healthcare for biotechnology 111 113 indeed,– is this part of itself definition the a thinkifof tank. But one focuses onthe is there with thinkfrom nothing tank wrong atechnocratic European possibleParliament: the instance. If one focuses on its ‘think thank’ role, one would want to make it asindependent as confused with (institutional system)“Take accountability: the European forCommission, Practice in European “Regional Economies” election. EU-wide popular, direct, on elected Commission andby having thepeople should beestablished president the of Commission the making” and their associationsindividuals “enables they well: as Commission of context in the secrecy and remoteness of to follow more closely, “transparency andprinciple” “participation are important infightingrights” backthe problem and hence influence, the course of decision- scientific knowledge” technocracy is thatdemocratic aproblem itisis deficit suggested by “independent cured 58 (4) P 110 arena” before entering comitology the …basically breaks chain democratic decision-making “the Commission of feature basic the of because than context, national the in legitimation have sincethey legitimized aredemocratically Council members view that the previously by memberwe adopted If Commission. states) the supervision of the (although under is carried out aswell,legislation is where criticized The comitology heavily process states. EU’s decision-making DeBeus 287,supra note 80, at18. Gavin Smith, Gavin and genomics sciences, “Life Study: Case guardian? guardian’s the guards Who Turcanu, Gabriela Geanina Francesca Bignami, Francesca Jeanne Morefield, Jeanne C ONTEMPORARY 111 OLITICAL Some of these critics are answered in the literature. Contrary to views that to Contrary literature. in the answered are critics these Some of 113 . . In order to solve the legitimacy-issue there are proposals that a linkbetween a that proposals are there legitimacy-issue tosolve the . In order R WhenLogicof “the Which CapitalIsthe Lurksin Real the Background” Programme and ESEARCH States AreNotPeople:States HaroldLaskion Unsetting Sovereignty, Rediscovering Democracy P ROBLEMS Three Generations ofParticipation Rights before the European Commission 112 110 Q of the Commission. As I mentioned in relation to the Council, the Council, the to in relation mentioned As I Commission. the of , since the Commission is highly independent from the member the from independent highly is Commission the since , UARTERLY 6162 (2004). 659667 (2005). 47(4) C URRENT 24 114 But sometimes democratic legitimacy is legitimacy democratic sometimes But A NTHROPOLOGY 621625 (2006). 68 (1) L AW CEU eTD Collection OF subjected to effective political control”. Boom 224, supra note 78, at 17. at 78, note supra 224, Boom control”. political effective to subjected Federal Constitutional Court, having a view according to which“fundamental isthat Unionlegislation be 117 2010. December University, Problem Analysis: Hungary Unitedand Kingdom”, Separationof Powers Course at Central European identify (mostly the political) responsibility in particular cases”. “Powers of the Parliamentary Opposition –a different fromare ministries which andwhich structure have no cleargovernmental task-list, ofthe inside having foreffect institutions that it becomes establish to highly executive difficult ofthe to efforts the understand “I 116 115 court. constitutional Hungarian and German French, the of judgments Lisbon-related the analyzing innext in the the scrutinized chapter and finally context bycomparativelyLisbon of Treaty control by without legitimized organs democratically of the governments since itis onlyinstitution the havingin drafting power to legislativethe process, the possibility control the preparatory of cannothaveitsfeature But Commission work. governments the the decisiveinfluenceon phase vanishes outsourcingby governmental of triggeredpowers unwanted and this phase partimportant of decision-makingthe is ThisIcall process. It deficit. drafting/preparatory becomesvery a in deficit democratic have onewe than legitimized democratically not is Commission the If present. is possibilities interest-enforcing states’ member of decline) least at lobbycritics interests about “capturing”and other Commission’s the views, than a deficit (or influence If thefinal oflegal instruments. outcome seriously takes abovementioned the one isCommission theinstitution which possesses power the to draftlegislation it can decisively important? Why is the Since (material) so democratic deficitthis Commission. the of nationalin democracy-underpinning. through thecase (exceptcontext elections), of popular shouldprior bedealt inside EU’swith institutional the thesetting latter and outside of EU- the legitimacy: democratic from be distinguished should accountability institutional view my issue.” animportant becomes accountability clearly Commission, of the role executive My My argument regarding importancethe of strengthenedcontrol is by Maastricht-decisionthe of Germanthe Tobe distinguished from the „wanted” outsourcing of governmental powers in national context, underwhat Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, E CONOMIC As it can be seen, fairly enough argument has been made, but none is concerned of the of is concerned none but made, been has argument enough fairly seen, be can it As P ERSPECTIVES 27 33 27 (2004). The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View 25 117 . These my findings will be examined be will findings my . These 116 : because of the supranational 18(4)T HE J OURNAL 115 In CEU eTD Collection 120 (2009). 119 enough although it was widely argued that the Treaty serves the better democratic legitimacy thebetter Treaty the serves arguedthat it enough was widely although activities.” its over scrutiny’ democratic ‘better its citizens’ to and providing of EU‘closer the bringing challenge asthat contentious effortpromulgate a to ‘constitution’ …[andidentifiedit] internal the major 4.1 AbouttheLisbonTreaty expectations. it preliminary managed tofulfill checkthe whether in to order contested) the previously localized critical points (where the democratic foundation of EU is or is to be chapterIexamine inthe present was born, in Reform the Treaty which context sketching the France and Treaty Netherlandsthe onreferenda the saidnoto hold in2005 meeting of itsCouncil in European the Juneratification 2004, “jammed” became when Brussels on the Treaty accepted Afterand havingtheConstitutional so-called quickly. whichEurope solve many rather suddenly would stopped acuteproblemsnevertheless the of problem:the “[would] solve would constitution aEuropean that suggestions There were issue. cure this to others) topic of the democratic deficit, since it was (and still is) widely seen as aiming (amongst Integration 118 P et al., Keohane O. Robert Mathias Albert, Mathias AUL Chapter Four: The Lisbon Treaty – What does it change? It was the Laeken Declaration which “officially launched the EU’s recent and recent EU’s the launched “officially which theLaekenDeclaration It was The examination of Lisbon Treaty is particularly important when one deals with the C RAIG 28 (2) R , T HE EVIEW OF EVIEW Governanceand Democracy European in Systems: OnSystems Theory andEuropean L ISBON T per se I NTERNATIONAL REATY Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism 119 : make the European ‘democratic’” makethe European Union L The enthusiastic process of Theprocess of enthusiastic forpreparing aconstitution AW , P OLITICS AND OLITICS S TUDIES 26 293305(2002). T REATY R EFORM 63I NTERNATIONAL 20 (2010). 118 O 120 . After briefly RGANIZATION . Interestingly . 1 3 CEU eTD Collection (2010). 126 125 124 123 122 (2008?). usage to new areas, while the other procedure are called special legislative procedures. special legislative arecalled procedure new other areas,while the usage to its and extended astoordinary legislative procedure renamed theco-decision procedure 121 followings. in the detail in more looked be will deficit democratic EU’s curing “constitutional” of frame institutionsthese –modifications relevant to possibilitythe of legislators main asthe Commission European the and Council modifiedinstitutional was setup fundamentally, not having the still European the Parliament, EU-institution “full-time” became a European Council untouched reforms issue but to (mostly changes important mainthe the and andmostrelated of goal statehood) Lisbon issuesformulated havethepreviouslyleft in highly was Treaty a way to out debated in by accepted member states end byall 2007,and finally atthe ratified of 2009. The of them being after Treaty, Lisbon the this became asReform Treaty: named drafted, was new treaty EU” would “adiminution of democracy” represent of the EU, amongst the reasons why citizens were encouraged voteto againstit was “newthe Z L C C C A ISBON ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF RAIG OLTAN LLEN For the present analyses important changes concerning decision-making are that it are that decision-making changes concerning important analyses present For the In ordertobefind able to asolution, aso-called was reflection period announced. A 20-25, supra20-25, note 120, at 26. : K W H IERAN HAT THE ORVATH , R EASONS TO 122 R & EFORM . B ALINT T REATY MEANS V O T T OTE DOR REATY ON REATY REATY ONTHE REATY , NO T HE TO THE TO U E 123 (Tony 123 (Tony Browned., 2008). NION AFTERNION UROPEAN F UNCTIONING OF UNCTIONING THE L 27 ISBON U 121 NION L T . ISBON REATY , Article 13. 124 : – , but except of , butexcept novelty this the of EU T E HE UROPEAN C T ONSTITUTIONAL 125 REATY REFORM OF REFORM REATY THE . Still, it did modify the modify did it Still, . U NION , Article 289., Article 126 R EFERENDUM 123 EU The 136 49 CEU eTD Collection 129 128 127 and which Igotowards those more possibly have alegitimacy-problem. recognized previously, Istartwith institutions legitimacy iswhich held tobe strongest,the curemanaged theargueddemocraticAsit LisbonTreaty to besee whetherthe could deficit. in to order chapter previous asinthe institutions same checkthe Accordingly process. I will benot examinedin followings,the duetotheir special outsiderole, of law-makingthe EU-institutions “full-time” official, are Auditors of Court the and Bank Central European the Union, European the of Justice of Court the Treaty Lisbon institutions involved in legislativethe process. Itshould bementioned thatalthough under the EU- main the of foundation democratic of points contested check the will I chapter: Commission. in shouldbe observed, European to the governmental powers more closely relation legitimacyCouncil the of outsourcingdrafting/preparatory triggereddeficit, byunwanted of insteadis Thisis have of lack found present. that why I of emphasizing the democratic governance” elite justifies level national at democracy “popular members, elected directly of composed the EU’s democratic in to relation picture see thebroader be able to back to step alittle Itried to previous chapter deficit. ofthe[issue]” complexity of dueaccount the to take I basically argued that, as for the institutions4.2 Democraticdeficit revisited which are not AND C Harlow 344, supra note 31, at 7. Neil MacCormick, P ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF HILOSOPHY Under the present heading I will follow the same approach have usedinprevious approach I same heading follow the Iwill Under present the needs As in suggests,“discussion rightly MacCormick a democratic Europe deficitof 128 331356 (1997). . But if there is no national-level democratic underpinning, democratic deficit democratic underpinning, democratic national-level no is if there But . Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship inthe‘European Commonwealth’ T REATY ON REATY E UROPEAN 28 U NION , Article 13. 127 129 . Accepting this caution, in the , their democratic legitimacy will legitimacy democratic , their 16 (4) L AW CEU eTD Collection 134 133 132 131 130 EU” the legitimacy of issueof broader the institutions in Brussels, notably Councilthe Ministers, butby of cannot itself the resolve other the into its relation position reinforces “[the] strengthened role that highlighted elected directly members its having institution only is the Parliament most appropriate way curingof the EU’s democratic deficit,having regard tothe fact that the where ordinary legislative procedure is beto used. According tonumerous scholars this is the The4.2.1 European Parliament 4.2.2 The4.2.2 European Council Council” exercising of a extent power the to if only deliberation, legislative in of share a larger to veto “admitted Parliament or at least of delay on legislationUnion. Thereis behindconsiderable support is the ideathatit equally important haveto the the of proposed setting institutional the under be should role main its what by on debate Commissionconsiderable and It does not provide any new powers, neither changes it the European Council’s main role, debate” for than a chamber like alegislature more much “looks Parliament the canarguethat one C Peterson &Shackleton 120,supra note 131, at 29. MacCormick 356, supra note 127, at 28. Peterson &Shackleton 105,supra note 131, at 29. T HE ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF I NSTITUTIONS NSTITUTIONS OF THE The Lisbon Treaty strengthened Parliament’s power by widening the circle of areas The Lisbon Treaty officially recognizes the European Council as an EU-institution an as Council European the recognizes officially Treaty Lisbon The is there nevercontested, was Parliament the legitimacy of the democratic Although 133 132 , thus its role as a partial legitimacy-provider is stronger than ever. as to have more power transferred to it. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force into came Treaty Lisbon it. the After to transferred morehave power asto E UROPEAN T REATY ON REATY U NION E 108 (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds., 2 UROPEAN 131 . 29 U NION , Article 13. 130 , although it is nd ed. 2006). 134 . CEU eTD Collection 353 (1996). 141 140 139 138 137 136 135 majority by a half years qualified for twoand elected novelty: headedbya becomes Council European important president, the up the main which set is fordirections EUpolicy-making to holders in member states and by the European Parliament, after Lisbon stronger then ever sovereignty- ultimate by the secured underpinning: democratic and “dual isaccountability” a not on the samebasis asfor the European Parliament but through the member states issecured: legitimacy still, democratic the structure, pointof EU’sinstitutional the contested The4.2.3 Council national governments EU isrespective the through that legitimated be it said can weaken previously it. AsIargued to even but contrary, on Council, European EU the for asan Council’sagenda-setter role European the strengthen can president a permanent that view a having well, as scholars and politicians from the hands of governments, once more from which one has to be chosen in Commission, theoption the since beforeto as Imentioned democratic deficit connection will become more limited, samepreparatory the canproduce decision-makers, EU’s the beonthetableof will and the initiativeneither will slip directly out elected nor a national official, but having the possibility to influence what Grainne Grainne de Burca, See Moravcsik,supra note 140, at 30. J See Rohrschneider,supra note 81,at 18. H C C AN ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF ORVATH W As Ishowed democratic in of chapter, deficit previous Councilis the the mostly the I find this newly introduced office not to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the of legitimacy democratic the strengthen to not office introduced newly this find I ERTS & , T O HE DOR E UROPEAN 153-155,supra note 126, at 27. The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union C OUNCIL T T REATY ON REATY REATY ON REATY 136 209(2008). . This new position . This was newposition welcomed of bymost public, the E E UROPEAN UROPEAN 139 . 30 U U NION NION 137 , Article 15 Section 5. , Article 15. . 59 (3) T 135 . Nevertheless it introduces an introduces it . Nevertheless HE 138 M . A president, who is ODERN L AW R 140 EVIEW . There 141 349 . CEU eTD Collection democratic accountability’ and so ‘perverting’ the constitutional balance between balance so ‘perverting’ constitutional democraticthe executive accountability’ and between of mechanisms ‘domestic of down cutting effect hashadthe which European democracy, callsWincott having “two-tier system of European governance”“the ‘perversion’ of Daniel Union. the of “double-legitimacy” regarding the enumerated, opinions Ipreviously law-makingof in the EU.Tounderstand why is this has one problematic, toremember of the phase preparatory of methods the controlling lacktheeffective especially their governments deficitisin present maintained Union.the I thatithappens andbecause themember states, by neither democratic elections a so-called directly preparatory/drafting memberstates, the direct through neither legitimized not is it since and proposals, legislative draft to power The4.2.4 European Commission by decision-making legitimized a democratically organ. providingand sufficient effective methods for controlling the preparatory phase the of changenot anything inrelation which inof Councilissue,the terms this would solve of unwanted outsourcing of Commission from the preparatory suffering deficit. andisdemocratic So the governmental present, deficit powers is still Council by legitimate drafted proposals aremade by decisions on the democratically the the there as well. The that this andthat mainLisbon concept: changethe not does this replace unanimity, can voting Treaty did 142 making. Although by introducing so-calledthe bridging-clauses not relevant, theseare examination of present purposes For the voting. majority the to related especially since they do not concern the basic structure and process of the decision- H ORVATH Previously is Iarguedthatbecausehaving Commission sole the the EU-institution The Lisbon Treaty introduced some novelties regarding the decision-making, the regarding novelties some introduced Treaty Lisbon The & O DOR 80-85,supra note 126, at 27. 31 142 the qualified majority CEU eTD Collection 148 147 146 144 143 level.” atnational organs andlegislative 145 deficit (stated in previous chapter) still stay in place – after Lisbon as well. presidentonly, allother and argumentstofind Commission the from ademocraticsuffering its for legitimacy provide linkage this Still, legitimated). isdemocratically (which Parliament itto the linking by the directly Commission for legitimacy provide democratic was to European Parliamentby a majority its componentof members” held consultations” having the appropriate after and Parliament European the to elections the account into “taking Parliament, European havingthe by majority” European Council (actingqualified the tothe nominating acandidate toprovidesupposed for “more democracy” is which Commission, the and Parliament the between link a is there though even legitimacy, legislation EI-level proposing of right exclusive the possesses democratic deficit) as to the structure,more. any balance no is there but “perverted” just not is balance functioningconstitutional the control, ormember-state nor legitimacy powers democratic neither has which Commission, the on of the Commission L ISBON C C Cygan386, supra note 98, at 22. National Forum on Europe, Government Publication Office, Ireland, A Ireland, Office, Publication Government Europe, on Forum National Daniel Wincott cited inHarlow 345, supra note 31, at 7. C ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF ONSOLIDATED VERSION THE OF – The Lisbon Treaty did not introduce any major changes (related to the issue of EU R EFORM T REATY 15-18 (?) T T T REATY ON REATY REATY ON REATY REATY ON REATY E E E 143 UROPEAN UROPEAN UROPEAN 146 If the initiative of proposing legislation issolely legislation proposing of initiative If the 32 147 : the president of the Commission is elected by . The „candidate shall be elected bythe beelected shall „candidate . The U U U NION NION NION , Article 17 Section 7. , Article 17 Section 7. , Article 17 Section 2. 145 SUMMARY TOTHE GUIDE 148 . It still does lack democratic lack does still It . . It can be seen that the aim the that seen be can It . 144 T REATY OF . It still CEU eTD Collection and is not and need not be like the national parliament.”). national the be like not need and not is and already one … which may not supplant the national parliament … and may not affect its ofduty transposition … J L 154 153 152 151 http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2010/06/AFSJ%2010%20years%20final.pdf FREEDOM Kristine Kruma, 150 the constitution court of Germany on the democracy-issue in the EU, which standpoint national sovereignty national 149 judgments, starting with Solange I relationship” “love-hate has a strange, to examine issuethe not of existdo democratic deficitmy according to best knowledge. rare are quite analyses comparative constitutional court judgments have been regularly examined and analyzed more closely, their particular legal system legal particular their means for interpretingandhaving democracy like whatterms powerof sole the sovereignty examinationthe someof as national of judgmentsof the institutions constitutional courts, knowledge, common of sort some become to seems EU the legitimating institutions national As to the question Treaty. Lisbon the on courts constitutional Hungarian and German whyFrench, the of decisions I chose this way of analysis the answer is that since the thesis of OURNAL OF AW Hungarian constitutional court judgments regarding the Lisbon See Davor Jancic, Davor See Decisionof the German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfG, 2 BvL 52/71 vom 29.5.1974 Id.172-174. David Marrani, Fora comparative analysis of constitutional court judgments regarding the LisbonTreaty see forexample A Chapter Five: Democratic deficit in the French, German and 171(2010). MI ALKOTMÁNYUNK MI Picking these three particular countries was more or less evident: France traditionally less evident: or wasmore countries these threeparticular Picking In order to test my mostchapter IexamineIn ordertotest in important findings, thepresent, the , SECURITY AND SECURITY YEARS JUSTICE TEN ON E UROPEAN Constitutional courts and the Lisbon Treaty.The future based on mutual trust, A Love-Hate Relationship: France andEuropean Law Caveats fromKarlsruhe and Berlin: Whither DemocracyAfter Lisbon? 152 L (O AW . In Germany there is a whole sequence of EU-related constitutional UR Treaty –acomparative analysis 337, 341-352 (2010)(“Letthere beEuropean Parliament a … unless there is C ONSTITUTION 149 , is a method that opens new horizons. And although relevant although And horizons. new opens that method a is , 153 150 , and eventually constituting a coherent standpoint coherent a constituting eventually and , ; having inanalyses specificof points ordercomparison ) 226 (Laszlo Trocsanyi ed.,2006). 151 with EU and is very much concerned with its 33 16 C OLUMBIA 38(2010), J OURNAL OF OURNAL 16 C THE AREATHE OF E UROPEAN OLUMBIA 154 of CEU eTD Collection equivalents) of the member states received applications concerning the unconstitutionality of theunconstitutionality received concerning member of applications equivalents) the states framework 5.1 Constitutional learned from this comparison-experiment. to finish with the (cross-) examination of the decisions. of define comparison specificpoints then inorder movementioned to I will countries, three I conclude with summarizing what I surrounding. practical-legal in the received been have project integration the of reform this with how demonstrate theoreticallythe for curing solutions possible EU’s the democratic deficit totry in to order picked (self-evidently) were decisions LisbonTreaty the dealing with court constitutional The value. added an have definitely would my analysis so Lisbon-decision, Hungarian the on literature isEnglish there no as well that was an aspect It comparison. explicit reference to the French and German judgments Hungary,inisnew addition, exampleis memberstates. a good becauseinthedecision there of mode by inquiry the see the conducted methodof one constitutional of and courts the the close examination of the Hungarian Lisbon-decision is a strategic one as well: its worthy to these decisions. ” decisions. these the (e.g. courts constitutional These … Germanfederal, Treaty the Polish, Lisbon the of the French, the Belgianconstitutional ratification court) the … before The Constitutionalcountries Court studied European numerous Constitutional Court points out that petitioner the infact veryasks the same questions werethat asked in ahawkere.htm&p=1&op11=and&op7=and&f=G (hereinafter: Decisionof HCC)the point III/1: „The 11=Dr&r=1&SECT5=AHAWKERE&op9=and&op10=and&d=AHAW&op8=and&l=20&u=/netahtml/ahawuj/ http://isz.mkab.hu/netacgi/ahawkere2009.pl?s1=119/2010&s2=&s3=&s4=&s5=&s6=&s7=&s8=&s9=&s10=&s 156 155 nevertheless has could (or important have) implications integration further regarding See Decisionof Hungarian the Constitutional Court 143/2010. (VII.14.)AB határozat, Id.339-341. After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, numerous constitutional courts (or their (or courts constitutional numerous Treaty, Lisbon the of adoption the After the of setting constitutional the to insight brief a give firstly will I following the In 34 156 , so it fits into the context of the of context the into fits it so , 155 . The . CEU eTD Collection 162 council’s official web-site: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr 161 constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constitution_anglais.pdf 160 constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/en_ordinance_58_1067.pdf C 159 simplify the text when it refers to the appropriate institution of all three countries. 158 “EU-clause” general so-called butthe matters, EU-related with deals French constitution the TitleXV of which deals with the particular country’s accession to the EU in the center of its examination. 2007 Constitution” the amending after only be given may involved undertaking international the approve or ratify to authorization Constitution, the contrary to aclause contains an international undertaking that council constitutional the to undertaking” “international to refer an Constitution of 4 French the of 54 Article the Under president. the from Lisbon of Treaty constitutionality Hungarian from 12 France5.1.1 law, etc. andEU- between relation domestic courts, constitutional the about basic rules the regarding countries these of system constitutional the to introduction a short provide to necessary is it 157 Treaty the from 26 from OUNCIL Terminology from Trocsanyi 60, supra note 149, at 33. at 149, note supra 60, Trocsanyi from Terminology For the purposes of examination I used the English translation of the decision, which can be found on Article 54 of the F of the 54 Article This procedure This is regulated underChapter IIof F Inthefollowings the terms Constitutional Council and Constitutional Court will be usedturnin in order to French Constitutional Council’s decisionfrom 20 161 th Of course each constitutional court placed the clause of the national constitution placed of national the clause the court eachconstitutional Of course In France the constitutional council constitutional In France the . , November 3 2008 and O 157 RDINANCE Nº RDINANCE 162 . Since the present thesis deals with the French, German and Hungarian rulings, Hungarian and German French, the with deals thesis present the Since . (where “the conditions in which the French Republic participates in the th July 2010, Polish from 24 160 th RENCH October 1958 the president of president 1958the of republicthe October others)(amongst has theright . The council delivered its decision . The DC on20 delivered itsnº decision council 2007-560 58-1067 C ONSTITUTION OF ONSTITUTION rd November 2009, Latvian from 7 from Latvian 2009, November OF 7 TH N th 4 November2010. Kruma 39,supra note150, at 33. OVEMBER TH O CTOBER th 35 December2007, CzechConstitutional Court’s judgment RENCH 158 1958, 1958, received a referral the areferral concerning received I NSTITUTIONAL http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- th April 2009,from German 30 159 A CT ONTHE . If the council “has. If held council the th C of December of ONSTITUTIONAL th June 2009, CEU eTD Collection extent of the rights and duties of a supreme Federal organ or of other parties concerned who concerned parties other of or organ Federal supreme a of duties and rights the of extent the concerning disputes of event the in Law Basic the of interpretation the “on rule to court Republic (23 Germany of for Federal the Basic Law Two bases. applications legal different on submitted application werewith dealt lodgedcourt constitutional with the court on the basisfederal Germanthe 1259/08and2BvR 182/09, 2 BvR 5/08, 2BvR1022/08, 2BvR 1010/08, of Article 93 Section 1 point 1 of the member states]” 5.1.2 Germany5.1.2 Constitution.” the of revision prior “require novelties which conclude to in order it byarticle, article almost it reviewed awhole: approach the as Treaty not examination mostly from viewpoint LisbonTreaty of the didof national the sovereignty. It 5.2.3 Institutions.point intergovernmental approach detail – animportant which willbe indealt more details under mentioningmethod butputs the supranational emphasis the onthe decision-making exercise in “to the Union participation official web-site: http://www.bverfg.de 167 166 165 164 (hereinafter: Decisionof the FCC) point 7. http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/a2007560dc.pdf amending the Treaty onEuropeanUnion and the Treaty establishing the EuropeanCommunity, 163 88-1 European arespecified”Communities andUnion European the For the purposes of examination I used the English translation of the decision, which can Decision beof FCCfoundthe point on 9,supra court’s note 163, at 36. Art 88-1 of the 1958 French Constitution. Emphasis added by me, Miklos Klenanc. Amended with the ratificationof the LisbonTreaty without substantial changes in the text. Decision FrenchConstitutionalof the Council n°2007-560 DC–December20 164 . What is important for the forthcoming analyses is that the clause allows for French for allows clause the is that analyses forthcoming the for important is What . In its judgment its In its conducted council constitutional French the mentioned above the to According 165 . This kind of phrasing of the exercise of power is not explicitly not is power of exercise the of phrasing of kind This . 167 from from 30 th June 2009, considering applications 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvEapplications 2BvE 2/08, June2009,considering some 36 of [its] powers in common [with the other rd May 1949). This procedure enables the May procedure 1949).This 163 ) can be found in Article 166 th 2007, Treaty of Lisbon CEU eTD Collection 172 171 170 169 C democratic issueof broader the decided on court constitutional German the sovereignty, national breaches it whether question the of and Treaty Lisbon of analysis the to stuck courts andHungarian While French the let most, us say,approach. radical the courttook German courts’. Out of the three constitutional courts whose decisions I examine in present thesis the theother of those EU than the foundation of democratic the on ismuch more centered court Basic Law” a guarantees social and federal “inparticipation theis developmentof to committed European the Union that Union. The aim of is power-transferthis limited by constitution:the itis Germany’s transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of of Bundesrat” the consent the law with by a powers sovereign transfer … may “the Federation circumstances which under indetail regulates German constitution much in the center, much more than the French and Hungarian court did. Article 23 of the public authority” “any one procedure [can] allegethat of …hasperson his basic beenby rights infringed Article40, theso-called 93Section 1 point constitutional complaintprocedure asunfounded. wasrejected fourother other petitions The werefiledanddecidedunder 168 Federal supremeorgan” have been vested with rights of their own by the Basic Law or by rules of procedure of a OURT Article 23 Section 1 of the German Basic Law. Emphasis added by me, Miklos Klenanc. Article 23 Section 1 of the German Basic Law. Article 93 Section 1 Point 4a of the German Basic Law. Id.Article 13 Point 8a. Cited provision of the German Basic Law as well as of G (12 Bearing formulation it inmindthis nois that the wonder reasoning of German the The court delivered its ruling putting the EU-clause of the German Basic Law very Law ofthe German Basic EU-clause delivered the putting its ruling The court TH M 172 ARCH level ofprotectionbasicrights . 170 1951), principles . http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm Article 13 Point 5. 168 . On of these applications was dismissed as inadmissible while the while inadmissible as dismissed was applications these of On . , to the rule oflaw 37 essentially comparable to that afforded by this tothat comparable essentially , and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that and subsidiarity, of principle the to and , ERMAN L AW ON THE AW ON F EDERAL 171 to the European the to C ONSTITUTIONAL democratic 169 . In this , CEU eTD Collection 180 179 178 http://www.mkab.hu/index.php?id=act_on_the_constitutional_court 177 176 175 State (2009) and DieterGrimm, consequences proceeding canbeinitiated by anyone tohave competence for examination laws…” “ex unconstitutionality post of international treaties” andof Parliament procedureof therulesof provisionsyetpromulgated, of of and butnot statutes adopted 1989 on Constitutionalthe Court. XXXII of further inAct Thisis specified Court”. of proceedings Constitutional the “initiate everyone can bystatute” specified in cases “thatthe right the secures Hungary Republic of individual complaint. Article 32/A Section 4 of Act XX of 1949 on Hungary5.1.3 the Constitution of the legitimacy democratic of basis the on heavily but approach sovereignty national the from just not it answers and 174 173 government) the process integration European overall the with but speaking strictly Treaty Lisbon the with just not is dealing it Union theEuropean of legitimacy Id. Article 21 Section 2 Id. Article 1 point b Id. Article 21 Section 1 Article 1 Point a of H the legitimacy. Democratic 5.2.1 under analysis Seedetailed Id. See Roland Bieber, Chalmers 43, supra note 33 at 8. ‘ 5E Under this act it is possible to have “ex ante examination for unconstitutionality of an of base on Treaty Lisbon the with dealt court constitutional Hungarian The UROPEAN 176 C ). 178 ONSTITUTIONAL 174 . Still, this was not the case, the court dealt with the Treaty according toits An Association ofSovereign States’ , and secondly it asks the question of democratic legitimacy more firmly more of legitimacy democratic thequestion it, andsecondly asks 175 Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the European Union into a (and especiallybecause of this heavingfar reaching possible L UNGARIAN AW 173 R EVIEW . This approach is exceeding the others from two points: two from others the exceeding is approach This . 180 177 A 353(2009) . The court found that the law which ratified the ratified which law the that found court . The CT if itis by initiated presidentthe of republicthe (or 38 XXXII 5 E OF UROPEAN 1989 ONTHE C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONSTITUTIONAL 179 L AW . This kind of R EVIEW C OURT 391 , CEU eTD Collection http://www.mkab.hu/index.php?id=constitution the for noobstacles are “… there EU-law: basically, the regarding, maketo considerations state” democratic stillwhether used state is“an independent, theHungarian totestcourt restrictions these treaties.” foundation [EU] the under obligations perform and Hungary (just as France and basically Germany as well) “may exercise “may well) as Germany basically and France as (just Hungary Article is in situation. to the role According consideration. Butthis not 2/A court’s the important an play not did constitution Hungarian the of EU-clause the that be thought can maybe it sight first On ones. German the and French the as just sovereignty, national of basis justified by theabsenceemphasizing of ex ante considerations. French constitutionalexamination” council exante for asking did,petition in absenceof examination, exercise to expost power the but took under considered Treaty Lisbon were the law ratifying regarding the constitutional problems a more general approach. This is what was 186 185 Klenanc. Miklos by me, done are court’s web-site: http://www.mkab.hu All the translations of parts of this judgment appearing in present thesis 184 183 182 181 … member states other inthe with … conjunction 12 content” normative … having force in lawstill a view of point formal is“from Treaty Lisbon court rules court constitutional Hungarian the inline with still but Treaty the of ratification the after scrutiny Article Emphasis added by me, Miklos Klenanc. 2 Section 1 of Forthe the purposes of examination I used the Hungarian officialA version of the decision, which Decisionof HCCthe can point IV/2.2 befifth found paragraph, supra on note 156, at 34. Forcontrary oppinion see dissenting oppinion of Dr. Bragyova András. Decisionof HCCthe point III/2 fifth paragraph, supra note 156, at 34. th of July 2010 of The founditcourt important to legitimate its decision by underlining whyitwas able The Hungarian court conducted the examination of the Lisbon Treaty generally on the on generally Treaty Lisbon the of examination the conducted court Hungarian The 181 . This is how itishappened constitutional Lisbon-provisions. This wereputunder the that 182 183 . The court itself emphasized the fact of fact the itself emphasized court . The . The court’s judgment14.). TheAB court’s 143/2010. (VII. határozatwasdelivered on 186 184 . . It should be noted that the court did not take apart the Treaty as the CT XX OF 1949 ONTHE 39 C to the extent necessary to theextent ONSTITUTION OF ONSTITUTION THE ex post 185 The Hungarian constitutional Hungarian The examination: “the argued examination: R certain EPUBLIC OF EPUBLIC toexercise rights competences H UNGARY , CEU eTD Collection state, Germany and Hungary have parliamentarian system of governance of system parliamentarian have Hungary and Germany state, beasemi-presidential is to France emphasizeconsidered thatwhile to is important made: it 189 point IV/2.1. withdrawalof case of the a member for state and ruled that the particullarily petitionersTreaty Lisbon argument bythe is unfounded. procedure See Decision introduced of newly to the HCCJ cited briefly Court The withdrawal from the EU since one of the arguments of the petitionerwas that withdrawal became impossible. 188 187 andsee whichprevious chapters to importantpointsare the emphasized by them. in the did I as conclusions similar implicitly) or explicitly (either stated courts constitutional checkanalyzing and comparing Iaim thesewhether decisions to these particular the democratic deficitis be to observed and where the deficitreally should belocalized. With where context the changed Treaty Lisbon the how about findings my cross-test is to decisions 5.2 Pointsofcomparison parliament’s. the than process integration in the important more much government the of task the considers one, German the to contrary court, constitutional Hungarian the Interestingly parliament. roleof the the highlights court German the and executive of the importance the emphasizes court French the decision its in that striking is it when mind in borne upon autonomous interpretation” of … regardingfacts falling be Lisbon not the back which can reform viewed asnotorious, having bemade need will without Reference for this. interpretation a them of or autonomous givingspecific an refernorms the …without to EU-law Constitutionalof to Court Trocsanyi 47-52, supra note 149, at 33. Itshould be mentioned that the Hungarian Constitutional Court briefly dealt withthe possibility of Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2 third paragraph, supra note 156, at 34. After havingthe basic introduced frameworkconstitutional afinal shouldremark be As I stated before,As Istated my goal with examining the abovementioned constitutional court 187 . 188 40 189 . Thisshould be CEU eTD Collection shall provideframework for the forthcoming comparative analysis: judgmentsthree and having regard tomy analysesprevious andfindings, the following points all through reading After them. alongside carried be should examination the and localized be x x x x x In order to be able to do an efficient cross-check, specific points of comparison should role). is bewhat “democracy-provider”sort of found to attachment regarding supposed their role, strengthened their valued courts constitutional the (how parliaments national is theimportanceprocedures, of emphasized); process preparatory the work/drafting democratic viewpoint, how deficit they some evaluated of introduced newly the from the process legislative of the evaluation is the courts’ (what process legislative present); implicitly are explicitly or andpreparatory/draftingoutsourcing deficitgovernmental of powers national institutions, whetherfindings from previous chapter regarding the of role the to attach they did importance much how EU-institutions, post-Lisbon institutions (how the constitutional courts valued the democratic foundation of the deficit); context foundingthe of democratic democratic and how they thefact evaluated of theenlarging circle of EU-institutions’in competences attach to EU’s (whatimportancenew did courts constitutional powers, powers the deficit); democratic ofdemocracy and context the and EUin memberstates between localized connection the courts the where analyses, of courts’ the framework is the what plan, a broader issue at legitimacy and the addressed deficit democratic the courts constitutional legitimacy the (how democratic 41 CEU eTD Collection 195 194 note 126, at 27, etc. overwhelming majority of scholars of opinion is the It Parliament. European the about conclusion the is approach of kind this for example Good extent. unconstitutional an to affected is sovereignty national whether but institution democratic is a EU the whether not is council the for question The sovereignty). 193 192 191 190 sovereignty” national of emanation an not is … Parliament European “the stating: when sovereignty-approach foot-stone to EU.Theconstitutional iscouncil dealing not with issue,this theystick tothe and Citizen Preamble the norms: constitutional French the of rules relevant the cites It sovereignty. national of but legitimacy democratic of framework in the not basically Treaty Democratic5.2.1 legitimacy authorisation to ratify such measures requires prior revision of the Constitution” the of revision prior requires measures such ratify to authorisation national sovereignty conditionsexercising thefundamental of theof or adverselyaffect counter Constitution,to the call questioninto constitutionally rights guaranteed andfreedoms undertakingsfor enteredinto [the of purpose inparticipating EU]contain the a clauserunning Article 3of 1958Constitution the Rights of andMan Citizen and Preamblethe of 1946Constitutionlegallythe binding) and democratic deficit is present at all,at isnot itdemocraticthat deficitpresenteven questionsseems thatthese areof and a whether not, or is democratic EU the whether about nothing says council constitutional Decisionof FCCthe point 9,supra note163, at 36. Emphasis addedby me, Miklos Klenanc. Decisionof the FCC point 20,supra note 163, at 36. C Decisionof FCCthe point 4,supra note 163, at 36. Decisionof FCCthe point 4,supra note 163, at 36. Decisionof FCCthe point 3,supra note 163, at 36. RAIG In its judgment the French constitutional council performs the analysis of the Lisbon the of analysis the performs council constitutional French the judgment its In It could be concluded on the basis of the above mentioned that the French the that mentioned above the of basis the on concluded be could It 36-39, supra note 120, atsupra 26, T note 120, 36-39, 192 (both of them recognize the nation/the people as ultimate holders ofnational holders people as ultimate nation/the the (bothof recognize them 194 . The council explicitly states its priorities: “When however “When priorities: its states explicitly council The . 191 AKACS 193 and the Article 3of the Declaration of the Rights of Man its main that “addedvalue” isthatgives democratic 111-127, supra1,111-127, H noteat 2, 42 ORVATH 190 & (which makes the O DOR 195 156-158,supra . , CEU eTD Collection of governmental powers. It actually emphasizes the importance of the possibility of memberimportance actually of possibility of the of It emphasizes governmental powers. outsourcing unwanted regarding findings my concerning one important very a is conclusion and and justby parliaments complemented governments” Parliament European the todemocratic …principles” Union European committed which “the Federal Republic of Germany shall in participate developmentthe of the as aconstitutional construct” development Nevertheless, itin“set thisdecision legal boundaries for the the European Union’s integration project. concerning theEuropean judgment of German court the first 200 GCC) point 231. 421), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (hereinafter: Decisionof the 199 198 197 196 order” Theconstitutions “Constitution in Europe” theirstates. …remains fundamental of aderived democratic with their Europe of thepeoples are it, constitutes that constitution European the democratic foundation of the Union. Itfound that the “source of Community authority, and of the examined court the constitution, German the with conformity in is Treaty Lisbon thesis incomparably more than otherthe courts whose decisionstwo areexamined in presentthe in necessary ensure the of “amount democracy” European Union.the of the highestfoundation democratic the sovereignty: institutionsnational the against prevail would which legitimacy of the French Republicimplicitly contain the idea of impossibility for the Unionwill to have its own sources of always findings cited before the itisthat as well true council.Nevertheless for the importance have to be there in order to Decision of the GCC point 262. Decisionof German the Federal Constitutional Court BVerfG, 2BvE vom 2/08 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - Law. Basic German of the 1 Section 23 Article Jancic 340, supra note 154 at 33. Jancic 339-341,supra note 154 at 33. 196 199 The court heavily relied on the EU-clause of the German constitution, according to The German constitutional court elaborated the issue of EU’s legitimacy . As Ialready mentioned previously, decision the Lisbon regarding is Treaty not the . Being so, it. Being in so, needs firstdemocratic underpinning, by national “provided the place 197 . How it did this? 43 198 . In order to see whether the 200 . This . CEU eTD Collection its decision’s last paragraph of point IV/2.3.2: “The constituent power complied the power with “The constituent IV/2.3.2: last of point paragraph its decision’s examination under the “Institutions” point of present thesis.) the for as well important be will conclusion (This is. legitimacy of “chain” the long traceable back to the ultimate source of of public power source ultimate the back to traceable be to framing is necessary fulfilled ittheir requirement have legitimacy to thedemocratic legitimacy democratic of basis the on solely exercised be shall power public that principlethe national by of interpreted sovereignty. is Thisprinciple courtasmeaningthe under law”. democratic the rule state 2 of Section of samearticle declares the “independent, is Hungary Hungarian an Articlethe constitution, Accordingthe 2Section to 1 of Union. legitimacy European the of democratic the clearly howitunderstands deducts is if arecaught.foundation a very of theproper interesting court Thecourt one the thoughts constitution too much transfer member states, arethe maindemocracy-holders sincethe Union: of future European the the of their power of a state” that to in analogy be shaped not, andneedto cannot, the EU would be unconstitutional under the German exists only exists only in States” Member the (parliamentary) democracy that “assuming further:went after court German constitutional Law Basic German the with is inconformity Lisbon Treaty the 207 206 205 204 203 202 201 strong enough still is activity EU’s the over control the since that found on later court The control. states Decisionof HCCthe 34. point IV/2.3.2 at fifthparagraph, 156, supra note note 156,at 34. supra paragraph, fourth IV/2.3.2 point HCC of the Decision See Jancic 339-341, supra note 154 at 33 agreeing with this finding. Decision of the GCC point 272. Jancic 340, supra note 154 at 33. Decision of the GCC point 272. See findings of the Hungarian constitutional court very similar to this under 5.2.2 Powers. The court’s idea about whether there is an untouched legitimacy-chain can be read in beread can islegitimacy-chain whether there an untouched idea about The court’s The view of the Hungarian constitutional court about the question of EU’s of question the democratic about court the constitutional The viewHungarian of 205 . 201 the necessary democratic foundation isby necessary foundation providedthe so democratic memberstates, the 203 , it stressed that “the democracy of the European Union European the “theof democracy stressed , itthat 44 207 . Accordingly, it does not matter how 204 202 . On the long run, it ruled on ruled it run, long the On . . Whatis important that the 206 . In order CEU eTD Collection 211 210 common”. Emphasis added by me, Miklos Klenanc. 209 208 subsidiarity uponthetransferimposed of by of EU-clause power the constitution the domestic law...” into integrated order legal of aCommunity theexistence recognised thus power “The constituent constitutional: constitution, of the EU-clause the according to statingthat, totheEUwith member states from the powers such a transfer (and Powers5.2.2 the product of the exercise from least of view. national the point of these made EUdemocratic, at power Hungarian the the constituent which itbeconcluded that can powers)decision:examine it not did but thelegitimacy-question, basically argues in amannerfrom can be question EU’s of democratic legitimacy. sticks The court to this its idea wholethrough itself legislator the theHungarian upon interpretation of constitutional the court decided in the that means This constitution.” the to 2/A Article the the to inserting by Union, accession European the preparing while … sovereignty national from origination of criterion sovereignty” such as to adversely affect the fundamental conditions of the exercise of national authorized powers by from Treaties assuming a orbeingimplemented in dimension a manner enough:“…the implementationsuffice ofthis preclude maynot principle any to of transfers exercising national sovereignty in areas or in a manner other than those provided for by the by for provided those than other manner in a or areas in sovereignty national exercising fundamental concerningconditions of the the Union powers European the transfer to Decisionof the FCC point 3,supra note 17, at36. Decisionof the FCC point 16,supra note 163, at 36. Article 88-1 of the 1958 French Constitution: „to exercise Decisionof FCCthe point 7,supra note 163, at 36. The French constitutional council starts its examination of newly conferred the its examination of starts council constitutional The French 210 211 . Still, constitutional the council is not of an opinion thisthat safeguardis . Because of this, the council hold that ”the clauses of the Treaty which 208 For thecouncil For safeguard of the restrictions the 45 some of their [the member states’] power in 209 is the principle of CEU eTD Collection 216 215 214 213 212 supranational institutions the by decision-making the to reference explicit contain not does constitution French in ArticleConstitution” referredTreaties 88-2requirearevision to the of commensurate with the extent and the importance of of power.” supranational importance and with the extent the commensurate not is legitimation democratic of level ifthe beunconstitutional may integration Increased transferred. powers sovereign of the in theexercise independence of political andthe degree totheUnion aretransferred which responsibilities theextent sovereign on to of depend Union European the procedures and decision-making the structure organisational clear that made it court The conferral. of the boundaries isthe „the puton emphasis where perspective the constitutional requirementsprocess of EU-legislation. complete the over control of means effective with governments national the providing placed byby deficit democratic preparatory/drafting eliminate the theneed to myfindingsasto with the principle forcontrol a general governmentto the inis possibility line decision-makingthe inEU; this of democracy on the before mentioned asIalready one: is important an It conclusion? not. Still, there can be found one (although quite unclear) “handhold”: “if however, the however, “if “handhold”: unclear) quite (although one found be can there Still, not. or is satisfactory democracy if EU’s check the it will how point reference particular give any the conferral is unconstitutional powers, these exercise Union the have to enough not is legitimacy democratic EU’s of level present the that member states the to related strongly areso if they powers: these of substance be from the checked against always should states transferring member newpowers the of constitutionality the and competences, limited only Union exercise can court the the Jancic 356, supra note 154 at 33. Decision of the GCC point 262. Grossmansugests similarily, see Grossman viiii, supra note 106, at 23. France. See5.1.1 Decisionof the FCC point 3,supra note 15, at36. The German constitutional court approached the examination of power-transfer from power-transfer of examination the approached court constitutional German The 214 . Accordingly for the constitutional council it is important to have to important is it council constitutional the for Accordingly . 216 . The problem with reasoningthis is courtdid thatthe not 46 213 , the EU-clause of the 215 212 According to . What is the What . CEU eTD Collection 222 221 220 Treaty of Lisbon) alkotmányosságáról (The judgment oftheConstitutional Courtthe constitutionality on of the act promulgating supranational cooperation in form of of their sovereignty part share they will agreed that who states, sovereign between agreement international bymeansof conducted Lisbon reform was the that Lisbon didnot establish a super-state” European power-transfer Lisbon Treaty’s of analysis 219 218 217 possibility control to Union’sthe activity have ofmember the states is while governments problematic the not power-transfer the it that declares democratic deficit): is a concluding there preparatory/drafting not that (although Union decision-making inthe governmental process complete the through control underpinningmy for findings from and chapter previous regarding theimportance of explicitly (but just in general terms) with new powers of the EU contains an important where underpinning of member is democratic the states dominant. situation, present the to contrary legitimation, democratic of source aprimary which provides ithappen benecessaryto have would acompletely institutional changed setting forEU, the make Union for maynot tothe it this transferred a federal powers concluded to the state; that a to federal state…” threshold werecrossed Fordeteiled analysis see 5.2.3 Institutions. Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.5second paragraph, supra note 156, at34. Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.5second paragraph, supra note 156, at34. Agoston Mohay, Agoston Jancic 356, supra note 154 at 33. Decision of the GCC point 263. The Hungarian constitutional court did not perform a particular constitutionality particular a perform not did court constitutional Hungarian The 3K ÖZJOGI Az Alkotmánybíróság döntése a Lisszaboni Szerz S ZEMLE 221 . Still, last the of sentence only the one paragraph dealing 64(2010). 222 . 219 47 217 . What is more, it declared: “…the Treaty of Treaty “…the it declared: ismore, . What According tothis halfsentence itcan be 220 . For the court it was enough to conclude 218 Ę dést kihirdet Ę törvény CEU eTD Collection went further on saying that the German parliament has to “retain a formative influence on the on influence formative a “retain to has parliament German the that saying on further went able to uniformly represent the will of people” the of uniformly will represent the able to body hascomebeingwhich into byequal election all citizens ofthe of and is Union which stated It Unioninstitutional“the lacks that setup. European …apoliticaldecision-making 223 entire the over control governmental have to importance the of concept my strengthens explicitly I find the possible.beforeis not deficit foundation exist, democratic this democratic people).If (the sovereign cited unbroken chain of democratic legitimacy should existbetween them and the national statementan that namely institutions, EU’s of foundation democratic the to as court Hungarian of the French sentence theFrench council implicitly agrees with constitutional findingsthe of the constitutional half- this With issueas well. views deficit but my modifieddemocratic of regarding power, in regarding chapter, Iintroduced perspective outsourcing the previous of governmental council … require a revision of Constitution”.the Thisis avery findingimportant from tothe be sovereignty national of one emanation an not is which Parliament, European which the on power taking decision- “[rules which confer] supranationals: tothose in contrast ones intergovernmental EUarethe of the institutions legitimized democratically the isconcerned, France as far as that, says basically council the decision its of 20 point In closely. more inspected be should which decision the of point important one is there Still, Union. the of functioning and of EU’s institution. The constitutional wasmostlyreview regarding conducted the powers Institutions5.2.3 Decision of the GCC point 267. legislative procedure in the EU in order to avoid democratic deficit. The German constitutional court is very harsh in its evaluation of the EU’s the of evaluation its in harsh very is court constitutional German The The French constitutional council did not put particular emphasis on the examination the on emphasis particular put not did council constitutional French The 48 223 . In line with this statement the court CEU eTD Collection an uninterrupted chainan powerexerciseduninterrupted of democratic underpinning. The (state) by the institutions should have democratic legitimacy, by provided national the institution through note 219, at 47. at 219, note 229 228 decisionof German the Constituional Court: Boom 223,supra note 78, at17. 227 226 225 224 sovereignty national to related closely tasks the of majority perform the to able arestill whether they itdidWhat isinstead theexamination of some of in institutions national tocheckthe order very drafting/preparatory the regarding deficitclearly. my itconcerns emphasized Ifind that deficit, democratic from an alarming suffers process Although the German courtunderpinning, especially having regardtothe similarities in Hungarianjudgmentthe as well. did not find thatprocess under the Lisbon of Treaty EU-lawmaking, memberstate-provided) having the whole necessity control during thus democratic (and of the decision-makingword the same as the one of the Hungarian constitutional court. For my findings regardingthe the beforedecision-making procedures” cited standpointinfluence“in onEuropean by exertadecisive or aposition havingto the government ofBundestag “[retaining] responsibilitiesimportance” ofsubstantial and competence political the Germanpolitical development[s]” court is a strong (EU-) clause of clause of constitution. the (EU-) relevant the with complies it since unconstitutional, not is Treaty Lisbon the accordingly extent” “necessary the only to institutions EU’s the to aretransferred competences This is very much emphasized in the separate opinion of Dr. Trócsányi László. See as well Mohay 64, supra 64, Mohay well See as László. Trócsányi of Dr. opinion separate inthe emphasized much very is This Article 2/A of the Hungarian Constitution. Decisionof HCC the IV/2.3 point and further, supra note 156,See at34.. similar reasoning in Maastricht- the Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.4.6, supra note 156, at 34. Jancic 360, supra note 154 at 33. Decision of the GCC point 246. As I stated before, according to the Hungarian constitutional court the EU’s the court constitutional Hungarian the to according before, stated As I The Hungarian constitutional court did not perform an analysis of the EU-institutions. the of analysis an perform not did court constitutional Hungarian The 227 . It can be read out from the decision that if this is still the case (i.e. if national 224 . Ithighlighted that can this be secured either byhaving the 226 . Thisleast reasoningits (at second is part) almost word-by- 229 49 228 ) than 225 CEU eTD Collection governmental isgovernmental control provided. whyit and possibility givebelievedthe effective reasons substantial appropriate that of governmental aswell draftingcontrol the process (in of recognize theimportance issuethe wheninthe possibility highlighted the reasoning of outsourcing andgovernmental of power thedemocratic preparatory it deficit, although did of sovereignty state)…” independence, the legal order does notempty (even after the Lisbon Treaty) the constitutional rules ensuring the (union’s) “… community’s the sovereignty, of their part decisive retain the member states states are still able to govern and control its [EU’s] activity” rights-enforcement” and legislative process for are guaranteed safeguards contentual and procedural institutional, legitimacy base of the democratic on power public the exercise institutions these that necessary constitutionis it not enough haveinstitutions specifically to with competences,itprovided is 236 34. at 156, note 235 234 233 232 231 French Constitutional Council underof the point 5.2.5 National opinion parliament. contrary the and this of analysis See parliament. national to powers new confers Treaty Lisbon the that accept to court the for aproblem not is it on further constitution, the in limited are parliament Hungarian 230 in constitution the specific competence-rules having only with aswell their powers can of organs exercise and state the parliament other national institutions (having the parliament on the top of the system) is not absolute: the See Decisionof HCC the point IV/2.3.2 fourth paragraph,supra note 156, at34. HCCJ Concurring point judgment of TrócsányiDr. László,seventh paragraph,Decision of HCC, suprathe Decisionof HCCthe 34. point IV/2.5second at paragraph, 156, supra note note 156, at34. supra paragraph, fourth IV/2.3.2 point HCC of the Decision 34. at 156, note supra paragraph, fourth IV/2.3.2 point HCC of the Decision Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.3.2 third paragraph, supra note 156,at34. ofthe competences that says Court Constitutional Hungarian the here although that issue interesting an is It It can be seen that the Hungarian court did not share my conclusions regarding the share regarding didmy not court conclusions Hungarian can the It seenthat be 232 . The concludedcourt thatthis isdemocratic foundation if“the provided 233 . These safeguards are present since “the governments of of memberthe since“the. These governments arepresent safeguards 235 230 50 limiting them 236 ). Still, in my view, the court did not did court the view, my in Still, ). 234 231 . Being this the situation the situation the this Being . . But under Article 2. of the CEU eTD Collection 241 240 239 clearly been more difficult to accommodate to some of France’s institutional and political features…” 238 237 influence in process government’s decision-making the and parliament’s German of loss the by much very is concerned it that emphasized one-by-one.isimportant Muchmore the of overall picture judgment:the the court deal practical itsof analysiswould forbe purpose separately, the presentfindings to not with with the novelties (e.g. the bridging clauses, the flexibility clause, etc.) very much in detail. It in process. drafting the andbe achieved thiscan onlyif areof enoughthey capable control exercising strong already shouldhave a constant possibility beingof able todecisively influence thelegislative process, making role of as“absolute masters” decision- important the of reasoninggovernments equally the having governmentsasfinalimplicitly it But incorporatedis indecision-makers. the constitution the of revision (which is highly valued by council),the rulesmaking and thesechanges possible require against sovereignty-principle the itgoes adecision” than tooppose … power France of national be masters of the to ifgovernments process is“depriving decision-making,the the importancethe involvementof governmental and voting. in regarding thechanges qualifiedmajority Thecouncilemphasized verymuch indidin the Union. It regarding respects: so two manners the “new ofexercising powers” Legislativeprocess5.2.4 Council in or by Council the required clausesfor bridging the amendment the of the Jancic 363, supra note supra note 154 at 33. Decisionof the FCC point 19and 23,supra note 163, at36. Decisionof the FCC point 20,supra note 163, at 36. See Grossmanviiii, supra 36. at note 106, 163, at23. note “The more supranationalsupra elements20-22., inpoints European for integrationsubtitle have FCC of the Decision The German constitutional court dealt with the legislative process, and in particularly in and process, legislative the with dealt court constitutional German The decision-making regarding rules the scrutinize did council constitutional French The 240 . This implicit conclusion could lead as to an other one: that the governments the that one: other an to as lead could conclusion implicit This . 239 . Explicitly . Explicitly councildoes talk importance the of about the only 51 238 : if there is no absolute possibility for the for possibility absolute no is if there : 241 . “The in unanimity the European 237 CEU eTD Collection supra note219, at 47. 243 242 Union. in atwork as safeguards of democracy basically legislativethe procedures introduced newly the sees it that is concluded briefly very it What specifically. ones introduced newly the with nor terms in general process legislative EU’s with neither substantially deal not deficit. itis here preparatory/drafting the process: as tothe of outcome the effectively control the preparatory phase of decision-making, there is a substantial uncertainty to possibility loose the member states of representatives Since the power. governmental examplegood my strengthens arguments regarding that the unwantedoutsourcing of futureis cases.” for waived thereby Council or in the Council to what extent the Member States’ possibility vetoof in the Council sufficiently is procedural a sufficientprovisions not for guarantee this becauseitmay not always be ascertainable for the representatives of the Member States in the European of of itself.being to them legislative related the process issues, non received petition concerningparticular Lisbon court the Hungarian while Treaty, uponfrom the presidentregardingof the constitutionality referral worked a general the council constitutional French the examinations: their conducted courts two the basis which The for reason underlying thisinmyopinion difference befoundifcan considerson one procedures. newlyintroduced the especially examinedquite indetail contrary council the on that French The consider sovereignty-issues. on effect canhavefundamental not legislative procedures the did it that seems it sovereignty, national the council: constitutional French Decision of the HCC point IV/2.5 fourth paragraph, supra note 156, at 34. See Mohay agreeing, Mohay 64, Mohay agreeing, Mohay See 34. at 156, note supra paragraph, fourth IV/2.5 point HCC of the Decision Decision of the GCC point 318. 243 Just as regarding the newly transferred powers, the Hungarian constitutional court did court Hungarian the constitutional powers, Just asregardingnewly the transferred Although the Hungarian court had the same starting point for its examination as the as examination its for point starting same the had court Hungarian the Although 242 Ifind this quotation from the German judgment tobe a 52 CEU eTD Collection constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/2004_505dc.pdf point 33. Constitutionfor Europe, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- 247 246 245 244 DC of November 19 neitherin in particularthe decision, nor decisionthe of constitutional the n° council 2004-505 found, be hardly can reasoning The Constitution”. the of revision a requires … Treaties the of revision simplifies of aprocedure of implementation the oppose “to parliament French Constitution” the of provisions current of the maybe within framework the such prerogatives exercised decidenecessary whether to powers of much not evident such that a role be could performed automatically.listingAfter thenew nationaldecision-making EU’s the to push a democratic give parliaments should legislators national of involvement the that is argued it Although heading. separate a under role strengthened their with under deals decision council’s constitutional French The the Lisbon respected) was rule the subsidiarity whether for checking mechanism (for example process Treaty, integrationthe under(possibility oppose simplified the to and legislative revision procedure) the council states National5.2.5 that parliaments “it is sovereignty” national of inherent exercise tothe “matter[s] with theprocedure of relation close the with much very concerned was council the that out be read can it Still to. refers original the point 27 andpointis 29arereadagainst each other,theresult that simplified the procedure revision requires a revision of Constitution”.the Hereonecanfindif adiscrepancy: findings under of… treaties procedure revision “simplified that the states thecouncil as well judgment Decisionof French Constitutionalthe Council n°2004-505 DC –November19 Decisionof the FCC point 28,supra note 163, at 36. Id. C RAIG The Lisbon Treaty reinforced the role and power of the national parliaments both in both of parliaments national the power and role the reinforced The Lisbon Treaty Nevertheless, the above conclusions are not consistent ones. In point 27 of the of 27 point In ones. consistent not are conclusions above the Nevertheless, 33-47., supra 33-47., supra note 120, at26. 247 . th 2004 pertaining to the “Treaty the 2004pertaining to forestablishing aConstitution Europe” 246 . The conclusion is that the competence of the 53 245 , it seems that for the council it is very it council for the it that , seems th 2004, Treatyestablishing a 244 . CEU eTD Collection 253 252 251 legitimacy. 250 largely to the Government…” See Grossman xi, supra note 106, at 23. 249 248 point of an interweaved democratic system” ones secondary are Parliament) European primaryimportant, one, and all ways of other providingby democratic underpinning (e.g. the most is the parliaments national by the provided legitimacy opinion court’s German the to German Bundestag in particular) are of much importance. As I showed previously, according power constituent very the the instance: basic role plus”-giver “democratic exercise a can not state French of the institutions the interpretation, IV Title under listed are competences its powers: haslimited parliament the constitution French the bearinmind thatunder to have one parliament French the of powers the regarding council constitutional French the of parliamentgain Of power. afinalcourse shouldremark bemade: when assessing the findings national the because necessary is revision hand other the on and power lose treaties) the ratify normally (whoshould legislators national the because revision needconstitutional once the Hungarianthe (discussedin followings)court constitutional is the it ultimate notthe and only European forParliamentas EU-institution this compensating having the of without in implementedby Treaty Lisbon loose the course reforms the power they that is criticized it moreover contested, arenot parliaments national the of new powers such awonder Decision of the GCC point 293. Decision of the GCC point 277. Jancic 356, supra note 154 at 33. Check my findings regarding Hungary Articleand 2/Aof the Hungarian Constitution under5.2.1 Democratic Anyhow, under the French constitutional setting „French Members of Parliament … leave EU policy-making 1958 French Constitution. per se To summarizementioned: council’s tothe constitutional To according above the For the German constitutional court the national parliaments (and of course the course of (and parliaments national the court constitutional German the For . For thisis. For it necessary have to the enablingprovisions of constitution,the and at 249 . 248 . Knowing this the findings of the council are not are council the of findings the this Knowing . 251 252 . The German parliamentis viewed as “the focal 250 54 . In the judgment, unlike in the French one, the . 253 . Contrary to the findings the . Contrary of to CEU eTD Collection 259 258 257 256 255 254 forming” permitted inits “aprocess Although entirety. different opinion-political court the of shaping decision-making the control to able be should states member that emphasizes it deficit: courtisthe animportant one in my connection findingsto own regarding the issueof drafting legislative process the during position government’s German the influence control and means to has effective the theBundestag that It isimportant in EU. equally the decision-making the cases in some disrupt can parliament national one even whether question that the Hungarian legislator should be that particular one. shouldparticular be that legislator Hungarian that the it amustis not decision-making, the veto can basically “evenparliament national that one” faris as constitutional Hungarian the court concerned is is it enough there that thepossibility national parliaments areenoughtohinder decision-making the process” the of of one even …where objections spheres “there are statement: aninteresting gives constitution Hungarian the of EU-clause the to according extent”, “necessary to the just exercised are powers its transferred check whether to able becomes for processes Hungarian newlythe the introduced Parliament provide asafeguard circle wider in a parliaments national the for intervention of possibility worthy of being more isissue. court argumentof Still,the the about paragraphs the areonly judgmenttwo there closelyshort) that (not its In courts. German and French the than examined. differently much very parliaments After stating that the Lisbon national the scrutinized against standpoints. Treaty secured the Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.5fourth paragraph, supra note 156,at 34. Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.5fourth paragraph, supra note 156,at 34. Mohay 64, supra note 219, at47. Decisionof HCCthe point IV/2.5 third paragraph, supra note 156, at 34. Decision of the GCC point 219. Decision of the GCC point 246. The Hungarian constitutional court valued the increased importance of national of importance increased the valued court constitutional Hungarian The 255 in is EU,thethe outcome ifitdemocratic enough has beenonly previously 55 258 . But further courtthe . But on 256 259 254 , it concludes that itconcludes , . It seems that as that . Itseems . This finding of 257 : it : CEU eTD Collection to make the Treaty of Lisbon unconditionally unconstitutional. unconditionally Lisbon of Treaty the make to bedangerous that to deficit democratic find notpresent the they did that fact is pure lies the Where difference the hypothesis. my theoretical accommodating of capable are absolutely much relevanthighly Inmy by findings conclusions) are emphasized viewtheir courts. the very two out point to (just process decision-making entire the control to possibility their and member of of states role importance the “democracy-giver” The of decisions. the context the to much very fit my findings powers, governmental of outsourcing unwanted called I by partially caused what be to present, naming deficit apreparatory/drafting previously, main present chapter. similarities can be mostly observed, to comparativethanks the constitutional method Iusedin remarkable) (sometimes certain Still, deficit. democratic of issue global the towards hasapproach a different each itcourt can be judgments that constitutional court concluded ofthe comparison 5.3 Summary Democratic legitimacy Powers In the following table I indicate my findings in an easily reviewable manner. reviewable easily in an findings my indicate I table following the In did I as conclusions same the to came explicitly courts the of none Although constitutional thetree comparatively analyzing After carefully examining, reviewing, for the government to government the for necessary democratic necessary control the decision- the control making in the EU is EU in the making underpinning of underpinning of the have provide to the general possibility institutions of the of institutions French French Republic European European Union the highestthe necessary France 56 Union is provided by and the EU itself can between the possible the between and the present level present the and never be democratic never of democracy in the conferral of powers the memberstated, the there iscorrelation there foundation of the the democratic the Germany enough Union constitution made the made constitution power-transfer is not the EU-clause of the member states have states member control the Union’s the control EU democratic for unbroken unbroken chain of problematic if the problematic Hungary through the possibility to governments of democratic legitimacy Hungary activity CEU eTD Collection Legislative process parliaments Institutions National the institutions of the of institutions the deprive France of its France of deprive the decision-makingthe French state can not can state French “democratic plus”- “democratic institutions are the power to oppose a intergovernmental process may not process giver role legitimized EU- legitimized democratically exercise a exercise decision ones per se 57 “in a position to exert effective control over control effective EU-decision making EU-decision outcomes have tobe the decision-making the ones which exercise which ones a decisive influence federal federal government constantly have the have constantly scrutinized against member states as member states Bundestag orthe it is necessary is itnecessary to decision-making it is necessary is itnecessary to have either the either have on European on procedures” the national the standpoints previously which have to be able to have which viewed assafeguards national parliaments’ national national institutions, national to veto the decision- the veto to of EU-democracy at of EU-democracy them power them has the role is viewed as a safeguard, so it is enough if any of it deals with the “to govern and govern “to procedures are control [EU’s] control the Lisbon- the introduced activity” making work CEU eTD Collection theoretical findings can fit in the context of the legal debate about the democratic deficit. For deficit. democratic the about legal debate of the in thecontext fit can findings theoretical if my dowas tomakesure to I aimedWhat research. aseparate for is a ittopic in practice; by cured Treaty. Lisbon the is deficit preparatory the nor outsourcing unwanted the neither literature, much the of and governmental powers. Ias showed by examining the relevant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty making, they decision- the of phase loose preparatory the influence and somecontrol effectively to in position of not their competences, which are governments) their (and particularly states member while the on Further is present. deficit I named as unwanted outsourcing monopoly inof drafting maintain power Union the I apreparatory/draftingthat democratic of and that b) it is the Commission that lacks the necessary legitimacy. Since it has the memberfunction of states the is democracy-giver the securedthrough democratic foundation Council’sa) the that thedebateIargue of center the body to main decision-making the an importantquestion examined isnotthat heavily instead enough: of theputting Council as is there that showed setting legal the of examination the and arguments different of analysis The close force. into came Lisbon Treaty the andafter before foundations, their democratic problem invokingand EU-institutions all of relevantthe decision-makingthe Itested process judgments of French, German and Hungarian constitutional courts. related of the analysis did acomparative I aswell, in terms issue practical of the context and fit they tothe that beifcan make able myfindingsarecorrect to sure to topic.order In this byLisbon Treaty impacton introduced it,localizing hadthereforms what see, after My goal was not to see how the unwanted outsourcing of governmental powers works themy viewpoint legal narrow of scope of research After the decidingto the to In presentcritically thesis issueI tried to approach the of democratic deficit, andto Conclusion 58 CEU eTD Collection 260 thesis reached its aim and the work I put intoit was not useless. my decisions,mentioned before court the examining approach while use the comparative of and if I made easier future research by introducing new terms andframework, as well as with court judgments underpin my hypothesis. a broaderpicture into aspects different these comes daylight: by method outto constitutional composing heavily usingthecomparative of success iswhere the This findings. my of aspects theoretical (different) some localized angels andviews, varying them each they of from different with problem the approach judgments: although court constitutional these of context inthe canbewellplaced powers governmental of outsourcing unwanted the of and deficit preparatory/drafting of concept the both that showed I Treaty. Lisbon of the of acceptance occasion issuethe on this regarding judgments and comparing the findings of French, German and Hungarian constitutional court the examining the with proceeded I literature in the contested is Union the of legitimacy localizing of the Afteron points comparison basis of democratic the checking where analysis. for the one good methodasseemingly constitutional thecomparative this Ichose For this purpose I use a comparative table, see 5.3 Summary of the comparison, at 56-57. If I was able to provide some new perspectives regarding the democratic deficit issueprovideIf regarding democratic the deficitsome newperspectives I wasableto 260 59 it can be said that the analyzed constitutional analyzed the that be said can it CEU eTD Collection Books: x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x A D A N T THE C (Cambridge University Press, 2010). J eds., Oxford University Press, 2 T ?) GUIDE TO THE TO GUIDE GovernmentNational Forum Publication on A Europe, Ireland,Office, Center, 1990). D D 2007). H DEFICIT Human andRights 1996-97Intergovernmental the Conference, T THE OF REFORM Z Koenig-Archibugi Blackwell,eds., 2005). G B M S C F DEFICIT DEMOCRATIC B Oxford University 2008). Press, P University Press, 2010). P (3 M Cambridgeed., University Press, 2010). E L L L G EAN RANCE AND THE YLVIA AUL AUL OLTAN ISBON ASZLO EGITIMACY OF AMARA HE UROPEAN IVIL RITAIN TO REDRESS ONSTITUTION ILL N MIALKOTMÁNYUNK AVID ATIONAL AVID AVID ANDBOOK OF LOBAL OVERNANCE AND THE AND OVERNANCE rd ICHAEL ICHELLE ed., Oxford ed., University 2010). Press, E D I -C VALUATION OF NSTITUTIONS OFTHE C EMOCRATIC S N C M W : OCIETY LAUDE . RAIG M H EWTON RAIG B W D H ARQUAND ARD T ARGREAVES ARTIN G LUTMAN EMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY ANDTHE H C HAT THE HAT L ORVATH AKACS OVERNANCE AND U ESELTINE EVEL INI , & NION LAW , T T (Emiliano Grossman ed., Routledge, 2008). 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Robert Michael Michael Keating, Europe 16 C Jancic, Davor OURNAL OURNAL OF OREIGN HILOSOPHY URRENT RITISH NTHROPOLOGY RGANIZATION L AW AND OLUMBIA 29 (1) P OVERNMENT AND J P OURNAL OF O A OLICY A Decade of Europe? Some Reflections on an Aspiration onan Europe? SomeReflections of A Decade F NTHROPOLOGY 357(1997). E 46 (2)A P S THE AREA OFFREEDOM Toward anAnthropologyofDemocracy Toward UROPEAN UBLIC Caveats from Karlsruhe Lisbon? andBerlin:WhitherCaveats DemocracyAfter from OCIETY J The Community IsWorking OURNAL OF The InstitutionalDesignDemocratic ofEMU:A Deficit? 1 (2009). UBLIUS When “the Logic of Capital When “theLogicofIs the RealWhichLurks inthe A Love-Hate Relationship: France andEuropean Law A Love-HateRelationship: 469(2002). The PoliticalSustainability MonetaryUnion ofEuropean 82(1998). 16 (4)L The FrenchException Constitutional courts and the Lisbon Treaty. The future basedConstitutional Treaty. on courtsandtheLisbon Thefuture Asymmetrical Government: MultinationalStatesin an Integrating Az AlkotmánybíróságdöntéseaLisszaboni Szerz 14C States Are Not People: Harold LaskionUnsetting Sovereignty, P In Defence of the ’Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy the ’Democratic of Deficit’: In Defence P Democracy, Subsidiarity, and CitizenshipDemocracy, Subsidiarity, and inthe‘European MERICAN 236 (2003). OLICY Jurisprudential Dilemmas of European Law Jurisprudential DilemmasofEuropean The TreatyofLisbon and its Impact onthe European Union’s OLITICAL International Institutions:Can Interdependence Work? 40(4)J 71 (1999). The Democracy andMass Deficit Support an EU-Wide for L OLUMBIA The Democratic Deficit of theEuropeanUnion: Towards AW AND AW O 58 (4) P 58(4) 621(2006). Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism E PPOSITION 107(1998). UROPEAN 171(2010). 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(2002)(unpublished thesis,University)European Central European the Community.in ThereStill Deficit European the a Democratic Is of Framework in Institutional the Parliament European the Place of Balan, Veaceslav 29.5.1974 Decision of BVerfG, GermanFederal the Court Constitutional 2BvL 52/71 vom http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 Decisionop7=and&f=G of &d=AHAW&op8=and&l=20&u=/netahtml/ahawuj/ahawkere.htm&p=1&op11=and& the German&s7=&s8=&s9=&s10=&s11=Dr&r=1&SECT5=AHAWKERE&op9=and&op10=and http://isz.mkab.hu/netacgi/ahawkere2009.pl?s1=119/2010&s2=&s3=&s4=&s5=&s6= Federal(VII. 14.)AB 143/2010. határozat, Decision of Court Constitutional Hungarian the Constitutionalconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/2004_505dc.pdf 2004, Treaty aConstitution for http://www.conseil-establishing Europe, Decision of French the Constitutional Council n°2004-505DC – November19 Courtconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/a2007560dc.pdf http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- BVerfG, Community, European the establishing 2007,2 BvE Decision Treaty ConstitutionalCounciln° –December20 French the of 2/082007-560 DC vom of Lisbon amendinghttp://www.mkab.hu/index.php?id=act_on_the_constitutional_court the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty H http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm 1067 G constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/en_ordinance_58_1067.pdf F constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constitution_anglais.pdf constitutionnel.fr/conseil- F https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf B http://www.mkab.hu/index.php?id=constitution A U C lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML C http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML ESTABLISHING THE ESTABLISHING T RENCH RENCH REATY OF ASIC ONSOLIDATED VERSION OFTHE ONSOLIDATED VERSION OFTHE CT UNGARIAN ERMAN NION OF XX , http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML L I AW FORTHE OF NSTITUTIONAL L C AW ON THE ON AW L 7 ONSTITUTION OF ISBON AMENDING THE TH A 1949 CT N E OVEMBER ON THE UROPEAN XXXII A F F CT ON THE EDERAL EDERAL OF C 1958, C OMMUNITY ONSTITUTION OF THE T REATY ONTHE T C 4 R 1989 TH 63 REATY ON ONSTITUTIONAL C T EPUBLIC OF ONSTITUTIONAL REATY ON http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- ON THE ON O , SIGNED AT CTOBER E UROPEAN F UNCTIONING OF THE E G UROPEAN C ERMANY L C 1958, OURT ISBON C OUNCIL R ONSTITUTIONAL U EPUBLIC OF NION AND THE AND NION (12 , (23 13 , - 421), http://www.conseil- U O TH NION D RDINANCE Nº rd ECEMBER M May1949), ARCH , http://eur- E H UROPEAN UNGARY T C REATY 1951), OURT 2007, 58- th th , , CEU eTD Collection Personal papers: Online sources: x x x x x x x thesis, Central European University) Central thesis, European for committee” (2009)(unpublished healthcare sciences, genomicsbiotechnology and the Case “LifeGeanina Turcanu,Whoguards guardian’s guardian? Gabriela Study: (unpublished thesis, University College Dublin) (1998) Oireachtas the to reference particular with perspective parliamentary Keith University) Central thesis, European MichaelDocumentsAccess (2009)(unpublished Stefan Law. to in Mayr,EC Transparency DaraUniversity) Purcell,Stronger voice of (2007) interest groups diffuse (unpublished thesis, Central European Commission: for European the actors asimportant groups Kafkova, Interest Tamara The as a Powerful Myth? (2006) (unpublished thesis, European Central University) democratic Union. in Deficit Democratic Jancarik, European the Peter Democracy Understanding deficit in the European Union: the Kingdom”, Separation Course,of DecemberPowers 2010. “Powers of the Parliamentary Opposition – a Problem Analysis: Hungary and United on 10 http://www.federalunion.org.uk/the-first-use-of-the-term-democratic-deficitAccessed th March 2011. 64