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Brexit: the Glaring Adoption of Populism in Europe Keely Eshenbaugh, Phd Candidate University of Nevada, Reno Abstract

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Brexit: the Glaring Adoption of Populism in Europe Keely Eshenbaugh, Phd Candidate University of Nevada, Reno Abstract Brexit: The Glaring Adoption of Populism in Europe Keely Eshenbaugh, PhD Candidate University of Nevada, Reno Abstract The rejection of elites and spread of right-wing populism is a threat to democracy. This chapter will discuss Brexit, the UK’s referendum that terminated their EU membership, to demonstrate how narratives of institutional arrangements, policy transparency, and the dismissal of elites have captured the attention of labor and business organizations in the UK. In order to discuss the dangers that Brexit poses to democracy, it is first important to understand who the elites are and why the public is critical of elites in populist social movements. Elites: A Group Defined by Power Political elites have been defined broadly as people “at or near the top of the pyramid of national power” (Putnam, 1976). While scholars have argued more specific definitions of the characteristics and goals of elites, all definitions include the criteria that political elites are individuals that have the means and ability to influence national politics by being close to the top. Embodying Meisel’s ‘three C’s’ – cohesion, consciousness, and conspiracy – many believe that elites and elite theories must be centered around a small group of individuals that run everything seamlessly (Meisel, 1964). However, there are no defining characteristics of elites embedded in Meisel’s C’s that stipulate cohesion can only come from a group of ten or less or that perfect cohesion is a goal of elites. Similarly, a definition that elites are “the leadership [of a body politics] and the social formations from which leaders typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a given generation” loses validity by adding social approval to the requirements of elites (Lasswell, Lerner, & Rothwell, 1952). As Putnam suggests, the 1 importance of size, composition, and autonomy should be left for empirical studies of elite theory. As power is central to the influence and importance of elites, there are two categories of power that can be distinguished: first is the power to influence individuals over other individuals and second is the ability to influence decision making (Dahl, 1968). While these two forms of power can reinforce and strengthen one another, political power dominantly comes from the second form of power, influencing decisions (Putnam, 1976). Steven Lukes’ first face of power, the open face, emphasizes transparency and obvious deliberation in the decision making process, contributing to Dahl’s assertion (Lukes, 1974). As the first face is commonly thought of as having a democratic nature, the second face of agenda setting (to allow or ban policies from the agenda) and third phase, insidious manipulation, are commonly used by elites in more discrete settings. For example, the political power of the senior population less commonly refers to the ability of the older generation to influence the younger generation and more commonly refers to the older generation’s ability to secure favorable retirement policy like Social Security. Studying how the elite wield their power using direct and/or indirect influence is an area of the study of elite theory that should take the number of actors, environment, public opinion, anticipated reactions and more into consideration (Friedrich, 1937). Classic elitists Mosca, Pareto, and Michels share five principle assumptions about elites. First, political power is distributed unequally. Those with the “highest indices in their branch of activity” are referred to as the elite who can be governing or non-governing (Pareto, 1966). The governing elite are active in and have the ability to influence political life while the non- governing elite does not have a significant role. Pareto does not expand on the relationship between these two classes of elites, but simply identifies there is a difference. Second, all 2 individuals can be classified dichotomously as those with significant political power and those without (Pareto, 1966). Third, elites are not only isolated individuals, but they know one another and operate in a makeshift exclusionary club (Meisel, 1964). Elites generally share backgrounds with similar interests, education, wealth, and maybe even familial pedigrees. Fourth, successful elites are chosen from pools of other elites. Fifth, because elites are self-perpetuating, they are essentially autonomous and do not have to answer to anyone outside of the group (Mosca, 1939). Dominating the masses, classic elite theorists believe that elites are isolated from the rest of society, are chosen from within their own ranks, and only serve the interests of other elites as an “iron law” (Michels, 1959). But why do we see that the political elites vary from one country to another? Mosca answers, “the varying structure of ruling classes [elites] has a preponderant importance in determining the political type, and also the level of civilization of the different peoples’”, such as in feudal societies where elites have military valor while modern bureaucratic elites have wealth (Mosca, 1939). Starting in the twentieth century, scholars have been trying to identify a typology that elites in particular regime types, regions, and development of political-economic structures can be categorized into. The ‘Western’ elites and ‘Soviet’ elites were proposed, but missed the nuances between Western states as well as non-Western and non-Communistic elites (Aron, 1950). Authoritarian, totalitarian, cartel, and liberal elites were also outlined as a possible typology, shining light on the absence of a liberal elite that could have rescued Germany during World War II (Dahrendorf, 1967). Robert Putnam later added consensual, competitive, and coalescent “types'' that respectively related policy choices and political procedures to communist, stable democratic, and multi-ethic democratic regimes ( Putnam, 1976; Burton & Higley, 2001). Other categories of elites have been posed more recently, but none of them have found popular 3 acceptance in the field. The role of the elites has changed dramatically as societies become more politically complex; making it more challenging to separate the general social structure from elite activities. This complication has challenged many of the elite theories that have been observed in the 20th century (Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 2009). Internal Splintering Bordering the literature on coalition characteristics and social networks, elite groups vary in their internal differentiation and integration. Differentiation is a process where groups of elites become more specialized in their offerings, diverse in their organizational structure, and numerous (Keller, 1979). Integration includes the internal unity or structure of the elite group itself; similar to Meisel’s ‘three C’s’ ( Putnam, 1976; Meisel, 1964). In this sense, four subtypes of elites can be assumed: strong integration with wide differentiation, strong integration with narrow differentiation, weak integration and wide differentiation, and weak integration with narrow differentiation (Burton & Higley, 2001). Strong integration with wide differentiation, or the consensual elite, has a lot of elites that are locked into a network that operates in many sectors. The group recognizes one another as legitimate elites and provides connections and access to central decision-makers. The idiocratic elite, strong integration with narrow differentiation, is very centralized with an elite group that pledges allegiance to the mission of their monopolistic movement. With weak integration and wide differentiation, the fragmented elite often disagree with one another’s goals but find security in pluralism. Lastly, the divided elites have weak integration and narrow differentiation. The divided elites seek to destroy the other camp by any means possible to ensure their power continues to dominate the arena. Recognizing different structures of power, wide differentiation supports a more representative regime type where elite groups take turns dominating. Similarly, 4 strong elite integration creates a stable environment for politics to operate in. Burton and Higley map these regime traits onto the four types of political elites, creating the table below (Burton & Higley, 2001). Table A: Political Elites and Regime Type (Taken from Burton & Higley, 2001) Elite Integration Strong Weak “Consensual elite” “Fragmented elite” Wide Stable Unstable Representative Regime Representative Regime Elite Differentiation “Ideocratic elite” “Divided elite” Narrow Stable Stable Unrepresentative Regime Unrepresentative Regime This typology was designed to help with the lack of empirical studies about elites and elite control. Being able to identify an elite is not possible by only looking at top position-holders in large organizations or corporations. Some CEOs may have a lot of wealth and influence in their sphere, but do not translate it into political power. Others may not be the President of a large organization, but have connections to make critical phone calls to influence policy. Organizational-positional identification of elites is complex, but can become easier with the use of interviews, informants, network analyses, and snowball sampling (Burton & Higley, 2001). Discerning boundaries is another conflict of uncovering the motives of elites because their business is often kept secret for reasons of personal gain or deliberate sabotage. Exactly as Mosca pointed out, elites usually do not have to answer to anyone outside of their group (Mosca, 1939). The ‘elite
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