Sobering the Revolution: Mexico's Anti-Alcohol Campaigns and the Process of State-Building, 1910-1940
Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation
Authors Pierce, Gretchen Kristine
Publisher The University of Arizona.
Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Download date 01/10/2021 10:21:09
Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194341
SOBERING THE REVOLUTION: MEXICO’S ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGNS AND THE PROCESS OF STATE-BUILDING, 1910-1940
by
Gretchen Kristine Pierce
______
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
2008 2
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE
As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation
prepared by Gretchen Kristine Pierce
entitled Sobering the Revolution: Mexico's Anti-Alcohol Campaigns and the State- Building Process, 1910-1940
and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
______Date: 3/28/08 William Beezley
______Date: 3/28/08 Kevin Gosner
______Date: 3/28/08 Bert Barickman
______Date:
______Date:
Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.
I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.
______Date: 3/28/08 Dissertation Director: William Beezley 3
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.
SIGNED: Gretchen Kristine Pierce
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Numerous individuals and institutions have provided invaluable assistance in the completion of this dissertation. I have received economic support from the Fulbright- Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship (2004), the Graduate and Professional Student Council (2007), the Ramenofsky Graduate Fellowship (2006), the Michael Sweetow Fellowship (2006), the History Department (2006), the Sybil Ellingwood Pierce Fellowship in Southwest History (2004), the Center for Latin American Studies (2004), and the Tinker Summer Research Grant (2003). Lety Becerril, Georgia Ehlers, Victoria Parker, Veronica Peralta, Karna Walters, and Margaret Wilder assisted me in securing the money and ensured that I received it in a timely fashion. Michelle Berry, Maritza de la Trinidad, Bill French, Alex Kindell, Rachel Kram Villarreal, Oscar Martínez, Fawn Montoya, Chrystel Pitt, Clark Pomerleau, Cal Raup, and Ageeth Sluis read and commented on drafts of various stages of this project, from seminar papers to grant proposals to dissertation chapters. Benjamin Alonso, Denise Barragan, Eduardo Marcos de la Cruz, Mike Ervin, Ziad Fahmy, Eileen Ford, Stephanie Mitchell, Alejandra Salazar Lamadrid, Stephen Lewis, Megan McLean, Lia Schraeder, Juan Manuel Silva Rodríguez, Jesús Uribe, Emily Wakild, and Louise Walker also gave me helpful advice about proposals, archives, sources, and writing. The archivists Raymundo Álvarez and Victoria San Vicente went out of their way to assist me. Thanks also to Áurea Toxqui, her parents Marina and Fabian, and Nohemí Orozco for housing me for periods in Mexico. I owe a debt of gratitude that words can hardly express to my advisors. Bill Beezley, Kevin Gosner and Bert Barickman have helped to shape me into the scholar I have become by inculcating my love of Mexico, expanding my horizons beyond this same country, and pushing me to question my initial conceptions of history. Stacie Widdifield and Keith McElroy taught me how to use images as primary sources rather than illustrations. Carmen Nava, Ignacio Almada Bay, and Servando Ortoll supported me while abroad by extending academic affiliation, writing letters of introduction, and answering questions about various matters. Finally, my husband, Jerry Pierce, has supported me in every phase of this project and deserves more thanks than I can possibly give. His influence enriched this work tremendously. 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... 6
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... 7
ABSTRACT...... 8
INTRODUCTION ...... 10
CHAPTER 1 FROM LAISSEZ-FAIRE TO LIMITED REGULATIONS: THE WEAK BEGINNINGS TO THE NATIONAL ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN AND THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS, 1910-1932 ...... 56
CHAPTER 2 PARADES, EPISTLES, AND PROHIBITIVE LEGISLATION: THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN AND THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS, 1932-1940...... 88
CHAPTER 3 “TEMPERANCIA: POR LA PATRIA. POR LA RAZA”: THE NATIONAL ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN, STATE-BUILDING, AND THE CREATION OF A NEW CITIZEN, 1929-1940...... 131
CHAPTER 4 ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK: THE ANTI- ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN AND THE CONTESTED STATE- BUILDING PROCESS IN SONORA, 1915-1939...... 188
CHAPTER 5 FIGHTING VICE, FORGING A NATION: UNOFFICIAL ANTI- ALCOHOL LEAGUES AND THE PARTICIPATORY STATE- BUILDING PROCESS, 1910-1940...... 253
CONCLUSION...... 296
WORKS CITED ...... 300 6
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
ILLUSTRATION 1...... 76
ILLUSTRATION 2...... 77
ILLUSTRATION 3...... 117
ILLUSTRATION 4...... 117
ILLUSTRATION 5...... 118
ILLUSTRATION 6...... 118
ILLUSTRATION 7...... 132
ILLUSTRATION 8...... 147
ILLUSTRATION 9...... 149
ILLUSTRATION 10...... 151
ILLUSTRATION 11...... 169
ILLUSTRATION 12...... 172
ILLUSTRATION 13...... 172
ILLUSTRATION 14...... 226
7
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Group Name(s) AFNT Asociación Femenil Nacional de Temperancia ANT Asociación Nacional de Temperancia AT Asociación de Temperancia CNLCA Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo CROM Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana DAA Dirección Antialcohólica DAEO Dirección Antialcohólica de Educación Obrera DEA Dirección de Educación Antialcohólica LAM Liga Antialcohólica Mexicana PNR Partido Nacional Revolucionario SASOC Subcomité Antialcohólico del Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos 8
ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the intimate connection between the State-building process and the temperance movement and asserts that neither project was merely imposed from the top down, but rather, involved input from a variety of actors. As presidents worked to rebuild the federal government during the Mexican Revolution of
1910 to 1940, they also strove to rid the country of alcoholism. In particular, utilizing prejudiced notions of class, ethnicity, and gender, they targeted working-class and indigenous men, who they tried to transform into pacifistic patriarchs, efficient workers, and sober, responsible citizens. However, the case study of Sonora demonstrates that this federal project did not go uncontested. Presidents relied on governors and legislators to mandate temperance, mayors to enforce these laws, and citizens to follow them, but these people did not always willingly comply and thus policies often had to be modified. In other instances, ordinary people supported the anti-alcohol campaign, creating unofficial temperance leagues, petitioning the president to close more cantinas, or demanding that corrupt authorities obey alcohol legislation. Governors’, mayors’, and especially citizens’ contributions to the anti-alcohol campaign and the State-building process may not have been equal to those of federal leaders, but both projects certainly benefited from the input of a diverse cross-section of society.
This present research adds to and combines three historiographical fields on the history of alcohol, State-building, and the social and cultural components of revolutions.
It is the first, full-length study of the anti-alcohol campaign during the Mexican
Revolution and the only work about Mexico as of yet to examine temperance from the 9 national, state, municipal, and popular perspective. This work also corroborates the argument of recent political scholars, demonstrating that the process of State formation was shaped by input from individuals on a variety of planes. Finally, this dissertation shows that the government’s cultural policies, which included promoting high art, distributing propaganda, and carrying out campaigns such as the temperance movement, should not be seen as trivial. Rather, attempts to form a new, modern citizenry through these projects were a vital part of the State-building process and of social revolution in general.
10
INTRODUCTION
Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas wrote a letter on December 13, 1937 to
Sonoran governor Román Yocupicio, asking him to close all cantinas in the indigenous pueblo of Esperanza. Cárdenas explained to the governor that he ought to employ his entire arsenal in the war against alcohol addiction because he believed sobriety would help to achieve one of the Revolution’s main goals, the assimilation of Indians to the nation.1 Yocupicio pledged his support to the cause and indeed passed a few laws
regulating the sale and taxation of intoxicating beverages, but many observers claimed
that the governor and other state officials did not strictly enforce this legislation.2 In the same year, having received a pro-temperance flyer from the Dirección Antialcohólica
(DAA), the federal agency overseeing the country’s official anti-alcohol campaign, members of one labor union’s temperance committee, the Subcomité Antialcohólico del
Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos (SASOC), felt inspired to complain about the level of vice in their community. This group accused municipal authorities in Etchoropo, Júpare, and Huatabampo, Sonora of approving the creation of new cantinas in a region filled with peasants and native peoples, and, as such, violating the national constitution. They likened the administration of such hypocritical leaders to a dictatorship worse than the
Porfiriato (the regime that had preceded and precipitated the Revolution).3
1 President Lázaro Cárdenas to Governor Román Yocupicio, Hermosillo, Sonora, 13 December 1937, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, (AGN-FAP-LC), Expediente (Exp.) 553.1/15. 2 Yocupicio to the Secretary of Government, 17 May 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Law 10, Boletín Oficial: Organo Oficial del Estado de Sonora (BO), 39, no. 4 (13 January 1937). 3 Dr. Alfonso Priani, Secretary of the Department of Public Health, to Yocupicio, 27 December 1937, Archivo Histórico del Estado de Sonora, Ramo Ejecutivo (AHES-RE)-1938, Caja S/N, Exp. 733”38”/2. 11
These events reveal that the anti-alcohol campaign and the State-building process
from 1910 to 1940 were intimately connected and that neither project was imposed
merely from the top down, but rather, involved input from a variety of individuals and
groups. As presidents worked to rebuild the federal government during the Revolution, they also strove to rid the country of excessive alcohol consumption. In particular, utilizing stereotypes of class, ethnicity, and gender, they targeted working-class and
indigenous men, whom they tried to transform into pacifistic patriarchs, efficient
workers, and sober, responsible citizens. The way that these political leaders attempted
to combat so-called vice depended on the ideological nature and administrative strength
of their respective regimes. Cárdenas, for instance, who presided over the most active
and powerful government in the period, not only had the DAA distribute propaganda, he
also wrote letters to recalcitrant officials who did not support temperance whole-
heartedly. The case study of Sonora demonstrates that this federal project did not go
uncontested, though. Presidents relied on governors and legislators to mandate sobriety,
mayors to enforce these laws, and citizens to follow them, but these various groups did
not always willingly comply, or at times openly resisted, and thus policies often had to be
modified. In other instances, ordinary people like the members of the SASOC supported
the anti-alcohol campaign, creating unofficial temperance leagues, petitioning the
president to close more cantinas, or demanding that authorities, who were often corrupt,
obey alcohol legislation and fulfill the ideals of the Revolution. Governors’, mayors’,
and especially citizens’ contributions to the anti-alcohol campaign and the State-building 12
process may not have been equal to those of federal leaders, but both projects certainly benefited from the input of a diverse cross-section of society.
Alcoholism in Mexico
The Mexican Revolution was launched on November 20, 1910 to overthrow the
thirty-five year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz that had centered on foreign investment and
economic development at the expense of the majority of the country. As individuals
from diverse social and geographical backgrounds flocked to join the rebellion, it quickly
grew into a social revolution whose adherents called not only for “Effective Suffrage and
No Re-election,” but also for “Land and Liberty.”4 For the next thirty years, revolutionary presidents sought to redistribute land more equitably, expand education, and strengthen the economy.
To advance these projects, leaders also needed to create “modern” citizens.
Intellectuals such as Moisés Sáenz, José Manuel Puig Casauranc, and Dr. Bernardo
Gastélum, who were employed in various governmental departments, defined these New
Men and Women as sober, healthy, and rational individuals. These experts, along with political officials, worried that alcohol consumption challenged their goals. They claimed that chronic intoxication caused a variety of problems for the individual, the family, and the nation. The immediate effects of inebriation included domestic violence, crime, and the multiplication of poverty as savings purportedly were spent at the local bar. Additionally, they argued that drunken individuals performed poorly at work and
4 John Womack, Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969; New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 55, 398, 401. 13 could not be trusted to participate in politics. Finally, experts believed that alcohol abuse would make the drinker more susceptible to tuberculosis and mental and venereal
diseases, afflictions which could be spread to spouses and children. Within a few
generations, they feared the results would be disastrous, leading to the deterioration of the entire race. Certainly, drunkards could not be categorized as New Men and Women.
To add to experts’ worries, scientific studies found excessive alcohol
consumption to be a particularly acute problem.5 The journal Estadística Nacional reported that in 1923, 70 percent of men and 80 percent of women between the ages of fifteen and eighty drank alcohol.6 Sociologist Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez conducted a
survey of indigenous peoples in 1939 and concluded that 70 percent of adult indios
consumed intoxicating beverages as well.7 These people drank, experts argued, because cantinas abounded. Several reformers claimed that the country had more bars than it had schools, hospitals, or libraries.8 Many bureaucrats, including Luis G. Franco, director of
5 James Scott argues that in order to govern more efficiently and ultimately carry out “high modernist” projects (like the anti-alcohol campaign), leaders and bureaucrats rely upon data to render an “unknown” population known and visible. Thomas F. Babor and Barbara G. Rosenkratz similarly show that leaders in Massachusetts in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries relied upon scientific studies to inform public policy on alcohol control. See: Thomas F. Babor and Barbara G. Rosenkrantz, “Public Health, Public Morals, and Public Order: Social Science and Liquor Control in Massachusetts, 1880-1916,” in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, ed. Susanna Barrows and Robin Room, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 265, 280-81; James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 2-3, 14, 24, 55, 64-65, 71, 77-83, 183. 6 “N.t.,” Estadística Nacional (Mexico City) (EN), (15 February 1925), Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Archivos Economicos (BMLT-AE), Ø03314, Alcoholismo, México. 7 Lucio Mendieta y Núñez, “Ensayos sobre el alcoholismo entre las razas indígenas de México,” in Antropología del alcoholismo en México: Los límites culturales de la economía política (1930-1979), ed. Eduardo L. Menéndez and Renée B. DiPardo (Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1991), 133. 8 “En México hay una cantina por cada cuarenta hombres,” El Observador (Hermosillo) (EO), 23 June 1923, 11; “N.t.,” ESN, (15 February 1925); Luis G. Franco, Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio (Monterrey, Mexico: Talleres Linotipográficos del Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo León, 1932), 13-14, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Fondo Salubridad Pública I, Sección 14 the national anti-alcohol campaign between 1932 and 1940, noted that their compatriots spent more on inebriants than they did on grain or milk.9 These figures became even more alarming to them when compared with those of other countries. Studies suggested that Mexicans drank more than Germans, Dutch, French, and other peoples.10
It is difficult to assess whether alcohol abuse was a real or only a perceived
problem. A reliable set of statistics that indicated that Mexicans actually consumed more
alcohol than people of other nationalities did has not been found. In fact, the journalist
Adolfo Camacho in 1936 employed scientific data to show that Mexicans drank less than
people from other countries.11 In addition, cultural biases likely colored many of these evaluations. As scholars have shown, the definition of alcoholism is a relative one, varying according to nationality, ethnicity, class, and other factors. During the
Revolution, upper-middle and middle-class mestizos believed that intoxicating beverages
ought to be consumed in moderation, so that one never reached the point of public
Servicio Jurídico (AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ), Caja 41, Exp. 6; “El alcoholismo, azote social. Propaganda del Departamento de Salubridad Pública de México,” El Maestro Rural, (EMR) 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934), 18; “Justificación de la guerra contra el alcoholismo. La Sría de la Economía aporta datos estadísticos que son reveladores,” El Nacional (Mexico City) (EN), 24 September 1935; José A. Granados, “Boceto de cooperación antialcohólica,” 1 May 1936, 12, 16, 18, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “La lucha en contra del alcoholismo. Las estadísticas presentadas en el Congreso de Niños Oberos y Campesinos de la República. Una agasajo,” El Universal (Mexico City) (EU), 17 October 1936. 9 Speech, Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo: Homenaje a las masas obreras mexicanas,” 28 November 1930, 5-7, BMLT-AE, Ø03314; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,” Actas y versiones del consejo consultivo del 11. de agosto al 13 de enero de 1934 (Mexico City: n.p., n.d.), 5-1, Biblioteca del Archivo Histórico del Distrito Federal, (BAHDF); “Distribución de alimentos. Será hecha por la Dirección de la Campaña Antialcohólica a los necesitados,” EN, 8 February 1936. 10 Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917: Diario de debates, vol. 2 (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1985), 619-22; “N.t.,” ESN, (15 February 1925); “El alcoholismo en México según la estadística,” EU, 22 April 1929, 1; Octavio Hernández R., “La campaña antialcohólica,” Crisol: Revista de Crítica (Mexico City), (15 October 1930), 304-05, BMLT-AE, Ø03314; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934), 18. 11 Adolfo Camacho, “El pueblo mexicano y el alcoholismo,” EU, 21 May 1936; Camacho, “México y el alcoholismo,” EN, 8 March 1937. 15 drunkenness. If one did not follow these guidelines, his or her behavior could be labeled as vice or even seen as indicative of alcoholism, terms reformers used frequently. Some indigenous groups, on the other hand, valued alcohol for its transcendental qualities.
They drank precisely to become inebriated and have a religious experience. Some impoverished peoples consumed pulque and other intoxicating beverages for their medicinal properties or to replace potable water and sufficient food. They did not see their drinking as problematic or an illness.12 Although it is difficult to ascertain whether
or not alcohol abuse was truly a problem, the available statistics, scientifically reliable or
not, make useful historical sources because they indicate the mindset of reformers.13
Political leaders, experts, and temperance advocates believed that alcoholism plagued the nation and thus they worked diligently to cure it. Therefore, the rest of this dissertation will not question whether an abnormal number of people abused intoxicating beverages,
12 “Una nueva actitud obrerista,” La Prensa (San Antonio, Texas), 23 November 1931, BMLT-AE, Ø02079, Cerveza, México; Manuel Velázquez Andrade, “La voz del maestro. Cuadros vivos,” EMR 5, no. 9 (1 November 1934), 11; minutes, Dirección Antialcohólica (DAA), 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; Jesús Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico. Proyecto de una campaña antialcohólica efectiva,” EN, 11 and 12 November 1936; “Medidas profilacticas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Archivo Particular, Emilio Portes Gil, (AGN-FArP-EPG), Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39; Charles H. Ambler, “Drunks, Brewers, and Chiefs: Alcohol Regulation in Colonial Kenya, 1900-1939,” in Drinking, 166-67, 171-72; Adrian A. Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution, (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998), 216-17, 224-25; Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 88, 122; Patience Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003), 27; Tim Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities: Alcohol’s Power in Mexican History and Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 4, 13; Stephen E. Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution: Forging State and Nation in Chiapas, 1910- 1945 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 106. 13 Leticia Mayer Celis, Entre el infierno de una realidad y el cielo de un imaginario: Estadística y comunidad científica en el México de la primera mitad del siglo XIX (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1999), 26-27. Babor and Rosenkrantz also find that the data from Massachusetts often produced unclear results and attempted to disguise prejudice as science. Babor and Rosenkrantz, “Public Health, Public Morals, and Public Order,” 265, 277, 279-81, 284. 16
nor whether this behavior ought to be considered a vice or symptomatic of a disease.
Rather, it will take reformers’ belief that a problem existed as its starting point.
Concern with alcohol abuse did not begin in 1910. Rather, since the formation of the colony of New Spain in 1521, social elites and political and religious leaders
lamented the lower classes’ and indigenous peoples’ supposedly excessive consumption
of intoxicating beverages. Spaniards worried that since these drinks were no longer
regulated by the indigenous nobility, and had lost their religious and social significance,
poor indios drank without abandon, leading to violent crime and rebellion. Therefore,
throughout the colonial period, and especially the late eighteenth century, priests tried to
link drunkenness with sin, while municipal authorities, viceroys, and administrators of
the royal tobacco manufactory taxed beverages, placed limits on where and where they
could be consumed, and restricted tobacco workers from drinking on the job. These
measures were largely unsuccessful because native peoples lacked a complete
understanding of the concepts of afterlife and sin, officials were not willing to pass
stricter legislation restricting alcohol consumption and lose tax revenue, and ordinary
people resisted the laws in a variety of ways.14 Concern for chronic intoxication continued during the age of Independence rebellions, as authorities worried that
14 William B. Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979); Michael C. Scardaville, “Alcohol Abuse and Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City,” Hispanic American Historical Review 60, no. 4 (1980); Pamela Voekel, “Peeing on the Palace: Bodily Resistance to Bourbon Reforms in Mexico City,” Journal of Historical Sociology 5, no. 2 (1992); Susan Deans-Smith, “The Working Poor and the Eighteenth-Century Colonial State: Gender, Public Order, and Work Discipline,” in Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico, ed. William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1994); Steve J. Stern, The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Sonia Corcuera, “Pulque y evangelización. El caso de Fray Manuel Pérez (1713),” in Consecuencias del encuentro de dos mundos, ed. Janet Long (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1996); Juan Pablo Viqueira Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico (Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 1999).. 17
drunkenness would encourage more violence. Throughout the nineteenth century,
political leaders, intellectuals, and the wealthy decried alcohol abuse (which they still associated with the lower classes), arguing that it held back the nation’s attainment of economic and social progress. Municipal and national governments regulated the hours and locations of alcoholic dispensaries and required that beverages maintain a standard of salubriousness. Regular citizens as well as elite owners of bars broke the law frequently,
though, again challenging the success of this project.15 In other words, the revolutionary anti-alcohol campaign, although more extensive than those carried out previously, was certainly not a new project.
Nor were Mexicans during the Revolution alone in their desire to rid their nation of alcohol. Not surprisingly, they were influenced by their neighbors to the north, where a strong temperance movement also had existed since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and where a national prohibition of alcohol was achieved from 1919 to 1933.
Some reformers admired their American counterparts’ success in combating vice and others hoped to mobilize groups of women, much like the Woman’s Christian
Temperance Union.16 However, it would be a mistake to claim that Mexicans were
15 Virginia Guedea, “México en 1812: Control político y bebidas prohibidas,” Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea de México 8 (1980); Anne Staples, “Policía y Buen Gobierno: Municipal Efforts to Regulate Public Behavior, 1821-1857,” in Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance; Pablo Piccato, “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol’: Criminality and Alcoholism in the Late Porfiriato,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 11, no. 2 (1995); Áurea Toxqui, “Identity and Power in Pulquerías in Mexico City during the Liberal Republic, 1857-1910,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2008).. 16 “¡Se acabo el whiskey!” Orientación (Hermosillo) (O), 13 September 1917; George T. Summerlin, chargé d’Affaires, Mexico City, to U.S. Secretary of State, 26 August 1922, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (RDS), 812.114 Liquors/36; speech, Franco, “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Carlos Macías Richard, Vida y temperamento: Plutarco Elías Calles, 1877-1920 (Mexico City: Instituto Sonorense de Cultura, Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Fondo de Cúltura Económica, 1995), 191-92; Janet Zollinger Giele, Two Paths to 18 merely parroting U.S. reforms, especially given their colonial and nineteenth-century ancestors’ concern with the same issues. Furthermore, Mexico never had a national prohibition, and indeed, many experts did not desire one, claiming that it would infringe
on individual rights, threaten the economy, and be too difficult to enforce. By the 1920s,
these observers could also point to the failures of the U.S. Volstead Act (as well as their
own country’s few, state-level experiments with prohibition).17 Rather, the revolutionary anti-alcohol campaign ought to be seen as an answer to national problems and as shaped by the form of domestic governments. Additionally, this crusade to eradicate the vice of drinking fit into a larger global trend, for temperance movements sprung up in dozens of countries during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, including Britain, Hungary,
Russia, Turkey, and Uruguay, among others.18 Indeed, bureaucrats maintained ties with
Women’s Equality: Temperance, Suffrage, and the Origins of Modern Feminism (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), 2. 17 Fernando Torreblanca, personal secretary of President Álvaro Obregón, to Jack Starr Hunt, correspondent, LA Times, Mexico City, 22 September 1923, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública, Obregón-Calles (AGN-FAP-O-C), Exp. 104-E-23; “El estado seco no da resultado y si ocasiona muchos daños,” El Pueblo (Hermosillo) (EP), 12 December 1929, 1; José Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social (Mexico City: Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo, 1930), 16, AHSEP-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10 “Ideario breve. La campaña antialcohólica,” La Patria: Semanario Doctrinal y de Variedades (Mexico City), 3 March 1930, 1; José Salomón Osorio, “Hacia un prohibicionismo salvador,” EN, 8 May 1932; proposal, Dr. Castañares, March 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Jorge Labra, “El refugio diabólico de la embriaguez,” Excélsior (Mexico City) (EX), 19 August 1935; “La estéril campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 15 November 1935; speech, Dr. Rafael Martínez Montes, program, Primer Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico, 24-31 October 1936, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11; “Los obstaculos de la ‘Ley Seca,’” EX, 7 April 1937; “Editorial. Acción del estado contra las lacras sociales,” EN, 8 April 1937. 18 “Medida antialcohólica,” O, 4 January 1917, 2; “El estado seco en Turquia,” El Sol (Hermosillo) (ES), 8 April 1923, 2; “El gobierno de Rumania restringe la venta de licores,” EP, 3 April 1929; “Russia and Mexico in Similar Wars on Liquor; Soviet Children Active in Fight Against Alcohol,” New York Times (NYT), 2 June 1929; “En El Salvador hay intensa campaña antialcohólica,” EP, 21 June 1929, 2; “Va a establecerse el estado seco en Hungria,” EP, 20 February 1930, 2; Díaz Barriga to the chief of the Judicial Service, Department of Public Health, 22 August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Franco to the chief of the Judicial Service, Department of Public Health, 10 September 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; poster, “Discurso pronunciado por el jefe del Departamiento de Salubridad Pública, Dr. y Gral. José Siurob, en la asamblea previa de la Segunda Conferencia Antialcohólica Infantil dedicado a la niñez mexicana,” 30 August 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 19 temperance leagues around the world and participated in a number of international anti- alcohol congresses, including ones in Copenhagen in 1923, Switzerland in 1935, and
Poland in 1937. These reformers also attempted to promote a pan-American effort to eradicate alcoholism, and they hoped to position their country, not the United States, as the movement’s leader.19
19 “¿Se implantará el estado seco?” EO, 21 October 1922, 1; “La acción conjunta de los países indo-latinos contra la embriaguez,” EO, 5 May 1923, 7; “Labor primordial del Departamento de Salubridad realizada durante el cuatrenio presidencial del Ciudadano General don Álvaro Obregón,” EX, 27 September 1924; “Rumorase que el estado seco será declarado en México,” EO, 27 December 1924, 7; Agapito Zepeda, Texas, to Dr. Aquilino Villanueva, president of the CNLCA, 14 September 1929, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Departamento de Escuelas Rurales, Dirección General (AHSEP- DERDG), Caja 8, Exp. 10; “Uruguay y la campaña antialcohólica,” EP, 23 November 1929, 1; Dr. Mario Quiñones, secretary of the CNLCA, to the Department of Public Education, 20 December 1929, AHSEP- DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI- SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; R. Ambrose Roberts, Superintendent of Education and Publicity, Victorian Prohibition League, Melbourne, Australia, to the Department of Public Education, 16 February 1932, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 7, Exp. 39; Nillis Johnson, School and College Books, Chicago, to Rafael Ramírez, Chief of the Department of Public Education, 24 October 1932, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 7, Exp. 39; La Liga Oficial contra el Alcoholismo, Uruguay, to unknown, n.d. [10 May 1933?], Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública, Abelardo Rodríguez, (AGN-FAP-AR), Exp. 562.6/14; Ambassador Josephus Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 August 1934, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939, (RDS), 812.114 Liquors/102; Instructivo #1, “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y subcomités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE- 1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Cárdenas to Maxwell J. Welch, Los Angeles, CA, n.d., [after 9 August 1935], AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “Difusión a la campaña contra el alcoholismo. El Comité Internacional de Lucha se refiere a la que se realiza en México,” EN, 28 August 1935; memorandum, Franco, 31 October 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 34, Exp. 4; “Representante de México en Suiza,” EE, 4 November 1935; “Estados Unidos y México luchan de común acuerdo en contra del alcoholismo,” El Día (Mexico City) (ED), 24 January 1936; “Labor social y de un Congreso Infantil. Higiene en los estados contra el alcoholismo. Será el primero de América. Formación de numerosos comités en el país,” EU, 15 February 1936; “Congreso Infantil Antialcohólico. Se reunirá el mes próximo en esta ciudad. Iniciativa de la Dirección Antialcohólica y del D. de Bellas Artes. Un manifesto. Será enviado a todos los niños del mundo por los escolares de México,” EN, 10 October 1936; “Iniciativa para la creación de una Liga Antialcohólica Panamericana. Mejoramiento del obrero y del campesino. Se sugiere a la vez la formación de un ejército infantil contra el vicio. Que los gobiernos de América dicten leyes que prohiban la venta de alcohol,” EN, 9 January 1937; Victor Estrada Cajigal, “La campaña antialcohólica y su transcendencia social,” El Gráfico (Mexico City) (EG), 20 January 1937; Profesor Rafael Méndez Aguirre, Director General of Urban and Rural Primary Education in the States and Territories, to Directors and Inspectors of Federal Schools, 2 February 1937, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Sección Subsecretaría de Educación Pública (AHSEP-SSEP), Caja 12, Exp. 7; “Congreso Antialcohólico en lejano país. Un delegado de México asistió al que se efectuó en Varsovia. Las conclusiones. Mil quinientos representantes concurrieron al humanitario acto,” EN, 9 October 1937; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas. Se inició ayer la semana nacional de higiene con festejos antialcohólicos. Fueron derramados 25 mil litros de bebidas embriagantes adulteradas. Acto en el Palacio de Bellas Artes,” EN, 18 October 1937; “Interés por la campaña al alcohol. De diversos países extranjeros se han recibido 20
Alcoholism and the State-Building Process
National leaders agreed that alcoholism was a problem, but they differed in the ways they dealt with it, according to the type of State they headed. Drawing upon the ideas of theorists Friedrich Engels, Max Weber, Ralph Miliband, and Philip Abrams, this work considers the State, with a capital “S,” to be a sovereign body consisting of the national government (executive, legislative and judicial branches), the ideological and repressive apparatuses it employs to stay in power (schools, the media, police, and the military), and the bureaucracies that carry out laws. On the other hand, this dissertation refers to a smaller political territory within a nation, such as Sonora, as a “state” with a lower-case “s.”20
Types of States can be differentiated by several factors, the first of these being
whether the president wants to lead a passive or an active government. In Mexico, heads
of ideologically passive States relied on the nineteenth-century, Liberal, laissez-faire
model of government. For the most part, they did not believe it was the executive solicitudes pidiendo informes,” EN, 14 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 3; Miguel E. Bustamante, “Protección a la infancia en las comunidades rurales,” EMR 11, no. 4 (April 1938), 16; memorandum, Moisés Sáenz, ambassador to Peru, 21 January 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.4/1, Legajo (Leg.) 1; “N.t.,” Comino: El periódico de los niños (Mexico City), (C) 6, no. 11 (November 1940): 7-8. AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11: H. Phelps-Gate, editor, The National Voice, Los Angeles, CA, to Cárdenas, 17 September 1935; speech, Martínez Montes, 24-31 October 1936; Dr. y Gral. José Siurob y Ramírez, chief of the Department of Public Health, to Cárdenas, 27 October 1936; Ramón Beteta, subsecretary of the Department of Foreign Relations, to Cárdenas, 16 November 1937; Siurob to Cárdenas, 24 January 1938; “Discurso pronunciado por el jefe del Departamiento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940; Siurob to Cárdenas, 22 and 24 October 1940. 20 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), 2; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969), 49-53; Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 6-7; David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly, and Alan Ryan, ed., The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1987), s.v. “state;” Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977),” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no. 1 (1988), 71, 75; The New Lexicon Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language. Deluxe Edition (New York: Lexicon Publications, 1989), s.v. “government;” The New Lexicon Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, s.v. “state.” 21
branch’s right or responsibility to engage in the socio-economic reconstruction of society.
Typically, they were also federalists: they thought that if it was necessary to reform
society, it ought to be left up to national legislators or state and municipal governments.
On the other hand, leaders of ideologically active States strove to employ the national
government, led by the executive branch, in social reform. As centralists, they usually
also demanded that local authorities comply with their social, political, and other
directives. Of course, presidents’ beliefs about the role of the executive might change
based on their audience, the issue at stake, or as they and the nation evolved.
Furthermore, it is important to note that “passive” and “active” merely refer to a
president’s desire to lead a certain kind of government, not his ability to do so. Finally, these terms do not correlate to “conservative” or “progressive,” labels which can rarely be applied so neatly to revolutionaries. In other words, both a “conservative” and a
“progressive” official might preside over an active State, they would just disagree over how to reconstruct the nation. Therefore, based on presidents’ projected budgets, their
policies, and the view they espoused most often during their time in office, I argue that
the administrations of Francisco I. Madero, Venustiano Carranza, and Álvaro Obregón
can be considered ideologically passive. Plutarco Elías Calles, Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual
Ortiz Rubio, Abelardo Rodríguez, and Lázaro Cárdenas del Río all sought to lead
ideologically active States.21
Another way to differentiate States is by national officials’ ability to achieve their
goals. In turn, this administrative strength revolves around two factors, autonomy and
21 James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 22 institutionalization. Autonomy can be defined as the government’s capacity to carry out policies that threaten the interests of the dominant class and foreign countries without fear of reprisal.22 To do this, the executive must have enough resources that he does not have to rely on the support of domestic or foreign capitalists, who must be sufficiently weakened so that even if they wanted to react to a perceived threat, they could not.
Presidents must prevent the military and other politicians from sidelining governmental projects, as well. The active support of non-dominant classes often aids in this process.23
Institutionalization, on the other hand, is the transformation of political bodies from personalistic regimes to governments based on institutions.24 Only when both autonomy and institutionalization have been achieved can the State be considered administratively strong. Based on these categories, no regime between 1910 and 1940 was truly strong.
Indeed, very few governments anywhere, except for perhaps totalitarian ones, can fully achieve administrative strength, but the Rodríguez and Cárdenas regimes came much closer than their predecessors.
22 Friedrich Engels, “Excerpts from The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” in Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, edited by Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1959), 392; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, 33; Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, 55-59, 63; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 30; Robert G. Williams, States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of National Governments in Central America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 5, 220; Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire: (Post)modern Interpretations, edited by Mark Cowling and James Martin (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002); Paul Wetherly, “Making Sense of the ‘Relative Autonomy’ of the State,” in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, 196, 198-99. 23 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 31; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 7-8, 10, 11, 16, 23; Williams, States and Social Evolution, 6. 24 Weber, Politics as a Vocation, 3, 4-5, 12; Alan Knight, “Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?” Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 1 (1994), 98; Eric Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 3, 14-17. 23
The administration of Francisco Madero (1911-1913) fits the characteristics of
ideologically passive. A “reluctant revolutionary” from a wealthy land-owning family,
Madero began the Revolution for largely political reasons: he opposed Díaz’s control
over the electoral system.25 He wanted to create a Liberal democracy where municipalities had control over their land and taxes and the role of the national
government would be limited to administrative matters. This is not to say that Madero
did not identify social and economic problems that beset the nation: he did in fact
acknowledge the concentration of land in the hands of an elite few and the general
repression of labor. However, he believed that political reform should proceed all others.
Once new officials had been fairly elected, the dispossessed could legally petition their
representatives to redress their grievances. The few exceptions, such as the establishment
of a labor department that began to resolve worker-owner disputes, notwithstanding, the
Madero administration was truly “hands-off.”26
Only in office for fifteen months, Madero certainly presided over an
administratively weak State as well. In fact, the president’s reforms angered people from
all socio-economic backgrounds and because the government did not have autonomy, it
was subject to the manifestations of these groups’ anger. Peasants and workers said that
Madero’s policies did not go far enough and they responded with rebellions and strikes.
25 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 41. 26 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 42, 46, 48; Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 57-58, 64, 68, 70-71, 388-89, 392, 416-19, 423, 433, 435, 440-41; Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power. A History of Modern Mexico, 1810-1996, translated by Hank Heifetz (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 252, 254, 266-67; Colin M. MacLachlan and William H. Beezley, El Gran Pueblo: A History of Greater Mexico, 2d ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999), 218, 221, 229-33. 24
On the other hand, the Catholic Church, the dominant classes, the military, and foreigners
residing in the country felt threatened by reforms that they argued were too radical.
Therefore, elites also engaged in rebellion. Faced with these challenges, Madero further failed to institutionalize his government: he created neither a neutral bureaucracy nor a professional military. He appointed friends and family members to significant administrative positions and he allowed many officials from the previous regime to remain in their posts. Similarly, the president retained a high number of Porfirian officers
in the military and angered the rank and file by discharging those who had helped him
defeat Díaz. Madero’s many mistakes proved fatal when a trio of generals who had
served the previous regime arranged the president’s assassination with the blessing of
United States Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson.27 Madero clearly presided over an administratively weak regime.
After a brief return to a neo-Porfirian government, the Revolution continued under General Venustiano Carranza (1914-1920). Although Carranza’s view of the role of the executive branch changed throughout his rule, ultimately his presidency can be considered ideologically passive. At times, he seemed to advocate an active State by using his authority to manipulate elections, beginning land redistribution, trying to limit the power of the Church, and giving basic protection to the labor movement.28 In general, though, Carranza personally rejected the position that the federal government’s
27 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 49; Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, 252-54, 389, 393, 395, 469-72, 482-87; Krauze, Mexico, 261, 264-72; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 230-33, 235, 236-37; John M. Hart, “The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920,” in The Oxford History of Mexico, edited by Michael C. Meyer, and William H. Beezley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 439-45. 28 Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, Counter-Revolution and Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 472, 478-79, 481-83, 488, 494-96; Krauze, Mexico, 365-66. 25
job was to restructure society. As historians Alan Knight and Enrique Krauze have
argued, the president did not want to carry out many of the reforms he did. Rather, they
were often forced on him from below or else he enacted them just to the extent that they
ensured political stability without altering the socio-economic framework of society.29
Furthermore, in 1916, Carranza sent the delegates of the constitutional convention he organized a proposal that reflected his desire to maintain a laissez-faire, Liberal State.
When many of Carranza’s plans were superceded, with the final document creating an active, interventionist regime, the president angrily refused to issue the legislation necessary to enact the constitution. Finally, the budget he created also reflected his preference for a passive government. He allotted 82.7% of federal funds toward administrative expenses like military costs and bureaucratic salaries, while he only planned to spend the remaining 17.3% on social or economic expenditures such as education, irrigation, or public health projects.30
The presidency of Venustiano Carranza was not only ideologically passive, it was also administratively weak. To his credit, this leader did begin the process of institutionalization by attempting to transform regional revolutionary forces into a national army. Even more importantly, he had the Constitution of 1917 drafted that ended martial law, established three distinct branches of government, and created a
bureaucracy. However, Carranza himself threatened the success of the project of
29 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 427, 446, 466-67, 496; Krauze, Mexico, 343, 352. 30 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 50-51, 56-57, 97-126, 131-55, 161-75; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 61; Douglas W. Richmond, Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 1893-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 65-66, 71, 73, 83-105, 107-14, 135, 136-37; Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 172-75, 189, 471-72, 489, 494-516; Krauze, Mexico, 351, 353, 357-62, 365-66, 369; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 265-67. 26
institutionalization when he would not ratify much of this important document. The
stability of the regime was further challenged by its lack of autonomy. In spite of the
attempted professionalization of the revolutionary military, armed bands of all political
stripes continued to use violence in their struggle for power. Furthermore, the economy
was a disaster, with a mammoth foreign debt and a high rate of unemployment. The
government, therefore, often sought financial support from bankers in the United States.
These factors meant that the State was still quite administratively weak under Carranza.31
Like his predecessor, Álvaro Obregón (1920-1924) ultimately falls into the category of ideologically passive, even though he entertained the notion that the national government might be used to resolve socio-economic inequalities. Indeed, one of
Obregón’s most impressive and long-lasting accomplishments was the 1921 creation of the Department of Public Education that not only transferred the control of education from the municipal to the federal level, but also began to erase regional, ethnic, and class differences in an attempt to forge a national, unified culture. Furthermore, Obregón enforced a minimum wage, backed the constituents of the Constitutional Convention of
1916-1917 who favored an active State, wanted to enact even more of the constitution than he did, and began to carry out land reform.32 Like Carranza as well, Obregón’s
actions can be seen more as practical than as an outright acceptance of an active regime,
31 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 63-64; Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 215, 240-54, 263, 276-85, 329-330, 349, 360, 375, 392-94, 404-06, 424, 435-36, 450-54, 456-66, 478, 488-93; Krauze, Mexico, 348, 349, 351, 357-58, 365-69; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 265-68. 32 Narciso Bassols Batalla, El pensamiento politico de Álvaro Obregón (Mexico: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1967), 75-76; Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 58, 188; Krauze, Mexico, 387-89, 393, 395; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 10, 26-30; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 276, 283-85, 287-89; Thomas Benjamin, “Rebuilding the Nation,” in The Oxford History of Mexico, 471-73; Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, 18-20. 27
for he recognized that without revolutionary legislation, regional and popular rebellions
would continue. For instance, Obregón believed that the government’s most pressing job was to protect political freedoms. Without the right to choose officials, he claimed, “it would be ridiculous for us to occupy ourselves with other problems.”33 Obregón considered labor conflicts to be one of these “problems.” While speaking at a tobacco factory, the president said that disputes between workers and managers could best be resolved by these two groups coming to an agreement, making the involvement of the authorities unnecessary. Indeed, his fiscal policies reflected his views on the ideal nature
of the government: nearly three-fourths of his budget was dedicated to administrative
expenses. Therefore, in spite of his few uses of federal resources in an active manner,
Obregón still preferred an ideologically passive State.34
The government during the tenure of Obregón was also administratively weak.
Even before he took office, he had spoken of the importance of institutionalization by
saying that without checks to their wealth and power, some revolutionary leaders had
become corrupt, and therefore he vowed to work to “liberate the country from its
liberators.”35 To do this, he continued to incorporate regional militias into the national military, insisted that officers refrain from supporting oppositional political candidates, and rotated generals around the country to ensure that no one man amassed too great a following. The project remained incomplete: at the municipal level, political administrations often retained much of their Porfirian flavor, in terms of both personnel
33 Bassols Batalla, El pensamiento politico de Álvaro Obregón, 149. 34 Bassols Batalla, El pensamiento politico de Álvaro Obregón, 75, 155-56; Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 58-59; Krauze, Mexico, 391-92, 395; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 283-85; Benjamin, “Rebuilding the Nation,” 472. 35 Krauze, Mexico, 391. 28
and policy. The president continued to choose his successor, rather than letting voters do
so, and when he selected Plutarco Elías Calles, Obregón had to deal with a rebellion led
by former revolutionary colleague, Adolfo De la Huerta. A lack of autonomy further
challenged the president’s authority and forced him to temper his policies. These
included economic crises and foreign countries refusing to recognize the Obregón regime
for three years over repayment of debts and the protection of property.36
Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) became the first president who presided over a truly ideologically active government. As governor of Sonora in the 1910s, he had undertaken significant reforms and he planned to continue this trend as president. In fact,
a few days after his inauguration, he said that the Revolution had entered a period of reconstruction. Using federal funds, he created a national bank, an agricultural credit system so that ejiditarios could better utilize their new plots of land, and hundreds of kilometers of roads. He also strengthened the education system and expanded land reform. The president was a centralist as well: he tightened anti-clerical legislation and demanded that other officials enforce it and he deposed twenty-five governors in fifteen different states for a variety of reasons. Granted, it seems that Calles thought that reforms would serve in part to teach people to learn to help themselves, but what is significant is the fact that the president believed that the national government should lead this educational project.37
36 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 57-59l Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 74-75; Krauze, Mexico, 391, 393, 397-99; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 277-79, 280-81, 282, 284-86, 298- 300; Benjamin, “Rebuilding the Nation,” 471-75. 37 Robert Hammond Murray, editor and translator, Mexico Before the World: Public Documents and Addresses of Plutarco Elías Calles (New York: The Academy Press, 1927), 2-3, 32, 51-52, 86-88, 102, 29
In spite of Calles’s desire to use the power of the government to carry out social
reforms, he was ultimately limited in his ability to do so because the State remained
administratively weak. Calles pointed out that the country was still dominated by
political and military strong men who did the nation a disservice by preventing it from
becoming a nation where individuals had “no real importance beside the perpetual and
august serenity of institutions and laws.”38 The president and his minister of war, Joaquin
Amaro, tried to fix this problem by reducing the military budget, improving its training programs, and standardizing the process for officer promotion. By far the most important measure taken came in 1929 at the end of Calles’s and the beginning of Emilio Portes
Gil’s presidency. Calles created the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), the ruling regime’s official party, to choose presidential candidates, ensure a smooth succession of power, reduce the independence of governors and regional organizations, strengthen the bureaucracy, and prevent rebellions like the Gómez-Serrano revolt of 1927. The State continued to lack autonomy, though, meaning that the president was limited in his ability to create an active government. This constraint can best be seen in the fact that when
Calles put teeth in the anti-clerical provisions of the constitution, the Catholic Church encouraged its parishioners to react to the affront, resulting in the Cristero Rebellion
(1926-1929) and eventually the retraction of some of the more unpopular laws, such as one that forbid worship in private homes.39
138-39; Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 61, 62; Krauze, Mexico, 409-11, 415-17, 419-21; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 301-02, 305-07; Benjamin, “Rebuilding the Nation,” 471, 475-76. 38 Krauze, Mexico, 427. 39 Lorenzo Meyer, Rafael Segovia, and Alejandra Lajous, Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 12, Periodo 1928-1934. Los inicios de la institucionalización La política del maximato (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1978), 5-9, 37-39, 46, 47, 51; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 75-77; Krauze, Mexico, 30
Emilio Portes Gil (1928-1930), who had also been a reformist governor, presided
over an ideologically active government as president after Calles. He distributed twice as many hectares of land per month as his predecessor had, and significantly more than anyone else had before them. He also supported both peasants’ and workers’ organizations. Finally, he drafted a Federal Labor Law, although it would not actually be passed until the year after Portes Gil’s presidency ended. This law provided for, among other things, maximum work hours, vacation days, and safety regulations. The measure was aimed at enacting Article 123 of the Constitution and it overrode all state or municipal labor laws.40 In other words, Portes Gil strove to create an ideologically active
State.
Many of Portes Gil’s goals went unfulfilled because the government remained
administratively weak. Although former president Calles initiated the PNR to help
institutionalize the Revolution, he compromised much of its effectiveness by trying to
control the party either directly or indirectly. Called the Jefe Máximo, he chose Portes
Gil as president, as well as his next three successors and many lesser officials. He often
dictated policy and served as the Secretary of War for a brief period. These acts not only
threatened institutionalization, they also limited the autonomy of the government.
Therefore, although Portes Gil redistributed large amounts of land, he was not able to
accomplish as much as he would have liked because he was constantly hamstrung by
416, 420-24, 427-29; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 301-05, 308-09, 311; Benjamin, “Rebuilding the Nation,” 475-77. 40 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 64, 188; Tzvi Medin, El minimato presidencial: Historia política del maximato (1928-1935) (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1982), 53, 59-60, 64; Susie S. Porter, Working Women in Mexico City: Public Discourses and Material Conditions, 1879-1931 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003), 184-86. 31
Calles and his appointees. He also had to deal with yet another military rebellion
(although it was the last that the country would experience) as well as attacks by Luis N.
Morones, the head of the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), an
umbrella organization of labor unions that had been supported by the Calles
government.41
Although politics moved to the right with the subsequent presidency, both Pascual
Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932) and his mentor Calles continued to envision an ideologically active role for the State. In fact, they agreed that “to construct is the magic word of our
epoch.”42 Ortiz Rubio and Calles believed that agrarian reform had been carried out as
far as it should go; now the national government had the job of leading the country in
economic development. To this end, the president diverted federal money from land
distribution to improving what had already had been divided. Thus he created
agricultural credit banks and increased the number of irrigation projects. Furthermore,
plots used for industrial development were promised protection from the risk of
expropriation.43
Nevertheless, Ortiz Rubio’s government remained administratively weak, with
many of the same characteristics as that of his predecessor. Institutionalization continued
to be sacrificed for personalistic power struggles: Calles and Portes Gil both tried to
impose their own supporters in Ortiz Rubio’s cabinet. Although autonomy improved in
the sense that the country did not endure any major rebellions, people continued to
41 Meyer, Segovia, and Lajous, Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 12, 9, 37-41, 64-83, 106; Medin, El minimato presidencial, 53-54; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 314, 316. 42 Medin, El minimato presidencial, 117. 43 Meyer, Segovia, and Lajous, Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 12, 162, 163-65; Medin, El minimato presidencial, 95-97, 102, 119, 120. 32
express dissatisfaction with the revolutionary regime through violence. In fact, a disillusioned supporter of José Vasconcelos, the former Secretary of Education who had run against Ortiz Rubio, attempted to assassinate the president in 1930. Finally, a foreign debt that was four times the nation’s yearly income, the repatriation of thousands of
Mexicans from the United States because of the Great Depression, and pressure from
U.S. and British diplomats and investors to slow agrarian reform and discourage strikes,
all further limited the president’s autonomy.44
Like his predecessors, Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934) presided over an ideologically active State. In 1932, at the height of the Great Depression in his country,
Rodríguez worked at moving the Revolution back to the left, and he used federal funds to do so. He was greatly aided in this process in the second year of his presidency by the publication of the PNR’s Six-Year Plan. This manifesto outlined the party’s goals for the president-elect, Lázaro Cárdenas. It called for an interventionist government that would accelerate land distribution, expand the scope of rational education, and increase support for the working classes. Rodríguez did not write this document but unlike Carranza he did not ignore it and began to implement much of it before his successor took office.45
President Rodríguez made significant advances in strengthening his government
but it stilled retained some elements of weakness. Economic problems caused by the
Great Depression and the continued presence of Calles made the achievement of
complete autonomy impossible. Nevertheless, Rodríguez worked toward achieving
44 Meyer, Segovia, and Lajous, Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 12, 85-93, 108-116, 123, 125-26, 132-44, 146-56, 215-27, 235-37, 241-43, 249, 267; Medin, El minimato presidencial, 78-79, 87-89, 95, 111; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 314. 45 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 70, 71; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 121-22; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 316. 33
independence from the Jefe Máximo from the beginning of his administration. He
insisted that military officers and politicians stop consulting with Calles, arguing instead
that they needed approval from the president to act on their plans. Ironically, the Great
Depression also worked to strengthen the government’s autonomy in that the ability of
foreign countries to interfere in Mexican politics was greatly reduced. Furthermore, the new U.S. ambassador Josephus Daniels represented his country’s Good Neighbor Policy:
Daniels was interested in social reform and he encouraged attempts to improve the well- being of the masses. Even with this growth in the State’s power, Rodríguez still could not force citizens to follow all of his policies. The most notable example came when the
Department of Public Education advocated secularizing Catholic schools and promoted sex education in the early 1930s. The proposed change in curriculum caused such an uproar that the government was forced to abandon it and ask the Secretary of Education to resign.46
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) led a truly ideologically active administration.
Contemporaries either loved or hated the man for this very reason. Most perceived his
presidency to be a radical change, even from previous revolutionary leaders, and they
claimed he used the power of a juggernaut State to initiate his socio-economic reforms.47
Cárdenas did indeed utilize the government in his transformation of society, a fact reflected in his budget. He dedicated significantly more federal money to social and economic concerns than any other president had. With these funds, he distributed land on
46 Meyer, Segovia, and Lajous, Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 12, 158-63, 170-76, 187, 194, 199-200; Medin, El minimato presidencial, 124-26; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 31-33; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 316-17; 47 Knight, “Cardenismo,” 73-79. 34
an unprecedented scale—more than all of his predecessors put together.48 Often he did
so by intervening in the process personally to speed it up. Additionally, he did not
hesitate in asserting that the government should direct the economy and he said that this
intervention ought to be, “increasingly great, increasingly frequent, and increasingly
profound.”49 Without a doubt, at least in the early years of his presidency, Cárdenas
allowed for a high number of strikes, while businesses that resorted to unfair labor
practices might be penalized through expropriation. To this end, the president
nationalized large swaths of commercial agricultural property, the railroads, and the
entire petroleum industry.50
Cárdenas’s government never achieved all of the characteristics necessary to
classify it as administratively strong, but it came the closest to achieving this designation.
He was originally selected by Calles to be the Jefe Máximo’s next “puppet,” and indeed,
earlier in his career, Cárdenas seemed as if he were willing to play the part. Once elected
as president, though, Cárdenas exiled his former mentor, removed Calles supporters from
political office, and replaced them with men loyal to him across the country. These
actions, coupled with the continued economic and political weakness of the United
States, as well as the support of the lower classes who believed that the president finally
represented the Revolution in power, helped to create an autonomy for the national
government that it had not previously achieved. This independence allowed him to carry
48 Cárdenas’ monthly average was 248,700 hectares. The president who had come the closest to this average was Portes Gil, who distributed 121,117 hectares per month. Other presidents did significantly less. See: Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 188. 49 Knight, “Cardenismo,” 84. 50 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 70, 74, 78, 184; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 128-29, 188; Knight, “Cardenismo,” 78, 82, 84-88, 90-91. 35
out his reforms. Ironically, one of the acts that gave the Cárdenas administration a degree of autonomy eventually also doomed this independence. When he staffed the government with men loyal to him, continuing the pattern of personalistic, rather than
institutionalized, regimes, he only required that they be faithful, not that they necessarily
share any ideological similarities with him. When Cárdenas began to make socio-
economic change, many of his appointees found that they disagreed with his goals.
Frequently, governors such as Yocupicio or Maximinio Ávila Camacho of Puebla did
little or nothing to carry out his policies and even allied with the social elite, actively
working to undermine the president.51 By 1938, with a governmental bankruptcy looming and the nation seriously divided, Cárdenas was forced to move his administration back to the right and abandon his earlier, more radical stance.52
Historiography
This dissertation adds to three bodies of historiography. The first of these, studies of alcohol’s role in Latin American countries, is of growing interest to historians.
Scholars have examined three main themes: first, they have looked at the problems that
alcohol consumption supposedly caused; second, they have investigated attempts to regulate intoxicating beverages by government officials, businesses, and ordinary people;
51 For more on the matter, see Chapter Four. Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 126-27, 130-31; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 47-48, 67-73; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 44-45, 59- 63, 175-86, 218-226. 52 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 79, 81; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 104, 125-29, 134, 190- 91, 213, 216-18, 220, 226-27, 235-36; Knight, “Cardenismo,” 79, 92, 99-101, 106; Krauze, Mexico, 457- 59, 461-63, 469-80; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 13, 47; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, xv, 23, 54, 96, 138; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 332-37, 343-44, 349-62; Benjamin, “Rebuilding the Nation,” 477-78, 488, 492, 496-98. 36
and third, they have questioned the cultural and economic aspects of the alcohol industry.
Although all of these studies are insightful, few of them discuss inebriants as their main
subject, and therefore their coverage of the topic is cursory.
Several authors discuss the problems that alcohol consumption posed for the
drinker and society in general. In a short work, Sonia Corcuera asserts that priests in
colonial Mexico worked diligently but ultimately unsuccessfully to convince indigenous
peoples that pulque, a drink that had had religious and social significance for them, was a
sin and might prevent one from going to heaven.53 William B. Taylor, in a seminal book
on alcohol, violence, and rebellion in colonial Mexico, argues that lay Spaniards’ concern
was more earthly. They believed that the proliferation of intoxicating beverages,
especially among lower-class indios, led to an increase in violent crimes such as
homicide and encouraged rebellion. Taylor finds, though, as does Steve Stern in his book
on gender, power, and violence in colonial Mexico, that violence could be better
explained by a number of other factors, including questioning one’s honor, a relief of
“normal” tensions, defense of a perceived right, and gender and property disputes.
Lyman L. Johnson, on the other hand, argues that in late-colonial Buenos Aires, intoxication did frequently precede assaults and homicides. Drunkenness aggravated
already-tense situations and caused them to escalate to the point of violence.54 Pablo
Piccato and Erin O’Connor show that Mexican and Ecuadorian elites during the late-
53 Corcuera, “Pulque y evangelización.” 54 Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages; Stern, The Secret History of Gender; Lyman L. Johnson, “Dangerous Words, Provocative Gestures, and Violent Acts: The Disputed Hierarchies of Plebian Life in Colonial Buenos Aires,” in The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame, and Violence in Colonial Latin America, ed. Lyman Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998). 37
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries came to similar conclusions as their colonial
predecessors. Using statistics gathered from scholarly studies and drawing on European
scientific models, these intellectuals argued that the lower classes and the indigenous
imbibed more than other people. Their supposed alcoholism caused an increase in crime
and encouraged sloth, which impeded modernization.55 In the same period, according to
William French, the middle class in mining districts of Chihuahua linked habitual drunkenness to similar problems. Accusing laborers of lacking morality and a work ethic, these gente decente wanted regulations passed that forbid drinking, gambling, prostitution, and other vices.56 Studies on the United States-Mexico border during the former’s Prohibition show that alcohol consumption did not just increase isolated cases of
violence. The proliferation of cantinas catering to American tourists encouraged
organized crime, spread other types of vice such as gambling and prostitution, and
improved the economies of border towns.57 Other authors focus on disease. In a book on education, eugenics, and race in Brazil from 1917 to 1945, Jerry Dávila briefly demonstrates that educators and other intellectuals blamed alcohol for causing diseases
55 Piccato, “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol,’” Erin O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs? Gender Ideologies, the State, and Indian Men in Late Nineteenth Century Ecuador,” in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador. 56 William E. French, A Peaceful and Working People: Manners, Morals, and Class Formation in Northern Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996). 57 Edward Lonnie Langston, “The Impact of Prohibition on the Mexican-United States Border: The El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Case,” (Ph.D. diss., Texas Tech University, 1974); Oscar J. Martínez, Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez since 1848 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Christina Rabe Seger, “The Economics of Vice: Prohibition along the Arizona-Mexico Border, 1915-1933,” (paper presented at the Arizona Historical Convention, Tucson, 1993), Arizona Historical Society; Robert Buffington, “Prohibition in the Borderlands: National Government-Border Community Relations,” Pacific Historical Review 63, no. 1 (1994). 38
like tuberculosis and leading eventually to racial degeneration.58 Katherine Bliss also shows that Mexican medical experts, during the same time, worried that alcoholism, along with tuberculosis and syphilis, was destroying the nation’s health and its economy.59
Most authors discuss attempts to control alcohol production and consumption.
Some businesses, concerned that drunken workers would be less efficient and docile,
forbade intoxicants in their domains. Susan Deans-Smith demonstrates that in the late
eighteenth century, New Spain’s royal tobacco manufactory, in an effort to discipline a
workforce unused to regulated labor and to inculcate submission to authority, demanded
that workers arrive on time, punished drunkenness on the job, and required that
employees wear uniforms.60 As Thomas Miller Klubock shows, the North American
Braden Copper Company engaged in a similar practice in Chile in the 1920s and 1930s.
Bosses prohibited alcoholic beverages, gambling, and extramarital sexual relations in the mining camp. Instead, they endorsed sports, education, and middle-class family values in the hopes that sober and married workers would be less likely to strike or abandon their jobs altogether.61 Ironically, as Michael Snodgrass points out, the Cuauhtémoc Brewery in Monterrey, Mexico promoted similar values among their laborers during the same time
58 Jerry Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness: Race and Social Policy in Brazil, 1917-1945 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003). 59 Katherine Elaine Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation: Gender and the Cultural Politics of Social Hygiene in Revolutionary Mexico,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920- 1940, ed. Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006). 60 Deans-Smith, “The Working Poor and the Eighteenth-Century Colonial State: Gender, Public Order, and Work Discipline.” 61 Thomas Miller Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines,” Journal of Social History 30, no. 2 (1996). 39
period. Owners supported the creation of sporting teams to keep workers healthy and
away from cantinas.62
Many historians have focused especially on how governments have tried to
control the use of inebriants. During the colonial period, Spanish officials worked to
improve the morality of the lower classes and to sanitize public space. They attempted to
achieve their goals by restricting alcoholic beverages, limiting the amount of time that
people could spend in pulquerías, and lighting streets so they would no longer be havens
for crime. Michael Scardaville and others claim that these efforts were largely
unsuccessful because Bourbon administrators lacked not only the power to enforce the
law but also the will—taxing alcoholic beverages provided significant revenue for them.
Pamela Voekel and Juan Pedro Viqueira Albán add to this argument by demonstrating that ordinary people expressed their displeasure with these measures in a variety of ways, such as by visiting bars that did not comply with regulations or drinking as quickly as possible so as to maximize one’s time.63 Virginia Guedea shows that during the initial battles of Independence, officials in New Spain restricted the number and hours of operation of alcohol dispensaries so that intoxicating beverages would not incite more violence and so that bars could not become meeting places to plan further conspiracies.64
Political leaders during Mexico’s Early Republic continued to try to reform public behavior. Anne Staples reveals that municipal laws in three towns regulated hours of cantinas, forced residents to apply for permits to serve alcohol at parties (to reinforce the
62 Michael Snodgrass, “‘We Are All Mexicans Here’: Workers, Patriotism, and Union Struggles in Monterrey,” in The Eagle and the Virgin. 63 Scardaville, “Alcohol Abuse and Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City;” Voekel, “Peeing on the Palace;” Viqueira Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico. 64 Guedea, “México en 1812.” 40
notion that even private functions could disrupt the public peace), and monitored the
salubriousness of beverages for sale.65 As Klubock and Marcos Fernández Labbé demonstrate, Chilean authorities also hoped to combat alcohol from the late nineteenth
century on. They began to follow the model established by the Braden Copper Company
in the 1920s by establishing dry zones across the entire nation. In the 1930s, the
government had enough political capital to demand that Braden follow its laws and they
sent inspectors to ensure that that company as well as those from other industries
complied.66
Several authors discuss attempts by government officials to achieve a sober
citizenry during the Mexican Revolution, but they have all done so primarily within the context of other subjects. Alan Knight has suggested in two articles on the cultural projects of the new regimes that the temperance movement was part of revolutionaries’ attempts to create healthy and modern citizens. He argues that these cultural campaigns largely failed because political leaders did not have enough power to force their reforms on the populace, and because regular people merely refused to change some aspects of their culture, including drinking.67 In books about secular and religious education in
several different parts of the country from the 1910s through the 1930s, Mary Kay
Vaughan, Guillermo Palacios, Patience Schell, and Stephen Lewis show that teachers,
65 Staples, “Policía y Buen Gobierno.” 66 Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines;” Marcos Fernández Labbé, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad: la instalación de zonas secas como método de control del beber inmoderado en Chile, 1910-1930,” Scripta Nova: Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales 9, no. 194 (59) (1 August 2005). 67 Alan Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People: Mexico, 1910-1940,” in The Revolutionary Process in Mexico: Essays on Political and Social Change, 1880-1940, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990); Alan Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico, 1910-1940,” Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 3 (1994). 41 usually in collaboration with the government, taught students, especially working-class and indigenous ones, about the dangers of consuming alcoholic beverages. They also formed temperance leagues made up of community members to petition authorities to close nearby cantinas. The success of their campaign was challenged, though, by state officials, alcohol merchants, and regular citizens.68 Katherine Bliss explains that Public
Health officials also demonstrated a concern for alcoholism, worked to monitor the salubriousness of beverages, and regulated cantinas.69 Finally, Ben Fallaw, Christopher
Boyer, and Félix Brito Rodríguez assert that some state-level officials also worried about
chronic intoxication. Governors Plutarco Elías Calles of Sonora, Salvador Allende and
Felipe Carrillo Puerto of Yucatán, Lázaro Cárdenas of Michoacán, and Manuel Páez of
Sinaloa vowed to extinguish alcohol abuse from the 1910s through the 1930s. These men
restricted inebriants, encouraged the creation of popular temperance leagues, and worked
with teachers to spread the message of sobriety. They often ran up against other political
leaders, though, who not only refused to obey the law, but also profited from breaking
it.70
68 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution; Guillermo Palacios, La pluma y el arado: Los intelectuales pedagogos y la construcción sociocultural del “problema campesino” en México, 1932-1934 (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1999); Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City; Alexander S. Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004); Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution. 69 Katherine Elaine Bliss, Compromised Positions: Prostitution, Public Health, and Gender Politics in Revolutionary Mexico City (University Park: Penn State Press, 2001); Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation.” 70 Ben Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics: Drinking and Prohibition in Post-Revolutionary Yucatán, 1915- 1935,” Latin American Research Review 37, no. 2 (2001); Ben Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001); Christopher R. Boyer, Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Félix Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario: elecciones, alcohol, y violencia,” (paper presented at XXX Simposio de Historia y Antropología de Sonora, Hermosillo, February 25, 2005); Jürgen Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). 42
A few scholars have illustrated the role that popular participation played in the
restriction of alcoholic beverages. During the Mexican Revolution, as Ben Fallaw,
Stephanie Mitchell, Christopher Boyer, and Jocelyn Olcott briefly show, ordinary men
and women formed temperance leagues to help improve their own lives, although often at
the request of a political figure. They used moral persuasion to try to convince their
relatives not to drink, assisted teachers in educating the community about the dangers of
excessive alcohol consumption, and petitioned authorities to have cantinas closed.71
Conversely, Truman R. Clark finds that Puerto Rico’s 1917 to 1933 Prohibition may have been voted for in a plebiscite, but it does not indicate real popular interest in restricting alcoholic beverages. Rather, he claims that Puerto Ricans approved the measure as a way of showing support to the United States during World War I.72
Four studies investigate the cultural and economic role of intoxicating beverages.
Áurea Toxqui examines pulquerías in Mexico City during the Liberal Republic and discovers that as sites of socialization, these bars encouraged the formation of working- class and gendered identity. She also reveals that poor patrons and wealthy owners alike resisted the restrictions and the modernizing projects of the encroaching central government.73 Gina Hames claims that in Sucre, Bolivia in the late-nineteenth century,
chicheras cholas were frequently slandered because elites considered them racially and
economically inferior, while members of their own social stratum labeled them as
71 Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics;” Stephanie Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer: Women and the Anti-Alcohol Campaign,” (paper presented at the Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, New Haven, Conn., 2001); Boyer, Becoming Campesinos; Jocelyn Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005). 72 Truman R. Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico, 1917-1933,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 1 (1995). 73 Toxqui, “Identity and Power in Pulquerías in Mexico City during the Liberal Republic, 1857-1910.” 43
sexually and morally untrustworthy businesswomen. By the mid-twentieth century,
chicheras’ economic status and their monopoly on neighborhood gossip had increased
sufficiently so that they could slander others, even the powerful.74 Stephen Lewis argues that in Chiapas, beginning in the late 1930s, a powerful ladino family monopolized the aguardiente industry and dangerous, clandestine liquor abounded. The federal Instituto
Nacional Indigenista eventually had the monopoly dismantled, but because of the power
of local, corrupt politics, it had to agree not to regulate other abuses done to indigenous peoples.75 Finally, José Orozco claims that following the end of the Revolution in 1940, the federal government began to promote tequila as a symbol of mestizo national identity,
modernity, and masculinity.76
The second body of literature, the question of State formation, has been central to
studies of the Mexican Revolution. The earliest histories of this movement, which first appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, had little to say about the process. Rather, praising the
Revolution as a successful populist movement, they focused on land reform, labor codes, and the nationalization of key industries.77 By the 1960s, scholars had grown increasingly critical of the current authoritarian government, and they searched for the roots of repression in the Revolution. These revisionists depicted political leaders from
74 Gina Hames, “Maize-Beer, Gossip, and Slander: Female Tavern Proprietors and Urban, Ethnic Cultural Elaboration in Bolivia, 1870-1930,” Journal of Social History 37, no. 2 (2003). 75 Stephen E. Lewis, “La guerra del posh, 1951-1954: Un conflicto decisivo entre el Instituto Nacional Indígenista, el monopolio del alcohol y el gobierno del estado de Chiapas,” Mesoamérica: Nuevas Historias de Chiapas, siglos XIX y XX 25, no. 46 (2004). 76 José Orozco, “Disgust and Creation of a Nationalist Tequila Discourse in Post-Revolutionary Mexico,” (paper presented at the American Historical Association Annual Conference, Atlanta, Ga., 2007). 77 Ernest Greuning, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York: The Century Company, 1928); Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1929); Jesús Silva Herzog, Trayectoria ideológica de la Revolución mexicana, 1910-1917 (Mexico City: Cuadernos Americanos, 1963). 44
the 1910s through the 1930s as being similarly powerful, squelching the voice of the
masses and denying them any role in the reconstruction of the State.78 Romana Falcón, for instance, examining San Luis Potosí, asserts that not even the origins of the
Revolution were populist in nature. In this state, the upper-middle class dominated the initial stages of the battle, forged temporary alliances with lower-class groups only out of necessity, and showed no qualms in using repression when their allies turned too violent or tried to seriously alter the status quo.79 Ian Jacobs sees democratic potential that was
ultimately squandered in his study of Guerrero. He argues that the Revolution had been
fought in part to gain municipal autonomy from the federal government. The supposedly
progressive, urban middle-class triumphed politically and they adopted some reformist
policies like land redistribution. He finds that a powerful neo-Porfirian regime quickly
emerged which controlled the popular groups it formerly had supported.80 Nora
Hamilton concludes that although revolutionaries began the process of creating a government with autonomy from foreign nations and the dominant classes within
Mexico, they ultimately failed to do so. Therefore, thanks to elite and popular resistance as well as economic troubles, Cárdenas, the most radical of presidents, was forced to
78 Several studies not about the Mexican Revolution come to similar conclusions. Roderick J. Barman argues that the “privileged few” had the unique ability to impose their will on the new nation of Brazil, and so he restricts his analysis to intellectuals and elites. In examining the formation of Central American governments in the late nineteenth century, Robert G. Williams shows that the coffee economy, land and labor availability, and the needs of elites were the main factors shaping the eventual nature of the State. Roderick J. Barman, Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1852 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Williams, States and Social Evolution. 79 Romana Falcón, “¿Los origines populares de la revolución de 1910? El caso de San Luis Potosí,” Historia mexicana 39, no. 2 (1979). 80 Ian Jacobs, Ranchero Revolt: The Mexican Revolution in Guerrero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982). 45
temper his policies. Within a few administrations, the government had come to exclude
the participation of ordinary citizens.81
A group of “post-revisionists” have challenged their predecessors in two main ways. First, they argue that the revolutionary government was never as strong as the revisionists imagined. Heather Fowler-Salamini, for instance, claims that because federal regimes were weak in the 1910s and 1920s, independent political parties flourished. It was not until 1929 and the creation of the PNR, that these regional organizations began to be consolidated or disbanded.82 Alan Knight argues that even the Cárdenas administration, to which many contemporary observers and historians have attributed great power, was more of a “jalopy” than a “juggernaut.” Its successes were often unexpected or forced upon it from below and its failures owed to the strength of other groups, including industrialists, the Catholic Church and the laity, and provincial elites.83
Mary Kay Vaughan, Adrian Bantjes, Ben Fallaw, and Stephen Lewis have further shown that the Cárdenas presidency was challenged by conservative governors and corrupt mayors who actively undermined his regime. The ability of these leaders to ignore or disobey the president, in part, forced him to alter many of his revolutionary campaigns.84
Second, many recent scholars assert that State-building was not a top-down process, but rather was a dialectical one that involved the participation of officials at a
variety of levels, as well as ordinary people. Drawing from James Scott’s concept of the
81 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy. 82 Heather Fowler-Salamini, “De-Centering the 1920s: Socialismo a la Tamaulipeca,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 14, no. 2 (1998). 83 Knight, “Cardenismo.” 84 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution. 46 weapons of the weak, these authors reveal that although they were restricted from law- making, the majority of citizens made clear their views and indeed influenced policy through a variety of unofficial techniques like strategic absences or protests. In other cases, people merely followed laws that suited them, and broke ones that did not.85 For instance, Elsie Rockwell, Mary Kay Vaughan, Patience Schell, Alexander Dawson, and
Stephen Lewis show that parents and students demonstrated their disapproval with anti- clerical, socialist, or other “undesirable” topics in the classroom by keeping their children from school, using violence against the offending teachers, and demanding more
“practical,” or, in the case of the indigenous, culturally relevant, lessons. Officials responded by changing subject matter enough so that both parties were satisfied and teachers began to see themselves less as missionaries sent to change backwards people’s culture, and more as advocates of these people to state and local lawmakers.86 Several
85 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994); Claudio Lomnitz, “Final Reflections: What Was Mexico’s Cultural Revolution?” in The Eagle and the Virgin. Although not about Mexico, most of the essays in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador come to a similar conclusion, arguing that indigenous peoples, national politicians, and local elite all helped to create the nation. Teresa Meade, Jeffrey Needell, Robert M. Levine, José Murilo de Carvalho, and Todd Diacon do not always use the language of State-building, but they examine popular revolts against the Brazilian government’s modernizing and centralizing schemes from the late-nineteenth to the early-twentieth centuries and find that the urban and rural poor, local power brokers, and the military shaped the nation, although perhaps not as much as federal leaders did. See: Teresa Meade, “‘Civilizing Rio de Janeiro’: The Public Health Campaign and the Riot of 1904,” Journal of Social History 20, no. 2 (1986); Jeffrey D. Needell, “The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904: The Revolt Against ‘Modernization’ in Belle Époque Rio de Janeiro,” Hispanic American Historical Review 67, no. 2 (1987); Robert M. Levine, “‘Mud-Hut Jerusalem’: Canudos Revisited,” Hispanic American Historical Review 68, no. 3 (1988); José Murilo de Carvalho, “Brazil 1870-1914: The Force of Tradition,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24, Quincentenary Supplement (1992); Todd Diacon, “Bringing the Countryside Back In: A Case Study of Military Intervention as State Building in the Brazilian Old Republic,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 3 (1995); A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker, ed., Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). 86 Elsie Rockwell, “Schools of the Revolution: Enacting and Contesting State Forms in Tlaxcala, 1910- 1930,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution; Schell, Church 47
authors demonstrate that Catholics did not passively accept the Revolution’s attack on the
Church and religion and rebelled in multiple ways. Marjorie Becker and Adrian Bantjes
argue that when anti-clerical activists burned important icons, some average people
supported these actions but others feared divine retribution and hid statuary or responded
with violence of their own. These tensions escalated, as Jean Meyer, Bantjes, and others
reveal, into the Cristero and other smaller rebellions. As a result of all of these protests,
the national government relaxed or changed its anti-clerical policies.87 Finally, as
Katherine Bliss demonstrates, citizens also selectively followed public health regulations: thanks to protests, sex education classes were never fully implemented, poor women asserted that it was their right to be prostitutes if they wanted to, and young men willingly played sports, but then celebrated their victories with trips to the cantina.88
The third body of relevant literature examines revolutionaries’ cultural policies and finds that these programs were no less important than political or economic ones. In fact, they often overlapped. In revolutions around the world, artists have made and officials have employed a variety of types of propaganda, including monuments, posters, movies, literature, festivals, and monetary bills to sway public opinion. They have also promoted cultural programs such as public health and anti-clerical campaigns to further
and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico; Stephen E. Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico, 1920-1940,” in The Eagle and the Virgin. 87 Marjorie Becker, “Torching La Purísima, Dancing at the Altar: The Construction of Revolutionary Hegemony in Michoacán, 1934-1940,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth; Jennie Purnell, Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999); Adrian A. Bantjes, “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation: Local Religion and Cultural Revolution in Mexico,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 142; Jean Meyer, “An Idea of Mexico: Catholics in the Revolution,” in The Eagle and the Virgin. 88 Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation.” 48
deliver their messages. These items and projects helped to justify new regimes’ power by delegitimizing previous governments or the Revolutions’ supposed enemies. For instance, in France, the Jacobins replaced statues of royalty with new revolutionary heroes and changed streets with monarchical or Christian names to things like “The
Constitution” or “The Rights of Man.” Such acts also validated new governments’ values. Chinese posters praised the masses and Communism, while postage stamps in
Iran glorified Islam. Revolutionaries further used cultural strategies to create New Men and Women who were modern, healthy, and efficient workers as well as peaceful, obedient citizens. To try to reduce the power of tradition and the Church, Russian authorities directed courses in hygiene and political rights as well as films to peasant women. Finally, some officials, such as in Cuba and Nicaragua, encouraged regular people to exercise their creativity by setting up art cooperatives and distributing their works. These acts, as well, served to legitimize regimes and their revolutionary credentials by suggesting (even if falsely) that leaders did not monopolize the channels of communication and that ordinary citizens could participate in the creation of a new social
order.89 In other words, cultural programs were essential to the State-building process
and the success of the Revolution as a whole.
89 James A. Leith, The Idea of Art as Propaganda in France, 1750-1799: A Study in the History of Ideas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); Dugald Stermer, ed. The Art of Revolution: Castro’s Cuba, 1959-1970 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970); David Kunzle, “Public Graphics in Cuba: A Very Cuban Form of Internationalist Art,” Latin American Perspectives 2, no. 4 (1975); Hannah Mitchell, “Art and the French Revolution: An Exhibition at the Musée Carnavalet,” History Workshop 5 (1979); Ilene V. O’Malley, The Myth of the Revolution: Hero Cults and the Institutionalization of the Mexican State, 1920- 1940 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), Stephen White, The Bolshevik Poster (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People;” James A. Leith, Space and Revolution: Projects for Monuments, Squares, and Public Buildings in France, 1789-1799 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991); Joel C. Sheesley and Wayne G. Bragg, ed., Sandino in the Streets (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, ed., Everyday Forms 49
This present research adds to and combines all three of these fields. Unlike the numerous but cursory examples above, it is the first, full-length study of the anti-alcohol campaign during the Mexican Revolution. Furthermore, it is the only work about Mexico as of yet to examine temperance from the national, state, municipal, and popular perspective. This dissertation also corroborates the argument of recent political scholars, demonstrating that the process of State formation was shaped by input from individuals
on a variety of planes, including government officials, intellectuals, and ordinary people.
Although these groups did not shape the eventual nation equally, they all played a role in
its creation. This work further shows that the government’s cultural policies, which
included promoting high art, distributing propaganda, and carrying out campaigns such as
the temperance movement, should not be seen as trivial. Rather, attempts to form a new,
of State Formation; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico;” Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Toby Clark, Art and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: The Political Image in the Age of Mass Culture (New York: Henry N. Abrams Publishers, 1997); Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution; Lynne Attwood and Catriona Kelly, “Programmes for Identity: The ‘New Man’ and the ‘New Woman,’” in Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881-1940, ed. Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Harriet Evans and Stephanie Donald, ed., Picturing Power in the People’s Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); Palacios, La pluma y el arado; Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000); Peter J. Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran (London: Booth- Clibborn Editions, 2000); Joy Elizabeth Hayes, Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture, and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920-1950 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000); Bliss, Compromised Positions; David E. Lorey, “Postrevolutionary Contexts for Independence Day: The Problem of Order and the Invention of Revolution Day, 1920s-1940s,” in ¡Viva México! ¡Viva la Independencia! Celebrations of September 16, ed. William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey, (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2001); David Craven, Art and Revolution in Latin America, 1910-1990 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002); Haggai Ram, “Multiple Iconographies: Political Posters in the Iranian Revolution,” in Picturing Iran: Art, Society, and Revolution, ed. Shiva Balaghi and Lynn Gumpet (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Lincoln Cushing, ¡Revolución! Cuban Poster Art (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2003); Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico; Lewis, Ambivalent Revolution; Vaughan and Lewis, ed., The Eagle and the Virgin; Elena Jackson Albarrán, “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-1940,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2008). 50
modern citizenry through these projects were a vital part of the State-building process
and of social revolution in general.
Sources
This project has employed a variety of sources from seventeen archives, libraries,
and museums in Mexico and the United States. The public administration records of
presidents, governors, and mayors included laws, reports about violations of these
regulations, and congressional debates. Memoranda from education, public health, and
military officials detailed the necessity of combating alcoholism, while teachers and state
officials reported on the progress of the campaign in various parts of Sonora. Letters
from sobriety advocates from around the world praised Mexico’s anti-vice crusade and
petitions from various domestic organizations and individuals asked that cantinas in their
communities be closed. Clippings files, newspaper and magazine collections, and rare
books and pamphlets provided information about vice, the temperance movement, and
the production of alcohol at the national, state, and local levels. Cultural sources
included photographs, posters, flyers, temperance plays, movies, and songs. Indeed, this
work examines the political, social and cultural history of the Revolution.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter One, “From Laissez-Faire to Limited Regulations: The Weak Beginnings to the National Anti-Alcohol Campaign and the State-Building Process, 1910-1932,” examines the way that presidents carried out the temperance movement and finds that the 51
methods they used were directly related to the nature of their governments. National
leaders between 1910 and 1924 were ideologically passive and administratively weak.
As inheritors of a laissez-faire tradition and further limited by their resources and authority, these presidents merely encouraged governors, legislators, and experts in the
Departments of Public Health and Public Education to promote sobriety. In other cases, they also advocated that individuals combat their own vices. Not surprisingly, early executives accomplished little in the anti-alcohol campaign. Their successors, who governed between 1924 and 1932, achieved more. Ideologically active, although still administratively weak, these leaders engaged in limited reforms. They increased taxes on intoxicating beverages, strengthened health codes that regulated these same drinks, and most importantly, created a national body that would oversee the official anti-alcohol campaign in 1929. This body, initially named the Comité Nacional de Lucha contra el
Alcoholismo (CNLCA), largely waged a cultural campaign, creating and distributing propaganda to students, workers, and mothers.
Chapter Two, “Parades, Epistles and Prohibitive Legislation: The Strengthening of the Anti-Alcohol Campaign and the State-Building Process, 1932-1940,” also argues that the temperance movement was carried out in a manner consistent with the nature of the government at the time. Presidents between 1932 and 1940 can be classified as ideologically active and administratively stronger and thus they took the largest strides toward creating a sober nation. These executives, working with the CNLCA’s successors, the DEA and the DAA, continued to finance cultural and educational strategies, such as parades, conferences, and radio programs, to fight vice. They also 52
began to promote more active techniques in the struggle, including writing strongly-
worded epistles to state and municipal officials, demanding that they participate in the
anti-alcohol campaign, and passing prohibitive legislation that limited where and when
intoxicants could be purchased.
Chapter Three, “‘Temperancia: Por la Patria. Por la Raza’: The National Anti-
Alcohol Campaign and the Creation of a New Citizen, 1929-1940,” examines national
officials’ and bureaucrats’ reasons for promoting the temperance movement and finds
that they mirrored those of the larger State-building process. This chapter focuses only
on that period when presidents and their administrators made a concerted effort to combat
vice, 1929 to 1940, from the advent of the CNLCA to the dismantling of the DAA and
the Revolution in general. Political leaders and official reformers during this time directed the anti-alcohol campaign at working-class and indigenous men, groups they accused of being particularly prone to inebriation, and they solicited the assistance of women and children, those people supposedly most affected by the alcoholism of their husbands and fathers. Reformers feared that intoxicated individuals committed crimes, mistreated their families, and passed their diseases on to their progeny. Perhaps even more importantly, they worried that they impeded the process of State-building.
Drunkards could not work diligently to rebuild the economy, participate in the political process, or whole-heartedly support the new regime over disgruntled outside politicians or the Church. Temperance advocates, therefore, strove to create New Men and Women who were healthy, sober, and efficient workers to raise the next generation of modern and rational citizens. Because reformers’ ideas about ethnicity, class, and gender were 53
prejudiced, and because they did not really attempt to address the socio-economic causes
of alcohol abuse, they merely ended up reinforcing patriarchy, a hierarchical society, and the paternalistic nature of the government.
Chapter Four, “One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: The Anti-Alcohol
Campaign and the Contested State-Building Process in Sonora, 1915-1939,” demonstrates that the temperance movement and the State-building process were not made by presidents and federal bureaucrats alone. Rather, both projects relied on the support (and were subject to the rejection) of thousands of governors, mayors, policemen, and ordinary citizens. Sonora makes an ideal case study for a variety of reasons. It had the nation’s first, and most radical, experiment with state-level alcohol prohibition.
Additionally, located on the border with Arizona, which was subject to the restriction of
intoxicants statewide and then federally from 1915 to 1933, Sonoran authorities
constantly had to choose between the ethical position of temperance and the revenue that
could be generated by catering to thirsty American tourists. Finally, Sonora was an
ethnically diverse region, consisting of mestizos with a strong tie to their European
ancestry, a small but visible indigenous population (including the Yaquis who maintained
a tribal lifestyle), and immigrants from the United States, Germany, and China, among
others. This chapter, then, looks at three moments in Sonoran history: 1915 to 1919,
when all types of intoxicating beverages were restricted in the state and Sonora led the
nation in its efforts to combat vice; 1929, the beginning of the official, national anti-
alcohol campaign, and a relative lull in Sonora’s; and 1934 to 1939, the height of
effectiveness in the federal movement, and a period when the state witnessed one set of 54
governors who whole-heartedly supported the creation of a sober constituency, and
another set who looked at the issue apathetically, if not hostilely. In all three cases, if national, state, and municipal authorities, as well as regular people, worked in concert, the campaign took strides forward. As these various stars rarely aligned, the movement more frequently than not regressed.
Chapter Five, “Fighting Vice, Forging a Nation: Unofficial Anti-Alcohol Leagues
and the Participatory State-Building Process, 1910-1940,” traces the participation of
ordinary citizens in the temperance movement and argues that while these people fought
vice, they were also forging a new country.90 The national government promoted the creation of unofficial organizations initially to do what it could not and would not do in the anti-alcohol campaign, and later to further the labor of federal bureaucrats. The members of these groups were not forced to promote sobriety, though, they willing joined temperance leagues and labor unions or worked as concerned individuals to fight vice by requesting the closure of a cantina in their neighborhood or asking for monetary assistance so as to be able to create pro-temperance propaganda. At the same time, these unofficial activists demanded that their political leaders respect the law and fulfill the ideals of the Revolution. Although their opinions were not always respected, they actively participated in both the anti-alcohol campaign and the State-building process.
90 “Ordinary citizens” are difficult to define because there is not always a clear distinction between the State and society. Therefore, people in this category include not only workers, peasants, and indigenous peoples with no ties to the government, but also parastatal actors like teachers, bureaucrats, and journalists who, in their spare time, formed leagues that advocated sobriety. Abrams, “The Difficulty of Studying the State,” 59, 74; Christine Ehrick, The Shield of the Weak: Feminism and the State I Uruguay, 1903-1933 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 13-15. 55
The upper-middle class bureaucrats from the DAA and the lower-class workers and peasants from the SASOC may not have had much in common. Nevertheless, they shared at least two goals: they wanted to decrease levels of chronic inebriation and to create a new, revolutionary nation. 56
CHAPTER 1 FROM LAISSEZ-FAIRE TO LIMITED REGULATIONS: THE WEAK BEGINNINGS TO THE NATIONAL ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN AND THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS, 1910-1932
In 1911, President Francisco Madero claimed that the nation’s politics had changed radically with the Revolution, but he advised people not to expect economics or social structure to improve as quickly, since, according to him, those could not be legislated. Rather, he advised, “you will find your happiness in yourselves, in the domination of your passions and the repression of your vices.”1 This individualistic, laissez-faire view of how to deal with the vice of alcohol abuse contrasted drastically with the more direct strategy of President Emilio Portes Gil. In 1929, he created the
Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo (CNLCA). This group printed temperance materials, organized festivals, parades, and radio programs, and consolidated the various anti-alcohol campaigns that previously had been waged by separate federal departments. With the CNLCA’s help, presidents also began to pass limited regulations aimed at subjecting alcohol consumption to the oversight of the national government.2
These examples demonstrate that the anti-alcohol campaign and the State- building process were closely connected, for the way that presidents carried out the former project was influenced by the nature of their governments. Ideologically passive and administratively weak presidents—Madero, Venustiano Carranza, and Álvaro
Obregón—shared a desire to have a sober nation, but they accomplished little in this
1 Francisco Madero, 24 June 1911, quoted in John Lear, Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens: The Revolution in Mexico City (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 143. 2 Circular, Felipe Canales, Subsecretary of Government, to governors, 22 April 1929, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública, Emilio Portes Gil (AGN-FAP-EPG), Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del Ejecutivo de la Unión,” Boletín de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, (BSEP), 8, no. 4 (1929): 141-42, 144. 57 field. As Madero’s quote shows, these leaders held laissez-faire views: they believed that vices could only be overcome when people chose not to be controlled by them any longer. None of these leaders felt that the executive branch had any business legislating morality, and after 1917, the constitution actually prevented it. Therefore, if these presidents did anything about chronic inebriation, their solution was to encourage governors and mayors to adopt anti-vice regulations and to appoint experts to the
Departments of Public Health and Public Education, who would then distribute informative flyers or create educational programs to teach people about the dangers of alcohol abuse. These strategies had the added benefit of being relatively inexpensive for fledgling, weak States with severe budgetary restrictions.
These techniques contrasted with those of the ideologically active, yet administratively weak regimes of Plutarco Elías Calles, Portes Gil, and Pascual Ortiz
Rubio. These leaders believed that the executive branch ought to head a vigorous anti- alcohol campaign, and they began to do so, as Portes Gil’s creation of the CNLCA shows. Nationally-directed reform was not always possible, however, in part because of constitutional restrictions. Therefore they passed limited regulations aimed at combating alcohol abuse in other ways, such as by changing tax codes or monitoring beverages for salubriousness. Officials from a variety of departments also launched extensive cultural campaigns that blanketed the nation with flyers, radio programs, and parades, as well as a temperance program in all of the nation’s schools. The use of cultural methods made sense for these administratively weak States because they cost relatively little and aural and visual propaganda were effective tools to reach the illiterate and non-Spanish 58
speakers. Furthermore, the president could leave the planning of festivals to bureaucrats,
which was essential as he was still busy with more directly threatening issues such as
rebellions. Finally, because he appointed these administrators of health, education, and labor departments, and they were usually individuals loyal to him, he could count on them to carry out his cultural policies, unlike governors and mayors who were frequently corrupt, apathetic, or openly hostile, and might not enforce anti-alcohol legislation.
The National Anti-Alcohol Campaign in Ideologically Passive and Administratively Weak Regimes
As a revolutionary, Francisco Madero primarily had political goals, but he had some social ones, as well. From a young age, he personally renounced liquor and tobacco, going so far as to sell off his entire stock of wine.3 He wanted to extend this reformist zeal to the general populace, and he claimed on his numerous campaign tours that he would rid the country of drinking, gambling, and blood sports. However, in the period from 1911 to 1913, Madero and his allies accomplished little in the field of moral reform. A proponent of an ideologically passive government, Madero would not use federal legislation to force people to abandon their vices. As the quote that began this chapter demonstrated, he relied on the Liberal idea of individual self-help and rejected the notion that the national government had a role in legislating morality, as desirable as it might be. Therefore, he left the project up to state and municipal leaders. Even if the president had advocated a more active State, though, the administratively weak nature of
the government at the time would have prevented him from realizing his goals. Some
3 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, 56, 58. 59
officials, especially those from the north of the country, shared Madero’s desire to rid the
nation of its so-called drinking problem but they were often overshadowed by other
authority figures, many of them also Maderistas, who actually encouraged the spread of
vice. A lack of funds compounded the problem and by the time Madero was assassinated
in 1913, his compatriots were no more sober than they had been three years earlier.4
During the presidency of Venustiano Carranza (1914-1920), the issue of
regulating alcohol resurfaced, as did the question of how active a role the national
government should play in creating a sober society. Nowhere was this issue debated more fiercely than at the Constitutional Convention of 1916 to 1917 where constituents from around Mexico attempted to institutionalize the Revolution by discussing political structures, the economy, education, and land distribution. They also debated the best ways to eradicate vice, which representatives argued had damaged the country.5
For one group of delegates, the answer was an active State. These men believed
that the constitution ought to prohibit the production, sale and consumption of alcohol,
suppress gambling, blood sports, and drugs, and close all cantinas and casinos.6 For these constituents, time was of the essence as well. Representative Rubén Martí claimed that the eradication of alcohol abuse had to come before even the redistribution of land, for if
4 Ibid., 443-44; Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, 41-49. 5 Seudónimo Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” (paper presented at Génesis, actualidad y perspectives de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico City, June 1992), 2-3, 5, 7-8, 24-25, 28-29, Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, Biblioteca de la Revolución Mexicana (INEHRM-BRM); Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917: Diario de debates, vol. 1 (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1985), 794, 1033; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 619-22, 649, 656, 936-37. 6 Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 2-4, 30; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 938. 60
Mexican citizens were drunk, they could not possibly hope to work their new plots.7 In addition, in response to the question of whether changing peoples’ habits might not be
more effective than imposing legislative mandates, these delegates argued that education
was a slow process and the problem of alcoholism was too great to wait. Therefore, the
government had to react immediately and with a complete prohibition—anything less
would be ineffective. More importantly, constituents such as Luis G. Monzón, who
believed that his colleagues should be less practical and more radical, felt that ignoring
the problem of alcohol would be a betrayal of the ideals of the Revolution.8 He and many others claimed that the country had long history of alcoholism that had been caused by the Spanish conquest, exploited by capitalists throughout the Porfiriato, and had only gotten worse during the Revolution, owing to economic and political instability.9 They further claimed that the interests of pulque hacendados would not be harmed by prohibiting alcohol because they could harvest other products instead. Even if their investments were damaged, the constituents believed that the Revolution had to serve the needs of the many over the needs of the few, and it was therefore the duty of the new government to rid people of their vices.10
The majority of constituents disapproved of a mandated, national prohibition of alcohol. Some argued that the measure would simply be too difficult to carry out with the sheer number of drinking establishments in the country and the quantity of law
7 Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 656. 8 Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 949-950, 1029-30. 9 Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 5, 7-8, 28- 29; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 1, 789-90, 793-94, 1033. 10 E. V. Niemeyer, Jr., Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Congress of 1916-1917 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), 183. 61
enforcement officials that would be necessary to ensure compliance.11 Others believed that such a measure would be ineffective, thanks to corruption and an alcoholic culture.
For example, Dr. José María Rodríguez, chief of the Department of Public Health, had tried in 1914 to combat alcohol abuse. He pointed out that pulque producers had attempted to bribe him with four hundred thousand pesos and the same was likely to happen again. On a smaller scale, a number of the delegates themselves drank during the proceedings and claimed that they would not want to give up alcohol altogether. Even the ardent temperance advocate Monzón sheepishly admitted that when he left his home state of Sonora (which was in the middle of an absolute prohibition) for the Convention, he was glad to have his first drink in fourteen months. This led Representative Manuel
Cepeda Medrano to ask how they could expect anyone else to stop drinking if they themselves would not.12 Some delegates further feared that abolishing the sale of alcohol would mean the loss of between four and eight million pesos of revenue, a blow that the national budget could not sustain. Others, including Dr. Rodríguez, stated that such an economic jolt would lead to further repercussions for the over four hundred thousand workers employed in growing, transporting, or selling pulque. In fact, only one of the fifteen representatives from the pulque-producing states of Mexico and Hidalgo voted for a prohibition.13 Perhaps even more importantly, and in keeping with the trend of the
ideologically passive State at the time, most representatives believed that the executive
branch and the constitution had no business regulating peoples’ personal lives. Rather,
11 Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 945. 12 Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 1, 800; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 945; Niemeyer, Jr., Revolution at Querétaro, 170, 184-85, 191-94. 13 Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 31; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 1, 939; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 949, 954-56. 62
they argued that the containment of vice was a matter best left to experts working in the
appropriate departments of Health or Education, in addition to legislators at the national
and state levels.14
In the end, this passive approach won out. The delegates rejected the matter of a
federal prohibition by nearly a two to one vote. Instead, they left the decision on whether
the sale and consumption of intoxicating beverages ought to be restricted up to state
governments.15 Additionally, the constitution granted the federal legislature the power to pass laws on public health as deemed necessary and to oversee an anti-alcohol campaign along with the Department of Public Health. The document further demanded that workers be paid in money, not credit or alcohol, a problem that had plagued the nation for centuries. Cantinas and casinos could not be located in work centers with over two hundred inhabitants. Finally, the constitution also declared that the rights of citizenship could be rescinded for vagrancy or habitual drunkenness.16 In other words, the delegates who supported an ideologically active government were outnumbered when it came to the issue of chronic intoxication.
The results of the Constitutional Convention affected the presidency of
Venustiano Carranza (1914-1920). Himself an abstainer, Carranza announced his
intention to combat vice in the early days of his presidency. Indeed, when the general
first occupied Mexico City in 1914, he declared martial law and closed all cantinas.
14 Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 2-4, 11, 31; Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 1, 796, 799-800. 15 Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 3, 11-12; Constitution of the United States of Mexico, Signed January 31, 1917 and Promulgated February 5, 1917 (Washington, DC: Columbian Printing Company, 1926), 27. 16 Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 3, 12; Constitution of the United States of Mexico, 11-12, 17, 28. 63
Once the rule of law was reestablished, though, with the drafting of the constitution, this
type of action was no longer possible. Therefore, Carranza left the matter of vice up to
legislators as well as state and municipal officials. In 1917, the federal legislature passed the Law of Family Relations, which declared that habitual intoxication would be considered an impediment to marriage. It is unclear how this law was regulated, and in the end, change on the national scale was limited.17
From 1920 to 1924, President Álvaro Obregón began to deal more seriously with
the issue of alcohol. His concern with the problem and his desire to find a solution to it caused rumors of a U.S.-style Prohibition to abound. Indeed, in 1922, the national legislature began to discuss the issue.18 In part, this increased interest can be explained
precisely because the United States had passed its Volstead Act in 1919. The following
year, the Undersecretary of the Interior, José L. Lugo, suggested closing all cantinas,
casinos, and other vice establishments in a 100-kilometer zone from the northern border.
He remarked that the government took into consideration the morality of both its citizens
and those of foreign countries. Lugo did not want the “geographical accident” of the
border to cause a law, which could lead to morality and order in both nations, to be
17 Ley sobre relaciones familiares (Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1917), 18; Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, 172, 439; Richmond, Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 65, 165-168; Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, 16. 18 Francis J. Dyer, consul, Nogales, to U.S. Department of State, 8 April 1922, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/33.5; Wiley J. Phillips, editor of California Voice, to Obregón, 21 September 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 425-P- 11; “¿Se implantará el estado seco?” EO, 21 October 1922, 1; Torreblanca to Starr Hunt, 22 September 1923, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-E-23; Ivy V. Yeaworth, president, and María Linsa Ortiz, secretary, of the Unión Local de Esfuerzo Cristiano, to Obregón, 6 September 1924, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-E-23. 64 violated. A similar measure, proposed in 1923, would have closed all cantinas on the border and heavily taxed those within fifty miles of the dividing line.19
Neither of these reforms ever occurred. In fact, all of the measures that were taken by the administration during this time period were indirect and gradual, consistent with an ideologically passive and administratively weak State. The Department of Public
Health proposed a national anti-alcohol campaign and requested funds to print propaganda posters. Although this goal was not achieved, the group did send a
representative to the International Anti-alcohol Congress held in Copenhagen in 1923 and
the Department’s Institute of Hygiene conducted a study on the yeast in pulque in order
to begin sanitizing the beverage.20 The Department of Education in 1923 had one million flyers which provided information about the links between alcoholism and tuberculosis distributed at the nation’s schools as well as industrial and agricultural workers’
associations.21 Furthermore, teachers sent to instruct indigenous students also worked to
19 Alfred P. Coles, of A. P. Coles Real Estate, El Paso, Texas, to U. S. Secretary of State, 30 August 1920, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/17; “‘Será implantado el ‘estado seco’ en toda la frontera de México con los Estados Unidos,” EO, 20 January 1923, 5; “El Primer Magistrado de la N. trató sobre la sucesión presidencial. ‘De la Huerta. Señalado como candidato presidencial. No constituye un problema para mi pais.’ Importantes topicos trató. Además, en la ultima entrevista que concedió a los periodistas de la capital. Entre otras cosas también se refirió al banco unico, al establecimiento de una zona seca, y del reconocimiento,” ES, 20 February 1923, 1. 20 Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Fondo Salubridad Pública II, Sección Presidencia, Serie Secretaría, (AHSSA-FSPII-SP-SS), Caja 9, Exp. 5: annual report, office of the Oficialía Mayor, Department of Public Health, 14 July 1924; information collected for the 1924 annual report. “Labor primordial del Departamento de Salubridad realizada durante el cuatrenio presidencial del Ciudádano General don Álvaro Obregón,” EX, 27 September 1924. 21 Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Fondo Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Sección Subsecretaría Asistencia (AHSSA-FSSA-SSA), Caja 17, Exp. 2: “Hay más tísicos en los niños de padres bebedores,” 1921; Profesor Rafael Mallén, Confederación Nacional Cooperativa de la República Mexicana, to Dr. Rafael Pascacio Gamboa, Chief of the Department of Public Health, 13 October 1947. 65 cure these communities of their supposed desire to drink.22 Finally, the Secretary of the
Army and the Navy announced that all officers who were seen in a cantina or in a state of intoxication while in their uniforms would be demoted, and in fact, one newspaper article reported that, as of May 1923, the first man had already been stripped of his rank.23
Other measures taken by the government involved trying to transform the alcohol industry. In 1921, Obregón put together a commission to determine how to eradicate the
maguey plant, used to produce pulque, tequila, and other beverages. The group
recommended doing it gradually, by letting all current harvests develop, but not planting
any new ones. In seven to ten years, the supply of pulque would be exhausted and
planters would have ample time to find a new source of income.24 Meanwhile, the president appointed several chemists to study the production of other goods from the maguey, including paper, textiles, sugar, industrial alcohol, and fuel, so that the economy
would not suffer so drastically from the subsequent loss of alcohol revenue.25 In spite of the fact that several scientists were working on these projects and at least one claimed to have found successful replacements for pulque, the government at this time did not begin
22 Report, Delegate C. Rivera Domínguez, Colonia Cultural Indígena General Benjamin Hill, Kunkaak, Sonora, 4 October 1922, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Departamento de Educación y Cultura Indígena, Estado de Sonora, (AHSEP-DECIS), Caja 16, Exp. 63. 23 “Militar dado de baja por estar ebrio con uniforme,” EO, 26 May 1923, 7. 24 Elie Delafond, Centro Azucarero y Químico-Industrial, to Obregón, 14 December 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2; Summerlin to U.S. Secretary of State, 15 December 1921, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/28; Cornelius Turner, consul in charge, Mexico City, to American Consulate General, 16 December 1921, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/27. 25 “El agave mexicano. Se ha descubierto un procedimiento para extraer glucosa y sacarina,” EO, 23 July 1921; Delafond to Obregón, 14 December 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2; Delafond to Torreblanca, February 14, 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2; “Tlaxcala to Open Fiber and Alcohol Plant. Entire Component of Maguey to be Utilized,” The Mexico Times, 20 May 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 808-A-35; Obregón to José Miguel Bont, Head of the Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, 29 September 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2; Delafond to Obregón, n.d., AGN-Admin Pub-O-C, Exp. 808-A-35; Delafond, “México, gracias al maguey, está llamado a ser uno de los más grandes productores del mundo de combustible carburante,” n.d., AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2 . 66
to officially dismantle the alcohol industry, quite likely because such an action would not
have been in keeping with its passive nature.
The National Anti-Alcohol Campaign in Ideologically Active and Administratively Weak Regimes
Teetotalers cheered with the election of Plutarco Elías Calles to president in 1924.
The most powerful man in the country, seemingly the nation’s strongest advocate for the
complete elimination of alcohol, and a proponent of ideologically active government, a
prohibition seemed all but guaranteed. In the 1910s, Calles had served as chief of police
in Agua Prieta, Sonora, where he had banned alcohol at Independence Day festivities and
forbidden that children enter cantinas.26 When he became governor of the state in 1915, his first measure was to prohibit the production, transportation, sale and consumption of all kinds of alcohol.27 Under Obregón, Calles had served as Chief of Government and he
made several public statements in support of a prohibition, going so far as to claim that
the U.S. Volstead Act was not failing.28 Therefore, when Calles did become president, it
seemed likely that he would carry out his promise to restrict alcohol of all kinds.
In spite of the heightened expectations and Calles’s desire to lead an ideologically
active regime, relatively little official temperance work was accomplished in his four
26 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, 444; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 31-32. 27 See Chapter 4. “Decreto 1,” BO, 1, no. 1 (13 September 1915). 28 M. de Velasco, President of the Camara Industrial y Agraria de Veracruz, and Ignacio Martínez, Velasco’s secretary, to Obregón, 12 January 1922, AGN-Admin Pub-O-C, Exp. 424-A-3; Summerlin to U.S. Secretary of State, 26 August 1922, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/36; Rafael Nieto, governor of San Luis Potosí, to Plutarco Elías Calles, 27 August 1922, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca-Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles, (FAPECyFT-APEC), Exp. 73, Inventario (Inv.) 3998, Leg. 1/3; “See Mexico Dry if General Calles Made President,” New Orleans Item, 20 October 1922, FAPECyFT- APEC, Exp. 53, Inv. 1717, Leg. 4/22; Murray, ed. and trans., Mexico Before the World: Public, 32. 67
years. In 1925, the Department of Government drew up a proposal to modify the
constitution. Article 117 stated that national and state legislatures had the right to pass
laws limiting alcohol consumption, but they were not required to do so. The president wanted to eliminate this technicality, so that these legislative bodies would have to debate the issue, but the proposal was either forgotten or rejected.29 Either way, it seems that in spite of Calles’s wishes, many legislators still adhered to the idea of an ideologically passive State, a fact that highlights the administratively weak nature of the regime.
Calles and other temperance advocates therefore had to approach the problem of chronic alcohol abuse in other ways. They tried to forbid that intoxicating beverages be produced from any materials needed to feed the populace. Lawmakers hoped that this
1927 measure would decrease alcoholism and hunger, as well as improve the economy, because it would not be necessary to import so much grain.30 They also increased taxes on the production of alcohol. In 1925, domestic barrel and bottled beers were taxed 3.5 and 10.5 centavos per liter respectively. Imported beer and liquors would be taxed at between 70 and 80 percent of their value. The goal was in part to reduce the consumption of alcohol, but also to bring in a minimum of 4.8 million pesos and to support domestic industry.31 It is impossible to know whether or not these measures
helped to increase sobriety, but it is certain that businesses were affected. Because beer
29 “Una ley contra el alcoholismo,” EO, 21 November 1925, 1. 30 “La Sría de Industría prohibió las bebidas fabricadas a base de aguardiente de maíz,” EO, 24 September 1927, 5; Circular 21-83, “Circular que no conderán permisos para la elaboración de alcohol, encindose el maíz como materia prima,” BO 20, no. 39 (10 November 1927); Leonardo M. Ballesteros to President Emilio Portes Gil, 12 November 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Department of Public Health Memorandum, 20 March 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1. 31 “La cerveza nacional y las cuotas que pagará. Por decreto presidencial, esta industría deberá hacer mayores enteros,” EO, 10 January 1925, 1; “Las cervezas que se importen a México pagarán 80 por ciento de su costo. También los vinos y aguardientes extranjeros pagarán muy altos impuestos. El whiskey de Canadá pagará sesenta y cinco por ciento,” EO, 31 January 1925, 4. 68
producers spent close to 4.5 million pesos in taxes, they were forced to hire fewer
employees the following year.32 Officials also at least tried to make beverages more sanitary. In 1927, the Department of Public Health mandated that pulque be sold only in closed containers so as to prevent it from spoiling or being adulterated. Additional measures the following year required that the drink arrive at dispensaries refrigerated and in closed and clean containers.33 Similarly, one idea was that if people had to consume alcohol, it ought to be not only sanitary, but also relatively weak. For this reason, Calles advocated the consumption of beer, rather than stronger liquors.34
Other departments launched or continued cultural campaigns. For instance, in
1927, the CROM considered a program to combat alcoholism in workers that would
combine education, centers of “honest” recreation, and propaganda.35 The Department of
Public Education for its part taught children to avoid alcohol, caffeine, and drugs. It sent
this message through textbooks, posters placed on school walls, and temperance plays, at
times written by the student themselves.36 Each of these strategies helped to advance the movement for sobriety, albeit slowly and indirectly.
An advocate of an ideologically active State, interim President Emilio Portes Gil
in 1929 revitalized the anti-alcohol campaign. He, like Calles, had long been associated
with temperance, having declared a partial prohibition as the governor of Tamualipas
32 Juan Saint Martín, president of the Convención de Cerveceros de la República Mexicana to Calles, 7 July 1925, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 205-C-169; report, Enrique Monterrubio, representative of the Department of Public Health, to the CNLCA, 3 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1. 33 “Se prohibe la venta de pulque en vaso,” EO, 27 August 1927, 2; Acuerdo 1026, Adición al Reglamento para la Produción, Introducción, Transporte, y Venta del Pulque, 13 September 1928, AGN-FAP-O-C, Acuerdo 1026-1928. 34 “El Señor Calles es partidario de la cerveza,” La Raza (Hermosillo) (LR), 19 July 1927, 3. 35 “Para combater el vicio de alcoholismo,” EO, 20 August 1927, 6. 36 Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, 34, 57, 95; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, 27. 69
from 1925 to 1928.37 Also like his predecessor, he announced that he would carry out similar legislation as president before he even took office.38 Unlike the previous administrations, Portes Gil wasted little time in fulfilling his campaign promises. Less than five months after being sworn in, on April 16, 1929, he made an official statement condemning alcohol. He followed it up in the next weeks with detailed plans and instructions to governors and department heads as to their roles in the new, official national anti-alcohol campaign.
Portes Gil’s proposal was that the anti-alcohol campaign would take a two-
pronged approach. First, an administrative body, the CNLCA, would employ educational
and cultural measures of persuasion, rather than repressive legislation, to cure the
problem. Most observers agreed that outright prohibition would not work, as the
example of the United States was demonstrating. Rather, through tools such as school
and sports programs, parades, hymns, and posters, temperance advocates would convince
people of the negative effects of alcohol. Second, the CNLCA would encourage the
formation of popular anti-alcohol societies among school children, women, and the lower
classes, allowing a national vision to be made reality on the local level.39
37 Ezequiel Padilla, “Los nuevos ideales en Tamualipas,” in El pueblo contra el alcoholismo: Silabarios de la Secretaría de Educación Pública (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1929), 16-17, BMLT- AE, Ø03314; “El Presidente Portes Gil,” LR, 21 January, 1929, 1; María Eugenia Ramírez García, “Introducción,” Guía al Archivo Particular de Emilio Portes Gil 246, no. 2 (n.p., n.d.), Archivo General de la Nación, Centro de Referencías. 38 “Portes Gil asegura a Morrow que implantará el estado seco. Implantará las mismas leyes contra la embriaguez y el juego que rigen actualmente en los Estados Unidos,” EO, 29 September 1928; “E. Portes Gil Avowed Dry. President Hopes to Abolish Alcohol as his Country’s Greatest Curse,” EE, 17 April 1929. 39 See Chapter 5. “E. Portes Gil Avowed Dry,” EX, 17 April 1929; “Reform in Mexico,” San Antonio Light, 18 April 1929; “La campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 18 April 1929; circular, Canales to governors, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del Ejecutivo de la Unión,”BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 141-42, 144. 70
The CNLCA, with its motto of “Patria Sana. Patria Fuerte. Antialcoholismo,”
began to meet, once a week, in May 1929. This group was composed of representatives
from the Departments of Agriculture and Development; Communication and Public
Works; Foreign Relations; Government; Industry, Commerce, and Labor; Public
Education; Public Health; Statistics; and Treasury. The CNLCA also consisted of
liaisons from state governments, the military, the Red Cross, the media, rotary clubs,
Masonic lodges, business and industrial organizations, mothers clubs, and workers and
peasant leagues. Having members from such diverse backgrounds allowed the group to
combine a wide array of experience. Dr. Aquilino Villanueva, a prominent physician and
head of the Department of Public Health, headed the CNLCA as president.40
In spite of Portes Gil’s desire to lead an ideologically active State, his government
remained administratively weak. Therefore, the majority of temperance activity during his presidency involved cultural projects such as those carried out by the Department of
Public Education. This ministry mandated anti-alcohol instruction in all federal schools
and teachers complied with this regulation in a variety of ways. Some taught about
alcohol and its negative effects on the body in science and hygiene courses, often relying
on statistics provided in teaching manuals written by the teacher Andrés Osuna, a
40 J. Sánchez Mejorada, chief of the Secretariat of Communication and Public Works, to Portes Gil, 17 May 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; Secretariat of Foreign Relations to Portes Gil, 23 May 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 3; “Reglamento del Comité Nacional de Lucha contra el Alcoholismo,” Abraham Ayala González, Interim Chief of the Department of Public Health, 6 June 1929, AGN-FAP- EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; Emilio Araujo, representative of the Confederación de las Cámaras de Comercio and the representatives from the Secretariat of Foreign Relations and the Department of Public Health to CNLCA, 11 June 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; memorandum, Dr. Juan Enríquez Roca to Monterrubio, chief of the Sección Servicio Jurídico of the Department of Public Health, 18 June 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Quiñones to the Department of Public Education, 20 December 1929, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; bulletin, 1929, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Sección Departamento de Psicopedagogía e Higiene, Subserie Inspección Sanitaria de Edificio de Escuelas Particulares, (AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP), Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73. 71 member of the CNLCA. Others utilized a new textbook, Fermín, which explained to
students that by ending their dependence on landowners, merchants, and priests, and
instead focusing on “national brotherhood,” peasants would be able to abandon
alcoholism, machismo, and other vices that had kept them from progressing. Others may
have employed a pamphlet of student anti-alcohol drawings and statements which had
been compiled and distributed to teachers.41 A few schools held temperance conferences for students, parents, and community members. Instructors were further encouraged to promote physical education, to hold art and essay contests on anti-alcohol themes, and have their students recite a temperance pledge daily. Inspectors traveled around their districts to ensure that teachers complied with these anti-vice regulations as well as their other duties. Many also took the opportunity to speak to parents and community members themselves, warning them about the dangers of alcohol abuse and organizing them into temperance leagues.42 Overall, the success of this program was limited. The
Chief of the Department of Public Education reported that in 1929, 3431 rural schools and 264 primary schools participated in the anti-alcohol campaign. Most did this by
41 Report, School Director Rosalío E. Moreno, Nogales, 4 February 1929, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Dirección General de Educación Primaria en los Estados y Territorios, Dirección de Educacion Federal, Estado de Sonora, (AHSEP-DEFS), Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del Ejecutivo de la Unión,”BSEP, 8 no. 4 (1929): 143-44; report, Ramón G. Bonfil, director of Federal Education in Sonora, 9 November 1929, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Departamento de Escuelas Rurales, Estado de Sonora, (AHSEP-DERS), Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 1; report, School Director Juan F. Márquez, Nogales, 30 November 1929, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; Bonfil to schools, 18 December 1929, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 9; Andrés Osuna, El alcoholismo. Manual de enseñanza antialcohólica. Para uso de profesores de educación primaria y estudiantes de escuelas secundarias (Mexico City: Sociedad de Edición y Librería Franco Americana, 1929); Manuel Flores A., Alcoholismo: Silabarios de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, (Mexico City: n.p., n.d.), 1-3, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Sección Departamento de Psicopedagogía e Higiene (AHSEP-SDPH), Caja 5123, Exp. 79; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 41-42. 42 Reports, J. Humberto Paniagua, inspector of the central zone of Sonora: 31 May, 16 June, 1 July, 31 July, 31 October, and 30 November 1929, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 1. Flyer, Nogales, Sonora, 24 May 1929, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 2. 72
hosting some type of community event, with an average of 343 attendees. In addition,
over 2700 educational institutions formed anti-alcohol committees. Although in this year
more than 19,000 schools existed, it was at least a beginning.43
One of the keys in reaching children and adults that did not attend school was the
use of various kinds of propaganda. Days after his initial declaration, Portes Gil released
a list of more than twenty slogans that could be displayed in public places. These included “If you want to triumph in life, you should keep yourself healthy. Alcohol is the worst enemy of your health.”44 Although it is unknown if these messages were ever posted, the CNLCA did employ newspaper ads, radio programs, movies, expert-led conferences, pamphlets and postcards. A traveling theater, set up in parks and gardens across Mexico City, enlisted comical puppets to deliver messages about hygiene and sobriety to enthusiastic audiences. Another tactic consisted of utilizing the more than two thousand drawings created in school contests. In November 1929, the best 800 on the themes of “The Child of an Alcoholic” and “The Destroyed Home” were selected and displayed in a Mexico City park. The president, various functionaries, and the working- class inhabitants of the neighborhood attended the opening of the exposition.45 These visual resources helped to reach the country’s large number of illiterate individuals as well as those who could not speak Spanish.
43 Chief of the Department of Public Education to Villanueva, 11 January 1930, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; Franco, “Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio,” in Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 14. 44 Circular, Canales to governors, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2. 45 Ayala González, 6 June 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Brigadas de moralización obrera,” EP, 14 June 1929; radio announcement, 27 November 1929, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Sección Oficina Cultural Radiotelefónica, (AHSEP-SOCR), Caja 9474, Exp. 12; “Dirección de radio,” BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 101; Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo;” Juan José Barreiro and Marcela Guijosa, Titeres mexicanos: Memorias y retrato de autómatas, fantoches y otros artistas ambulantes (Mexico City: Grupo Roche-Syntex, 1997), 99. 73
The widespread diffusion of this propaganda further ensured that no matter where
people lived—in cities, villages, or haciendas—they would come across the message of
sobriety. For this reason, the Department of Government printed 100,000 copies of
Portes Gil’s declaration and the newspaper Excélsior contributed one thousand more.
These flyers were distributed throughout Mexico and around the world.46 Indeed, the response was overwhelming. In just one year’s time, the president received dozens of letters from Mexicans, Americans (including a number of Mexican-Americans),
Canadians, Britons, and Uruguayans who supported the program and offered advice of their own.47 The Mexican letters came from across the country, even from small towns.
Furthermore, the fact that some letters contained poor grammar and spelling suggests that
even the relatively uneducated were familiar with Portes Gil’s stance on sobriety. A
group of “ragged drunks” even showed up at the Department of Government, offering to tour the country and serve as demonstrations of the degenerating effects of alcohol.
Although the offer was declined, it shows the government’s success in advertising the campaign.48
The biggest event planned to commemorate and promote the health of the nation
was a series of anti-alcohol parades held across the country on November 20, 1929, the
46 “Veinte gobernadores listos para apoyar con toda energia la cruzada en contra del alcoholismo. Ofrecen su cooperación al supreme mandatorio. Algunos de ellos informan de los trabajos que han emprendido ya en pro de la desalcoholización de las respectivas Entidades. Acción sostenida,” EU, 24 April 1929; “Excélsior acoge con entusiasmo la idea para combatir el vicio de la embriaguez en la nación,” EU, n.d. 47 AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Legs. 1-4; AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 3, 10-11, 18-19, 21-22, 24. 48 “Los gobernadores secundan la campaña antialcohólica. Copiosa propaganda mural. Ebrios andrajosas, que deseaban mostrar de ‘bulto’ la degeneración por el alcohol,” EU, 23 April 1929, 1; Refugio G. Rivera, Estación Llano, to Governor Francisco S. Elías, 15 June 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41. 74 anniversary of the Revolution.49 Portes Gil called for all public and private schools to
participate in this event, and inspectors spent months traveling the countryside, making
sure that the schools in their district were prepared. The day was a resounding success.
The Department of Public Education reported that one million children across the nation
marched, 30,000 in Mexico City alone. The state of Sonora had at least eleven parades,
everywhere from the state capital to small farming and mining communities. One school
inspector counted 1200 students marching just in the medium-sized town of Ures. At
each event, the military, public officials, and observers, including American citizens in
some border towns, joined students and teachers. In the parades and the demonstrations
that followed them, children carried flags or drawings that showed the consequences of
drinking and signs with anti-alcohol messages such as “Pure water. War on alcoholism.”
Some sang anti-alcohol hymns such as “The Shame of Alcohol,” while other wrote letters
to their parents asking them to no longer drink. Respected members of the community
delivered harangues on the dangers of intoxication.50
49 As essays from Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance and ¡Viva México! ¡Viva La Independencia! show, parades were an ideal way to reach the illiterate and non-Spanish speaking masses with messages of national import. They emphasized the accepted social order and values, as well as official history and memory, while affirming State power. William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French, “Introduction: Constructing Conflict, Inciting Conflict,” in Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance, xv-xvi, xix; William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey, “Introduction: The Functions of Patriotic Ceremony in Mexico,” in ¡Viva México! xi-xii, xv, xvii. 50 Two reports, Paniagua, 20 November 1929, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 1; H. P. Rising, Viceconsul of Latvia to the United States, Los Angeles, to Portes Gil, 11 October 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 18; Mrs. E. D. Meader, secretary of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), Franklin, Massachusetts, to Portes Gil, 23 October 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 19; “12,000 banderas está manufacturando la Sría de Educación Pública,” EP, 9 November 1929; Miss Fannie D. Robb, secretary of the WCTU, St. Louis, to Portes Gil, 11 November 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 21; Arthur M. Charles, clerk of the Indiana Yearly Meeting of Friends, to Portes Gil, 14 November 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 24; “Más de un millión de niños desfilarón en una manifestación. La campaña contra el alcohol está tomando cuerpo en todo el país,” EP, 16 November 1929; photo album, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; Reverend T. F. McCourtney and Guy E. Williamson, Imperial Valley Baptist Association, Calexico, CA, to Portes Gil, 20 November 1929, AGN- 75
The teachers and school inspectors that choreographed these events used a variety
of techniques to reach the audience. The number of people marching was impressive.
Photographs show demonstrators in some cities filling the streets. In addition, the variety
of participants, adults and children, men and women, campesinos and workers, soldiers
and nurses, must have made it seem as if the whole country supported sobriety. Even the
physical layout of the parade, as seen in the event held in Navojoa, Sonora, served a
purpose (see Image 1).51 Perfectly-formed lines of participants, many of whom later joined in sporting events, posing for the camera in symmetrical pyramids, reinforced the message that temperance would help bring order to families, and by extension, the nation.52 Holding the parade on Revolution Day was no coincidence, either. Some students in Ures marched with posters portraying Francisco Madero, who began the
Revolution on November 20 (see Image 2). Others carried the likeness of President
Portes Gil.53 The message was clear: Portes Gil’s campaign against alcoholism was just
as revolutionary as Madero’s struggle against the dictator Porfirio Díaz. Ramón G.
Bonfil, the Director of Federal Education in Sonora, spoke at the parade in Hermosillo
FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 24; “El aniversario de la Revolución en Mex. Fue inaugurada el campo military de Balbuena por el Presidente de la República. Más de 35,000 niños desfilaron por las calles de la Ciudad de México ayer,” EP, 21 November 1929; “Informe del Departamento de Enseñanza Primaria y Normal,” BSEP, 8, no. 9-11 (1929): 28-29; “Informe de las labores desarolladas por el Departamento de Escuelas Rurales, Primarias Foraneas e Incorporación Cultural Indígena,” BSEP, 8, no. 9-11 (1929): 51. 51 Photograph of the Manifestación Infantil Antialcohólica, Navojoa, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. There are other photos found in this expediente, as well as in several other albums. AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 23, Invs. 982/2276 and 982/2277, Caja 25, Exp. 80/04, Caja 31, Exps. 80/28-29, 32- 33, Caja 32, Exps. 80/34, 36-43, and Caja 33, Exps. 80/44-53. 52 Although he does not mention temperance, David Lorey argues that Revolution Day parades, beginning in the 1920s, emphasized order so that leaders might prove their abilities as peacekeepers and keep dissatisfied groups from armed insurrections. The events highlighted the government’s organization and the overall health of the nation. See: Lorey, “Postrevolutionary Contexts for Independence Day,” in ¡Viva México!, 234, 241. 53 Photograph of the Manifestación Infantil Antialcohólica, Ures, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. 76
and made this comparison even more explicit. He claimed that the Revolution had
succeeded in getting rid of large landowners, despots, capitalists, and priests, but this
social movement also aimed for moral rehabilitation of the nation. To liberate the
oppressed completely, revolutionary leaders now battled alcohol abuse, which
impoverished homes and degenerated spirits.54 The overall message of the events of
Revolution Day was that ordinary people should join this battle and should also admire their political representatives for trying to purge the nation of its scourge.
Image 1, no title, artist unknown, Navojoa, Sonora, 1929. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
54 “El aniversario de la revolución,” speech delivered by Bonfil at the Manifestación Infantil Antialcohólica in Hermosillo, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. 77
Image 2, no title, artist unknown, Ures, Sonora, 1929. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
The vast majority of temperance work was cultural in nature, but the CNLCA and its partners did attempt some “active” strategies, as well. The CNLCA’s various commissions drafted a list of the causes of alcoholism and generated plans of action to guide their work over the next several years, knowledge that members hoped would help to combat this disease.55 In January 1930, the Department of Government asked governors to close all cantinas and other dispensaries of alcohol located near train stations to prevent “drunken scandals” on board the trains.56 The Department of Public
Health required that pulque be sold refrigerated (which would make it more sanitary and reduce its alcohol content by 80-90 percent) and the Department of Industry, Commerce,
55 Plans of Action, AHSSA-SPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1: Commission of Sanitary Measures, 20 June 1929; Commission of Sanitary Measures, 15 September 1929; Commission of Fiscal Measures, 4 December 1929; Commission of Education and Sports, n.d. Commission of Education and Sports, July 1929, AHSSA- SPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; “A qué causas obedece el fatídico incremento del alcoholismo. Interesantes conclusions del Comité Nacional para combater este mal,” EN, 1 July 1929. 56 Enrique C. Chalico, Oficial Mayor of the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works, to the Oficial Mayor of the Department of Government, 15 January 1930, Archivo General de la Nación, Dirección General de Gobierno (AGN-DGG), Serie 2.015.3(29)-6, Caja 2, Exp. 6. 78 and Labor looked into ways of transforming the intoxicating beverage industry into something more useful for the nation.57 Furthermore, the PNR demanded that its members participate in the temperance movement in whatever ways they could and that they inform the party of their progress through annual reports.58 These strategies, many of which had been suggested during previous presidencies, remained little more than ideas, revealing that the government remained administratively weak.
Pascual Ortiz Rubio, another proponent of an ideologically active State, began to affirm the importance of the temperance movement before he even took office in 1930.
He asserted that the CNLCA should not only continue its work, but should also intensify it, and he promised to provide the group 100,000 pesos annually.59 In spite of this assistance, the anti-alcohol campaign struggled monetarily for the next two years of his presidency because of the administrative weakness of the regime. In 1931, the group worked without any financial support, and only in December of that year did Ortiz Rubio grant it enough money to cover the expenses it had accumulated.60 A few weeks later, on
January 1, 1932, the CNLCA was officially dissolved because the national budget could
57 “La campaña, [rest of title missing],” EP, 23 May 1929, 1; “Celebra sesiones el Comité Antialcohólico en México,” EP, 25 May 1929, 1; “Un patente para una substancia alimenticia del jugo del maguey,” EP, 7 November 1929; “El pulque debe venderse refrigerado,” EP, 31 January 1930. 58 “Como secundará el P.N.R. la campaña contra el alcohol. Ha girado a todas las agrupaciones adherientes una circular en que se fija la línea de acción,” n.p., n.d. 59 “En contra del alcoholismo. Lo que opinan los candidatos a la Presidencia de la República, Ingeniero Ortiz Rubio, José Vasconcelos, y Aarón Sáenz,” EU, 26 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 1; “Ideario breve. La campaña antialcohólica,” La Patria, 3 March 1930; Official Declaration by President Pascual Ortiz Rubio, 20 March 1930, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, (AGN-FAP-POR), Acuerdo 132-1930; official declaration by President Ortiz Rubio, 11 April 1930, AGN- FAP-POR, Acuerdo 171-1930. 60 Quiñones to Dr. Rafael Silva, chief of the Department of Public Health and current president of the CNLCA, 12 March 1931, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 27, Exp. 11; memorandum, Luis S. Viramontes, personal secretary of Silva, to Quiñones, 21 March 1931, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 27, Exp. 11; official declaration by Ortiz Rubio, 11 December 1931, AGN-FAP-POR, Acuerdo 1217-1931. 79 no longer support it.61 Five months later, Ortiz Rubio transferred the campaign to the
Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor with the name Dirección Antialcohólica de Educación Obrera (DAEO). 62 The DAEO only remained under the purview of this department for another several months before monetary problems and a change of presidents forced another reorganization.
Although the administrative unit of the national temperance movement suffered financially in these three years, especially in 1932, the drive for sobriety nevertheless continued, thanks to the decentralized nature of the campaign and the dedication of its members. Because the CNLCA had been composed of representatives from a variety of departments, those individuals who supported the cause continued their work, albeit on a reduced scale, using funds from their home organizations or even volunteering their time.
The figure who did this most prominently was the Department of Industry, Commerce,
and Labor’s representative, Luis G. Franco.63 He was rewarded by being named director
61 Antonio Pérez Alcocer, sub-chief of the Department of Public Health claimed that this change took place on 1 January 1931. Many more records indicate that it happened on 1 January 1932, and I assume that the 1931 date was merely an error. See: official declaration by Ortiz Rubio, 11 December 1931, AGN-FAP- POR, Acuerdo 1217-1931; Department of Public Health to Ortiz Rubio, 6 August 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/3937 (1932); minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; Franco to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Pérez Alcocer to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 28 August 1935, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1. 62 Again Pérez Alcocer indicated that this change took place in May 1931, but all other sources (except for one) point to May 1932. See: presidential declaration, 11 December 1931, AGN-FAP-POR, Acuerdo 1217-1931; presidential declaration, 31 May 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Acuerdo 827-1932; Franco to Nicéforo Guerrero, personal secretary of Ortiz Rubio, 30 June 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/2918-1932; the Department of Public Health to Ortiz Rubio, 6 August 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/3937 (1932); the DAEO to President Abelardo Rodríguez, 18 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; statement, Siurob, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Franco to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Pérez Alcocer to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 28 August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1. 63 Franco to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6. 80
of the DAEO in May 1932, a position he held until January 1938, and again for several
months in 1940, until the campaign essentially ended that same year.
Because of the administrative weakness of the regime, reformers only carried out
a few successful projects during the Ortiz Rubio presidency. The most important was the
revision of the Penal Code in 1930. The new law authorized family members to deposit
habitually drunk relatives in police stations, prisons, or mental health facilities so that
they might be reformed. The newspaper reported that the provision was so popular that
penal institutions were filled beyond capacity and yet people still arrived everyday with their errant spouses, children, or siblings.64
Most measures, however, remained little more than suggestions. The CNLCA’s
Commission on Fiscal Measures pointed out that the above-mentioned 1927 law that forbade the production of intoxicating beverages from grain had been compromised the following year with a provision that allowed alcohol to be made from imported corn, leading to disastrous results for the nation. First, according to the members of this commission, the law encouraged the spread of alcoholism. Mexico produced an average of 15 million liters of alcohol per year. This amount was more than was “needed,” which suppressed prices and increased consumption. Second, allowing alcohol to be produced from grain equated to stealing bread from the hungry. In 1927, the country had produced more than two million metric tons of corn.65 As this was not nearly enough to feed the
entire population, over 28,000 metric tons had been imported as well. In spite of this
64 “Guerra a los borrachitos. Buenas esposas han procedido contra sus maridos, unos viciosos sin oficio. Hay aquí un caso verdaderomente resultado por el Código que está en vigor,” EN, 1 June 1930, sec. 2, p. 1; “Muchos borrachos ya no alcanzan lugar,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 7; “En Locopolis falta lugar a los ebrios,” EN, 14 June 1930, sec. 2, p. 1. 65 One metric ton equals 1.102 US tons. 81 deficiency, though, in Mexico City alone, forty-five of these metric tons per day were used to produce alcohol. Third, the measure essentially robbed the national treasury.
The government spent over two million pesos annually to import maize. Furthermore, the producers of corn alcohol frequently avoided paying taxes because of the small-scale nature of their operations. The Commission recommended prohibiting the production of alcohol from grains and raising taxes on the production of other intoxicating beverages, which would benefit the nation by limiting consumption.66
The CNLCA’s Commission on Sanitary Measures worked on several projects as well. First, they debated how much alcohol was necessary for a beverage to be declared an intoxicant. Portes Gil’s 1929 plan for a federal labor law had mandated that all casinos, bordellos, and cantinas be at least 200 kilometers from workplaces. However, this piece of legislation did not consider beverages with less than a 5 percent alcohol content to be intoxicants. This definition allowed beer and pulque to be sold near factories, mines, and plantations. The members of this commission argued that the law would violate the constitution and counteract the group’s accomplishments. They advocated changing the wording of the law so that it would recognize all beverages with alcohol as intoxicants. They also wanted to make sure that state legislators used this same definition.67 Second, this group recommended introducing yerba mate, a tea from the Southern Cone, in an effort to replace alcohol with a stimulant and they petitioned the
66 AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1: Ballesteros to Portes Gil, 12 November 1929; Chemist Salvador Souverielle to Silva, 12 March 1930; memorandum, Department of Public Health, 20 March 1930; report, Monterrubio, President of the Commission on Sanitary Measures, to CNLCA, 3 April 1930. “Aumentarán el impuesto a los alcoholes,” EP, 11 March 1930, 1. 67 Memorandum, CNLCA’s Commission on Sanitary Measures, 21 August 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1. 82 government to restrict sales of the medicine Bala Rasa, which supposedly fomented alcoholism.68 The fact that these recommendations could not be implemented, though, demonstrates the administratively weak nature of the State.
Therefore, during the Ortiz Rubio presidency, the majority of time and resources
went into cultural and educational measures. Franco and other experts gave speeches
broadcast on the radio individually targeting groups such as children, women, workers,
soldiers, prison inmates, and parents. They advised listeners not to drink, because it was
a dangerous habit, and they asked them to convince those around them to lead a sober life, as well.69 In 1931 and 1932, three of these lecture series transformed into weekly
radio programs and artistic festivals. Other members of the CNLCA from the
Department of Public Health continued advising teachers, workers’ associations, and
anti-alcohol committees across the country about the best ways to fight habitual
drunkenness. Experts from this department also gave eighteen more technical lectures in
1930 alone on alcohol and the negative effects it had on health.70 Criminals received
68 Quiñones to Monterrubio, 11 November 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; report, Monterrubio, 31 July 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10. 69 Speech, Franco, “El concepto de la moral del niño frente al vicio del alcohol,” 28 March 1930, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; speech, Franco, “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; speech, Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 28 November 1930, BMLT-AE, Ø03314, Alcoholismo; radio transcript, 1930, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación, Sección Oficina Cultural Radiotelefónica, Subserie Periódico Infantil (AHSEP-SOCR-SPI), Caja 9479, Exp. 27; Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia munidal: Homenaje al ejército nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, 1931), 3-4; radio transcript, 23 June 1931, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación, Sección Oficina Cultural Radiotelefónica, Subserie Conferencias y Boletines, (AHSEP-SOCR-SCB), Caja 9478, Exp. 5; radio transcript, “El alcoholismo en los niños,” 29 August 1931, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación, Sección Oficina Cultural Radiotelefónica, Subserie Departamento de Salubridad Pública (AHSEP-SOCR-SDSP), Caja 9477, Exp. 3; “Nuestra responsibilidad histórica ante la niñez de hoy,” EN, 22 November 1931; Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 2. 70 Franco to Guerrerro, 23 June 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 18/2734-1932; David F. España, First Secretary, and Santiago Hernández, Grand Master, of the Gran Logia V, to Elías Calles, 26 July 1932, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Archivo Fernando Torreblanca, 83 special attention: in 1932, the DAEO hosted anti-alcohol hours and “regeneration”
contests in prisons, where “reformed” inmates spoke to their peers about how alcohol had
caused their own downfall. To discourage communications employees from entering into
a life of vice, in 1931, a Day of Mail and Telegraph Services was established.71 The dedicated CNLCA members also continued to make and distribute propaganda. They sent out over 140,000 copies of posters, comic strips, and pamphlets across the country, published a book of statistics about alcoholism’s causes and results, and either produced or endorsed the anti-alcohol movie Abismo, which they hoped eventually to screen nationwide.72 Finally, so that this propaganda would not be undermined, the group proposed that all advertising that promoted alcohol as a food or medicine, or was otherwise based on false premises, be prohibited.73
The Department of Public Education undertook perhaps the most significant work done between 1930 and 1932. The chief of this department, Rafael Ramírez, mandated
Fondo Plutarco Elías Calles, (FAPECyFT-AFT-FPEC), Series 010805, Exp. 7, Inv. 563, Leg. 7/8; Luis G. Franco, Tres años de actuación en la agricultura de un pueblo. Apuntes para la historia (Mexico City: n.p., 1945), Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública, Manuel Avila Camacho, (AGN- FAP-MAC), Exp. 710.11/15. 71 “El festival antialcohólico en la penitenciaria del D. Federal,” EN, 1 May 1932, sec. 1, p. 8; list of the principal activities of the anti-alcohol campaign, Franco to Daniels, 17 August 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/102; “El oficio de Joseph Lazcano,” in El cartero: una imagen, un personaje, ed. Claudia A. Walls (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, y Servicio Postal Mexicano, 1992), 50. 72 Dr. Manuel Martínez Báez, interim president of the Commission of Propaganda, CNLCA, to R. Ramírez, May 23, 1930, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; Martínez Báez, “Servicio de propaganda y educación higiénicas. Informe del tercer trimestre de 1930. Sección de propaganda y educación higiénicas,” S 1 (July-September 1930): 843-56; Martínez Báez to the Chief of the Department of Rural Schools, 13 November 1930, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; Martínez Báez, “Servicio de propaganda y educación higiénicas. Informe del cuatro trimestre de 1930. Sección de propaganda y educación higiénicas,” S 1 (October-December 1930): 1297-1304; Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social; Quiñones to Silva, 12 March 1931, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 27, Exp. 11; Martínez Báez, “Servicio de propaganda y educación higiénicas. Informe del primer trimestre de 1932,” S 3 (January-March 1932): 202. 73 Report, Commissions of Propaganda, Culture and Popular Education, Work and Social Foresight, and Education and Sports, 5 June 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; “Como reducir el número de las cantinas. Un interesante studio sobre el particular. Fue presentado al Comité Nacional de Lucha contra el Alcoholismo. La restricción de la publicidad que se la hace al alcohol en todo el país,” EN, 14 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 1. 84 that beginning in October 1931, all schools dedicate at least one hour per week to anti- alcohol instruction.74 Teachers taught lessons in the classroom, had their students recite anti-alcohol pledges, or sang songs that reminded them of alcohol’s dangers. Frequently they combined these lessons with sporting events, festivals, conferences, or simple question-and-answer sessions for the community.75 Sometimes students, such as those in
Hermosillo, developed and performed anti-alcohol programs that featured music, songs, recitations, lectures, and dances, all of which imparted a message of temperance.76
Inspectors assisted in the process by speaking to teachers and the community, encouraging them to participate in the campaign and occasionally organizing the townspeople into anti-alcohol societies.77
74 Ramírez to the Directors of Federal Education and school inspectors, 9 October 1931, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7. 75 Report, Bonfil, 23 May 1930, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 1; report, School Director José Arriaga G., Ures, 31 October 1930, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 1673, Sin Exp.; list of suggested course work, Arriaga G., 1 March 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8347, Exp. 5319/48; report, School Director Agapito Constantino, Hermosillo, 22 June 1931, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; questionnaire, Profesor María Gutiérrez, La Misión Magdalena, 28 September 1931, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Exp. 20; questionnaire, School Director Crisóstomo Cavarons Matamoros, San Pedro Etchojoa, 31 October 1931, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Exp. 20; report, Constantino, 2 November 1931, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; report, Inspector Leonides Ayala E., 30 November 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 15; schedule for rural schools and Centers of Communal Betterment, Ures, 10 May 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 15; report, School Sub-Director Mario Matus Maceli, Ures, 23 May 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 1673, Sin Exp.; report, School Director José Vicente Estrada G., Hermosillo, 3 June 1932, AHSEP- DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 6; report, Elpidio López, Director of Federal Education in Sonora, 25 June 1932, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Exp. 20; report, Inspector J. Humberto Paniagua, 31 July 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 1. 76 Programs, Escuela Federal Tipo, Hermosillo, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20: 23, 27, and 30 October, and 3, 6, 10, and 13 November 1931. 77 Reports, Paniagua, 8 March 1930-14 June 1932 in the following Sonoran communities: La Paz, Tuape, Meresichi, La Palma, Ures, Ranchería de Suaqui, Pozo Crisanto, La Manga, Mesa de Seri, Rosales, Buyacusi, Pueblo Nuevo, La Laguna, El Taste, Los Nachuquis, Campanichaca, Sahuaral, Tepahui, Batacosa, Baynorillo, Guaymitas, Bemelabampo, Tesia, Bacame, Basibampo, Ejido Bayajorit, Basconcobe, Cedros, Baucari, La Villa, Chibucú, Tierra Blanca, El Sabino, Sebampo, Los Viejos, El Mezquital, Sitabaros. AHSEP-DERS: Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 78; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 34; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 22; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 49; Caja 5719, Referencia (Ref.) IV/161(IV-14)/12211; Caja 5719, Exp. 71; Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 23; Caja 5719, Exp. 30; Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19474; Caja 5719, Exp. 83; Caja 5719, Exp. 84; Caja 8446, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19341; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 36; Caja 5719, Exp. 89; Caja 829 (50), Exp. 63; Caja 829 (4), Exp. 73; Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6376; Caja 829, Exp. 5; Caja 85
The CNLCA and the Department of Public Education planned anti-alcohol parades on Revolution Day in both 1930 and 1931 and wanted the second- and third- annual events to be even more spectacular than the first had been. Inspectors traveled to the remotest corners of the country, inviting students, teachers, parents, and community members to participate.78 In October 1930, a contest was held in Mexico City where students from across the country sent in anti-alcohol pledges. The winning oath, written by Eduardo Peraza Villanueva, was recited by a group of children as well as President
Ortiz Rubio. Children in other states followed suit and the next year they recited the winning pledges from local contests.79
At least in Sonora, the day both years was deemed a success. Students and teachers from all federal schools marched, carrying flags, banners, posters, and signs, many of which the Department provided. Periodically, the marchers stopped to sing the
national anthem and popular corridos, or to allow teachers, community members, or
5748 (8429), Exp. 40; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 33; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 74; Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/19343; Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 21; Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 13; Caja 5719, Exp. 75; Caja 1673 (6), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19353; Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 22; Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19342; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 9; Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19375; Caja 5719, Exp. 28; Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19426; Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19211; Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 39; Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19370; Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19425; Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19374. Reports, other inspectors, AHSEP-DERS: Ramón R. Reyes, El Pantanito, 6 February 1930, Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 10; Reyes, Ojo de Agua, 6 March 1930, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19257; Ayala E., Tojibampo, 23 November 1930, Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 24; Evaristo Hinojosa, Santiago, 27 November 1930; Reyes, Aquimiri, May 1931, Caja 8440 (5), Exp. 66; Ayala E., Guadalupe, 27 February 1932, Caja 5719, Exp. 27. 78 Reports, Paniagua, AHSEP-DERS: Los Bahuisos, 10 October 1931, Caja 829 (5), Exp. 50; Bemelabampo, 13 October 1931, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19343; Los Nachuquis, 15 October 1931, Caja 829 (5), Exp. 63; Jitonhueca, 22 October 1931, Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 37; Sahuaral, 2 November 1931, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6373; unknown community, 4 November 1931, Caja 829, Exp. 72; Campanichaca, 7 November 1931, Caja 829 (5), Exp. 73; La Villa, 10 November 1931, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19375; Huitchaca, 14 November 1931, Caja 8446 (6), Exp. 7; Baynorillo, 15 November 1930, Caja 5748 (8429) Exp. 33. 79 “Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo. Juramento infantil antialcohólico,” El Intruso: Diario Joco-Serio Netamente Independiente, (Cananea), (EI), 18 November 1930; “Manifestación infantil,” EI, 20 November 1930; report, Bonfil, 21 January 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447, Exp. 1; BSEP, 10, no. 1-4 (1930-1931): 78; report, Ayala E., 30 November 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 15. 86
particularly capable students to give talks about temperance. To end the day, many towns
hosted sports and literary events, exhibitions of students’ anti-alcohol drawings, and
dances to encourage people to pursue healthy pastimes. So as to enhance the message of
the marchers, the government mandated that all dispensaries of alcohol be closed that
day.80
During the first twenty-two years of the Revolution, 1910-1932, presidents shared a concern for the problem of alcohol abuse, but they fought it in a variety of manners.
The State under Francisco I. Madero, Venustiano Carranza, and Álvaro Obregón can be classified as ideologically passive: for the most part, these men did not believe that the executive branch ought to mandate socio-economic change. Their regimes were also administratively weak: they lacked autonomy from dominant classes, the military, other politicians, and foreign countries, and they also failed to create institutions that were
stronger than charismatic, power-hungry individuals. Therefore, although Madero,
Carranza, and Obregón claimed that they wanted to combat alcoholism, they achieved
relatively little. These presidents encouraged individuals to deal with their vices on their
own, they relied on bureaucrats in the Departments of Public Health and Education to
teach about the dangers of frequent intoxication through propaganda and in the
classroom, and they hoped that like-minded federal legislators or administrators at the
state and municipal levels would pass measures restricting the sale of alcoholic
80 Martínez Báez to the Chief of the Department of Rural Schools, 13 November 1930, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; report, Bonfil, 15 November 1930, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447, Exp. 1; “Manifestación infantil,” EI, 20 November 1930, 1; “Festival escolar,” EI, 21 November 1930, 1; “Mucho éxito,” EI, 22 November 1930, 1; Ramírez to the Directors of Federal Education and school inspectors, 22 October 1931, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7; report, Ayala E., 30 November 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 15. 87 beverages. Presidents Plutarco Elías Calles, Emilio Portes Gil, and Pascual Ortiz Rubio presided over ideologically active but administratively weak regimes. Although they continued to be beset by frequent rebellions and economic shortfalls, they at least attempted to engage the State in social reforms. Therefore, it is no surprise that the national temperance movement under these leaders accelerated quickly. They restructured tax codes in the hopes that people would buy less alcohol, tightened sanitary laws so that when they did buy it, it would at least be healthy, and consolidated the temperance campaigns of various departments into a national organization, the CNLCA.
Because the government continued to lack strength, though, this group faced frequent reorganizations and continued to employ primarily cultural tactics such as parades, speeches, and schooling, in the war against alcoholism. 88
CHAPTER 2 PARADES, EPISTLES, AND PROHIBITIVE LEGISLATION: THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN AND THE STATE- BUILDING PROCESS, 1932-1940
In July 1937, ejiditarios from Sonora petitioned President Lázaro Cárdenas,
asking that a cantina on their ejido be closed. The bar’s existence was in direct violation
of the Constitution of 1917, which stated that cantinas and casinos could not be located in
“work places” with over two hundred inhabitants. Unlike many of his predecessors, this executive responded to the request in a quick and direct manner. Within days, the
president’s personal assistant, Ignacio García Téllez, wrote to Governor Román
Yocupicio’s secretary and asked that the bar be closed. Two months later, the ejiditarios complained again about this cantina, and the president’s office sent another request to the governor to shut it down. When that did not work, Cárdenas wrote the governor himself, demanding that the issue be resolved quickly.1 Perhaps tired of writing these epistles so frequently, in June 1939, Cárdenas issued prohibitive legislation for the entire nation. He
demanded that governors oversee the closing of all alcohol dispensaries in their states in
ejidos, mining towns, petroleum regions, and all other workplaces.2 Additionally,
throughout his presidency, Cárdenas authorized several anti-alcohol parades, replete with
marching students carrying signs and singing temperance hymns.
1 Adolfo Zamora and Mariano A. Velarde, President and Secretary of the Comisariado Ejidal in Cócorit, to Cárdenas, 14 July 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, 553.1/15; Carlos B. Maldonado, Secretary of State, Sonora, to Secretary of Government, 31 July 1937, AGN-DGG, Series 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp. 7; Zamora and Velarde to Cárdenas, 25 September 1937, AGN-DGG, Series 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp. 7; Yocupicio to Ignacio García Téllez, Personal Secretary of Cárdenas, 30 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, 553.1/15; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 13 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, 553.1/15. 2 Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 16 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; Cárdenas to unknown, 23 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; “Opinión editorial. Necesidad de una batida nacional contra el alcohol,” EN, 24 June 1939; “Los últimos 67 días de jira presidencial,” EN, 6 August 1939, sec. 1, p. 1; “Acción contra los centros de vicio en núcleos de labor. Clausuras inmediatas,” EN, 28 August 1939, sec. 1, p. 1. 89
These examples further demonstrate the intimate connection between the anti-
alcohol campaign and the State-building process during the Revolution. In fact, the tools that presidents used in the hopes of achieving a sober nation were influenced by the nature of their governments. For example, Presidents Abelardo Rodríguez and Cárdenas were proponents of an ideologically active State—they fully endorsed their heading of
the national government to direct socio-economic change, including ridding the country
of alcohol abuse. Thanks to the growing administrative strength of their regimes, they
were able to accomplish many of their temperance-oriented goals, unlike their
predecessors. Therefore, Rodríguez and Cárdenas, along with the bureaucrats they
appointed, fought vice in a variety of ways. These included cultural methods such as
parades, which reached a large, diverse audience and were relatively inexpensive,
prohibitive legislation such as the above-mentioned 1939 decree that demonstrated
presidents’ increased desire to exert their authority over the populace and state
governments, and epistles, which demanded that governors, mayors, and policemen
adhere to the law. In other words, the course of the anti-alcohol campaign was in many
ways determined by the State-building process.
The State under President Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934) had not yet attained
complete autonomy or institutionalization. Therefore, monetary issues continued to
plague the anti-alcohol campaign. On January 1, 1933, the Department of Industry, 90
Commerce and Labor was reorganized and the DAEO’s budget eliminated.3 This time,
the group did not just accept its fate; within days, members of the DAEO wrote to
Rodríguez, protesting the measure and claiming that they provided a valuable service to
the nation. Several other organizations that supported the temperance cause agreed that the DAEO had made a significant difference and told the President as much.4 It seems that Rodríguez responded to their request, for on February 6, he placed the group under the purview of the municipal government of Mexico City, and changed its name to the
Dirección de Educación Antialcohólica (DEA).5 The DEA remained in this department for nearly two years.
Even with the move to a new department, the DEA had a constrained budget. In
September 1933, Franco and other members of the group went in before the municipal council to request that they be given more funding, explaining that they did most of their work for free.6 In November 1933, the governing body of the DEA, a group of sixteen men and women, requested an audience with Rodríguez, likely for the same purpose.7
3 DAEO to President Abelardo Rodríguez, 18 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; Franco to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Pérez Alcocer to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 28 August 1935, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1. 4 AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4: DAEO to A. Rodríguez, 18 January 1933; Dr. Alfredo M. Saavedra, president of the Sociedad Eugenica Mexicana to A. Rodríguez, 19 January 1933; General Alejandro Mange, Chief of Military Operations, Jalisco, to A. Rodríguez, 19 January 1933; José Cruz y Celis, president of the Confederación de Cámaras de Comercio, to A. Rodríguez, 20 January 1933. 5 F. Javier Gaxiola, Jr., A. Rodríguez’s secretary, to Saavedra, 6 February 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; Cruz y Celis to A. Rodríguez, 10 February 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 6 de abril de 1933,” Actas y versiones del Consejo Consultivo del 1o. de marzo al 3 de agosto de 1933 (Mexico City: n.p., n.d.), 20-2, BAHDF; Franco to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI- SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Pérez Alcocer to Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 28 August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1. 6 “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,” 2-2, 3-1, 4-1. 7 Cuerpo Consultivo of the DEA to A. Rodríguez, 16 November 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4. 91
Although the outcomes of both meetings remain unknown, the temperance workers
probably did not succeed in securing much money at a time when the government was
severely strained economically.
In spite of some economic hardships, the overall administrative strength of
national government improved under Rodríguez. This trend can be discerned in part from the trajectory of the anti-alcohol campaign. In 1934, the productivity of Franco and the other members of the DEA increased dramatically, probably in response to the PNR’s
Six-Year Plan. The document confirmed that one of the party’s biggest responsibilities to the nation was to protect it from the dangers of alcoholism. It called for an “energetic” and “effective” campaign against the problem, creating sanitoriums to cure people of this disease, prohibiting the establishment of cantinas near workplaces, and imposing prohibitively high taxes on intoxicating beverages.8 That same month, the DEA issued its own ambitious plan of over one hundred points, which it continued to supplement periodically.9 Over the next several years the group began to carry out these activities on an unprecedented scale.
The Plan General de la Campaña Antialcohólica, other DEA statements from
1933 and 1934, and the group’s actions reveal that politicians and reformers still saw cultural weapons as essential in the war against alcohol abuse. Representatives from
several departments continued to issue propaganda advocating a sober lifestyle. The
8 Partido Nacional Revolucionario, Plan sexeñal del P.N.R. (Mexico City: n. p., 1934), 92-93, 101, 121, 122, 126-27; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 121-22. 9 AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733”35”/21: Plan General de la Campaña Antialcohólica, 15 January 1934; Medidas Addicionales a las Medidas Complementarias, 15 January 1934; Adiciones que presenta la Dirección Antialcohólica al Plan General de la Campaña, que fue presentado en enero de 1934, July 1935; Hoja Segunda de adiciones al Plan General, 3 August 1935. 92
DEA and one of its liaisons from the newspaper Excélsior supplied schools, libraries, and local temperance leagues with pamphlets and other printed materials.10 The group also hosted a number of events aimed at convincing people not to imbibe, including a penitentiary congress, a festival in the state of Toluca, and an homage to the newspaper
El Nacional.11 Furthermore, Franco and other experts continued to issue weekly radio
broadcasts on the dangers of chronic intoxication to peasants, prisoners, workers, students, and soldiers.12 One message urged people to drink milk, rather than pulque or hard alcohol, or, if they absolutely “had” to consume an intoxicating beverage, then beer was preferable because it contained a lower percentage of alcohol.13 Perhaps one of these radio shows played the winning entry from a DEA contest that asked the nation’s poets and musicians to write a temperance-themed song. The requirements were that the lyrics discuss the repercussions of alcohol for men, the home, and the country, and that they be short and simple enough so as to be easily learned. Furthermore, the rules dictated that
10 Luis Tijerina Almaguer to Rodolfo Elías Calles, Governor of Sonora, 12 June 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733”34”/23. 11 “Fue celebrada en la C. de Toluca la Hora Anti-Alcohólica. El teatro principal fue insuficiente para contener la enorme concurrencia,” EN, 12 February 1933, sec. 2, p. 3; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 19 de enero de 1933,” Actas y versiones del Consejo Consultivo del 20 de octubre de 1932 al 23 de febrero de 1933 (Mexico City: n.p., n.d.), 4, BAHDF; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 23 de febrero de 1933,” Actas y versiones del Consejo Consultivo del 20 de octubre de 1932 al 23 de febrero de 1933, 4, BAHDF; “El undécimo festival antialcohólico de la Secretaría de Guerra,” EN, 18 March 1933, sec. 1, p. 7; “Un homenaje a El Nacional. Hoy será transmitido por radio interesante programa literario-musical,” EN, 3 August 1933, sec. 2, p. 1; Adelante: Revista militar y de cultura, (15 August 1933), 2, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,”4-1. 12 Franco to R. Calles, 21 October 1932, FAPECyFT-APEC, Exp. 98, Inv. 1563, Leg. 1; Adelante (15 August 1933), 2; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,”4-1, 5-1; “Los campesinos, base del gobierno. Un interesante mensaje,” El Universal Gráfico (Mexico City), (EUG), 1 December 1933, 16; “La hora de la grandes responsibilidades para la revolución mexicana,” EN, 24 December 1933. 13 “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,”4-2, 5-1. 93 the music be a traditional Mexican style, presumably to appeal to a working-class audience.14 One related goal, which was not achieved, was to install radios in all of the capital’s lower-class neighborhoods by September 1934, so that aural anti-alcohol propaganda might counteract the ill-effects of Independence Day festivals, which tended to be celebrated with music and drink.15
The Department of Public Education continued doing the most significant cultural work in the anti-alcohol campaign because key educators considered the promotion of sobriety to be one of their most important tasks. In fact, in an official radio program
broadcast to teachers, the writer Alfredo Maillefert argued that the anti-alcohol campaign
was one of the most pressing issues they should cover. As in the past, the Department
asked instructors to promote sobriety by holding a weekly anti-alcohol hour and
encouraging students to join temperance leagues and march in the annual Revolution Day
parade.16 Beginning in the 1930s, government officials saw the rural school as less of a classroom, and more of a cultural mission where teachers would “save” students and their
14 “Concurso del canto contra el alcoholismo. Los poetas y músicos de la república han sido convocados a dicha justa,” EN, 23 August 1933, sec. 2, p. 1. 15 “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,” 2-1, 5-1; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 56-57; Hayes, Radio Nation, 6, 43-44, 58. 16 Report, Elpidio López, 12 September 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 5; Elpidio López, Instrucciones a los maestros de las escuelas urbanas y rurales federales del estado de Sonora (Ures, Mexico City: Escuela Normal Rural, 1932), 15, 29, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 11; report, Inspector J. Lamberto Moreno, Alamos, Sonora, 8 February 1933, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 602, Exp. 5378/6; report, Moreno, 4 March 1933, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 8; Alfredo Maillefert, “Antena campesina. Transmisiones de la XFX de la Secretaría de Educación Pública. Destinadas a los campesinos,” EMR 3, no. 5 (1 August 1933): 22; Inspector Ocampo N. Bolaños, general plan for teachers in the central zone, 30 September 1933, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 3; “Campaña antialcohólica,” EMR 3, no. 10 (15 October 1933): 3-4. Inspection reports, Sonora, J. Humberto Paniagua, AHSEP-DERS: Pueblo Nuevo, 5 October 1932, Caja 8446, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19341; Tesia, 11 October 1932, Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 21; Chibucú, 15 October 1932, Caja 5719, Exp. 28; El Mezquital, 31 October 1932, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19425. 94 families from the “sins” of alcoholism, fanaticism, and disease.17 This meant that teachers should not only work with children, but also with the community-at-large. In fact, in a new magazine designed for rural school educators, El Maestro Rural, one article claimed that instruction of the students was of secondary concern: teachers should worry first about the well-being of the community!18 This message was constantly reinforced as inspectors discussed the anti-alcohol campaign or organized temperance leagues on nearly every visit they made to a school, and in the years 1933 and 1934, the theme of alcohol, how to defeat it, and the problems it caused, appeared in at least eighteen articles, stories, and plays in El Maestro Rural.19
In addition to cultural measures, the DEA and its affiliates began to envision an
even more active role for themselves in the fight against habitual drunkenness through
17 Ordoñez Vila, “Alcoholismo y fanatismo,” EMR 4, no. 3 (1 February 1934): 16; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 32-33, 58; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 39, 42, 46, 192-93. 18 Antonio H. Garcia, “Sección pedagógica: El trabajo con los niños de las escuelas es secundario. El debe llevar a cabo el maestro rural con los adultos y la comunidad en general, es el primordial y más interesante,” EMR 3, no. 6 (1 September 1933): 4. 19 Reports, School Inspectors in Sonora in AHSEP-DERS: Paniagua, La Laguna, 19 October 1932, Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 36; Magdaleno Constantino, Santa Teresa, 10 December 1932, Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 57; J. L. Moreno, El Tabelo, 16 February 1933, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19367; Constantino, Tesia, 28 March 1933, Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 21; Constantino, 29 March 1933, Caja 829 (5), Exp. 51; Ramón R. Reyes, La Malenita, April 1933, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19382; R. Reyes, Cucurpe, April 1933, Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 80; José Bernal Rodríguez, Sehuahehuachi, 4 April 1933, Caja 5719, Exp. 83; Bernal Rodríguez, Bamori, 7 April 1933, Caja 829, Exp. 62; Mario Aguilera D., Bella Esperanza, 19 April 1933, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19277; Aguilera D., Nacozari Viejo, 20 April 1933, Caja 1673 (6), Exp. 15; Aguilera D., Las Chispas, 9 May 1933, Caja 829 (5), Exp. 30; Aguilera D., Buenavista, 10 May 1933, Caja 8446, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19338; Aguilera D., Chinampa, 10 May 1933, Caja 8440 (5), Exp. 25; Aguilera D., Unamichi, 11 May 1933, Caja 5748 (8429), Exp. 52; Aguilera D., San Juan del Río, 12 June 1933, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/11184; Aguilera D., Casa de Teras, 17 June 1933, Caja 829 (5), Exp. 52; Aguilera D., La Noria, October 1933, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19644; Aguilera D., Los Hoyos, October 1933, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/12879; Aguilera D., Pivipa, October 1933, Caja 5719, Exp. 33; Bernal Rodríguez, El Trigo de Corodepe, 21 October 1933, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/6278; Constantino, Las Guayabas, 31 October 1933, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19380; Constantino, Puerto Yavares, 31 October 1933, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/1390; Bernal Rodríguez, Guisamopa, 10 November 1933, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19275; Aguilera D., La Noria and La Mesa, 10 November 1933, Caja 8443, Exp. 7; Bernal Rodríguez, El Encinal, 21 November 1933, Caja 829, Exp. 63. 95
direct political action. One of reformers’ main goals was enforcement of existing alcohol
legislation. For instance, although Article 123 of the Constitution prevented cantinas
from being located near workplaces, alcohol could still legally be purchased nearby at sports clubs, social centers, and other leisure sites. Furthermore, government buildings were not technically considered “work centers,” and bars were sufficiently close to them
to tempt politicians and federal employees into imbibing. Franco suggested making
changes to these loopholes in the law. DEA members also wanted to see that laws be
upheld that prevented unsanitary beverages from being sold or the payment of workers
with intoxicating drink by hacendados and ranchers. In order to aid in this process, the
1934 Plan advocated that the Department of Public Health create a corps of inspectors.20
Also, the DEA began to research violations of existing legislation by reading national and local newspapers and by responding to letters from ordinary citizens who complained about clandestine cantinas. When governors passed strict laws regulating the sale of
alcohol or shut down illegal bars, Franco sent them a personal letter of thanks.21 In the opposite situation, he also wrote to governors personally, asking that they enforce the law, and he continued to write to them until he felt the situation had been properly rectified.22 These new, active weapons in the temperance crusaders’ arsenal reveal that
the administrative strength of the national government had increased.
20 Medidas Addicionales a las Medidas Complementarias, 15 January 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Franco to the Sub-secretary of Government, 18 May 13 August (two) 1934, AGN- DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-7, Caja 13, Exp. 7. 21 Franco to R. Calles, 31 May 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 741“34”/16; Franco to R. Calles, 18 June 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733“34”/28. 22 José Magro Soto, Oficial Mayor of the Secretary of Government to R. Calles, 5 June 1934, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-7, Caja 13, Exp. 7; Franco to R. Calles, 5 June 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 96
Much like his predecessor and one-time mentor Plutarco Elías Calles, Cárdenas
(1934-1940) already had a reputation as an advocate for an ideologically active State when he became president. Temperate himself, as the governor of Michoacán from 1928 to 1932, he had encouraged teachers to combat vice by promoting sports.23 In these four years, state legislators had adopted Cárdenas’s reformist zeal and began placing more restrictions on the sale of pulque.24 Furthermore, when Cárdenas started campaigning for the presidency in 1933 and 1934, he claimed that extirpating alcoholism was one of his
foremost goals, saying that if he were elected president, he would prohibit the sale and
production of intoxicants in the entire Republic.25 Throughout his presidency, many observers believed—some hoped, some feared—that Cárdenas would indeed outlaw all types of alcoholic beverages.26 Although such a law never passed, unlike the Calles government, the Cárdenas administration accomplished many of its temperance goals.
733“34”/28; Franco to R. Calles, 30 August 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733“34”/21; Franco to R. Calles, 26 November 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733“34”/58. 23 In this, Cárdenas differed from Calles, who was a well-known alcoholic and was often mocked as a hypocrite. See Chapter 4. Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 218; Krauze, Mexico, 460. 24 Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 133, 188, 206-207. 25 Partido Nacional Revolucionario, Plan sexeñal del P.N.R., 92-93; governing body of the DEA to President-elect Cárdenas, 23 November 1934, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 568/1; “Homenaje al soldado,” (Mexico City: Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, 1935), AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 135.2/74. 26 “Mexico Opens Campaign Against Drinking, President Cárdenas Increasing Liquor Taxes,” NYT, 7 January 1935; “Reformas al reglamento de bebidas. No se permitirán cantinas ni expendios de pulques cerca de las escuelas,” EN, 14 April 1936; “No habrá estado seco en la nación. Pero sí será enérgcia la represión de la embriaguez. Los ejidos y congregaciones serán considerados centros de trabajo y no podrá haber en ellas Cantinas. Declaraciones del Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad. Las medidas para extinguir el alcoholismo,” EN, 31 October 1936; “Editorial,” EN, 8 April 1937; “La lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 22 July 1937; “La campaña contra el alcoholismo. El ante-proyecto de ley formulado para intensificarla fue bien recibido. Secundan la idea. Los industriales alcoholeros colaborarán con el gobierno en tan nobles fines. Agudo contraste. En cambio, los que expenden las bebidas se declarán por el estado seco,” EN, 27 July 1937; “La ley antialcohólica es contra la bebida de pésima calidad,” LP, 7 September 1937; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; Preguntón, “La encuesta relámpago. ¿Qué opina Usted de la campaña antialcohólica?” LP, 22 November 1937; “Restricciones provechosas,” EX, 26 June 1939; “Un comité especial para la obra antialcohólica. La clausura de tabernas,” EN, 27 June 1939. 97
This achievement happened in part because by the mid-1930s, the State had grown administratively stronger.
In spite of Cárdenas’s interest in the temperance movement, the central organizing committee of the anti-alcohol campaign continued to face instability. On January 1,
1935, he renamed the DEA the Dirección Antialcohólica (DAA) and moved it back to the
Department of Public Health.27 Although the DAA saw its strongest years of activity in
late 1935 and 1936, the committee’s activities drastically declined in 1937 and 1938.28
The economic problems and social tensions in the late 1930s that caused Cárdenas to abandon several of his more radical projects and strike a more moderate path probably affected this program, as well.29 The DAA’s funds were so low, members claimed that
they often had to turn down requests to print propaganda for state temperance leagues and
the group had to have one of its debts with the Taller Gráfica de la Nación pardoned by
the President.30 In fact, not even the positions of the most dedicated anti-alcohol
27 One document lists the date as 1 January 1934, but all other sources point to 1 January 1935: Aquilino Villanueva to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 17 January 1934, AHSSA-FSPI- SSJ, Caja 39, Exp. 17; Franco to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; DAA to Cárdenas, 1 August 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Mrs. Margaret H. Sawyer, director of the WCTU, Rochester, New York, to Cárdenas, 6 August 1935, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; Pérez Alcocer to the Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, 28 August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1. 28 Ramón Beteta, subsecretary of the Department of Foreign Relations, to Cárdenas, 16 November 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “En el mes de abril de 1938 se hará la 2a. Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica. Está listo el temario del Congreso. Cuáles son las bases principales a que se sujetará la importante junta. Quienes cooperan. Educación Pública y Salubridad, a través de sus oficinas, los iniciadores,” EN, 6 December 1937; Franco to García Téllez, 10 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Un congreso femenil antialcohólico. Se efectuará en julio de este año en el Palacio de Bellas Artes. Una fuerte lucha. En 1938 se harán dos reuniones de la misma indole y importancia,” EN, 2 January 1938, sec. 2, p. 3; “Preparativos para el congreso infantil en contra del alcohol,” EN, 14 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 4; “Notas cortas de salubridad,” EN, 28 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 6; “La Segunda Asamblea Contra el Alcoholismo,” EN, 22 February 1938. 29 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 226-27, 231-32, 236. 30 Governing body of the DAA to Cárdenas, 23 November 1934, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 568/1; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; Franco to the Secretary General of the 98 reformers were guaranteed. In January 1938, the director of the Department of Public
Health, Dr. José Siurob y Ramírez, resigned his post to head the municipal government of
Mexico City. Although the new chief, Dr. Leónides Andreu Almazán, reassured employees that restructuring would only take place at the highest levels of the department, Franco lost his job to Dr. Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, a psychiatrist at a prominent mental health facility and the country’s leading authority on the effect of drugs on the body.31 Nevertheless, Franco, the dedicated revolutionary, proved willing to serve
the government in any capacity. He directed the national radio station, XEFO, for several
months until January or March 1940, when he returned to head the DAA once more.32
Even with all of these problems, the anti-alcohol campaign accomplished more during this presidency than it ever had before. The DAA continued to rely primarily on educational strategies. The group tirelessly organized conferences, hosted cultural
Department of Public Health, 3 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; memorandum, Siurob to Cárdenas, 5 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 43, Exp. 11; “Campaña al alcoholismo en el país. Se solicitará la ayuda de los estados para intensificarla en sus aspectos,” EN, 18 September 1937. 31 “Un programa de gobierno. Política administrative que se propone seguir el Doctor Siurob, Jefe el Deparamento Central. Servicios sociales, pavimientos, higiene, policía,” EU, 6 January 1938, p. 1; “Inició ayer sus labores. Tomó posesión el nuevo Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” EN, 8 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 1; “Director de una campaña. Fue designado el Doctor Salazar Viniegra para hacer la antialcohólica. Tomará posesión. Hoy en el Departamento de Salubridad rendirá la protesta de ley,” EN, 18 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 2; “Gobernantes de la ciudad de México, 1524-2000,” in Archivo Histórico del Distrito Federal: Guía general, ed. Lina Odena Güemes H. (Mexico City: Gobierno del DF, 2000), 96. 32 “El Dr. Salazar Viniegra, Rector. Lo designó el directorio depurador el día de ayer,” EN, 10 June 1938, sec. 1, p. 1; “Medidas profilactas contra el alcoholismo,” speech given by Franco to the Congress of Attorneys, 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39; Franco to Agustín Leñero, personal secretary of Cárdenas, 19 July 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 702.2/11192; María Luisa M. Vda. de Naude, President of the Unión de Mujeres de Hogar, DF, to Alfonso Pruneda, Oficial Mayor of the Department of Public Health, 22 July 1939, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Fondo Salubridad Pública II, Sección Oficiala Mayor, (AHSSA-FSPII-SOM), Caja 2, Exp. 18; Franco to unknown, 22 July 1939 and 9 January 1940, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39; Guillermina Rios and other artists at the Cadena Radio Nacional, to Cárdenas, 26 February 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 702.2/11192; “No concurrirán ya menores de edad a los cabarets capitalanos. Resultados de una junta antialcohólica,” EN, 1 March 1940, sec. 2, p. 1; “Designación a favor del Ing. Franco,” EN, 13 March 1940, sec. 1, p. 4; Franco to the chief of the Department of Public Health’s office of Legal Consultation, 15 March 1940, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM, Caja 3, Exp. 8; Franco to the chief of the Department of Public Health, 23 November 1940, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM, Caja 3, Exp. 16. 99
“spectacles,” and gave speeches to prisoners, workers, campesinos, soldiers, students, postal employees, political leaders, and scientific and cultural societies, as well as the general public. Many of these events were broadcast on the radio. In fact, one
representative claimed that the DAA put on festivals twice a month and did other cultural
programs every week.33 The Dirección, along with several other affiliated departments,
also continued to send out printed propaganda to be distributed to schools, local
temperance committees, and worker and campesino groups, while slogans promoting
33 Dr. Jesús Díaz Barriga, Secretary General of the Department of Public Health, to Emiliano Corella M., interim governor of Sonora, 25 July 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; program for the National Anti-Alcohol Serenade, 25 August 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “Campaña en Contra del Alcoholismo,” EN, 19 September 1935; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “La acción obrera se inicia contra el alcoholismo. Resultados inmediatos de un mensaje del Doctor Siurob a los trabajadores,” EN, 21 October 1935; “La campaña contra el alcoholismo en el Congreso de Higiene Rural,” EU, 26 October 1935; “La labor de la unificación de trabajadores. Se lleva a cabo mediante la campaña antialcohólica del D.S.P. Unos festivales. Han sido organizados sistemáticamente para interesar a las fuerzas del país,” EN, 5 November 1935; “La lucha contra el alcohol está siendo magnifica cruzada. Un cálido mensaje del Director-Gerente del diario de la revolución,” EN, 20 January 1936; “Es un deber combatir el alcoholismo. Por ser el mayor enemigo de la humanidad se le debe desterrar del medio social. Ejemplos prácticos. La nación que menos alcohol consume acumula mayores energías vitales. Vibrante mensaje dirigido al ejército nacional en nombre del Secretario de la Economía Nacional,” EN, 25 January 1936; Enriqueta de Parodi, Sonoran representative to the DAA, to Jesús Gutiérrez Cázares, Governor of Sonora, 31 January 1936, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; “Informe de las actividades concretas desarolladas durante el año comprendido entre el 1o. de septiembre de 1935 y el 1o. de septiembre de 1936,” S 6 (January-December 1935, January-June 1936): 89; “Festival en contra del alcoholismo. Se efectuó en el salón de actos del Departamento Autónomo del Trabajo. La ceremonía. Interesante conferencia del Sr. Tovar en representación del deparamento,” EN, 1 March 1936; “Cruzada en contra del alcoholismo. Magníficos resultados ha obtenido la campaña emprendida por Salubridad,” EN, 9 March 1936; “Se dará una plática contra el alcoholismo. Será a las once horas en la 4a. calle de Chopin, Colonía Peralvillo,” EU, 22 March 1936; “Acuerdos de la reunión penalista. Algunos estados ya llevan a la práctica las resoluciones que aprobaron. Bases de redención. Será evitado la promiscuidad de los internados en sitios de segregación. Urge cooperación. Se luchará por desterrar la toxicomanía de las cárceles e internados,” EN, 3 April 1936; “Cooperación de la policía en la campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 4 April 1936; “Servicio de educación higiénica. Resumen del informe de las labores desarolladas durante el primer semester de 1936,” S 6 (January-December 1935, January-June 1936): 102; speech given by Priani, 10 July 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “La cruzada contra el alcoholismo se hace en toda la república. Todas las fuerzas de acción están cooperando para acabar con el vicio de la embriaguez,” El Porvenir (Monterrey, Mex.) (EPM), n.d., AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; speech, Dr. Severino Herrera, “La lucha antituberculosa y la campaña antialcohólica,” 23 August 1936, AHSSA- FSPII-SPSS, Caja 13, Exp. 11; “Eficaz labor antialcohólica,” EN, 29 August 1936; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; Franco to García Téllez, 1 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Programas contra el alcohol por medio del radio. Dos estaciones pasaron ayer conciertos dedicados para Tlaxcala,” EN, 24 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 4; “Medidas profilactas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39. 100 sobriety were published in a variety of national newspapers and magazines.34
Additionally, the Department of Public Health released the anti-alcohol films Abismo and
Dragón Hambriento and began showing them in towns around the country.35 The DAA
even organized Anti-Alcohol Days on April 9, 1936, 1937, and 1940, as well as National
Hygiene Weeks in October 1937 and August 1938, with parades, lectures, music, and the
dramatic and public pouring out of adulterated alcohol. All homes and businesses in
support of the campaign were asked to fly white flags and no intoxicating beverages
could be sold on these days.36
During the Cárdenas presidency, the DAA hosted three particularly large cultural
events: two temperance conferences for children and one anti-alcohol congress. The
Primera Asamblea Infantil Antialcohólica took place from September 28 to October 3,
1936 in Mexico City. Students between the ages of eight and fifteen from across the
country were invited in advance to submit essays, stories, poetry, drawings, and oaths on
the subject of sobriety. At the opening ceremony, thousands of sign-carrying children
34 “Instructivo #1, organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub-comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Casimiro Tecisteo, President, Sub-Comité Antialcohólica, Estación Ortiz to Franco, 19 January 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/4-20; CNLCA, “n.t.,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1935): 20; “Los obreros en contra del alcoholismo. Invitación de Agricultura y Fomento y del Depto. de Salubridad Pública,” EN, 29 August 1935; “N.t.,” EN, 26 April 1936. 35 Díaz Barriga to Gutiérrez Cázares, 10 March 1936, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 741“34”/16. 36 “Mañana no habrá venta de licores,” EE, 8 April 1936; “Anti-Alcohol Day in Mexico Marked by Curb on Saloon,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 April 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “La lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 10 April 1936; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108; program, “Mosaico musical,” 9 April 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “Campaña antialcohólica,” LP, 20 October 1937; “Dos mil niños en la manifestación antialcohólica de la Semana de Higiene organizada por Salubridad,” EU, 17 August 1938; memorandum, Franco, 26 February 1940, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 9; Siurob to Cárdenas, 2 April 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “El deporte contra el alcohol. Mensaje del Lic. Leñero a la nación. En nombre del Señor Presidente produjó altos conceptos sobre el problema social del alcoholismo. Factor degradante y de aniquilamiento. Con la velada del Anfiteatro Bolivar culminaron los actos cívicos para conmemorar el día antialcohólico,” EN, 10 April 1940. 101
from the capital attended. They were treated to a variety of musical performances, with
bands from local schools, the police, and various governmental departments playing
regional music and “revolutionary” mariachi. After attending a series of panels, some of
them with student presenters, the children created a list of proposals that they submitted
to the DAA. The children also got to speak to officials themselves, asking that they not
allow any more cantinas to open. Furthermore, select representatives were chosen to join
a permanent student commission to be integrated into the DAA.37
The Primer Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico was held from October 24 to 31,
1936 in the city of Puebla. The magnitude of this assembly can be seen in the fact that to
advertise it, two parades were planned: one of 5000 school children in front of an
audience of 10,000 people and the other was to consist of 50,000 workers and
campesinos. At the first manifestation, the students, as well as Dr. Siurob, the presiding
official, took an anti-alcohol pledge, while the second one culminated with an artistic
festival and temperance-related speeches.38 Furthermore, in celebration of the opening of the conference, the president asked that all cantinas in the country remain closed for the day. Three hundred fifteen adults, including experts in the field of alcoholism,
37 “El primer congreso infantil antialcohólico de México,” LP, 18 February 1936; pre-program, Primera Asamblea Infantil Antialcohólica, 28 September-3 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; program, Primera Asamblea Infantil Antialcohólica, 28 September-3 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Un aspecto de la inauguración del congreso infantil antialcohólico que se efectuó ayer en el Palacio de Bellas Artes,” EU, 29 September 1936; “Humanitaria labor social. 100,000 niños hicieron acto de protesta contra el vicio del alcoholismo,” EN, 29 September 1936; “Contra el vicio del alcoholismo. Por la alumna de la Escuela ‘Doctor Porfirio Parra’ Adriana Lombardo Otero,” EN, 2 October 1936; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34. 38 “Un congreso contra el alcoholismo. Tendrá verificativo en la Cd. de Puebla y a él concurrirán todos los gobernadores. Los preparativos. Como actos preparatorios de propaganda se han organizado dos manifestaciones,” EN, 25 August 1936; General and Dr. José Siurob y Ramírez, “La campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 8 September 1936; Siurob to Cárdenas, 14 September 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 102 representatives from private organizations that promoted sobriety, and governmental officials from across Mexico and ten other European and American nations attended the congress. They listened to a variety of lectures that covered educational, social,
economic, judicial, and medical topics. At the end of the meeting, the delegates put
together a list of goals that the DAA should work toward. Indeed, in the following year,
DAA committees began trying to implement the recommendations. Additionally, the
Dirección offered free transcripts of the conference to temperance leagues, schools, and
worker and peasant organizations so that they could benefit from all of these ideas.39
The second of the children’s assemblies took place on October 21 to 26, 1940 in the capital. This event was even bigger than its predecessor had been, for it was seen as a way for Cárdenas to emphasize the successes of his administration, which would end that
November. For two months, a variety of events advertised the conference. These included posters, speeches on the radio, an anti-alcohol week, and a parade of thousands of children carrying school penants and anti-alcohol signs, during which time there was a partial ban on the sale of intoxicants.40 At the assembly, student leaders of temperance
39 “Campaña al alcoholismo en el país. Están por terminarse los preparativos para el c. en contra del alcohol,” EN, 30 August 1936; “Temas para el congreso contra el alcoholismo han sido seleccionados debidamente por las dependencias oficiales,” EX, 11 September 1936; Siurob to Cárdenas, 14 September and 27 October 1936 and 25 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Adhesiones al congreso contra el alcoholismo. Las ha estado recibiendo el comité organizador, de numerosos particulares,” EN, 25 September 1936; “El 24 no abrirán los expendios de licor en el país. Así se celebrará el aniversario del Primero Congreso Antialcohólico reunido en la capital,” LP, 15 October 1936; pre-program, Primer Congreso Antialcohólico, 24-31 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; program, Primer Congreso Antialcohólico, 24-31 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Distribución de la memoria antialcohólica,” EN, 7 June 1940. 40 “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Siurob to Cárdenas, 11 and 14 September and 8 and 16 October 1940, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11; Bernardino Mena Brito, Unión de Mayoristas y Detallistas de Alcoholes y Similares del Distrito Federal to Cárdenas, n.d., AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Una campaña ineficaz,” EU, 10 October 1940; “Magno desfile de pequeños. 6,000 escolares pasaron por las calles en lucha contra el alcohol. Presidió el Lic. García Téllez. Discursos,” EN, 10 October 1940. 103
leagues at their schools, ten to sixteen years in age, were joined by officials or
businessmen from at least fourteen nations. On the first day of the event, the delegates
learned that they would be able to sign a White Book where they pledged to remain
sober. They requested that President Cárdenas’s six-year old son, Cuauhtémoc, be the first to sign the book. Other events included a speech by Franco, formal sessions, a literary and artistic contest that received over 12,000 entries, and the creation of a children’s anti-vice brigade. As in the adult congress, these delegates prepared a list of
125 recommendations to guide the anti-alcohol campaign in the future.41
Other cultural projects that the DAA wished to carry out, for one reason or
another, probably never happened. For instance, the group wanted to find ways to extend
the reach of its message beyond the capital and central Valley of Mexico. Members
hoped to place temperance-related propaganda on board all trains, to create a newspaper
with a national circulation that was solely geared to promoting the anti-alcohol campaign
and its goals, and to teach lecturers indigenous languages so they could deliver the
group’s message in remote parts of the country.42 The DAA also suggested that the president issue 20,000 special stamps with a pro-temperance image. Not only would they be a form of propaganda, the money earned from the extra fee on these stamps would
41 Siurob to Cárdenas, 9 August and 22 and 24 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; pre-program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Clausura de una reunión. Con toda solemnidad ha terminado la asamblea antialcohólica,” EN, 27 October 1940; “N.t.,” C 6, no. 11 (November 1940): 7-8; list of panel recommendations, n.d., AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 42 “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa. Amplia acción se desarrollará en todos los sectores a fin de evitar este mal social,” EN, 20 August 1935; “10 mil comités informativos en contra del alcoholismo van a ser fundados este año. El Consejo Consultivo de la campaña antialcohólica sigue los lineamientos del Presidente Cárdenas. Se formula un plan concreto de acción. Los hijos de los viciosos serán atendidos para proteger el mejoramiento de nuestra raza,” EN, 22 January 1936; “Acuerdo en relación a una campaña. Lo acaba de dictar el J. de Salubridad a los de la Dirección Antialcohólica,” EN, 11 July 1936. 104
support the campaign.43 Next, the DAA strove to ensure that these and other lessons
about sobriety were not challenged by ideas to the contrary by drawing on some pre-
existing regulations. The Department of Public Education, for instance, required that all
schools stop teaching children traditional songs such as “La Valentina” and “La
Borrachita,” both of which praised drinking as manly and Mexican.44 Additionally, there already existed some restrictions on the advertisements of intoxicating beverages: those with a high alcoholic content could not be advertised on the radio or in newspapers.45
The DAA wanted to extend these policies by preventing the producers of alcohol from advertising at the cinema, as well as to censor movies that depicted children consuming pulque, or presented drunkards as amusing, socially acceptable characters.46 Finally, the group proposed that advertisements for soft drinks and other non-alcoholic beverages contain a slogan demonstrating that their products supported sobriety.47 Although most of these goals were likely never achieved, they should not be overlooked, for they show that the group had great hope in Cárdenas. The DAA sensed that the president was ideologically active, and that under his guidance, the State would have enough administrative strength to fulfill these temperance-related plans.
43 Such a stamp was never issued. “Programa de acción contra el alcohol. Quedó terminado ya el que se implantará en las escuelas primarias del país,” EN, 18 April 1936; Department of Public Health memorandum, October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Carlos Fernández Terán, Catálogo de estampillas postales de México, 1856-1996—140 años de la estampilla postal mexicana (Mexico City: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1997). 44 Gabriel Lucio, subsecretary of the office of Social Action in Primary Schools in the States and Territories, 27 March 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Ref. 297, Exp. 16. 45 “Propaganda alcohólica en el cine. Salubridad trata de evitar a toda costa que el sistema continua,” EN, 12 October 1937; program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11. 46 “Propaganda alcohólica en el cine,” EN, 12 October 1937; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “El alcoholismo y las películas nacionales. Salubridad sostiene que éstas hacen franca propaganda al vicio,” LP, 23 October 1937. 47 Pérez Alcocer to Franco, 10 September 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1. 105
The cultural work of the DAA was supplemented by, and, in fact, overlapped with, that of the Department of Public Education. High-level bureaucrats continued to
insist that the anti-alcohol campaign was one of the most important components of the
educational system, for if future generations were to be sober, they must learn healthy
habits from an early age. Therefore, they evaluated teachers and inspectors not only on
how well they taught reading, writing, and math, but also on how extensively they
promoted temperance.48 They mandated that lessons include scientific explanations of the dangers of alcohol consumption as well as examples of why drunkards did not make ideal citizens. This information was to be reinforced by having students recite a temperance salute every day. One such pledge had students chorus, “Never will we go to cantinas. Never will we drink aguardiente. Aguardiente poisons. Aguardiente sickens.”
48 Keys for bi-monthly graphs of schools’ progress in Sonora, November-December, 1934, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 4; Circular #1, J. L. Moreno, Director of Federal Education in Sonora, to Inspectors and Teachers of federal schools, n.d. [January or February 1935?], AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 3; Circular #3, J. L. Moreno, to Inspectors and Teachers of federal schools, 25 February 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 3; Circular #6, J. L. Moreno to Inspectors and Teachers of federal schools, 16 April 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 3; Circular #10, J. L. Moreno to Inspectors and Teachers of federal schools, 17 May 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 3; J. L. Moreno, 12 June 1935, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; Rafael Ramírez, “México y su educación rural. Información proporcionada a los miembros de la Conferencia de Educación Progresiva reunida en México del 26 al 31 de agosto de 1935,” EMR 7, no. 6 (15 September 1935): 10; Gabino Bautista and E. Dávila R., “La escuela socialista ante los problemas del hogar,” EMR 7, no. 6 (15 September 1935): 31; “Medidas contra el vicio del alcohol. La campaña respectiva se extenderá a todas las escuelas rurales,” EX, 18 May 1936; “Concurso de la mejor escuela rural,” EMR 9, no. 7 (December 1936): 2; Méndez Aguirre to Directors and Inspectors of Federal Schools, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; Méndez Aguirre, to Directors and Inspectors of Federal Education Schools, 26 March 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 4; Joaquin Jara Díaz, Chief of the Department of Primary and Normal Teaching, to Sector Chiefs, Inspectors, School Directors, and Teachers, 26 March 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 4; “Ruda lucha al Alcoholismo. En todas las escuelas de la república se desarrollará para acabar con esta lacra social,” EN, 23 March 1939; Arturo Madrid Carrillo, Chief of the Office of Drug Addiction and Mental Hygiene, to Dr. Gustavo A. Rovirosa, Chief of the Health Bureau in the Distrito Federal, 8 May 1939, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 23, Exp. 2; Madrid Carrillo to the Subsecretary of the Department of Public Education, 17 May 1939, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 23, Exp. 2. 106
Textbooks were to be plastered with an anti-alcohol decalogue as well.49 Pedagological experts claimed that the facts should be supplemented by cultural teaching tools in the classroom. The winners of student contests held at the national, state, and even school level often created this material. These plays, music, art, and slogans that praised sobriety were then published in teachers’ magazines or exhibited around the country so that they could be appreciated by a wider audience.50 Furthermore, experts hoped that
49 Curriculum for the zone of Magdalena, January 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 22; Luis Villarreal, “Programa de educación higiénica para las escuelas rurales,” EMR 7, no. 10 (15 November 1935): 13; Luis Villarreal, “Programa de educación higiénica para las escuelas rurales,” EMR 7, no. 11 (1 December 1935): 8; Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, Moreno, n.d. [1935?], AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; “10 mil comités informativos en contra del alcoholismo van a ser fundados este año,” EN, 22 January 1936; report, Bernal Rodríguez, Sahuaripa, 19 March 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 9; “La cooperación infantil en la campaña antialcohólica. Vasto plan de trabajo se formula. Se desarrollará intensa acción en la escuela República de Cuba, de acuerdo con un comité. Uno de los prinicipales medios para llenar ese fin consiste en hacer propaganda entre obreros,” EN, 11 April 1936; “La labor antialcohólica en escuelas primarias del D.F. Durante todo el mes los escolares harán una intensa campaña en contra del vicio. Plan de acción del comité de salud de la escuela ‘F. M. del Castillo,’” EN, 11 August 1936; Francisco Nicodermo, Oficial Mayor of the Department of Public Education, to Yocupicio, 1 February 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 1; Méndez Aguirre, to Directors and Inspectors of Federal Schools, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; report, School Director Felizardo Olivares T., Los Angeles, 31 October 1937, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Articulo 123 Escuelas, Estado de Sonora, (AHSEP-A123ES), Caja 70 (20), Exp. 12; Tercero año, serie S.E.P. Lectura oral (Mexico City: Comisión Editora Popular de la Secretaría de Educación Pública and Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad, 1938), 88-89; Antonio Santa María, “La campaña antialcohólica en las Escuelas del D. F. El plan de trabajo de la 9a. zona foránea,” EN, 1 March 1938; plan for the 1938-1939 school year, Hermosillo, 6 July 1938, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 59; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 33-34; “Ruda lucha al alcoholismo,” EN, 23 March 1939. Questionnaires, Sonora school directors, AHSEP-DERS: Maclovia Celaya Gómez, Imuais, 2 June 1939, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 50; Rigcarsto Rivas Acedo, Ejido El Claro, 4 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19432; Guillermo Coronado M., Pueblo Nuevo, 5 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/19473; Manuel Romero Guerrero, Yécora, 15 June 1939, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 36; Félix Vargas Nídes, Hermosillo, 15 June 1939, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 59; José S. Arana, El Júpare, 20 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19422, Exp. 56; Juana López Ruiz, Natora, 30 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19468, Exp. 71; Humberto Romero Córdova, Tecoriname, June 1939, Caja 829, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19218, Exp. 37; Guadalupe Rascan B., Santa Rosa, June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/19272, Exp. 68. 50 Mariana Frenk, “Muchos somos muchísimos, EMR 7, no. 3 (1 August 1935): 35-38; “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; “Un decálogo de alumnos. Ha sido formulado contra el alcoholismo en el Centro ‘Revolución.’ Cooperación infantil. Los niños de México siguen demostrando su propósito firme antialcohólico,” EN, 30 October 1935; Villarreal, “Programa de educación higiénica para las escuelas rurales,” EMR 7, no. 11 (1 December 1935): 8; “Pensamientos en contra del alcoholismo. El Departamento de Salubridad abre importante concurso al efecto,” EN, 31 March 1936; 107 courses in physical education and the creation of sports teams would help to replace leisure time spent carousing with more healthy habits.51 The cultural education would continue outside of the schoolhouse, and into the larger community, with anti-alcohol conferences, festivals, and parades.52 Printed materials, such as flyers, posters, and
“La Niñez Continúa Cooperando en la Campaña Antialcohólica,” EN, 6 April 1936; “La cooperación infantil en la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 11 April 1936; “Estimulo a los niños en la lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EG, 13 April 1936; “Programa de acción contra el alcohol,” EN, 18 April 1936; “La campaña en contra del alcohol. En la escuela ‘Marcelino Dávalos’ se celebró la semana contra al alcoholismo. El programa. Fue del todo sugestivo haciendo uso de la palabra en los mitines los alumnos,” EN, 16 July 1936; “La labor antialcohólica en escuelas primarias del D.F.,” EN, 11 August 1936; “La cruzada contra el alcoholismo se hace en toda la república,” EPM, n.d., [before 19 August 1936?], 8, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Jara Díaz, to Sector Chiefs, Inspectors, School Directors, and Teachers, 26 March 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 4; report, School Director Vicente F. Padilla, Nogales, 27 March 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8438 (14), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/708, Exp. 12; “Estrecha cooperación en la labor antialcohólica. Una reunión anoche en Salubridad. Se acordó, desde luego, no prorrogar el plazo para registro de bebidas. Otras disposiciones. Se fijará un plazo a los líquidos extranjeros, sin representante aquí,” EN, 20 July 1937; “Campaña al alcoholismo en el país. Se solicitará la ayuda de los estados para intensificarla en sus aspectos,” EN, 18 September 1937; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP- SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; Roberto Reyes Pérez, Chief of the Department of Worker Education, to Inspectors, Directors, and Teachers of night schools, 6 December 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 12; “Labor antialcohólica por medio de las escuelas al servicio de los obreros. Una circular señalando los lineamientos ha expedido la Sría. de Educación, indicando debe realizarse una campaña objetiva para mejores resultados,” EN, 11 December 1937; Santa María, “La campaña antialcohólica en las escuelas del D. F.,” EN, 1 March 1938; plan for the 1938-1939 school year, Yécora, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 36. Questionnaires, Sonora school directors, AHSEP-DERS: Manuel Enriquez Herrera, San Juan del Rio, 8 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/11184; Manuela Montaño Miranda, La Colonia, 15 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/5876; Arana, 20 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/19422, Exp. 56; José Francisco Mange Reina, El Saúz, 15 June 1939, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 58. 51 Roberto Sánchez Lima, Hermosillo, to J. L. Moreno, 26 March 1935, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; J. L. Moreno, Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; Méndez Aguirre, Directors and Inspectors of Federal Schools, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; “Una función moralizadora del maestro rural,” EN, 10 September 1937; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; Santa María, “La campaña antialcohólica en las escuelas del D. F.,” EN, 1 March 1938; Profesor Leobardo Parra y Marquina, director of Federal Education in Sonora, to all Inspectors, 11 May 1938, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8407, Exp. 4167/47. Questionnaires, Sonora school directors, AHSEP-DERS: Carlos Puebla Valenzuela, Santiago, 15 May 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19297, Exp. 32; Ramón Real Carrasco, Santa Emilia, 1 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19480; Adelina López Murrieta, Santa Ana Viejo, 7 June 1939, Caja 829, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19193, Exp. 44; Altagracia Ruiz Varela, La Cienguita, 10 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19312, Exp. 87; Socorro Granillo Moreno, Maytorena, 10 June 1939, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19446; Gabriel González Salazar, El Pantanito 15 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19217, Exp. 10; Blares M., Guadalupe, 15 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19281, Exp. 27; Francisco Álvarez González, Zacaton, n.d, [June 1939?], Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 48. 52 Questionnaires, Sonora school directors, AHSEP-DERS: Soledad Terán Vázquez, La Capilla, 13 April 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19310, Exp. 88; Julia Espinosa Trujillo, San José de Baviacora, 29 108
April 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19311, Exp. 86; J. Catarino Dojaque Estrada, La Cebolla, 4 May 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/192229, Exp. 4; Puebla Valenzuela, 15 May 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19297, Exp. 32; Carmen Figueroa, San Lorenzo, 20 May 1939, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19231, Exp. 74; Rosario Román Uriarte, Agua Zarca, 30 May 1939, Caja 1673 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19539, Exp. 43; Margarita Molina Acuña, Campo Carretero, 31 May 1939, Caja 829 (8), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19630, Exp. 64; José Fernández Fernández, Ejido Alamo, 31 May 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19499; Eliseo Grijalva González, Kilómetro 47, 3 June 1939, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19464, Exp. 62; Guadalupe Campa Campa, El Trigo, 5 June 1939, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19201; Campo Rodríguez, 5 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6373; María de los Angeles Valenzuela L., 5 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19537; Fernando Blanco Blanco, San Luis, 5 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19609, Exp. 62; María Dolores Peralta López, La Brizca, 5 June 1939, Caja 8440 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19531, Exp. 24; J. Francisco Lima Morales, Casa Blanca, 5 June 1939, Caja 8440 (8), Exp. 66; Carlos Rivera Rivas, Guisamopa, 6 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19275; María Gutiérrez Rivera, La Misión, 6 June 1939, Caja 8440 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/19230, Exp. 70; López Murrieta, 7 June 1939, Caja 829, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19193, Exp. 44; Leonardo Vargas Nada, Casa de Teras, 10 June 1939, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19306, Exp. 52; Raúl A. Reina, San Benito, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6491; Concepción Rodríguez de Tirado, Iglesia Vieja, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19508, Exp. 42; Jerónimo Velardo Romero, La Estancia, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673 (9), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19655, Exp. 73; Ruth Hernández Duarte, Bella Esperanza, 10 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19277; Rosa Velázquez Ortíz, Cerro Blanco, 10 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19433; Héctor Mange Reyna, Ranchería, 10 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19593, Exp. 71; Lidia Ballesteros Yépiz, Las Guayabitas, 10 June 1939, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19460; Hildelíza Rodríguez Rivera, La Bocana, 10 June 1939, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19249, Exp. 34; María Reyes Morales M., Campanichaca, 10 June 1939, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19262, Exp. 73; Magdalena Delgado Murillo, Rillito Muerto, 10 June 1939, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19295, Exp. 48; María Oswalda Cons, Estación Pesquiera, 11 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19323, Exp. 46; Cornelio González Delgado, Chinotehuaca, 13 June 1939, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19439; Montaño Miranda, 15 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/5876; González Salazar, June 15, 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19217, Exp. 10; A. H. Cárdenas, Ejido La Unión, n.d., Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19483. Graphs on schools’ progress, various zones of Sonora, AHSEP-DERS: Alamos, November-December 1934, Caja 8443, Exp. 4; Huatabampo, November-December 1934, Caja 8443, Exp. 9; Alamos, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 4; Cumpas, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 10; Huatabampo, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 9; Magdalena, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 22; Ures, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 16; Magdalena, March-April 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 22; Caborca, March-April 1935, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 4; Sahuaripa, March-April 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 17; Ures, March-April 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 16; Magdalena, September-October 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 18. Graphs on schools’ progress, various zones of Sonora, AHSEP-DEFS: Hermosillo, November-December 1935, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 10; Sahuaripa, November-December 1935, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 9; Arizpe, January-February 1936, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 3; Cumpas/Nacozari, January-February 1936, Caja 5763, Sin Exp.; Hermosillo, January-February 1936, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 10; Magdalena, January-February 1936, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 8; Sahuaripa, January-February 1936, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 9; Magdalena, March-April 1936, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 8; Cumpas/Nacozari, March-April 1936, Caja 5763, Sin Exp. “La campaña contra el alcoholismo, iniciada en el mundo escolar. El primer acto de la generosa ofensiva lo llevó a cabo la esc. ‘D. F. Sarmiento,’” EN, 24 August 1935; “En contra del alcoholismo. El Depto. de Salubridad Pública destina $100,000 a intensificar la campaña. Estrecha cooperación. Se fundarán más subcomités para combatirlo. Manifestación el 20 de noviembre,” EN, 10 October 1935; Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, Moreno, n.d., AHSEP- DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; “La cooperación infantil en la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 11 April 1936; “La labor antialcohólica en escuelas primarias del D.F.,” EN, 11 August 1936; plan for the 1936- 1937 school year, E. López, 15 January 1937, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 602, Exp. 22; Nicodermo to Yocupicio, 1 February 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 1; Méndez Aguirre, to Directors and Inspectors of 109 magazines, as well as radio programs aimed at students and their parents, would further the message of temperance.53
During the Cárdenas years, the Department of Public Education’s cultural instructional strategies were paired with an emphasis on more active measures to counteract social vices. Pedagological experts believed that only teaching students about the dangers of alcohol consumption, no matter how creatively it was done, would not be enough to counteract bad habits. Educators’ hard work could easily be undone by the multitude of negative influences that constantly surrounded students and their families.54
Therefore, they argued that the first step to make sure that the anti-alcohol campaign had
a long-term influence was for teachers to observe their community or to take a survey,
noting areas of weakness in regard to vice. Such knowledge would help them to better
address the needs of their particular region.55 Second, they expected teachers and school
Federal Schools, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; report, School Director and Profesor Rodolfo G. Velazquez, El Tigre, 12 May 1937, AHSEP-A123ES, Caja 70 (20), Exp. 18; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; Santa María, “La campaña antialcohólica en las escuelas del D. F.,” EN, 1 March 1938. 53 “Cooperan en la campaña al alcoholismo. Los escolares se dedicarán al combate del vicio y piden publicidad impresa,” EN, 17 August 1935; “Propaganda contra el alcoholismo en centros escolares. La Secretaría de Educación la hará también en los barrios,” EX, 16 September 1935; “La escuela ‘Amiga de la Obrera,’ cooperará en la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 10 March 1936; “La cooperación infantil en la campaña antialcohólica,”EN, 11 April 1936; report, Inspector Felipe Madera M., Cumpas, 10 September 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5763, Sin Exp.; Méndez Aguirre, Directors and Inspectors of Federal Schools, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; Jara Díaz, to Sector Chiefs, Inspectors, School Directors, and Teachers, 26 March 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 4; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; questionnaire, School Director Adelina Bonilla S. Peralta, Ranchería del Carrizal, Sonora, 8 June 1939, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 1673 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19526, Exp. 18; questionnaire, Reina, 10 June 1939, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6491; “Una Campaña en contra del alcoholismo en las escuelas,” EN, 14 June 1939. 54 “Una función moralizadora del maestro rural,” EN, 10 September 1937; Rafael Ramírez, “Organizando el programa de salud de la escuela rural,” EMR 11, no. 11-12 (November-December 1938), 11. 55 “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; Otto Rühle, “El niño proletario en México. Plan de trabajo para una Investigación,” EMR 8, no. 8 (15 April 1936): 5-6; Celerino Cano, “Interpretación y Manejo del Programa,” EMR 11, no. 11-12 (November-December 1938): 30; 110 inspectors to organize student, parent, and community temperance leagues on a regular basis. These leagues would be able to help instructors in planning festivals or distributing propaganda.56 These anti-alcohol committees could aid municipal governments in closing cantinas that were located too close to schools, that sold adulterated beverages, or that operated on days and times when the law required they be closed.57 Finally, educators were asked to set a good example by preferably abstaining
questionnaire, School Director Eusebio López Herrera, Juliantabampo, 10 June 1939, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8440 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19300, Exp. 47. 56 Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, J. L. Moreno, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; “Programa de acción contra el alcohol,” EN, 18 April 1936; Fernando Ximello, director of Federal Education in Sonora, to Celso Flores Zamora, director of Primary Education in the States and Territories, 13 May 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Ref. 297, Exp. 16; report, Inspector Pascual López, Magdalena, 26 June 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 8; “La labor antialcohólica en escuelas primarias del D.F,” EN, 11 August 1936; “La campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 25 August 1936; Méndez Aguirre to Inspectors and Directors of Federal Education, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; Reyes Pérez, to Inspectors, Directors, and Teachers of night schools, 6 December 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 12; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; Rafael Ramírez, “Organizando el programa de salud de la escuela rural,” EMR 11, no. 11-12 (November-December 1938): 13; questionnaire, School Director Jesús Bermúdez C., Rancho Guadalupe El Grande, 10 June 1939, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 1673 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19508, Exp. 42. 57 Questionnaires, Sonora school directors, AHSEP-DERS: Carlos Puebla Valenzuela, Santiago, 15 May 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19297, Exp. 32; Gerardo Carrasco Meza, Esterito, 24 May 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19206, Exp. 16; Rafael Villa Gutiérrez, El Carrizo, 25 May 1939, Caja 8446 (6), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19228, Exp. 3; Matilde Ramírez Barragán, El Rodeo, 31 May 1939, Caja 5748, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19294, Exp. 76; Edmundo López, San Rafael, 31 May 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19319, Exp. 77; María Jesús López Castro, Yécora, 1 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19560, Exp. 15; Alfonso Reyes Rivera, Las Placitas, 1 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19318, Exp. 38; María Dolores Peralta López, La Brizca, 5 June 1939, Caja 8440 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19531, Exp. 24; Rivera Rivas, 6 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19275; Plutarca Cruz Huerico, Casa Grande, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/5880; Mercedes Gil, Sahuaral, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6376; Francisco Ochoa Chávez, La Noria, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19644; Manuel del Cid Grijalva, El Alhuate, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673 (9), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/5628, Exp. 44; Ceferina Torres de Fuentes, Los Viejos, 10 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19370; Benjamin de la Ree, Mesa de Seri, 10 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV- 14)/19475; Refugio Sánchez Tépiz, Los Hoyos, 10 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/12879; Susana Quijada Reyna, Térapa, 10 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19299, Exp. 82; José Lozano Navarro, Meresichi, 10 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19586, Exp. 22; Marcelina H. de Zavala, Ejido de Citavaro, 10 June 1939, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 69; Eduardo Regez Bay, Vega Azul, 10 June 1939, Caja 8446 (6), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/7054; José Manuel López Herrerra, Huitchaca, 10 June 1939, Caja 8446 (6), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/7097, Exp. 7; Agripina Moreno Riesgo, El Llano, 10 June 1939, Caja 8440 (8), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19659, Exp. 68; Jesús Leyva Ibarra, Ejido Bayajorit, 12 June 1939, Caja 1673 (6), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19353; Ernestina Blanco S., Las Guayabas, 12 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. 111 completely from intoxicating beverages or at least drinking moderately. Gains in the fight for sobriety could suffer a serious setback if students observed one of their role models under the influences of alcohol.58 Engaging in these types of actions, claimed
IV/161(IV-14)/19380; Jesús Reina A., La Yesca, 15 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6389; Ricardo Willem Madrid, Cajón de Onapa, 15 June 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19472; Blares M., 15 June 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19281, Exp. 27; Mariana Félix Cordova, Rebeico, 16 June 1939, Caja 829 (8), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19603, Exp. 55; Rafael E. Badilla Chenowiell, La Paz, 18 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19321, Exp. 78; Lucía Lubrán Olivas, Bacanora, 30 June 1939, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 53; Santos Romero Rodríguez, Badesi, n.d. [June 1939?], Caja 1673 (6), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19222, Exp. 15; Manuel Amaya Trólix, Yécora, 11 July 1939, Caja 829 (8), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19229, Exp. 36. Graphs on schools’ progress, various zones of Sonora, AHSEP-DEFS: Arizpe, January-February 1936, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 3; Hermosillo, January-February 1936, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 10; Cumpas/Nacozari, March-April 1936, Caja 5763, Sin Exp.; Magdalena, March- April 1936, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 8. Graphs on schools’ progress, various zones of Sonora, AHSEP- DERS: Alamos, November-December 1934, Caja 8443, Exp. 4; Cumpas, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 10; Huatabampo, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 9, Magdalena, January-February 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 22; Caborca, March-April 1935, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 4; Magdalena, March-April 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 22; Magdalena, September-October 1935, Caja 8443, Exp. 18. Key for graphs on schools’ progress, November-December 1934, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 4; report, Bernal Rodríguez, 28 February 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 9; Circular 10, 17 May 1935, AHSEP- DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 3; report, J. L. Moreno, 22 May 1935, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; report, Inspector Leonardo Ramírez G., Sahuaripa, 29 July 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 16; J. L. Moreno, Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; report, Madera M., 26 May 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5763, Sin Exp.; report, Bernal Rodríguez, n.d., [late 1936?], AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 9; report, School Director Cuauhtémoc Terán, Nacozari, 15 October 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8347, Exp. 297/25; report, E. López, 15 January 1937, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 602, Exp. 22; Méndez Aguirre to Inspectors and School Directors, 3 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; “El alcoholismo será combatido por los maestros rurales,” EU, 9 September 1937; “Una función moralizadora del maestro rural,” EN, 10 September 1937; report, School Director Ámparo de la Fuente, 10 September 1937, AHSEP-A123ES, Caja 70 (20), Exp. 18; E. López, 24 September 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 1; report, Bernal Rodríguez, 30 September 1937, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 602, Exp. 22; plan for the 1937-1938 school year, Hermosillo, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 59; “Labor antialcohólica por medio de las escuelas al servicio de los obreros,” EN, 11 December 1937; Santa María, “La campaña antialcohólica en las escuelas del D. F.,” EN, 1 March 1938; plan for the 1937-1938 school year, El Tejában, 30 October 1938, AHSEP- DERS, Caja 8347 (9), Exp. 36; School Inspector Pedro López Lagarda, plan for the 1937-1938 school year, Navojoa, 1 November 1938, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5518, Exp. 3; Ramírez, “Organizando el programa de salud de la escuela rural,” EMR 11, no. 11-12 (November-December 1938): 12; report, School Director Crescencio Gámez A., Bacobampo, 31 October 1939, Caja 1673 (8), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19651, Exp. 67. 58 Report, Inspector Juan G. Oropeza, Cumpas, 10 March 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 10; J. Raquel Velázquez, “Comportamiento del maestro,” Reforma Escolar. Hoja mensual de propaganda educative de los Maestros Rurales Federales de la Primera Zona Escolar de Sonora (Magdalena) 1, no. 2 (December 1935); J. L. Moreno, Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; Investigations Commission, “Resumen del estudio sobre el alcoholismo en México,” 6 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Inspector Leonardo Magaña, 2 October 1939, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5518 (2989), Exp. 6. 112
Roberto Reyes Pérez, Chief of the Department of Worker Education in 1937, would
ensure that the campaign was more than just a good idea.59
The sustained, active measures to fight vice in the Department of Public
Education were mirrored in the larger temperance movement. In fact, Franco claimed that in late 1936, the anti-alcohol campaign had moved out of its first phase, which had been aimed at raising people’s conciousness about chronic alcohol abuse. This stage had relied on “social” or “cultural” strategies, such as sponsoring festivals or distributing propaganda. Now, in its second phase, the movement would employ more “concrete actions,” such as prosecuting those who violated the nation’s liquor laws and finding other jobs for cantina employees. These changes led him to conclude that the anti- alcohol campaign was finally “on its feet.”60
The DAA’s ability to take concrete actions came in part because Cárdenas strove
to lead an ideologically active regime, and in part because the increase in the
administrative strength of his government made it possible to achieve some of these
goals.61 Unlike previous presidents, Cárdenas passed a number of measures himself that
were directly aimed at combating the alcohol problem and that had been unfulfilled goals
of temperance reformers for years. In fact, he announced in April 1937 that the anti-
59 Reyes Pérez, 6 December 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 12. 60 Historian Stephen Lewis claims that this change was evident between 1928 and 1934 in the Department of Public Education’s tactics in Yucatán as well. Pamphlet, attached to Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 22 October 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/118; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 103. 61 The connection between the administrative strength of the regime and the intensification of the anti- alcohol campaign was noted by U.S. Ambassador Josephus Daniels, who commented that “Ending alcoholism was a key goal of the revolution, but during the military phase, the social chaos was too great for anything to be accomplished. Afterwards, there were too many economic problems to pursue this goal. . . . As the economy has improved, so has the anti-alcohol campaign.” Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108. 113 alcohol campaign would continue to use cultural and economic means to combat vice, but
that he was going to supplement these measures with “administrative sanctions and penal
punishments.”62 Cárdenas’s first decree in this spirit had come on October 7, 1935, when he prohibited the sale of hard alcohol on board trains and in station restaurants.63 Next, in
1937, he restricted the sale of beverages containing more than 5 percent alcohol on the weekends and holidays. This measure tried to prevent people from spending their entire paychecks on intoxicating drinks, to make festivals and markets more orderly, and to keep children, who would be out of school on these days, from being exposed to vice.
Without alcohol, it was hoped that people would read, play sports, or engage in other
“honest endeavors.”64 Next, on January 1, 1938, Cárdenas strove to regulate the toxicity
of alcohol. All beverages sold commercially had to be inspected by the Department of
Public Health to ensure their salubriousness. This meant that popular amargos, or
alcoholic fruit punches, like ajenjo, nanche, guayaba, or tejocote were banned. The
choice of these specific beverages was based on a study done by the DAA which
identified them as particularly noxious because of their high alcohol content.65 This
62 Presidential decree, n.d. [April 1937?], AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 63 “El estado seco en los ferrocarriles,” EX, 8 October 1935; Franco to Siurob, 14 October 1935, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 34, Exp. 4; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Prohibición sobre bebidas,” EN, 20 February 1936. 64 Memorandum, Siurob to Cárdenas, 1 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Circular 35, Department of Government, 16 August 1935, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-3925, Caja 14, Exp. 2; presidential decree, n.d., AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Tres días de la semana no habrá alcohol. El Presidente L. Cárdenas tiene el firme propósito de librar del vicio a las razas indígenas. Está incluido el Distrito Federal. En las regiones densamente pobladas por indios, será prohibida la fabricación de alcohol,” EX, 6 April 1937; “Los obstaculos de la ‘ley seca,’” EX, 7 April 1937; A. Cuenca Díaz, secretary of Sección 8 del Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana, DF, to Cárdenas, 19 April 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 65 Díaz Barriga to the chief of the Legal Office of the Department of Public Health, 19 July 1935, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Desde enero no se expenderán más amargos. A partir del mes que entra, Salubridad ejercerá estricto control sobre la venta de licores,” LP, 14 December 1937; “Hasta mañana podrá libarse ajenjo. También mañana se 114 legislation seems to have been combined with the promotion of beer, which was seen by some temperance advocates as being less harmful since it had a substantially lower percentage of alcohol and was produced in a regulated environment.66 Finally, in June
1939, Cárdenas demanded that a long-neglected provision of the constitution, as well as the Federal Labor Law of 1931, be honored. Therefore, he ordered that governors oversee the closing of all alcohol dispensaries in their states in ejidos, mining towns, the petroleum region, and all other workplaces. The president hoped that such a provision would help to increase the wealth of these regions, improve the wellbeing of the families living there, and would cause crime, gambling, and prostitution to decline.67 These measures, taken together, demonstrated a great change in strategy from the more passive techniques of earlier executives.
acabarán en México los ‘amarguitos.’ Desde las cero horas del día primero los agentes de Salubridad echarán a las coladeras cuanto menjurje encuentren en las cantinas y piqueras,” LP, 30 December 1937; “Solo vinos puros y en botellas certificadas. Otras medidas tomadas para intensificar la campaña antialcohólica,” EU, 29 September 1940. 66 It should be noted that not all members of the DAA agreed with the idea that beer ought to be promoted as an alternative to pulque or any other drink. Dr. Ayala González pointed out that it was still a stupefying substance. Minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS 812.114 Liquors/108; “Un triunfo de ‘El Nacional,’” EN, 19 September 1938; program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 355. 67 “1,500 comités contra el alcoholismo en el país,” EN, 10 August 1935; “Campaña en contra de los vicios. El Departamento del Trabajo está distribuyendo un programa al respecto,” EN, 29 January 1936; “Nuevos aspectos en la campaña en contra del vicio del alcoholismo,” EN, 6 February 1936; “Todos los antros de vicio cercanos a las escuelas se cerrarán. Lo mismo los que estén junto a talleres o fábricas, por orden del Consejo Consultivo,” LP, 13 May 1937; “Prohibición del alcohol en el ejido,” EN, 24 September 1937; “El Reglamento de las Cantinas Restringe el Vicio del Alcohol. Destitución de empleados en ebriedad. Salubridad someterá a los ejecutivos locales ese ordenamiento para su vigencia en todo el país. Requisitos que deberán observarse en las cantinas y expendios de bebidas espirituosas,” EN, 26 November 1937; María Luisa M. Vda. de Naude, “Comentarios femeninos. El último drama ocasionado por el alcohol. Una respetuosa llamada al Gral. Siurob,” EG, 23 August 1938; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 16 June 1939, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; Cárdenas to unknown, 23 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; “Opinión editorial,” EN, 24 June 1939; “Los últimos 67 días de Jira Presidencial,” EN, 6 August 1939, sec. 1, p. 1; “Acción contra los centros de vicio en núcleos de labor. Clausuras Inmediatas,” EN, 28 August 1939, sec. 1, p. 1. 115
Cárdenas did not just pass laws to combat alcohol abuse, he also created a new corps of inspectors beginning in 1935 or 1936 to ensure that they were followed. These agents came from the Department of Public Health, the municipal government of Mexico
City, the army, and the Attorney General’s office.68 They made sure that cantinas, restaurants and other establishments that sold alcoholic beverages had registered with the proper authorities. Later, they also ensured that only legal and non-adulterated beverages
were dispensed and that they be in closed and properly-labeled containers. Clandestine
locations were shut down immediately, their owners fined, and bottles destroyed so they
could not be reused. It seems that these inspectors never lacked for work: Franco noted
that his men collected over 81,000 pesos in fines in one year alone, closed thousands of
establishments, and found beverages so adulterated that some even contained rats and
lizards. The DAA also took credit for the significant decline in the number of locations
that dispensed intoxicants.69 Agents did their work in as public a manner as possible so
68 Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Plan General, Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108; “La campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 23 February 1937; “Inspectores en servicio permanente. Ha sido creado un cuerpo de esta naturaleza por el Departamento del D.F. Estricta vigilancia. Los expendios de cerveza donde vendan alcoholes serán clausurados luego,” EN, 24 July 1937; “Los soldados tirán barriles de malas bebidas a las coladeras,” LP, 1 December 1937; “Una medida de salud pública. Dos dependencias oficiales cooperarán en una campaña al vicio,” EX, 22 May 1939. 69 “Los resultados de la campaña contra el alcoholismo. A pesar de la reducción del número de expendios, las pulquerías siguen siendo en número extraordinario,” EG, 16 June 1936; “Batida a los vendedores clandestinos de bebidas. Una campaña moralizadora se emprende. El Departamento Central la realizará con el objeto de poner fuerte coto. Informes recibidos. Los embrigadores públicos aprovechan cualquier ocasión para hacer ventas,” EN, 21 January 1937; “La campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 23 February 1937; “Campaña contra los infractores de reglamentos. Con toda energia están procediendo los inspectores del Departamento del D. F.,” EN, 1 May 1937; “N.t.,” EX, 21 July 1937; “Cuarentinueve cantinas han sido cerradas. La campaña contra el alcoholismo. En el Distrito Federal se clausuraron treinta y cuatro centros de vicio en barrios obreros. Los restantes en Morelos, Aguascalientes, y Chiapas. Una tenaz lucha en pro de la raza,” EN, 7 October 1937; “N.t.,” EN, 8 October 1937; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “Campaña enérgica contra los licores adulterados,” EG, 14 June 1938; “Destrucción de alcoholes,” EN, 14 June 1938; “Se inspeccionan unos comercios. Se trata de los que se dedican a la venta de las bebidas alcohólicas,” EX, 21 June 1938; “Verdadero peligro para los pobres,” 116 as to send a message that the nation’s alcohol laws ought to be obeyed. They poured out unsanitary drinks in the gutter, an event that newspapers frequently reported. In fact, these theatrical spectacles seemed to have attracted a large number of observers. In one
Mexico City neighborhood in 1937, a photograph shows that an inspector forced a man to empty a barrel of pulque into the street and at least ten other people from a variety of
class and ethnic backgrounds gathered around to watch (see Image 3).70 Sometimes
inspectors even had ordinary men, women, and schoolchildren participate in the
destruction of adulterated alcohol (See Images 4, 5, and 6).71 These demonstrations were certainly meant to impress upon both the participants and the observers that alcoholic beverages were dangerous and that the government had the ability to monitor illegal behavior.
EX, 1 July 1938; “10,000 litros de licor adulterado fueron destruidos,” EN, 2 July 1938; “Contra los que violen las restricciones alcohólicas. Salubridad aplicaré sanciones máximas,” EN, 4 July 1938; “La vigilancia a las bebidas,” EN, 12 July 1938; “Advertencia sobre venta de bebidas,” EX, 14 July 1938; “La campaña en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 20 July 1938; “Medidas para evitar desleales competencias en el comercio,” EN, 30 August 1938; “N.t.,” EN, 30 August 1938; “Solo vinos puros y en botellas certificadas. Otras medidas tomadas para intensificar la campaña antialcohólica,” EU, 29 September 1940. AHSSA- FSPII-SOM: Franco to the Legal Consultation office of the Department of Public Health, 15 March 1940, Caja 3, Exp. 8; Inspectors Ignacio Rico M., Fidencio Ramírez García, Alfonso Zubieta C., et al, to Franco, 15 March 1940, Caja 3, Exp. 8; Franco to Inspectors Ramírez García and Carlos H. Nafarrate, 15 March 1940, Caja 3, Exp. 8; Franco to the chief of the Fine-Processing Office, 3 and 8 April, 4 and 25 June, 3 August, 7 September, 16 and 17 October (three), 22 November, and 10 and 13 December (two) 1940, Caja 3, Exp. 16; memorandum, Franco, 3 September 1940, Caja 3, Exp. 8; Franco to Siurob, 23 November 1940 (two), Caja 3, Exp. 16. 70 Photograph, Department of Public Health memorandum to Cárdenas, 7 January 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 71 Photographs 4 and 5, Siurob to Cárdenas, 9 July 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; photograph 6, ca. 1930s, Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, Archivo Gráfico El Nacional, (INEHRM-AGEN), NT/12B/002. 117
Image 3, no title, artist unknown, Mexico City, 1937. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
Image 4, no title, artist unknown, Mexico City, 1937. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City. 118
Image 5, no title, artist unknown, Mexico City, 1937. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
Image 6, no title, artist unknown, Mexico City, ca. 1930s. Reproduced with permission by the Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, Mexico City.
119
In addition to their cultural measures, the DAA and a variety of other concerned governmental departments also engaged in more active strategies to combat social vices, often with the help of Cárdenas. For instance, temperance advocates looked for ways to transform the alcohol industry into something more beneficial to the nation without
damaging the economy. Some of the suggestions included encouraging factories to
produce things such as perfume, ether, soap, industrial alcohol and other useful items,
converting land where maguey plants had grown into cow pastures, and compensating
businesses for making such transitions.72 Although these had been goals of reformers for years, in 1936 they began to be achieved. The president created a National Society of
Producers of Alcohol to help collect taxes, prevent the sale of clandestine or adulterated alcohol, and limit the production of intoxicants.73 Furthermore, a series of meetings took place in the summer of 1937 which included the DAA, the Departments of Public Health and the Treasury, some senators, and representatives of the alcoholic beverage industry.74
During these conversations, members on all sides of the debate agreed that when such
72 “Mexico Opens Campaign Against Drinking,” NYT, 7 January 1935; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; Siurob to the Secretary of the National Treasury, 29 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; “Enérgica campaña contra el alcoholismo. Supresión sistemática de cantinas cerca de los centros de trabajo. Salarios de hambre. El Departamento de Salubridad solicita la cooperación de la sociedad,” EX, 14 August 1935, 10; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11; “Pasturas en vez de aguardientes. Una proposición para reducir el vicio del alcoholismo en el país,” EX, 9 February 1936; “Habrá menos alcoholismo,” EN, 27 March 1936; “No habrá estado seco en la nación,” EN, 31 October 1936; “La lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 22 July 1937. 73 “Producción restringida. Se venderá menos alcohol y bebidas embriagantes en la república. Impuestos elevados de carácter prohibitivo,” EU, 3 April 1936; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108. 74 “Producción restringida,” EU, 3 April 1936; “N.t.,” EX, 23 June 1937; Siurob to García Téllez, 19 July 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Ya no se venderán bebidas por litro, solo botellas cerradas. Ni se permitirá el tráfico con cascos vacios para evitar la adulteración de las bebidas,” LP, 28 July 1937; “El alcoholismo será rudamente combatido. Hace tres semanas se vienen celebrando juntas en la Sría. de Gobernación,” EU, 2 August 1937; “La campaña al alcohol. Se terminó ya la discusión del anteproyecto de la ley respectiva. Puntos de vista. Los dieron a conocer los fabricantes al Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” EN, 30 August 1937; “La ley antialcohólica es contra la bebida de pésima calidad,” LP, 7 September 1937. 120 drinks were made, either in Mexico or abroad, they ought to be sanitary and subject to inspection. Retailers approved of Franco’s suggestion to support domestic, as opposed to foreign, alcohol, agreed to sell drinks only in closed, labeled containers, and vowed not to
sell empty bottles with labels on them so that they could not be subsequently refilled.75 It seems that their goal of drafting a law solidifying these informal agreements never materialized, and it is unclear the role that these meetings played in Cárdenas’s decision to pass the previously-mentioned decrees that sought the purification and restriction of alcohol. Regardless, the national government’s increased capacity to elicit the cooperation of business was a milestone for the anti-alcohol campaign.
Another of these more active strategies involved the promotion and organization of auxiliary anti-alcohol leagues. Although overseeing the formation of these organizations had been one of the DAA’s goals since its inception as the CNLCA in
1929, in the mid-to late-1930s, the focus on popular mobilization increased dramatically under Cárdenas. Spurred on by the president himself, the DAA hoped to create hundreds of popular leagues, and encouraged affiliated departments to do so as well.76 Similarly,
75 “Estrecha cooperación en la labor antialcohólica,” EN, 20 July 1937; “Ya no se venderán bebidas por litro, solo botellas cerradas,” LP, 28 July 1937; “El expendio del alcohol es regulado. Plazo para el registro de bebidas. Se impedirá la venta de aquellas licores que no sean debidamente controladas por Salubridad. Importante circular se giró ayer a los introductores y productores de bebidas espirituosas,” EN, 6 January 1938, sec. 1, p. 1. 76 “1,500 comités contra el alcoholismo en el país. Participación de los estados en la campaña. Gobernación se dirige a los gobiernos y a los municipios para ello. El reglamento de distancias. No se tolerará una sola taberna cerca de los centros de trabajo,” EN, 10 August 1935; “En contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 10 October 1935; “10 mil comités informativos en contra del alcoholismo van a ser fundados este año,” EN, 22 January 1936; “La acción en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 19 March 1936; “Informe de las actividades concretas desarolladas durante el año comprendido entre el 1o. de septiembre de 1935 y el 1o. de septiembre de 1936,” S 6 (January-December 1935, January-June 1936): 77; “No habrá estado seco en la nación,” EN, 31 October 1936; Priani to the chief of the Distrito Federal, 15 December 1936, AHSSA-FSPII-SPSS, Caja 13, Exp. 33; “Por que la mujer debe dar su cooperación eficaz a la campaña contra el alcohol. No ha ocupado su puesto aún en la cruzada ni ha respondido al llamado del 121 the Agrarian and Forestry and the Hunting and Fishing Departments, in addition to the
Department of Public Health, asked their traveling employees to organize individuals that they came into contact with as they worked.77 Cárdenas, along with Emilio Portes Gil, who served as the president of the PNR, further encouraged the party’s sub-branches, especially the Women’s Sector, to form anti-alcohol leagues. The largest such group, the
Subcomité Antialcohólico Femenino del Sector Femenino del PNR was inaugurated in
1935.78 At the President’s request, the Gran Comité Femenino de Acción Antialcohólica was also created in 1935 by thousands of female employees of governmental bureaucracies.79 The push for popular mobilization was part of a larger trend within the
Cárdenas presidency and helped to create the administrative strength of the regime.80
primer manditario, pero urge que se aliste y entre en la batalla,” EN, 17 October 1937; “Ruda campaña contra el alcoholismo en toda la república,” LP, 5 July 1938. 77 “La labor en contra del alcoholismo. El personal foráneo de las dependencias de la federación colaborará en la campaña contra el vicio. Se formarán comités y subcomités antialcohólicos para ampliar las actividades,” EN, 4 June 1936; “16 organizaciones de defensa social y antialcohólica. Han sido formadas por el C. de Acción Social y Cultural del Depto. Agario. Jiras de miembros. Las realizan por todos los edos. de la república, los empleados del agrario,” EN, 17 June 1936. 78 Franco to Luis Rodríguez, Secretary to Cárdenas, 21 September 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Se generaliza la campaña al alcoholismo. Comité nacional con representantes de los poderes federales. Acción femenil,” EN, 22 September 1935; “Un comité femenil para luchar en contra del alcoholismo,” LP, 1 October 1935; memorandum, Margarita Robles de Mendoza, to Portes Gil, 10 October 1935, AGN- FArP-EPG, Caja 38, Exp. D-13; Programa de la Secretaría de Acción Femenina del PNR, 5 February 1936, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 38, Exp. D-13; “Todos los candidatos del P.N.R. comprometidos para hacer obra antialcohólica. La Secretaría de Acción Educativa, Deportiva y de Salubridad del organismo político aludido gira una trascendental circular,” EX, 19 February 1936; PNR memorandum, n.d. [after 30 April 1936?], AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 38, Exp. D-13; leaders of the Primer Congreso to Cárdenas, 31 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 79 Concrete Points of Immediate Action, 29 October 1935, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-6046, Caja 14, Exp. 3; Augusto Fócil Díaz, “Combaten el alcoholismo las mujeres. 10,000 empleadas acogieron con entusiasmo la idea del señor presidente,” EN, 30 October 1935; “La acción de las mujeres es la más eficaz para combatir el pernicioso vicio del alcohol. En una nutrida asamblea efectuada ayer, dedicada al bello sexo, las empleadas públicas se comprometieron a luchar por el exterminio del alcoholismo,” LP, 30 October 1935; “Mujeres y alcohol,” EN, 31 October 1935; “20,000 empleadas en la campaña en contra del alcohol. Colaborarán con el sector femenino del P.N.R. en tan plausible fin. Noble excitativa,” EN, 5 November 1935; “El primer comité femenino contra el vicio del alcohol,” El Día (Mexico City) (ED), 12 November 1935, 21; “La mujer mexicana en la lucha antialcohólica,” EN, 12 June 1936; “La mujer en la lucha contra el alcohol,” EN, 20 June 1936; “La amplia labor contra el vicio de la embriaguez. En agosto venidero se reunirá en Puebla un interesante congreso,” EX, 13 July 1936; “Quedó integrado el Comité 122
The DAA and other groups were involved in a number of smaller projects, as well. First, throughout the Cárdenas regime, the Secretary of the Treasury, with the help of the president, raised taxes on the production, importation, transport, and sale of alcoholic beverages. It was hoped that these fees would keep the price of intoxicants prohibitively high, although temperance advocates constantly requested that they be increased even further.81 Next, beginning in 1936, the PNR formally banned the introduction of intoxicating beverages at all party meetings or celebrations. Its leaders further warned that alcohol ought not to be used in political campaigns. To reinforce this message, cantinas were to be closed on election days, and the right to vote could be denied to anyone who was drunk. The party also sponsored its own talks, festivals, and radio programs, all promoting the message of sobriety.82 Furthermore, continuing a trend begun under Rodríguez, both Cárdenas and the DAA attempted to remain involved in state and municipal politics. The group’s leaders requested copies of states’ alcohol regulations, so as to gain ideas for what might be feasible to pass at the national level, to make suggestions for tougher state legislation when they felt it was necessary, and to
Nacional Femenino,” EU, 14 July 1936; “Están totalmente acordes con el ante-proyecto de una ley antialcohólica. Las mujeres que integran el Comité Femenino de Acción Social en lucha contra este vicio, aplauden sin reservas lo elaborado en la materia por el DSP,” EN, 7 September 1937; act, witnessed by Fernando Álvarez, office of Administrative Inspection, Department of Public Health, Flora R. de Garza Leal, representative, Comité Nacional Femenil Antialcohólico, and Norberto Bedoya and Rosario Maldonado, sanitary officials, DAA, 5 July 1940, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM, Caja 3, Exp. 9. 80 This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 81 “Campaña contra el Alcohol. La Secretaría de Hacienda, de acuerdo con el ejecutivo dictó aumento de impuesto,” EPM, 3 January 1935; “Mexico Opens Campaign Against Drinking,” NYT, 7 January 1935; Mariano Muñoz, P. Luis Solorzano, Antonio González, P. Test. Juana Díaz Vda. de Arratia, Juan B. Ruiz, Luis Ortiz, and Miguel Díaz, B., Asociación de Productores de Pulque, to Cárdenas, 7 January 1935, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 564.1/50; “Producción restringida,” EU, 3 April 1936; “Juventudes temperantes en acción. Cooperación estudantil en la obra antialcohólica que realiza el gob. federal en el país en defensa colectiva. Puntos de vista. De ‘juventudes temperantes de México,’ perfectamente documentados,” EN, 27 July 1937. 82 “Todos los candidatos del P.N.R. comprometidos para hacer obra antialcohólica,” EE, 19 February 1936; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108; “La cruzada contra el alcoholismo se hace en toda la república,” EPM, n.d., 8, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 123 thank the appropriate authorities for passing laws designed to combat vice.83 The president and his temperance advocates also followed up on popular requests to close cantinas. As the example that began this chapter demonstrates, Cárdenas and his assistants contacted governors on behalf of letter writers who decried the spread of vice in their communities.84 Finally, the DAA also worked to ensure that public employees remain sober. The group suggested that white collar workers be fired if it was found that they had an “alcoholic habit” and that political officials be forbidden from having any contact with the alcohol industry whatsoever. They also wanted to designate government buildings as workplaces so that cantinas could not be located nearby.85 These ideas never became law, but many of the DAA’s affiliates did adopt similar measures within their proper departments. For instance, the Department of Public Education, as shown above, asked all teachers, school directors, and inspectors to abstain from alcohol. The
Department of Communication and Public Works took a harsher stance—all mail carriers and telegraph operators were forbidden from drinking while working—and nine
83 Report, Dr. Rafael Martínez Montes and Dr. Jorge Muñoz, August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Díaz Barriga to Ramón Ramos, Governor of Sonora, 10 September 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Díaz Barriga to all Governors, 29 October 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Díaz Barriga to Gutiérrez Cázares, 17 April 1936, AHES-RE-1936, Caja 39, 512.1“36”/1; Franco to Gutiérrez Cázares, 21 September 1936, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21. 84 Yocupicio to García Téllez, 30 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, 553.1/15; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 13 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, 553.1/15; Cárdenas to Lamberto Martínez, president of the Sociedad Local Colectiva de Credito Ejidal, Valle Yaqui, Sonora, 10 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Cárdenas to Felípe A. Saldívar, José Acosta, and Rafael Gil, representatives of the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Sistema de Irrigación de la Región del Yaqui, Cd. Obregón, Sonora, 16 June 1939, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Florencio Padillo, secretary general of the Office of Government, to General A. Macias Valenzuela, governor of Sonora, 20 March 1940, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-1, Caja 8, Exp. 65. 85 Memorandum, Siurob to Cárdenas, 1 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Siurob to Cárdenas, 22 July 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; Franco to Siurob, 14 October 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 34, Exp. 4; “Prohibición a empleados del gobierno. Salubridad pedirá que no participen en negocios alcoholeros en el país,” EN, 6 October 1937; “El reglamento de las cantinas restringe el vicio del alcohol,” EN, 26 November 1937; Department of Public Health memorandum, 12 March 1940, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 12. 124
employees from the Department of Statistics were in fact fired for being intoxicated in
1939.86
Much as in the cultural realm, when it came to more active measures to combat
alcoholism, temperance advocates had several goals that seem to not have gone much
beyond the proposal stage or may have been only partially implemented. Many experts,
especially Dr. Jesús Díaz Barriga and other members of the Investigations Commission
for the DAA and the Department of Public Health, felt that they ought to work at
combating some of the problems that led to chronic alcohol abuse, or the temperance
movement would never succeed.87 Therefore, the DAA wanted to send out inspectors to
poorer urban neighborhoods and rural villages who would be able to identify some of the
lower classes’ main needs and report them back to the appropriate governmental
departments. These agents would also be able to provide villages between 1,000 and
10,000 liters of milk if they agreed not to consume intoxicating beverages. Rice, beans, and other staples, as well as potable water and clothes, could also be distributed.88
Next, the DAA, the municipal government of the Distrito Federal, and the
Department of Public Health worked to make cantinas less attractive locations for
86 “Será opuesto un valladar al vicio del alcoholismo. Reglamento enérgico es formulado. Tiene éxito la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 13 March 1936; “Nueve empleados de Estadística fueron cesados por embriaguez,” EN, 27 August 1939, sec. 2, p. 1. 87 Investigations Commission, “Resumen del estudio sobre el alcoholismo en México,” 6 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 88 “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; “10 mil comités informativos en contra del alcoholismo van a ser fundados este año,” EN, 22 January 1936; “Distribución de alimentos,” EN, 8 February 1936; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108. 125 socializing as well as more responsible businesses.89 Temperance-minded bureaucrats believed that centers of vice would be much less inviting if women could not enter them as clients or especially work in them as waitresses, dancers, or prostitutes. Therefore, they asked that the provision of the Federal Labor Law of 1931 that forbid women from working in locations that sold alcohol be upheld.90 In the same vein, reformers also proposed to prohibit radios, live music, and food inside of bars, and to cover them with wooden or dark glass screens, so that children could not see inside.91 Other temperance advocates hoped to prevent bar owners from defrauding the government of tax revenue.
Therefore, they wanted to crack down on establishments that sold drinks other than the types they were licensed to vend. Such a measure would have the added benefit, reformers hoped, of limiting the number of beverages being sold with high alcoholic content.92 Other cantinas should be stopped from paying an extra fee to operate past legal
89 For similar measures in colonial Mexico, see: Scardaville, “Alcohol Abuse and Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City,” 654-61; Viqueira Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico, 101, 143-46, 155-58; Voekel, “Peeing on the Palace,” 187-92. 90 “Va a ser combatido el vicio del alcoholismo,” EN, 23 June 1935; Díaz Barriga to the Chief of Judicial Section of the Department of Public Health, 19 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Luis G. Saldaña, secretary of the Empleados del Comercio Mexicano en el Pequeño en el DF, Raúl Castañeda, president of the Unión Comercial Mexicano en el Pequeño del Mercado de la Merced, and José T. Romero, treasurer of the Comité Pro-Raza, to Cárdenas, 23 July 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Cooperación en el antialcoholismo. La solicita Salubridad de las centrales obreras de esta capital,” EN, 8 October 1937; “Notas cortas de Salubridad,” EN, 8 October 1937; “El Reglamento de las Cantinas restringe el vicio del alcohol,” EN, 26 November 1937; Department of Public Health memorandum, 9 February 1940, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 12; “No concurrirán ya menores de edad a los cabarets capitalanos. Resultados de una junta antialcohólica,” EN, 1 March 1940, sec. 2, p. 1; Department of Public Health memorandum, 12 March 1940, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 12; Ramón L. Bojórquez, chief of the Population Service to the mayor of Agua Prieta, 29 October 1940, AGN-DGG, Series 2.015.4(22)-2, Caja 8, Exp. 66; Porter, Working Women in Mexico City, 185. 91 Memorandum, 13 August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; report, Dr. Rafael Martínez Montes and Dr. Jorge Muñoz, August 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; “El Reglamento de las Cantinas restringe el vicio del alcohol,” EN, 26 November 1937; Department of Public Health memorandum, 12 March 1940, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 12. 92 Díaz Barriga to the chief of the Legal Service of the Department of Public Health, 15 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; “Las cervecerías ya no venderán más aguardientes,” LP, 21 February 126
hours. Temperance advocates argued that if people could not find pharmacies open late
at night for emergencies, they should not be able to stop at a tavern, either.93 Finally, if any bar violated any of these provisions, the DAA recommended fining and revoking the license of the owner, and ensuring that he or she could never run such an establishment again.94 Although many of these reforms quite likely never were enacted, they nevertheless reveal the ideologically active nature of the State. Temperance advocates attempted to extend the reach of the national government into ordinary people’s homes and over businesses.
The revolutionary anti-alcohol campaign came to an end under Cárdenas’s successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946). When Ávila Camacho began campaigning for president in 1940, he claimed he would support the temperance movement. He was a prominent participant at the Segunda Asamblea Escolar
Antialcohólica in that same year, where Luis Franco reported that the president-elect had agreed to work with the DAA and support the campaign once he got in office.95 During his presidency, Ávila Camacho passed a few laws to this end. In 1941, he raised the taxes on the sale of alcoholic beverages in Mexico City to increase its budget as well as to eradicate alcoholism and in 1943 he prohibited the sale of alcohol in towns on both the
1936; Department of Public Health memorandum, 1936, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 34, Exp. 4; “El Reglamento de las Cantinas restringe el vicio del alcohol,” EN, 26 November 1937. 93 Díaz Barriga to the chief of the Legal Service of the Department of Public Health, 18 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6. 94 Díaz Barriga to the chief of the Legal Service of the Department of Public Health, 15 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; Department of Public Health memorandum, July 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “El Reglamento de las Cantinas restringe el vicio del alcohol,” EN, 26 November 1937; Department of Public Health memorandum, 12 March 1940, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 12. 95 Program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Clausura de una reunión,” EN, 27 October 1940. 127 northern and southern borders of the country, as well as the island of Cozumel.96
However, the DAA was dissolved in these years and all complaints about the increasing number of cantinas and drunkards were directed to the Office of Labor and Social
Welfare. Few of the individuals associated with this department in the 1940s had previously participated in the anti-alcohol campaign.97 Luis Franco, for instance, left the
Department of Public Health in December 1940, returned to his work at the national radio station, and over the next few years, continued to petition the government for a more important post.98 Unlike its predecessor the DAA (as well as its many earlier manifestations), the Office of Labor and Social Welfare seems to have responded infrequently to complaints, which Congressman Jacinto López said showed a lack of respect for Cárdenas’s decrees.99 Nor does the office appear to have engaged in any cultural work.100 Even the Department of Public Education took less interest in the anti-
96 Ley del Impuesto Sobre Compreventa de Alcoholes, Aguardientes, y Demás Bebidas Alcohólicas, Así Como Sobre Compreventas e Mieles Incristalizables en el DF, 23 January 1941, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública Manuel Ávila Camacho (AGN-FAP-MAC), Exp. 545.21/3-4; note, n.d., [1943?], AGN-FAP-MAC, Exp. 553/98. 97 The Secretary of this office, García Téllez, had served in a number of important offices during the Cárdenas administration, including Chief of the Department of Public Education (1934-1935), Attorney General (1936-1937), personal secretary of Cárdenas (1937), and Chief of the Department of Government (1938-1940). As such, he played a role in the anti-alcohol campaign, but it was only secondary. 98 Victor Requelme and 23 other men and women to Ávila Camacho, 7 December 1940, AGN-FAP-MAC, Exp. 702.12/2-5; Franco to Ávila Camacho, 21 April and 17 September 1941, AGN-FAP-MAC, Exp. 710.11/15; Fanny Anitua and other artists to Ávila Camacho, 27 October 1941, AGN-FAP-MAC, Exp. 702.12/2-5; Franco to unknown, 6 May 1949, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Administración Pública Miguel Alemán Valdes, (AGN-FAP-MAV), Exp. 544.4/8; Ortiz Rubio to President Miguel Alemán, 14 November 1949, AGN-FAP-MAV, Exp. 111/551. 99 Representative Jacinto López, Cd. Obregón, to President Manuel Ávila Camacho, 6 May 1941, AGN- FAP-MAC, Exp. 553/27; García Téllez, chief of the Office of Labor and Social Welfare, to all Governors, 13 May 1941, AGN-FAP-MAC, Exp. 553/15; AGN-FAP-MAC, Exps. 553/1, 553/4, 553/5, 553/18, 553/50, 553/55, 553/62, 553/66, 553/99, 553/123, and others. 100 A clippings file of newspaper articles related to the anti-alcohol campaign from 1937-1945 contains only 8 articles for the Ávila Camacho presidency. Only one mentions a cultural event, the National Assembly Against Vice. There is no mention of who organized this event. See: “Aterradores cifras sobre alcoholismo,” Novedades, 17 February 1944; and other articles in BMLT-AE, Ø03316, Alcoholismo, México. 128
vice movement. The new director, Raúl Reyes Cepeda, claimed that under his
predecessor, the department had focused 70 percent of its energies on cultural activities
(such as the temperance movement) and only 10 percent on academics. He asked that
these percentages be changed to 10 percent and 60 percent, respectively.101 Indeed, the references to the anti-alcohol campaign in teachers’ and inspectors’ reports dropped precipitously, although they did not disappear altogether.102
These changes can be explained in several, interrelated ways. Ávila Camacho made a definitive move to the right politically and brought an end to the Revolution.103
In doing so, he abandoned many of Cárdenas’s projects, including the anti-alcohol campaign, and began new ones such as a literacy drive. He also replaced government officials, from high-level cabinet members to lower-level bureaucrats, with loyal individuals who shared his political ideology and who may not have been overly
concerned with the issue of temperance. Indeed, in the 1940s, the anti-alcohol campaign
may have seemed less relevant than it was to revolutionary presidents. Considerably
weakened, the Church was no longer considered a threat to the government and anti-
clericalism was rejected. Urbanization, industrialization, and a reorganized Department
of Public Health slowly helped to improve average people’s work ethic and level of
hygiene. More than a decade had passed since the last major rebellion against the
101 Raúl Reyes Cepeda, Director of Federal Education, to Inspectors of Federal Schools, 12 April 1941, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 602 (5507), Exp. 12. 102 AHSEP-DEFS: Caja 602, Exp. 28; Caja 602, Exp. 34; Caja 602 (5507), Exp. 7; Caja 602 (5507), Exp. 12; Caja 602 (5507), Exp. 16; Caja 5518, Exp. 4; Caja 5518, Exp. 17; Caja 5518 (5507), Exp. 10; Caja 5843 (1102), Exp. 24; Caja 5843 (1102), Exp. 39; Caja 8347, Exp. 5319/48; Caja 8407, Exp. 7/11; Caja 8407, Exp. 5315/5; Caja 8447, Exp. 5319/48. 103 Stephen R. Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1999), 75. 129
government, and in fact, during World War II, the new enemy was external.104 Rather
than being a source of concern, political leaders promoted tequila consumption as a source of national identity that nostalgically harkened back to a simpler, albeit invented, rural life.105
As this chapter has argued, the way the national anti-alcohol campaign was conducted mirrored the overall nature of the government as officials engaged in State- building during the Revolution. The regimes of Abelardo Rodríguez and Lázaro
Cárdenas can be categorized as ideologically active and administratively stronger. These men used the increased power of the executive branch to conduct the temperance movment by passing decrees mandating sobriety in certain places and at certain times, demanding that these laws be followed in every state, and using appointed agents as well as citizen inspectors to monitor business owners’ as well as officials’ adherence to these policies. Rodríguez and Cárdenas did come closer than any of their predecessors to
achieving administrative strength, but they were never completely free of the intrigues of
industry and the growing Right, nor were they ever fully economically solvent. Thus,
these presidents and the men they selected to head the anti-alcohol campaign continued to
find cultural techniques ideal in educating vast numbers of people, especially the illiterate
and non-Spanish speakers, in the dangers of chronic alcohol abuse. In 1940, a new
104 Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 254-56, 258; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 441-42; Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s, 1-2, 23, 26-27, 32, 114-15, 138; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 364-69; Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov, “Assembling the Fragments: Writing a Cultural History of Mexico since 1940,” in Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 3, 8-9; Mary Kay Vaughan, “Transnational Processes and the Rise and Fall of the Mexican Cultural State: Notes from the Past,” in Fragments of a Golden Age, 474-76. 105 Vaughan, “Transnational Processes and the Rise and Fall of the Mexican Cultural State,” 476; Orozco, “Disgust and Creation of a Nationalist Tequila Discourse in Post-Revolutionary Mexico.” 130 regime dismantled the anti-alcohol campaign, because many of the factors that made it seem necessary to the State-building revolutionaries no longer existed. 131
CHAPTER 3 “TEMPERANCIA: POR LA PATRIA. POR LA RAZA”: THE NATIONAL ANTI- ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN, STATE-BUILDING, AND THE CREATION OF A NEW CITIZEN, 1929-1940
Advertising the upcoming Primer Congreso Nacional Antialcohólica in 1936, the
Dirección Antialcohólica released a program of the conference’s panels, which included a
graphic representation of the DAA’s view of the ill effects of alcoholic beverages (See
Image 7).1 At the bottom-center of the image sits a goblet which resembles a chalice
used for wine during mass, presumably filled with an intoxicant, and overflowing with
noxious fumes. Directly above the cup, a man wears the white cotton shirt commonly
associated with campesinos and the indigenous. His saucer-shaped eyes and gaping
mouth suggest that he has fallen under the spell of the alcohol, and perhaps that it has
already dimmed his wits. To his left is another man, wearing the overalls typical of urban laborers. The vapors arising from the beverage have wrapped themselves around one of his knife-wielding hands, and continue to waft past his crazed, bloodthirsty eyes. Across from the would-be murderer, and seemingly affected by the fumes emanating from the right side of the chalice, is a sad-looking woman holding a sickly child. The darker tone of the woman’s skin and her long hair hint that she is indigenous. Directly to her left sits
a mysterious, hooded figure with a dark, shadowy face that might represent Death.
Above him or her are two final individuals. At the top is a woman, dressed in white, and
of much paler countenance than her compatriot below. Her short, bobbed hair suggests
1 Because the DAA changed names so many times throughout its eleven-year history, for simplicity’s sake, in this chapter, I will continue to refer to the official, governing body of the national anti-alcohol campaign as the DAA, regardless of whether its name at the time was actually the CNLCA, DAEO, DEA, etc. Pamphlet, attached to Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 22 October 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/118. 132
that the woman comes from the upper or middle class, and that she is white or mestiza.
She holds a slumped over, and obviously drunk, male worker, also in overalls. Above the
entire scene stretches a banner bearing the DAA’s motto, “Temperancia: Por la Patria.
Por la Raza,” hinting that the government oversees the entire enterprise. 2
Image 7, no title, [R. Pineda?], [1936].
This picture and hundreds of other documents from 1929 to 1940, the period of the official anti-alcohol campaign, reveal how concerns about alcoholism overlapped with the revolutionary government’s larger State-building project. These sources
demonstrate that reformers and politicians believed that alcohol abuse was largely a
2 Memorandum, Higinio López, Secretary Particular of the Department of Public Health, to the chief of the Legal Office, 16 January 1936, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 47, Exp. 23. 133 problem concentrated in the male, working-class, and indigenous population. They saw these men as machos who were overly sensitive to insult, prone to violence, and obsessed with their own virility. They further feared that Indians’ and workers’ supposed propensity for intoxication only exacerbated the traits characteristic of machismo.
Moreover, temperance advocates worried that these men did more than damage themselves, because their behavior negatively impacted their families and the nation as well. Thus, morality crusaders attempted to redefine masculinity, claiming that truly manly men were not violent drunks who beat their wives, or selfish individuals who drank away their wages and passed diseases on to their progeny, but rather, were responsible fathers, workers, and citizens. One of the ways that reformers tried to achieve these changes was by calling on women to organize temperance leagues that would keep husbands and brothers sober. Although at first glance these appear to be radical measures aimed at protecting women from drunken spouses and promoting the health of working and indigenous men, reformers and politicians actually had a much less progressive primary mission: they strove to increase the administrative strength of the
State. They believed this goal could be met by encouraging peace, inculcating a work ethic necessary for economic development, promoting a national, unified, and mestizo culture, reducing the influence of the Catholic Church which they blamed for encouraging alcohol consumption, and in general creating sober, healthy, and efficient
New Men and Women. In the end, because propaganda was not combined with extensive reform of the socio-economic causes of chronic intoxication, the campaign reinforced the 134 patriarchal and hierarchical order within society at large, and the paternalistic government increased its control over a supposedly helpless populace.
Men Behaving Badly: Pelados, Campesinos, and Indios as the Targets of Temperance Reform
Analyzing visual and oral propaganda, official statements, and legislation
generated during the eleven-year, official, national anti-alcohol campaign reveals that
three figures in particular were the targets of reform: men, the working class, and
indigenous peoples.3 Beginning in 1929, political leaders and bureaucrats alike claimed that the temperance movement would aim at wiping out alcoholism in the first group.4
As a result, the vast majority of propaganda generated by the campaign such as images, stories, plays, and radio programs as well as songs, pledges, and decalogues taught to students, consistently depicted drunkards as male and exhorted them to stop carousing.5
3 Mexican reformers in the 1930s were not unique in their depiction of men as problem drinkers. See: Elaine Frantz Parsons, Manhood Lost: Fallen Drunkards and Redeeming Women in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 11, 55-57; Babor and Rosenkrantz, “Public Health, Public Morals, and Public Order,” 271, 282; Catherine Gilbert Murdock, Domesticating Drink: Women, Men, and Alcohol in America, 1870-1940 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 12-16. 4 “Se prepara una campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EP, 18 May 1929, 1; “Tres días de la semana no habrá alcohol,” EX, 6 April 1937; “Por que la mujer debe dar su cooperación eficaz a la campaña contra el alcohol,” EN, 17 October 1937; Eugenio Martínez Lazzari, “El alcoholismo y sus consecuencias,” EN, 28 October 1937. 5 Pedro Chávez, “De nuestros concursantes. En la comisaría,” EU, 25 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 5; “Campana antialcohólica. Juan el desmemoriado. Cuento borracho,” EP, 7 September 1929, 3; flyer, “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 2, 3, 6- 13; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 13; Antonio Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana o el cantinero y la conquista pacifica (Mexico City: Casa Unida de Publicaciones, 1929), 10, 20, 29, 36, 49, 52, 55-56, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; Franco, “Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio,” 23; school bulletin, 1929, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73, 24-25; Franco, “El concepto de la moral del niño frente al vicio del alcohol,” 28 March 1930, AHSSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social, 5, 12-14; “El alcoholismo en niños,” 29 August 1931, AHSEP-SOCR-SDSP, Caja 9477, Exp. 3; Adelante, 15 August 1933, 0, 6; “Concurso del canto contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 23 August 1933, sec. 2, p. 1; Artemio Serrano, “Teatro rural. Regeneración: Drama de costumbres rurales en dos cuadros,” EMR 3, no. 6 (1 September 135
One reason for so much temperance-related propaganda directed at males was because politicians as well as reformers worked with the assumption that men drank more than women. In other words, the depiction of men as problem drinkers did not just
appear in persuasive literature; even in reports that were not designed to be released to the public, experts mainly in the fields of medicine and education claimed that men more frequently abused alcohol than women.6 This idea developed from two, interrelated conceptions. First, intellectuals stated that men believed that their identities, their very masculinity, revolved around the consumption of alcohol. In fact, because these experts considered drinking to be such an integral part of male identity, the DAA voted to aim their work at merely making men temperate. Women and children, on the other hand, were to completely abstain from intoxicating beverages.7 Second, these intellectuals argued (although perhaps incorrectly) that men were more likely to be in the public
1933): 37-39; Simón Z. Hernández, “Grados de ebrio,” EMR 3, no. 9 (October 1933): 36-39; Facundo H. Gómez and Victor R. Medina, “Himno antialcohólico huasteco,” EMR 3, no. 13 (1 December 1933): 20- 21; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18; Jesús Salinas González, “Maldita botella,” EMR 5, no. 7 (1 September 1934): 30-32; CNLCA, “n.t.,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1935): 20; V. Castañeda Michel, “El fratricida,” EMR 8, no. 4 (15 February 1936): 35-36; “N.t.,” EN, 26 April 1936; “El alcoholismo, temible plaga,” EN, 7 February 1937; “Miserias e ignorancia,” EN, 27 October 1937; Santa María, “La campaña antialcohólica en las escuelas del D. F.,” EN, 1 March 1938; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 33-34; Celia A. de Reyes sel Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina! (Mexico City: D.A.P.P., 1938), 17-18; Tercero año, 88-89; “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Magno desfile de pequeños,” EN, 20 October 1940; pre-program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 6 Circular #5, E. López to School Directors, 30 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 16; Ordoñez Vila, “Alcoholismo y fanatismo,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1934): 16; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; J. L. Moreno, Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; Mendieta y Núñez, “Ensayos sobre el alcoholismo entre las razas indígenas de México,” 133. 7 Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 10; “A qué causas obedece el fatídico incremento del alcoholismo,” EN, 1 July 1929; “Va a ser combatida el vicio del alcoholismo,” EN, 23 June 1935; Díaz Barriga, “No habrá estado seco en la nación,” EN, 31 October 1936; “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 11 November 1936; “La plaga del aperitivo,” EN, 30 January 1938; “Restricciones provechosas,” EX, 26 June 1939; “No concurrirán ya menores de edad a los cabarets capitalinos,” EN, 1 March 1940, sec. 2, p. 1. 136 sphere, working or participating in politics, and therefore it seemed logical that they would be more vulnerable to the snares of vice while away from the safety of home.8
Although bureaucrats did occasionally acknowledge that women might also abuse intoxicants, these instances were dismissed as exceptions to the rule.9
The second major group temperance advocates wanted to reform was the urban and rural working class.10 Indeed, President Emilio Portes Gil made his first public announcement of the anti-alcohol campaign in 1929 at a workers’ recreation center in
8 For discussions of how societies divide labor and create gender roles, and who can follow these standards, see: Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, “Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview,” in Woman, Culture, and Society, ed. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 17, 23, 30-31, 34; Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, and Jane Fishburne Collier, “Toward a Unified Analysis of Gender and Kinship,” in Gender and Kinship: Essays Toward a Unified Analysis, ed. Jane Fishbourne Collier and Sylvia Junko Yanagisako (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 16-20; John L. Comaroff, “Sui genderis: Feminism, Kinship Theory, and Structural ‘Domains’,” in Gender and Kinship, 53-58, 83; Staples, “Policía y Buen Gobierno,” 116; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 21-22. 9 Abel R. Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 7 July 1929; Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 37, 41, 46, 49; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 145; “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; report, Inspector Leonides Ayala Escamilla, Ures, 24 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 15; Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 14; Emma Piñeyro, “La mujer en la campaña antialcohólica. La joven escritora y cuentista mexicana, Leonor Llach, dice,” EN, 14 June 1936; Mendieta y Núñez, “Ensayos sobre el alcohlismo entre las razas indigenas de México,” 133; Angel M. Corzo, Cuestionario para fijar la cultura de las razas indígenas de México (Mexico City: Departamento Autónomo de Asuntos Indígenas, 1940), AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533/4.1, Leg. 4. For the United States, see: Murdock, Domesticating Drink, 42-69; Parsons, Manhood Lost, 119. 10 Worldwide, the lower classes seem to be the most common target of temperance reforms. See: Guedea, “México en 1812,”36; Scardaville, “Alcohol Abuse and Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City,” 644, 652, 654-55, 658, 660; Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement, 2d ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 5-6; George Reid Andrews, “Black and White Workers: São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1928,” Hispanic American Historical Review 68, no. 3 (1988): 510-12; Babor and Rosenkrantz, “Public Health, Public Morals, and Public Order,” 282; George E. Snow, “Socialism, Alcoholism, and the Russian Working Class before 1917,” in Drinking, 243-58; Rocamadour, “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917,” 7, 13, 14, 28; Voekel, "Peeing on the Palace,” 183, 187, 189-92; Lanny Thompson, “La fotografía como documento histórico: la familia proletaria y la vida domestica en la ciudad de México, 1900-1950,” Historias 29 (October 1992-March 1993), 110-15; Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico, 1917-1933,” 85; Piccato, “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol,’” 203-41; Viqueira Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico, 5-6, 101, 129-63; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 40-42; Michael E. James, “The City on the Hill: Temperance, Race, and Class in Turn-of-the-Century Pasadena,” California History (winter 2001- 2002): 189, 193, 195; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 1; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 206; Fernández Labbé, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad,” 2-3; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 74. James Scott argues that the poor are often the first group targeted for high modernist projects to transform society. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 92. 137
Mexico City.11 Other presidents and high-level bureaucrats throughout the 1930s
asserted that the movement had been undertaken primarily to benefit the lower classes.12
In fact, the issue of how to keep workers from becoming intoxicated was a frequent topic at the DAA’s meetings as well as at its larger, public conferences, and was a central goal of the group’s plans.13
Therefore, the vast majority of the anti-alcohol campaign’s work, both cultural and proactive, aimed at campesinos and urban laborers. For instance, in 1929, President
Portes Gil suggested posting the following slogan in public places: “Worker: spend in books what you would otherwise spend on alcohol. The books will teach and educate you and alcohol will only make you a brute and kill you.”14 Radio addresses,
11 “Concurrio a un festival cultural el Sr. Portes Gil. Fue el que ayer se efectuó en el Centro Obrero ‘Vasco de Quiroga’ que se encuentra establecido en plena Colonia de la Bolsa. Discurso pronunciado por el Primer Magistrado de la República. Centros para el pueblo humilde. La campaña antialcohólica,” EU, 22 April 1929; El pueblo contra el alcoholismo, 11. 12 “Activa cruzada de convencimiento. El alcohol y las gentes del campo. Hay que convencerlas de que la bebida las degenera y las quebranta. En el ejército se llevará también a cabo una intensa propaganda antialcohólica,” EU, 25 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 1; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,” 5-1; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 2 August 1935; unknown to unknown, 19 September 1935, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 36, Exp. D-9; Ximello to Flores Zamora, 13 May 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Ref. 297, Exp. 16; speech, Priani, 10 July 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; Estrada Cajigal, “La campaña antialcohólica y su trascendencia social,” EG, 20 January 1937; “Enérgica campaña en contra del vicio del alcoholismo. La realiza el Departamento de Trabajo en todo el país. La benéfica labor se hará en cooperación con la Dirección de la Campaña Antialcohólica y otras dependencias más. Instrucciones a los inspectores. Pugnará porque se establezca cuanto antes el Comité de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo, creado por decreto presedencial,” EN, 15 June 1939. 13 Report, Pruneda, Monterrubio, and Y. Navarro, 5 June 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Department of Public Health memorandum, 1 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; program, Primera Asamblea Infantil Antialcohólica, 28 September-3 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; pre-program, Primer Congreso Antialcohólico, 24-31 October 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “No habrá estado seco en la nación,” EN, 31 October 1936; “Medidas profilactas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39. AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21: Plan General de la Campaña Antialcohólica, 15 January 1934; Medidas Addicionales a las Medidas Complementarias, 15 January 1934; Adiciones que presenta la Dirección Antialcohólica al Plan General de la Campaña, July 1935; Hoja Segunda de adiciones al Plan General, 3 August 1935. 14 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2. 138 conferences at workers’ centers and factories, art exhibits, parades, magazines, and textbooks were all designed to further convince the lower classes to abstain from a life of vice.15 Furthermore, teachers and school inspectors in working-class and rural communities were especially encouraged to carry out the anti-alcohol campaign.16
Presidents utilized legislation as well. By passing his 1937 decree that closed drinking establishments on weekends and holidays and his 1939 measure that mandated the closure of cantinas in or near areas of work, President Cárdenas intended to keep laborers from spending all of their salaries on alcohol.17 Additionlly, political leaders levied taxes
15 “La campaña en contra del alcoholismo. Propaganda por medio de conferencias, que se efectúan en las escuelas,” N.t., n.d. [likely April 1929], AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Antonio Gutiérrez y Olivares to Portes Gil, 6 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 10, 25, 29; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 6, 8, 10, 12; “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 28 November 1930, 1-2, 7, BMLT-AE, Ø03314, Alcoholismo; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 11; “Acta de la sesión celebrada por el Consejo Consultivo de la ciudad de México, el jueves 7 de septiembre de 1933,” 4-2, 5-1; “Los campesinos, base del gobierno,” EUG, 1 December 1933, 16; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 August 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/102; “Propaganda contra el alcoholismo en centros escolares,” EX, 16 September 1935; “La labor de la unificación de trabajadores,” EN, 5 November 1935; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935 and 2 April 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Todos los candidatos del P.N.R. comprometidos para hacer obra antialcohólica,” EX, 19 February 1936; “Cruzada en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 9 March 1936; “Se Dará una Platica Contra el Alcoholismo,” EU, 22 March 1936; “Anti-Alcohol Day in Mexico Marked by Curb on Saloon,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 April 1936; “N.t.,” EN, 26 April 1936; speech, Dr. Severino Herrera, “La lucha antituberculosa y la campaña antialcohólica,” 23 August 1936, AHSSA- FSPII-SPSS, Caja 13, Exp. 11; “Un congreso contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 25 August 1936; “La exposición de carteles contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 20 July 1937; “Labor antialcohólica por medio de las escuelas al servicio de los obreros,” EN, 11 December 1937; Tercero año, 88. 16 Gabino Bautista and E. Dávila R., “La escuela socialista ante los problemas del hogar,” EMR 7, no. 6 (15 September 1935): 31; J. Jesús Cortéz, “Programa de mejoramiento inmediato del ejido,” EMR 8, no. 6 (15 March 1936): 27; Otto Rühle, “El niño proletario en México,” EMR 8, no. 8 (15 April 1936): 5-6, 8, 9; “Medidas contra el vicio del alcohol,” EX, 18 May 1936; Méndez Aguirre to Inspectors and School Directors, 2 February 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; Reyes Pérez to Inspectors, School Directors and Teachers of Night Schools, 6 December 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 12; Bustamante, “Protección a la infancia en las comunidades rurales,” EMR 11, no. 4 (April 1938): 16, 18; Rafael Ramírez, “Organizando el problema para la educación económica de las masas rurales,” EMR 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 13. 17 Presidential decree, n.d. [April 1937?], AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 16 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/34. 139 on alcoholic beverages in the late 1930s to keep these drinks out of the reach of the working classes.18
Politicians and temperance advocates aimed the anti-alcohol campaign at urban
and rural workers because they felt that these groups were particularly susceptible to vice.19 In his declaration that initiated the campaign in 1929, President Portes Gil wrote
that one of the greatest enemies of the nation was alcoholism, and that it especially
affected campesinos and laborers.20 Other prominent figures in the movement made similar statements.21 Proponents of sobriety believed that scientific studies validated these stereotypical views of the lower classes. For instance, Dr. José Mesa Gutiérrez, who did research at the Instituto Patológico at the Hospital de San Andrés, found that in
3000 autopsies he conducted on lower-class cadavers in 1930, no less than 76 percent had perished from an alcohol-related cause. Dr. Mesa Gutiérrez did not give comparative
18 “Mexico Opens Campaign Against Drinking,” NYT, 7 January 1935; “Festival en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 1 March 1936. 19 Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 7 July 1929; Gutiérrez y Olivares to Portes Gil, 6 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 21, 25, 36, 46, 49; “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; “Editoriales. La lucha contra el alcoholismo en el año actual,” EN, 23 January 1936; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 180. 20 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Los campesinos, base del gobierno,” EUG, 1 December 1933, 16. 21 Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 7 July 1929; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 248; José Salomón Osorio, “Hacia un prohibicionismo salvador,” EN, 8 May 1932; Antonio H. García, “Sección pedagógica,” EMR 3, no. 6 (1 September 1933): 5; García Téllez, Chief of the Department of Public Education, to Mason Isaías L. Acosta, April 1934, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Institución de Orientación Socialista, (AHSEP-IOS), Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; Díaz Barriga to all Governors, 29 October 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; “Campaña en contra del alcohol. El jefe del Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas cooperá grandamente en ella,” EN, 20 June 1936; Herrera, “La lucha antituberculosa y la campaña antialcohólica,” 23 August 1936, AHSSA-FSPII-SPSS, Caja 13, Exp. 11; “Contra el vicio del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 October 1936; Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 12 November 1936; “Editorial,” EN, 8 April 1937; “Alcoholismo,” EN, 3 May 1937; Méndez Aguirre to School Directors and Inspectors, 3 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 12, Exp. 7; Dr. Jesús Díaz Barriga and other members of the Comisión de Estudios, Department of Public Health, “Resumen del estudio sobre el alcoholismo en México,” 6 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “Verdadero peligro para los pobres,” EX, 1 July 1938; Sigfried Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” in Antropología del alcoholismo en México. 140 statistics for cadavers from the upper or middle classes, nor did he explain how he determined the status of the bodies he examined. But the fact that he only provided statistics for lower-class individuals indicates that he believed workers consumed more than other people.22 Other experts claimed that, not only did the poor drink more alcohol than their peers, but they did so because of socio-economic factors, including a lack of potable water, food, and medicine, the relative cheapness of intoxicating beverages, anti- hygienic living conditions, and insufficient education. Some teachers, doctors, and other intellectuals even asserted that the poor were more likely to drink because they had mental problems, lacked morality and lived a sad, boring existence.23 The common denominator in these views was that although people of all backgrounds might imbibe, the lower classes abused alcohol more frequently than their compatriots did.
The third group politicians and bureaucrats singled out was the indigenous.24
President Cárdenas, for one, stated that he wanted to rescue Indians from the vice of
22 Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social, 2. 23 “A qué causas obedece el fatídico incremento del alcoholismo,” EN, 1 July 1929; Agustín Estrada M., “Dar a los pueblos la alegría que necesitan,” EMR 5, no. 9 (1 November 1934): 5; Velázquez Andrade, “La voz del maestro,” EMR 5, no. 9 (1 November 1934), 11; “Mexico Opens Campaign Against Drinking,” NYT, 7 January 1935; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; “El alcohol y la miseria pública,” ED, 9 August 1935; “Energica campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EX, 14 August 1935; Pedro Gringoire, “El pulso de los tiempos. El materialismoy el vicio alcohólico,” EX, 24 June 1936; Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 11 November 1936; Jesús Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 12 November 1936; Manuel Ceballos Novelo, “Alimentación del campesino,” EMR 9, no. 6 (15 November 1936), 33; “Miseria e ignorancia,” EN, 17 October 1937; “Medidas profilactas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP- EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39. 24 Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 89-90. For earlier campaigns directed at indigenous peoples in Mexico, see: Guedea, “México en 1812,” 25; Corcuera, “Pulque y evangelización,” 411. For examples of temperance movements aimed at indigenous peoples outside Mexico, see: Ambler, “Drunks, Brewers, and Chiefs,” 170; Robert Gordon, “Inside the Windhoek Lager: Liquor and Lust in Namibia,” in Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, ed. William Jankowiak and Daniel Bradburd (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003), 124, 126; O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 68. Michael James studies a temperance movement in Pasadena, California that aimed to combat alcoholism in Native Americans, but more prominently in Mexican and Chinese immigrants as well as African Americans. See: James, “The City on the Hill,” 189. 141 alcoholism in 1937.25 A few other temperance advocates throughout the 1920s and 30s, including the teacher Antonio Gutiérrez y Olivares of the Casa del Estudiante Indígena,
Secretary of Public Education Ignacio García Téllez, and Ambassador Moisés Sáenz, an influential anthropologist concerned with indigenous policies, also argued that this disease was a serious threat to the health and well-being of native peoples. In doing so, these politicians and bureaucrats claimed, or at least implied, that alcoholism was more prevalent in natives than in other people.26 In fact, several studies carried out by government departments began with the premise that these people drank excessively, and set out to find out why.27 However, for the most part, there were significantly fewer
claims that the indigenous were problem drinkers during the entire eleven-year campaign
than there were about men in general, and the working classes in particular.
These fewer references to Indians probably occurred because observers did not
draw sharp distinctions between native peoples and the rural lower classes. President
Cárdenas was one of the leading figures who conflated class and ethnicity, viewing native
25 “Los obstaculos a la ‘Ley Seca,’” EX, 7 April 1937. 26 Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulterero de la raza latinoamericana, 22-23; Luis Mazzotti, “Informe general sobre las condiciones sanitarias de la tribu seri o kunkaak,” S, 5, no. 1 (January-March 1934), 25, 31; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; “Energica campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EX, 14 August 1935; “Contra el vicio del Alcoholismo,” EN, 2 October 1936; “Ponencia en contra del alcoholismo. El Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas cooperará con importantes trabajos. Próximo congreso. Se reunirá el día 24 del actual con carácter nacional en la C. de Puebla. Numerosas delegaciones. Asistirán representantes de todos los estados de la república a la reunión,” EN, 19 October 1936; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 13 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; M. Sáenz, Ambassador to Peru, 21 January 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.4/1, Leg. 1; Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages, 104; Beatriz Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México, 1930- 1950,” Historia y grafía 17 (2001): 196. 27 Dr. Lucio Mendieta y Núñez claimed that alcoholism was a growing problem for the indigenous, but he also stated that people had used this “fact” to grossly over-generalize that Indians preferred drinking to working. See: Mendieta y Núñez, “Ensayos sobre el alcoholismo entre las razas indígenas de México,” 129, 133-34; Corzo, Cuestionario para fijar la cultura de las razas indígenas, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.4/1, Leg. 4. 142
peoples as members of the working class, not of various cultural groups.28 Other officials used the words “peasant” and “Indian” interchangeably. For instance, all employees of the Department of Indigenous Affairs were asked in 1936 to get involved in the anti- alcohol campaign because they had the closest contact with campesinos.29 Other experts spoke about alcoholism being an ancestral vice among campesinos: a problem ever since the Spanish arrived in the area, over four hundred years earlier, and began exploiting the
Aztecs, Maya, and other native peoples with intoxicating beverages.30 These statements imply that temperance advocates did not or could not clearly differentiate between the
indigenous and mestizo rural poor. This confusion also appeared in images. As the
example which began the chapter demonstrates, representations of both peasant and
Indian men frequently depicted them wearing white, cotton pants and a sombrero.31
Because of this overlap in the minds of temperance advocates, much of the
propaganda used for the rural (and, at times, urban) working classes also was directed at indigenous peoples. These included educational programs, textbooks, decalogues, and
public lectures.32 Only a few projects dealt directly with ethnicity.33 For instance, in
28 “La campaña en contra del alcoholismo,” n.p., n.d., AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, 73; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 119; Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico,” 177-78; Rick A. López, “The Noche Mexicana and the Exhibition of Popular Arts: Two Ways of Exalting Indianness,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 36. 29 “Los empleados en la campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 16 April 1936; “Campaña en contra del alcohol,” EN, 20 June 1936. 30 “García, “Sección pedagógica,” EMR 3, no. 6 (1 September 1933): 5; “Los campesinos, base del gobierno,” EUG, 1 December 1933, 16; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 34; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 185. 31 Desmond Rochfort, “The Sickle, the Serpent, and the Soil: History, Revolution, Nationhood, and Modernity in the Murals of Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 47. 32 “La campaña en contra del alcoholismo,” n.p., n.d., AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Guiérrez y Olivares, to Portes Gil, 6 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 34. 143
1936, Dr. Siurob suggested that many indigenous peoples did not hear the anti-alcohol
campaign’s message because their communities were isolated, they did not speak
Spanish, or they were illiterate. Therefore, he suggested training temperance lecturers in
Indian languages so that they could disseminate propaganda into the remotest corners of
the country.34 Attorneys in indigenous communities also were asked to restrict the sale of
alcoholic beverages in their domains.35 Finally, Cárdenas designed his 1937 decree that closed cantinas on weekends not only to keep workers from spending their paychecks on alcohol, but also to prevent the indigenous from visiting local markets and purchasing intoxicating beverages there.36 Temperance advocates hoped that these measures would
combat what they saw as chronic alcohol abuse among autochthonous peoples.
Although in theory three distinct categories of “problem drinkers” existed, it was the area where these categories overlapped that most concerned reformers and politicians in the 1930s. In other words, they considered pelados, campesinos, and, to a lesser extent, indios, to be particularly disruptive to society in general. The social philosopher
Samuel Ramos partially expressed this anxiety in 1934. He posited that pelados had an
inherent sense of inferiority, which led them to compensate with an exaggerated
masculinity consisting of a brazen attitude, an explosive temper, coarse language, and
33 “Campaña antialcohólica que realiza la Secretaría de Educación Pública. Cooperación nacional en esta labor. El titular del ramo se dirige a los gobernadores de los estados urgentemente en contra del vicio. Solicita la clausura de los centros de disipación, en bien del magisterio,” EN, 31 July 1936; pre-program, Primer Congreso Antialcohólico, 5 August 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 34 “Acuerdo en relación a una campaña. Lo acaba de dictar el J. de Salubridad a los de la Dirección Antialcohólica,” EN, 11 July 1936. 35 “Campaña en contra del alcohol,” EN, 20 June 1936. 36 Presidential decree, n.d. [April 1937?], AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Tres días de la semana no habrá alcohol,” EX, 6 April 1937; “Los obstaculos de la ‘Ley Seca,’” EX, 7 April 1937. 144
most especially, overstated virility.37 This destructive behavior, as well as a desire to live
for the present, Ramos bemoaned, would make it impossible for the entire nation to ever
progress, in part because he considered the pelado to most accurately represent national character, a statement he never clarified.38 Although later authors have criticized Ramos for his class and gender biases,39 contemporary middle-class political leaders and bureaucrats also characterized urban, as well as rural and indigenous, working-class masculinity as chauvinistic and as a barrier to national progress.40
Temperance crusaders in the 1920s and ‘30s feared that the traits Ramos and others identified as natural characteristics of pelados, campesinos, and indios were exacerbated by alcohol. They thought that alcohol caused men to behave even worse than normal, that it encouraged them to compete with other men and inflamed their tempers.41 Dr. Celia A. de Reyes del Campillo said as much in a book directed to campesinas in 1938, explaining that “the man that is drunk always has his nerves altered, his character is sour and insupportable; the smallest thing offends him; he believes that
everyone . . . insults him; he becomes stupid, rude by the smallest word that is said.”42
37 Samuel Ramos, Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico, trans. Peter G. Earle (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), 9, 58-59, 65. 38 Ibid., 58. 39 Américo Paredes, “Estados Unidos, México, y el macishimo,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 9 (1967): 65-84; José E. Limón, “‘Carne, carnales,’ and the Carnivalesque: Bakhtinian ‘batos,’ Disorder, and Narrative Discourses,” American Ethnologist 16, no. 3 (1989): 471-86. 40 Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 28, 29; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 41-42; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 131, 159. For discussions of lower-class masculinity as aggressive and violent in other times and places, see: French, A Peaceful and Working People, 124; Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines,” 435-36, 440-42, 445-46; Stern, The Secret History of Gender, 151-56, 173; Johnson, “Dangerous Words, Provocative Gestures, and Violent Acts,” 130-32. 41 For the United States, see: Parsons, Manhood Lost, 58-63. 42 Reyes del Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 18. 145
Such a man ought to be avoided at all costs—Dr. Reyes del Campillo advised campesinas to never date, much less marry, an alcoholic.
Reformers also believed that alcohol did more than make men disagreeable, it often led to a number of other problems for society. First, reformers feared that the alcohol abuse of pelados, campesinos, and indios sparked an increase in crime.43 One image demonstrates the connection between intoxicants and violence particularly well.
The Department of Public Education compiled a collection of temperance-oriented drawings and statements for teachers made by a twelve year-old student, Manuel Flores
A., in 1929. In a picture called “La Riña,” two men quarrel in front of a bar (See Image
8).44 The location of the fight, and the fact that the man being stabbed holds a beer bottle,
implies that he, and perhaps his attacker, is drunk. We can also deduce that the fighters are campesinos, or perhaps indios (or both), given that they, as well as one of the patrons
observing the scuffle from inside the safety of the bar, wear large sombreros. A further
clue to the men’s status is that this bar is a pulquería, a dispensary of the drink frequently associated with peasants and the indigenous in Central Mexico. Flores A.’s message was that lower-class men (be they campesinos or indios) drank too frequently, and when they did, the sad result was violent crime. This image is just one of many pieces of propaganda, which also included newspaper articles, radio programs, and books, that
43 Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 22-23. Reformers in 1930s Mexico were not alone in seeing a connection between alcohol and crime. See also: Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages, 37, 62-67, 92-96; Guedea, “México en 1812,” 33; Ambler, “Drunks, Brewers, and Chiefs,” 165; Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico,” 85; Piccato, “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol,” 203-41; French, A Peaceful and Working People, 69; Johnson, “Dangerous Words, Provocative Gestures, and Violent Acts,” 131-32, 135; James, “The City on the Hill,” 196; Fernández Labbé, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad,” 5; O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 62. 44 Flores A., Alcoholismo, 6. 146 linked chronic intoxication and crime.45 Indeed, the association between alcohol and criminality was not believed to be just a popular myth, as scientific data seemed to validate the conclusion.46 For instance, in his 1930 study, Dr. Mesa Gutiérrez found that
90 percent of injuries from bloody arguments resulted from alcohol abuse.47 Similarly, in
1929, Gutiérrez y Olivares claimed that of the people sent to jail in Mexico City every year, over 117,000 were intoxicated.48 Therefore, he, and other experts, hoped that by combating alcoholism, crime would also abate.
45 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Para llegar a ser un pueblo fuerte en el futuro hay que crear un pueblo sin vicios,” EU, 22 April 1929, 1; flyer, Hermosillo, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 29; bulletin, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 3, 6-7, 10-11; “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 28 November 1930, 13-14; Hernández, “Grados del ebrio,” EMR 3, no. 9 (October 1933): 36-39; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18; CNLCA, “n.t.,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1935): 20; Castañeda Michel, “El fratricida,” EMR 8, no. 4 (15 February 1936): 36; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 33; Tercero año, 89; “Restricciones provechosas,” EX, 26 June 1939; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 146; “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 46 Osuna, El alcoholismo, 214-15; Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 10-13, 14. 47 Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social, 2, 14-15. 48 Gutiérrez y Olivares does not provide the total number of people sent to jail each year in El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 44. 147
Image 8, “La Riña,” Manuel Flores A., [1929?].
Second, reformers feared that drunken pelados, campesinos, and indios often turned to domestic abuse.49 As Dr. Reyes del Campillo explained, when a peasant drinks,
“He always loses his shame and mistreats his family, without compassion of any kind,
and many times, he kills them . . . [H]e loses respect for his wife, he beats her, humiliates
her, converts her into a true shrew, instead of being the caring father that should arrive at
49 For other instances of reformers citing alcoholism as a cause of domestic abuse, see: Sylvia Marina Arrom, The Women of Mexico City, 1790-1857 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 235; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 41, 44; Corcuera, “Pulque y evangelización,” 417; Cheryl English Martin, Governance and Society in Colonial Mexico: Chihuahua in the Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 154; O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 62, 66, 68. 148 his house with the desire of receiving the affection of his wife and his children.”50 One image, although from another book, illustrates this argument well (See Image 9).51 In this picture, the devil appears to an Indian or peasant man, wearing a sarape and sombrero, and asks him to choose between killing his wife, robbing someone, or getting drunk. The man elects for the latter because he does not want to be a criminal or a thief, but once he gets drunk, he ends up committing the other two crimes, as well. Perhaps an extreme case, but dozens of other stories, songs, plays, and images as well as actual newspaper reports, also depicted drunken, lower-class men abusing their wives, and, at times, their children.52 These examples reflected and supported the belief that alcoholism caused domestic abuse.
50 Reyes del Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 18. 51 Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 29. 52 “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; flyer, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; bulletin, 1929, AHSEP-SDPH, SISEEP, Caja 5123 (143), Exp. 73; Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 52; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 170; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 2, 9; Xochitl, “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 17; Serrano, “Teatro rural,” EMR 3, no. 6 (1 September 1933), 37-39; Salinas Gonzáles, “Maldita botella,” EMR 5, no. 7 (1 September 1934): 30-32; Frenk, “Muchos somos muchísimos,” EMR 7, no. 3 (1 August 1935): 35-38; “Un decálogo de alumnos,” EN, 30 October 1935; Tercero año, 88; “Restricciones provechosas,” EX, 26 June 1939. 149
Image 9, no title, Alberto Rios, 1924. Reproduced with permission from the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
Third, temperance reformers labeled lower-class and indigenous men as selfish individuals who thought more about male bonding than providing for their families.53 As
President Cárdenas’s legislation of 1937 demonstrates, middle-class observers believed that workers wasted their entire salaries on drink.54 Dozens of stories, plays, and
newspaper articles also supported the notion that drunkard fathers abandoned their
families, both monetarily and emotionally.55 One propaganda piece from 1934 reminded
53 For other examples of abandonment of the family being blamed on alcohol, see: Guedea, “México en 1812,” 36; Arrom, The Women of Mexico City, 235; Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico,” 85; French, A Peaceful and Working People, 85; Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines,” 448; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 41; Parsons, Manhood Lost, 55-56; O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 62. 54 Decree, n.d. [likely June 1937], AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11. 55 Photograph, Anti-Alcohol Parade, Hermosillo, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 3; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 172-74; Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 28 November 1930, 13-14; Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo 150 peasant men that if they drank, “your children will be without bread and without school,
your wife will be abandoned and a martyr.”56 Many images addressed this subject matter, but one is particularly telling: “Abandono del Hogar,” one of several illustrations from a
pamphlet that also contained speeches previously broadcast on radio stations in 1932
(See Image 10).57 In this picture, a mother and her three young children (at least two
appear to be girls) stand outside of a bar, looking sad, cold, and hungry. Inside the bar, three men peer back at the women and children with angry looks on their faces, annoyed
that their masculine space has been invaded. The message of this image is not that the
mother and children have intruded into male territory, but rather, that the husband and
father has abandoned his family, thanks to his addiction to alcoholic beverages.
como plaga social, 14-15; Adelante (15 August 1933): 0, 6; Ordoñez Vila, “Alcoholismo y fanatismo,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1934): 16; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; Salinas Gonzáles, “Maldita botella,” EMR 5, no. 7 (1 September 1934): 30-32; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; “Tres días de la semana no habrá alcohol,” EX, 6 April 1937; Enrique E. Meyer, “El trabajador y el alcoholismo,” EN, 14 October 1937; “Miserias e ignorancia,” EN, 17 October 1937; “Al margen de dos líquidos muy distintos. Consideraciones sobre el uso y consumo de la leche y lo perjudicial que resulta nuestra pulque,” EN, 31 October 1937; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 33; Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 18; Mónico Neck, “Apuntes de actualidad. El alcoholismo enemigo,” EN, 26 June 1939; “Magno desfile de pequeños,” EN, 10 October 1940. 56 “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18. 57 Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 23. 151
Image 10, “Abandono del Hogar,” artist unknown, n.d. Reproduced with permission from the Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Mexico City.
Fourth, temperance reformers worried that the supposed inability of pelados, campesinos, and indios to use foresight caused these “virile machos” to father sickly and maladjusted children. Although, according to Gutiérrez y Olivares in 1929, many
“[Mexicans] believe that alcohol does not produce anything worse than the stimulus to sing with a guitar,” other temperance experts and advocates argued that alcohol abuse helped to spread diseases. They claimed that chronic intoxication weakened the immune system and left the drinker vulnerable to ailments such as tuberculosis, increased the likelihood of the drinker engaging in illicit sexual activity and thus helped to spread 152 venereal diseases, and caused cerebral lesions which led to mental diseases.58 These, and
other problems, could then be acquired by the offspring of the drunkard.59 As Dr. Reyes del Campillo warned peasant women in 1938, if they married a drunk, they risked having children that would be ill, idiots, or criminals, and she provided her readers with several sets of photographs so they could compare healthy and sickly children.60 Gutiérrez y
Olivares gave further proof of this phenomenon by citing a study that concluded that the habitual consumption of intoxicating beverages had disastrous results that remained for multiple generations. In one of the alcoholic families examined, only seven out of eighteen descendants were either healthy or intelligent. The other eleven were characterized as imbeciles, prostitutes, assassins, alcoholics, or disease-ridden, causing
them to die young. Three of the original children had no offspring.61 Anti-alcohol crusaders and politicians used such sobering data to make sure that parents, and especially fathers, understood that their descendants would bear the burden of their addiction. Thus, this message was passed on through a variety of media, including newspaper articles, images, and even signs at parades.62 For instance, at the first-annual
58 Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 17, 24, 43-47, 58; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 145; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 3; Martínez Baez, “Servicio de propaganda y educación higienica,” S 1 (July-September 1930): 843-56; Martínez Baez, “Servicio de propaganda y educación higienica,” S 1 (October-December 1930): 1297-1304; Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 11; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18; Priani to Cárdenas, 5 August 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Campaña al alcoholismo en el país,” EN, 30 August 1936; “Alcoholismo,” EN, 3 May 1937; Fernando Rosales, “La intoxicación por bebidas alcohólicas. Sintomas mentales delatores. Destruye, sin remedio, todos los tejidos del organismo,” EN, 19 October 1937; “Orientaciones sobre higiene rural de acuerdo con el programa de las escuelas regionales campesinas,” EMR 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 30; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 146. 59 Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 191; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 197. 60 Reyes del Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 17. 61 Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 44-48. 62 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 6 July 1929; photographs, anti-alcohol parades, Sonora, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 153 anti-alcohol parade held in Ures, Sonora in 1929, students marched with banners that read, “Alcoholic fathers have degenerate children.”63 Educators hoped that such messages would force men to think about the consequences of their actions.
Finally, an even greater concern for politicians and temperance advocates was that the selfishness of one group of men would not only affect themselves and their immediate descendants, but that their actions also would have national consequences, leading to the deterioration of the entire Mexican race.64 President Portes Gil summed up this belief with the slogan he suggested posting in a public location in 1929, “Alcohol destroys all
possibility of greatness for the future of the country with degenerated children.”65 A variety of other propaganda, including public lectures, articles, and parades, passed on
this message as well.66 Indeed, during the 1920s and 1930s, presidents began to work
80/54; “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Expediente 80/54; bulletin, 1929, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 3, 14, 15; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 172-74, 182-83; A. Flores Caneda, “Alcoholismo y procreación,” S 1 (October- December 1930): 1099-1101; Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio, 11, 14, 17, 22-25; radio program, 23 June 1931, AHSEP-SOCR-SCB, Caja 9478, Exp. 5; “El alcoholismo en los niños,” 29 August 1931, AHSEP-SOCR-SDSP, Caja 9477, Exp. 3; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; CNLCA, “N.t.,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1935): 20; Rühle, “El niño Proletario en México,” EMR 8, no. 8 (15 April 1936): 8-9; Priani to Cárdenas, 15 August 1936, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11; Alfonso G. Alarcón, “La higiene infantil y la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 29 August 1936; “Campaña al alcoholismo en el país,” EN, 30 August 1936; “Ponencia en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 19 October 1936; “El alcoholismo, temible plaga,” EN, 7 February 1937; Meyer, “El trabajador y el alcoholismo,” EN, 14 October 1937; Martínez Lazarri, “El alcoholismo y sus consecuencias,” EN, 28 October 1937; “Orientaciones sobre higiene rural de acuerdo con el programa de las escuelas regionales campesinas,” EMR 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 30; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 33; “Restricciones provechosas,” EX, 26 June 1939; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 146; Corzo, Cuestionario para fijar la cultura de las razas indígenas de México. 63 Photograph, anti-alcohol parade, Ures, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. 64 For other temperance reformers that linked alcoholism and racial degeneration, see: Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico,” 85; French, A Peaceful and Working People, 69; Murdock, Domesticating Drink, 45; Fernández Labbé, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad,” 2. 65 “El alcohol destruye con hijos degenerados, toda posibilidad de grandeza en el porvenir de la patria.” See: circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2. 66 “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; “Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo,” 18 November 1930, EI, 1; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18; “La escuela socialista ante los problemas del hogar,” EMR 7, no. 6 (15 September 1935): 31-32; 154 with eugenicists who argued that for the nation to progress, its vices, such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and prostitution, must be eliminated.67 Some more radical reformers claimed that the federal government should employ forced sterilization policies to ensure that the
unhealthy did not reproduce, replicating their “unfit” genes in the population.68 Luis
Franco suggested in 1939 that alcoholic addiction be an impediment to marriage, that if already married, women demand that drunkard husbands enter a sanitarium, and if they did not comply, that these men be sterilized.69 However, most argued more moderately
that education should be used to teach children healthy and moral habits, with the idea that future generations would be free from disease and vice.70 Members of eugenics societies expressed their support for such a policy and some of these individuals even gained positions in the DAA.71 Indeed, education became official practice in the struggle
to keep the country from being composed of destructive, drunken machos.
“Un decálogo de alumnos,” EN, 30 October 1935; Rafael Ramírez, “El papel de la escuela rural ante los problemas de la salud campesina,” EMR 7, no. 12 (15 December 1935): 5; Bautista and Dávila R., “Alcohol para embrutecer y explotar mejor al indio. Revelación que es casi increíble. Hay autoridades que dediquen a ese ‘negocio’ y tienen bodegas en los mismos palacios municipales,” EU, 17 May 1936, 1; Priani to Cárdenas, 15 August 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Alcoholismo,” EN, 3 May 1937; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 146; “Magno desfile de pequeños,” EN, 10 October 1940. 67 “Orientaciones sobre higiene rural de acuerdo con el programa de las escuelas regionales campesinas,” EMR 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 29, 30; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 174; Alexandra Minna Stern, “From Mestizophilia to Biotyplogy: Racialization and Science in Mexico, 1920- 1960,” in Race and Nation in Modern Latin America, ed. Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 190, 192; Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 2. For other discussions of eugenics and how it occasionally overlapped with a concern about alcoholism, see: Dávila, Diploma of Whiteness, 33, 41-42, 208. 68 Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 202. 69 “Orientaciones sobre higiene rural de acuerdo con el programa de las escuelas regionales campesinas,” EMR 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 29, 30; “Medidas profilactas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP- EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39. 70 Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 203; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, 17-18. 71 Franco to Guerrero, 30 June 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, 2/2918 (1932); Saavedra to A. Rodríguez, 19 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, 573/4; DAA to Cárdenas, 1 August 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11. 155
“Su Excelencia la Mujer” and “Su Majestad el Niño”: Women and Children as Collaborators in the Temperance Movement
Because politicians and reformers classified males (especially indigenous and lower-class ones) as problem drinkers, they often directed propaganda to two other groups, and asked them to get involved in the campaign. First these leaders called on women. For instance, one slogan that Portes Gil suggested using in 1929 read, “Women: for your husbands and your sons, for your brothers and for your fathers, combat alcoholism.”72 Other appeals included plays, parades, and images. In other instances, politicians and bureaucrats directly entreated “Su Excelencia La Mujer,” a name Franco gave to women in one of his speeches, to take part in the effort to combat vice.73
Reformers strongly urged women to join the anti-alcohol campaign because the former argued that the latter would be the most important participants.74 In fact, the delegates at the First National Anti-Alcohol Congress passed a resolution stating that the movement should reach out to mothers first.75 Bureaucrats and politicians agreed that
women ought to get involved for two main reasons. First, they believed that women
endured domestic abuse, monetary neglect, and the pain of watching their children
72 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2. 73 “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio de alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Xochitl, “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; Franco, “Nuestra responsibilidad histórica ante la niñez de hoy,” EN, 22 November 1931; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 13-14; Fócil Díaz, “Combaten el alcoholismo las mujeres,” EN, 30 October 1935; “Por que la mujer debe dar su cooperación eficaza a la campaña contra el alcohol,” EN, 17 October 1937. 74 For women’s role in temperance movements, see: Ian R. Tyrrell, “Women and Prohibition in International Perspective: The World’s WCTU, 1880s-1920s,” in Drinking; Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico,” 84-85; Murdock, Domesticating Drink, 9, 16-25, 115-27; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 45; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 1-26; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 207; Parsons, Manhood Lost, 117, 164-77; Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 20; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 64-65, 72-77, 206, 214. 75 “La campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 18 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 3; “Activa cruzada de convencimiento,” 25 April 1929, EU, sec. 1, p. 1; R. Ramírez to Directors of Federal Education and School Inspectors, 12 September 1931, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11. 156 suffer.76 Therefore, a great many illustrations, including Images 7, 9, and 10, newspaper articles, and radio programs all reminded women that they were often the victims of their
husband’s addiction to drink.77 For example, El Maestro Rural provided a play to be used in rural classrooms or in community presentations in 1933. In the drama, the main character Petra explains to her friend María that she refused to marry her boyfriend
Lencho, inspite of his professed love for her, because he had never been to school, was a drunk, would hit her, and would waste his money on alcoholic binges. María approves of her friend’s logic, but suggests that Petra simply tell Lencho to stop drinking and to go to school. Petra does it, Lencho changes his ways, and the two end up in wedded bliss.78
The happy ending of this skit must have been attractive to many women who found themselves in similar situations and thus reinforced the importance of joining the temperance movement.
The second reason that reformers entreated women to join the anti-alcohol campaign came from the belief that they were moral, spiritual beings. This notion developed in most Western societies because women had the biological capacity to
76 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; R. Ramírez to Directors of Federal Education and School Inspectors, 12 September 1931, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7; J. L. Moreno, Programa de Acción de los Consejos Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; Piñeyro, “La mujer en la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 14 June 1936; “Por que la mujer debe dar su cooperación eficaz a la campaña contra el alcohol,” EN, 17 October 1937; Corcuera, “Pulque y evangelización,” 416; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 2; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 204. 77 “Para llegar a ser un pueblo fuerte en el futuro hay que crear un pueblo sin vicios,” EU, 22 April 1929, 1; El pueblo contra el alcoholismo, 1929; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 14, 33; Xochitl, “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 13; “Mujeres y alcohol,” EN, 31 October 1935; Enriqueta de Parodi, “La aportación femenina a la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 26 June 1936; speech, Priani, 10 July 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; Neck, “Apuntes de actualidad,” EN, 26 June 1939; “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 78 Serrano, “Teatro rural,” EMR 3, no. 6 (1 September 1933): 37-39. 157 become mothers and they spent the majority of their fertile lives caring for their children.
Therefore, they became associated with the domestic sphere.79 Spending more of their time indoors than men did, it was easy to imagine that women possessed a more developed interior side of their personalities, as well.80 This supposed spiritual superiority often made women their communities’ guardians of morality.81 By this logic, reformers argued, it would be easier for women to intervene in the life of a drunkard and come away unaffected by the evils they had witnessed.82 Temperance work seemed to fit
perfectly with women’s “natural” social role: they would use their powers of moral
suasion to guard their homes, protect their children, save their male relatives, and even
prevent degeneration of the entire nation!83
Politicians and bureaucrats envisioned a variety of ways women could get
involved in the anti-alcohol campaign, especially the formation of temperance leagues.
According to reformers, these organizations ought to include mothers of schoolchildren,
79 Rosaldo, “Woman, Culture, and Society,” 23, 30, 34; Sandra McGee Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 2 (1991), 263. 80 Thompson, “La fotografía como documento histórico,”112; Stern, The Secret History of Gender, 15; French, A Peaceful and Working People, 4-5, 86, 106. 81 Arrom, The Women of Mexico City, 46-47; Staples, “Policía y Buen Gobierno,” 116; Ana María Alonso, Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico’s Northern Frontier (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995), 137-38. For outside of Mexico, see: O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 59-60. 82 Murdock, Domesticating Drink, 39; Parsons, Manhood Lost, 117, 177; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 4. 83 “Para llegar a ser un pueblo fuerte en el futuro hay que crear un pueblo sin vicios,” EU, 22 April 1929, 1; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del ejecutivo de la unión,” BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 144-45; El pueblo contra el alcoholismo, 29; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 55-56; “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI- SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Fócil Díaz, “Combaten el alcoholismo las mujeres,” EN, 30 October 1935; Piñeyro, “La mujer en la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 14 June 1936; Parodi, “La aportación femenina a la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 26 June 1936; “Campaña al alcoholismo en el país,” EN, 30 August 1936; Reyes del Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 1; Maxine Molyneux, “Twentieth-Century State Formations in Latin America,” in Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America, ed. Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molyneux (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 48-49; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 16. In the United States, see: Murdock, Domesticating Drink, 17, 24. 158 adult students, rural community members, or ejiditarias. Once formed, the groups would assist teachers by participating in theater presentations, organizing conferences, and marching in anti-alcohol parades. The leagues also would report to municipal authorities when their town had more cantinas than allowed by law.84 Finally, most reformers emphasized that, like the main anti-alcohol campaign, women should base their work on propaganda and knowledge, and not on repression or absolute prohibition. Therefore, women in temperance leagues would teach their male relatives about the dangers of intoxicating beverages and would try to persuade them to stop consuming these drinks, as
Petra did in the skit.85
84 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del ejecutivo de la unión,” BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 143-45; “La cruzada que se hace contra el alcoholismo. La Secretaría de Educación secunda la iniciativa del Sr. Presidente. Giro una circular. Folletos que serán distribuidos en todas las escuelas oficiales,” n.p., n.d., AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 55-56; report, Monterrubio, 31 July 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja. 18, Exp. 10; R. Ramírez to Directors of Federal Education and School Inspectors, 12 September 1931, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7; Circular #5, E. López to Directors of Federal Education, 30 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 16; Plan General de la Campaña Antialcohólica, 15 January 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Medidas Addicionales a las Medidas Complementarias, 15 January 1934, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub- comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; Gerardo Romero, Interim Governor of Sonora, to mayors in Sonora, 18 October 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Programa de Acción de los Consejos, Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; “Todos los candidatos del P.N.R. Comprometidos para hacer obra antialcohólica,” EE, 19 February 1936; “La labor en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 4 June 1936; Luis Chávez Orozco, “Discurso pronunciado por el C. Subsecretario de Educación Pública con motivo de la junta general de supervisores de la enseñanza de la 7a zona general de la república,” EMR 10, no. 5-6 (November- December 1937): 6; “Medidas profilacticas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39. 85 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Para llegar a ser un pueblo fuerte en el futuro hay que crear un pueblo sin vicios,” EU, 22 April 1929, 1; El pueblo contra el alcoholismo, 29; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 55-56; R. Ramírez to Directors of Federal Education and School Inspectors, 12 September 1931, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7; Circular #5, E. López to Directors of Federal Education, 30 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 16; “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; Programa de Acción de los Consejos, Regionales de Educación Socialista del Estado de Sonora, n.d., AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 13; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 23. 159
Reformers identified children as the second group they wanted to employ in the anti-alcohol campaign. The DAA stressed the importance of reaching juveniles in 1936: they claimed that primary school-age children were the second-most important group to
include in this movement, following women and preceding teenagers. Officials from
several other departments echoed this sentiment, explaining that “Su Majestad El Niño,”
another name used by Franco, ought to be involved in fighting vice.86
Temperance advocates had three main reasons for wanting children to join the anti-alcohol campaign. First, they claimed that, like women, children were negatively affected by alcohol addiction: they suffered from domestic abuse and neglect, and they
often physically and mentally manifested signs of their fathers’ vices, as Images 7 and 10
show.87 These problems, reformers reasoned, ought to make youngsters particularly concerned about the spread of alcoholism. Second, children represent the future.88 As
Luis Franco said at the Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica in 1940, “The anti- alcohol campaign is a fruit of the Revolution that the boys of this generation will harvest when they are men.”89 Therefore, juveniles needed to know the risks associated with
86 “Se prepara una campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EP, 18 May 1929, 1; Franco, “Nuestra responsibilidad histórica ante la niñez de hoy,” EN, 22 November 1931; Circular #1, J. L. Moreno, n.d. [1935], AHSEP- DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 3; speech, Priani, 10 July 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “Contra el vicio del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 October 1936; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 87 Radio announcement, 27 November 1929, AHSEP-SOCR, Caja 9474, Exp. 12; Neck, “Apuntes de actualidad,” EN, 26 June 1939; “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 88 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “El concepto de la moral del niño frente al vicio del alcohol,” 28 March 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; “Discurso pronunciado por el Jefe del Departamento de Salubridad Pública,” 30 August 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Mary Kay Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside: Schools and Rural Communities in the 1930s,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 161. 89 Pre-program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11. 160 chronic inebriation, so they could decide from an early age to stay away from
intoxicating beverages. Third, perhaps through a sense of guilt, they could convince their
fathers to stop drinking, and therefore help to ameliorate the current problem. Politicians
and bureaucrats alike hoped that their work with children would make a sober nation.
Politicians, bureaucrats, and educators envisioned several ways that children
could be a part of the temperance movement. The first called for education. To teach
their students about alcohol, teachers used lectures, plays, art, and songs such as “Papa,
do not be a drunk!”90 For youth who did not attend schools, reformers suggested doing puppet shows in public parks, creating temperance-themed movies, and hosting conferences for urban and rural workers.91 These strategies were designed to inform students of the dangers of alcohol abuse and to frighten them into being teetotalers for the rest of their lives. They reminded juveniles of all ages and backgrounds that a drunkard could not achieve any of his or her goals.92 However, reformers did not want children to be mere passive observers, they wanted youths to be active participants in the anti-
90 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2, 2-3; “La cruzada que se hace contra el alcoholismo,” n.p., n.d., AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del ejecutivo de la unión,” BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 143-44; “¡Papa, no seas borracho!” Ramón A. Bolton, [likely 15 May 1929], Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, (AHSEP); Gutiérrez to Portes Gil, 6 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; bulletin, 1929, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 43; Circular #5, 30 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 16; Gómez and Medina, “Himno antialcohólico huasteco,” EMR 3, no. 13 (1 December 1933): 21; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3594/3093/5, Exp. 15; Frenk, “Muchos somos muchísimos,” EMR 7, no. 3 (1 August 1935): 35-38; Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 12 November 1936; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 204. 91 “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del ejecutivo de la unión,” BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 144; Programa de Educación Antialcohólica, 1930, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Subserie Propaganda Antialcohólica Escuela Rural Federal, (AHSEP-SDPH-SPAERF), Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 79; Barreiro and Guijosa, Titeres mexicanos, 98, 99. 92 Bulletin, 1929, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73; Salomón Osorio, “Hacia un prohibicionismo salvador,” EN, 8 May 1932; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11. 161 alcohol campaign. This meant that, like their mothers, these children should join temperance leagues, convince their fathers not to drink, and exhort local authorities to close vice centers. They might also march in parades and perform in temperance plays.93
Furthermore, children educated others when officials exhibited or published the best art,
stories, and slogans that they created in their classrooms.94 Other children helped inspectors pour out adulterated alcohol.95 Students could even attend congresses where they recommended plans of action for the DAA.96 In these ways, they actively participated in the anti-alcohol campaign.97
93 “Para llegar a ser un pueblo fuerte en el futuro hay que crear un pueblo sin vicios,” EU, 22 April 1929, 1; “Activa cruzada de convencimiento,” EU, 25 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 1; “La cruzada que se hace contra el alcoholismo,” n.p., n.d., AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; “Acuerdos a los Secretarías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del ejecutivo de la unión,” BSEP, 8, no. 4 (1929): 143-44; El pueblo contra el alcoholismo, 29; “El concepto de la moral del niño frente al vicio del alcohol,” 28 March 1930, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Programa de Educación Antialcohólica, 1930, AHSEP-SDPH-SPAERF, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 79; Circular #5, 30 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 16; López, Instrucciones a los maestros de las escuelas urbanas y rurales federales del estado de Sonora, 15, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 11; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3594/3093/5, Exp. 15; “Todos los candidatos del P.N.R. comprometidos para hacer obra antialcohólica,” EX, 19 February 1936; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; Siurob to Cárdenas, 2 April 1940, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Magno Desfile de Pequeños,” EN, 10 October 1940; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 204. 94 Radio announcement, 27 November 1929, AHSEP-SOCR, Caja 9474, Exp. 12; Flores A., Alcoholismo; “Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo,” EI, 18 November 1930, 1; Programa de Educación Antialcohólica, 1930, AHSEP-SDPH-SPAERF, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 79; Circular #5, 30 April 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 16; “Un decálogo de alumnos,” EN, 30 October 1935; pamphlet, attached to Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 22 October 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/118; “Magno desfile de pequeños,” EN, 10 October 1940. 95 See Images 4 and 5. Siurob to Cárdenas, 9 July 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937. 96 Pre-program, Primera Asamblea Infantil Antialcohólica, 5 August 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; pre-program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11; program, Segunda Asamblea Escolar Antialcohólica, 21-26 October 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, 553/11. 97 In fact, as Elena Jackson Albarrán shows, participation in the anti-alcohol campaign and other extra- curricular activities did not just help to form children into future citizens. Rather, these youthful participants worked as political actors in their own right. See: Jackson Albarrán, ““Children of the Revolution.” 162
“Temperancia: Por la Patria. Por la Raza”: The Goals and Results of Temperance Reform
Why did the national regime pour so much time and money into the anti-alcohol campaign when the country was in the process of rebuilding itself following a ten-year civil war? The answer is precisely because Mexico was in the process of rebuilding itself. The temperance movement was not just a cultural program, but an integral part of the larger State-building project.98 All of the presidents from 1929 to 1940 were ideologically active: they believed that the national government ought to direct social
reforms. However, the relative administrative weakness of each of these regimes (even
those of Rodríguez and Cárdenas) prevented leaders from attaining all of their political,
economic, and cultural goals. Promoting temperance in a country where alcohol was
consumed excessively (or so reformers argued), could potentially increase the potency of
the government.99
Supplementing the power of the State first required the promotion of peace.
Following the decade of the revolutionary war in 1920, the nation continued to
experience upheaval and destruction, including the Cristero Rebellion, regional uprisings,
political gunfights, and frequent strikes.100 This violence challenged the stability of the regime in two main ways. First, as the country was constantly poised for war, it had little
98 Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer argue that the State-building process is itself a cultural act. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 1-5, 126-27, 180, 207. 99 Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 44; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 190; Adelante (15 August 1933), 0; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 393, 399. 100 Alan Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 255-56; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 393, 399; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 183. 163 time to carry out social betterment programs or to progress economically. Second, disgruntled individuals, especially generals, proved willing to use violence to force either
a change in policy or in government altogether. Therefore, to secure the State’s
autonomy and the eventual institutionalization of power, political leaders reduced the size
of the military and depoliticized it through the process of professionalization.101
Reformers hoped that the promotion of sobriety also would help to prevent further violence. They feared that alcohol made men more aggressive than normal, provoking crime and domestic abuse, but they also worried that alcohol might encourage violence
on a grander scale. Thus, officials gave special emphasis to the anti-alcohol campaign in
the military and several officers even served on the governing board of the national
temperance organization.102 A weekly military anti-alcohol hour broadcast on the radio implored soldiers not to drink, with messages such as, “The Mexican soldier is already brave. He does not need to go looking for false valor in a bottle.”103 Newspapers, magazines, and classes in military schools provided further information about the dangers of being intoxicated on or off the battlefield.104 Governmental authorities also offered
101 Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 8, 17-19, 21-23. 102 Temperance advocates worked with all branches of the military as well as the police. See: General Isaac M. Ibarra to Portes Gil, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “La Secretaría de Guerra interesada en la campaña antialcohólica,” EU, 2 August 1930, 7; Emilio Araujo and the representatives from the Secretariat of Foreign Relations and the Department of Public Health to CNLCA, 11 June 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 30; Franco to Nicéforo Guerrero, 30 June 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/2918 (1932); Circular 50, War Department, 7 December 1932, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/89; DAA to Rodríguez, 18 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; Consultative Body of the DAEO to Rodríguez, 16 November 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; Siurob to Cárdenas, 19 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Cooperación de la policía en la campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 4 April 1936; “Los empleados en la campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 16 April 1936; Priani to Cárdenas, 5 August 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 103 Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 19-20. 104 “Activa cruzada de convencimiento,” EU, 25 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 1; Gutiérrez y Olivares to Portes Gil, 6 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; “La Secretaría de Guerra interesada en la campaña 164 soldiers opportunities to actively participate in the campaign by inviting them to form temperance leagues, participate in parades, and help dispose of adulterated alcohol.105
Finally, officials developed some unique measures for this group: they encouraged the
troops to observe a Day of Abstinence every year, worked at keeping alcohol away from
barracks, and supported the military law that called for the discharge of soldiers and
officers if they went to a cantina while in uniform, or if they attempted to perform their
duties while intoxicated.106 All of these measures aimed at creating a professional military that could protect the country in case of attack, a depoliticized institution that
antialcohólica,” EU, 2 August 1930, 7; Franco to General Joaquín Amaro, Director of Military Education, 7 September 1931, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Archivo Joaquín Amaro (FAPECyFT-AJA), Serie 0307, Leg. 31; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 30; DAA to A. Rodríguez, 18 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; General Alejandro Mange to A. Rodríguez, 19 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; Adelante (15 August 1933), 0, 6, 22, AGN-FAP- AR, Exp. 573/4; “La hora de las grandes responsibilidades para la revolución mexicana,” EN, 24 December 1933; Plan General de la Campaña Antialcohólica, 15 January 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 August 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/102; “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; “La labor de la unificación de trabajadores,” EN, 5 November 1935; Homenaje al soldado (Mexico City: Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, 1935), AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 135.2/74; “Es un deber combatir el alcoholismo,” EN, 25 January 1936; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108; “Eficaz labor antialcohólica,” EN, 29 August 1936; program for the Hora Dominal Pro-Servicio Militar Obligatorio, 18 December 1940, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5518 (S/N), Exp. 1. 105 “La Secretaría de Guerra interesada en la campaña antialcohólica,” EU, 2 August 1930, 7; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 21, 30; Circular 50, War Department, 7 December 1932, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/89; “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub-comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733”35”/21; “Los soldados tirán barriles de malas bebides a las coladeras,” LP, 1 December 1937; Siurob to Cárdenas, 2 April 1940, AGN- FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “La [sic] deudas de cantina serán como las del juego. Se harán reformas al Código Civil de 1928, como parte de la campaña en contra del alcoholismo,” EU, 1 October 1940; “Magno desfile de pequeños,” EN, 10 October 1940. 106 “Activa cruzada de convencimiento,” EU, 25 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 1; “El ejército dedicará un día para la abstinencia. Mensajes por radio a todos los soldados y bandera blanca en los cuarteles de la República. Enérgica campaña. Gestiones de la Liga Nacional Antialcohólica. Ha recibido con entusiasmo la idea del señor Secretario de Guerra,” EU, 29 July 1930, 5; “El ejército nacional celebrará cada año ‘el día de abstinencia,’” EU, 6 September 1930; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 11-12, 15, 21, 30; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 August 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/102; Adiciones que presenta la Dirección Antialcohólica al Plan General de la Campaña, July 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733”35”/21; “1,500 Comités Contra el Alcoholismo en el País,” EN, 10 August 1935. 165 would not be tempted to overthrow the government, and a model of morality for the lower classes to emulate.107
Promoting the strength of the State next necessitated improving the economy. To help secure governmental autonomy from dominant classes and foreign investors, many revolutionary presidents promoted capitalist expansion, a goal that finally began to achieve some success in the 1930s.108 Temperance reformers feared that the strength of the nation’s alcohol industry would counteract economic development, though. For instance, Dr. Díaz Barriga of the Department of Public Health found that in 1935,
Mexicans spent 200 million pesos on alcohol, while the harvests of maize, wheat, and beans together did not even yield 150 million pesos in sales.109 The situation worsened as profits on the production and sale of intoxicating beverages seemed to benefit the alcohol industry exclusively. There were charges that producers of pulque and other beverages
routinely defrauded the government of tax revenue that could be used to fund
revolutionary programs. Indeed, images of the bartender frequently showed him as an
evil, enterprising individual who grew fat by profiting from others’ vices and misery.110
107 “Activa cruzada de convencimiento,” EU, 25 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 1; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 3-4, 15, 30; Homenaje al soldado, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 135.2/74; “El djercito es garantia del obrero. Los trabajadores de México se sienten fuertemente vinculados al instituto armado. Campaña antialcohólica. La hora semanal de ayer fue dedicada al sindicato del diario de la revolución,” EN, 29 August 1936; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 113. 108 Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 393, 399; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 91; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 178; O’Malley, The Myth of the Revolution, 138; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 40; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 13. 109 “Resumen del estudio sobre el alcoholismo en México,” 6 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 110 AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1: Ballesteros to Portes Gil, 12 November 1929; Chemist Salvador Souverielle to Dr. Rafael Silva, 12 March 1930; memorandum, Department of Public Health, 20 March 1930; report, Monterrubio, President of the Commission on Sanitary Measures, to CNLCA, 3 April 1930; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 14, 28-30, 41; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 26, 224; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18. 166
Díaz Barriga and other experts concluded that combating alcoholism should not be considered just a matter of public health or morality, but that it needed to be taken more
“seriously” as an issue of economics essential for the success of the Revolution. Political leaders responded by tightening tax codes, attempting to restrict the amount of grain that
could be used to produce alcohol, and regulating the alcohol industry.111
Third, to increase the authority of the revolutionary regime, officials needed to limit the influence of the Catholic Church.112 Although the Church had lost much of its power as an institution after the Liberal reforms of the 1850s, it continued to exert a powerful influence over the majority of the population, which remained socially, and at times, politically Catholic in the 1920s and 1930s.113 In fact, the Church used the laity to challenge the authority of the fledgling State when, during the Cristero Rebellion of 1926 to 1929 and on the eve of a second Cristiada in 1934, priests encouraged their parishioners to rebel against a government seen as godless. In both cases, to garner peace, government officials stepped back from their more radical policies. Their actions demonstrated that the regime was not yet completely autonomous.114 The anti-alcohol campaign provided one way to weaken the grip of the Church on its citizens as the
111 “Aumentarán el impuesto a los alcoholes,” EP, 11 March 1930, 1; “Producción restringida,” EU, 3 April 1936; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 April 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/108; “Ya no se venderán bebidas por litro, solo botellas cerradas,” LP, 28 July 1937; “La ley antialcohólica es contra la bebida de pésima calidad,” LP, 7 September 1937. 112 Staples, “Policía y Buen Gobierno,” 118; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 68-69. 113 Charles A. Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968); Richard N. Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 233, 256; Brian Hamnett, Juárez (London: Longman, 1994); Jean Meyer, “An Idea of Mexico: Catholics in the Revolution,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 281, 295. 114 Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 229, 235; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 402-03, 405, 416, 441; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 33-36; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 154, 166-68; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, xxiii; Bantjes, “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation,” 142; Meyer, “An Idea of Mexico,” 283-91. 167
movement began organizing women into temperance leagues. The prevailing view saw
women as more religious and vulnerable to the influence of the Church than men. In fact,
many women had participated in the Cristero Rebellion. Political leaders hoped that
getting females involved in State-sponsored organizations might convince them that
secular morality was more useful than religiosity, while securing their loyalty and
redirecting it away from the Church.115
The fourth step to strengthening the State came through efforts to institutionalize
it, transforming personalist rule to bureaucracies, laws, and institutions that endured
beyond presidential terms. Political leaders strived to create an institutionalized regime
by drafting and then enforcing the Constitution of 1917, as well as creating the PNR in
1929 and then the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana in 1939. Reducing the use of
alcohol as a political tool also worked toward this goal. Officials and reformers worried
that political bosses used alcohol to manipulate the system, as they often traded beer or
other intoxicating beverages for peasants’ votes.116 Thus, several times over the eleven- year course of the national anti-alcohol campaign, officials forbade the use of intoxicating beverages in politics or even closed cantinas on polling days.117 Leaders intended these measures to achieve a modern, institutionalized regime that could not be manipulated by strongmen.
115 Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” 266-67; Becker, “Torching La Purísima, Dancing at the Altar,” 259, 271; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 181; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 15, 41, 45, 62, 71-72; Bantjes, “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation,” 148; Meyer, “An Idea of Mexico,” 288; Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside,” 161. Leaders in the Soviet Union also hoped to reduce the influence of the Church over women. See: Attwood and Kelly, “Programmes for Identity: The ‘New Man’ and the ‘New Woman,’” 274. 116 “Restricciones provechosas,” EX, 26 June 1939; Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 21-23. 117 See Chapter Two. 168
For these governmental projects, or any others, to succeed, one thing above all
was necessary: to create a citizenry of modern people. Intellectuals defined these New
Men and Women as individuals who were sober, healthy, efficient, and rational. Experts
feared that Mexicans (other than themselves, of course!) failed on every count: far too
many drank intemperately, the nation was plagued with tuberculosis and venereal
diseases, workers were anything but productive, and countless people lived on the basis
of blind faith. These problems threatened the well-being of the nation, as Image 11
demonstrates.118 In this illustration to a 1929 anti-alcohol booklet, a woman, who
represents the nation, stretches over a map of Mexico. A snake wraps itself around her,
and each coil lists one of the country’s problems: alcohol, drugs, venereal diseases, and
crime, all leading to the final coil, ruin. She beseeches her countrymen not to observe
passively the destruction of their nation, but rather, to get involved in its rescue, for she
says, “Only the united force of good Mexicans will be able to save me from the terrible
threat of vice.” Policy makers and reformers indeed did not remain passive: they created
a far-reaching, national educational system in 1921 that tried to solve some of these
problems by teaching children the three “Rs” and carrying out extensive anti-clerical,
anti-prostitution, and pro-hygiene campaigns. Festivals, parades, and other types of
propaganda were used to reach those individuals who did not attend school.119 The anti-
118 Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 33. 119 Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 230, 243-45; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 394-96; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 5, 10-11, 28, 197-98; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 7-10; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 14-15, 27-33, 61-70, 103-09, 180, 185-86, 192, 200-04, 218, 228-31; Hayes, Radio Nation, 43, 46, 48-50; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 4-5, 97-98; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 40; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 1; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 182-83; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 36-37; Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, 18-20, 22, 27-28, 90-93; 169
alcohol campaign must be considered as part of this plan to mold the hearts and minds of
ordinary people and make them into modern citizens.
Image 11, no title, Alberto Rios, 1924. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
Teachers, doctors, and other temperance reformers started this process by
attempting to redefine gender norms, or what was considered to be acceptable traits for
each sex. Anti-alcohol crusaders feared that demobilization and the promotion of
temperance in the military would not be enough to guarantee lasting peace. They needed
to pacify the entire country, which, for the last twenty years, had based its social values
Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, xiv-xv, xvii, 12-13; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, xiii, xvii, 100; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 9; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 197; Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico,” 186; Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis, “Introduction,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 1, 5, 10-11; Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside,” 158-59. For similar campaigns to create “New Men and Women” in other revolutions and high modernist regimes, see: Scott, Seeing Like a State, 88-91, 195-96, 211; Attwood and Kelly, “Programmes for Identity,” 256-59, 264-76. 170
around violence. Therefore, they had to convince men that bravery, virility, and the
consumption of alcohol should be less important to their sense of honor than fulfilling
their patriarchal duties 120 Several pieces of propaganda illustrated this idea. For instance, the corrido “The Shame of Alcohol,” performed at the first annual anti-alcohol parade in Hermosillo, Sonora in 1929 said, “He who yells the most is not brave, so I assure you, alcohol advises you poorly.” Although the song explained that the nation did want manly sons, they were characterized as being healthy individuals who lived up to their social responsibilities, did not mistreat their wives, and provided good examples for their children.121 One image from a 1929 booklet had a similar message (See Image
12).122 It depicts two naked and well-defined young men; the one standing appears to be choking the one on his knees, who is labeled “vices.” The accompanying caption reads,
“Young man: do you want to be a very manly man? Have you thought about what it means to be a man? It is not to be a murderer, nor to know how to use guns. Nor is it to defeat an army. Nor is it to be a strong brute. [A man] is he that defeats his vices and passions. He that does not permit his low nature to cloud his life nor the life of his fellow men. That is a man.” A second image from this pamphlet also juxtaposes two men (See
Image 13).123 One is disheveled, drunk, and dressed in black, while the other, dressed in white, is neat and clean. The sober man has his hand on the intoxicated friend’s shoulder,
120 Alonso, Thread of Violence, 118, 121, 227; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 89-91; Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, 87-88. Brazilian leaders in the late-nineteenth and early- twentieth centuries had to go through the opposite process: convincing men that army service was honorable and masculine. See: Peter M. Beattie, “The House, the Street, and the Barracks: Reform and Honorable Masculine Social Space in Brazil, 1864-1945,” Hispanic American Historical Review 76, no. 3 (1996): 439, 442-44. 121 “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. 122 Gutiérrez y Oliveras, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 61. 123 Ibid., 10. 171 as he says, “Do you remember that time when . . . you called me ‘coward’ and ‘girl’ because I did not drink wine? . . . You continued being a ‘man’ and ‘valiant,’ and now here you are. Ruined.” The man’s downfall can further be seen by contrasting the setting of this interaction—a dark and obviously lower-class cantina with campesinos in the
background—to the setting of the flashback, with the men in an elegant, airy, and well-lit
restaurant. These images (and other pieces of propaganda) demonstrate that traditional
concepts of masculinity, which valued men who “behaved badly,” had brute strength, and
abused liquor, only brought them to their ruin, as they abandoned their friends, family,
and jobs.124 Revolutionary New Men, on the other hand, possessed the characteristics of being healthy, vice-free, and peaceful fathers.125
124 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 11; Franco, “Mensaje para la Revista Militar Adelante,” Adelante, (15 August 1933): 6; Hernández, “Grados del ebrio,” EMR 3, no. 9 (October 1933): 36-39; “El alcoholismo se combatirá en una forma más intensa,” EN, 20 August 1935; Martínez Lazarri, “El alcoholismo y sus consecuencias,” EN, 28 October 1937. 125 Thompson, “La fotografía como documento histórico,” 115-19; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 183, 200; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 18-19; Marco Velázquez and Mary Kay Vaughan, “Mestizaje and Musical Nationalism in Mexico,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 108; Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside,” 160. Katherine Bliss finds that the campaign against prostitution and veneral diseases in revolutionary Mexico also tried to define “good” men as fathers and workers. Bliss, Compromised Positions, 132-35. 172
Image 12, no title, Alberto Rios, 1924. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
Image 13, no title, Alberto Rios, 1924. Reproduced with permission by the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
173
Examining anti-alcohol propaganda reveals that temperance advocates also attempted to transform lower-class and indigenous men into better citizens. Reformers believed that drunks could not be trusted to vote or otherwise participate in the political process, activities deemed central to the creation of a modern nation.126 Therefore, propaganda called on men’s sense of nationalism and taught them that imbibing alcohol would not allow one to fulfill his duties as a patriarch or as a citizen.127 As President
Portes Gil said in 1929, “The alcoholic will never be: a good son, a good father, a good husband, nor a good citizen.”128 Children learned this lesson at school as well. At the first anti-alcohol parade in Hermosillo in 1929, teachers exhibited drawings that their students had done so that observers could benefit from the same information. One picture showed two drunken men colliding, yelling, “¡Viva México!” The artist asks,
“What do you say? That you are a patriot and you do not see that your vices are disgracing your family, and at the same time, your country?”129 These and dozens of other examples told men that they should be sober, responsible citizens.130
Officials also worked to create a New Woman who ran a hygienic household,
“properly” raised and educated her children, and used her supposedly superior morality to
126 Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 7 July 1929. 127 For other temperance movements that linked sobriety to responsible citizenship, see: Fernández Labbe, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad,” 3. 128 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 34. 129 Photographs, Hermosillo, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. 130 “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34; Exp. 80/54; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 3; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulterero de la raza latinoamericana, 14, 21, 33; Franco, “El concepto de la moral del niño frente al vicio del alcohol,” 28 March 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Xochitl, “Los crimenes del alcoholismo,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 3; LMA, “Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo,” EI, 18 November 1930, 1; report, Ayala E., 30 November 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 15; Franco, Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia mundial, 12, 21; “Concurso del canto contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 23 August 1933, sec. 2, p. 1. 174 rid her family, and thus, the nation, of its vices. Since reformers believed that most women spent the majority of their time at home, they wanted to educate them in how to keep themselves, their families, and their houses clean, how to prevent venereal diseases, and how to cook healthy food.131 Raising children, who represented the next generation,
became a task of national significance, as well. Therefore, reformers begged mothers not
to drink while pregnant or breastfeeding and to refrain from giving their children
pulque.132 Finally, reformers believed it was women’s spiritual side that would enable
them to combat alcoholism, so they should use their powers of persuasion to keep their
husbands and fathers from drinking. When women did these things, reformers thought of
them as the saviors of the race, as Image 7 and other illustrations demonstrate.133 In other words, the revolutionary New Woman as wife and mother improved the wellbeing of herself, her family, and even the nation.
131 Reyes del Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 7-17; Thompson, “La fotografía como documento histórico,” 115-19; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 43; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 196; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 91; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 200; Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, 32, 39-40, 43, 51-56, 59-61; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 95-96; Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside,” 160-61. 132 Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana 39, 55-56; “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; “El alcoholismo en los niños,” 29 August 1931, AHSEP-SOCR-SDSP, Caja 9477, Exp. 3; Ceballos Novelo, “Alimentación del campesino,” EMR 9, no. 6 (15 November 1936): 33; “El alcoholismo, temible plaga,” EN, 7 February 1937; presidential decree, 23 September 1937, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 13, Exp. 11; “Orientaciones sobre higiene rural de acuerdo con el programa de las escuelas regionales campesinas,” EMR 11, no. 6 (June 1938): 25; Reyes del Campillo, ¡Hermana campesina!, 22, 39; “Medidas profilacticas contra el alcoholismo,” 8 May 1939, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 194, Exp. 1-F-39. 133 Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 25; Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social; pamphlet, attached to Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 22 October 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/118; Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” 267-68. 175
Reformers further hoped to use the anti-alcohol campaign to create a corps of modern and efficient workers that would aid in the process of economic development.134
These leaders and employers complained that vast numbers of laborers drank so much over the weekend that they simply skipped work on Monday, turning this day into an unofficial holiday they called San Lunes. Other workers just came to work hung over or even drunk, risking their own safety and further lowering a workplace’s output for the day.135 In 1936, Dr. Alfredo Ramos Espinosa also accused campesinos of being lazy:
after growing and selling their agricultural goods, which took all of a month, they spent
the rest of the year idle and intoxicated, rather than finding more work, such as growing
134 There are numerous examples of governments and companies supporting temperance movements in order to create a more disciplined workforce. See: E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” Past and Present 38 (1967): 73, 76, 81; Ian R. Tyrrell, “Temperance and Economic Change in the Antebellum North,” in Alcohol, Reform and Society: The Liquor Issue in Social Context, ed. Jack S. Blocker (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), 46, 53; Scardaville, “Alcohol Abuse and Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City,” 657-60; Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 237-38; Ambler, “Drunks, Brewers, and Chiefs,” 173-74; Voekel, "Peeing on the Palace,” 187; Deans-Smith, “The Working Poor and the Eighteenth-Century Colonial State, 48-52, 58, 60; Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico,” 82; Piccato, “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol,” 205; French, A Peaceful and Working People, 6, 63, 68; Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines,” 436-38, 445; Lear, Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens, 94-95; James, “The City on the Hill,” 189, 196; Daniel Bradford and William Jankowiak, “Drugs, Desire, and European Economic Expansion,” in Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, 25-26; Gordon, “Inside the Windhoek Lager,” 126-127; Fernández Labbé, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad,” 2-5; Snodgrass, “‘We Are All Mexicans Here,’” 317-18. Some employers, although they are rare, have allowed the use of alcohol among workers, because they believed it promoted sociability and discouraged direct rebellion. Michael V. Angrosino, “Rum and Ganja: Indenture, Drug Foods, Labor Motivation, and the Evolution of the Modern Sugar Industry in Trinidad,” in Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, 108-09; Bradford and Jankowiak, “Drugs, Desire, and European Economic Expansion,” 27. Some pre-industrial cultures actually view alcohol as encouraging efficient work. David N. Suggs and Stacy A. Lewis, “Alcohol as a Direct and Indirect Labor Enhancer in the Mixed Economy of the BaTswana, 1800-1900,” in Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, 136-37; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 47. For a governmental and industrial attempt to forge healthy, peaceful, and efficient workers and citizens (albeit through soccer and not temperance), see: Leonardo Affonso de Miranda Pereira, “O jogo dos sentidos: Os literatos e a popularização do futebol no Rio de Janeiro,” in A História contada: Capítulos de história social da literature no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1998), 196-97, 200-05. 135 Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 7 July 1929; Meyer, “El trabajador y el alcoholismo,” EN, 14 October 1937; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 146; Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” 73-76. 176 other products or engaging in public projects.136 Reformers saw all of these problems as threats to economic development and to the ability of the nation to progress.137
Therefore, their propaganda taught laborers that they would not be as productive if they
arrived at their jobs intoxicated, and that they risked being injured.138 One such slogan from 1929 claimed, “The worker of the future should be healthy of body and spirit.
Worker: do not drink!”139 Slogans, plays, and articles urged lower-class men to come to work on Mondays and laws encouraged this behavior as well by restricting the sale of
alcohol on weekends.140 However, asking and even demanding that workers adhere to a sober, six-day workweek was not enough. As Rafael Ramírez, head of the Department of
Public Education, urged in 1931, reformers must also “inculcate . . . a horror of alcohol and a love of work.”141 Propaganda demonstrated that sobriety and work were not just necessities, they also were desirable because they allowed a man to fulfill his
136 Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 11 November 1936. 137 García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; “El Departamento del Trabajo y la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 26 June 1936; “No tomarán alcohol indigentes ni ciegos. Disposición dictada por el Jefe del Departamento Central. Interesante acuerdo,” EU, 26 February 1937; “Los obstaculos de la ‘Ley Seca,’” EX, 7 April 1937; Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” 267; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 178; Bantjes, “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation,” 140; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 202. 138 Pérez, “Contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 7 July 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 14; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 149; Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 28 November 1930, 9; “El alcoholismo, azote social,” EMR 5, no. 5 (1 September 1934): 18; CNLCA, EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1935): 20; “La acción obrera se inicia contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 21 October 1935; “El alcoholismo en el medio industrial,” EN, 16 May 1937; “El alcoholismo,” EN, 13 June 1937; Meyer, “El trabajador y el alcoholismo,” EN, 14 October 1937. 139 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2. 140 Bulletin, 1929, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP, Caja 5123 (146), Exp. 73; Flores A., Alcoholismo, 8; Franco, “El concepto de la moral del niño frente al vicio del alcohol,” 28 March 1930; Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 August 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/102; CNLCA, “N.t.,” EMR 6, no. 3 (1 February 1935): 20; presidential decree, n.d. [April 1937?], AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Los obstaculos de la ‘Ley Seca,’” EX, 7 April 1937. 141 R. Ramírez to the Directors of Federal Education and school inspectors, 12 September 1931, AHSEP- DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 7. Emphasis mine. 177 responsibilities to his family and nation.142 Reformers hoped that changing the
perception about alcohol consumption and work would help to improve the country’s
economy and general well-being.
Furthermore, reformers designed the anti-alcohol campaign to encourage the
incorporation and assimilation of indigenous peoples into the nation as a whole. Many of
these intellectuals believed that modern citizens would not only be healthy and educated,
they also would be culturally homogeneous. Indios challenged this project for they often
lived in ethnic enclaves, knew little to no Spanish, and refused to jettison their traditions
for mestizo culture. A further problem was that some groups, like the Yaquis of Sonora, still maintained a tribal existence, adhered to a hatred of all people who were not Yaqui, and refused to acknowledge the authority of the national government. Additionally, some observers characterized indigenous peoples as lazy, unhygienic alcoholics.143 Therefore, political leaders believed that education would be essential not only for teaching indigenous peoples the Spanish language and Mexican history and culture, but also in
142 “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; Osuna, El alcoholismo, 170; Franco, “La elevación del obrero venciendo los obstaculos del alcoholismo,” 28 November 1930, 1-2, 13-14; Hernández, “Grados del ebrio,” EMR 3, no. 9 (October 1933): 36-39; Frenk, “Muchos somos muchísimos,” EMR 7, no. 3 (1 August 1935): 35-38; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 34; Barreiro and Guijosa, Titeres mexicanos, 100. 143 Ramos, Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico, 34-35, 39, 63; M. Sáenz, Ambassador to Denmark, to Cárdenas, 14 September 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.4/1, Leg. 1; pre-program, Primer Congreso Anti- alcohólico, 5 August 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; General Gutiérrez Cázares to the Secretary of Defense, May 12, 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; General Brigadier Commander José Mendivil Talamante to the General Brigadier Commander in Hermosillo, 2 August 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; Evelyn Hu-DeHart, “Peasant Rebellion in the Northwest: The Yaqui Indians of Sonora, 1740- 1976,” in Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico, ed. Friedrich Katz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 141, 167-69, 174; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 404; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 89-90; Urías Horcasitas, “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México,” 175-78, 199. 178 inundating them with propaganda from the government’s reform campaigns.144 In fact, as the introduction to this dissertation showed, President Cárdenas claimed that one of his administration’s main goals was to use the anti-alcohol campaign in order to completely incorporate indios to the nation.145 For this reason, he decreed in 1939 that alcohol could not be sold in certain indigenous zones, including those of the Yaqui.146 Cárdenas and other leaders hoped that education and legal restrictions on intoxicating beverages would secure natives’ loyalty as they became modern citizens.
Politicians also desired that the anti-alcohol campaign would help to reduce the power of Catholicism over Mexicans of all genders, classes, and ethnicities.147 As heirs of the Liberal tradition, revolutionaries felt that religion in general, or superstition and fanaticism as they called it, kept people from achieving their potential as New Men and
Women because it encouraged them to reject science and fear progress.148 Although temperance reformers did not accuse priests of actively promoting alcohol consumption,
144 Alan Knight, “Racism, Revolution, and Indígenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940,” in The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940, ed. Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 81-86; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 198-213; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 60, 145, 147-48, 150-51, 156; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, 8, 20-22, 27, 145-46; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, xviii. 145 Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 13 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, 72-73, 88; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, xxi, 121-22. 146 Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 12 and 26 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.1/15; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 16 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “Opinión editorial,” EN, 24 June 1939; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 146-47, 206. 147 The anti-clericalism of Mexico’s anti-alcohol campaign makes it unique. In many other locations, temperance movements were led by religious laypeople, clerics, or missionaries. See: Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, 4; Snow, “Socialism, Alcoholism, and the Russian Working Class before 1917,” 248; Tyrrell, “Women and Temperance in International Perspective,” 218, 221; James, “The City on the Hill,” 189; Parsons, Manhood Lost, 130. 148 Piccato, “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol,” 230; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 395-96, 405-11, 416-17; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 9-10; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 186-92; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 96; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 37; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 68-69; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, xxiii; Bantjes, “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation,” 137-38, 140, 142, 145; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 202. 179 they did identify a connection between religion and chronic inebriation, as lower-class and indigenous men frequently imbibed during religious festivals.149 Many reformers believed that restricting religious celebrations would result in less alcohol consumption.
For this reason, the anti-alcohol and the anti-clerical campaigns shared overlapping goals,
and the government required schools to participate in both.
Political leaders claimed that adopting principles of thrift, sobriety, and other
characteristics of New Men and Women would be immensely helpful to everyone
involved. They quickly pointed out that intoxicating beverages had been used throughout
149 Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 26; minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; “Opinión editorial,” EN, 24 June 1939; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 405; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 46; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 8-11; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 209; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 74, 87. My preliminary research indicates that blaming alcoholism on the Church overlooked the fact that the Church also promoted temperance, both in its private schools and its men’s and women’s organizations. One priest, Luis Encinas Ibarra, who led a second, mini-Cristiada in the Sierra Madre in 1935, forbade alcohol in the towns he captured. Katherine Bliss also finds that revolutionary reformers blamed religion for many of the problems that led to prostitution and veneral diseases, but the Church had combated prostitution prior to the Revolution. See: El lector católico mexicano, Vol. 3 (Mexico City: Herrerro Hermanos, n.d.), 135-44; ex-voto, 8 May 1901, Museo de la Basilica de Guadalupe (MBG), Núm. 1-1067; ex-voto, 1913, MBG, Núm. 1-887; “N.t.,” C 2, no. 8 (August 1936): 3, 7, 11, 12; pledge card, Legión Mexicana de la Decencia, DF, 1937, Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavigero, Archivo Acción Católica Mexicana (BFXC-AACM), Número (Núm.) 1.5.8.3; “Comisión central de la Unión Femenina Católica Mexicana de clases trabajadoras,” Acción Femenina, May 1938, BFXC-AACM; ex-voto, 1938, personal collection of author; “N.t.,” C 6, no. 11 (November 1940): 7-8; memorandum, Grupo Moralizador, n.d. [likely 1941-1943], BFXC-AACM, Núm. 2.5.8; Miguel Álvarado Guzmán, “Los enemigos de la familia,” n.d., [likely early 1940s], BFXC-AACM, Núm. 2.5.11; ex-voto, 5 January 1943, MBG, Núm. 1-1115; speech, Álvarado Guzmán, 3 June 1945, BFXC-AACM, Núm. 3.7; ex- voto, 1952, MBG, Núm. 1-1023; Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 243-44; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 415-16; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 49; Viquiera Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico, 114; pledge card to the Virgin of Guadalupe, n.d. [1 January 2000-December 2004], personal collection of the author; Stanley H. Brandes, Staying Sober in Mexico City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 36-39; Schell, Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico, xix, 81; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 69; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 96, 117; María Teresa Fernández Aceves, “Guadalajaran Women and the Construction of National Identity,” in The Eagle and the Virgin, 307; Lomnitz, “Final Reflections,” 346. 180 the nation’s history as instruments of servitude to exploit working-class and indigenous men and women, and that the revolutionary government intended to change that.150
For all of its rhetoric to the contrary, though, government officials did not drastically restructure gender roles or eliminate class and ethnic biases within the social structure.151 First, although revolutionaries attempted to modify masculinity, they did not
question the existence of patriarchy as an institution. Men were still to remain dominant
figures over their wives and children. Nor did requests for men to be more responsible
husbands and fathers result in legislation demanding it.152 Second, revolutionary policy in general and the anti-alcohol campaign in particular brought only limited changes in women’s stature. For instance, they had relatively little voice within the DAA; the main figures in this governing body were men. In fact, Franco claimed in 1937 that females
150 Circular, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “La vergüenza del alcohol,” 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Exp. 80/54; García Téllez to Acosta, April 1934, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3954/3093/5, Exp. 15; PNR, Plan Sexeñal del P.N.R.,” 92-93; “Festival en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 1 March 1936; “Alcohol para embrutecer y explotar mejor al indio,” EU, 17 May 1936, 1; “La lacra social del alcohol en la vida de los indígenas,” EN, 26 May 1936; “El Departamento del Trabajo y la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 26 June 1936; Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 12 November 1936; “Miserias e ignorancia,” EN, 17 October 1937; Ramírez, “Organizando el problema para la educación económica de las masas rurales,” EMR 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 13; “Decálogo antialcohólico,” EMR 11, no. 9 (September 1938): 34; Celerino Cano, “Hacia la nueva escuela rural,” EMR 11, no. 10 (October 1938): 5; Neck, “Apuntes de actualidad,” EN, June 26, 1939; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 142- 44. Indeed, Mexican temperance advocates were not alone in asserting that alcohol had been used to exploit the working class. See: Snow, “Socialism, Alcoholism, and the Russian Working Class before 1917,” 244-47. 151 For examples of other State-building eras where, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary, gender and class hierarchies did not change significantly, see: Corrigan and Sayer, The Great Arch, 132-33; José Murilo de Carvalho, A formação das almas: O imaginario da República no Brasil (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1990), 31-32; Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” 262, 266, 275, 281-82, 286, 297-98; Attwood and Kelly, “Programmes for Identity,” 266-69, 274-76; Sueann Caulfield, In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Brazil (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 4, 10, 12, 83, 147, 186; Elizabeth Dore, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gender and the State in the Long Nineteenth Century,” in Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America, 23-24; Molyneux, “Twentieth-Century State Formations in Latin America,” 44-45, 51, 56, 58; Ehrick, The Shield of the Weak, 2, 3-4. 152 Becker, “Torching La Purísima,” 258; Fernández Aceves, “Guadalajaran Women and the Construction of National Identity,” 301. Katherine Bliss finds similar contradictions in Mexico’s revolutionary campaign against prostitution and venereal diseases. Bliss, Compromised Positions, 127, 131, 136, 138. 181 offered invaluable contributions to the anti-alcohol campaign, but, in the end, men would make the most significant achievements.153 Furthermore, local women’s temperance leagues did not have full autonomy, they had to answer to the DAA and abide by its rules. These organizations could only accomplish so much; they were forced to rely on moral persuasion because they had no authority to close cantinas or to enact fines themselves.154 Finally, leaders of the anti-alcohol campaign envisioned that temperance
work would help to free women from some of their burdens, but they did not advise them
to expand their efforts into a larger political struggle.155 For instance, Franco claimed in
1930 that when females obtained the vote, he believed, rather condescendingly, that they would use it “in exclusive benefit of the Majesty of her Home.” Nor did he suggest that women deserved suffrage immediately.156 In other words, reformers did not plan for
New Women to break all older gender molds.
Nor did temperance-minded politicians and bureaucrats see all women as equal.
Rather, the role that reformers envisioned for them in the campaign varied according to
153 Consultative Body of the DAEO to A. Rodríguez, 16 November 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; “La acción de las mujeres en la más eficaz para combatir el pernicioso vicio del alcohol,” LP, 30 October 1935; “Recibe apoyo popular la campaña antialcohólica. Funciona una comisión de asesoramiento. El pueblo de México comprende cada día mejor su deber de participar en la lucha contra los vicios que degradan y lo entregan en manos de sus explotadores,” EN, 27 September 1937; “Por que la mujer debe dar su cooperación eficaz a la campaña contra el alcohol,” EN, 17 October 1937. 154 See Chapter Five. “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub-comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733”35”/21; “Las asociaciones femeninas en la lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 8 October 1937; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 1-3; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 86, 145. 155 Although leaders may not have advised women to become political actors, this is in fact what happened. See this dissertation’s Conclusion. For discussions of how and why the new revolutionary government strengthened patriarchy, see: O’Malley, The Myth of the Revolution, 136; Shirlene A. Soto, The Mexican Woman: A Study of her Participation in the Revolution, 1910-1940 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978); Bliss, Compromised Positions, 8-9; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 186; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 11, 17, 20-22, 168, 173, 183. 156 “La lucha de la mujer contra el vicio del alcohol,” 25 April 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Franco, “Nuestra responsibilidad histórica ante la niñez de hoy,” EN, 22 November 1931; Piñeyro, “La mujer en la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 14 June 1936; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 191. 182 their class and ethnicity. As Image 7 and others demonstrate, the saviors of the nation always appeared as upper-middle class whites or mestizas.157 Indeed, those few females
who were members of the DAA’s governing body or who participated in leagues directly
linked to the movement appear to have come from a similar background as their artistic
counterparts.158 Lower-class and indigenous women, on the other hand, may also have been entreated to join anti-alcohol committees at the local level, but they did not play a role in the day-to-day functioning of the national movement. Furthermore, some reformers criticized them for supposedly facilitating vice. They chastised indias and campesinas for introducing their children to alcohol consumption by giving them pulque to drink. They denigrated peladas for working in cantinas and cabarets, and at times, drinking themselves. In the minds of temperance advocates, if these women were not flagrant prostitutes, they at least used their sexuality to encourage men to imbibe.
Therefore, reformers worked at getting a law passed to prevent women from entering bars for any reason.159 Lower-class and indigenous females violated the reformers’ upper-
157 Gutiérrez y Olivares, El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana, 25; Mesa Gutiérrez, El alcoholismo como plaga social; pamphlet, attached to Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 22 October 1936, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/118. 158 Franco to L. Rodríguez, 21 September 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Se generaliza la campaña al alcoholismo,” EN, 22 September 1935; photographs, attached to Siurob to Cárdenas, 24 September 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Un comité femenil para luchar en contra del alcoholismo,” LP, 1 October 1935; “Las acciones de las mujeres es la más eficaz para combatir el pernicioso vicio del alcohol,” LP, 30 October 1935; “El primer comité femenino contra el vicio del alcohol,” ED, 12 November 1935; “La mujer mexicana en la lucha antialcohólica,” EN, 12 June 1936. 159 Memorandum, Silva to Ortiz Rubio, 25 July 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; Díaz Barriga to the Chief of the Judicial Office of the Department of Public Health, 19 July 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 41, Exp. 6; “Notas cortas de Salubridad,” EN, 8 October 1937; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “El Reglamento de las Cantinas restringe el vicio del alcohol,” EN, 26 November 1937; memorandum, 9 February 1940, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 54, Exp. 12; Guedea, “México en 1812,” 40; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 141; Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 10-11. For similar cases outside of Mexico, see: Gordon, “Inside the Windhoek Lager,” 130; Hames, “Maize-Beer, Gossip, and Slander,” 355-57. 183 middle class standards of morality by not acting as rational, hygienic mothers, nor by adhering to their ideal of domesticity.160
In the end, then, the New Man and Woman were not much different from their
predecessors. Men were still to be paternal figures, they were just to be sober and non-
violent ones. Similarly, women were to remain wives and mothers with secondary status,
but now the ideal was for them to use their so-called natural morality to inspire social
change.161 Although securing an alcohol- and violence-free home would certainly have been a victory for women in the 1930s, this did not involve an overt challenge to patriarchy, at either the public or the private level.162
Similarly, the anti-alcohol campaign contained a number of contradictions in its rhetoric about class and race. As most, if not all, of the politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals associated with the temperance movement came from middle-class and white or mestizo backgrounds, their assertion that poor and indigenous peoples drank
more than others demonstrates their prejudice.163 This bias can be seen in Image 3, which depicts an urban, mestizo, middle-class inspector forcing a lower-class campesino
160 Stern, The Secret History of Gender, 15. 161 Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” 267; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 95, 195; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 207. 162 Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 82-83, 89, 241. The reinforcement of traditional gender norms, sometimes by the women themselves, in spite of some apparent gains in women’s rights, can be seen in other temperance movements as well. See: Giele, Two Paths to Women’s Equality, 94-96, 98; Murdock, Domesticating Drink, 17, 24; Parsons, Manhood Lost, 9, 169. The morality campaign, one part of which combated alcoholism, in Chile from the 1920s through the 1940s, also attempted to create working-class families made up of “‘responsible’ heads of household” and “model housewives.” See: Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines,” 439. 163 Historian Peter C. Mancall, a specialist on alcoholism and Native Americans in the United States, claims that there is no scientific evidence that indigenous peoples in the Americas or elsewhere have a biological or genetic predisposition to alcohol abuse. See: Peter C. Mancall, “Alcohol and the Fur Trade in New France and English America, 1600-1800,” in Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, 90. 184
or indio to pour out his pulque. The difference in status of these two men can further be
seen in the inspector’s stance—he is literally looking down on the other figure.164 A similar divide existed between the DAA and its affiliated unofficial organizations.
Directors strictly monitored these urban workers and peasants, as they did with women’s leagues, and in 1939, when the DAA believed that these committees grew too independent, it demanded that they stop operating.165 Native peoples received even less of a chance to participate in the anti-alcohol campaign. They were never invited to form temperance leagues, and although experts in the “Indian problem” participated in the
DAA’s governing body, it seems as if no indigenous peoples were members.166 Also, if
Siurob had suggested training indigenous people, who already spoke their own
languages, how to deliver anti-alcohol talks, instead of the other way around, the message
of sobriety quite likely would have been better understood and accepted, and a new
generation of native leaders might have been created.167
Although the elimination of alcohol abuse in the lives of the working-class and
the indigenous would have been an important first step to improving the status of these
164 Photograph, Department of Public Health memorandum to Cárdenas, 7 January 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 165 “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub-comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733”35”/21; “Un organismo único llevará a cabo la lucha antialcohólica. Disolución de todos los comités que venian funcionando por cuenta propia. Importantes acuerdos en una junta celebrada ayer,” EU, 24 June 1939. 166 Memoranda, Enríquez Roca to Monterrubio, 18 June 1929 (two), AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; memorandum, Quiñones to Monterrubio, 20 March 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; DAA to Cárdenas, 1 August 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Recibe apoyo popular la campaña antialcohólica,” EN, 27 September 1937. 167 “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub-comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733”35”/21; “Acuerdo en relación a una campaña,” EN, 11 July 1936. Historians Guillermo Palacios and Stephen Lewis note this same phenomenon in education in general. See; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 227-28; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 45; Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico,” 181. 185
groups, in the end, the anti-alcohol campaign only brought about surface-level, relatively insignificant changes. One reason for this may be that reformers did little to combat the causes of habitual drunkenness (such as poverty and lack of potable water) and focused more on propaganda and education. Indeed, by the late 1930s, when critics began to label the movement as sterile and ineffective, this was a major complaint.168 Another reason may be that although reformers hoped to help the dispossessed, they never intended to challenge the social structure. This pattern fits a model proposed by sociologist Joseph R. Gusfield for the U.S. temperance movement. There, as in Mexico,
“assimilative” reformers were progressive, but not revolutionary. In other words, these temperance advocates had sympathy for the plight of the lower classes: their exploitation by the bourgeoisie, their sub-standard living conditions, and the alcoholism that may have been caused by the above factors. But rather than improving these underlying socio- economic factors, they advocated that the poor change their habits by adopting middle- class principles of thrift, self-help, and morality. While this affirmed the reformers’ own social status, as they set themselves up for emulation, it did nothing more for the poor than to offer them empty rhetoric that encouraged them to assimilate with the dominant culture. Furthermore, this middle-class model of morality was often virtually unattainable for the economically challenged.169
168 “Resumen del estudio sobre el alcoholismo en México,” 6 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Sección editorial. Errores en la lucha contra el alcohol,” EG, 26 June 1939; Askinasy, “El alcoholismo,” 146; Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 254. 169 Corrigan and Sayer, The Great Arch, 129, 132, 138; Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, 6; Snow, “Socialism, Alcoholism, and the Russian Working Class before 1917,” 247-49; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 403-04; French, A Peaceful and Working People, 4-5; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 14-15, 89; Scott, Seeing Like a State, 94, 96; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 5; James, “The City on the Hill,” 189, 194; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 104; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 122; 186
Indeed, when it came to the treatment of lower-class and indigenous men and women, the government acted in a paternalistic manner. By the late 1920s, the State no longer just regulated the economy or interacted with foreign nations, it had become involved in its citizens’ intimate, private lives.170 In promoting sobriety, government officials told men how to treat their wives and what to do with their free time. They tried to teach women how to be better mothers. Workers and natives were to lose any aspects of their cultures that middle-class and mestizo reformers considered offensive or immoral.
The government wanted to extend this influence even further than it did. In the mid-
1930s, the DAA generated several different plans of action that called for inspection
teams that would enter proletarian homes to discover how hygienic and sober these
families were. Another idea suggested having workers volunteer to place anti-alcohol
posters in their homes. Those signs that were found to be in the best condition
(presumably after an inspection) would earn their owners a reward.171 Although it seems
Vaughan and Lewis, “Introduction,” 1-2, 10; O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 63. 170 Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 401, 412-13, 415; Barreiro and Guijosa, Titeres mexicanos, 98; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 71-72, 82, 188, 234; Bliss, Compromised Positions, 6, 98, 110-19; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 91-92; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 41-42; Hayes, Radio Nation, 80-81; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 100; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 122; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 100, 232; Bliss, “For the Health of the Nation,” 198, 205; Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico,” 179; Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside,” 173. For examples outside of Mexico, see: Deutsch, “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” 276, 278-79, 292; Scott, Seeing Like a State, 93; Fernández Labbé, “Las comunidades de la sobriedad,” 5-6; O’Connor, “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs?” 56, 61, 65-66. 171 Plan General de la Campaña Antialcohólica, 15 January 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; “Organización y funcionamiento de comités y sub-comités antialcohólicos en la república,” 1 December 1934, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21; “10 mil comités informativos en contra del alcoholismo van a ser fundados este año,” EN, 22 January 1936; “Distribución de alimentos,” EN, 8 February 1936; Priani to the Chief of the Departmento of the Federal District, 15 December 1936, AHSSA- FSPII-SPSS, Caja 13, Exp. 33. 187
as if the government never created these corps, the idea to have them demonstrates that in
the anti-alcohol campaign, the personal was political.
Reformers in 1920s and 1930s Mexico viewed lower-class and indigenous men as volatile, violent, and obsessed with their own virility. Worse still, their supposed propensity for alcoholic binges only exacerbated these qualities. Thus, temperance crusaders and activist presidents attempted to redefine working-class masculinity by eliminating spousal abuse, familial abandonment, and alcoholic intoxication. Rather, they wanted to get men to associate honor with sobriety, hard work, and fulfilling the duties of a responsible patriarch. Government officials also urged women, who they enlisted, along with children, in the campaign, to use their position as morally superior wives and mothers to help convince their husbands to be sober and to raise a new generation of healthy citizens. Political leaders hoped that creating these New Men and
Women would pacify a contentious citizenry, encourage economic development, and weaken the Church’s influence, thereby strengthening the State. In the long run, these revolutionaries helped to reinforce the paternalistic nature of the government, along with patriarchy and social hierarchy.
188
CHAPTER 4 ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK: THE ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN AND THE CONTESTED STATE-BUILDING PROCESS IN SONORA, 1915-1939
Nogales mayor Astolfo Cárdenas, Bahuises resident Marcelina López, and
Governor Román Yocupicio may have only had one thing in common, other than their state of residence: these Sonorans violated legislation restricting alcohol at least once in their lives. In 1919, Cárdenas, who supposedly ran a clandestine dispensary of liquor out of his brother’s home, was caught assisting his brother and a state alcohol inspector in
stealing decommissioned intoxicants they then planned to distribute on the black market.
López was found selling mescal in 1929 in front of a night school, causing students to get inebriated and miss classes. Yocupicio, who was well known for not enforcing alcohol laws, celebrated the one-year anniversary of his governorship in 1938 by hosting a dance,
where he served beer from the state’s brewery.1 Individuals such as these made it
difficult for the anti-alcohol campaign to succeed.
These examples demonstrate that presidents’ and bureaucrats’ desire to have a sober nation was not sufficient to move the campaign forward. Instead, they relied on governors and legislators to mandate temperance, mayors to enforce these laws, and citizens to follow them. However, state and municipal authorities, as well as regular people, did not always willingly comply with measures that restricted alcohol; they often forced the movement to take “one step back.” Higher-level (or more honest) officials constantly had to demand that the law be followed. In other words, the anti-alcohol
1 Carlos Ramírez, Nogales, to unknown, 1 July 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296; report, Ramón B. Espinoza, Nogales, 6 January 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3364; School Inspector A. C. Delgado, Navojoa, to Mayor Juan Castillo, 11 February 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 175. 189 campaign was a major part of the power struggle between the national, state, and municipal governments, and various administrations used it as a tool to try to assert their authority over the populace, who in turn resisted this control. The fact that so many groups participated in and determined the outcome of the temperance crusade, a movement intimately linked to the act of nation-building, demonstrates that State formation during the Revolution was not just a top-down process, but rather, a contested one. Three case studies from the state of Sonora, each of which corresponds chronologically to one of the presidential categories detailed in Chapters One and Two, illustrate these points particularly well.
Ideologically passive presidents from 1910 to 1924 felt that the executive branch ought not legislate socio-economic change, so they left the temperance movement almost entirely up to state officials. Indeed, in this period, at least two states did pass measures restricting intoxicating beverages. The best example of this relative autonomy can be seen in Sonora. From 1915 to 1919, Governor Plutarco Elías Calles and several interim leaders restricted the production, sale, and consumption of all types of alcoholic drinks through a measure called Decree One. Presidents could not have achieved, and indeed, did not desire, such legislation at the national level. The way this prohibition was carried
out also demonstrates that the national government was administratively weak. In his
zeal to curtail vice, Governor Calles frequently bypassed the judicial process and violated
the new Constitution of 1917, causing an uproar in Mexico City. This case study also
shows that the state government faced the same challenges of institutionalization that the
national government did. Decree One proved impossible to carry out because the 190 governor could not force mayors, policemen, or even regular citizens to obey it. With clandestine alcohol sales rising dramatically, often supported by corrupt municipal officials, the decree was repealed in 1919. Legislators believed that they could create a temperate, if not abstinent, populace, as well as a law-abiding citizenry and government, by regulating rather than restricting the sale of alcohol.
Presidents of ideologically active regimes, from 1924 to 1932, desired to carry out a more extensive anti-alcohol campaign at the national level, but due to the administratively weak nature of their governments, they were often prevented from doing so. The most notable advances came with the founding of the CNLCA in 1929. In
Sonora, the CNLCA helped to renew interest in a movement that had been dormant for nine years, a period in which lawmakers permitted the production and sale of all types of alcohol in the state and in which very little temperance work was done in schools.
Furthermore, President Portes Gil and members of his administration wrote to Governor
Francisco S. Elías frequently, inquiring into the measures he was taking, or would take in the very near future, to combat alcohol abuse in his realm. The CNLCA also supplied the state with propaganda to keep people informed about the temperance movement, which
Elías claimed to support whole-heartedly. In fact, he probably backed this movement because the Sonoran government suffered from a lack of autonomy as did its national counterpart. With a major rebellion in the state, economic woes, and municipal bodies at times still staffed by allies of the insurgents, the governor likely hoped that temperance would create a more docile citizenry, efficient workers, and loyal political subordinates.
But, in the end, these problems prevented effective enforcement of the law, and very 191 little, other than rhetoric, actually changed: the Governor did not modify state laws, and crime and corruption continued.
From 1932 to 1940, leaders of ideologically active regimes not only wanted to combat chronic intoxication, but they also actually began to achieve some of their goals because their governments had increased in administrative strength. This strength was not absolute, though, and so many of the gains of the anti-alcohol campaign were partial or temporary. The case of Sonora from 1934 to 1939 demonstrates the potential of the temperance movement to succeed, as well as many of the ways it ultimately was compromised. With the publication of the PNR’s Six Year Plan in 1934 and the inauguration of President Cárdenas at the end of that year, the DEA began to expand the scope of its activities. Governors Rodolfo Elías Calles and Emiliano Corella M. gladly responded to the DEA’s and then the DAA’s requests that they participate in the anti- alcohol movement by distributing the groups’ propaganda, hosting weekly festivals, and encouraging teachers to engage themselves and their students in the movement. Indeed, these leaders passed the most restrictive legislation in the state since Decree One. These beginnings to a hardy temperance movement in Sonora actually were challenged by
Cárdenas, though. In his attempt to secure autonomy for his regime, he purged the state of Calles’s supporters and family, inadvertently banishing some of the most effective proponents of the temperance movement. The men that replaced the Callistas, Jesús
Gutiérrez Cázares and Román Yocupicio, may have sworn loyalty to the president, but they were at best indifferent, and more likely, hostile, to the anti-alcohol campaign.
Complaints about corruption and vice increased, and Yocupicio reauthorized the 192 production and sale of all types of intoxicating beverages. Cárdenas had to personally
intervene in the state to ensure Yocupicio’s participation in the temperance movement
and adherence to the constitution.
Sonora’s Prohibition, 1915-1919
Presidents from 1910 to 1924 were both ideologically passive and administratively weak, so requesting that the states deal with the problem of alcohol abuse on their own was an ideal solution for these executives. Indeed, in these fourteen years, at least two states did restrict the sale and consumption of intoxicating beverages—
Sonora and Yucatán.2 Sonora had the earliest, longest-lasting and most drastic
prohibition in the country. On August 8, 1915, four days after he took office, General
Plutarco Elías Calles passed his first decree as provisional governor. Known as Decree
One, it mandated the absolute suppression of the production, importation, and sale of
intoxicating beverages, no matter the alcoholic content.3 The measure remained in effect until September 1919, except for a four-month period in 1918 when certain cities were given the right to sell and tax beer to raise money for the severely-depleted state coffers.4
Calles supplemented this decree with nearly twenty other moralizing regulations by the end of 1915, including those creating the Cruz Gálvez schools for orphans of
2 As very few studies on the subject of the anti-alcohol campaign in Mexico have been done, it is unknown if more states restricted intoxicating beverages. 3 Decree #1, 8 August 1915, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 57. 4 This measure will be discussed further below. Decree, 15 June 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. 193 revolutionary veterans, and banning gambling and all games of chance.5 At this time, the ability to take such direct action in the anti-alcohol campaign at the national level was impossible, and indeed, considered undesirable.
Calles and the governors who temporarily replaced him during periods of warfare likely figured that an absolute prohibition like Decree One ought to be sufficient to solve the problem of habitual drunkenness. Therefore, these political leaders employed few cultural methods to fight vice. In June 1917, Interim Governor Adolfo de la Huerta claimed to have increased the number of “spectacles and public diversions,” presumably in order to promote healthier pastimes than alcohol consumption, although he did not elaborate on these activities.6 Six months later, the state government obtained several
anti-alcohol movies from a distributor, and played them for free for thirty days in
Hermosillo. The films were shown in public parks to increase the number of potential
viewers.7 De la Huerta and other executives also posted copies of Decree One, and any
circulars clarifying or modifying it, in public locations so that the general populace would
be familiar with the law.8 Furthermore, teachers at state primary schools (education had
5 “Decreto #4,” BO 1, no. 1 (13 September 1915); Héctor Aguilar Camín, La frontera nómada: Sonora y la revolución nomada, 2d ed. (Mexico City: Siglo Veinteuno Editores, 1979), 421-22; Enrique Krauze, Reformer desde el origin. Plutarco Elías Calles (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), 32-33; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 58-65. 6 Report, Interim Governor Adolfo De la Huerta, June 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3132, Exp. 17. 7 “Una interesante película contra la embriaguez. Será exhibida gratis dentro de breve tiempo en esta capital,” O, 20 October 1917; “Las películas contra el vicio del alcohol. Serán varias que se exhibirán gratis durante el mes de noviembre,” O, 24 October 1917. 8 Mayor Dr. Rafael Crúz, Guaymas, to Enrique Moreno, Secretary of State of Sonora, 4 December 1915, AHES-RE-1915, Tomo 3045, 1a. Parte; transcript of the acts of the city council, Sahuaripa, 18 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3072; report, De la Huerta, 24 September [1916 or 1917?], AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3071. Mayors to Interim Governor Cesáreo G. Soriano, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: E. Campbell, Magdalena, 11 September 1917; Astolfo R. Cárdenas, Nogales, 13 September 1917; Daniel Salmerón, La Colorada, 13 September 1917; S. F. [Cukuady?], Torín, 14 September 1917; E. Y. Shugert, Arizpe, 17 September 1917; F. L. Durazo, Oputo, 17 September 1917; Jesús Peralta B., Cumpas, 18 September 1917; E. Corella, Sr., Banámichi, 19 September 1917; Jesús S. Reina, Altar, 21 September 1917; Carlos Obregón, 194 not yet been nationalized), as well as Cruz Gálvez institutions, were encouraged to moralize their students and to set good examples for them.9 The Interim General Director of Primary Education in Sonora in 1916 further suggested instituting the Boy Scouts in the state in order to create men that were intellectually, physically, and morally strong.
Although he did not mention vice specifically, it is safe to assume that he correlated a morally strong man with one that abstained from alcohol. A study was undertaken to determine the feasibility of instituting this group, but it is unknown if it was ever created.10 Unlike the techniques employed nationally, educational strategies were secondary to legislation in the Sonoran anti-alcohol campaign.
Calles claimed that he had a variety of motives for enacting Decree One but social control seems to have been the main one. He and other officials argued that alcohol abuse caused diseases and physical deformities, perverted morality, led to crime, and stole money from drinkers’ families.11 Drawing on his experience as police chief in
Etchojoa, 22 September 1917; Jesús A. Figueroa, [Ogustón?], 22 September 1917; J. de J. Durazo, Nácori Chico, 22 September 1917; J. Mendívil, Trincheras, 25 September 1917; Ygnacio Barba, Sahuaripa, 25 September 1917; Reyes D. Ortíz, Tepache, 25 September 1917; J. R. Morales, Sáric, 26 September 1917; Manuel E. Córdova, San Pedro de la Cueva, 27 September 1917; Antonio G. Romero, Bátuc, 28 September 1917; Max. Moreno, Bacadéhuachi, 2 October 1917; Diego L. Ortega, Caborca, 5 October 1917; Francisco L. Córdova, Mazatán, 6 October 1917. Circular to mayors of Cócorit, Bácum, Torín, Guaymas, Navojoa, Álamos, and Huatabampo, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca-Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles-Fondo Elías Calles (FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC), Fondo 03, Serie 0202, Exp. 121, Inv. 976; Calles to B. F. Yost, U.S. consul, Guaymas, 22 April 1919, AHES, RE-1919, Tomo 3292. 9 Regulations for the Cruz Gálvez school of Arts and Trades for Men, 12 August 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3225; [C. Giuíes?], Director of Cruz Gálvez School for Girls, to Calles, 9 October 1918, AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3228; Krauze, Reformer desde el origin, 32-33. 10 Report, Interim General Director, Dirección e Inspección General de Educación Primaria en Sonora, 6 October 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3071. 11 AHES-RE-1916: Decree #1, 8 August 1915, Tomo 3062; transcript of the acts of the city council, Sahuaripa, 18 January 1916, Tomo 3072. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: circular 2A, 6 July 1917; Calles to General Ramón F. Iturbe, Governor of Sinaloa, 18 August 1917; official declaration, 15 October 1917. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3220: report, E. Campbell, 31 December 1917; report, Mayor Teodoro G. Lizárraga, Imuris, 20 August 1918; report, Mayor [R. Rinabemba M.?], Cananea, 26 August 1918; report, Mayor Leandro P. Gaxiola, Hermosillo, 31 August 1918. Report for the director of El Mercurio, 1918, 195
Agua Prieta and because Arizona had passed its own prohibition at the beginning of
1915, the governor also wanted to keep thirsty U.S. citizens from further transforming his state’s northern border towns into dens of iniquity.12 In spite of these altruistic sentiments, and like the later national temperance movement, Decree One was also elitist, paternalistic, and motivated by developmentalist concerns. Calles and other officials worried that alcoholism was a problem that particularly plagued working-class and indigenous men, as well as those of Chinese descent, and that it kept them from working and the state from progressing.13 Indeed, several observers accused Calles of dealing with poor violators of the law in a stricter manner than he dealt with wealthier individuals.14 Without a doubt, Chinese perpetrators were treated harshly, an unsurprising fact, given that Sonora was the center of the rabid anti-Chinese sentiment that swept the nation from the 1910s through the ‘30s.15 In other words, in spite of
AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3221; report, Mayor A. N. Cota, Nacozari de García, 8 August 1919, AHES-RE- 1919, Tomo 3304; Everardo García, Nogales, to Calles, 27 March 1918, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0204, Exp. 37, Inv. 1063; Luis L. León, Crónica del poder en los recuerdos de un politico en el México revolucionario (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), 22-23. 12 Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 59-60. 13 Decree #1, 8 August 1915, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Antonio Honrado, [Robendo P. Galaz?], Bernardo [Token?], U. Y. Loaiza, F. Loiaza, M. P. Carrillo, E. R. Vda. de Campillo, Hermosillo, to E. Moreno, 13 December 1915, AHES-RE-1915, Tomo 3045, 1a. Parte. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Soriano to Calles, 18 August 1917; Calles to Iturbe, 18 August 1917; official declaration, 15 October 1917. Mayor Rafael Méndez, Caborca, to Calles, 8 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; E. Campbell, 31 December 1917, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3220; report for the director of El Mercurio, 1918, AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3221; initiative to reform Decree #1, 9 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 227, Carpeta (Carp.) 1; León, Crónica del poder, 22-23; Gerardo Réñique, “Región, raza y nación en el antichinismo sonorense: Cultura regional y mestizaje en el México posrevolucionario,” in Seis expulsiones y un adios: Despojos y exclusiones en Sonora, ed. Aarón Grageda Bustamante (Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés, 2003), 252, 262, 269; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, xxiii, 16-17, 60. 14 Brigído Caro, Plutarco Elías Calles: Dictador bolsheviqui de México. Episodios de la Revolución mexicana desde 1910 hasta 1924 (Los Angeles: Talleres Linotipográficos de “El Heraldo de México,” 1924), 77-78; Teodoro O. Paz, Guaymas de ayer (n.p., [1974?]), 216-17, 231. 15 Anonymous, Magdalena, to De la Huerta, 23 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125; Mayor J. R. Estrada, Pilares de Nacozari, to Calles, 16 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3219; Calles to Estrada, 17 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205; Calles to Tomás Juan, Asociación China Unión Fraternal, Nogales, 9 March 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: Mayor J. 196 statements to the contrary, state authorities attempted to use Decree One as a tool of social control over the populace.
Due to the nature of the national government, Calles’s experiment in Sonora initially appeared to be the ideal way to pursue a temperance movement. Indeed, he and other officials claimed that Decree One brought a number of benefits to the state. Many political leaders argued that crime decreased. The capital city of Hermosillo typically housed between 200-300 inmates at a time, but in June 1917, there were only between thirty and thirty-five. Political officials in several towns boasted that, thanks to their careful vigilance of the law, jails remained empty, and the mayor of Santa Ana even said that he had destroyed the prison and replaced it with a school.16 Furthermore, although none of these leaders was pleased when Decree One was violated, 50 percent of the revenue generated from collecting fines was given to municipal governments, and they used the money to fund the construction of schools and other public buildings, as well as to increase their towns’ overall budgets.17 Family life supposedly improved as well:
M. Arana, Magdalena, to Calles, 14 April 1919; Arturo Chan, Magdalena, to Calles, 16 April 1919; Réñique, “Región, raza y nación en el antichinismo sonorense,” 235. 16 Report, De la Huerta, June 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3132, Exp. 17; report, Soriano, 1 April 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3219; report for the director of El Mercurio, 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3221. Reports, mayors, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3220: E. Campbell, 31 December 1917; Ignacio [Seyna?], Banámichi, 29 August 1918; Cayetano Navarro, Guaymas, 31 August 1918; Jesús J. Encinas, Bácum, 31 August 1918; Francisco E. León, Santa Ana, 31 August 1918; E. S. Ochoa, Villa de Seris, 1 September 1918. Calles to Yost, 22 April 1919, AHES, RE-1919, Tomo 3292. Reports, mayors, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304: [Rique N. Porchua?], Ures, 6 August 1919; Alejandro [Vegas?], Banámichi, 3 September 1919. 17 Mayor Y. Soto, Moctezuma, to E. Moreno, 16 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Calles to Loaiza, 6 November 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Soriano to Carlos Barraza y Tirado, Inspector of Alcoholic Drinks, 6 September 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 6 September 1917; Mayor E. Buelna, Nogales, to Calles, 8 July 1917; Mayor Mariano Urrea, Cananea, to De la Huerta, 24 July 1917. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202: General Arnulfo R. Gómez, Nogales, to Calles, 13 September 1917, Exp. 78, Inv. 933; Barraza y Tirado to Calles, 6 October 1917, Exp. 27, Inv. 882; Calles to A. Gómez, 4 December 1917, Exp. 78, Inv. 933. Report, Mayor Jesús María Valencia, Bacadéhuachi, 31 August 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3220; Mayor J. Quintero, Altar, to 197 according to officials, wives no longer had to battle hunger or abuse, mothers did not have to take plates of food to sons in prison, and boys did not have to abandon their studies to replace their fathers’ economic contributions.18
In spite of these assertions, the measure did more harm than benefit to the state. It is difficult to believe that overall levels of crime could have decreased, for officials dealt with hundreds of violations of Decree One in just four years, demonstrating that people resisted the government’s imposition on their lives. In fact, because this mandate criminalized all aspects of drinking, a variety of ways to break the law existed. One of these was making one’s own mescal; a common practice, especially in rural, mountainous parts of the state. In fact, a report in 1917 noted that near the Sonora-Chihuahua border,
there were at least sixty clandestine mescal-producing operations.19 Law enforcement
Calles, 17 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Mayor Aureliano A. Anaya, Cócorit to Calles, 28 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202; Mayor J. B. Martínez, Fronteras to Calles, 23 November 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Mayor Luis F. Encinas, Yécora, to De la Huerta, 17 September 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297. 18 Report for the director of El Mercurio, 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3221; report, [Porchua?], 6 August 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304. 19 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3075: Frank E. Miller, Agua Prieta, to De la Huerta, 12 September 1916; Mayor Federico [Samaniego?], Bavispe, to Moreno, 13 October 1916. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Soriano to Calles, 18 August 1917; Vice-Mayor Manuel Elías M., Arizpe, to E. Moreno, 20 August 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 1 October 1917; Urrea to Soriano, 10 October 1917; Urrea to E. Moreno, 26 December 1917. Mayor Luis C. Cañizares, Cucurpe, to Soriano, 22 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125. “Se Fabrica Mezcal en Rayón. Hizo Pesquisas para descubrir a los Alcoholeros el Juez de Ures,” O, 19 July 1918; report, Calles, 16 September 1918, in “Documentos para la historia de Sonora, 1915-1923,” compiled by Fernando Pesqueira, Biblioteca Fernando Pesqueira, Universidad de Sonora, Sala de Noroeste, (BFP- SN). AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Mayor E. León, Arizpe, to Soriano, 23 January 1918; Mayor R. Rubalcaba, Cananea, to Soriano, 7 and 8 February and 13 July 1918; Mayor Ygnacio Seyna, Banámichi, to Soriano, 15 March 1918; Enrique Cota, Álamos, to Soriano, 25 March 1918; A. Gómez to Calles, 19 and 28 July 1918; Calles to Mayor Pedro Robles, Baviácora, 29 July 1918; P. Robles to Calles, 5 August 1918; Mayor Jesús Ruiz, Baviácora, to unknown, 24 September 1918; Mayor Florentino Rocha, Cananea to Calles, 12, 17, and 28 October 1918; Major Manuel Moza, Fronteras, to Calles, 23 November 1918; Mayor Jesús Elías, Arizpe, to unknown, 7 December 1918; Luis Soqui, to General Miguel Piña, n.d. [December 1918?]. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202: Mayor Loreto Valenzuela, Guaymas, to unknown, 4 November 1918; L. Valenzuela to Calles, 27 November 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: Agent of Public Ministry, Magdalena, to unknown, 6 March 1918; A. Gómez to unknown, 19 July 1918; Calles to the judge of Magdalena, 26 September 1918; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 17 October and 13 November 1918. AHES-RE- 198 officials found it difficult to regulate this offense, for the makers often escaped before inspectors arrived, or when the agents discovered stills and other equipment on haciendas, landowners told them that they were unaware of any illegal operations taking place on their properties, and that any alcohol produced there must have been made by
someone else.20 In order to deal with the latter situation, Jesús Ruiz, the mayor of
Baviácora in 1918, and Jesús Elías, the mayor of Arizpe in 1919, issued advisories
declaring that landowners would be held responsible for anything found on their
properties, even if it was there without their knowledge. All of the utensils were to be
seized, and the landowners would be treated as accomplices.21
1918, Tomo 3205: Mayor Luis Haro, Rayón, to Soriano, 22 April 1918; Soriano to the Attorney General, 21 June 1918; Mayor Eleazar Salazar, Opodepe, to unknown, 11 July 1918; A. Gómez to unknown, 29 July 1918; Calles to the mayors of Suaqui de Bátuc, Baviácora, Cumpas, and San Pedro de la Cueva, 29 July 1918; Mayor Pastor Molina, San Pedro de la Cueva, to Calles, 25 August 1918; Major Canuto Ortega to Calles, 19 and 25 September, 14 November, and 10 December 1918; Canuto Ortega to unknown, 24 October 1918; Major Meza to Calles, 6 November 1918. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Mayor Ramón Mendoza, Banámichi, to Calles, 27 September 1918; Mayor Francisco Ruiz, Aconchi, to Calles, 10 February 1919; J. Martínez to Calles, 16 February 1919; Meza to unknown, 6 March, 15 April, and 17 May 1919; J. Elías to unknown, 17 and 28 March and 26 April 1919; J. Elías to Calles, 20 March 1919; Mayor E. Arvizu, Huépac, to Calles, 24 March 1919; Interim Mayor José F. Mazón, Arizpe, to Calles, 1 April 1919; Lieutenant Colonel A. Camargo to Piña, 9 May 1919; Mayor Arturo Corella, Sáric, to Calles, 10 May 1919; Calles to Petra Ancelmo de Rivera, Aconchi, 20 June 1919; Lieutenant Colonel Santos R. Flores, chief of the garrison, Navojoa, to Calles, 15 July 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: Calles to General Juan Torres S., La Misa, 5 April 1919; J. Torres S. to Calles, 5 and 20 April 1919; Camargo, Nogales, to Calles, 7 May 1919; Major I. Sánchez, Cananea, to unknown, 18 July 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297: Judge E. J. [Ernánoz?] Flores, Ures, to Calles, 20 January 1919; Canuto Ortega to unknown, 19 April 1919; Canuto Ortega to Calles, 4 May 1919; Mayor Ygnacio Valenzuela, Tacupeto, to Calles, 8 May 1919; Mayor Pomposo Bermudez, Huásabas, to De la Huerta, 4 October 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304; Piña to Calles, 8 April 1919; report, J. Elías, 26 August 1919; report, [Vegas?], 3 September 1919. “Una fábrica de bebidas embriagantes,” Prensa Libre: Periódico Político, Moralizador, de Comercio, e Informativo (Nogales, Son.), 18 January 1919; “A última hora. Un grupo de alcoholeros escarmentado. El debut de Mimi Derba y otras notas,” O, 12 November 1919. 20 Miller to De la Huerta, 12 September 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3075. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Seyna to Soriano, 15 March 1918; Rocha to Calles, 17 October 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Major A. C. Pradeau, El Tigre, to unknown, 1 June 1918; A. Gómez to Meza, 29 July 1918; Meza to Calles, 6 November 1918. Major Prisciliano Vázquez, Guaymas, to Calles 13 January 1919; [Ernánoz?] Flores to Calles, 20 January 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297. 21 Advisory, Baviácora, 25 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; report, J. Elías, 26 August 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304. 199
Another major way to resist the law, of course, was by selling alcohol. Although some reputable businesses, like the Cervecería de Sonora, did, in fact, shutdown their operations, hundreds of others continued selling intoxicating beverages after August
1915.22 In fact, governors had to remind business owners to stop selling alcohol several times.23 Throughout the entire four-year period that Decree One was in effect, drinks could be found in clandestine cantinas, bordellos, hotels, grocery stores, ice cream shops, and even people’s homes. Some notorious sellers, like Clara García of Guaymas and
José Borboa “El Borrego” of Nogales, sold liquor constantly, in spite of multiple fines and jail sentences. Other sellers like José Salazar broke the law out of necessity: he claimed he only sold just more than one gallon of intoxicating liquors, justifiying it on the basis of his poverty, his sickness, and his need to support his wife and small daughter.24
22 De la Huerta to Cervecería de Sonora, 3 July 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Enrique Ramos Bours, “El incendio de la cervecería en 1926,” El Pitic (Hermosillo), 2, no. 24 (March 2003): 1; Juan José Gracida Romo, “Historia de la Cervecería de Sonora y sus empresarios,” in La industria en la historia de Sonora (Hermosillo: Editorial Sociedad Sonorense de Historia and Editorial Universidad de Arizona, 2004), 246; Carlos Martín Quintero Orci, “Cervecería de Sonora. 3ra. parte,” (N.p., n.d.), 4. 23 Circular #11, 1 December 1915, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061; flyer, Captain Homobono Camacho, military commander of the plaza, Cananea, 23 December 1915, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061; draft of a decree, April 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124. 24 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: E. Goldhauer y Padilla, chief of state police, to E. Moreno, 9 January 1916; E. Moreno to R. Crúz, 12 January 1916; statement, José Salazar, 26 June 1916. AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: Mayor J. J. S. Araiza, Santa Ana, to E. Moreno, 24 January 1916; First Captain Dolores Romero, San Pedro de la Cueva, to Calles, 31 January 1916; E. Moreno to unknown, 27 April 1916; Mayor Fernando U. Andrade, Villa Pesqueira, to Calles, 6 May 1916; Police Colonel F. G. Manríquez, to unknown, 14 October 1916; Judge José J. Vásquez, 17 October 1916. Official 165, Judge R. Moreno, Magdalena, 30 October 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3075. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Juan Sing, Cananea, to De la Huerta, 31 December 1916; Mayor Francis Ramonet, Guaymas, to unknown, 19 January 1917; E. Moreno to unknown, 25 January 1917; Ramonet to De la Huerta, 28 January 1917; Pascual Soto, Nuri, to De la Huerta, 31 March 1917; Rafael Monjardín, Commissioner, Hermosillo, to De la Huerta, 21 and 28 May, 18 June, and 15 July 1917; De la Huerta to Félix, 1 June 1917; H. S. Temple, General Superintendent, Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México, to Mayor Carlos R. Félix, Guaymas, 19 June 1917; De la Huerta to Mayor of Hermosillo, 16 July 1917; Félix to De la Huerta, 28 July 1917; report, Miguel Luján, State Inspector of Beverages, 9 August 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 6 September (two), 25 and 29 September 1917; Adolfo Aldama, personal assistant of the mayor, Pueblo Nuevo de Navojoa, to Soriano, 27 September 1917; report, Luján, 27 September 1917; Luján to Soriano, 4 October 1917; Mayor F. G. Bernal, Agua Prieta, to Soriano, 15 October 1917; C. Obregón to Soriano, 29 October 1917; Soriano to 200
Despite the fact that consumption of alcoholic beverages also was forbidden by
Decree One, finding a place to purchase a drink was not difficult. In fact, in 1918 in the town of Cananea alone, out of 256 incidents to which the police responded, 164 were related to drunkenness.25 Across the state, law enforcement officials dealt with dozens of cases of intoxication in the four years of the law’s existence.26 These individuals often
unknown, 17 November 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125: A. Cárdenas to De la Huerta, 6 April and 11 May 1917; report, Luján, 20 July 1917; anonymous, Magdalena, to De la Huerta, 23 July 1917; report, José María Rubio, Inspector of Decree 1, 31 July 1917; A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 2 October 1917; Luján to Calles, 4 October 1917. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03: A. Gómez, Campamento Pozo, to Calles, 13 December 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 78, Inv. 933; Arturo M. Elías, Nacozari, to Calles, 24 and 27 May, 27 June, and 23 September 1918, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056; Antonio Pedrazzini, Minas Pedrazzini Gold and Silver Mining Co., Arizpe, to A. Elías, 18 October 1918, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056. AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3201: Méndez to Calles, 8 October 1918; Quintero to Calles, 13 October 1918; Rocha to Calles, 16 October 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: Mayor Félix B. Peñaloza, Nogales, to unknown, 2 August 1918; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 1 and 5 October and 7 November 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Pradeau to unknown, 3 June 1918; Enrique R. Verdugo, Sahuaripa, to Calles, 23 July 1918; J. M. Linares, police captain, Querobabi, to Calles, 25 July 1918; Barba to Calles, 16 October 1918. Estrada to Calles, 16 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3219; G. Robles to Secretary of State, 19 December 1918, AHES- RE-1918, Tomo 3202; “Alcoholera,” O, 7 January 1919; Luis Basso, General State Inspector, to Calles, 1 March 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292; “Chinos alcoholeros en Cananea. Fueron capturados dos celestiales que hacian el prohibido negocio,” O, 12 March 1919; “El mercado es la gran taberna de la ciudad. Hasta el punto de que los ebrios polutan por entre las mesas de comestibles, mientres otras duermen tranquilamente sobre el despacho de carne,” O, 21 October 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Mayor A. N. Ramírez, Caborca, to Calles, 29 April 1919; Quintero to Calles, 6 May 1919; Mayor R. M. Sotelo, Pitiquito, to Calles, 6 May 1919; Rico to Piña, 23 and 24 May 1919; Méndez to De la Huerta, 4 November 1919; Francisco R. Neblina, President of the Club Ignacio Ramírez, Pitiquito, to De la Huerta, 10 November 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294: Mayor Antonio Cruz, Bácum, to unknown, 7 February 1919; J. M. Echeagaray, State Inspector, to Calles, 6 March 1919; Colonel A. Carmona, Torín, to Piña, 31 May 1919; Méndez to unknown, 13 November 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295: Mayor Y. L. Romero, Hermosillo, to Calles, 12 February 1919; Jesús R. López, Town Councilman, to unknown, 20 March 1919; Leopoldo Ulloa, Town Councilman, San Javier, to unknown, 10 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: Basso to Calles, 6 March 1919; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 24 March 1919; Basso to unknown, 13 April 1919; Piña to Mayor of Nogales, 4 June 1919; Andrés O. Muñoz, Inspector of Intoxicating Beverages, Ures, to Piña, 5 June 1919; report, Nogales, 5 June 1919; unknown to unknown, 14 June 1919; report, Judge Luis Alonzo, Nogales, 27 June 1919; General Carlos Plank, Chief of Gendarmerie, to unknown, 15 September 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297: Mayor Ángel A. Porchas, Ures, to unknown, 21 January 1919; Josefa Cosio, Santiago Ures, to unknown, 22 January 1919; Basso to Calles, 20 March 1919; Canuto Ortega, Moctezuma, to unknown, 31 March 1919; Mayor José C. Arvizu, Cumpas, to unknown, 8 April 1919; Y. Valenzuela to Piña, 8 May 1919; Manuel O. Villegas, police captain, El Tigre, to Calles, 21 July 1919. Ramón Leyva, Town Councilman, Bacadéhuachi, to Calles, 15 May 1919; AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304. 25 Report, [Rinabemba?] M., 26 August 1918. 26 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: Goldhauer y Padilla to E. Moreno, 13 and 18 January 1916; Elías Arias, Assistant Secretary of State, to E. Moreno, 6 March 1916; A. B. Sobarzo, chief of state police, to E. Moreno, 8 March 1916 (two); J. M. Hernández to De la Huerta, 11 September 1916. “Del carnet reporteril. Por la cárcel,” O, 14 October 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Ramonet to unknown, 19 January 1917; 201 gave away their crimes by loud or obnoxious behavior, such as singing or firing guns.
For example, in September 1916, a drunken Susano Ayala of Hermosillo defied the law doubly by mounting a horse, chasing De la Huerta’s car, and catching it with a lasso. On
Independence Day 1917 in Navojoa, a group of men drank mescal that they knew had been stolen, and which they have may have in fact taken from alcohol inspectors. As they caroused, these resisters defiantly yelled out, “Long live Calles! Long live Decree
One!”27 Other drinkers took to consuming whatever they could find: medicine (which might be up to eighty-five proof), reduced alcohol mixed with water, camphor, or marijuana, or otherwise toxic beverages that were much more dangerous to consume than regular mescal or wine.28
P. Soto to De la Huerta, 31 March 1917; Monjardín to De la Huerta, 9 July 1917; report, Luján, Guaymas, 27 September 1917; C. Obregón to Soriano, 29 October 1917; Mayor C. Caturegli, Hermosillo, to Soriano, 2 November 1917. Report, Rubio, Magdalena, 31 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125; A. Elías to Calles, 27 May 1918, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056; Quintero to Calles, 13 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; [Nabos?] Salazar, First Town Councilman, Nogales, to unknown, 1 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Barba to Calles, 16 October 1918; Lázaro M. León, police captain, Querobabi, to Calles, 7 December 1918. A. Cruz to unknown, 7 February 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295: Y. O. Quijada, police captain, Hermosillo, to unknown, 19 February 1919; Mayor J. M. Ávila, Hermosillo, to unknown, 4 November 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: A. Muñoz to Piña, 21 June 1919; A. Muñoz to Calles, 28 July 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297: Barba to Calles, 5 May 1919; Barba to unknown, 9 May 1919; A. Muñoz, Ures, to unknown, 9 June 1919; unknown to unknown, 16 and 18 June 1919. 27 AHES-RE-1916: Andrade to De la Huerta, 6 May 1916, Tomo 3062; F. Manríquez to De la Huerta, 26 September 1916, Tomo 3072; trial transcript, Soyopa, 11 May 1916, Tomo 3082, Exp. 22; trial transcript, Hermosillo, 11 July 1916, Tomo 3082, Exp. 12. AHES-RE-1917: Monjardín to De la Huerta, 28 May 1917, Tomo 3124; report, Luján, 22 August 1917, Tomo 3125; A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 19 September 1917, Tomo 3125. AHES-RE-1918: Judge C. Ramírez Lewall, Guaymas, to Calles, 23 September 1918, Tomo 3202; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 30 September 1918, Tomo 3204; Verdugo to Calles, 23 July 1918, Tomo 3205; Barba to Calles, 25 September 1918, Tomo 3205; Jesús J. Hurtado, Acting Mayor, Sahuaripa, to unknown, 31 January 1918, Tomo 3219. “Por ebria y faltas a la moral,” O, 8 December 1918; “Por ebrios y escandolosos,” O, 18 December 1918; “Por ebrio,” O, 25 December 1918; “Ebrios,” O, 28 December 1918; “Ebria reincidente,” O, 4 January 1919; “Un nuevo golpe contra los alcoholeros,” O, 20 April 1919; “El mercado es la gran taberna de la ciudad,” O, 21 October 1919. AHES-RE-1919: A. Muñoz to Calles, 8 July and 7 and 18 July 1919, Tomo 3296; Major P. García, El Tigre, to Calles, 23 June 1919, Tomo 3297. 28 AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: report, Luján, 9 August 1917; Soriano to unknown, 17 November 1917. Report, Luján, 20 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125; Modesto G. Castro, Inspector of Intoxicating Beverages, 31 May 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202; report, Nogales, 5 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, 202
As both selling and consuming alcohol were crimes, the sheer act of possessing an intoxicating beverage also was illegal. In December 1915, Secretary of State Enrique
Moreno demanded that any businesses that still had stores of alcohol remove them from the state, and he gave them one month to make the necessary arrangements.29 Business persons with large stores of alcohol did not feel that thirty days was ample time to dispose of their supplies because sellers in other states were loathe to purchase them, fearing similar measures might be passed there, as well.30 Many reputable owners did eventually ship their materials elsewhere.31 However, for the four years that Decree One was in effect, individuals continued to store intoxicating beverages in their homes and businesses. In fact, officials had to issue statements several times demanding that alcohol be relinquished.32 Inspectors found large caches—one person had 250 cases of tequila— and small ones, routinely confiscating single bottles of liquor.33 Herminia Duarte, from
Tomo 3296; “A última hora,” O, 12 November 1919; Paz, Guaymas de Ayer, 181; Germán Zúñiga Moreno, “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915,” in Memoria. IV Simposio de Historia de Sonora (Hermosillo: n.p., 1979), 269-70; Ramón F. Zamora, “Cosas de mi archivo. El famoso decreto número uno de Calles,” Fundación de la Ciudad de Hermosillo, May 2004; reprint, La Opinión, March 1955. 29 Circular #11, 1 December 1915, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061; Honrado, [Galaz?], [Token?], U. Y. Loaiza, F. Loiaza, Carrillo, Vda. de Campillo, to E. Moreno, 13 December 1915, AHES-RE-1915, Tomo 3045, 1a. Parte. 30 Honrado, [Galaz?], [Token?], U. Y. Loaiza, F. Loiaza, Carrillo, Vda. de Campillo, to E. Moreno, 13 December 1915, AHES-RE-1915, Tomo 3045, 1a. Parte, 31 Miguel A. López, for Artemisa D. Viuda de Bringes, Soyopa, to De la Huerta, 6 June 1916, AHES-RE- 1916, Tomo 3062. 32 Draft of a decree, April 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124 33 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: unknown to unknown, 24 July 1916; unknown, Cananea, to Calles, 4 September 1916. Goldhauer y Padilla to E. Moreno, 17 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Félix to De la Huerta, 29 March 1917; Aviles to Soriano, 21, 22, and 25 September 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 25 September 1917; report, Luján, 27 September 1917; Urrea to Soriano, 26 October 1917; Mayor Ramón García, Bácum, to Soriano, 1 November 1917. AHES- RE-1917, Tomo 3125: A. Gómez to A. Cárdenas, 5 April 1917; A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 30 August and 5 October 1917. “Del carnet reporteril. Más infractores al Decreto Número Uno,” O, 4 January 1917; Calles to Captain A. J. Abasolo, Nogales, 19 December 1917, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202, Exp. 1, Inv. 856. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Mayor F. E. Armenta, Cócorit, 16 March 1918; Mayor M. R. Valenzuela, Álamos, 11 April 1918; Méndez to Calles, 23 September 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202: José María Díaz, police captain, Estación Esperanza, to unknown, 30 July 1918; C. Navarro to 203
Nogales, fits into the former category. When a raid was carried out on her house in
November 1919, inspectors found sixty empty casks of tequila. They believed she had never sold the liquor, but rather, had offered customs agents one hundred dollars [sic] to ensure that she would always have alcohol at her house to drink.34
Indeed, even transporting alcohol through the state was forbidden without permission. Vendors from other states and the United States, who simply wanted to transport their goods through Sonora in order to reach another destination, or Sonoran businesses that needed to ship their remaining supply of alcohol elsewhere could do so, but such cases required a permit. Many legitimate businesses took advantage of this offer.35 In spite of the regulation, inspectors found large amounts of contraband alcohol
unknown, 11 September 1918; Gregorio Robles, police captain, Empalme, to unknown, 19 October 1918; L. Valenzuela to Calles, 2 December 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: Peñaloza to unknown, 8 February 1918; Mayor Nicolás Burgos, Magdalena, to unknown, 4 April 1918; unknown to Soriano, 19 April 1918; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 7 and 18 September and 17 and 18 October 1918; Colonel J. Félix Lara, Nogales, to Calles, 19 September 1918; A. Gómez to Calles, 21 September 1918; Judge S. R. Campbell, Magdalena, to Calles, 2 October 1918. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Vázquez to Calles, 13 January 1919; Quijada to unknown, 15 May 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Basso to Calles, 22 November 1919; Mayor G. M. Ramírez, Caborca, to De la Huerta, 6 September 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294: L. Valenzuela to Calles, 9 January 1919; statement, Alfonso Echeverría, 7 March 1919; L. Valenzuela to Piña, 9 June 1919; L. Valenzuela to Calles, 21 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: Basso to Piña, 14 January 1919; Interim Mayor José María Palma, Nogales, to Calles, 25 June 1919; José Francisco Borboa, Nogales, to Calles, 26 June 1919; report, Alonzo, 27 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297: P. García to Calles, 31 January 1919; L. León to unknown, 25 February 1919; Villegas to unknown, 5 April 1919. “Diez barriles de tequila descubiertos por la policía fueron exhumados de un lugar de la costa y traidos a esta capital,” O, 9 March 1919; “Entierro de alcohol. 8 latas, 9 botellas, y otras vasijas desenterró la policia,” O, 19 March 1919; “Debutó el nuevo Inspector General de bebidas,” O, 18 May 1919; “Otro golpe del Inspector Gral. de Bebidas,” O, 21 May 1919; Ávila to unknown, 16 October 1919, AHES-RE- 1919, Tomo 3295; Don Smith, “Rapid Strides Mark Growth of Cavern, Colorful History Told,” in The Cavern Café’s Tenth Anniversary Fiesta Souvenir Album, ed. Nick Kerson and Jim P. Kerson, (N.p., 1937), Special Collections, University of Arizona Library (SCUAL), L9791 N77. Pam. 14, 10. 34 Plank to unknown, 15 September 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296. 35 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: E. Moreno to Juana Alcantar, Guaymas, 8 January 1916; R. Crúz to Calles, 28 January 1916; E. Moreno to R. Crúz, 28 March 1916; W. Iberri and Sons to Calles, 26 April 1916; Rademacher, Mueller, y Cía to E. Moreno, 29 April 1916; E. Moreno to Rademacher, Mueller, y Cía, 8 May 1916; Almada Sugar Company, to Calles, 8 May 1916; Calles to Almada Sugar Company, 9 May 1916; Calles to W. Iberri and Sons, 10 May 1916; E. Moreno to Maritime Customs Inspector, Guaymas, 21 May 1916; N. F. Romo, customs administrator, Guaymas, to Calles, 31 May 1916. De la Huerta to Cervecería de Sonora, 3 July 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062. 204 that were headed to Sonora on board passenger and mail trains. The beverages were frequently stuffed inside luggage addressed with false names. Liquor also was found in containers of products like bananas or tomatoes, or even in the bins of coal used to operate the trains. Still further violators of the law hid their contraband in mule convoys, boats, and cars.36
The assertion that Decree One reduced crime seems even more questionable as alcohol producers, transporters, sellers, and consumers did not just violate the law by
36 BO 1, no. 1 (20 September 1915). AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: hearing transcript, 20 January 1917; Mayor Nicolás Porchas, San Javier, to Calles 27 June 1917; Buelna to Calles, 8 July 1917; report, Luján, 9 August 1917; Ives G. Lelevier, Mexican consul in Douglas, Arizona, to Soriano, 27 August 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 19 September 1917; Mayor Jesús Aviles, Guaymas, to Soriano, 25 September 1917; report, Luján 27 September 1917; Urrea to Soriano, 1 and 26 October 1917; Barraza y Tirado to unknown, 9 October 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 30 October and 6 and 14 November 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125: Luján to Soriano, 23 October 1917; Luján to Secretary of State, 30 October 1917. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03 Serie 0202: Barraza y Tirado to Calles, 6 November 1917, Exp. 27, Inv. 882; Calles to A. Gómez, 4 December 1917, Exp. 78, Inv. 933; Evodio Rojo, Fiscal Agent, Cócorit, to Calles, 30 December 1917, Exp. 127, Inv. 982. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Rocha to Calles, 27 November 1918; Caturegli to unknown, 17 September 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202: Rojo to unknown, 4 March 1918; C. Navarro to unknown, 23 July, 18 August (three), and 13 and 14 September 1918; J. Díaz to unknown, 30 July 1918; Alberto Celaya, police captain, Empalme, to unknown, 16 August 1918; L. Valenzuela to unknown, 18 and 29 September, 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, and 18 October, and 8 and 21 November 1918; L. Valenzuela to Calles, 9 October, 1 November, and 23 December 1918; Anaya to Calles, 28 October 1918; Calles to L. Valenzuela, 26 November 1918; G. Robles to Calles, 12 December 1918; G. Robles to Secretary of State, 19 December 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: Burgos to unknown, 8 February 1918; Captain A. J. Abasolas, Nogales, to A. Gómez, 21 July 1918; F. León to unknown, 1 August 1918; N. Salazar to unknown, 1 September 1918; J. A. Sánchez, Chief of the Fiscal Gendarmerie, Magdalena, to Calles, 29 October 1918; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 16 November 1918. AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Vázquez to Calles, 13 January 1918; anonymous, Los Mochis, Sinaloa, to Calles, 25 February 1919; Yost to Calles, 13 April 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Echeagaray to Calles, 25 February and 14 April 1919; Pedro Anguis, Trustee, Navojoa, to Calles, 17 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294: G. Robles to Calles, 30 December 1918; L. M. Martínez, Guaymas, to Calles, 30 December 1918; [Aly S. Yeda?], Wells Fargo, Guaymas, to Calles, 1 January 1919; Echeagaray to Calles, 25 February and 27 March 1919; L. Valenzuela to Calles, 9 and 25 March 1919; statement, Fidencio E. Schmidt and Francisco López, 31 March 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: A. Cárdenas to Calles, 13 February and 10 March 1919; Plank, Magdalena, to unknown, 3 April 1919; report, Nogales, 5 June 1919; F. E. Ochoa, Nogales, to Piña, 9 June 1919; Alberto S. Díaz, Customs Administrator, Nogales, to unknown, 12 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297: Mayor Juan Burgas, Nácori Chico, 20 December 1918; Canuto Ortega to Calles, 4 May 1919. “Fue capturado un importante contrabando de tequila. Procedia de Sinaloa y venia designado a diversas personas de Guaymas y Cananea,” O, 3 January 1919; Y. Romero to Calles, 22 February 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295; “Chinos alcoholeros en Cananea,” O, 12 March 1919; “Entierro de alcohol,” O, 19 March 1919; “La policía tras el alcohol. Estuvieron a punto de ser capturados 120 grandes barricas de alcoholes,” O, 23 April 1919; “Severo castigo a un alcoholero. Génaro G. Preciado sufrirá una prisión de 3 años y 4 meses,” O, 23 July 1919. 205 these acts alone, they often engaged in violence, as well. Emboldened by liquor, some drinkers fought with one another or passersby. In Navojoa in August 1918, for instance, a group of inebriated individuals attacked marchers in a parade.37 Other perpetrators reacted violently when law enforcement officers tried to detain them. When Jorge Rafael and the afore-mentioned Jesús Borboa attempted to cross into Nogales, Sonora with ten
cases of whiskey in Borboa’s car in June 1919, they were stopped by customs officials.
To avoid handing over their cargo, Rafael assaulted the officials, who then fired at the suspects. Although no one was hurt in this instance, in other cases, both officers and suspects were killed.38 A group of Chinese cantina- and casino-owners in Cananea similarly was aggressive: these men supposedly agreed to take the life of anyone that impeded their business. When a fellow Chinese immigrant, Juan Sing, reported their activities to De la Huerta, he had to seek the governor’s protection because they threatened him.39
37 E. Cota to Soriano, 7 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; agent of Public Ministry, to unknown, 6 March 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204; Mayor Y. C. Cumparán, Navojoa, 17 August 1918, AHES- RE-1918, Tomo 3201; L. L. Arias, Empalme, to Calles, 20 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918; “Por embriaguez y amargos,” O, 27 December 1918; Barba to Calles, 5 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297. 38 “El Comandante de Policia fue agredido a balazas por un sargente ebrio,” La Razón (Guaymas) (LRG), 18 January 1917; Rojo, Cócorit, to Calles, 9 October 1917, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0203, Exp. 17, Inv. 1026. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Rocha to Calles, 16 October 1918; A. Gómez to Calles, 28 July 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202: L. Valenzuela to unknown, 8 November 1918; G. Robles to unknown, 19 October 1918. Echeagaray to Calles, 14 April 1919, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3293. AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3296: A. Díaz to unknown, 12 June 1919; A. Muñoz to Calles, 13 August 1919. AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3297: [Ernánoz?] Flores, to Calles, 20 January 1919; P. García to Calles, 23 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304: Mayor C. Munguia, Ures, to Calles, 7 April 1919; Leyva to Calles, 15 May 1919. A. Cruz to unknown, 7 February 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294; report, Nogales, 5 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296. 39 AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Juan Sing, Cananea, to De la Huerta, 27 and 31 December 1916; De la Huerta to Mayor, Cananea, 20 January 1917. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: J. Martínez to Calles, 16 February 1919; Meza to unknown, 6 March 1919. 206
Resisters of the prohibition could expect one of a variety of punishments. Decree
One stated that perpetrators of any kind would receive five years in prison, while accomplices would be given two-to-three years in jail.40 Although many individuals did, in fact, spend time in prison, quite frequently it was for a much shorter period than the law prescribed. Some repeat offenders in Nogales, for instance, were incarcerated only for fifteen days. Other perpetrators even were able to reduce their sentences if they demonstrated that they had an illness, their families required their economic support, or that they only broke the law because of extreme impoverishment.41 Furthermore, a great number of people had fines levied against them, rather than prison sentences. Fines ranged anywhere from five to two thousand pesos. No set rule existed as to how much the perpetrator ought to pay; the decision was left up to the governor.42 In the case of fines, as well, justice was not blind, for they frequently were reduced for the indigent.43
40 Decree #1, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062. 41 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: E. Moreno to unknown, 27 April 1916; Adriana V. de Siqueiros to E. Moreno, 12 May 1916; unknown to unknown, 13 and 17 May, 1916. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 25 August 1917, R. García to Soriano, 1 November 1917. Soqui to Piña, [December 1918?], AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; “Severo castigo a un alcoholero,” O, 23 July 1919. 42 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: R. Crúz to E. Moreno, 25 January 1916; Mayor Calles to J. F. Loaiza, Huépac, 30 November 1916. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 25 August 1917; Caturegli to Soriano, 7 September 1917; Salmerón to unknown, 14 September 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 25 September 1917; official statement 1670, 26 October 1917. Barba to Calles, 25 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205; José M. Rico, General State Inspector, to Piña, 24 May 1919, AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3293. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: Calles to Arana, 15 April 1919; Arana to Calles, 15 April 1919. 43 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: E. Moreno to unknown, 27 April 1916; V. de Siqueiros to E. Moreno, 12 May 1916; unknown to unknown, 13 and 17 May, 1916. Filiberto Lung, Quiriego, to Calles, 6 October 1917, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202, Exp. 27, Inv. 882; Urrea to Soriano, 10 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Cecilio Ortega, Navojoa to unknown, 3 March 1919; unknown to unknown, 5 March 1919; J. Elías to Calles, 20 March 1919; Rico to Piña, 23 May 1919; Rico to Piña, 27 May 1919; unknown to unknown, 19 November 1919; Pablo Chavarín, Altar, to unknown, 22 November 1919; unknown to unknown, 29 December 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294: Josefina Robles, Cócorit, to unknown, 19 November 1919; Laura Gamboa, Cócorit, to unknown, 23 November 1919; Trinidad Padilla, Cócorit, to unknown, 24 November 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: A. Muñoz to Piña, 5 June 1919; unknown to unknown, 6 and 10 June 1919; A. Muñoz to Calles, 22 June 1919. 207
Other violators were exiled, forced to work on a public construction project, made to join in the hunt for other violators of Decree One, or drafted into the military, especially to fight Yaqui rebels.44
Resistance to Decree One was so intense that Calles and his successors had to solicit a variety of groups to help enforce the law. Beginning in 1916, the position of
State Inspectors of Intoxicating Beverages was created. This body lasted for the duration of the prohibition, with one brief, three-month reprise during 1918, when presumably the government could not afford to pay these men’s salaries.45 When they operated, the inspectors had the authority to inspect businesses and to apprehend violators. With a judge’s permission, they could raid people’s homes for stashes of liquor, and some went
undercover, soliciting the sale of alcohol. These inspectors also were expected to collect
all intoxicating beverages, containers that held these drinks, and any tools used in the
creation of alcohol.46 Once confiscated, these items were dealt with in a variety of manners. At times, they mixed intoxicating beverages together, making them not
44 Report, E. Moreno, Joaquín Ruíz, Attorney General, and Gilberto Valenzuela, president of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, 25 April 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3075. “Un batallón de rateros, vagos, y borrachos. Las tres ventajas que pueden obtenerse con ese batallón,” O, 16 November 1917. FAPECyFT- APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202: Calles to A. Gómez, 6 December 1917, Exp. 78, Inv. 933; Calles to General A. Mange, 25 December 1917, Exp. 94, Inv. 949. Estrada to Soriano, 23 April 1918, AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3205. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: J. Torres to Calles, 5 April 1919; A. Muñoz to Calles, 22 June 1919. Caro, Plutarco Elías Calles, 78; León, Crónica del Poder en los Recuerdos de un Político en el México revolucionario, 22-23; Zamora, “Cosas de mi archivo.” 45 Official statement, 5 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061; report, De la Huerta, 24 September [1916 or 1917?], AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3071; official statement, 24 April 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: official statement, 30 June 1918; Calles to Toribio García, Ronquillo, 22 July 1918; official statement, 7 October 1918. Official statement, 15 February 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. 46 AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: official statement 148A, 11 July 1917; Félix to De la Huerta, 28 July 1917; A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 24 August 1917; official statement 3718, 10 November 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125: Luján to Calles, 4 October 1917; A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 12 December 1917. Calles to unknown, 10 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202; Calles to Vázquez, 25 1918, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292; Basso, Ures, to Calles, 19 January 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297. 208 potable. In other cases, they destroyed alcohol publicly. In Guaymas in September 1917, an inspector decommissioned more than fourteen cases of alcohol in front of the Hotel
Albán, in the presence of the mayor, a police captain, the caretaker of the municipal palace, a security guard, and a reporter. In an October 1918 incident, inspectors poured sixty gallons of tequila into the Sea of Cortez in Guaymas.47 It was not just inspectors who performed these tasks, though. The military, police, gendarmerie, and customs officials, as well as all levels of state authorities, were also expected to lend their services.48 In 1917, the government even encouraged ordinary citizens to report
47 Photograph, Hermosillo, 1915, personal collection of Siria Loustanau. AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: Vicente Lara, police captain, Empalme, to E. Moreno, 26 January 1916; Luján to E. Moreno, 24 April 1916. AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: Sobarzo to E. Moreno, 25 January 1916; Sobarzo to unknown, 9 February 1916. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Félix to De la Huerta, 29 March 1917; draft of a decree, April 1917; unknown to unknown, Guaymas, 12 May, 1 June, and 26 and 28 September 1917; Félix to Soriano, 30 August and 29 December 1917; Soriano to Barraza y Tirado, 19 September 1917; Luján, Guaymas, to Soriano, 26 September 1917. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03: Lieutenant Colonel Antonio R. Armenta, Lencho, to Calles, 21 September 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 22, Inv. 877; Rojo, Cócorit, to Calles, 9 October 1917, Serie 0203, Exp. 17, Inv. 1026; Calles to Colonel Pablo E. Macías, Navojoa, 15 December 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 92, Inv. 947; Calles to A. Elías, 8 July 1918, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202: F. Armenta to unknown, 16 March, 13 June, and 7 July 1918; C. Navarro to unknown, 28 March, 27 and 28 April, 9 August, and 11 and 14 September 1918; L. Valenzuela to unknown, 21 and 29 September and 4 and 8 October 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Mayor Cármen Vencia, Bacerac, to Soriano, 4 March 1918; Estrada to Soriano, 23 April and 2 May 1918. Report, Estrada, 8 August 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3225; “Un Riego Alcohólico. Recorrió las Calles una Pipa Derramando Embriagante Licor,” O, 4 January 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Echeagaray to Calles, 14, 20, and 26 March 1919; Y. Mayor Y. L. Gómez, Navojoa, to Calles, 16 October 1919. Unknown to unknown, Guaymas, 1 April and 11 and 16 October 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295: Y. Gómez to unknown, 1 November 1919; report, Alonzo, 27 June 1919. Quintero Orci, “Cervecería de Sonora,” 44. 48 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: E. Moreno to all mayors, 4 January 1916; Circular #33, 20 May 1916. Unknown to Mayor of San Javier, 23 November 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Félix to De la Huerta, 29 March 1917; official statement 488-A, 3 August 1917. FAPECyFT- APEC-FEC, Fondo 03: Calles to Macías, 15 December 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 92, Inv. 947; A. Elías to Calles, 23 September 1918, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: report, Castro, 30 April 1918; Calles to M. Valenzuela, 24 August 1918; Calles to mayors of Banámichi, Huépac, Aconchi, Sinoquipe, and San Felipe, 8 September 1918; unknown to Caturegli, 26 September 1918. Report, Calles, 16 September 1918, in “Documentos para la historia de Sonora, 1915-1923.” AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3204: Calles to Judge of Magdalena, 26 September 1918; J. Sánchez to Calles, 29 October 1918. Calles to Estrada, 17 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205. Reports, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3220: Peñaloza, 10 August 1918; Cumparán, 15 August 1918; Mayor [B. J. Zanátan?], Huatabampo, 17 August 1918; [Rinabemba?] M., 26 August 1918; [Seyna?], 29 August 1918; 209 violations of Decree One. If their information resulted in an apprehension, the informant
would receive whatever amount was deemed acceptable by the town council.49 Although not to the extent of later years, ordinary citizens did, in fact, denounce violations of the law.50
The apparent increase of crime was not the only problem with Decree One. The
measure made painfully obvious the administrative weakness of the state government.
With monetary depreciation, frequent rebellions by the Yaqui, and destruction of fields
and mines from the armed phase of the Revolution, the economy reached a crisis level in
the 1910s. The loss of revenue from taxing alcohol sales compounded the problem and
forced the government to compromise its standards in its anti-vice campaigns.51
Therefore, violators of the law were fined more frequently than placed in jail. Indeed, some municipal authorities tried to keep all of the fine money for their treasuries, rather
than returning the designated portion to the state.52 Economic woes also explain why the government temporarily reversed Decree One. On June 15, 1918, Interim Governor
Cesáreo Soriano announced that the government would permit the sale of beer for four months. The drink could be sold in restaurants, first-class hotels, and a limited, pre-
Gaxiola, 31 August 1918. Official statement 1623, 29 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3304: Piña to Calles, 8 April 1919; report, J. Elías, 26 August 1919. 49 Circular, BO 5, no. 23 (15 September 1917); official statement #961 A, 7 September 1917. 50 See Chapter 5. Aldama to Soriano, 27 September 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; anonymous, Magdalena, to De la Huerta, 23 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125; Hurtado to unknown, 31 January 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3219; L. L. Arias, Empalme, to Calles, 20 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202; residents, Empalme, to Calles and Piña, 25 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294. 51 Aguilar Camín, La frontera nómada, 424, 440-46; Zúñiga Moreno, “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915,” 267; Juan Manuel Romero Gil, “Notas para un studio sobre la industria de alcohol en Sonora en los siglos XIX y XX,” in La industria en la historia de Sonora, 404; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 56-58, 63. 52 Mauricio [Canna?], Accountant of the State Treasury, to Soriano, 19 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; initiative to reform Decree #1, 9 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 227, Carp. 1. 210 determined number of cantinas in major towns. To receive a license, each business had to pay a refundable, three thousand-peso deposit, as well as a one thousand-peso fee to the state and five hundred pesos to the municipality. Fines for selling anything other than beer were similarly steep. In the text of the decree itself, the governor argued that the act
would not violate the moral campaign he was attempting to carry out, and that beer was
actually a healthy drink that doctors advocated.53 Soriano’s need to make this assertion suggests that he was trying to justify his actions and that perhaps people accused him of violating his revolutionary standards. Regardless, it demonstrates that the state government was not administratively strong enough to achieve its temperance goals.
Economic straits forced the government to compromise in yet another way.
Decree One forbid the use of alcohol for anything other than industrial or medicinal
purposes, and anyone who needed it for these reasons had to petition the government.54
However, in these four years, people sent the governor hundreds of petitions to have intoxicating beverages for reasons that were expressly forbidden by the law and the vast majority of these requests were granted. For instance, supplicants asked to have alcohol in their homes for their own consumption, promising that they would not sell it.55 Some immigrants asked to be able to consume beer or wine with their meals because it had
53 Decree, 15 June 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. 54 Petitions: Dr. Francisco Castillo Nájera, Hermosillo, 13 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Jesús S. Reyna, Altar, 14 October 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061; Dr. F. B. Ketchul, Cananea, 6 January 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; J. M. Rubio, Singer Company, Guaymas, 18 March 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3202. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03: Colonel M. Mendoza, Nogales, to Calles, 24 October 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 99, Inv. 954; A. Elías to Calles, 25 October 1918, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056. Petitions from AHES-RE-1916, Tomos 3061-62; AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; AHES-RE-1918, Tomos 3201-02, 3204-05; AHES-RE-1919, Tomos 3293-97. 55 Petition, Francisco J. Telles, Ures, 28 July 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297. Petitions from AHES- RE-1916, Tomo 3062; AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; AHES-RE-1918, Tomos 3201-02, 3204-05; AHES- RE-1919, Tomos 3293-97. 211 been part of their culture in Europe or Asia.56 Surprisingly, considering that the state government was so strongly anti-clerical at the time, several priests requested wine for use in communion, and these petitions were approved.57 Dozens of municipal governments asked for licenses to sell beer to celebrate national holidays or for fundraisers for projects such as public lighting, potable water, and constructing schools.
Some of these leaders offered to ensure that no Mexicans, only American tourists, drank.58 When granted, sales of alcohol were taxed and provided revenue for the government, theoretically to achieve other revolutionary goals, but the whole situation seems to be a betrayal of the ideals of Decree One. Indeed, a journalist for the newspaper
Malkriado in Nacozari criticized Soriano’s and Calles’s endorsement of these fundraisers, saying, “The grandiose work undertaken by you, tending to the extinction of alcoholic drinks in the state, will fall to the ground like a statue of paper, and with it, the admiration and just respect that you have captured among conscientious citizens and
56 Petition, Otto Rademacher, German Vice Consul, Guaymas, 2 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124. Petitions from AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; AHES-RE-1918, Tomos 3201-02, 3204; AHES-RE-1919, Tomos 3293-95. 57 Petitions, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Melerio Monge, Presbyterian priest, Navojoa, 22 May 1919; Refugio E. Salcido, Catholic priest, Arizpe, 31 May 1919; Monge, 1 November 1919. Petitions, AHES- RE-3297: R. G. Durazo, Moctezuma, 24 April 1919; Luis Valencia, Nacozari, 4 September 1919. Petition, Martín Portela, Hermosillo, 19 September 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295. 58 Petitions, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Francisco Tamayo, police chief, Naco, 24 July 1917; Alberto Celaya, Committee on Material Improvements, Empalme, 27 September 1917. Petition, Mayor J. F. [Terra?], Etchojoa, 2 May 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03: Rojo to Calles, 9 October 1917, Serie 0203, Exp. 17, Inv. 1026; Lieutenant Colonel Jesús O. Cota, Agua Prieta, to Calles, 4 November 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 53, Inv. 908; J. Cota to Calles, 16 November 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 53, Inv. 908; A. Elías to Calles, 6 July 1919, Fondo 03, Serie 0207, Exp. 10, Inv. 1140. Petitions from AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3071; AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; AHES-RE-1918, Tomos 3201- 02, 3204-05; AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293-97; Seger, “The Economics of Vice,” 4. . 212 lovers of the bettering of this entity.”59 The author of the article did not think that the meager amount of money schools would receive was worth encouraging intoxication.
The weakness of the state government also prevented effective enforcement of
Decree One. Governors could not afford to hire enough inspectors.60 Soliciting the support of the military, police, and public officials helped, but did not solve, the problem: the law was simply too easy to violate.61 Surrounded by two states, Sinaloa and
Chihuahua, which did not restrict intoxicating beverages, alcohol constantly flowed across the border.62 Furthermore, in spite of Calles’s attempts to prevent it, vice
59 “En ves de Licores, Necesitamos Cereales y Ropa,” Malkriado (Nacozari), 19 May 1918, FAPECyFT- APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056, Leg. 1; AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: petition, Mayor Luis F. Romero, Santa Ana, 21 June 1918; Mayor W. Manzo, La Colorada, 5 July 1918. 60 Félix Brito Rodríguez notes a similar enforcement problem in Sinaloa’s alcohol restrictions in the 1930s. See: Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 13. 61 Francisco E. Contreras, police captain, Pilares de Nacozari, to De la Huerta, 11 November 1916, AHES- RE-1916, Tomo 3062; José S. Healy, “Un haz de verdades sobre el Decreto Número Uno,” O, 6 October 1917; “Los alcoholeros. Nuestras investigaciones nos llevarán al conocimiento de detalles por demás curiosas, que comunicaremos a nuestros lectores,” O, 14 October 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: De la Huerta to Félix, 1 June 1917; Buelna to Calles, 8 July 1917; official 839A, 11 September 1917; C. Obregón to Soriano, 29 October 1917; Soriano to Barraza y Tirado, 17 November 1917. A. Elías to Calles, 27 May and 25 October 1918, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0204, Exp.30, Inv. 1056. AHES- RE-1918, Tomo 3201: official statement, 10 December 1917; official statement, 22 April 1918; Cumparán to Calles, 27 July 1918; M. Valenzuela to Calles, 17 August 1918; J. Elías to Calles, 17 September 1918; E. Arvizu to unknown, 22 September 1918. Initiative to reform Decree #1, 9 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 227, Carp. 1; Basso to Calles, 25 March 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: E. Arvizu to Calles, 24 March and 12 April 1919; Mayor Jorge Tato, Agua Prieta, to Calles, 1 April 1919. Zúñiga Moreno, “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915,” 264. 62 AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: P. Soto, to Interim Governor G. Valenzuela, 17 January 1917; P. Soto to De la Huerta, 31 March 1917; Soriano to Temple, 3 August 1917; A. Gómez to Soriano, 17 August 1917; Soriano to Calles, 18 August 1917; Calles to Iturbe, 18 August 1917; Colonel Fausto Topete, chief of the garrison, Guaymas, to Soriano, 20 September 1917. FAPEC-FT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202: R. Cruz to Calles, 31 August 1917, Exp. 54, Inv. 909; Calles to Barraza y Tirado, Quiriego, 19 October 1917, Exp. 27, Inv. 882. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: E. Cota to Soriano, 25 March 1918; H. Lawton, general fleet agent, Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México, to agents in the Sinaloan division, 10 April 1918. AHES- RE-1918, Tomo 3202: L. Valenzuela to Calles, 9 October and 1 November 1918; L. Valenzuela to unknown, 10, 11, and 18 October 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Vencia to Soriano, 4 March 1918; Canuto Ortega to Calles, 25 September 1918. “Fue capturado un importante contrabando de tequila,” O, 3 January 1919; initiative to reform Decree #1, 9 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 227, Carp. 1. AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Echeagaray to unknown, 22 February 1919; anonymous to Calles, 25 February 1919; circular 158, 10 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Mayor R. M. Salazar, Álamos, to Calles, 8 November 1918; Echeagaray to Calles, 14 March 1919. G. Robles, to Calles, 30 December 1918, AHES- 213 continued to flourish in border towns like Nogales, Agua Prieta and Naco, because
Arizonans’ demand for liquor made the business of selling it profitable.63 In fact, the measure that allowed the sale of beer in 1918 had to be revoked after a month in border towns, presumably because crime escalated. A measure passed by the town council in
Nogales the following year reiterated that any establishments that violated Decree One,
Four, or any others that created public morality, would be closed immediately.64 In other words, throughout the entire four-year period of Decree One, inspectors could only
achieve pyrrhic victories: they might take “one step forward” and close a cantina, but
immediately, another two seemed to take its place, forcing the whole process to take “two steps back.”
Not only did state governments lack funds, they also lacked the ability to force
their own agents to follow the law, demonstrating the contested nature of the State-
building process.65 Although Decree One was issued in August 1915, Calles did not have
RE-1919, Tomo 3294; report, Celerino C. Landeros, Manager of the Alcohol Warehouse for Cruz Gálvez schools, Navojoa, 24 October 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 13 February 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297: Canuto Ortega to Calles, 4 May 1919; Mayor José B. Enríquez, Bacerac, to De la Huerta, 13 November 1919. 63 AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Buelna to Calles, 8 July 1917; M. V. Vivero, Administrator, Naco, to unknown, 24 October 1917. A. Cárdenas to De la Huerta, 6 April 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125; Calles to A. Gómez, 4 December 1917, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03 Serie 0202, Exp. 78, Inv. 933. R. V. López, police captain, Naco, to Calles, 29 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: Abasolas to A. Gómez, 21 July 1918; S. Aguirre, customs administrator, Nogales, to unknown, 1 October 1918. Echeagaray to unknown, 22 February 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292; Dyer to U.S. Secretary of State, 16 May 1919, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/10. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: A. Cárdenas to Calles, 10 March 1919; report, Nogales, 5 June 1919; Palma to Calles, 25 June 1919. Seger, “The Economics of Vice,” 3-4. 64 A. Gómez to Soriano, 13 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Tato to Calles, 1 April 1919, AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3293; decree, Nogales town council, 28 March 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296. 65 Other studies of alcohol control in revolutionary Mexico also find that municipal officials were some of the primary violators of the law. See: Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 222; Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 93, 103-04; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 48-49; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 5; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 54-55; Brito Rodríguez, “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario,” 6-8, 15, 19; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, 102, 104-05, 115; Olcott, 214 military and administrative control over the entire state until the beginning of 1916. Even after this point, informants frequently pointed out that certain officials in power had been allied to ex-Governor José María Maytorena, and that these “enemies” were actively working to undermine Calles’s regime, even if by disobeying alcohol legislation.66
Additionally, the meager salaries that alcohol inspectors, policemen, teachers, and mayors earned likely encouraged corruption, as well.67 And corruption was rife. Dozens
of the violators of Decree One every year were public employees. Some of these officials
broke the law themselves—they got drunk and acted scandalously in public, owned a
cantina or a mescal-producing operation, or pretended to confiscate alcohol, but really kept it for themselves. For instance, in 1917, inspectors in Cananea discovered alcohol bound for Major Tomás G. Otero, who had requested it for use in a military hospital.
However, there was no such facility in the area, nor was Otero authorized to make this purchase. When Otero’s associate, Colonel Campos, was seen intoxicated, officials felt confident that the men had made a mockery of the law. Officials engaged in another plot in 1917. After confiscating a number of containers of alcohol, Inspector Carlos Barraza y
Tirado placed them in the Hotel Republicano in Guaymas for safekeeping. Before he could destroy the stash, the hotel was robbed, and the alcohol disappeared. The press accused the inspector of working with the mayor and the town council to fake the heist.
They claimed the men had transported the alcohol to the town of Bacochibampo in an
Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 145, 154. For Puerto Rico, see: Clark, “Prohibition in Puerto Rico,” 91. 66 Goldhauer y Padilla to E. Moreno, 9 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; A. Gómez, Nogales, to de la Huerta, 18 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; report, unknown, Nogales, 5 June 1919, AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3296; Aguilar Camín, La frontera nómada, 429-30; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 52, 56, 65. 67 Weber, Politics as Vocation, 4-5 12; Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 132-33. 215 inspection vehicle with its identifying number removed.68 Other authority figures
68 BO 1, no. 1 (20 September 1915); E. Moreno to Military Commander of La Plaza, 13 December 1915, AHES-RE-1915, Tomo 3045, 1a. Parte; P. García to the military commander in Naco, 29 May 1916, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202, Exp. 42, Inv. 897. AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: R. Crúz to E. Moreno, 25 January and 8 and 9 February 1916; Luis Mejía, State Sub-Inspector of Alcohol, to Calles, 24 June 1916; F. O. Guzmán, customs, Guaymas, to unknown, 22 August 1916. AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: Goldhauer y Padilla to E. Moreno, 9 January 1916; R. M. Torres, police officer, Magdalena, to E. Moreno, 7 February 1916; Mayor F. E. Montaño, Granados, to E. Moreno, 1 July 1916; Mayor Jesús Montaño, Moctezuma, to E. Moreno, 30 December 1916. “El comandante de policía fue agredido a balazas por un sargente ebrio,” LRG, 18 January 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: G. Valenzuela to Mayor R. L. Márquez, Agua Prieta, 16 January 1917; Urrea to De la Huerta, 12 March 1917; Dr. I. Rivera, owner of the Botica Mexicana, Guaymas, to E. Moreno, 11 April 1917; Félix to De la Huerta, 28 April 1917; Circular 347, Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México, Sonoran Division, 17 May 1917; Caturegli to Calles, 7 July 1917; A. Gómez to De la Huerta, 18 July 1917; De la Huerta to Félix, 23 July 1917; Soriano to Temple, 3 August 1917; report, Luján, 9 August 1917; Soriano to Calles, 18 August 1917; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 30 August 1917; Colonel E. C. García, chief of the garrison, Hermosillo, to unknown, 2 September 1917; A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 3 September 1917; Salmerón to Soriano, 11 September 1917; unknown to Soriano, 2 October 1917; report, Luján, Guaymas, 3 October 1917; Vivero to unknown, 24 October 1917; C. Obregón to Soriano, 29 October 1917; Urrea to Soriano, 24 November 1917. AHES-RE- 1917, Tomo 3125: A. Cárdenas to Soriano, 19 September and 18 October 1917; Luján to Secretary of State, 30 October 1917. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03: Calles to Mange, 25 December 1917, Serie 0202, Exp. 94, Inv. 949; A. Elías to Calles, 27 May and 23 September 1918, Serie 0204, Exp. 30, Inv. 1056. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Alfonso López, Eligio N. Matus, Ramón E. Duarte, Antonio C. Encinas, Pomposo Matus Navarro, J. P. Castro, J. Acosta, Jesús Barreras, Jesús López, Domingo Vázquez, Anastacio Barreras, Jr., H. Mipiles, Pedro Urías, and M. L. Goycochea, residents, Huatabampo, to unknown, 24 September 1917; Circular #407, Ferrocarril Sud-Pacífico de México, 8 April 1918; Lawton to agents in the Sinaloan division, 10 April 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: R. López to Calles, 29 July 1918; Mayor Rafael G. Suárez, Tubutama, to unknown, 8 August 1918; Lieutenant Paulino Beltran, Navojoa, to Calles, 7 September 1918; Belén P. Serrano, to unknown, 13 December 1918. AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3202: unknown to unknown, 29 June 1918; C. Navarro to unknown, 23 July 1918; Ramírez Lewall to Calles, 23 September 1918; Arias, to Calles, 20 October 1918; G. Robles to Calles, 11 December 1918; G. Robles to Secretary of State, 19 December 1918; L. Valenzuela to Calles, 23 December 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: Burgos to unknown, 22 January 1918; Guadalaupe González, Inspector of Alcoholic Beverages, to unknown, 25 March 1918; Castro to unknown, 1 July 1918; A. Cárdenas to unknown, 21 September 1918; A. Cárdenas to Calles, 21 September 1918. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Dr. I. B. Hamilton, Cananea, to unknown, 25 June 1918; Mayor Agustín Velarde, Tepache, to Calles, 8 August 1918; unknown to unknown, 13 September 1918; Meza to unknown, 16 October 1918. Report, Calles, 16 September 1918, in “Documentos para la historia de Sonora, 1915-1923;” “Oficiales que escandalizan,” O, 28 December 1918; “Fue destituido y será expulsado del estado el Inspector de Bebidas Bassó. En el trayecto de Navojoa a Hermosillo cometió graves irregularidades. Deben ser suprimidas las plazas de inspectores de bebidas que solo sirven de pretexto para actos delictuosos e immorales,” O, 10 May 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292: anonymous to Calles, 25 February 1919; Calles to mayors of Guaymas, Cócorit, Torín, Pótam, Bácum, Navojoa, Etchojoa, Huatabampo, and Álamos, 6 May 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293: Calles to Tato, 1 April 1919; Y. M. Contreras, teacher at the Official School for Men, Caborca, to Calles, 8 April 1919; J. Elías to unknown, 26 April 1919; Anguis to Calles, 17 June 1919; Jesús M. Corella, military commander, Cabullona, to Calles, 26 June 1919; Nacho Corella, Agua Prieta, to Calles, 16 July 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294: G. Robles to unknown, 9 February 1919; Calles to Eduardo Oliver, Inspector of the Soldiers, Guaymas, 26 February 1919; Echeagaray, Guaymas, to Calles, 28 February 1919; Calles to Judge Salvador Sandoval, Nogales, 31 March 1919; residents, Empalme, to Calles and Piña, 25 June 1919; G. Robles to unknown, 1 July 1919; Inspector Rafael Méndez, 216 accepted bribes from clandestine vendors, who were at times their relatives, and thus allowed them to remain in operation.69 This problem was so overwhelming that governors constantly issued statements reminding officials that they must enforce the law, and that if they did not, they would be fired.70 Indeed, several alcohol inspectors and other authorities did lose their jobs; one report from 1918 claimed that the entire
Cócorit, to unknown, 29 October 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295: Quijada to Y. Romero, 13 February 1919; Josefa Navarro Viuda de Sánchez, San Javier, 3 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: A. Cárdenas to Calles, 10 March 1919; report, 5 June 1919; José Francisco Borboa, Nogales, to Calles, 26 June 1919; Carlos Ramírez, Nogales, to Calles, 1 July 1919; unknown to unknown, 28 August 1919. Report, José Onejory, chief of police, Hermosillo, 28 December 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304; Manuel Sandomingo, Historia de Agua Prieta. Resumen histórico. En su primer cincuentario (Agua Prieta: Imprenta Sandomingo, 1951), 234; Zúñiga Moreno, “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915,” 264. 69 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062: F. Montaño to E. Moreno, 1 July 1916; Contreras to De la Huerta, 11 November 1916. Healy, “Un haz de verdades sobre el Decreto Número Uno,” O, 6 October 1917. AHES- RE-1917, Tomo 3124: De la Huerta to Mayor M. Acuña, Álamos, 7 March 1917; Temple to Félix, 19 June 1917; report, Luján, 9 August 1917; A. Gómez to Soriano, 17 August 1917; Salmerón to Soriano, 11 September 1917; Luján to unknown, 18 September 1917; Topete to Soriano, 20 September 1917; E. Cota to Soriano, 7 October 1917; C. Obregón to Soriano, 29 October 1917; Barraza y Tirado to Soriano, 14 November 1917. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125: A. Gómez, Nogales, to General Serrano, 2 April 1917; A. Cárdenas to unknown, 3 April 1917; Luján to Calles, 4 October 1917. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Beltran to Calles, 7 September 1918; A. Gómez, Agua Prieta, to Calles, 17 September 1918. AHES-RE- 1918, Tomo 3202: C. Navarro to unknown, 18 August 1918; Ramírez Lewall to Calles, 23 September 1918. Calles to judge of Magdalena, 26 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205: Verdugo to Calles, 23 July 1918; Canuto Ortega to Calles, 25 September 1918. “En ves de licores, necesitamos cereales y ropa,” Malkriado, 19 May 1918; report, J. Encinas, 31 August 1918, AHES- RE-1918, Tomo 3220; [Ernánoz Flores?], to Calles, 20 January 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3297; “En Esqueda están los vicios a orden del día,” O, 1 July 1919; “El mercado es la gran taberna de la ciudad,” O, 21 October 1919; Méndez to unknown, 29 October 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Calles to P. Vázquez, 25 December 1918; anonymous to Calles, 25 February 1919. AHES- RE-1919, Tomo 3293: M. L. Banuet, customs administrator, Agua Prieta, to unknown, 1 April 1919; Neblina to De la Huerta, 10 November 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3295: Ávila to unknown, 16 October 1919; Ávila to De la Huerta, 18 October 1919; report, Nogales, 5 June 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3296: report, Alonzo, 27 June 1919; A. Muñoz to Calles, 8 July 1919. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3304: Piña to Calles, 8 April 1919; report, J. Elías, 26 August 1919; report, Enríquez, 18 September 1919; Caro, Plutarco Elías Calles, 94-95; Paz, Guaymas de Ayer, 216-17. 70 AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061: Circular #33, 20 May 1916; circular from Provisional Governor G. Valenzuela, to the mayors of Álamos, Cócorit, Guaymas, Navojoa, Huatabampo, Etchojoa, Magdalena, Nogales, Santa Ana, Ures, Altar, Caborca, Moctezuma, Cumpas, Nacozari de García, Arizpe, Cananea, Banámichi, Agua Prieta, Pitiquito, Bácum, Torín, Naco, Tubutama, and Baviácora, 15 December 1916. Unknown to Mayor of San Javier, 23 November 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; report, De la Huerta, [24 September 1916 or 1917?], AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3071. AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124: Circular 2A, 6 July 1917; Circular 3A, 9 July 1917; A. Gómez to Soriano, 17 August 1917; Calles to Soriano, 18 August 1917. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201: Circular #13, 7 March 1918; Circular #1, 19 July 1918; Calles to the mayors of Banámichi, Huépac, Aconchi, Sinoquipe, and San Felipe, 8 September 1918. Report for the director of El Mercurio, 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3221. 217 administration in Cumpas had been replaced because of Decree One violations.71 More frequently, however, it seems as if there was very little consequence for officials breaking the law. For instance, Judge Jesús Gallo of Magdalena drank frequently and acted scandalously in public, insulting other political leaders and threatening them with his gun.
When the mayor and town councilmen complained in January 1918, Soriano claimed he could not do anything because Gallo was an employee of the state’s judicial, not the executive, branch. The acting mayor incarcerated the man, but Soriano came to his rescue, saying that Gallo’s imprisonment was illegal and that he must be freed. The judge was never fired.72 These actions demonstrate that the process of State-building was contested and resisted, not just by ordinary citizens, but even by government officials.73
Nor, in the end, could the government force people to change their habits. The numerous violations of Decree One demonstrate beyond a doubt that ordinary citizens, public employees, and government officials alike continued to imbibe. Some frustrated
71 Report, Soriano, 1 April 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3219; Calles to De la Huerta, 27 July 1918, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles, Fondo Presidentes, (FAPECyFT-APEC-FP), Fondo 02, Serie 02, Exp. 2, Inv. 719; R. López to Calles, 29 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Mayor Ramón Y. González, Cananea, to unknown, 24 May 1919; official statement 2728, 26 May 1919. Unknown to unknown, 24 April 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294; “Fue destituido y será expulsado del estado el Inspector de Bebidas, Bassó,” O, 10 May 1919. 72 Calles to Mange, 25 December 1917, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202, Exp. 94, Inv. 949. AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3204: transcript, extraordinary city council session, Magdalena, 4 January 1918; Burgos to unknown, 21 January 1918; Soriano to unknown, 29 January 1918; José V. Palomino, acting mayor, Magdalena, to Soriano, 20 February 1918; Soriano to Palomino, 20 February 1918. Unknown to unknown, 31 March 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294; report, Calles, 16 September 1919, AHES-RE- 1919, Tomo 3304; Ramos Bour, “El incendio de la cervecería en 1926,” 1-2. 73 For similar divisions in the State-building process outside of Mexico, see: Needell, “The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904,” 244-49; Abrams, “The Difficulty of Studying the State,” 79; Diacon, “Bringing the Countryside Back In,” 583-84; A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker, “Indigenous Peoples and State Formation in Modern Ecuador,” in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, 5-6; Aleezé Sattar, “¿Indígena o Ciudadano? Republican Laws and Highland Indian Communities in Ecuador, 1820-1857,” in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, 23, 29-30; Derek Williams, “Administering the Otavalan Indian and Centralizing Governance in Ecuador, 1851-1875,” in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, 39, 43-47; Michiel Baud, “Liberalism, Indigenismo, and Social Mobilization in Late Nineteenth- Century Ecaudor,” in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, 81. 218 authorities believed that Sonorans were just stubbornly set in their ways.74 But even the most ardent of temperance advocates occasionally partook of spirits. Representative Luis
Monzón, who argued so passionately for a national prohibition based on the model of
Sonora at the Constitutional Convention in 1917, drank alcohol when he went to this very event. He also applied for, and received, a case of beer to keep in his home in 1916.75
Calles acted even more hypocritically. It was well-known that the governor drank prodigiously. He may even have been an alcoholic and for this he was frequently mocked. One popular story claims that as he signed Decree One, Calles took a swig of cognac to steel his nerves. Another legend is that the governor had his own stash of alcohol that he kept on a train and took with him wherever he went.76 While these stories may or may not be true, they certainly reveal the government’s inability to impose its authority unilaterally.
Decree One also highlighted the administrative weakness of the national regime.
Granted, ideologically passive presidents during this period favored a degree of local autonomy (one of Madero’s campaign slogans had been municipio libre), and these presidents felt that certain issues, like temperance, were best dealt with by state, rather
than national, governments. However, Calles’s governorship, especially in relation to
Decree One, proved to President Carranza that there ought to be a limit to these
74 Rojo to Calles, 9 October 1917, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0203, Exp. 17, Inv. 1026; Circular 158, 10 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. 75 Petition, Luis G. Monzón, Guaymas, 14 July 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062. 76 Caro, Plutarco Elías Calles, 15, 16, 20; Roberto Guzmán Esparaza, Memorias de Don Adolfo de la Huerta: Según su propio dictado, (Mexico City: Ediciones “Guzmán,” 1957), 109-13; Aguilar Camín, La frontera nómada, 422; Zúñiga Moreno, “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915,” 265; Krauze, Reformer desde el origin, 34; Carlos Moncada, La sucesión política en Sonora, 1917-1985 (Hermosillo: Editorial Latinoamericana, 1988), 14; Alfredo Camou Olea, El molino de Camou (Mexico City: Editorial Aldus, 2002), 105-06; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 176; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 18, 21, 59. 219 freedoms. Calles passed the measure while he served as military commander and interim governor.77 Even after his election and the establishment of a legislative body in May
1917, the measure was never made into a law. Interim Governor Soriano even drafted a
proposal to legalize and clarify the decree a few months later, but the initiative did not pass. As it was not an official law, neither governors nor judges had the legal basis to enforce it.78 Calles also handled the Decree in an unconstitutional manner. Initially, he
did not allow judges to participate in enforcing the measure. The Decree stated that the
executive branch would deal with all violators while the judicial branch was being
rebuilt, and this policy continued until perhaps as late as November 1916.79 In fact, when
Moreno, State Attorney General Joaquín Ruíz, and Gilberto Valenzeula, president of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice, visited the state penitentiary in Hermosillo in 1916, they found it in poor condition. One man had been in prison for thirty-six days for intoxication and had not yet been tried. Two others had been sentenced to fifteen days of public work for the same crime, but they had not been released to do this labor.80 Other constitutional violations included punishing suspected offenders without legal proof of their guilt as well as sentencing violators to exile and forced military service.81
77 Aguilar Camín, La frontera nómada, 420; MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 221. 78 Official declaration, 15 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; initiative to reform Decree #1, 9 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 227, Carp. 1; Cynthia Radding de Murrieta, “El triunfo constitucionalista y la reformas en la región (1913-1919),” in Historia general de Sonora, vol. 4, Sonora moderno: 1880-1929, ed. Cynthia Radding de Murrieta (Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985), 308; Ignacio Almada Bay and José Marcos Medina Bustos, Historia panorámica del congreso del estado de Sonora, 1825-2000 (Mexico City: Aguilar, León y Cal Editores, 2001), 317. 79 Decree #1, 8 August 1915, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Calles to Loaiza, 30 November 1916, AHES- RE-1916, Tomo 3061; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 61-62. 80 Report, E. Moreno, Ruíz, and G. Valenzuela, 25 April 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3075. 81 R. Crúz to E. Moreno, 17 January 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3061; Secretary General of the State, to unknown, 29 September 1916, AHES-RE-1916, Tomo 3062; Beatríz Mendivil, Altar, to unknown, 13 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Constitution of the United States of Mexico, 4-6. 220
Even more serious were the myriad accusations that Calles ordered the deaths of several violators of Decree One. A few people, although at least one admittedly was an avowed enemy of Calles, claimed to have witnessed executions of mostly impoverished men who had done nothing more than get drunk.82 Luis León, who organized a regional agriculture school in Hermosillo in 1917, served as a national legislator from 1918 to
1922, and later became a Callista as he held national offices in the mid 1920s through early 1930s, claimed that no one was ever killed.83 Indeed, extensive research in several archives did not reveal a single official record of an execution having taken place. There
is ample evidence, though, that Calles did at least endorse and authorize such methods.
For instance, in December 1915, Captain Homobono Camacho, military commander in
Cananea and presumably under the direction of Military Chief and Governor Calles,
ordered that anyone who continued to horde or sell alcohol would be punished with the
pain of death.84 In December 1917, Calles himself demanded that generals in the southeast part of the state execute anyone who sold intoxicating beverages, regardless of who they were. At the time, Yaquis were rebelling, and he feared that alcohol would
82 Caro, Plutarco Elías Calles, 63-64, 77-78, 96-97; Ray to Secretary of State, 21 June 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/101; “La lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 10 April 1936; Pablo de Gongora, “El alcohol adulto y el infantil,” EU, 28 October 1936; Alfonso Taracena, Mi vida en el vértigo de la Revolución mexicana. (Anales sintéticos—1900-1930) (Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1936), 481; Ramón Puente, “Plutarco Elías Calles,” in Historia de la Revolución mexicana, vol. 2, ed. José T. Meléndez (Mexico City: Ediciones Aguilas, 1940), 184; Sandomingo, Historia de Agua Prieta, 234; Paz, Guaymas de Ayer, 104-06, 216-17, 226, 231; Krauze, Reformer desde el origin, 30; Gilberto Escobar Gámez, Crónicas sonorenses, 2d ed. (Hermosillo: Flash Printers, 1999), 207; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, xxiii, 32, 60. 83 León, Crónica del Poder en los Recuerdos de un Político en el México revolucionario, 7-9, 22-23; Flavio Molina Molina, Ciudad de Hermosillo, 1910-1993 (Hermosillo: Instituto Sonorense de Cultura, 2001), 95. 84 Flyer, Camacho 23 December 1915, AHES-RE-1915, Tomo 3061. 221 only further disrupt public order.85 On June 10, 1919, Calles accused winemakers living near the border of Chihuahua of violating his authority by housing and arming Yaqui
rebels as well as the marauding followers of Pancho Villa from the neighboring state. He
once again demanded that these alcohol producers be shot.86 The earlier measures do not
seem to have attracted much attention, but the one from 1919 caused an uproar amongst
U. S. citizens, as well as the press and politicians in Mexico City.87 Calles felt the measure was justified to preserve peace in the state, but De la Huerta, serving as a senator in Mexico City, begged him to repeal the decree. De la Huerta suggested that Calles claim that the measure had only been a temporary one, and that the initial danger that had warranted its issuance had passed. This way Calles would not appear to be the blood- thirsty barbarian that people accused him of being.88 Calles reluctantly agreed and repealed the measure on June 27, although he backdated it to June 20, making it appear as
85 Only General Mange was not given specific orders to execute alcohol sellers. Calles asked the general to contact him to be informed as to the most advisable punishment. FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC, Fondo 03, Serie 0202, 4 December 1917: Calles to General Roberto Cruz, Esperanza, Exp. 54, Inv. 909; Calles to A. Gómez, La Colorada, Exp. 78, Inv. 933; Calles to Mange, Guaymas, Exp. 94, Inv. 949; Circular to mayors of Cócorit, Bácum, Torín, Guaymas, Navojoa, Álamos, and Huatabampo, Exp. 121, Inv. 976. 86 AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Circular 158, 10 June 1919; Calles to Flavio A. Bórquez, Sonoran Senator, Mexico City, 26 June 1919; Ignacio Almada Bay, “La conexión Yocupicio: Soberanía estatal, tradición civico-liberal y resistencia al reemplazo de los lealtades en Sonora, 1913-1939” (Ph.D. diss., Colegio de México, 1993), 279-80. 87 AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292: Bórquez to Calles, 26 June 1919; De la Huerta to Calles, 27 June 1919; Aguirre Berlanga, Secretary of Government, Mexico City, to Calles, 5 July 1919; De la Huerta to Calles, 5 July 1919; Berlanga to Calles, 11 July 1919. “Una disposición bárbara en Sonora. Las garantías individuales suspendidas de golpe por una circular del Gral. Calles. Pena de muerte para los que fabriquen vinos y licores o comercien con ellos,” EU, 25 June 1919; “La mortifera Circular 158, del Gral. Calles causa escándalo e indignación en la sociedad. La opinión entre los diputados es que debe consignarse al gran jurado al Gobernador del estado de Sonora,” EU, 26 June 1919; “Editoriales. La Circular 158 y La cobardia del silencio,” EU, 27 June 1919; “Los senadores por Sonora confirman la autencidad de la Circular 158 del General P. Elías Calles. Pedimos al Presidente de la república que exija la derogación de esa circular,” EU, 27 June 1919; Macías Richard, Vida y temperamento, 193-94. 88 De la Huerta to Calles, 27 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. 222 if the decree had been repealed after only ten days.89 The problem had theoretically been
fixed, but this violation of the Constitution was too much for President Carranza to
ignore. He opposed Decree One and had long feared that Calles would make Sonora
“ungovernable.” Therefore, the President likely “promoted” Calles to Secretary of
Industry, Commerce, and Labor at the end of the governor’s term in 1919, so that he
would be close and observable in Mexico City.90
The end of Decree One was not far behind Calles’s exit from office. De la Huerta
ran for governor in 1919 on the platform of reforming the measure. He was not the only
critic: politicians, journalists, and other observers had begun to argue that the desire to rid the state of vices was admirable, but the decree had ironically led to an increase in immorality, as people resisted the measure through the clandestine production and consumption of alcohol. Furthermore, the decree had been unconstitutional.91 Therefore, on November 14, 1919, the state legislature unanimously passed Law Nine, which announced that grape table wine, cider, champagne, and all alcoholic drinks with less
89 Circular 163, [20 or 27?] June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. 90 This would not be the last time that a president accused Sonoran leaders of acting anti-constitutionally. Obregón would have to rein in the state’s anti-Chinese legislation in the early 1920s. Puente, “Plutarco Elías Calles,” 184; Memorias de Don Adolfo de la Huerta, 109-13; Macías Richard, Vida y temperamento, 194; Réñique, “Región, raza, y nación en el antichinismo sonorense,” 275; Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution, 60, 67, 71-72, 78. 91 “¿Habrá cantinas en Sonora? Entre la 1ra. desbordante de la galerías aprobóse un dictamen irrisorio. Por medio de un plebiscito en que tendrán voto las mujeres se resolverá el problema del licor,” El Tiempo (Cananea), 10 January 1919; Initiative to reform Decree #1, 9 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 227, Carp. 1; A. Cárdenas to unknown, 17 May 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292; “El Decreto Núm. 1 sigue ocupando la atención de la H. Cámara del Estado. La comisión encargada de formular el capítulo de penas, presentó ayer su dictamen,” O, 5 November 1919; Caro, Plutarco Elías Calles, 96-97; Zúñiga Moreno, “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915,” 272. 223 than 6 percent alcohol content were legal. All other types of liquor remained prohibited.
The measure also very clearly spelled out how violations would be handled.92
Ideologically passive presidents, like Carranza, did not believe it was the
executive branch’s right or responsibility to direct the anti-alcohol campaign, and thus
encouraged governors and state legislators to deal with the issue of vice on their own.
Governor Calles did just this with his Decree One, which restricted the production, sale,
and consumption of all types of alcoholic beverages. The measure was supplemented
with limited cultural programs. Although on the surface this decree seems to have
advanced the anti-alcohol campaign, reduced crime, and mitigated poverty and suffering,
the negative effects abounded. These included clandestine sales and consumption of
alcohol, often toxic in nature, as well as rampant corruption. Indeed, this measure highlighted the administrative weakness of the state government, which lacked the resources and the power to force resistant political officials and ordinary people to obey
the law. The Decree even demonstrated the weakness of the national government, for
Calles handled the measure unconstitutionally. In the end, the prohibition proved
unsustainable, revealing on multiple levels the contested nature of the State-building
process.
1929: A Change in Rhetoric and Little Else
Presidents of ideologically active regimes from 1924-1932 worked to create a
central anti-alcohol campaign. The most significant advance in this movement came in
92 Law 9, 14 November 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3292. 224
1929 when President Portes Gil created the CNLCA, a body that not only coordinated the national temperance crusade but also tried to foment one in areas where they had not previously existed. Although Sonora had taken the lead in the anti-alcohol campaign in the 1910s, by 1929 it needed a kick-start. Law Nine from 1919, which attempted to curtail clandestinity and corruption as well as strengthen the economy by allowing the sale and taxation of beverages of less than 6 percent alcohol content, lasted for only two years.93 In October 1921, legislators passed Law Six, which allowed for the production, sale and consumption of all types of alcoholic beverages. They modified the law several
times in terms of how much state and municipal governments could receive in taxes, but
it essentially remained in effect throughout the decade.94
Government regulation of alcohol beginning in 1919 did not solve the problem of clandestinity and crime in the 1920s. Throughout the state, vendors continued to sell intoxicating beverages without a proper license, often with the approval of authorities,
and obnoxious and violent public drunkenness did not dissipate.95 Officials perceived
93 Decree 21, 26 December 1919, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3361, 2a. Parte; report, De la Huerta, 31 March 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3373. AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3360, 2a. Parte: Decree 22, 3 January 1920; Decree 64, 2 December 1920. 94 AHES-RE-1921, Tomo 3412: Law 6, 12 October 1921; Law 15, 5 December 1921. Decree 2, 2 January 1922, AHES-RE-1922, Tomo 3480; Decree 5, BO 11, no. 22 (18 February 1922); Law 26, 20 December 1923, AHES-RE-1923, Tomo 3553; Law 85, 24 June 1924, AHES-RE-1924, Tomo 3622. AHES-RE- 1925, Tomo 3720: Law 85, 25 April 1925; Law 31, 15 December 1925. Law 35, 28 January 1926, AHES- RE-1926, Tomo 40. 95 Report, Profesor José Alcanzar Robledo, Agua Prieta, 28 May 1923, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 63, Exp. 38; anonymous to Corona, 19 April 1924, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 64, Exp. 60; unknown, Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, to the Secretary of Government, 21 December 1925, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.3.(22)-1, Caja 1, Exp. 37; Profesor Roberto Thomson, Carrizal, 4 August 1927, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 829 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19324, Exp. 68. Articles from: O, 1920-21; EO, 1921-24, 1927-28; El: El Periódico de Sonora (Hermosillo), 1921; ES, 1923-24; La Prensa de Sonora (Hermosillo), 1924; Nueva Era: Periódico Independiente (Nacozari) (NE), 1925; La Gaceta (Guaymas), 1928. AHES-RE-1920, Tomos 3361, 1a. Parte and 2a. Parte, 3362, 1a. Parte and 2a. Parte, 3363-64, 3365, 1a. Parte, 3373; AHES- RE-1921, Tomos 3413-3416; AHES-RE-1922, Tomos 3480-91; AHES-RE-1923, Tomos 3554-60; AHES- 225 debauchery and depravity to flourish especially along the northern border. With alcohol legal once again in Sonora, but not the United States, Americans flocked to cantinas in
Nogales, Agua Prieta, Naco, and San Luis, which were owned by Mexican and U.S. businessmen taking advantage of the opportunity to profit. Many of these bars advertised
in the United States with pamphlets and newspaper ads, telling thirsty Arizonans that in
Mexico, “you can order with legal disregard for the Volstead Act.”96 The fact that
Sonoran border towns catered to American tourists can be seen in a photograph of Agua
Prieta (see Image 14).97 The street is lined with bars painted with alcohol advertisements, all of which are written in English. One establishment is even called the Volstead Café.
Sonoran political leaders hoped by endorsing these businesses they would boost their cities’ economies, and occasionally they permitted gambling, blood sports, and divorce for hefty fees as well. These border towns became havens of corruption and crime, even though pamphlets assured wary Americans that they could expect “perfect safety, law, and order.”98 In fact, vice became so bad in some of these places that U.S. officials and both Mexican and American citizens complained frequently, leading the United States government to close parts of the Arizona-Sonora border at night to prevent drinking
RE-1924, Tomos 3622-31; AHES-RE-1925, Tomos 3720-28; AHES-RE-1926, Tomo 42; AHES-RE-1927, Tomos 41-52; AHES-RE-1928, Tomos 51-53. 96 P. D. Clagett, Nogales—Across the Street is Mexico (Nogales, Ariz.: Nogales Wonderland Club, Inc., 1927), SCUAL, L9791.N77 N774n, 3, 9; Smith, “Rapid Strides Mark Growth of Cavern,” 10. 97 Although this photograph was placed in an album labeled 1910-1915, it seems more plausible that it was taken between 1919 and 1933, for the United States’ Prohibition was in effect during these years. Andrew Volstead, the Minnesota Representative who lent his name to the legislation, was a temperance advocate prior to 1919, but it is unlikely that he would have been known well enough in Sonora and Arizona prior to the passing of the Volstead Act for his patronym to be used as an ironic bar name. Photograph, Agua Prieta, n.d. [ca. 1919-1933], Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Fototeca Archivo Fernando Torreblanca, Fondo Plutarco Elías Calles, Álbumes (FAPECyFT-FAFT-FPECA), Número de Álbum (Núm. Álb.) 60, Inventario del Álbum (Inv. Álb.) 139, Núm. 75. 98 Clagett, Nogales, 3, 10; Osuna, El Alcoholismo, 33; Buffington, “Prohibition in the Borderlands,” 26-29. 226 sprees as well as the northward movement of contraband alcohol.99 President Obregón also entertained, but never accepted, proposals in the early 1920s to solve these problems by creating a dry zone along the entire border of the two nations.
Image 14, no title, artist unknown, Agua Prieta, Sonora, ca. 1919-1933. Reproduced with permission from the Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Mexico City.
During the early- to mid-1920s, even schools did not seem particularly concerned
with fighting alcohol consumption. At an education conference held in late 1919 or early
1920, school inspectors and municipal authorities were instructed to work together to
ensure moral vigilance. Teachers were also asked to hold talks with parents to make sure
that they were keeping themselves and their children away from vice. It is unclear if
99 AHES-RE-1920, Tomos 3362, 1a. Parte, 3363-64, 3365, 2a. Parte, 3373; AHES-RE-1921, Tomos 3413- 16; AHES-RE-1922, Tomos 3481-91; AHES-RE-1923, Tomos 3553-60; AHES-RE-1924, Tomos 3622-31; AHES-RE-1925, Tomos 3720-28; AHES-RE-1927, Tomos 41-52; AHES-RE-1928, Tomos 51-53. Articles from: EE, 1920; O, 1920; La Nación (Nogales, Son.), 1920; La Revista de Cananea, 1920; EO, 1921-23; ES, 1923; Savia Nueva (Agua Prieta), 1925. Official statement 1955, 9 June 1920, AHES-RE- 1920, Tomo 3361, 2a Parte; U.S. Senator Morris Sheppard to Bainbridge Colby, U.S. Secretary of State, 16 July 1920, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/15; Juan Sebastián Bastidas, “Un hotel al estilo gangster,” El Imparcial, Edición Comercial, Puerto Peñasco Turístico, n.d.; Seger, “The Economics of Vice,” 8-11. 227 anyone complied with these decrees.100 After the federalization of education in 1921, a few Sonoran teachers mentioned trying to eradicate alcoholism from their communities, but they did not do so systematically.101 In spite of these few instances, it seems safe to assert that from 1920 to 1929, both Sonora’s political leaders and educators had essentially abandoned the anti-alcohol campaign.
Therefore, in 1929, Portes Gil and the CNLCA worked to reinvigorate this
movement in Sonora and ensure that the state was following national directives. The
president and his bureaucrats constantly sent reminders to Provisional Governor
Francisco S. Elías (a relative of Calles) that the nation had undertaken an anti-alcohol
campaign. They demanded his allegiance and asked what steps he would take to join
them.102 Bureaucrats also followed up on information about the violation of state alcohol
legislation. For instance, after receiving a complaint that excessive alcohol was being
sold in Oputo, the Sub-secretary of Government, Felipe Canales, wrote to Elías, asking if
this statement was true.103
Governor Elías claimed, on numerous occasions, to support the temperance movement. In May 1929, he told the president that Decree One had been incredibly
100 Report, De la Huerta, 31 March 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3373. 101 Report, C. Rivera Domínguez, Department of Public Education representative, Colonia Cultural Indígena General Benjamin Hill, Kunkaak, 4 October 1922, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 16, Exp. 63; report, Alcanzar Robledo, Casa de las Teras, 7 April 1923, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 63, Exp. 38; invitation, Misión Cultural and Segundo Instituto Social de Maestros, Noche Mexicana, Magdalena, 31 July 1927, AHSEP- DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. 15; program, perfection course for rural teachers, Magdalena, 31 May 1928, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 2. 102 Circular, Canales to Governors, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “El presidente se dirige a los gobernadores. Está preparando otra campaña contra el vicio y contra las maquinas tostoneras,” EP, 6 September 1929. AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: García Téllez, Oficial Mayor of the Secretary of Government, to Governor F. Elías, 2 September 1929; Canales to F. Elías, 17 September 1929. 103 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: García Téllez to F. Elías, 2 September 1929; Canales to F. Elías, 17 September 1929. 228 beneficial for the state, reducing poverty, improving general well-being, and allowing workers to save money. Therefore, he had confidence that Portes Gil’s efforts to restrict alcoholism would be equally helpful.104 To show his adherence to this national campaign, he demanded that mayors, policemen, and other public officials obey his command by restricting the clandestine sale of intoxicating beverages and not violating the law themselves.105 Elías also asked municipal officials and treasury employees to ensure that all taxes on alcohol production and sales be collected. He hoped that producers and vendors who found the taxes too steep might choose another, less socially harmful occupation, rather than defrauding the government of resources and challenging its authority.106
The governor took a few more drastic steps in an effort to curtail vice. In May
1929, Elías vowed to not issue any new permits for alcohol factories or dispensaries.107
He also saw that all current permits in the town of Bácum be revoked on the request of
General Juventino Espinosa.108 Additionally, in September of that year, Elías pointed out
that the state labor law forbade cantinas from being in areas where urban or rural workers
made up the majority of the population. In a few towns that fit this description, including
Bavispe, Empalme, Etchojoa, and Hermosillo, he asked that alcohol be banned all
104 “Se prepara una campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EP, 22 May 1929; F. Elías to Portes Gil, 24 May 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 65; “El Gobernador del Estado contesta un mensaje de la Presidente de la República—encontró la Hacienda Pública en estado ruinoso—tan pronto queda debidamento organizado el gobierno, va a dictar disposiciones antialcohólicas,” EP, 25 May 1929; F. Elías to Mayor Juan Bautista Muñoz, Etchojoa, 13 September 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Circular #163, 7 October 1929, AHES- RE-1929, Tomo 9. 105 F. Elías to Portes Gil, 24 May 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 65; Circular #163, 7 October 1929, AHES- RE-1929, Tomo 9. 106 Circular #163, 7 October 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 9. 107 Ibid. 108 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: General Juventino Espinosa to General Macías, 27 May 1929; unknown to unknown, 1 June 1929. 229 together. The governor acted on the cases of Empalme and Etchojoa, as well as an isolated incident in Cananea, thanks to specific requests by citizens.109
A few other public officials took notable steps to combat alcohol abuse. The chief of police in Estación Pesqueira prohibited the sale of all intoxicating beverages in his community in October 1929.110 The city councils of Hermosillo and Nogales in the following month required that all cantinas and cabarets shut down during election weekend so as to prevent political manipulation.111 Finally, Elías’s successor, A. B.
Sobarzo, demanded in December that cantinas in Pilares de Nacozari be moved to the outskirts of the town and those in Los Angeles be restricted to a tolerance zone so as to be as far away from workers and families as possible. He also asked that bars in Pilares de
Nacozari close at 10 PM and on Sundays.112
The national and state governments worked together to spread the message that the anti-alcohol campaign had begun nationally and was being reinvigorated in Sonora.
To begin with, copies of the President’s decree that launched the movement and created the CNLCA were posted in public places and printed in newspapers.113 The effort seems
109 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: Petrocinio Ayala and Ygancio R. Valenzuela, secretaries of the Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de Mochipaco, Etchojoa, to F. Elías, 18 August 1929; J. Muñoz to F. Elías, 10 September 1929; F. Elías to J. Muñoz, 13 September 1929; Pedro Gómez, Secretary, Confederación de Transportes y Comunicaciones, Empalme, to F. Elías, 9 October 1929; unknown to unknown, 16 and 21 October 1929. AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 50: Inspector F. Romero, Guaymas, to F. Elías, 6 September 1929; Rafael Rubalcava N., Buenavista, to F. Elías, 12 September 1929; F. Elías to mayor of Cananea, 19 September 1929. 110 Report, Paniagua, 31 October 1929, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 1. 111 “El domingo cerrarán sus puertas las cantinas. Para impedir desórdenes en las elecciones,” EP, 19 October 1929; “Cerrarán los cabarets y cantinas en Nogales,” EP, 15 November 1929; “Permanecerán cerradas las cantinas mañana,” EP, 16 November 1929. 112 Governor A. B. Sobarzo to Mayor Bernardino Meza, Pilares de Nacozari, 17 December 1929, AHES- RE-1929, Tomo 41. 113 “Veinte gobernadores listos para apoyar con toda energia la cruzada en contra del alcoholismo,” EU, 24 April 1929; flyer, “Campaña antialcohólica revolucionaria. Unámonos todos en un supreme esfuerzo por libertar a nuestro pueblo de las garras del alcoholismo,” Álamos, 20 June 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 50; 230 to have been successful. Not only did the numbers of complaints about cantinas or corruption emanating from regular citizens increase, many of these people referred directly to the President’s anti-alcohol campaign. These missive-writers included individuals from small, rural towns or workers and peasants who wrote with poor grammar, suggesting that they may not have been well-educated.114 The governor also
worked with the Department of Public Education to spread the message about the dangers
of habitual drunkenness. Echoing the requests of Portes Gil, the CNLCA, and the Chief
of this ministry, Ezequiel Padilla, Elías asked all teachers in Sonora to host anti-alcohol
parades. He suggested they use the anniversary of the Revolution to “exercise their
renovating influence, modifying customs that obscurity, ignorance, and inertia have made
strong.”115 The governor requested that instructors work with municipal authorities, the local junta patriótica, and student organizations. The event ought to be replete with marching students, songs, speeches, bands, and signs that read, “Alcohol is the Most
Abominable Tyranny,” or “Alcohol Dulls One’s Intelligence.” He also suggested asking businesses to put these posters on their signboards after the parade, so that the message would continue to have an impact.116 These parades and festivals did take place across the state, including in the communities of Chibucú, El Claro, El Foste, El Pantanito,
“Unificando la campaña antialcohólica,” El Nacional (Navojoa) (ENN), 4 August 1929; “Unificando la campaña antialcohólica. Acuerdo a las Srías de Estado y departamentos dependientes del Ejecutivo,” ENN, 11 August 1929. 114 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: Refugio G. Rivera, Estación Llano, to F. Elías, 15 June 1929; Ayala and Y. R. Valenzuela to F. Elías, 18 August 1929; 83 residents, Querobabi, to F. Elías, 22 November 1929. 115 Circular 2, 1 October 1929, in report, F. Elías, 1929, BFP-SN, 67; “Manifestación Infantil de Caracter Antialcohólica,” EP 7 October 1929; report, F. Elías, 1929, BFP-SN, 56. 116 Circular 2, 1 October 1929, in report, F. Elías, 1929, BFP-SN, 67; report, F. Elías, 1929, BFP-SN, 56. 231
Hermosillo, Navojoa, Nogales, Pueblo Nuevo, Rosales, Santa Ana, San Lorenzo, Ures, and Vicam.117
Elías likely saw the anti-alcohol campaign as a way to assert his government’s
authority. In March 1929, then-Governor Fausto Topete left his post to join the Escobar
Rebellion, a nation-wide protest by generals and politicians who opposed Calles’s
domination of the country. In Sonora, the movement ended in the last days of April when
national forces defeated Topete’s troops and named Elías as provisional governor.118 In fact, in May 1929, when Governor Elías first praised the anti-alcohol campaign, he had only served in the position for a few days. Thus, he explained to Portes Gil that he could not do much temperance work until he had completely pacified the state, improved its economy, and reorganized his government.119 Promoting temperance might have been a way of achieving all of these goals. Elías and other leaders feared that alcohol made men violent, especially soldiers or the already-rebellious Yaquis, and so they sought to restrict
these groups’ access to liquor. This was the reason, for instance, that General Espinosa
requested that alcohol permits be cancelled in the Yaqui town Bácum.120 Furthermore, as the above examples indicate, most of the legislative measures employed by state officials were directed at workers. This was not only a measure of social control, these laborers
117 Felipe Magallanes, “Himno antialcohólico,” 12 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54; report, Paniagua, 20 November 1929 (two), AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 1; photographs, 20 November 1929, AGN-FArP-EPG, Caja 34, Exp. 80/54. 118 Cynthia Radding de Murrieta and Rosa María Ruíz Murrieta, “La reconstrucción del modelo de progreso, 1919-1929,” in Historia General de Sonora, vol. 4, 343-44, 347. 119 F. Elías to Portes Gil, 24 May 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 65; “El Gobernador del estado contesta un mensaje de la Presidente de la República,” EP, 25 May 1929. 120 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: M. Pimienta, Federico Velásquez, J. Ruíz, Francisco Satis, and Jesús Ochoa, owners of cantinas, Nogales, to unknown, 16 May 1929; Espinosa to Macías, 27 May 1929; R. Rivera to unknown, 15 June 1929. 232 also would have been more valuable sober in order to get the economy back on track.121
Finally, several people claimed that political officials who broke the alcohol laws were supporters of Topete who remained in power and they demanded that these traitors be removed.122 The accusations about alcohol abuse or participation in the Escobar
Rebellion may or may not be true. But they are further indication that the temperance
movement was a tool to assist in the struggles of political reordering and State-building.
As in the 1910s, though, the government’s weakness limited its ability to carry
out the anti-alcohol campaign. Therefore, in spite of Elías’s desire to support the
movement, crime and corruption do not seem to have decreased. Inspectors continued to
arrest those who resisted the government through public inebriation and shut down
cantinas owned by rebellious people who operated without a license. As in the past,
many of the primary violators of the law were state and municipal employees who either
gave in to their desires to drink themselves or benefited monetarily by protecting other
perpetrators.123 A new problem emerged as well: in towns where the governor had ordered the closing of bars, such as Etchojoa, clandestine ones sprung up in their wake.
121 AHES-RE-1929: F. Elías to Portes Gil, 24 May 1929, Tomo 65; Mayor Rafael N. Corella, Imuris, to F. Elías, 25 May 1929, Tomo 47-2; Rubalcava N. to F. Elías, 12 September 1929, Tomo 50; Mayor F. Contreras, Pilares de Nacozari, to F. Elías, 8 October 1929, Tomo 41. 122 Rubalcava N. to F. Elías, 12 September 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 50; Rocio Guadarrama, Cristina Martínez, and Lourdes Martínez, “La reorganización de la sociedad,” in Historia general de Sonora, vol. 5, Historia contemporánea de Sonora: 1929-1984, ed. Gerardo Cornejo Murrieta (Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985), 81. 123 R. Díaz Brown, military chief, Álamos, to F. Elías, 1 April 1929, FAPECyFT-AFT-FPEC, Fondo 12, Serie 010802, Exp. 1, Inv. 395, Leg. 5/6; “Están buscando dos furgones de cajas de alcohol,” EP, 8 May 1929; “Sacaron muchas damajuanas y cajas de alcohol en un cateo,” EP, 16 May 1929; “Más cajas de alcohol recogidas por la policia hoy,” EP, 17 May 1929; “No se cumple con el reglamento de tráfico y por eso hay choques,” EP, 20 May 1929; “Dijo que un gendarme le saco el dinero a un ebrio,” EP, 31 May 1929; “El Gobernador de Sinaloa inicia una campaña contra el vicio,” EP, 4 July 1929; Cruz Salazar, Oputo, to Portes Gil, 27 August 1929, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.3(22)-2, Caja 1, Exp. 38; “Localizó un contrabando de alcohol,” EP, 11 October 1929; “Los directores de los pueblos,” El Progreso (Hermosillo), 7 November 1929. AHES-RE-1919, Tomos 41-43, 45-50. 233
Or, in the case of Hermosillo, the city council agreed to allow clandestine cantinas to remain open, as long as they paid between ten and thirty pesos per month. This act angered legitimate bar owners, who had to pay much higher rates in taxes. Additionally, it meant a loss of revenue for the government as well as a compromising of their standards.124
Even Governor Elías was guilty of subverting the anti-alcohol campaign.
Although he promised to curtail alcohol permits, in August 1929, he gave the mayor of
Banámichi permission to sell beer during the four-day Independence festivities to raise money for new schools.125 Furthermore, several citizens and journalists claimed that he
frequently allowed new cantinas to open without even the meager benefits of a
fundraiser. One newspaper noted that Elías had granted an Italian immigrant a
concession to open a restaurant and alcohol dispensary in Sásabe, a border town that the
author accused of trying to become the next Tijuana with its high levels of vice.126 Juan
Valdez of Nogales thought that Elías’s actions were particularly abhorrent, given that the man had not even been elected.127 Finally, in at least three cases, Elías rejected a request to close a cantina. For instance, the mayor of Navojoa, Medardo Tellechea, explained to the governor that not only did small dispensaries of alcohol fill his and nine other nearby
124 M. S. Sotomayor, “Se tolera oficialmente el clandestinaje de licores,” EP, 12 August 1929. AHES-RE- 1919, Tomos 41: owners of cantinas, Hermosillo, to F. Elías, 23 August 1929; Ayala and Y. R. Valenzuela to F. Elías, 4 November 1929. 125 F. Elías to State General Treasurer, 12 August 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41. 126 “La campaña antialcohólica . . . en las declaraciones,” EP, 20 June 1929; “Más cantinas abrirán en Sonora. Ni siqueira en esas partes secundada la política del Primer Magistrado de la Nación. La campaña antialcohólica del Lic. Portes Gil no es tomada en consideración en el estado,” LP, 9 August 1929; García Téllez to F. Elías, 2 September 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; “El presidente se dirige a los gobernadores,” EP, 6 September 1929. 127 Juan Valdez, Club Liberal Revolucionario, Nogales, to Portes Gil, 14 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 14. 234 communities, but that drinking binges were common in front of schools. He suggested eliminating the permits for these institutions because they did not pay much in taxes and
were difficult to monitor. Elías denied this petition and instead suggested that the mayor
just better utilize Filiberto Cruz, the guerrilla chief in the area, to help root out
clandestine sales of alcohol.128
Although 1929 marked a turning point in the national anti-alcohol campaign, with
the creation of the CNLCA, in Sonora very little changed. Governor Elías and a few other officials claimed to support the temperance movement, began to restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages in working-class communities and on election days, and promoted the use of propaganda such as flyers and parades. They likely did this, not only at the request of the national government, but also to strengthen their administrations, which had been beset by a rebellion and economic troubles. These weaknesses, though, limited the effectiveness of the governor, making it difficult for him to eliminate vice and corruption. Indeed, Elías was guilty of violating his own regulations by allowing new cantinas to open and refusing to shut down others. In the end, the president did very little to rectify this situation as the administrative strength of his regime was precarious, as well. This case study demonstrates, once again, that the process of State-building took place on multiple levels.
128 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: Mayor Medardo Tellechea, Navojoa, to F. Elías, 1 June 1929; F. Elías to Tellechea, 6 June 1929; 83 residents, Querobabi, to F. Elías, 22 November 1929; F. Elías to unknown, 26 November 1929; Mayor Alejandro C. Villaseñor, Nogales, to Sobarzo, 9 December 1929; Sobarzo to Villaseñor, 9 December 1929. 235
The Potential of the Anti-Alcohol Campaign and its Failure, 1934-1939
The issuance of the Six-Year Plan in January 1934 marked another turning point
for the national anti-alcohol campaign. This document symbolized the ideologically
active nature of the Rodríguez and Cárdenas regimes, for both men believed that creating a sober nation ought to be at the forefront of the executive’s goals. To this end, they had an ally in Sonoran Governor Rodolfo Elías Calles (the Jefe Máximo’s son) and his successor Emiliano Corella M., both of whom made temperance a central aim of their administrations, as well. At the start of the younger Calles’s governorship, in September
1931, Law Two was passed, which continued to allow for the sale and production of all types of alcoholic beverages. Although it did not restrict consumption of intoxicants, it did attempt to limit vice, clandestinity, and corruption by regulating the location of cantinas and who could own them. Echoing the national Constitution and the Labor Law of 1931, the measure stated that alcohol could not be produced or sold in agrarian communities, ejidos, or workplaces. Cantinas and other dispensaries of alcohol had to remain at least one hundred meters from schools, hospitals, jails, or orphanages.
Alcoholic beverages could not be sold in homes or public places, either. The law also stipulated that to engage in any part of the alcohol-producing or –selling process, one had to have a permit issued by the Department of Public Health and approved by the governor. To receive these permits, the solicitor had to prove that he or she had a “good” background and did not have a contagious disease. Permits were subject to frequent inspection, had to be kept in a visible location, and would be revoked for violations of the 236 law.129 This lengthy piece of legislation represented not only an increased desire to rid the state of vice, but also a government with a greater capacity to oversee every step of the process.
By 1933, the younger Calles and his associates started to pass even more drastic laws to curtail alcohol abuse. In this year, the governor vowed not to open any more cantinas.130 In 1934, he took a number of additional steps. Calles again asked all mayors
to see that drinking establishments remain at a set distance from workplaces. He also
demanded that alcohol dispensaries, except those that only sold beer, close from Saturday
night through Monday morning. A few mayors took this measure even further by
requiring bars to close on Saturday afternoons, as well. Across the state, those
dispensaries that had been shut down for not following the law were not allowed to reopen, even if they paid a fee. The governor further forbade the sale of mescal and all
strong drinks in the Mayo Valley, a populous, agricultural center. In this area, as well as
the Yaqui Valley and the city of Hermosillo, he created a special police force to fight
clandestine production and sales of liquor.131 He also worked to change a practice that had been in effect since 1925. Governor Alejo Bay had permitted the General Treasurer of the state to sell alcohol decommissioned by inspectors, as long as it was not toxic. The younger Calles required once again that confiscated beverages and equipment be
129 Law Two, 21 September 1931, in BO 28, no. 28 (3 October 1931). 130 Franco to R. Calles, 5 June 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733“34”/28. 131 AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23: R. Calles to Franco, 9 June 1934, 733“34”/28; Franco to R. Calles, 30 August 1934, 733“34”/21; R. Calles to Franco, 5 December 1934, 733“34”/58. Ray to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 June 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/101; report, R. Calles, 16 September 1934, FAPECyFT-AFT- FPEC, Fondo 12, Serie 010804, Exp. 34, Inv. 476, Leg. 1/2; Laureano Calvo Berber, Nociones de historia de Sonora (Mexico City: Librería de Manuel Porrúa, 1958), 309-10. 237 destroyed.132 On New Years Day 1935, Corella M. closed all dispensaries of alcohol beverages to prevent drunken scandals on the holiday.133 Just over a month later, Law
131 passed, which forbade the sale and consumption of all cheap and potent alcohol.
Only beer, wine, and other beverages of less than 15 percent alcohol content were
permitted.134
These political leaders supplemented their legislation with a far-reaching cultural program. In 1934, Rodolfo Calles requested and received propaganda that he could distribute to libraries, schools, and meeting halls, as well as post on the street. These materials included copies of special, anti-alcohol editions of the Mexico City newspapers
Excélsior and Izquierdas, pamphlets about Cárdenas’s tour of the nation where, among other issues, he discussed his desire to eradicate alcoholism, and reports about the DAA’s activities.135 That same year, the governor began his Cultural Sundays, a series of sporting events and public lectures designed to keep people from spending their time in cantinas or churches. For the same reason, he also had recreation centers built, such as the Casa del Pueblo in Hermosillo and Navojoa.136 Furthermore, the governor commissioned Wilfrido Oloño, an itinerant movie operator, to show the Department of
132 Governor Alejo Bay to General Treasurer of the State, 6 January 1925, AHES-RE-1925, Tomo 3720; R. Calles to General Treasurer of the State, 15 June 1935, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733“34”/31. 133 Tecisteco to Franco, 19 January 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/4-20. 134 Law 131, 19 February 1935, in BO 35, no. 17 (27 February 1935). 135 AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 733“34”/23: R. Calles to Representative Francisco L. Terminal, Mexico City, 28 May 1934; Luis Tijerina Almaguer to R. Calles, 12 June 1934. Tecisteco to Franco, 19 January 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/4-20. 136 AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23: Circular 03-11-/126, 15 May 1934, 743“34”/11; Representative Guadalupe Bustamante, President of the State Committee of the PNR, to R. Calles, 25 May 1934, 733“34”/24; Franco to R. Calles, 31 May 1934, 743“34”/16; report, R. Calles, 16 September 1934, FAPECyFT-AFT-FPEC, Fondo 12, Serie 010804, Exp. 34, Inv. 476, Leg. 1/2; Rodolfo Guajardo, police delegate, El Tiro, to R. Calles, 10 July 1934, 733“34”/37; Calvo Berber, Nociones de historia de Sonora, 309-10; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 16. 238
Public Health’s anti-alcohol films, Abismo and Dragón Hambriento, which portrayed the
negative effects of alcohol consumption in a realistic manner. These movies played
across the state, in at least thirty-six communities, free of charge, beginning in 1935. In
some towns, mayors noted significant turnouts of workers and children and that the
audience seemed to like the films. Other towns combined these movies with commercial
ones to increase the turnout and some officials took advantage of a captive audience to
deliver brief anti-alcohol speeches.137 Corella M. continued this work by asking mayors to see that their communities listen to the DAA’s Children’s Anti-Alcohol Hour radio broadcast, form temperance leagues, and have parades of women and children on the anniversary of the Revolution.138 He also distributed copies of a speech given at one of
the DAA’s Prison Anti-Alcohol Hours to jails across the state.139 Throughout 1934 and
1935, the state government actively supported schools and encouraged teachers to participate in the temperance movement, as well.140
137 AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23: Wilfrido Oloño to R. Calles, 21 February 1934, 741“34”/1; R. Calles to Mayors, 21 February 1934, 741“34”/1. AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 57, 741“35”/3: Interim Governor Emiliano Corella M. to Mayors and Police Chiefs, 15 January 1935; Ernestina Aida de Huerta, School Director, Ures, to Ramón Avilés, Secretary of Government, 28 January 1935; Abraham F. Aguayo, School Director, Nacozari, to Avilés, 2 March 1935; José Pedro Durazo, police delegate, El Tiro, to Avilés, 24 April 1935; Profesor Fernando Moreno Torres, El Tigre, 4 June 1935; Jesús Moreno, police chief, Jécori, to Avilés, 4 June 1935; Manuel B. Carrillo, police delegate, Churunibabiri, to Avilés, 6 June 1935; Mayor Alejandro Hurtado, Sahuaripa, to Corella M., 2 July 1935; Manuel Baldenegro, police chief, Tacupeto, to Corella M., 3 July 1935; Governor Ramón Ramos to mayors and police chiefs, 13 September 1935. AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 57: Corella M. to R. Calles, Chief of the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works, Mexico City, 4 May 1935, 741“35”/8; Corella M. to unknown, 18 July 1935, 741“35”/12. 138 AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56; Circular 03/11-267, 8 August 1935, 733“35”/4-20; Interim Governor Gerardo Romero to Mayors, 18 October 1935, 733“35”/21. 139 AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21: Díaz Barriga to Corella M., 25 July 1935; Corella M. to Díaz Barriga, 22 August 1935. 140 Report, R. Calles, 16 September 1934, FAPECyFT-AFT-FPEC, Fondo 12, Serie 010804, Exp. 34, Inv. 476, Leg. 1/2. 239
As the national government’s strength had increased, beginning in 1934, federal temperance reformers worked even harder to ensure that state and municipal governments carried out the anti-alcohol campaign, a project so important to the
Rodríguez and Cárdenas administrations. Members of the DEA and DAA asked state authorities to launch cultural programs, organize temperance leagues, or to pass stricter alcohol laws.141 These bureaucrats also stayed informed about vice by reading local
newspapers, letters from ordinary citizens, or reports from the group’s representatives in
various parts of the country. With this knowledge, they constantly wrote to governors
and mayors, multiple times if necessary, asking that they obey existing anti-alcohol
legislation. For instance, in May 1934, Franco read in a Cananea newspaper that a
members-only recreational club located near a church and a school sold alcohol.
Although the club sponsored sports events, the athletes always lost because they drank too much the night before. As the location of this club violated the constitution, both an employee of the Department of Government and Franco himself wrote to the younger
Calles, asking him to rectify the problem, noting also that in spite of the governor’s law banning new cantinas, two more had opened recently in the town. Complying with this national directive, Calles then requested that the mayor of Cananea close all cantinas.
Franco read that the municipal authorities had responded and the community was pleased. However, alcohol-induced scandals in the mining town resumed quickly. The reformer wrote again to the governor and also appointed a delegate of the DEA in the
141 “1,500 comités contra el alcoholismo en el país,” EN, 10 August 1935; Circular 35, Department of Government to governors, 16 August 1935, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-3925, Caja 14, Exp. 2. 240 community to better monitor the situtation.142 However, for the most part, these federal bureaucrats more frequently thanked than chastised Governors Rodolfo Calles and
Emiliano Corella M. for their temperance work. In fact, Franco told the younger Calles
in 1934 that Sonoran officials best knew how to collaborate with the national government
and carry out the anti-alcohol campaign.143
Governors Calles and Corella M. in part could take such effective actions against chronic intoxication because their governments were strong enough to be able to donate significant resources to fighting it. The effects of the Stock Market crash in New York hit Sonora in early 1930, disrupting mining, agriculture, cattle-ranching, commerce and finance, triggering high levels of unemployment. By 1934, thanks to governors’ policies
that had promoted autonomy and diversification, such as establishing minimum
production rates for agribusinesses, encouraging farmers to grow new products and sell
them in countries other than the United States or those in Europe, the construction of
highways that facilitated commerce in diverse parts of the state as well as created jobs,
and the establishment of new, small banks, the economy began to improve. In addition,
142 AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-7, Caja 13, Exp. 7: Franco to Secretary of Government, 18 May and 1 June 1934; José Magro Soto, Oficial Mayor of the Department of Government, to R. Calles, 5 June 1934; R. Calles to Mayor of Cananea, 12 June 1934. AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23: Franco to R. Calles, 5 June 1934, 733“34”/28; Franco to R. Calles, 15 June 1934, 733“34”/33; Franco to Mayor of Cananea, 12 July 1934, 733“34”/39; Franco to R. Calles, 30 August 1934, 733“34”/21; Franco to R. Calles, 26 November 1934, 733“34”/58. Corella M. to Secretary of Government, 23 August 1935, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-4186, Caja 9, Exp. 3. 143 Franco to R. Calles, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23: 31 May 1934, 743“34”/16; 15 June 1934, 733“34”/33; 18 June 1934, 733“34”/28. Díaz Barriga to Corella M., 10 September 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/21. 241 at least until the beginning of 1935, the state remained relatively peaceful.144 These favorable conditions increased the governors’ ability to eradicate vice.
The combination of ideologically active and administratively stronger governments at both the national and the state levels seemed to bode well for the future of the anti-alcohol campaign in Sonora. Ironically, though, as Lázaro Cárdenas, arguably the president most dedicated to the temperance movement and who fortified it the most nationally, attempted to further increase the autonomy of his government, he undermined the anti-alcohol campaign in Sonora. In his attempt to separate his administration from the Jefe Máximo and thus strengthen it, he not only exiled the former president, he also began purging the government of Calles supporters in December 1935. As the home of the Jefe Máximo and his prodigious family, Sonora was particularly important for the new president to control. Cárdenas relied on a growing and diverse group of anti-
Callistas in this northern state. This group consisted of labor union members and politicians on both the left and the right who opposed the Callista stranglehold on democracy, economic elites who felt that the Callistas’ labor policies had been too radical, and priests and the Catholic peasantry who disliked the Callistas’ socialist education and anti-clericalism. With the threat of the Jefe Máximo removed from
Sonora, Cárdenas named General Jesús Gutiérrez Cázares provisional governor in
144 José C. Ramírez, Ricardo León, and Oscar Conde, “La estrategia económica de los Callistas,” in Historia general de Sonora, vol. 5, 69-73, 77; José C. Ramírez, Ricardo León, and Oscar Conde, “Una epoca de crisis económica,” in Historia general de Sonora, vol. 5, 56-58; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 5-6. 242
December 1935. General Román Yocupicio was elected in January 1937 and held the office until 1939.145
In one sense, Cárdenas’s strategy worked. With the Jefe Máximo gone and
governmental autonomy at its zenith nationally, the President was relatively free to
pursue his more radical policies. However, by staffing the government with men loyal to
him, rather than relying on an open, democratic system, the president threatened the very
administrative strength he was trying to achieve. Men like Yocupicio and Maximinio
Ávila Camacho may have pledged loyalty to Cárdenas initially, but they opposed him
ideologically. By 1938, the economy began to go into decline again and the power of
industrialists, conservative politicians, and sinarquistas grew. In order to avoid a civil
war like the one raging in Spain, Cárdenas began to shift his policies toward the right.
Just two years later, the election of centrist General Manuel Ávila Camacho marked the
end of the Revolution.146
Cárdenas’s purge of the Callistas and his endorsement of supposedly loyal, conservative political leaders was a death sentence for the anti-alcohol campaign in
Sonora. Although the younger Calles and Corella M. may have been loyal to the Jefe
Máximo, they agreed with Cárdenas about the importance of creating a sober nation. The
position of Gutiérrez Cázares was less clear. During his time in office, and after he
returned to being a brigade commander, the general claimed to want to eradicate
145 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 104, 125-27; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 13, 62- 63; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 5-6, 23-26, 29-36, 43-55. 146 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 126-27, 129-31, 190-91, 216-17, 220, 226-27, 235-37, 256-57, 267-68; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 13, 21, 56-62, 67-72; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 3, 45, 59-60, 62-67, 73, 78-79, 175-86. 243 alcoholism.147 The laws he passed, though, did not always reflect this goal. In April
1936, Gutiérrez Cázares reversed Law 131 with Decree Thirteen, which allowed for the
production, sale, and taxation of all alcoholic beverages. Intoxicants were only forbidden in agrarian communities and ejidos.148 In October, he passed a more drastic measure,
Decree Twenty-Six, which once again forbade the production, transportation, or sale of
any intoxicating beverages that were more potent than beer, wine, cider, and champagne.
Cities on the U.S. border, however, had permission to sell all types of liquor.149
The contradictory nature of these measures indicates that the general’s interest in temperance was paternalistic and an extension of his desire to improve the state’s economy. Like many of his predecessors, Gutiérrez Cázares believed alcohol abuse to be a working-class and indigenous problem.150 Thus, in February 1936, before he had issued Decree Thirteen, he suggested to Cárdenas that the law be modified so that rather than restricting drinks of higher alcohol content, they merely be made more expensive and thus put out of the reach of workers.151 This idea suggests that the general wanted to control the habits of the poor, for wealthier individuals would be able to imbibe without consequence. The government would also benefit from the tax revenue. When they were mandated months later, Decree Thirteen, as well as the exception to Decree Twenty-Six, also allowed state and municipal authorities to supplement their treasuries with money
147 Gutiérrez Cázares to Cárdenas, 14 February 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Gutiérrez Cázares to Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; Gutiérrez Cázares to Cárdenas, 17 August 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1. 148 Decree Thirteen, 28 April 1936, in BO 37, no. 35 (29 April 1936). 149 Decree Twenty-six, 8 October 1936, in BO 38, no. 30 (10 October 1936). 150 Gutiérrez Cázares to Cárdenas, 14 February 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Gutiérrez Cázares to Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; Gutiérrez Cázares to Cárdenas, 17 August 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 156. 151 Gutiérrez Cázares to Cárdenas, 14 February 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15. 244 generated from alcohol sales. Finally, when a U.S. citizen who owned the Hotel Playa de
Cortés in Guaymas complained, saying that Decree Twenty-Six would hurt his business as well as tourism in the state, the governor gave the man permission to continue selling alcohol at his hotel.152 Again, finances seemed to take precedent over temperance.
Although some observers claimed that vice decreased because of Gutiérrez Cázares’s
decrees, others indicated that both ordinary citizens and lower-level political officials
resisted the governor’s attempts to strengthen the government at their expense by
continuing to break the law.153 The year 1936, then, can be seen as a transitional period between governments that actively promoted the anti-alcohol campaign and ones that openly scorned it.
There can be no doubt that the anti-alcohol campaign did not occupy a place of importance for Yocupicio. The new leader of the executive branch did claim to support the temperance movement a few times throughout his governorship.154 Days after he
took office, though, he passed Law Ten, which permitted the production, transportation,
and sale of all types of alcoholic beverages in the state, except in agrarian communities,
ejidos, and labor centers. Although adulterated alcohol was to be poured out so that no
152 AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15: Walter Douglas, President of the Directors Board of the South Pacific Railroad of Mexico, to L. Rodríguez, 13 October 1936; Gutiérrez Cázares to Douglas, 16 October 1936. 153 AHSEP-DEFS: report, School Oropeza, Arizpe, March 1936, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 3; report, School Inspector Daniel Domínguez Duarte, Navojoa, 30 April 1936, Caja 8447, Ref. 319, Exp. 12; Ximello to Flores Zamora, 13 May 1936, Caja 8401, Ref. 297, Exp. 16; report, Madera M., September- October 1936, Caja 5763, Exp. S/N; P. López, plan for the 1936-37 school year, Magdalena, 2 December 1936, Caja 5518, Exp. 15; School Inspector José M. Flores Gutiérrez, Navojoa, to the Director of Federal Education, 4 October 1937, Caja 5518, Exp. 5. Vicente Nava, San Luis Río Colorado, to Cárdenas, 6 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/11; report, P. López, Cucurpe, 2 January 1936, AHSEP- DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 18; “Alcohol para embrutecer y explotar mejor al indio,” EU, 17 May 1936; “La lacra social del alcohol en la vida de los indígenas,” EN, 26 May 1936. 154 AHES-RE-1938, Caja S/N: Plan de Acción Social Formulado por Acuerdo del C. Gobernador Constitucional del Estado y que Debe Iniciar desde Luego, 25 October 1937, 733“38”/8; Circular 03-11/97, 16 November 1938, 733“38”/13. 245 one could try to resell it, confiscated beverages that had been sold without a government- issued permit, but were otherwise salubrious, could be sold to make up for the lost permit revenue.155 This law was in effect for Yocupicio’s two and a half years in office, although it he modified it in a few ways in 1938. In April of that year, the governor forbade the production, transportation and sale of alcoholic beverages of any gradation in the entire Yaqui region, except for the major city of Ciudad Obregón. Drinks remained prohibited in the Mayo Valley, as they had been since 1934.156 On an election day in
June in Guaymas and across the state on Revolution Day, dispensaries of intoxicants also were closed.157 The governor’s cultural policies were similarly sparse. He merely asked the state branches of the PNR and the Department of Public Education to continue the anti-alcohol campaign by educating people about the “great pains” alcohol abuse caused,
and to continue forming student, teacher, and parent temperance leagues.158 Although some schools hosted Cultural Sundays and distributed propaganda, the governor did not seem to have been involved.159
Because laws regulating alcohol sales were fairly relaxed during the Yocupicio governorship, complaints about the spread of vice rose dramatically from the previous
few years. Teachers, honest political officials, and ordinary people grumbled about
155 Law Ten, 12 January 1937, in BO 39, no. 4 (13 January 1937). 156 Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 17 May 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15. 157 “Hay estado seco en el Pto. de Guaymas. Las actividades de la política ameritaron el cierre de todas las cantinas,” EE, 12 June 1938; Circular 03-11/97, 16 November 1938, AHES-RE-1938, Caja S/N, 733“38”/13. 158 Plan de Acción Social, 25 October 1937, AHES-RE-1938, Caja S/N, 733“38”/8. 159 E. López, plan for the 1936-37 school year, 15 January 1937, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 602, Exp. 22. Questionnaires, AHSEP-DERS: Puebla Valenzuela, 15 May 1939, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19297, Exp. 32; S. Peralta, 8 June 1939, Caja 1673 (5), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19526, Exp. 18; Raúl A. Reina, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/6491; Velarde Romero, 10 June 1939, Caja 1673 (9), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19655, Exp. 73. 246 excessive sales of alcohol, cantinas located too close to schools or workplaces, and corruption.160 Of these three grievances, the last was particularly pronounced. People accused teachers, mayors, and judges of acting scandalously, or ignoring and permitting the spread of vice in their communities.161 They leveled a significant number of
accusations against high level members of the state government. In fact, the Director of
Federal Education in Sonora, Elpidio López, in 1937 characterized these men as
160 See Chapter Five. AGN-DGG: School Inspector Francisco Zárate González, Huatabampo, to Yocupicio, 7 March 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6; Ezequiel Burguete, agent of the M.F.P. Auxiliary of the Attorney General, to Secretary of Government, 17 June 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32804, Caja 9, Exp. 14; Mayor Miguel Arías, Yavaros, to Secretary of Government, 5 October 1938 and 10 June 1939, Serie 2.015.4(22)-34578, Caja 9, Exp. 15; Secretaries Antonia Baldonegro and Josefa Valencia, Liga Femenil de Lucha Social, Citavaro, to Cárdenas, 27 July 1939, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6. AGN-FAP-LC: President Gabino Cruz, Secretary José Parra, and Cruz Grijalba, Board of Vigilence, Comisario Ejidal, La Primavera, 11 May 1939, Exp. 404.1/4419; Gutiérrez Cázares to Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1939, Exp. 533.11/1; Saturnino Morales, Blas Oscimea, and Hermengildo [Treler?], ejiditarios, La Unión, to Cárdenas, 5 June 1939, Exp. 404.1/5601. AHSEP-DEFS: Flores Gutiérrez, plan for the 1936-37 school year, 27 January 1937, Caja 5518, Exp. 5; School Inspector R. Verduga P., plan for the 1937-38 school year, Empalme, 20 November 1937, Caja 5518, Exp. 3. Report, School Director Ámparo de la Fuente, September-October 1937, AHSEP-A123ES, Caja 70 (20), Exp. 18; “El ayuntamiento de Cananea ordeno una recogida de mezcaleros. Dicen que el licor que vendían había ocasionado algunas de funciones entre los viciosos,” EP, 15 December 1938; “Se lo llevaron a la carcel porque se puso una borrachera gritona,” EP, 23 December 1938; “Muchas barriles de mescal y de cerveza fueron ingeridos el año nuevo. Se registraron varios choques de automóviles aunque ninguno sin consecuencias graves,” EP, 2 January 1939. 161 AGN-FAP-LC: memorial of the Yaqui tribe to Cárdenas, 20 August 1937, Exp. 533.11/1; Juan Orozco, President of the Sociedad Cooperativa Pescadores, Bahía Kino, to Cárdenas, 13 February 1938, Exp. 553.1/15; Santiago Díaz and 66 others, Empalme, to Yocupicio, 1 May 1938, Exp. 553.1/15. AGN-DGG: President Adolfo Zamora and Secretary Mariano A. Velarde, ejidiatrios, Cócorit, to Cárdenas, 25 September 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp. 7; President Pascual V. Ayón and Secretary Carlos Álvarez, Comité Particular Ejecutivo Agrario, El Yaqui, to the Secretary of State, Sonora, 16 October 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-27693, Caja 9, Exp. 8; Abraham G. Sánchez, Monserrat Salazar, Ernesto Guzmán, José Arochea, J. Guadalupe R. Segura, Juan R. Pérez, and Roberto Saldaña, Secretaries of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, La Angostura, to Cárdenas, 8 March 1939, Series 2.015.4(22)-36791, Caja 9, Exp. 16; A. Hernández Tapia, Chief of Inspectors of Liquor in the State, to José Moreno Aragón, director of Ahora, Navojoa, 18 October 1939, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32804, Caja 9, Exp. 14. AHSEP-DEFS: report, E. López to Senators and Representatives, 23 June 1937, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-2; School Inspector Amilcar Pereyra Vera, plan for the 1938-39 school year, Nogales, 9 October 1938, Caja 5518, Exp. 3. Questionnaires, AHSEP-DERS: Fernández Fernández, 31 May 1939, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19499; School Director S. Jacob Valenzuela Amavizea, Las Parras, 10 June 1939, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19239, Exp. 12. Francisco Nicodemo to Yocupicio, 1 February 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-1; E. López to unknown, 24 September 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-1; Priani to Yocupicio, 27 December 1938, AHES-RE-1938, Caja S/N, 733“38”/2; Paz, Guaymas de ayer, 327-29. 247
“reactionaries, capitalists, fascists, resisters of the projects of the central government, and
uncultured.” He noted that the General Treasurer, José R. Berlanga, was the principal
introducer of alcohol from Sinaloa in the state. Francisco Enciso, a representative in the
state legislature, and Hermosillo mayor Juan León were also employees of the Cervecería
de Sonora and used their connections to run for political office, even though doing so was
expressly forbidden by the PNR’s regulations.162 Yocupicio himself disregarded the law
multiple times. He was accused of misappropriating government money and was
frequently seen in Nogales and Tucson, Arizona spending it in bars, hotels, and
bordellos.163 In other words, the governor and his administration did not try hard to mask their resistance to the anti-alcohol campaign or the authority of Cárdenas.
Therefore, the national government continued to monitor the temperance movement in this northern state. The increased number of letters sent to Sonoran political leaders by members of the DAA indicates not only the growing administrative strength of Cárdenas’s regime, but also the disregard of the Yocupicio government for the president and his anti-alcohol campaign.164 Occasionally, the governor, mayors, or other members of Yocupicio’s administration complied with requests to follow the law.165 In other cases, they cooperated only half-heartedly, closing a cantina, only to reopen it a
162 List of confidential facts, July 1937, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-2; Ramos Bours, “El incendio de la cervecería en 1926,” 1. 163 U.S. Consul Lewis Boyle, quoted in Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 71. 164 Francisco Nicodemo to Yocupicio, 1 February 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-2. AGN- DGG, Caja 9, Exps. 6-22. 165 Aguirre, Subsecretary of the Department of Education, to the Mayor of Ciudad Obregón, 16 August 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-1. AGN-DGG: Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 17 March 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-31041, Caja 9, Exp. 11; Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 5 April 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-29093, Caja 9, Exp. 9; Interim Governor Manuel C. Romo to Secretary of Government, 6 July 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32804, Caja 9, Exp. 14; M. Romo to Secretary of Government, 13 July 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32766, Caja 9, Exp. 13. 248 month later, or shutting down a bar with the pretext of fighting alcohol abuse, but allowing more dangerous clandestine establishments to function.166 In fact, a number of individuals who complained to the DAA or Cárdenas explained that they had first petitioned the governor and he had simply ignored their request.167 Most frequently, state authorities responded by denying the validity of a complaint or even slandering the petitioners. For example, School Inspector Francisco Zárate González asked that permits for cantinas be limited throughout the region of Huatabampo, for they encouraged peasants to waste their money, and led to violence, including the assault of teacher María
Ruíz Sotomayor. Etchojoa Mayor Jesús Ramírez labeled the inspector’s accusations as false: he had not allowed a cantina to open and the teacher had been beaten up by a brute, not a drunkard. Huatabampo Interim Mayor took his statement one step further, claiming that Zárate González himself frequently was inebriated, was a person of poor morals, and that he did not show proper respect to the authorities.168 Yocupico and his
166 Federación de Trabajadores del Estado de Sonora to Subsecretary of the Department of Education, 15 July 1937, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8401, Exp. S/N-1. 167 AGN-DGG: Secretaries Susana Contreras and Victoria de Santa Cruz, Liga Femenil de Lucha Social, Quechehueca, to Cárdenas, 10 February 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-30936, Caja 9, Exp. 10; President Rodolfo Valenzuela, Comisariado Ejidal, Quiriego, to Cárdenas, 7 June 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32766, Caja 9, Exp. 13. AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15: Santiago Díaz and 66 others, Empalme, to Yocupicio, 1 May 1938; Jesús V. Lizárraga, Pitiquito, to Cárdenas, 20 May 1938. 168 AGN-DGG: Mayor Jesús Ramírez, Jr., Etchojoa, to Secretary of Government, 18 March 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6; Interim Governor Carlos B. Maldonado to Zárate González, 18 March 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6; Interim Mayor Manuel Mexía, Huatabampo, to Secretary of Government, 22 March 1937 (two), Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6; Maldonado, State Secretary General, to Secretary of Government, 31 July 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp. 7; A. Zamora and M. Velarde to Cárdenas, 25 September 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp. 7; Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 30 October 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp. 7; Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 16 November 1937, Serie 2.015.4(22)-27693, Caja 9, Exp. 8; Hilario Olea, Jr., Sonoran State Authority, to Secretary of Government, 11 January 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-27693, Caja 9, Exp. 8; M. Romo, to DAA, 6 July 1938, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32468, Caja 9, Exp. 12; Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 11 April 1939, Serie 2.015.4(22)-36791, Caja 9, Exp. 16; Gilberto Suárez, Secretary of State, to Secretary of Government, 16 August 1939, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6; Suárez to 249 associates showed blatant disrespect for the temperance movement, and by extension, the president’s State-building project.
Although Cárdenas usually let his bureaucrats ensure that governors participated in the anti-alcohol campaign and obeyed the law, if a governor was particularly recalcitrant, like Yocupicio, he intervened directly.169 As the previously-mentioned example demonstrates, several attempts to close a cantina in Cócorit failed. Cárdenas then wrote to Yocupicio directly, saying, “As one of the principal aims that motivates the
current government . . . is to combat by all means possible the vice of intoxication, I will
need you to attend to the request in the best way.”170 Writing such epistles was often not enough, though. In May and June 1939, Cárdenas took a diplomatic visit to the rebellious Sonora to secure the loyalty of its political leaders and key residents. He did not go specifically to deal with problems related to alcohol, but many of the actions he took benefited the temperance movement. First, he outlawed liquor in the state during his time there. Second, after noting the harmful effects of alcohol consumption on workers, he asked Yocupicio to see that cantinas and other establishments be permanently closed in all mining communities, ejidos, work centers, and the agricultural Yaqui and Mayo districts, a request that became the basis of Cárdenas’s decree for all governors in June
1939.171 The fact that the president had to take such drastic measures to get Yocupicio to
Secretary of Government, 16 August 1939, Serie 2.015.4(22)-38466, Caja 9, Exp. 19. Yocupicio to García Téllez, 30 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15. 169 Cárdenas had to take a similar trip to Yucatán. Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 80-96. 170 Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 13 December 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15. 171 Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 12 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; Cárdenas to Yocupicio, 16 June 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/34; “Opinión editorial,” EN, 24 June 1939; “Ningún expendio de bebidas alcohólicas será permitido en los centros de trabajo. Por acuerdo expreso del Presidente de la República, serán clausurados las tabernas en las regiones industriales en todo el país,” EE, 25 June 1939; “Opinión 250 obey a provision of the Constitution of 1917, which had been turned into law in 1931, demonstrates that even the strongest executive could not simply impose his State- building project.
By 1934, the national government’s increased administrative strength led to a flurry of activity in the anti-alcohol campaign. The DEA, followed by the DAA, used its new-found authority not only to issue more propaganda, but also to monitor the progress of the movement in the states. In 1934 and 1935, the president and his bureaucrats did not have to demand that officials in Sonora obey them, for under the guidance of
Governors Rodolfo Elías Calles and Emiliano Corella M., the anti-alcohol campaign flourished, with restrictive legislation and a vibrant cultural component. Ironically, this situation was undermined by President Cárdenas as he attempted to secure the autonomy of his government. By purging the nation of supporters of the strongman Calles, the president inadvertently rid it of avid temperance advocates, as well. The Callistas’ successors, Jesús Gutiérrez Cázares and Román Yocupicio, did not do as much for the campaign, and in the case of Yocupicio, actively undermined it and the national government. Not only did the president and his bureaucrats have to more closely monitor the temperance movement in Sonora between 1936 and 1939, Cárdenas was also forced to decree his own anti-vice measures for the state, an unprecedented move.
After the armed phase of the Revolution, presidents and their political appointees set out to rebuild both the government and society at large. The anti-alcohol campaign
editorial. En defensa del trabajador,” EN, 26 June 1939; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 146-47, 205-06. 251 was a part of both of these attempts. However, these leaders did not create a new nation on their own, they needed the cooperation of a variety of social groups. This meant that a president who was willing and able to donate portions of the federal budget to the eradication of alcohol was important, but not the only factor necessary to creating a thriving temperance movement, for a president’s work would be for naught if governors, mayors, and even regular people resisted it. Three cases studies from Sonora have illustrated this point. From 1915-1919, while the national government was unable, and indeed, unwilling, to achieve many temperance-related goals, Governor Calles mandated an absolute moratorium on intoxicating beverages. His plan was actively resisted by ordinary, thirsty Sonorans, corrupt politicians, and eventually, even honest officials and the president, who demanded that alcohol laws not be so draconian, but rather, obey the constitution. In 1929, Governor Elías, with some prodding by the national temperance organization, the CNLCA, supported the anti-alcohol campaign, and passed some initial measures aimed at encouraging sobriety. Leading a weak regime that had just been imposed following a rebellion, Elías hoped that the temperance movement would help to pacify the population and make workers more efficient. These very weaknesses meant that the governor did not have enough resources to donate to the campaign, though, and he achieved very little. The years 1934 to 1939 represent both the high and the low points of the anti-alcohol campaign. The first two governors in this period, Rodolfo
Calles and Corella M., whole-heartedly supported the movement with restrictive legislation and a variety of cultural programs. But in President Cárdenas’s attempt to secure autonomy for his government, he forced these Callistas out of power. The 252 following two governors, Gutiérrez Cázares and Yocupicio, were indifferent and hostile to the campaign, respectively. The latter’s policies were so abysmal that the president, while touring the state, broke precedent and mandated his own temperance regulations there. In other words, thanks to the varied actions of presidents, governors, mayors, other political officials, and ordinary citizens, every time the anti-alcohol campaign in Sonora took “one step forward,” it was forced to take another “two steps back.” 253
CHAPTER 5 FIGHTING VICE, FORGING A NATION: UNOFFICIAL ANTI-ALCOHOL LEAGUES AND THE PARTICIPATORY STATE-BUILDING PROCESS, 1910-1940
Profesora Ernestina M. Alvarado presided over the Asociación Femenil Nacional de Temperancia (AFNT), a Mexico-City based group composed of teachers, wives of bureaucrats, and other prominent women.1 During the 1920s, she wrote dozens of letters to presidents, their wives, and their secretaries, asking for funding and a building for the organization, travel money to attend international temperance conferences, the ability to print free anti-alcohol propaganda, and even a better job with the Department of Public
Education so she could spend more time promoting sobriety. Occasionally, the national executive honored her request, but often not to the extent that Alvarado had hoped.
When a building granted to her did not meet her specifications or when she was only given permission to print a single issue of her temperance magazine, this intrepid woman continued to write to the president. She asked him to fully support her work, reminding him that it benefited the nation, and she promised she would report his benevolence to the wives and mothers of workers, a group that he had sworn to assist.2
1 This group had a variety of names: Asociación Femenil Nacional de Temperancia, Sociedad Femenil Mexicana de Temperancia, Sociedad Nacional de Temperancia, and Asociación Femenil Nacional de Temperancia y Mejoramiento Social, Federación de Madres "Natalia Chacón de Elías Calles." For simplicity’s sake, I will simply call them the Asociación Femenil Nacional de Temperancia or AFNT. 2 Ernestina M. Alvarado, President, AFNT, to Obregón, 18 October and 16 December 1922, AGN-FAP-O- C, Exp. 805-T-64; Alvarado to Calles, 13 May and 19 June 1925 and 6 February 1928, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-A-259; Alvarado to First Lady Natalia Chacón de Elías Calles, 6 October 1925, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-A-259; Alvarado to Calles, 19 January 1927, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 813-A-167; Alvarado to Calles, 25 November 1927, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-F-125; Alvarado to Calles, 21 June 1928, AGN- FAP-O-C, Exp. 826-A-92; Alvarado to Hortensia de Torreblanca, Calles’s daughter, wife of Fernando Torreblanca, and honorary member of the AFNT, 18 and 27 November 1928, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Archivo Fernando Torreblanca, Fondo Fernando Torreblanca (FAPECyFT-AFT-FFT), Fondo 13, Serie 010207, Exp. “131”/102, Inv. 553, Leg. 1; Alvarado to Portes Gil, 26 February and 24 August 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/365/802; Alvarado and María Luisa A. de Lozano, Vice President, AFNT, to Torreblanca, 2 May and 2 July 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/365/802; Alvarado to Torreblanca, 13 June 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/365/802; María Luisa L. de 254
Similarly, in 1937, sixteen men from the Yaqui tribe in Vicam, Sonora wrote a
letter to President Cárdenas, soliciting a variety of improvements on their territory. In addition to requests for racial equality, medical services and the construction of new schools, the men asked that intoxicating beverages be restricted, for drunkenness was degenerating their people. Although the sale of alcohol in this indigenous region was supposedly illegal, the writers explained that officials prohibited beer one day, only to tolerate wine the next. After discussing these outrages for pages, the men very respectfully closed by explaining to the President that they wrote to him because they only desired their own betterment as well as that of the Mexican nation.3
These stories nuance the commonly-held perception that temperance movements and State-building projects are predominantly directed from above. Although political leaders and bureaucrats did gear Mexico’s official anti-alcohol campaign at working- class and indigenous men, whom they viewed as problem drinkers and victimizers of women and children, in reality individuals from a variety of classes and ethnicities and both genders shared a concern about alcoholism. Furthermore, government officials may have seen the populace as uninterested in temperance and in need of guidance, but many citizens began fighting for sobriety long before the creation of the CNLCA in 1929 and throughout the entire Revolution, they refused to be manipulated. As members of
Junyent, Sub-Secretary, AFNT, to Portes Gil, 14 January 1930, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 1/849; Alvarado to Ortiz Rubio, 27 June 1930, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 183/483 (1930), Registro (Reg). 3609; Alvarado to Ortiz Rubio, 24 July 1930, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 220/805 (1930), Reg. 5230; Alvarado and Guadalupe C. de Mieres, AFNT, to Ortiz Rubio, n.d. [around 17 October 1930], AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 227/805 (1930); Alvarado to the Oficial Mayor, n.d., AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/217 (1930). 3 Crl. Francisco Pluma Blanca, Cpt. Sebastian González, Cpt. Agustín Castillo, Lt. Simon Espinosa, Mayor Manuel Valencia, Subte. José María Aldama, Cpt. Bernardo López, Lt. Juan María Buitimea, Lt. Nicolas Flores, José Miranda, Lt. Tomás Cupiz, Mjr. Manuel Valenzuela, Lt. Cenobio Valenzuela, Anselmo Espinosa, Antonio Flores, and R. Armita, Estación Vicam, to Cárdenas, 20 August 1937, AGN-FAP-LC), Exp. 533.11/1. 255 temperance leagues and communities, or even as individuals, ordinary citizens from the
1910s on distributed propaganda and wrote letters to their officials, asking that they enforce alcohol legislation and live up to their revolutionary promises. In other words, people from all social backgrounds were actively involved in fighting vice, and in the process, they helped to forge a new nation.
In the period from 1910 to 1924, average men and women from a variety of class and ethnic backgrounds expressed their concern about the problem of alcohol abuse.
Upper- and middle-class temperance leagues focused on propaganda and education, while lower-class groups, usually labor unions, communities, and even individuals, took more direct action by writing to their political leaders and asking them to curtail vice. As presidents wanted to encourage sobriety, but were both ideologically passive and administratively weak, they lauded the efforts of these groups, although they could lend them little more than moral support. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of citizens in these years wrote to governors for help instead, as they probably seemed more involved in the anti-alcohol campaign and a more prominent presence than their national counterparts.
Between 1924 and 1932, especially in the years following 1929, the number of groups and individuals that advocated a sober nation increased significantly. Upper- and middle-class temperance leagues and lower-class organizations that focused on a variety of issues continued to exist, but their relationship to the government changed. Leaders of ideologically active regimes no longer needed to support independent groups that did work they could not do; rather, these organizations began to be incorporated into the 256
CNLCA. Indeed, a growing number of unofficial reformers wrote to the president for
help following 1929. However, because these executives still presided over
administratively weak governments, a significant number of requests continued to be
directed to governors.
The number of temperance-oriented organizations increased even more
dramatically in the period from 1932 to 1940. This growth can likely be traced to the fact
that the ideologically active and administratively stronger presidents of this period succeeded in spreading their anti-vice message. These leaders also encouraged popular mobilization, in part to uplift the masses, and in part to counteract the influence of regional and state political authorities. Indeed, the number of anti-alcohol related
petitions to governors declined drastically in favor of presidential supplications. By
1937, as the power of the federal government grew, and moved politically to the right,
popular support became less necessary. Leaders of the DAA in 1939 feared that
unofficial temperance leagues had become too autonomous, and the government sought
to eliminate them. Members of these local groups refused to be silenced, though: they
continued to push for sober communities and for officials who upheld the promises of the
Revolution.
In fact, throughout this entire social movement, average men and women not only
fought vice in their communities, they also actively worked to forge a new nation. Their
contributions perhaps were not as influential as those of politicians or intellectuals, but
they did help to shape the course of the Revolution. They assisted in the State-building
process by willingly joining hundreds of temperance leagues, as well as labor unions, 257
parent associations, and Masonic lodges that reported on violations of existing alcohol
legislation, distributed pro-temperance propaganda, and persuaded family members to
remain sober. These groups’ associates also worked to transform society in ways perhaps
unintended by the presidents who launched and continued the anti-alcohol campaign by
insisting that all authorities act vigorously to eliminate vice, obey the Constitution, and
thus uphold the ideals of the Revolution.
Sources
This chapter is by no means a definitive history of the unofficial anti-alcohol
campaign, or the groups and their members that participated in it. Unlike in the United
States, the records of Mexican temperance leagues have not been collected in private archives. Rather, to find information about these groups, one has to look in a variety of locations, including national, state, and local archives, newspaper and magazine articles, and United States consular reports. Often, the information about these organizations is sparse: articles might mention the name of a group in passing and archives might contain a letter or two that a temperance advocate wrote to an official, along with, at times, a response back from that leader. This limited information precludes writing a narrative about each individual association and instead necessitates placing the overall data into categories and analyzing them. These categories include: types of organizations, their members, their social background, which authority figure they wrote for help, and what response, if any, they received. 258
Even quantification has its limits. It is impossible to know how many unofficial groups might have existed throughout the country. Political leaders claimed that there were a total of 2400 anti-alcohol leagues nationwide by July 1938. The number could be high, though, because officials may have exaggerated to make the campaign appear more successful than it actually was. Alternately, it is also possible that the number is on the low side, for it only counts groups that exclusively fought alcoholism and omits those interested in multiple causes.4 This chapter examines 326 organizations, including anti- alcohol associations, labor unions, and individuals, that promoted temperance (and perhaps other projects) and that were located in Sonora or were based in Mexico City but claimed to have national aims. They are known because they petitioned a government official, distributed a piece of propaganda, or wrote a newspaper article, and this
information was then collected in an archive. Countless other organizations and
individuals concerned about temperance, but whose names were never recorded, may
have also existed. Similarly, this chapter finds that the groups examined had at least
3290 members, but this number is not exact either. When most organizations wrote a
4 Daniels to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 August 1934, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/102; minutes, DAA, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; “1,500 comités contra el alcoholismo en el país,” EN, 10 August 1935; “10 mil comités informativos en contra del alcoholismo van a ser fundados este año,” EN, 22 January 1936; “La acción en contra del alcoholismo. La Dirección del ramo inició ya una serie de trabajos para intensificarla sin interrupción. Se espera que habrá 10,000 comités y subcomités al terminarse este año. Reunión antialcohólica. Será efectuado un congreso infantil. Se organizará el Comité Nacl. Femenino,” EN, 19 March 1936; “Informe de las actividades concretas desarolladas durante el año comprendido entre el 1o. de septiembre de 1935 y el 1o. de septiembre de 1936,” Salubridad: Organo del Departamento de Salubridad Pública (S) 6, no. 1 (January-December 1935, January-June 1936): 77, Biblioteca del Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia; “La Segunda Asamblea Contra el Alcoholismo. Participarán escolares de toda la república en la reunión de referencia. La convocatoria respectiva. La organizan el Departamento de Salubridad Pública y la Secretaría de Educación, del 17-24 de abril próximo,” EN, 22 February 1938; “Ruda campaña contra el alcoholismo en toda la república,” La Prensa (Mexico City) (LP), 5 July 1938. 259
letter or an editorial, only a single person, or at most a few officers, signed it. There were
likely dozens if not hundreds of additional reformers in these associations.
The Unofficial Anti-Alcohol Campaign and the State-Building Process, 1910-1924
In the period from 1910 to 1924, government officials were not the only figures
concerned with the spread of vice. Over these fourteen years, at least sixty-four
organizations or individuals from Mexico City and Sonora voiced their dismay about
alcohol abuse through letters and newspaper articles. Four of these groups (6.3 percent)
were exclusively temperance leagues, and their work, like that of contemporary
presidents, was largely cultural in nature.5 The Liga Antialcohólica Nacional,
presumably based in Mexico City, or at least with a branch in the capital, was one
exception. In an article published in an Hermosillo newspaper in 1916, one group
member opined that alcoholism could not be curtailed by destroying the alcohol industry
or by employing indirect measures, such as propaganda. He or she suggested, instead,
harsh punishments for drinkers so that they would not continue to set bad examples.6 The
Ligas Patrióticas-Moralizadoras de la República also worked to fight alcoholism in the masses, but using instruction. President Ocampo N. Bolaños (himself an educator) and
Secretary Ignacio Flores Maciel suggested teaching children and workers about the dangers of intoxication, organizing leagues across the nation, and distributing temperance
5 Unless otherwise noted, the rest of the statistics in this section will be based on the sixty-four known temperance organizations from 1910 to 1924. 6 Other than this brief piece, the LAN left no other trace. Liga Antialcohólica Nacional, “La campaña antialcohólica,” Reforma Social (Hermosillo), 19 May 1916, 2. 260
literature. These reformers also noted that they supported legal change to end vice, but
they did not elaborate on the matter.7
One of the groups most involved in education was the Asociación de Temperancia
(AT).8 In 1918, two hundred doctors, teachers, bureaucrats, and other prominent men and women in Mexico City formed this organization in the hopes of helping the working classes and “beginning” an anti-alcohol campaign in the country. By 1922, the group had established branches in five northern states, counted itself a member of the Permanent
International Committee of the General Council of the World League Against
Alcoholism, and secured a nomination to attend the Fifteenth International Congress
Against Alcoholism in Washington, D.C. The members of this organization hoped to publish pamphlets, newspapers, and scientific studies about alcoholism that could be distributed nationwide, but limited resources prevented them from doing so. In order to counteract their economic shortcomings, members wrote to President Obregón and his wife, María Tapia de Obregón, themselves honorary AT members, and asked for funding and printing equipment. In lieu of monetary donations, leaders of the Asociación de
Temperancia also requested that politicians lend their time and influence to the cause.
For example, Secretary Epigmenio Velasco wrote to Obregón in 1920, asking him what he planned to do about vice when he became president in a few months, and to Sonora
7 The Ligas Patrióticas-Moralizadoras de la República (LPMR) may have been related to the Liga Antialcohólica Nacional. Bolaños and Flores Maciel noted that the LPMR had originally had the name Ligas Antialcohólicas Nacionales. Bolaños and Flores Maciel to De la Huerta, 17 July 1921, AHES-RE- 1921, Tomo 3471; photograph, 1923, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Fototeca Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles, (FAPECyFT-FAPEC), Inv. 671. 8 The Asociación de Temperancia began as the Asociación Antialcohólica Nacional in 1918, and changed its name in 1920. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the group simply as the Asociación de Temperancia or AT. 261
Governor Adolfo De la Huerta in 1921, requesting that he give the group his moral support.9
Teacher Rafael Mallén created another of these culturally-oriented leagues, the
Asociación Nacional de Temperancia (ANT), in Mexico City in 1923. The group aimed to study the causes of vice, brainstorm solutions for them, and then carry out these strategies, in part by lobbying for temperance-oriented laws to be passed. It is unclear if
they achieved these goals, but the members did have success in educating the average
citizen about the dangers of alcohol addiction. Mallén, recently returned from the United
States, led the way in this effort by translating American temperance material into
Spanish and distributing millions of flyers. Other members traveled throughout the
country and delivered scientific anti-alcohol harangues. Mallén and other teachers also
used their connection with the Department of Public Education to push for temperance
education for all ages in the classroom.10
Other groups that fought habitual intoxication in the early years of the Revolution
labored for a variety of causes. For instance, the AFNT formed in 1922 not only to teach
9 “La campaña que se hará contra el alcoholismo. Acaba de fundarse una liga se denominara ‘Asociación Antialcohólica Nacional’ que atacará el vicio,” E, 12 April 1919, 1; Charles H. Cunningham, Vice Consul, Mexico City, to U.S. Consulate General, 16 April 1919, RDS, 812.114 Liquors/9; Epigmenio Velasco, Secretary, AT, to Obregón, 20 August 1920, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Archivo Fernando Torreblanca, Fondo Álvaro Obregón, (FAPECyFT-FT-FAO), Fondo 11, Serie 030500, Exp. 1563, Inv. 4435, Leg. 1; Velasco to De la Huerta, 13 May 1921, AHES-RE-1921, Tomo 3412; Dr. Ignacio Torres Delgado, Secretary General, AT, Mexico City, to unknown, 20 August 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46; Torres Delgado to Obregón, 21 October 1921 and 16 January 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46; Torres Delgado to First Lady María Tapia de Obregón, Honorary Vice President, AT, 10 February 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46. 10 “Hay más tísicos en los niños de padres bebedores,” 1921, AHSSA-FSSA-SSA, Caja 17, Exp. 2; General Constitution, Asociación Nacional de Temperancia (ANT), 8 September 1923, AHSSA-FSSA-SSA, Caja 17, Exp. 2; Andrés Osuna, Secretary, ANT, to Torreblanca, 6 August 1924, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 814-A- 119; Rafael Mallén to Dr. Rafael Pascacio Gamboa, 13 October 1947, AHSSA-FSSA-SSA, Caja 17, Exp. 2. 262
men and children about the dangers of alcoholism but also to show mothers how to care
for their children and their homes. These female activists organized mothers’ clubs in
primary schools throughout Mexico City and hoped to open up other branches of the
AFNT throughout the nation. The group’s president and secretary, Alvarado and Josefina
Casas Labastida, further represented it in the World League Against Alcoholism.11
Many organizations (fifteen, or 23.4 percent) concerned about alcohol abuse from
1910 to 1924, did not even identify themselves primarily as temperance-oriented. These
institutions included labor unions, a political party, and a medical organization, among
others.12 For instance, Francisco R. Neblina, the President of the Club Ignacio Ramírez in Pitiquito, defined it in 1919 as a revolutionary party whose members strove to conserve social morality and create respect for the law.13 At least eight newspapers (12.5 percent) helped to educate the citizenry about alcoholism, in addition to the other political, economic, and social topics they covered. The papers not only reported on the government’s efforts to eradicate this disease, but also printed stories and poems that portrayed the horrors of intoxication. One 1917 piece from the Hermosillo daily
Orientación described the tavern as an “antechamber of crime, the incubator of future
11 Reglamento de la Asociación Femenil Nacional de Temperancia, 15 June 1922, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4; “La labor moralizadora de la Sociedad de Temperancia. Numerosas personas se han adherido en defensa de la colectividad,” n.t., n.d., attached to Alvarado to Obregón, 18 October 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-T-64; Alvarado to Obregón, 18 October 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-T-64. 12 Thomas Miller Klubock also finds that labor unions in 1920s-1940s Chile supported sobriety to protect workers. Klubock, “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines,” 451. 13 Federico de la Colina, Casa del Obrero Mundial, 1912, quoted in Lear, Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens, 174; [Toni? Farías?], President, Junta Organizadora del VI Congreso Médico Nacional, to Governor Soriano, 22 May 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Neblina to De la Huerta, 10 November 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293; Ramón B. Espinoza, Sindicato Obrero de la Secretaría del Exterior, Nogales, 6 and 29 January 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3364; Aurelio Méndez de León, Unión Obrera Mutualista de Sahuaripa, to Secretary of State of Sonora, 8 March 1930, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3365, 1a Parte. 263 evils, the fertilizer of misery and moral relaxation.”14 Like other groups, newspapers combated vice as one goal among many.
In the early years of the Revolution, the majority of complaints about excessive
alcohol consumption came from individuals and communities (forty-four, or 68.8
percent), as opposed to established organizations. Some of these concerned people wrote
letters to the authorities or to newspapers, complaining about vice in their neighborhoods
or about existing alcohol legislation being too lax. For instance, an anonymous group of
wives and mothers in Hermosillo in 1922 asked Governor De la Huerta either to get rid of
all cantinas, or move them out of the center of town, where they had too much power to
lure their husbands and sons after work.15 Others praised political leaders for their
14 See: O, Malkriado, EU, La Nación, El Tiempo, EO, NE, and La Prensa de Sonora. “La taberna,” O, 29 August 1917. 15 Anonymous, Magdalena, to Soriano, 23 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3125; A. López, E. N. Matus, R. E. Duarte, A. C. Encinas, P. M. Navarro, J. P. Castro, J. Acosta, J. Barreras, J. López, D. Vázquez, A. Barreras hijo, H. Mipiles, Pedro Urías, and M. L Goycochea, 24 September 1917, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; E. Cota, Álamos, to Soriano, 7 October 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; E. Cota to Soriano, 25 March 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; E. Verdugo to Calles, 23 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205; L. L. Arias to Calles, 20 October 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3205; residents of Empalme to Calles, 25 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294. AHES-RE-1920: anonymous, Estación Esperanza to De la Huerta, 14, 24, and 29 February 1920, Tomo 3362, 2a Parte; farmers, Campo 66, to unknown, 15 February 1920, Tomo 3362, 2a Parte; Méndez de León to Sonora Secretary of State, 23 February, 8 and 17 March, 22 April, and 7 June 1920, Tomo 3365, 1a Parte; Antonio González, Agua Prieta, to De la Huerta, 3 March 1920, Tomo 3362, 1a Parte; Mariano F. Montaño, Moctezuma, to De la Huerta, 20 June 1920, Tomo 3365, 1a Parte; I[Y]gnacio Márquez, Pótam, to Governor Flavio A. Bórquez, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3361, 2a Parte; petition, families, Sahuaripa, 9 July 1920, Tomo 3365, 1a Parte; Luis Hernández, Guaymas, to De la Huerta, 27 July 1920, Tomo 3362, 2a Parte; Antonia Acuña de Ortíz, Jesús V. de Vázquez, Rosa A. de Galindo, Arselia A. de Ybarra, Guadalupe A. de Montaño, Guadalupe V. de Tolano, Leonor V. de Velarde, and Santos F. de Moreno, Tepache, to Bórquez, 21 August 1920, Tomo 3365, 1a Parte; José María Cordova, Hermosillo, to unknown, 14 September 1920, Tomo 3363; Eduardo Encinas, San Javier, to Bórquez, 17 September 1920, Tomo 3363; Juan D. Gastellum, Tubutama, to unknown, 5 October 1920, Tomo 3362, 1a Parte; I[Y]. Márquez to Bórquez, 15 November 1920, Tomo 3362, 2a Parte; Anonymous, Nogales, to Bórquez, 11 December 1920, Tomo 3364; anonymous to unknown, n.d. [1920?], Tomo 3364. Teodoro Vasconcelos, Comisión ?, to Obregón, 15 April 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 427-V- 10; anonymous, n.d., AHES-RE-1921, Tomo 3412. AHES-RE-1922, Tomo 3480: anonymous wives and mothers, Hermosillo, to De la Huerta, March 1922; M. N. Olea, Felipe Ruiz, Aurelio D. García, Francisco Encinas, and R. Francisco Torres, Bácum, to De la Huerta, 6 April 1922; Lorenzo Walters, Sáric, to unknown, 20 August 1922. Parents, Agua Prieta, to José Vasconcelos, Chief of the Department of Public 264 actions in combating alcoholism. In July 1920, a group of families in Nogales thanked
Governor Flavio A. Bórquez for closing all cantinas located within 150 miles of the border because this was an area families traversed regularly. Claiming to share his morality and his desire to make the city great, they further suggested that all dispensaries of alcohol be moved to a separate zone of tolerance.16 Some people wanted to help the official anti-alcohol campaign. For example, during Sonora’s Decree One Prohibition of the 1910s, Mónico Noriega of Hermosillo and several others asked to be made secret police officers to assist in the eradication of vice. The Mexico-City based chemist, Elie
Delafond, offered his services to Obregón in the early 1920s, claiming that he could extract sugar rather than pulque from the maguey plant, a more beneficial product for society.17
Although the government accused lower-class and indigenous men of drinking more than their peers, ordinary citizens who fought temperance of their own accord came from a variety of class-, ethnic-, and gender-backgrounds. Based on their stated occupations, or at times, last names, only five (7.8 percent) of the sixty-four known anti- alcohol organizations that existed from 1910 to 1924 contained members that hailed exclusively from the upper or middle classes. Another four groups (6.3 percent) likely
Education, 16 April 1923, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 71, Exp. 66; unknown, Navojoa, to Corona, 19 April 1924, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 64, Exp. 60. 16 Families, Nogales, to Bórquez, 18 July 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3365, 2a Parte; colonists, San Luis, Río Colorado, to De la Huerta, 17 April 1922, AHES-RE-1922, Tomo 3480. 17 Mónico S. Noriega, Hermosillo, to Calles, 30 July 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; Toribio García, Ronquillo, to Calles, 22 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Méndez de León to Calles, 22 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; Ventura [Pro?] to Calles, 21 September 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2: Delafond to Obregón, 14 December 1921 and 7 January 1922; Delafond to Torreblanca, 14 February 1922; José D. Morales to Obregón, 15 November 1922. Delafond to Obregón, 20 May, 16 and 23 October, and 11 November 1922, 7 July 1923, and n.d., AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 808-A-35; J. [Aylumno?], Personal Assistant of the Chief of the Department of Public Health to the Personal Secretary of Obregón, 27 February 1923, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 241-D2-M-8. 265
were also composed of people from the highest echelons of society. Six others (9.4 percent) can be classified as working-class organizations, while three more groups (4.7 percent) probably fit this description, as well. One organization had members from the middle-as well as the lower-classes. It also is difficult to deduce the ethnicity of unofficial temperance reformers, for no one self-identified as indigenous, mestizo, or any other category. Based on the areas in which they lived, seven groups (10.9 percent) may have been composed of Mayo, Ópata, Pima, or Tonichi Indians. Three organizations (4.7 percent) either complained that the Yaquis constantly got drunk, or hailed from a region in Sonora largely composed of immigrants from other parts of the nation, as well as foreign countries, so it can be assumed that they were not indigenous themselves.
Members from the other fifty-four associations (84.4 percent) came from unknown backgrounds. It is easier to document gender in temperance groups, using names of organizations as well as people’s titles and first and last names. Forty-one groups (64.1 percent) had at least some, if not all, male members. Only four associations (6.3 percent) were exclusively peopled by women and another one probably was. The gender of seventeen groups’ members (26.6 percent) is unknown. While these statistics cannot conclusively elucidate all reformers’ class, ethnicity, and gender, they do demonstrate that not all working-class and indigenous men rejected the anti-alcohol campaign.
The manner in which groups and individuals expressed their concern about alcohol abuse reflects the nature of both national and state governments. From 1910 to
1924, presidents were ideologically passive and administratively weak, while their regional counterparts, at least in the state of Sonora, were active and at times more 266
powerful. Therefore, it is not surprising that out of ninety-four total requests to support a
temperance league or to end vice in one’s community, most (forty-eight, or 51.1
percent)18 were directed to state authorities.19 Reformers sent forty-four letters (46.8 percent) to the governor and four (4.3 percent) to the state secretary. Some of these writers noted that they had previously solicited the assistance of mayors or other low- level officials. National figures, on the other hand, only received 19.1 percent of all requests. These went to the president (thirteen, or 13.8 percent), his wife (one) and bureaucrats at the Departments of Public Education (three, or 3.2 percent) or Public
Health (one). Some people (29.8 percent) expressed frustration with vice without actually making a request to a Mexican official. They did so through newspaper articles, a pamphlet, and a letter to the United States Secretary of State. These statistics indicate that the vast majority of concerned citizens in the early years of the Revolution did not turn to the national government for help in combating chronic inebriation.
The responses by governmental leaders to requests for assistance or complaints about vice further reflect the nature of their regimes. Although officials’ reactions in many cases (42.6 percent) could not be judged, state leaders in general appeared to have taken more direct action than their national counterparts. In response to eight out of forty-eight petitions directed to the state level (16.7 percent), governors asked municipal
18 The rest of the statistics in this paragraph are based on the ninety-four requests that were written, rather than the sixty-four groups that wrote, from 1910 to 1924. 19 Ann L. Craig finds that because the federal government was weak and distant in the 1920s and ‘30s, people rarely saw it as the source of their problems. Rather, they blamed (and thus petitioned) state and local leaders. Heather Fowler-Salamini argues that because the national government was not yet strong enough, independent socialist movements until 1926 pressured their state, not their federal, officials to enforce the national Constitution of 1917. These conclusions parallel my own findings. See: Ann L. Craig, “Legal Constraints and Mobilization Strategies in the Countryside,” in Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico, ed. Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 62; Fowler-Salamini, “Decentering the 1920s,” 293. 267
authorities to verify informants’ claims, although it is unclear if they ever acted upon the
information.20 They denied four requests (8.3 percent), but only because the supplicants asked to be made alcohol inspectors and there were no available positions at the time.21
In nine instances (18.8 percent), state leaders honored petitions. In most cases, this involved taking a direct action, like in 1919, when Governor De la Huerta, after receiving a telegram from members of the Club Ignacio Ramírez, ordered that a cantina in Pitiquito be closed and that its owner be fined. In two examples (4.2 percent), state authorities responded in a more passive manner, by lending moral support to national temperance leagues or granting them the right to distribute propaganda in the state.22 In two other
cases, not included in the forty-eight because the letter writers did not request anything,
unofficial reformers thanked the governor for having taken action in cleaning up their
neighborhoods.23
The presidential record was more mixed. National leaders denied one out of eighteen petitions outright because of a lack of funding.24 In two cases (11.1 percent), the president could not give the supplicant what he or she asked for, but offered something else instead. For example, members of the AT asked for a linotype and paper to make
20 The percentages in this paragraph are derived from the forty-eight requests specifically sent to state leaders from 1910 to 1924. 21 Unknown to Noriega, 9 August 1917, AHES-RE-1917, Tomo 3124; unknown to T. García, 22 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201; unknown to Méndez de León, 22 July 1918, AHES-RE-1918, Tomo 3201. 22 De la Huerta to unknown, 11 and 19 November 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3293; De la Huerta to Velasco, 10 June 1921, AHES-RE-1921, Tomo 3412; De la Huerta to Bolaños and Flores Maciel, 28 July 1921, AHES-RE-1921, Tomo 3471. 23 Families to Bórquez, 18 July 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3365, 2a Parte; colonists to De la Huerta, 17 April 1922, AHES-RE-1922, Tomo 3480. 24 The percentages in this paragraph are derived from the eighteen requests specifically sent to national leaders from 1910 to 1924. 268
propaganda but got the right to use government presses free of charge, instead.25
National officials responded positively to three requests (16.7 percent). One of these grants was active in nature: Obregón commissioned the chemist Delafond to study the transformation of the pulque industry into something more useful.26 The others worked to create sobriety through moral persuasion. Minister of the Department of Public
Education Vasconcelos authorized members of the AFNT in 1924 to form mothers’ and girls’ clubs that would give temperance lectures in primary schools across Mexico City, while Obregón gave a small stipend to the AT to continue their cultural work.27 The statistics indicate that perhaps in spite of appearances, national and state authorities had a more or less equal desire to help unofficial reformers. Both sets of governments were administratively weak, so they could not provide much monetary assistance. Because
Sonora’s governors were ideologically active, while presidents were not, the former responded in a more active, engaged manner than the latter did to requests to combat vice.
The Unofficial Anti-Alcohol Campaign and the State-Building Process, 1924-1932
From 1924 to 1932, popular interest in combating vice increased. In this eight- year period, 107 organizations or individuals expressed their interest in temperance, seventy-eight of which (72.9 percent) appeared in the historical record after President
25 AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46: Torres Delgado to Obregón, 21 October 1921; Obregón to Torres Delgado, n.d. 26 Delafond to Torreblanca, 14 February 1922, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-P-2. 27 Torres Delgado to unknown, 20 August 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46; Obregón to Treasury, 14 September 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46; Conrado A. Morales, Sub-Secretary, AT, to Obregón, 18 October 1921, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 816-A-46; José Vasconcelos, Minister of the Department of Public Education, 15 March 1924, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4. 269
Portes Gil launched the official anti-alcohol campaign in 1929.28 Seven of these 107 groups (6.5 percent) were temperance leagues. As before, these organizations used mostly educational strategies to fight vice. For example, the Liga Antialcohólica
Mexicana (LAM), which at least two teachers formed in 1928, sent members to speak in schools in Mexico City. By May 1929, they had collected the signatures of 150 youths who vowed to abstain from alcohol. On May Day of that year, LAM members distributed twenty thousand pamphlets to workers. The group also sent lecturers to Cuba and published an anti-alcohol newspaper with articles and poems. The editors claimed that many people thanked the LAM for its helpful activities. Additionally, in 1929, the teacher Andrés Osuna of the ANT published an informative booklet entitled Alcoholismo, filled with statistics about alcohol production and consumption, as well as the drink’s link to disease, accidents, and crime. Other educators, politicians, and unofficial reformers used this tract extensively.29 Some temperance leagues relied on more active techniques
or encouraged their political leaders to take legislative measures. For instance, an
unnamed group in Mexico City, composed of doctors, pharmacists, and their wives,
wanted to create a hospital for recovering alcoholics in 1929. There, they would apply the treatment pioneered by the late Dr. José Hernández Ortega, who had dedicated his life to the anti-alcohol mission. A newspaper article noted that an Hermosillo-based Comité
28 Until otherwise noted, the statistics in this section are derived from the 107 temperance groups from 1924 to 1932. 29 Prof. J. T. Ramírez, Secretary, Liga Antialcohólica Mexicana (LAM), to Portes Gil, 17 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; M. Montoya, President, Instrucción y Temperancia, to Portes Gil, 29 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Notas del redactor,” El vocero antialcohólico: Organo oficial de la Liga Antialcohólica Mexicana 1, no. 6 (May and June 1929): 1-2, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 8, Exp. 10; “Manifesto de un taberno,” El vocero antialcohólico, 1, no. 6 (May and June 1929): 7-8; Osuna, El alcoholismo. 270
Antialcohólico put together a petition signed by 1300 of the city’s residents in December
1929 that asked Governor Elías to pass a total prohibition in the state.30 These groups forged a similar path as national leaders: they continued to rely on education in the fight against intemperance, but they combined it with limited attempts at legislative reform.
Two groups (1.9 percent) mixed temperance and the enrichment of women’s lives. The most prominent in this field was the still-active AFNT. This association
published a newsletter, Humanidad, which promoted sobriety as well as women’s rights,
protection of children, and nationalism. Alvarado and other members continued through at least 1930 to organize mothers’ groups in Mexico City schools. These leagues prepared women to be “model” housewives by giving classes on cooking and hygiene, promoting the construction of libraries and lecture halls, and hosting temperance speakers. The AFNT remained connected to international organizations, as well.
Alvarado was designated the President of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance
Union White Ribbon Forces in Mexico, and tried to attend temperance conventions in
Baltimore in 1925 and in Switzerland three years later.31 The other group to promote
30 Report No. 11, Comisión de Medidas Sanitarias, to the Secretary of CNLCA, 15 September 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; “En breve se formará un Comité Antialcohólico,” EP, 12 December 1929, 4; Amasbindo Cepeda, Dr. Horaclio Ortiz R., Octavio Bertrant, Central Committee, Fuerza y Acción, Agrupación Contra la Embriaguez, to Ortiz Rubio, 15 February 1930, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/217 (1930); Cepeda, H. Ortiz R., and Bertrant, to Ortiz Rubio, 8 March 1930, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 163/104 (1930), Reg. 3124. 31 Alvarado to Chacón de Elías Calles, 6 October 1925, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-A-259; J. Pichardo, Chief of the Department of Primary and Normal Instruction, to Alvarado, 25 May 1927, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4; Anna Gordon, President, World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, to Alvarado, 13 January 1928, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-F-125; Alvarado to Calles, 6 February 1928, AGN- FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-A-259; Gordon to H. de Torreblanca, 11 and 23 February 1928, FAPECyFT-AFT- FFT, Fondo 13, Serie 010207, Exp. “230”/279, Inv. 730, Leg. 1; Padilla to Alvarado, 19 October 1929, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4; Instrucciones para la organización de las Ligas Femeninas de Temperancia y Mejoramiento Social, 12 January 1930, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4; L. de Junyent to Portes Gil, 14 January 1930, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 1/849. 271
temperance and women’s rights was the Rama Pro-Temperancia de la Unión Nacional
Femenina.32 This group hosted an anti-alcohol festival for the whole family in Mexico
City in September 1932. The evening featured music (including a temperance hymn) and a lecture by the teacher Antonio Gutiérrez y Olivares.33 Both groups considered anti- alcohol work to be one part of creating more responsible, educated (although not necessarily emancipated) women.
As in the previous period, the majority of organizations that registered concerns
about alcohol abuse primarily worked toward achieving other goals. Eleven newspapers
(10.3 percent) ran reports about the national and state anti-alcohol campaigns, as well as editorials, stories, and poems promoting sobriety. El Intruso of Cananea and El Pueblo of Hermosillo also interviewed ordinary citizens and asked them how they would carry out the temperance movement if they were politicians.34 Nine urban and rural labor unions (8.4 percent), two mining companies (1.9 percent), and one business organization all hoped to prevent workers from becoming intoxicated, although perhaps for opposing reasons. For instance, representatives of mining companies in El Tigre and Nacozari complained that, thanks to cantinas, laborers had poor attendance on Saturdays,
Mondays, and Tuesdays, and this affected the businesses’ output. However, Jesús
Delgado, secretary of the Sindicato Obrero in La Dura feared that if his compatriots
32 The Rama Pro-Temperencia de la Unión Nacional Femenina was also referred to as the Unión Nacional Femenina Pro-Temperancia de la República Mexicana. For simplicity’s sake, I will only use the former name, or RPTUNF. 33 Flyer, RPTUNF, n.d. [1931 or 1932?], BMLT-AE- Ø03314; DAEO to the Sección Subsecretaría de Educación Pública, 6 September 1932, AHSEP-SSEP, Caja 4, Exp. 33. 34 See NE, El Oasis (Hermosillo), EO, EP, LR, Mercurio (Mexico City?), El Progreso (Hermosillo), EN, LPSDV, Crisol, EI. “La campaña antialcohólica—lo que dicen nuestros lectores sobre la pregunta ¿Qué haría Ud. como gobernante contra el alcoholismo?” EP, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, and 18 June 1929; “Sección antialcohólica a disposición del público,” EI, 13, 14, 16-19 December 1930. 272 drank on Sunday, they would come to work hung over, making accidents more likely.35
Three Masonic lodges (2.8 percent) also promoted temperance. In fact, Grand Masters forbade the use of alcohol at meetings, and members seen at a bar would be deprived of their rights. These regulations were so strict because Masons, like Alfonso LaMadrid of
Mexico City, believed that they ought to lead by example.36
The number of individuals and communities (fifty-five, or 51.4 percent) that supported the anti-alcohol campaign remained high. As before, these concerned citizens wrote to their political leaders, asking for vice to be curtailed or making suggestions on how best to attain sober constituents. Jesús Castro Torres of Cananea was one such reformer. In 1929, he reported that a “factory” in the mountains of Sonora made adulterated mescal, defrauded the government of tax revenue, and forced its workers to toil long hours for low pay. Leonardo M. Ballesteros suggested in the same year that to avoid the loss of governmental revenue by dishonest alcohol producers, as well as to
35 AHES-RE-1926, Tomo 42: Alejandro Trujillo, mayor, El Tigre, to Governor Alejo Bay, 21 January 1926; Jesús Delgado, Secretary, Sindicato Obrero de La Dura, to Bay, 5 February 1926; A. B. Álvarez, Secretary, Sindicato de Obreros y Trabajadores (SOT), Los Angeles, to Sindicato Laborista de Sonora, 27 June 1926; Frank Ayer, Manager, Moctezuma Copper Co., Nacozari, to unknown, 11 November 1926. Eduardo M. Butron, Oficial Mayor, Secretariat of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, to Bay, 26 March 1927, AHES-RE-1927, Tomo 41; Jesús A. Mendoza and Hipólito P. Gastelum, Secretaries, Sindicato Obrero de El Tigre, to Bay, 14 October 1927, AHES-RE-1927, Tomo 41; “Las sociedades de locatorios secundan la campaña antialcohólica,” EU, 26 April 1929, sec. 1, p. 9; Emilio Araujo, Representative, Confederación de las Cámaras de Comercio, unknown Representative, Secretariat of Foreign Relation, and unknown Representative, Department of Public Health, to CNLCA, 11 June 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; memorandum, Dr. Juan Enríquez Roca, Secretary, CNLCA, to Monterrubio, 18 June 1929, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; P. Ayala and Y. R. Valenzuela to Governor Elías, 18 August and 4 November 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Pedro Gómez, Secretary, Confederación de Transportes y Comunicaciones, Empalme, to Elías, 9 October 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; “Conferencias culturales en todo el país. Serán sustenadas por elementos de la Unión de Estudiantes Pro-Obrero y Campesino y versarán sobre tópicos de gran interés social,” EU, 1 January 1930, sec. 1, p. 5; memorandum, Quiñones to Monterrubio, 20 March 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10.. 36 Joaquin Pardo Dufoo, Deputy Grand Master, Mexican Knights Templar, to Portes Gil, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669; Alfonso LaMadrid, Mexico City, to Portes Gil, 26 April 1929, AGN-FAP- EPG, Exp. 3/669; David F. España, First Grand Secretary, and Santiago Hernández, Grand Master, Gran Logia V, to Calles, 26 July 1932, FAPECyFT-AFT-FPEC, Fondo 12, Serie 010805, Exp. 7, Inv. 563, Leg. 7/8. 273 lower levels of intoxication and prevent starvation, the national government forbid beverages be made from grain.37 Other people thanked authorities for combating alcohol
abuse or wanted to know how they could assist the official anti-alcohol campaign. For
instance, in 1929, Rosario Munguia, a soldier from Agua Prieta, suggested that he help
persecute clandestine production and sales of alcohol in the region he knew so well. The
following year, Dr. E. Mendoza Albarrán, who wrote his dissertation on alcoholism,
offered to lend his services to the Department of Public Education by traveling around the
country, studying this problem.38 Dozens of residents of Mexico City also expressed
their dislike of habitual drunkenness by taking advantage of a new Penal Code in 1930
that allowed them to place inebriated individuals in jails, police stations or mental
institutions.39
37 Sabino A. Sánchez, Mexico City, to Calles, 27 May 1925, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-E-23; Cepeda to Calles, 23 July 1925, AGN-FAP-O-C; women, Buenavista, to unknown, 4 February 1926, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 50; Y. G. Flores and others, Cócorit, to Bay, 5 December 1926, AHES-RE-1926, Tomo 42; Delfín Ruibal, Manager, Compañía Industrial del Pacífico, to unknown, 25 December 1928, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Jesús D. Olivares, San Miguelito de Bavispe, to Maytorena, 19 January 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Lic. Alejandro Velázquez López to Portes Gil, 29 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; Jesús Castro Torres, Cananea, to Elías, 8 June 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; F. M. Navarro, Onavaz, to Portes Gil, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 4; D. G. Rivas, Cumpas, to Elías, 17 July 1929, AHES- RE-1929, Tomo 41; Cruz Salazar, Oputo, to Portes Gil, 27 August 1929, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.3(22)-2, Caja 1, Exp. 38; María José de López and P. Madrugales, Trinidad, to unknown, 10 September 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Rubalcava N. to Elías, 12 September 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 50; L. Ballesteros to Portes Gil, 12 November 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; campesinos, Querobabi, to Elías, 22 November 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Salvador Souvervielle to Dr. Rafael Silva, 12 March 1930, AHSSA- FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1. 38 Aristeo Torres, Mexico City, to Portes Gil, 17 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 1; Guilebaldo Herrerra, Mexico City, to Portes Gil, 17 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 1; Gral. I. Ibarra to Portes Gil, 22 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; P. J. Caballero, Mexico City to Portes Gil, 27 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 1; Rosario Munguia, Agua Prieta, to Portes Gil, 21 May 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 672/217, Leg. 11; Dr. E. Mendoza Albarrán to Aaron Sáenz, 28 May 1930, AHSEP-DERDG, Caja 3, Exp. 3; R. Rivera to Elías, 15 June 1929, AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41; Ballesteros to Portes Gil, 12 November 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; Bolaños to Franco, 23 April 1932, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/1745 (1932). 39 “Guerra a los borrachitos,” EN, 1 June 1930, sec. 2, p. 1; “Muchos borrachos ya no alcanzan lugar,” EN, 2 June 1930, sec. 1, p. 7; “En locopolis falta lugar a los ebrios,” EN, 14 June 1930, sec. 2, p. 1. 274
As in the previous period, people from a variety of social backgrounds supported
temperance. Twelve groups’ members (11.2 percent) definitely hailed from the lower or
the lower-middle class, and those from another three organizations (2.8 percent) probably did, too. Unofficial reformers mostly came from the upper-, upper-middle, and middle- classes. Seventeen leagues (15.9 percent) were composed of people of this status, while another eleven (10.3 percent) likely were. Members’ socio-economic origins could not be determined in sixty-four cases (59.8 percent). Data on ethnicity were even more difficult to find. Only one individual defined himself as Mayo. Four groups (3.7 percent) may have been composed of indigenous members; three (2.8 percent) probably were not.
The ethnicity of the other ninety-nine sets of reformers (92.5 percent) is unknown. The gender of concerned citizens was clearer. Fifty-one organizations (47.7 percent) had all male members and five others (4.7 percent) may have, as well. Women were exclusively in twenty groups (18.7 percent) and probably in one other. Four organizations (3.7 percent) had both men and women in them. In twenty-six cases (24.3 percent), gender was unspecified. As in the first section, the amount of indeterminate data makes it difficult to assess conclusively the class, ethnicity, and gender of reformers, but it is evident that people of all backgrounds did participate in the anti-alcohol campaign at least to a certain extent.
To whom ordinary citizens directed their requests and complaints indicates that the national government had become ideologically active. From 1924 to 1929, unofficial reformers only sent thirteen out of forty-three requests (30.2 percent)40 to state officials:
40 The following statistics are based on forty-three petitions to leaders from 1924 to 1929. 275
the governor (eleven, or 10.4 percent), Sonora’s Secretary of State (one), and a statewide
labor union (one). National leaders, on the other hand, received seventeen petitions (39.5 percent). They were sent to presidents (nine, or 8.5 percent) and their secretaries (one), both of these men’s wives (two, or 1.9 percent, and one), and various federal bodies, including the Departments of the Treasury and Public Credit (two, or 1.9 percent),
Industry, Commerce, and Labor (one), and Public Education (one). Citizens also demonstrated their concern about alcohol addiction through thirteen newspaper articles
(30.2 percent). These figures mark a drastic change from the previous period and only accelerated after 1929. From this date until 1932, temperance groups sent a mere twelve out of ninety missives (13.3 percent) to the governor.41 Reformers directed thirty-two requests (35.6 percent) to national functionaries, including presidents (twenty-six, or 28.9 percent) and bureaucrats in the CNLCA (three, or 3.3 percent), and the Departments of
Public Education (two, or 2.2 percent) and Government (one). Other groups communicated through forty-six pamphlets, flyers, surveys, and newspaper articles (51.1 percent) that were not intended for any one figure. During the period as a whole, 1924 to
1932, citizens wrote to state leaders 18.8 percent of the time and national figures in 36.8 percent of cases. These figures demonstrate that citizens’ confidence with and dependence on the federal government had grown.
Indeed, the relationship of temperance organizations to the national government suggests that its authority began to increase after 1929. Although the number of these groups and concerned individuals grew significantly in the middle period of the
41 The following statistics are based on ninety petitions to leaders from 1929 to 1932. 276
Revolution, the government also worked to incorporate unofficial reformers into the
federal framework. In 1929, the CNLCA’s governing board included: Ernestina
Alvarado and María Luisa A. de Lozano of the AFNT and members of the AT, the
Confederación de las Cámaras Industriales, the Confederación de las Cámaras de
Comercio, the Sociedad Eugenica Mexicana, and the Red Cross. The Mexico City
newspapers El Nacional, El Popular, El Universal, Excélsior, and Universal Gráfico had
liaisons in the CNLCA, as did Masonic lodges, although their individual names were not
listed in official correspondence.42 Incorporating these groups into the CNLCA was one
part of the national government’s attempt to centralize and expand its authority.
The response of government officials to temperance-related petitions indicates that in spite of some political leaders’ good intentions and the national regime’s attempt at centralization, governments remained administratively weak at all levels. In fact, in five out of twenty-five instances (20 percent), state authorities denied temperance-related requests.43 For instance, in 1927, the Sindicato Obrero of El Tigre requested that
Governor Topete close the cantinas in their community. They argued that the taverns in
El Tigre violated the national constitution, for the town was filled with workers and
alcohol endangered their health. When Topete forwarded the matter on to the mayor,
José Figueroa, the man asked that his community be exempted from the law, for cantinas
brought nearly seven hundred pesos in tax revenue to the state and the municipality. He
42 Araujo and other representatives to CNLCA, 11 June 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; memorandum, Enríquez Roca to Monterrubio, 18 June 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 1; program for the Commission of Physical Education and Sports, Priani, Tirso Hernández, J. Arturo Richardo, Dr. Cayetano F. Quintanilla, and Alvarado, July 1929, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10; memorandum, Quiñones to Monterrubio, 20 March 1930, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 18, Exp. 10. 43 The percentages in the following paragraph are based on twenty-five requests sent to state leaders from 1924 to 1932. 277
offered, instead, to persecute clandestinity. Rather than enforce the law and combat
excessive alcohol consumption, the governor chose to maintain tax revenues.44 In six out of twenty-five cases (24 percent), state leaders responded positively. However, even in some of these instances, these officials did not fulfill all parts of the request. For instance, for the Week of the Child in December 1927, the city council of Hermosillo selected a child legislature. In its first “decree,” this body declared that cantinas ought to be closed for the entire week, so as to set a positive example for young people. Governor
Topete agreed to shut down cantinas, but only on Christmas Eve. He did consent to enforcing the measure with fines that would be donated to the construction of libraries and sports centers.45 In most cases, the response was difficult to determine. Five times
(20 percent), state leaders’ decisions were neutral. When Refugio Rivera of Estación
Llano asked Governor Elías how he could participate in the anti-alcohol campaign, Elías
replied that he would contact Rivera when he had formulated a plan for the state. It is
unclear if the governor ever did this.46 State authorities’ responses to nine requests (36
percent) were unknown. The statistics show that between 1924 and 1932, governors and
their bureaucrats assisted unofficial temperance reformers only infrequently, in large part
because they could not afford to do so more often.
In spite of the launch of the official anti-alcohol campaign, national leaders’
responses to petitioners were just as mixed. Unfortunately, in twenty-eight out of forty-
44 AHES-RE-1927, Tomo 41: Mendoza and Gastelum to Topete, 14 October 1927; José Figueroa, Mayor, El Tigre, to Topete, 31 October 1927; Topete to Mendoza and Gastelum, 2 November 1927. 45 “La primera iniciativa del ayuntamiento infantil,” EP, 19 December 1927, 2; Leovigildo Gómez, mayor, Hermosillo, to Topete, 21 December 1927, AHES-RE-1927, Tomo 41; Topete to Gómez, 23 December 1927, AHES-RE-1927, Tomo 41; España and Hernández to Calles, 26 July 1932, FAPECYFT-AFT-FPEC, Fondo 12, Serie 010805, Exp. 7, Inv. 563, Leg. 7/8. 46 AHES-RE-1929, Tomo 41: R. Rivera to Elías, 15 June 1929; Elías to R. Rivera, 19 June 1929. 278
nine cases (57.1 percent), it is unclear if these authorities even replied.47 In another six instances (12.2 percent), the response was neutral. Often, this meant that the matter was passed on to another federal body or the governor, and the outcome of this transference was unknown. This category also included two individuals (1.9 percent) who did not ask for anything specific, they just wrote to the President and thanked him for fighting alcoholism.48 In six cases (12.2 percent), political leaders responded positively. These grants included the donation of buildings and printing rights to the AFNT.49 However, national officials denied requests nine times (18.4 percent). The reason cited most times was a lack of budget.50 Although the national government had become ideologically active, and had begun the process of centralization, its authority remained incomplete, in large part because of financial shortcomings.
The Unofficial Anti-Alcohol Campaign and the State-Building Process, 1932-1940
Thanks in part to President Cárdenas’s encouragement of popular mobilization
and in part to genuine concern, the number of unofficial groups and individuals that
recorded an interest in the anti-alcohol campaign (171) increased significantly in the
47 The statistics in the following paragraph are based on forty-nine requests of national authorities from 1924 to 1932. 48 Cepeda, Ortiz R., and Bertrant to Ortiz Rubio, 15 February 1930, AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 2/217 (1930). 49 Pichardo to Alvarado, 25 May 1927, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4; Calles to Alvarado, 22 December 1927, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-A-259; Alvarado to H. de Torreblanca, 31 December 1927, FAPECyFT-AFT-FFT, Fondo 13, Serie 010207, Exp. “131”/102, Inv. 553, Leg. 1; Calles to Secretary of Treasury, 27 November 1928, FAPECyFT-AFT-FFT, Fondo 13, Serie 010207, Exp. “131”/102, Inv. 553, Leg. 1; unknown to Alvarado, 17 May 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/365/802; Padilla to Alvarado, 19 October 1929, AHSEP-IOS, Caja 3952/3091/3, Exp. 4; Alvarado to Ortiz Rubio, 3 October 1930, AGN- FAP-POR, Exp. 227/805 (1930). 50 Calles to Alvarado, n.d., 6 February 1928, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 805-A-259; Portes Gil to Junyent, n.d. [after 14 January 1930], AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 1/849; Portes Gil to Alvarado, n.d. [after 24 July 1930], AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 220/805 (1930), Reg. 5230; Ortiz Rubio to Alvarado and Mieres, n.d., [after 17 October 1930], AGN-FAP-POR, Exp. 227/805 (1930). 279
years from 1932 to 1940. Twenty of these institutions (11.7 percent) were temperance
leagues.51 Many of them employed cultural strategies in fighting vice. For instance,
Casimiro Tecisteco, president of the Sub-Comité Antialcohólico of Estación Ortíz, in
1935 requested propaganda from the DAA and distributed it to the town’s campesinos.
The committee also formed sports teams and worked with the local school and authorities to host an anti-alcohol parade. The Comité Anitialcohólico y de Propaganda Contra
Todos Los Vicios in Bataconcica in 1936 printed informative flyers and gave speeches to other members of the Yaqui tribe about the dangers of alcohol consumption, which caused people to stop working, lose their honor, and remain in poverty.52 Other groups combined cultural measures with more “active,” legislative ones. One Comité
Antialcohólico in Mexico City in the same year noted that although the group was in the process of reorganization, it planned on petitioning authorities to limit the number of cantinas there. Members of another group, the Comité Central de Luchas Antialcohólicas y Toxicomanías, also based in Mexico City, hoped to help the Department of Public
Health pour out adulterated alcohol in order to protect workers’ savings.53 These groups, then, mirrored the techniques and strategies of the larger, national movement.
51 The percentages that follow have been derived from 171 temperance-related groups from 1932 to 1940. 52 Tecisteco to Franco, 19 January 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, 733“35”/4-20; “La Cooperación Infantil en la Campaña Antialcohólica,” EN, 11 April 1936; report, Madera, September- October 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5763 (S/N), Exp. ?; flyer, Comité Anitialcohólico y de Propaganda Contra Todos Los Vicios (CAPCTLV), Bataconcica, 20 November 1936, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 5585, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19501; flyer, CAPCTLV, 20 November 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1; report, Profesor Rodolfo G. Velázquez, El Tigre, 12 May 1937, AHSEP-A123ES, Caja 70 (20), Exp. 18; Nicolás S. Solís, Vice President, Comité Obrero de Profilaxis Social y Lucha Contra los Vicios e Immoralidades (COPSLCVI), to Cárdenas, 13 September 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 415.2/104. 53 “Será reorganizado el comité antialcohólico,” EU, 22 March 1936; “Juventudes temperantes en acción,” EN, 27 July 1937; Solís to Cárdenas, 13 September 1938 and 23 August 1939, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 415.2/104; Emilio H. Morales, President, Comité Central de Luchas Antialcohólicas y Toxicomanías, Mexico City, to Cárdenas, 26 October 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; minutes, Comite del Gobierno 280
Twelve institutions (7 percent) combined the temperance struggle with one or more other goals. Eight of these groups (4.7 percent) were Ligas Femeniles de Lucha
Social: women’s agrarian leagues that frequently fought for temperance. The members of these groups often wrote to the president, demanding that cantinas be removed from their communities, and many of them also asked for new schools, an ejidal bank, and potable water.54 The association mentioned in the dissertation introduction, the SASOC, dealt with temperance and labor agitation. This rural, lower-class union fought for the rights of workers in a variety of manners. In addition to strikes and labor negotiations, the group also wrote at least one letter to the DAA in 1937, informing this body that cantinas and clandestine dispensaries harmed the area’s campesinos. At these establishments, peasants, many of whom also were indigenous, reportedly spent all the money governmental banks had given them in order to better themselves.55
As in prior periods, the vast majority of groups (100, or 58.5 percent) that fought for temperance had not been organized initially to do so. Thirty labor unions (17.5
Escolar, Chinotehuaca, 19 November 1938, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8440, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19439; Dr. Victorio Lorandi, Oficial Mayor, Department of Public Health, to Solís and General Arturo Vigueros, 9 September 1939, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM, Caja 2, Exp. 18; Solís to Cárdenas, 17 November 1939, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/11. 54 Although the Ligas Femeniles were created by Cárdenas in 1936 to encourage peasant women to agitate for land, to support the government rather than the Church, and to promote temperance, they can still be considered unofficial anti-alcohol organizations. These women were not manipulated by the president; they often acted in ways that were unexpected and that subtly challenged the government and its leaders’ plans. For more, see the subsequent section. Tomasa Valenzuela, President, and Elena Sombra and Santos Bultimea, Secretaries, Liga Femenil de Lucha Social (LFLS), Bacame, to the Executive Agrarian Committee, 9 February 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 151.3/1233; Contreras and Santa Cruz to Cárdenas, 10 February 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Anita Vda. de Álvarez, President, LFLS, Querobabi, to Cárdenas, 29 March 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Gabino Vázquez, Chief of the Agrarian Department, to García Téllez, 14 July 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-38913, Caja 9, Exp. 20; Baldonegro and J. Valencia to Cárdenas, 27 July 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6; Vázquez to García Téllez, 3 August 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-38741, Caja 9, Exp. 18; Antonia Salazar, Secretary, LFLS, Navojoa, to Cárdenas, 10 August 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)- 32804, Caja 9, Exp. 14; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 124-25, 138-47, 158. 55 Priani to Yocupicio, 27 December 1937, AHES-RE-1938, Caja S/N, Exp. 733“38”/2. 281 percent) registered their support for the cause, including Guaymas’s Sindicato Obrero
“La Mexicana.” The secretary of this organization, José León, informed President
Rodríguez that the group wanted to participate in the anti-alcohol campaign in 1934. He requested a grant to purchase books and sporting equipment so as to encourage other workers to spend their leisure time on healthy pursuits.56 Six religious groups (3.5 percent), two Catholic and four Protestant, supported the idea of sobriety.57 For instance, a 1937 pledge card for Mexico City’s Legión Mexicana de la Decencia, a group connected with Catholic Action, stated that members would work to combat immoral actions such as swearing, mistreating women, or drinking alcohol. The Secretaría de la
Educación Cristiana de la Iglesia Metodista de México published a children’s magazine.
In addition to more general religious pieces, the weekly occasionally contained anti- alcohol stories, hymns, cartoons, and articles.58 Six secular periodicals (3.5 percent) also
contributed to the temperance movement with reports, editorials, and stories. Two of
these newspapers, El Nacional and La Prensa, also interviewed regular citizens and
asked their opinion about the campaign.59
56 José León, Secretary, Sindicato Obrero “La Mexicana,” Guaymas, to Rodríguez, 28 May 1934, AGN- FAP-AR, Exp. 183/21. 57 Stephanie Mitchell and Jocelyn Olcott, in their studies of popular temperance leagues in Michoacán in the 1920s and 30s, found that many of these organizations doubled as anti-clerical groups. From 1910 to 1940, I discovered seven anti-alcohol leagues that were also associated with a religious institution. Another group specifically mentioned that they did not demand that members follow any set religion or that they be opposed to religiosity. Not a single group claimed to also be an anti-clerical organization. Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 8-11; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 74. 58 “N.t.,” C, 2, no. 8 (August 1936); pledge card, Legión Mexicana de la Decencia, 1937, BFXC-AACM, Exp. 1.5.8.3; “N.t.,” C, 6, no. 11 (November 1940). 59 See: EE, EG, EN, ES, EU, LP. “El papel de la madre en la defensa de la niñez. Los trabajadores Deben colaborar con su ejemplo en la campaña moralizadora de la juventud. Pasa con perfiles de agua fuerte, el caso de un hombre a quien los vicios hicieron criminal,” EN, 30 August 1937; “La encuesta relámpago. ¿Qué opina Ud. de la ley antialcohólica?” LP, 7 September 1937; Preguntón, “La encuesta relámpago,” LP, 22 November 1937; “Un comité especial para la obra antialcohólica,” EN, 27 June 1939. 282
Individuals (thirty-four, or 19.9 percent) continued to make up a sizeable number
of those interested in temperance. Thirteen citizens (7.6 percent) signed their names to newspaper editorials. For instance, Antonio Zozaya in 1940 praised a recent anti-alcohol
parade of school children. He felt that this method was an ideal way to teach youth that if, as adults, they drank alcohol, they would be consuming “the tears of [their] mother, the blood of [their] children, and [their] own dignity.” Catalina D’Erzell would have disagreed. Although she wanted to eradicate vice, she felt that children should not be engaged in the struggle. She was horrified that at the First Children’s Anti-Alcohol
Assembly in 1936, young boys and girls heard vulgar stories about the effects of intoxication and were made to debate difficult and inappropriate topics. D’Erzell even witnessed the young delegates “arguing like vulgar men” at the panels. She not only felt that such strategies were harmful to fragile minds, but that they were counterproductive to the campaign as well.60 Other people, who usually wrote letters to an authority figure, complained about local vice or gave advice about how to defeat alcoholism. Manuel R.
Lamas and Dr. Noreis Rodríguez of Mexico City in 1935 suggested that Cárdenas use a
dual cultural-punitive strategy by teaching people how bad alcohol consumption is, but
60 Maximiliano Arias M., “Opiniones de maestros. El alcoholismo frente al psicoanálysis,” EN, 13 January 1936; Camacho, “El pueblo mexicano y el alcoholismo,” EU, 21 May 1936; Gringoire, “El pulso de los tiempos,” EE, 24 June 1936; Pablo de Gongora, “Embriaguez y educación,” EU, 20 August 1936; Gongora, “El alcoholismo adulto y el infantil,” EU, 28 October 1936; Catalina D’Erzell, “No habrá niños en México, digo yo como mujer,” La Defensa del Hogar: Salvemos a la Patria Salvando a la Niñez 19 (22 November 1936), 1-2; Ballesteros Gil, “La campaña antialcohólica,” EG, 6 February 1937; José Lión Depetre, “El vino y el alcoholismo,” EN, 29 April 1937; Rosales, “La intoxicación por bebidas alcohólicas,” EN, 19 October 1937; Martínez Lazzari, “El alcoholismo y sus consecuencias,” EN, 28 October 1937; Enrique Uhthoff, “Elogio y vituperio del alcohol,” EE, 16 November, 1937; Francisco Arreola R., “Espantosos efectos de la embriaguez. ¿Quereis al hombre abyecto? ¿Buscad al ebrio?,” EG, 30 December 1937; “Acción energetica contra el cabaret. No es con frases, dice uno de nuestros comunicantes, como se resuelve el caso,” EN, 28 August 1938; Neck, “Apuntes de actualidad,” EN, 26 June 1939; Antonio Zozaya, “Cartera de un solitario. Alcoholismo. Carta a un niño manifestante,” EE, 17 October 1940. 283
also by firing any public employee if they did not uphold the law and thus allowed vice to
continue.61 Some citizens praised their political leaders for their work in the temperance movement, asked to participate in it themselves, or simply explained what they had already done to help. For instance, Genaro Borbón of Quiriego had applied for a permit to sell beer in June 1934, but the following month, thanks to Governor Rodolfo Calles’s dedication to the anti-alcohol campaign, Borbón decided to rescind his petition and collaborate with the government.62
When data about unofficial temperance reformers could be determined, they
revealed that a much wider swath of the population got involved with the anti-alcohol
campaign in the period from 1932 to 1940 than had previously. Twenty-two groups (12.9
percent) had members who came from an upper, upper-middle, or middle class
background. Another sixteen sets of participants (9.4 percent) likely fit in this category
as well. People from the lower-classes definitely made up the membership of fifty-six
groups (32.7 percent) and probably of ten others (5.8 percent). Two associations (1.2
percent) contained people from a variety of classes. The socio-economic background of
people in sixty-five organizations (38 percent) was unclear. Four sets of reformers (2.3
percent) identified themselves as Mayo, Pápago, or Yaqui Indians. Another nineteen
61 Delfino Sartiaguin, San Luis Río Colorado, to Rodríguez, 1 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 562.6/6; Manuel R. Lamas and Dr. [Noreis?] Rodríguez, Mexico City, to Cárdenas, 9 April 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/18; Alfredo Iruretagoyena and Julio G. Reina, Santa Ana, to Corella M., 9 August 1935, AHES- RE-1935, Caja 23, Tomo 33, Exp. 231.5“35”/68; anonymous, Caborca, to Cárdenas, 8 October 1935, AGN-DGG, Series 2.015.4(22)-6320, Caja 9, Exp. 4; Nava to Cárdenas, 6 December 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/11; Zárate González, Huatabampo, to Cárdenas, 7 March 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1.15; Zárate González to Yocupicio, 7 March 1937, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6. 62 Oloño to R. Calles, 21 February 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 741“34”/1; Genaro Borbón, Quiriego, to R. Calles, 15 July 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/38; report, Miguel Espinosa R., Altar, 1 November 1934, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 20; Corella M. to Luis Bálsamo Infante and his wife [sic], Navojoa, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, Exp. 733“35”/4-20; Enrique Zúñiga, Navojoa, to Cárdenas, 30 September 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 9. 284
groups (11.1 percent) may have had indigenous members. Three organizations (1.8 percent) contained individuals who were likely not indigenous, while the ethnicity of 145 sets of people (84.8 percent) could not be determined. Men joined seventy-nine groups
(46.2 percent) and likely another ten (5.8 percent). Thirty-three organizations (19.3 percent) had all female members and one other group probably did, as well. Both sexes peopled nine associations (5.3 percent). The gender of citizens in forty-nine groups could not be determined (28.7 percent). These figures suggest that a much larger percentage of the working classes and of indigenous peoples found resonance in the temperance movement in the 1930s than had previously. Men continued to dominate the campaign, in spite of the fact that official reformers labeled them as problem drinkers.
In the final phase of the Revolution, from 1932 to 1940, the federal government had become increasingly ideologically active and administratively strong, as revealed by
217 temperance-related petitions. In fact, President Cárdenas encouraged groups of all kinds to contact him directly with concerns, going so far as to make telegraph communications with him free for an hour each day.63 Therefore, national figures
received 102 missives (47 percent).64 Letter writers penned the president (sixty-three, or
29 percent), a federal senator (one), and bureaucrats at the DAA (four, or 1.8 percent) and the Departments of Public Education (nineteen, or 8.8 percent), Government (six, or 2.8 percent), Public Health (four, or 1.8 percent), Agriculture (four, or 1.8 percent), and
Industry, Commerce and Labor (one). On the other hand, unofficial reformers only
63 Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 134; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 224. 64 Percentages in the following paragraph are drawn from 217 petitions to leaders from 1932 to 1940. 285
solicited Sonoran authorities for help twenty-six times (12 percent). These figures
included the governor (seventeen, or 7.8 percent), mayors (six, or 2.8 percent), a police
officer (one), the state secretary (one), and the state treasurer (one). Eighty-nine
statements supporting temperance (41 percent) did not go to one particular figure, but
rather were found in newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets, and group minutes or
regulations. These statistics demonstrate that unofficial anti-alcohol crusaders turned less
frequently to state leaders for assistance than they had in previous eras. The very act of
supplicating national, rather than local, officials, led to increased authority for the State.65
The way in which national authorities interacted with unofficial reformers
demonstrates that the federal government had indeed achieved a measure of administrative strength. Since 1929, presidents and key temperance bureaucrats had called for the creation of citizen anti-alcohol groups. Combined with Cárdenas’s support of popular mobilization in general, the drive to create more local leagues accelerated after
1934. Paradoxically, at the same time, leaders sought to restrict the rights of these very groups. For instance, from at least 1932 on, the DEA and the Department of Public
Education issued regulations for how local anti-alcohol committees ought to operate.
These rules stated that upon formation, groups needed to gain state and DEA recognition,
and they would be subsequently incorporated into the national body.66 Indeed, a number
65 Similarly, in Ecuador in the nineteenth century, indigenous peoples turned to national leaders rather than local ones as they sensed that these national officials were more likely to protect and less likely to exploit them. Clark and Becker, “Indigenous Peoples and State Formation in Modern Ecuador,” 6; Sattar, “¿Indígena o Ciudadano?” 29-30. 66 Reglamento por las Sociedades de Madres, 1 December 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 9; Instructivo para el Funcionamiento de Comités y Subcomités Antialcohólicos en la República, 28 August 1933, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/44; Instructivo 1, Instructivo para el 286 of unofficial organizations remained or became integrated into the DEA and the DAA, including the Gran Logia “Valle de México,” the Asociación Cristiana de Jovenes, the
Federación de Sindicatos Obreros, and the Subcomité Antialcohólico of Estación Ortíz.
These groups were also occasionally asked to attend DAA functions, like the public pouring out of illegal alcohol.67 Regulations further stipulated that these groups focus mainly on cultural methods to eradicate alcohol abuse: members ought to organize festivals and parades and distribute propaganda provided to them by the DEA. Although unofficial reformers were encouraged to assist authorities in closing cantinas that violated the law as well, they were given no authority to do so themselves.68
The trend of governmental control over unofficial temperance leagues only accelerated after 1938. As the government moved to the right because of popular and elite resistance as well as economic troubles, Cárdenas had less tolerance for popular groups, and he and his bureaucrats began to increase the restrictions that they placed on
these leagues.69 In 1938, high-ranking officials in the DAA like Dr. Salazar Viniegra
Funcionamiento de Comités y Subcomités Antialcohólicos en la República, 1 December 1934, AHES-RE- 1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, Exp. 733“35”/21; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 1. 67 Franco to Tecisteco, 24 February 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/10; DAA to Cárdenas, 1 August 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; “Durante el actual régimen se han clausurado 1,600 cantinas,” EN, 18 October 1937; “Un organismo único llevará a cabo la lucha antialcohólica,” EU, 24 June 1939; Vda. de Naude to Pruneda, 22 July 1939, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM, Caja 2, Exp. 18; Pruneda to Vda. de Naude, 31 July 1939, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM, Caja 2, Exp. 18. 68 Reglamento por las Sociedades de Madres, 1 December 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 9; Instructivo para el Funcionamiento de Comités y Subcomités Antialcohólicos en la República, 28 August 1933, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/44; Instructivo 1, Instructivo para el Funcionamiento de Comités y Subcomités Antialcohólicos en la República, 1 December 1934, AHES-RE- 1935, Caja 30, Tomo 56, Exp. 733“35”/21; “Las asociaciones femeninas en la lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 8 October 1937; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 2-3; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 86, 145. 69 Scholars have found that although Cárdenas in theory supported popular mobilization, he also created a corporate structure that reduced the autonomy of these groups and ultimately increased their dependence on the federal government. See: Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 122-23, 142-43, 161-62, 183, 241- 44; Jacobs, Ranchero Revolt, 129, 135, 161-65; Jan Rus, “The ‘Comunidad Revolucionaria Institucional’: 287 began to note that some temperance committees had become too enthusiastic in their anti- vice crusades. For example, members of the Comité Central de Lucha contra el
Alcoholismo y Toxicomanía en el Distrito Federal and El Ala Izquierda tried to impersonate Public Health officials. They used letterhead that closely resembled that of the DAA, and claiming to act in the name of the federal government, sent their own inspectors to shut down illegal cantinas and collect fines. When sharply worded letters to these rogue groups did not work, Public Health bureaucrats decided to decommission all unofficial anti-alcohol leagues in 1939.70 Average citizens continued to participate in the
temperance movement, but they now did so without governmental sanction.
The response of state authorities to twenty-six temperance-related requests suggests that political leaders from 1932 to 1936 actively supported the anti-alcohol campaign, while those from 1936 to 1940 did not.71 In this first period, when Callista governors controlled the state, the historical record indicates the denial of only three
The Subversion of Native Government in Highland Chiapas,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation, 267; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, 216-17, 224-25; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 228; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 12-13, 23, 51-52, 185-87, 238. 70 Minutes, DAA meeting, 24 June 1935, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ, Caja 42, Exp. 1; “Solo Salubridad deberá controlar la campaña en contra del alcoholismo,” EN, 13 July 1936; summary, Matilde Anguiano N., President, Federación Femenil Socialista Michoacana, Morelia, to Cárdenas, 14 February 1938, AGN-FAP- LC, Exp. 553/26; Luciano Gómez Nieto, Federación de Campesinos Revolucionarios del Estado de México, to Cárdenas, 26 July 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; E. Morales, President, and Modesto C. Flores, Secretary, Comité Central de Lucha contra el Alcoholismo y Toxicomanía en el Distrito Federal, to Secretary of Government, 8 October 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-6046, Caja 14, Exp. 3; Viniegra to Chief of Department of Government, 4 November 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-6046, Caja 14, Exp. 3; Viniegra to the Oficial Mayor of Cárdenas, 7 November 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Viniegra to E. Morales, 10 November 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Solís, Vice President, Comité Oficial de Lucha contra el Alcoholismo en el Distrito Federal (COLCADF), to Secretary of Government, 22 May 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(29)-6046, Caja 14, Exp. 3; “Un organismo único llevará a cabo la lucha antialcohólica,” EU, 24 June 1939; Vda. de Naude to Pruneda, n.d. [before 6 July 1939], AHSSA- FSPII-SOM, Caja 2, Exp. 18; Dr. Alberto P. León, secretary of Public Health, to the personal secretary of Cárdenas, 7 May 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Comité de Vigilancia Contra el Alcoholismo en el DF, to Cárdenas, 7 June 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 24. 71 The statistics in this paragraph come from twenty-six requests sent to state leaders from 1932 to 1940. 288 petitions (11.5 percent): in 1933, for unknown reasons, the mayor of Basconcobe rejected multiple requests to close a cantina.72 One petition was favorably resolved. This happened in 1934 when the younger Calles gave Wilfrido Oloño permission to show anti- alcohol movies across the state, and he asked mayors to support the project.73 Seven
letters (26.9 percent) to state officials did not ask for anything in particular, but still
indicate governors’ interest in the temperance movement. Six groups noted the creation
of anti-alcohol leagues or explained what measures they were taking to combat vice,
while members of the Unión de Obreros y Campesinos del Yaqui thanked Governor
Corella M. for passing Law 131, which forbade the sale of cheap and potent liquor.74
After the ascendance of so-called Cárdenista governors in 1936, the ratio worsened: not a
single request seems to have been granted. Authorities denied or ignored eight petitions
(30.8 percent), including one from the Liga Femenil de Lucha Social in Quechehueca to
close centers of vice in rural parts of the state.75 In two instances (7.7 percent), governors
asked other state officials to resolve an issue, but it is unclear if they ever did. Unlike
72 Report, Constantino, 7 April 1933, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 6. 73 AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, 741“34”/1: Oloño to R. Calles, 21 February 1934; R. Calles to mayors, 21 February 1934. 74 Marcelino G. Rocha, Mónico Guzmán, Miguel C. Chocoza, Máximo Ramírez, and Adolfo Inda, Secretaries, SOT, to unknown, 9 June 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/35; Borbón to R. Calles, 15 July 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/38; Felizardo Figueroa, President, Juan Méndez, Secretary, Comité Antialcohólico, El Plomo, to R. Calles, 24 September 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/49; Comité de Cooperación Antialcohólica, Fronteras, to unknown, 28 October 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/54; Manuel Galindo, Fourth Councilman, Bacanora, to State Treasurer, 10 November 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/55; José G. Tapia, Minero de Cananea, to Corella M., 7 January 1935, AHES-RE-1935, Caja 30, Tomo 57, Exp. 743“35”/6; Carlos Álvarez, Secretary, Unión de Obreros y Campesinos del Yaqui, Pueblo El Yaqui, to Corella M., AHES-RE-1935, Caja 23, Tomo 33, Exp. 231.5“35”/4. 75 Contreras and Santa Cruz to Cárdenas, 10 February 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-30936, Caja 9, Exp. 10; J. Orozco and Angulo to Cárdenas, 13 February 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-31041, Caja 9, Exp. 11; Lizárraga to Cárdenas, 20 May 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553.1/15; Lizárraga to Cárdenas, 20 May 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32468, Caja 9, Exp. 12; R. Valenzuela to Cárdenas, 7 June 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32766, Caja 9, Exp. 13. 289
previous eras, when these leaders denied requests, they never claimed to do so because
they lacked the funds.
National leaders’ responses to unofficial reformers indicate that their regimes had
achieved increased, but not absolute, administrative strength. Unfortunately, a great deal
of data could not be interpreted, including the conclusion of forty-three out of 102 cases
(42.2 percent).76 In an additional twenty-four instances (23.5 percent), citizens did not
make direct requests. With this said, though, increased national power can be seen in the
ten times (9.8 percent) that political leaders granted alcohol-related petitions. These
included “simple” matters, like bestowing official recognition on a new temperance
league. In more “difficult” cases, the federal government asserted its authority over state
authorities. For instance, at the request of the Sociedad Cooperativa de Pescadores in
1938, Cárdenas and bureaucrats in the Department of Government convinced Governor
Yocupicio to close dispensaries of alcohol in Bahía Kino.77 Administrative strength is also evident in two cases (2 percent) where the executive or his assistants denied the requests of temperance advocates who wanted to work directly with the authorities in combating vice.78 Federal leaders still faced a variety of limitations. In fourteen cases
(13.7 percent), they transferred requests to other national figures or to local authorities,
76 The statistics in this paragraph come from 102 requests sent to national leaders between 1932 and 1940. 77 Saavedra to A. Rodríguez, 19 January 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; Cruz y Celis to A. Rodríguez, 10 February 1933, AGN-FAP-AR, Exp. 573/4; report, Constantino, 7 April 1933, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 6; Franco to Tecisteco, 24 February 1934, AHES-RE-1934, Caja 21, Tomo 23, Exp. 733“34”/10; Zamora and Velarde to Cárdenas, 25 September 1937, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-26813, Caja 9, Exp 7; Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 17 March 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)- 31041, Caja 9, Exp. 11; Francisco Q. Salazar, Interim Governor, to Secretary of Government, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-19701, Caja 9, Exp. 5. 78 Salazar Viniegra to E. Morales, 10 November 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Dr. Alberto P. León, Secretary, Department of Public Health, to the personal secretary of Cárdenas, 7 May 1940, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11. 290 and it is unclear if they were dealt with further. Four times (3.9 percent, all of them after
1936), the governor or mayor denied the validity of a vice-related complaint. For instance, in 1938, groups of workers, peasants and “respectable women” from the community of Pitiquito asked that the abuse of intoxicating beverage sales cease, and the president passed this request on to Interim Governor Manuel Romo. Rather than obey the executive’s orders, Romo speculated that the petitioners might own illegal liquor dispensaries and only denounced legal ones so as to distract the authorities.79 These examples demonstrate that the national government had become stronger but it still lacked sufficient autonomy to force recalcitrant mayors and governors to participate in
the anti-alcohol campaign.80
The Unofficial Anti-Alcohol Campaign and the Participatory Nature of State-Building, 1910-1940
Above all, unofficial reformers and their demands indicate that regular people
actively participated in the State-building process.81 The anti-alcohol campaign was intimately linked to the act of forging the nation: presidents, bureaucrats, and intellectuals
79 Lizárraga to Cárdenas, 20 May 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32468, Caja 9, Exp. 12; Romo to DAA, 6 July 1938, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-32468, Caja 9, Exp. 12; Yocupicio to Secretary of Government, 11 April 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-36791, Caja 9, Exp. 16; G. Suárez to Secretary of Government, 16 August 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-38466, Caja 9, Exp. 19; G. Suárez to Secretary of Government, 16 August 1939, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-24444, Caja 9, Exp. 6. 80 Stephanie Mitchell draws a similar conclusion for Michoacán. Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 15-16. 81 Craig, “Legal Constraints and Mobilization Strategies in the Countryside,” 66; Joseph and Nugent, “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” 12; Knight, “Cardenismo,” 79, 90-95; Rockwell, “Schools of the Revolution,” 170-71, 191, 194-96; Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 7, 18-24; Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth, xix, 45-50, 214-18, 220-21; Purnell, Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico, 11; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 234-35; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, xiii. 94-95; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 240; Bantjes, “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation,” 152-53. For Ecuador, see: Sattar, “¿Indígena o Ciudadano?,” 22-23. 291
wanted to enhance the power of State, strengthen the economy, and create healthy,
rational, and modern citizens. These leaders believed that encouraging sobriety would
promote all three goals and with the beginning of the official anti-alcohol campaign in
April 1929, they urged ordinary people to create temperance leagues. Therefore, the
sheer act of joining these groups or demanding the end of vice through labor unions and
community organizations supported national leaders’ goals to have a healthy, sober
nation.
Some modern scholars argue that the anti-alcohol campaign was largely an elitist
project designed to control a populace largely uninterested in temperance. Historian
Alexander Dawson claims, “There is very little evidence that local [indigenous] groups
ever prioritized anti-alcohol campaigns and suggestions that alcohol be taxed out of the
reach of workers smacked of paternalism.”82 Furthermore, historian Alan Knight admits that not all revolutionary projects were imposed from the top down, but he asserts that the temperance movement and other “unpopular” revolutionary projects such as anti- clericalism and sexual education failed because the lower-classes were either
“recalcitrant” or simply disinterested.83 Certainly, political leaders and reformers carried out the anti-alcohol campaign in a paternalistic manner.84 Nor did the majority of the citizenry prioritize the temperance movement to the extent the national government did.
82 Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico, 120-21. 83 Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 230, 252, 255, 258; Knight, “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico,” 401, 426, 440-41. 84 See Chapter Three. 292
However, hundreds of groups, from just two areas of the country, and many of them from a working-class or indigenous background, did support this movement.85
Nor did ordinary citizens support the anti-alcohol campaign simply because someone instructed them to. Out of the 326 known temperance-oriented organizations and individuals from 1910 to 1940 in Sonora and Mexico City, eighty-nine (27.3 percent) recorded their concerns prior to the launch of the national campaign.86 Indeed, these early groups accomplished more than federal leaders could, or even desired to, at the time. As further proof that people were not forced to form temperance leagues, at least twenty-three out of 3290 known reformers joined multiple organizations during the entire
Revolution. These included J. T. Ramírez who worked with Mexico City’s ANT, LAM, and the Iglesia Metodista de México from 1923 to 1936, and Tomasa Valenzuela, treasurer of the Sociedad de Madres in Navojoa in 1936 and president of the Liga
Femenil de Lucha Social in the same town in 1938.87 Their devotion to the cause was sincere enough that they joined multiple temperance organizations.
85 Christopher Boyer, Ben Fallaw, Stephanie Mitchell, and Jocelyn Olcott all examine popular temperance leagues as well. Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised, 92-95; Fallaw, “Dry Law, Wet Politics,” 43-47, 61; Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer;” Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 207, 220-21; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 64, 72-76, 80-89, 138-47. 86 The statistics that follow are calculated out of the 326 groups that existed between 1910 and 1940. 87 There were likely many other people who joined multiple groups but whose names were not listed on documents I saw. Osuna, ANT, to Torreblanca, 6 August 1924, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 814-A-119; J. T. Ramírez, LAM, to Portes Gil, 17 April 1929, AGN-FAP-EPG, Exp. 3/669, Leg. 2; “Notas del Redactor,” El Vocero Antialcohólico, 1, no. 6 (May and June 1929), 1-2; Ruperta López, president, Margarita López, secretary, and T. Valenzuela, treasurer, Sociedad de Madres, and Ygnacio Valencia, president, Zenon Rivera, treasurer, and [Si? Casani?], secretary, Comité de Educación, Guaymitas, to director of Anahuac School, 1 June 1936, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161/(IV-14)/19361, Exp. 74; J. T. Ramírez, District Superintendent, Iglesia Metodista de México, District of Mexico, to Cárdenas, 4 September 1936, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; T. Valenzuela, E. Sombra, and S. Bultimea to Comité Ejecutivo Agrario, 9 February 1938, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 151.3/1233. 293
The nature of people’s requests also demonstrates their involvement in the State-
building process. One of the more common complaints in letters, petitions, and articles
(fifty-three groups, or 16.3 percent) was that state and local authorities either permitted or
facilitated the spread of vice. In several cases, this happened when officials denied or
ignored requests to purge their town of rampant alcohol abuse, an excessive number of cantinas, or mushrooming clandestinity. Or, as the second example which began this chapter illustrated, some authorities would prohibit beer only to tolerate the sale of wine.88 Other political leaders personally benefited from the sale of alcohol. For example, in 1920, naval officers J. de la Llave and J. M. Cházaro owned a casino where they sold all types of intoxicating beverages without paying taxes. In 1936 in the village of Los Angeles, the police commissary developed both cantinas and casinos, and in El
Yaqui in the following year, the police chief accepted bribes from clandestine venders of alcohol.89 Some authorities were even accused of being drunkards themselves.
Unofficial reformers realized that their governmental leaders did not just erect inconvenient bureaucratic obstacles to temperance, but rather, obstructed the revolutionary process in general.90 Five groups (1.5 percent) claimed that officials’
dishonesty impeded the development of their constituents’ morality, thus stymieing
88 Pluma Blanca et al. to Cárdenas, 20 August 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 533.11/1. 89 L. Hernández to De la Huerta, 27 July 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3362, 2a Parte; Ricardo Treviño and Martín Torres, General Secretaries of the CROM, to the Secretary of the Department of Government, 29 July 1936, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)-19701, Caja 9, Exp. 5; Ayón and C. Álvarez to the Secretary of the State of Sonora, 16 October 1937, AGN-DGG, Serie 2.015.4(22)- 27693, Caja 9, Exp. 8. 90 Stephanie Mitchell finds that anti-alcohol leagues in Michoacán fought corruption at the same time they fought vice. Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 23. Elaborating on the notion of Philip Abrams, A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker argue that there is a difference between the “idea of the State” and the actual “State system.” They, and other authors from their edited volume on the indigenous and the State in Ecuador, find that indigenous people often pressured the government to live up to its rhetoric. Abrams, “The Difficulty of Studying the State,” 79; Clark and Becker, “Indigenous Peoples and State Formation in Modern Ecuador,” 5. 294
governors’ and presidents’ temperance plans. For instance, in 1919, residents of
Empalme accused judges Federico D. Cázares and Alberto Celaya of distributing mescal to manipulate the political system. The community was working to improve itself, as the president hoped, and these judicial authorities undermined those goals. An anonymous letter writer from Nogales in 1920 also blamed corrupt alcohol inspectors, who neglected their duties, abused their power, and terrorized the poor, for threatening the governor’s moralization project.91 In fact, as one of the examples which began this dissertation
showed, members of the SASOC said that having such corrupt municipal authorities was
like living in a dictatorship worse than the Porfiriato.92 Indeed, nine organizations (2.8 percent) explained that they deserved to have officials that obeyed the Constitution, enforced the law equally, and were dedicated to the ideals of the Revolution.
In other words, when faced with officials that facilitated, rather than fought, the
spread of vice, and thwarted the drive for social change, ordinary citizens did not remain passive observers. A variety of types of organizations as well as individuals appealed to authority figures and asked that alcohol regulations be enacted, or where they already existed, enforced. When an official would not listen, regular people were not afraid to approach this figure again, or even to take the matter up the chain of authority. Clearly, unofficial reformers did not merely hope to have a temperate, just, and revolutionary nation, they actively worked to create one. Though their contributions may not have
91 Residents, Empalme, to Calles or Piña, 25 June 1919, AHES-RE-1919, Tomo 3294; anonymous, Nogales, to Governor Alberto M. Sánchez, 11 December 1920, AHES-RE-1920, Tomo 3364. 92 Priani to Yocupicio, 27 December 1937, AHES-RE-1938, Caja S/N, Exp. 733”38”/2. 295
shaped the anti-alcohol campaign or the State-building process as much as those of politicians and intellectuals, they nevertheless contributed to both projects.
From 1910 to 1940, regular people participated in the anti-alcohol campaign in a
variety of manners. Many of them formed their own temperance leagues and spread
visual and verbal propaganda. Others assisted the government by linking their
organizations to the national one and by participating in official conferences or the
decommissioning of poisonous liquors. Still other individuals wrote letters to authorities
or newspaper articles that decried the ill effects of intoxicating beverages or demanded
the closure of an illegal cantina. In all of these cases, unofficial reformers played an
active role, not only in the temperance movement, but also in the larger State-building
process. These people helped to carry out a major goal of presidents and governors by
fighting vice and to forge a new nation by demanding that their officials live up to their
reformist rhetoric, and thus the ideals of the Revolution. 296
CONCLUSION
In 1939, Mónico Neck, a columnist from the official newspaper El Nacional,
remarked that on any given street in the capital, one could find three cantinas, but only
one school. Where two factories existed, there were also three pulquerías and one wine shop selling venomous liquors.1 Neck used these figures to urge readers to work harder
in the struggle to curtail vice, but after nearly three decades of the anti-alcohol campaign
and just a year before it was abandoned altogether, the data also suggests that this
movement largely failed.
As with the statistics used to “prove” that alcoholism was a problem in 1910,
there are few clear indicators that it remained a problem in 1940. Researchers’ social and
cultural perceptions about acceptable levels of intoxication and public behavior continued
to taint their conclusions. However, there were a few signs that the number of the
country’s problem drinkers, howsoever defined, in fact had not declined. First, several
observers continued to note the preponderance of liquor dispensaries throughout the
nation. Others claimed that the amount of drunkenness in the nation had actually
increased.2 Second, by the late 1930s, an increasing number of editorialists, intellectuals,
and other observers labeled the anti-alcohol campaign’s techniques as ineffective or said
that the movement had failed entirely.3 Third, by 1947, Alcoholics Anonymous, an
1 Neck, “Apuntes de actualidad,” EN, 26 June 1939. 2 “Justificación de la guerra contra el alcoholismo,” EN, 24 September 1935; Díaz Barriga, “Ponencias del Congreso Nacional Antialcohólico,” EN, 12 November 1936; Díaz Barriga and other members of Comisión de Estudios, “Resumen del estudio sobre el alcoholismo en México,” 6 September 1937, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 553/11; Arreola R., “Espantosos efectos de la embriaguez,” EG, 30 December 1937; “Dos pesas y dos medidas,” EX, 16 August 1940; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 2. 3 Gonzalo Hernández M., “Campaña de temperancia en vez de campaña antialcohólica,” EMR 3, no. 9 (October 1933), 15-16; “La lucha contra el alcoholismo,” EU, 10 April 1936; Gongora, “Embriaguez y 297
organization promoting self-help to overcome alcoholism rather than governmental
intervention, was established in Mexico.4
The anti-alcohol campaign failed for a number of reasons. As Chapters One and
Two demonstrated, early presidents lacked both the will and the means to combat alcohol
abuse. Their successors did use the resources of the national government to fight vice,
but these resources remained constrained, even in the late 1930s. Chapter Four argued
that the temperance movement was also challenged by the disinterest and disobedience of
state and municipal authorities, the weaknesses of these governments, and the active
resistance of citizens. This last group may have thwarted the anti-alcohol campaign
because they were “recalcitrant,” as Alan Knight claims, in that they may have
stubbornly refused to stop drinking.5 But there are a variety of other ways to explain their resistance as well. Perhaps reformers failed because they advocated change in a way that alienated those they tried to assist. Social workers’ outdated notions of ethnicity, class, and gender, as outlined in Chapter Three, and their insistence on equating intoxication with moral laxity, limited their ability to recognize the cultural and religious
significance of alcohol for a number of communities as well as its more practical uses for
families without access to potable water or a steady supply of food. Additionally, while
theoretically temperance might have helped poor families save money, laws that heavily
educación,” EU, 20 August 1936; D’Erzell, “No habrá niños en México, digo yo como mujer,” La Defensa del Hogar, 19 (22 November 1936), 1-2; Ballesteros Gil, “La campaña antialcohólica,” EG, 6 February 1937; “Congresos esteriles. La campaña antialcohólica en la república. No habrá más reuniones de ese género. Hasta que no se haga una labor apropriada y eficaz,” EU, 18 July 1938; Mendieta y Nuñez, “Ensayos sobre el alcoholismo entre las razas indígenas de México,” 126; “Sección editorial,” EG, 26 June 1939; “Una campaña ineficaz,” EU, 10 October 1940; Palacios, La pluma y el arado, 222. 4 Brandes, Staying Sober in Mexico City, 26; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 10; Orozco, “Disgust and Creation of a Nationalist Tequila Discourse in Post-Revolutionary Mexico.” 5 Knight, “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People,” 230, 252, 258. 298 taxed or restricted the production and sale of alcohol reduced the income of small producers and storeowners, actually costing these families in the long run.6
Of course, the anti-alcohol campaign did not fail in every way. In fact, as Chapter
Five demonstrated, when political leaders worked with local communities, or better still, when the impetus for change came from ordinary Mexicans, the movement had more success.7 Dozens of teachers and popular reformers reported with satisfaction that they had cantinas closed in their communities, providing at least temporary relief from scandalous public behavior or familial hunger.8 Perhaps a more significant and longer- lasting result was the creation of a new identity for these unofficial temperance
6 Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917, vol. 2, 939; M. Luna y Menocal, president, and José M. Montaño, secretary, Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Magueyera, to Obregón, 24 May 1922, AGN-FAP-O- C, Exp. 802-D-9; Belén Camarero Vda. de Maza, Coxcatlán, San Luis Potosí, to Calles, 29 April 1925, AGN-FAP-O-C, Exp. 104-E-23; J. L. Moreno, Álamos, to E. López, 30 April 1933, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 5719, Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19243, Exp. 47; M. Muñoz, Solorzano, A. González, Test, Díaz Vda. de Arratia, J. B. Ruíz, L. Ortíz, and Díaz B., to Cárdenas, 7 January 1935, AGN-FAP-LC, Exp. 564.1/50; “Mexico Opens Campaign Against Drinking,” NYT, 7 January 1935; report, J. G. Oropeza, Arizpe, March 1936, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 3; “Juventudes temperantes en acción,” EN, 17 July 1937; “Hablan los números,” EN, 13 October 1938; “Acertada medida en la campaña en contra del vicio,” EN, 28 October 1938; Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, 209; Mitchell, Intoxicated Identities, 101. 7 Indeed, James Scott argues that most high modernist projects failed because they ignored local realities, and mētis, or local knowledge. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 6, 25, 35, 53, 93, 108, 115, 129, 133-39, 157, 177, 201, 309-41. 8 Report, Alcazar Robledo, Casa de las Teras, 7 April 1923, AHSEP-DECIS, Caja 63, Exp. 38; report, Bonfil, 5 and 15 March 1930, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8447 (25), Exp. 1; report, Paniagua, 31 December 1931, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 1; report, Constantino, 29 June and 31 July 1932 and 26 July 1933, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 6; report, R. Reyes, August 1932, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 4; report, E. López, 20 July and 10 September 1932, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 8401, Exp. 20; report, E. López, 16 February, 15 April, and 20 May 1933, Caja 5843 (?). Exp. 21; report, Bernal Rodríguez, 4 December 1933 and 28 February 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 9; report, E. López, 10 October 1934, AHSEP- DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; report, Espinosa R., 1 November 1934, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 20; report, J. L. Moreno, 22 May 1935, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5507 (25), Exp. 20; report, Ramírez G., Sahuaripa, 29 July 1935, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 8443, Exp. 17; report, J. G. Oropeza, March 1936, AHSEP- DEFS, Caja 5763, Ref. 319, Exp. 3; “Los resultados de la campaña contra el alcoholismo,” EUG, 16 June 1936; “Menos alcoholismo en varios estados. La campaña desarollando por el Depto. de Salubridad de resultados,” EX, 9 July 1936; “Cuarentinueve cantinas han sido cerradas,” EN, 7 October 1937; questionnaire, School Director José Trinidad Villa Casanova, Sebampo, 10 June 1939, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 5748 (8429), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19286, Exp. 39; report, Gámez A., El Alhuate, 10 June 1939, AHSEP-DERS, Caja 1673 (8), Ref. IV/161(IV-14)/19651, Exp. 67; report, L. Magaña, Magdalena, 10 July 1940, AHSEP-DEFS, Caja 5518 Exp. 18. 299
advocates. Many men, and especially women, without previous political experience
joined anti-alcohol leagues or wrote letters with other members of their community
simply to solve a local problem. As they began to run up against corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, though, many began to see their fight as part of a larger political struggle. Some of these new activists then joined anti-clerical, agrarian reform, and female suffrage movements, as well.9 Whether ordinary people became immersed in further political struggles or “simply” advocated temperance, they participated in the
State-building process. They demanded that their officials live up to their anti-vice
rhetoric, obey the constitution, and uphold the ideals of the Revolution and in doing so, they helped to shape the eventual form of the nation.
9 Mitchell, “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer,” 6, 8, 14, 20, 22; Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 39, 73-74, 77, 97, 158, 239; Fernández Aceves, “Guadalajaran Women and the Construction of National Identity,” 309. For examples of how women and lower-class Latin Americans joined New Social Movements and became political actors in recent Latin American history, see: Marysa Navarro, “The Personal is Political: Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” in Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, ed. Susan Eckstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 249, 251; Silvio Caccia Bava, “Neighborhood Movements and the Trade Unions: The São Bernardo Experience,” in Social Struggles and the City: The Case of São Paulo, ed. Lucio Kowarick (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), 202-03, 214. 300
WORKS CITED
Primary Sources Archives Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City Dirección General de Gobierno, AGN-DGG Mercurio (Mexico City) Fondo Administración Pública Abelardo Rodríguez, AGN-FAP-AR Emilio Portes Gil, AGN-FAP-EPG Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, AGN-FAP-LC El Porvenir (Monterrey, Mex.), EPM Manuel Avila Camacho, AGN-FAP-MAC Miguel Alemán Valdes, AGN-FAP-MAV Alvaro Obregón-Plutarco Elías Calles, AGN-FAP-O-C Pascual Ortiz Rubio, AGN-FAP-POR Fondo Archivo Particular Emilio Portes Gil, AGN-FArP-EPG Fototeca Archivo Histórico del Estado de Sonora, Hermosillo Boletín Oficial: Organo del Gobierno Constitucionalista de Sonora, BO Ramo Ejecutivo, AHES-RE Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Mexico City, AHSEP Articulo 123 Escuelas, Estado de Sonora, AHSEP-A123ES Departamento de Educación y Cultura Indígena, Sonora, AHSEP-DECIS Departamento de Escuelas Rurales Estado de Sonora, AHSEP-DERS Dirección General, AHSEP-DERDG El vocero antialcohólico: Organo official de la Liga Antialcohólica Mexicana (Mexico City) Dirección General de Educación Primaria en los Estados y Territorios Dirección de Educacion Federal, Estado de Sonora, AHSEP-DEFS Institución de Orientación Socialista, AHSEP-IOS Sección Departamento de Psicopedagogía e Higiene, AHSEP-SDPH Subserie Inspección Sanitaria de Edificio de Escuelas Particulares, AHSEP-SDPH-SISEEP Subserie Propaganda Antialcohólica Escuela Rural Federal, AHSEP- SDPH-SPAERF Sección Oficina Cultural Radiotelefónica, AHSEP-SOCR Subserie Conferencias y Boletines, AHSEP-SOCR-SCB Subserie Departamento de Salubridad Pública, AHSEP-SOCR-SDSP Subserie Periódico Infantil, AHSEP-SOCR-SPI Sección Subsecretaría de Educación Pública, AHSEP-SSEP Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Mexico City, AHSSA 301
Fondo Salubridad Pública I Sección Servicio Jurídico, AHSSA-FSPI-SSJ Fondo Salubridad Pública II Sección Oficiala Mayor, AHSSA-FSPII-SOM Sección Presidencia Serie Secretaría, AHSSA-FSPII-SP-SS Fondo Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia Sección Subsecretaría Asistencia, AHSSA-FSSA-SSA Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Mexico City Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles, FAPECyFT-APEC Fondo Elías Calles, FAPECyFT-APEC-FEC Malkriado (Nacozari) Fondo Presidentes, FAPECyFT-APEC-FP Archivo Fernando Torreblanca Fondo Álvaro Obregón, FAPECyFT-FT-FAO Fondo Fernando Torreblanca, FAPECyFT-AFT-FFT Fondo Plutarco Elías Calles, FAPECyFT-AFT-FPEC Archivo Joaquín Amaro, FAPECyFT-AJA Fototeca Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles, FAPECyFT-FAPEC Fototeca Archivo Fernando Torreblanca, Fondo Plutarco Elías Calles, Álbumes, FAPECyFT-FAFT-FPECA
Libraries, Newspaper Repositories, and Museums Arizona Historical Foundation, Arizona State University, Tempe Arizona Historical Society, Tucson Biblioteca del Archivo Histórico del Distrito Federal, Mexico City, BAHDF Biblioteca del Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Mexico City Boletín de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, BSEP El Maestro Rural, EMR Biblioteca del Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencía, Mexico City Salubridad: Organo del Departamento de Salubridad, S Biblioteca de El Colegio de Sonora, Hermosillo Biblioteca de Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Mexico City Biblioteca de Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Hermosillo Biblioteca Fernando Pesqueira, Universidad de Sonora, Hermosillo Hemeroteca Fundación de la Ciudad de Hermosillo El Observador (Hermosillo), EO El Pueblo (Hermosillo), EP Sala de Noroeste, BFP-SN Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavigero, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City Archivo Acción Católica Mexicana, BFXC-AACM Acción Femenina (Mexico City) 302
Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Mexico City Archivos Económicos, BMLT-AE Crisol: Revista de Crítica (Mexico City) El Día (Mexico City), ED El Gráfico (Mexico City), EG El Nacional (Mexico City), EN El Universal (Mexico City), EU El Universal Gráfico (Mexico City), EUG Estadística Nacional (Mexico City), ESN Excélsior (Mexico City), EX La Prensa (Mexico City), LP La Prensa (San Antonio, Texas) New York Times (New York), NYT Hemeroteca del Archivo Histórico del Estado de Sonora, Hermosillo El: El Periódico de Sonora (Hermosillo) El Intruso: Diario Joco-Serio Netamente Independiente (Cananea), EI El Nacional (Navojoa), ENN El Oasis (Hermosillo) El Progreso (Hermosillo) El Sol (Hermosillo), ES El Tiempo (Cananea) La Gaceta (Guaymas) La Nación (Nogales) La Patria: Semanario Doctrinal y de Variedades (Mexico City) La Prensa de Sonora (Hermosillo) La Raza (Hermosillo), LR La Razón (Guaymas), LRG La Revista de Cananea Nueva Era: Periódico Independiente (Nacozari), NE Orientación, (Hermosillo), O Prensa Libre: Periódico Político, Moralizador, de Comercio, e Informativo (Nogales) Reforma Social (Hermosillo) Savia Nueva (Agua Prieta) Hemeroteca Nacional, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City Comino: El periódico de los niños (Mexico City), C La Defensa del Hogar: Salvemos a la Patria Salvando a la Niñez (Puebla) Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, Mexico City Archivo Gráfico El Nacional, INEHRM-AGEN Biblioteca de la Revolución Mexicana, INEHRM-BRM Museo de la Basílica de Guadalupe, Mexico City, MBG Regenstein Library, University of Chicago Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, (812.00) (microfilm), RDS 303
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939 (812.00) (microfilm), RDS Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson, SCUAL
Printed Actas y versiones del Consejo Consultivo del 20 de octubre de 1932 al 23 de febrero de 1933. Mexico City: n.p., n.d.
Actas y versiones del Consejo Consultivo del 1o. de marzo al 3 de agosto de 1933. Mexico City: n.p., n.d.
Actas y versiones del Consejo Consultivo del 11 de agosto de 1933 al 13 de enero de 1934. Mexico City: n.p., n.d.
Adelante: Revista militar y de cultura. (15 August 1933).
Askinasy, Sigfried. “El alcoholismo.” In Antropología del alcoholismo en México: Los límites culturales de la economía política (1930-1979), edited by Eduardo L. Menéndez and Renée B. DiPardo. Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1991. First published in Sigfried Askinasy, México Indígena: observanciones sobre algunos problemas de México (Mexico City: Imprenta “Cosmos,” 1939).
Camou Olea, Alfredo. El molino de Camou. Mexico City: Editorial Aldus, 2002.
Caro, Brigído. Plutarco Elías Calles: Dictador bolsheviqui de México. Episodios de la Revolución mexicana desde 1910 hasta 1924. Los Angeles: Talleres Linotipográficos de “El Heraldo de México,” 1924.
Clagett, P. D. Nogales—Across the Street is Mexico. Nogales, Ariz.: Nogales Wonderland Club, Inc., 1927.
Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917: Diario de debates. Vol. 1. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1985.
Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917: Diario de debates. Vol. 2. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1985.
Constitution of the United States of Mexico, Signed January 31, 1917 and Promulgated February 5, 1917. Washington, DC: Columbian Printing Company, 1926.
Corzo, Angel M. Cuestionario para fijar la cultura de las razas indígenas de México. Mexico City: Departamento Autónomo de Asuntos Indígenas, 1940.
304
El lector católico mexicano. Vol. 3. Mexico City: Herrerro Hermanos, n.d.
Flores A., Manuel. Alcoholismo: Silabarios de la Secretaría de Educación Pública. Mexico City: n.p, n.d.
Franco, Luis G. “Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio.” In Los hijos de la intemperancía alcohólica y el presidio. Monterrey, Mex.: Talleres Linotipográficos del Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo León, 1932.
_____. Tres años de actuación en la agricultura de un pueblo. Apuntes para la historia. Mexico City: n.p., 1945.
Gutiérrez y Oliveras, Antonio. El sepulturero de la raza latinoamericana o el cantinero y la conquista pacifica. Mexico City: Casa Unida de Publicaciones, 1929.
Guzmán Esparza, Roberto. Memorias de Don Adolfo de la Huerta: Según su propio dictado. Mexico City: Ediciones “Guzmán,” 1957.
Homenaje al soldado. Mexico City: Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, 1935.
León, Luis L. Crónica del poder en los recuerdos de un politico en el México revolucionario. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987.
Ley sobre relaciones familiares. Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1917.
López, Elpidio. Instrucciones a los maestros de las escuelas urbanas y rurales federales del estado de Sonora. Ures, Mexico: Escuela Normal Rural, 1932.
Los efectos del alcoholismo en la milicia munidal: Homenaje al ejército nacional. Mexico City: Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, 1931.
Mendieta y Núñez, Lucio. “Ensayos sobre el alcoholismo entre las razas indígenas de México.” In Antropología del alcoholismo en México: Los límites culturales de la economía política (1930-1979), edited by Eduardo L. Menéndez and Renée B. DiPardo. Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 1991. First published in Revista Mexicana de Sociología 1, no. 3 (1939).
Mesa Gutiérrez, José. El alcoholismo como plaga social. Mexico City: Comité Nacional de Lucha Contra el Alcoholismo, 1930.
Murray, Robert Hammond, ed. and trans. Mexico Before the World: Public Documents and Addresses of Plutarco Elías Calles. New York: The Academy Press, 1927.
305
Osuna, Andrés. El alcoholismo. Manual de enseñanza antialcohólica. Para uso de profesores de educación primaria y estudiantes de escuelas secundarias. Mexico City: Sociedad de Edición y Librería Franco Americana, 1929.
Padilla, Ezequiel. “Los nuevos ideales en Tamualipas.” In El pueblo contra el alcoholismo: Silabarios de la Secretaría de Educación Pública. Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1929.
Partido Nacional Revolucionario. Plan sexeñal del P.N.R. Mexico City: n.p., 1934.
Paz, Teodoro O. Guaymas de ayer. N.p., [1974?].
Puente, Ramón. “Plutarco Elías Calles.” In Historia de la Revolución mexicana. Vol. 2, edited by José T. Meléndez. Mexico City: Ediciones Aguilas, 1940.
Ramos, Samuel. Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico. Trans. Peter G. Earle. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962. Originally published as El perfil del hombre y la cultura en México (Mexico City: Imprenta Mendívil, 1934).
Reyes del Campillo, Celia A. de. ¡Hermana campesina! Mexico City: Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad, 1938.
Sandomingo, Manuel. Historia de Agua Prieta. Resumen histórico. En su primer cincuentario. Agua Prieta: Imprenta Sandomingo, 1951.
Smith, Don. “Rapid Strides Mark Growth of Cavern, Colorful History Told.” In The Cavern Café’s Tenth Anniversary Fiesta Souvenir Album, edited by Nick Kerson and Jim P. Kerson. N.p., 1937.
Taracena, Alfonso. Mi vida en el vértigo de la Revolución mexicana. (Anales sintéticos—1900-1930). Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1936.
Tercero año, serie S.E.P. Lectura oral. Mexico City: Comisión Editora Popular de la Secretaría de Educación Pública and Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad, 1938.
Secondary Sources Abrams, Philip. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977).” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no. 1 (1988).
Aguilar Camín, Héctor. La frontera nómada: Sonora y la revolución nomada. 2d ed. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979.
306
Albarrán, Elena Jackson. “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-1940.” Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2008.
Almada Bay, Ignacio. “La conexión Yocupicio: Soberanía estatal, tradición civico- liberal y resistencia al reemplazo de los lealtades en Sonora, 1913-1939.” Ph.D. diss., Colegio de México, 1993.
Almada Bay, Ignacio, and José Marcos Medina Bustos. Historia panorámica del congreso del estado de Sonora, 1825-2000. Mexico City: Aguilar, León y Cal Editores, 2001.
Alonso, Ana María. Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico’s Northern Frontier. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995.
Ambler, Charles H. “Drunks, Brewers, and Chiefs: Alcohol Regulation in Colonial Kenya, 1900-1939.” In Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, edited by Susanna Barrows and Robin Room. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Andrews, George Reid. “Black and White Workers: São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1928.” Hispanic American Historical Review 68, no. 3 (1988).
Arrom, Sylvia Marina. The Women of Mexico City, 1790-1857. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985.
Attwood, Lynne, and Catriona Kelly. “Programmes for Identity: The ‘New Man’ and the ‘New Woman.’” In Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881-1940. Edited by Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Babor, Thomas F., and Barbara G. Rosenkrantz. “Public Health, Public Morals, and Public Order: Social Science and Liquor Control in Massachusetts, 1880-1916.” In Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, edited by Susanna Barrows and Robin Room. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Bantjes, Adrian A. As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1998.
_____. “Saints, Sinners, and State Formation: Local Religion and Cultural Revolution in Mexico.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
307
Barman, Roderick J. Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1852. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
Barreiro, Juan José, and Marcela Guijosa. Titeres mexicanos: Memorias y retrato de autómatas, fantoches y otros artistas ambulantes. Mexico City: Grupo Roche- Syntex, 1997.
Bassols Batalla, Narciso. El pensamiento politico de Álvaro Obregón. Mexico City: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1967.
Baud, Michiel. “Liberalism, Indigenismo, and Social Mobilization in Late Nineteenth Century Ecaudor.” In Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, edited by A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007.
Bava, Silvio Caccia. “Neighborhood Movements and the Trade Unions: The São Bernardo Experience.” In Social Struggles and the City: The Case of São Paulo, ed. Lucio Kowarick. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994.
Beattie, Peter M. “The House, the Street, and the Barracks: Reform and Honorable Masculine Social Space in Brazil, 1864-1945.” Hispanic American Historical Review 76, no. 3 (1996).
Becker, Marjorie. “Torching La Purísima, Dancing at the Altar: The Construction of Revolutionary Hegemony in Michoacán, 1934-1940.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.
Beezley, William H., and David E. Lorey. “Introduction: The Functions of Patriotic Ceremony in Mexico.” In ¡Viva México! ¡Viva la Independencia! Celebrations of September 16, edited by William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2001.
Beezley, William H., Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French. “Introduction: Constructing Conflict, Inciting Conflict.” In Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico, edited by William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1994.
Benjamin, Thomas. La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000.
308
_____. “Rebuilding the Nation.” In The Oxford History of Mexico, edited by Michael C. Meyer and William H. Beezley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Bliss, Katherine Elaine. Compromised Positions: Prostitution, Public Health, and Gender Politics in Revolutionary Mexico City. University Park: Penn State Press, 2001.
_____. “For the Health of the Nation: Gender and the Cultural Politics of Social Hygiene in Revolutionary Mexico.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Bonnell, Victoria E. Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Boyer, Christopher R. Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Bradford, Daniel, and William Jankowiak. “Drugs, Desire, and European Economic Expansion.” In Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, edited by William Jankowiak and Daniel Bradburd. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.
Brandes, Stanley H. Staying Sober in Mexico City. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.
Brito Rodríguez, Félix. “La cultura política en el Sinaloa posrevolucionario: elecciones, alcohol, y violencia.” Paper presented at XXX Simposio de Historia y Antropología de Sonora, Hermosillo, February 25, 2005.
Buchenau, Jürgen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007.
Buffington, Robert. “Prohibition in the Borderlands: National Government-Border Community Relations.” Pacific Historical Review 63, no. 1 (1994).
Calvo Berber, Laureano. Nociones de historia de Sonora. Mexico City: Librería de Manuel Porrúa, 1958.
Camp, Roderic Ai. Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Carvalho, José Murilo de. “Brazil 1870-1914: The Force of Tradition.” Journal of Latin American Studies 24, Quincentenary Supplement (1992). 309
_____. A formação das almas: O imaginario da República no Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1990.
Caulfield, Sueann. In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Brazil. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000.
Chelkowski, Peter J., and Hamid Dabashi. Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran. London: Booth-Clibborn Editions, 2000.
Clark, A. Kim, and Marc Becker, ed. Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007.
_____. “Indigenous Peoples and State Formation in Modern Ecuador.” In Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, edited by A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007.
Clark, Toby. Art and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: The Political Image in the Age of Mass Culture. New York: Henry N. Abrams Publishers, 1997.
Clark, Truman R. “Prohibition in Puerto Rico, 1917-1933.” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 1 (1995).
Comaroff, John L. “Sui genderis: Feminism, Kinship Theory, and Structural ‘Domains’.” In Gender and Kinship: Essays Toward a Unified Analysis, edited by Jane Fishbourne Collier and Sylvia Junko Yanagisako. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987.
Corcuera, Sonia. “Pulque y evangelización. El caso de Fray Manuel Pérez (1713).” In Consecuencias del encuentro de dos mundos, edited by Janet Long. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1996.
Corrigan, Philip, and Derek Sayer. The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
Craig, Ann L. “Legal Constraints and Mobilization Strategies in the Countryside.” In Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico, edited by Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
Craven, David. Art and Revolution in Latin America, 1910-1990. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002.
Cushing, Lincoln. ¡Revolución! Cuban Poster Art. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2003. 310
Dávila, Jerry. Diploma of Whiteness: Race and Social Policy in Brazil, 1917-1945. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003.
Dawson, Alexander S. Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004.
Deans-Smith, Susan. “The Working Poor and the Eighteenth-Century Colonial State: Gender, Public Order, and Work Discipline.” In Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico, edited by William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1994.
Deutsch, Sandra McGee. “Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America.” Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 2 (1991).
Diacon, Todd. “Bringing the Countryside Back In: A Case Study of Military Intervention as State Building in the Brazilian Old Republic.” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 3 (1995).
Dore, Elizabeth. “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gender and the State in the Long Nineteenth Century.” In Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America, edited by Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molyneux. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000.
Ehrick, Christine. The Shield of the Weak: Feminism and the State in Uruguay, 1903- 1933. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005.
“El oficio de Joseph Lazcano.” In El cartero: una imagen, un personaje, edited by Claudia A. Walls. Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, y Servicio Postal Mexicano, 1992.
Engels, Friedrich. “Excerpts from The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State.” In Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, edited by Lewis S. Feuer. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1959.
Escobar Gámez, Gilberto. Crónicas sonorenses. 2d ed. Hermosillo: Flash Printers, 1999.
Evans, Harriet, and Stephanie Donald, ed. Picturing Power in the People’s Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
311
Falcón, Romana. “¿Los origines populares de la revolución de 1910? El caso de San Luis Potosí.” Historia mexicana 39, no. 2 (1979).
Fallaw, Ben. Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001.
_____. “Dry Law, Wet Politics: Drinking and Prohibition in Post-Revolutionary Yucatán, 1915-1935.” Latin American Research Review 37, no. 2 (2001).
Fernández Aceves, María Teresa. “Guadalajaran Women and the Construction of National Identity.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Fernández Labbé, Marcos. “Las comunidades de la sobriedad: la instalación de zonas secas como método de control del beber inmoderado en Chile, 1910-1930.” Scripta Nova: Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales 9, no. 194 (59) (1 August 2005).
Fernández Terán, Carlos. Catálogo de estampillas postales de México, 1856-1996—140 años de la estampilla postal mexicana. Mexico City: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1997.
Fowler-Salamini, Heather. “De-Centering the 1920s: Socialismo a la Tamaulipeca.” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 14, no. 2 (1998).
French, William E. A Peaceful and Working People: Manners, Morals, and Class Formation in Northern Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996.
Giele, Janet Zollinger. Two Paths to Women’s Equality: Temperance, Suffrage, and the Origins of Modern Feminism. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995.
“Gobernantes de la ciudad de México, 1524-2000.” In Archivo Histórico del Distrito Federal: Guía general, edited by Lina Odena Güemes H. Mexico City: Gobierno del DF, 2000.
Gordon, Robert. “Inside the Windhoek Lager: Liquor and Lust in Namibia.” In Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, edited by William Jankowiak and Daniel Bradburd. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.
Gracida Romo, Juan José. “Historia de la Cervecería de Sonora y sus empresarios.” In La industria en la historia de Sonora. Hermosillo: Editorial Sociedad Sonorense de Historia and Editorial Universidad de Arizona, 2004. 312
Greuning, Ernest. Mexico and Its Heritage. New York: The Century Company, 1928.
Guadarrama, Rocio, Cristina Martínez, and Lourdes Martínez. “La reorganización de la sociedad.” In Historia general de Sonora. Vol. 5, Historia contemporánea de Sonora: 1929-1984, edited by Gerardo Cornejo Murrieta. Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985.
Guedea, Virginia. “México en 1812: Control político y bebidas prohibidas.” Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea de México 8 (1980).
Gusfield, Joseph R. Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement. 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986.
Hale, Charles A. Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.
Hames, Gina. “Maize-Beer, Gossip, and Slander: Female Tavern Proprietors and Urban, Ethnic Cultural Elaboration in Bolivia, 1870-1930.” Journal of Social History 37, no. 2 (2003).
Hamilton, Nora. The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
Hamnett, Brian. Juárez. London: Longman, 1994.
Hart, John M. “The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920.” In The Oxford History of Mexico, edited by Michael C. Meyer, and William H. Beezley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Hayes, Joy Elizabeth. Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture, and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920-1950. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000.
Hu-DeHart, Evelyn. “Peasant Rebellion in the Northwest: The Yaqui Indians of Sonora, 1740-1976.” In Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico, edited by Friedrich Katz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Jacobs, Ian. Ranchero Revolt: The Mexican Revolution in Guerrero. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.
James, Michael E. “The City on the Hill: Temperance, Race, and Class in Turn-of-the- Century Pasadena.” California History (winter 2001-2002).
313
Johnson, Lyman L. “Dangerous Words, Provocative Gestures, and Violent Acts: The Disputed Hierarchies of Plebian Life in Colonial Buenos Aires.” In The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame, and Violence in Colonial Latin America, edited by Lyman Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998.
Joseph, Gilbert M., and Daniel Nugent. “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.
Joseph, Gilbert M., Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov. “Assembling the Fragments: Writing a Cultural History of Mexico since 1940.” In Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001.
Klubock, Thomas Miller. “Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor Politics in the Chilean Mines.” Journal of Social History 30, no. 2 (1996).
Knight, Alan. “Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?” Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 1 (1994).
_____. The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 1, Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants. Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.
_____. The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 2, Counter-Revolution and Reconstruction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.
_____. “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico, 1910-1940.” Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 3 (1994).
_____. “Racism, Revolution, and Indígenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940.” In The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940, edited by Richard Graham. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990.
_____. “Revolutionary Project, Recalcitrant People: Mexico, 1910-1940.” In The Revolutionary Process in Mexico: Essays on Political and Social Change, 1880- 1940, edited by Jaime E. Rodríguez O. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.
Krauze, Enrique. Mexico: Biography of Power. A History of Modern Mexico, 1810- 1996, translated by Hank Heifetz. New York: Harper Perennial, 1997. 314
_____. Reformer desde el origin. Plutarco Elías Calles. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987.
Kunzle, David. “Public Graphics in Cuba: A Very Cuban Form of Internationalist Art.” Latin American Perspectives 2, no. 4 (1975).
Langston, Edward Lonnie. “The Impact of Prohibition on the Mexican-United States Border: The El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Case.” Ph.D. diss., Texas Tech University, 1974.
Lear, John. Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens: The Revolution in Mexico City. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001.
Leith, James A. The Idea of Art as Propaganda in France, 1750-1799: A Study in the History of Ideas. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.
_____. Space and Revolution: Projects for Monuments, Squares, and Public Buildings in France, 1789-1799. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991.
Levine, Robert M. “‘Mud-Hut Jerusalem’: Canudos Revisited.” Hispanic American Historical Review 68, no. 3 (1988).
Lewis, Stephen E. The Ambivalent Revolution: Forging State and Nation in Chiapas, 1910-1945. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005.
_____. “La guerra del posh, 1951-1954: Un conflicto decisivo entre el Instituto Nacional Indígenista, el monopolio del alcohol y el gobierno del estado de Chiapas.” Mesoamérica: Nuevas Historias de Chiapas, siglos XIX y XX 25, no. 46 (2004).
_____. “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico, 1920-1940.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Limón, José E. “‘Carne, carnales,’ and the Carnivalesque: Bakhtinian ‘batos,’ Disorder, and Narrative Discourses.” American Ethnologist 16, no. 3 (1989).
Lomnitz, Claudio. “Final Reflections: What Was Mexico’s Cultural Revolution?” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
315
López, Rick A. “The Noche Mexicana and the Exhibition of Popular Arts: Two Ways of Exalting Indianness.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Lorey, David E. “Postrevolutionary Contexts for Independence Day: The Problem of Order and the Invention of Revolution Day, 1920s-1940s.” In ¡Viva México! ¡Viva la Independencia! Celebrations of September 16, edited by William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2001.
Luque Agraz, Elin, and Mary Michele Beltrán. El arte de dar gracias. Selección de exvotos pictóricos del Museo de la Basilica de Guadalupe. Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana and Casa Lamm, 2003.
Macías Richard, Carlos. Vida y temperamento: Plutarco Elías Calles, 1877-1920. Mexico City: Instituto Sonorense de Cultura, Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Fondo de Cúltura Económica, 1995.
MacLachlan, Colin M., and William H. Beezley. El Gran Pueblo: A History of Greater Mexico. 2d ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999.
Mancall, Peter C. “Alcohol and the Fur Trade in New France and English America, 1600-1800.” In Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, edited by William Jankowiak and Daniel Bradburd. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.
Martin, Cheryl English. Governance and Society in Colonial Mexico: Chihuahua in the Eighteenth Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Martínez, Oscar J. Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez since 1848. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” In Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, edited by Lewis S. Feuer. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1959.
Mayer Celis, Leticia. Entre el infierno de una realidad y el cielo de un imaginario: Estadística y comunidad científica en el México de la primera mitad del siglo XIX. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1999.
Meade, Teresa. “‘Civilizing Rio de Janeiro’: The Public Health Campaign and the Riot of 1904.” Journal of Social History 20, no. 2 (1986).
316
Medin, Tzvi. El minimato presidencial: Historia política del maximato (1928-1935). Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1982.
Meyer, Jean. “An Idea of Mexico: Catholics in the Revolution.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Meyer, Lorenzo, Rafael Segovia, and Alejandra Lajous. Historia de la Revolución mexicana. Vol. 12, Periodo 1928-1934. Los inicios de la institucionalización. La política del maximato. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978.
Miliband, Ralph. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969.
Mitchell, Hannah. “Art and the French Revolution: An Exhibition at the Musée Carnavalet.” History Workshop 5 (1979).
Mitchell, Stephanie. “Por la Liberación Integral de la Mujer: Women and the Anti- Alcohol Campaign.” Paper presented at the Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, New Haven, Conn., 2001.
Mitchell, Tim. Intoxicated Identities: Alcohol’s Power in Mexican History and Culture. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Molina Molina, Flavio. Ciudad de Hermosillo, 1910-1993. Hermosillo: Instituto Sonorense de Cultura, 2001.
Molyneux, Maxine. “Twentieth-Century State Formations in Latin America.” In Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America, edited by Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molyneux. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000.
Moncada, Carlos. La sucesión política en Sonora, 1917-1985. Hermosillo: Editorial Latinoamericana, 1988.
Moreno, Germán Zúñiga. “Comentarios sobre la ley seca en Sonora de 1915.” In Memoria. IV Simposio de Historia de Sonora. Hermosillo: n.p., 1979.
Murdock, Catherine Gilbert. Domesticating Drink: Women, Men, and Alcohol in America, 1870-1940. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
Navarro, Marysa. “The Personal is Political: Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo.” In Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, edited by Susan Eckstein. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
317
Needell, Jeffrey D. “The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904: The Revolt Against ‘Modernization’ in Belle Époque Rio de Janeiro,” Hispanic American Historical Review 67, no. 2 (1987).
Niblo, Stephen R. Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1999.
Niemeyer, Jr., E. V. Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Congress of 1916-1917. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974.
O’Connor, Erin. “Helpless Children or Undeserving Patriarchs? Gender Ideologies, the State, and Indian Men in Late Nineteenth Century Ecuador.” In Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, edited by A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007.
Olcott, Jocelyn. Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005.
O’Malley, Ilene V. The Myth of the Revolution: Hero Cults and the Institutionalization of the Mexican State, 1920-1940. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
Orozco, José. “Disgust and Creation of a Nationalist Tequila Discourse in Post- Revolutionary Mexico.” Paper presented at the American Historical Association Annual Conference, Atlanta, Ga., 2007.
Palacios, Guillermo. La pluma y el arado: Los intelectuales pedagogos y la construcción sociocultural del “problema campesino” en México, 1932-1934. Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1999.
Paredes, Américo. “Estados Unidos, México, y el macishimo.” Journal of Inter- American Studies 9, no. 1 (1967).
Parsons, Elaine Frantz. Manhood Lost: Fallen Drunkards and Redeeming Women in the Nineteenth-Century United States. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
Pereira, Leonardo Affonso de Miranda. “O jogo dos sentidos: Os literatos e a popularização do futebol no Rio de Janeiro.” In A História contada: Capítulos de história social da literature no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1998.
Piccato, Pablo. “‘El Paso de Venus por el disco del Sol’: Criminality and Alcoholism in the Late Porfiriato.” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 11, no. 2 (1995).
318
Porter, Susie S. Working Women in Mexico City: Public Discourses and Material Conditions, 1879-1931. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.
Purnell, Jennie. Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999.
Quintero Orci, Carlos Martín, “Cervecería de Sonora. 3ra. Parte.” N.p., n.d.
Radding de Murrieta, Cynthia. “El triunfo constitucionalista y la reformas en la región (1913-1919).” In Historia general de Sonora. Vol. 4, Sonora moderno: 1880- 1929, edited by Cynthia Radding de Murrieta. Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985.
Radding de Murrieta, Cynthia, and Rosa María Ruíz Murrieta. “La reconstrucción del modelo de progreso, 1919-1929.” In Historia general de Sonora. Vol. 4, Sonora moderno: 1880-1929, edited by Cynthia Radding de Murrieta. Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985.
Ram, Haggai. “Multiple Iconographies: Political Posters in the Iranian Revolution.” In Picturing Iran: Art, Society, and Revolution, edited by Shiva Balaghi and Lynn Gumpet. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002.
Ramírez, José C., Ricardo León, and Oscar Conde. “La estrategia económica de los Callistas.” In Historia general de Sonora. Vol. 5, Historia contemporánea de Sonora: 1929-1984, edited by Gerardo Cornejo Murrieta. Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985.
_____. “Una epoca de crisis económica.” In Historia general de Sonora. Vol. 5, Historia contemporánea de Sonora: 1929-1984, edited by Gerardo Cornejo Murrieta. Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora, 1985.
Ramírez García, María Eugenia. “Introducción.” Guía al Archivo Particular de Emilio Portes Gil 246, no. 2 (n.p., n.d.).
Réñique, Gerardo. “Región, raza y nación en el antichinismo sonorense: Cultura regional y mestizaje en el México posrevolucionario.” In Seis expulsiones y un adios: Despojos y exclusiones en Sonora, edited by Aarón Grageda Bustamante. Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés, 2003.
Richmond, Douglas W. Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 1893-1920. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
319
Rocamadour, Seudónimo. “El discurso sobre el alcoholismo en el Congreso Constituyente de 1916-1917.” Paper presented at Génesis, actualidad y perspectives de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico City, June 1992.
Rochfort, Desmond. “The Sickle, the Serpent, and the Soil: History, Revolution, Nationhood, and Modernity in the Murals of Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Rockwell, Elsie. “Schools of the Revolution: Enacting and Contesting State Forms in Tlaxcala, 1910-1930.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.
Romero Gil, Juan Manuel. “Notas para un studio sobre la industria de alcohol en Sonora en los siglos XIX y XX.” In La industria en la historia de Sonora. Hermosillo: Editorial Sociedad Sonorense de Historia and Editorial Universidad de Arizona, 2004.
Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist. “Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview.” In Woman, Culture, and Society, edited by Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.
Rus, Jan. “The ‘Comunidad Revolucionaria Institucional’: The Subversion of Native Government in Highland Chiapas.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.
Sattar, Aleezé. “¿Indígena o Ciudadano? Republican Laws and Highland Indian Communities in Ecuador, 1820-1857.” In Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, edited by A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007.
Scardaville, Michael C. "Alcohol Abuse and Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City." Hispanic American Historical Review 60, no. 4 (1980).
Schell, Patience A. Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998.
320
_____. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985.
Seger, Christina Rabe. “The Economics of Vice: Prohibition along the Arizona-Mexico Border, 1915-1933.” Paper presented at the Arizona Historical Convention, Tucson, 1993.
Selbin, Eric. Modern Latin American Revolutions. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999.
Sheesley, Joel C., and Wayne G. Bragg, ed. Sandino in the Streets. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
Silva Herzog, Jesús. Trayectoria ideológica de la Revolución mexicana, 1910-1917. Mexico City: Cuadernos Americanos, 1963.
Sinkin, Richard N. The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.
Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Smith, Peter H. “The Mexican Revolution and the Transformation of Political Elites.” Boletín de Estudios Latinamericanos 25 (December 1978).
Snodgrass, Michael. “‘We Are All Mexicans Here’: Workers, Patriotism, and Union Struggles in Monterrey.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Snow, George E. “Socialism, Alcoholism, and the Russian Working Class before 1917.” In Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, edited by Susanna Barrows and Robin Room. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Soto, Shirlene A. The Mexican Woman: A Study of her Participation in the Revolution, 1910-1940. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978.
Staples, Anne. “Policía y Buen Gobierno: Municipal Efforts to Regulate Public Behavior, 1821-1857.” In Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico, edited by William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1994.
321
Stermer, Dugald, ed. The Art of Revolution: Castro’s Cuba, 1959-1970. New York: McGraw Hill, 1970.
Stern, Alexandra Minna. “From Mestizophilia to Biotyplogy: Racialization and Science in Mexico, 1920-1960.” In Race and Nation in Modern Latin America, edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Stern, Steve J. The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
Suggs, David N., and Stacy A. Lewis. “Alcohol as a Direct and Indirect Labor Enhancer in the Mixed Economy of the BaTswana, 1800-1900.” In Drugs, Labor, and Colonial Expansion, edited by William Jankowiak and Daniel Bradburd. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.
Tannenbaum, Frank. The Mexican Agrarian Revolution. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1929.
Taylor, William B. Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979.
Thompson, E. P. “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” Past and Present 38 (1967).
Thompson, Lanny. “La fotografía como documento histórico: la familia proletaria y la vida domestica en la ciudad de México, 1900-1950.” Historias 29 (October 1992- March 1993).
Toxqui, Áurea. “Identity and Power in Pulquerías in Mexico City during the Liberal Republic, 1857-1910.” Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2008.
Tyrrell, Ian R. “Temperance and Economic Change in the Antebellum North.” In Alcohol, Reform and Society: The Liquor Issue in Social Context, edited by Jack S. Blocker. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979.
_____. “Women and Temperance in International Perspective: The World’s WCTU, 1880s-1920s.” In Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, edited by Susanna Barrows and Robin Room. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Urías Horcasitas, Beatriz. “Eugenesia e ideas sobre las razas en México, 1930-1950.” Historia y grafía 17 (2001).
322
Vaughan, Mary Kay. Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997.
_____. “Nationalizing the Countryside: Schools and Rural Communities in the 1930s.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920- 1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
_____. “Transnational Processes and the Rise and Fall of the Mexican Cultural State: Notes from the Past.” In Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001.
_____, and Stephen E. Lewis. “Introduction.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Velázquez, Marco, and Mary Kay Vaughan, “Mestizaje and Musical Nationalism in Mexico.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Viqueira Albán, Juan Pablo. Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1999.
Voekel, Pamela. "Peeing on the Palace: Bodily Resistance to Bourbon Reforms in Mexico City." Journal of Historical Sociology 5, no. 2 (1992).
Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965.
Wetherly, Paul. “Making Sense of the ‘Relative Autonomy’ of the State.” In Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire: (Post)modern Interpretations, edited by Mark Cowling and James Martin. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
White, Stephen. The Bolshevik Poster. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988.
Wilkie, James W. The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditures and Social Change Since 1910. 2d ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Williams, Derek. “Administering the Otavalan Indian and Centralizing Governance in Ecuador, 1851-1875.” In Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, edited by A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007. 323
Williams, Robert G. States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of National Governments in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
Womack, Jr., John. Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969; New York: Vintage Books, 1970.
Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, and Jane Fishburne Collier. “Toward a Unified Analysis of Gender and Kinship.” In Gender and Kinship: Essays Toward a Unified Analysis, edited by Jane Fishbourne Collier and Sylvia Junko Yanagisako. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987