Tunisia and the Arab Democratic Awakening
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The New Era of the Arab World Tunisia and the Arab Democratic Awakening bichara khader the protest had reached the point of no return. Director Ben Ali calls in the army but it rebels and, through Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Monde Arabe the voice of its chief, refuses to shoot at the crowd. Keys Contemporain (CERMAC), Louvain-la-Neuve The regime collapses and the dictator, pursued, flees on 14 January 2011. Who would have foreseen such agitation? Who Tunisians themselves were surprised at the turn of dared hope that the Tunisian people would be ca- events. They were prone to believe that the dicta- pable of overturning a plundering police regime tor had sharp teeth and long arms, but he turned 2011 whose stability and strength were extolled in Eu- out to be a paper tiger in the face of a population Med. rope and elsewhere? Even those who are not nov- no longing fearing him and going into action. Evi- ices in Arab politics were taken by surprise, dumb- dently, fear changed sides. founded by the turn of events, stunned by the I pride myself in closely following political, eco- speed of the victory of the Tunisian people and nomic and social developments in Tunisia and astonished by the maturity and modernity that it the Arab world. Nevertheless, I must admit that I 15 displayed. was caught unawares. I wanted change; I deeply It is thus hardly astonishing that the uprising by hoped for it and never stopped repeating that the Tunisian people had the effect of an electro- “night is darkest just before the dawn” and that shock. Let’s admit it – the surprise was complete: “after the winter of dictatorship will come the a young street vendor, harassed by police in Sidi spring of freedom.” Then came the great sur- Bouzid, immolates himself on 17 December 2010 prise, a youth immolating himself and an entire and a sweeping movement of revolt is triggered. country rising up for freedom. Thus, everything Arising in the Centre-West region (Kasserine, Sidi begins in the sacrificial mode, as it is called by Bouzid, Feriana, etc.), the movement spreads like Abdelwahab Meddeb, who adds that “it is Christ- wildfire throughout the entire country, which is like: giving of oneself to give health to others.” roused and takes to the streets. Mohammad Personally, I believe that Bouazizi’s self-immola- Bouazizi dies on 4 January 2011. tion was devoid of any religious or sacrificial im- Believing it to be a simple riot like those that have port; it was simply a statement made through fire, punctuated the history of this country, the police an act committed in order to say “enough” or do not go in for half-measures: tear gas and real “no.” This gesture cannot be associated with a bullets. But the more the Tunisians are cut down, form of Jihad either, for any cause whatsoever, the more the protests spread and become gener- nor, a fortiori, a simple suicide. These young Ar- alized. Deaf to the appeals of youth, Ben Ali first abs who immolate themselves are seeking above takes refuge in silence, confident in the efficiency all to make their despair visible. Perhaps they be- of his police force, then he takes the floor only to lieve they can spark the population through a rip- attribute the riots to “excited and subversive” ele- ple effect and put them into action. And if they ments, before finally facing the facts and acknowl- have succeeded, it is because their countries re- edging the errors committed, uttering the famous sembled dry scrub fields that only needed a phrase coined by another general (of greater stat- spark to set them ablaze. Without believing in the ure) “I have understood you.” This came too late; miracle of unpredictability, it is clear that the situ- ation was ripe for generalized revolt; all that was Arab population was still low; it no longer functions needed was a triggering event. today because the Arab population has quadru- pled over the past sixty years, its needs have rock- eted and the States’ means have been diminished the Longevity of authoritarian arab regimes by poor governance: the predatory excesses of re- gimes, arms purchasing and generalized corrup- Yet if the situation was ripe for change, how can one tion. Having lost all legitimacy, the States resort to account for the longevity demonstrated by authori- a single or dominant party and a highly sophisti- tarian Arab regimes? Where were they getting their cated system of repression and control, making a capacity to withstand such headwinds? And as a real climate of terror reign. corollary, why have the Arab peoples waited so long, In oil-producing countries, oil revenues func- when waves of democratization had swept away the tion as a damper: they devalue labour, the entre- Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal in preneurial spirit and efficiency, since the States’ the 1970s and the dictatorships of Latin America in revenues are not linked to labour; they reduce taxa- Keys the 1980s and the authoritarian regimes of Eastern tion and empower States (recall the catchphrase of Europe in the 1990s? the early Americans: “no taxation without represen- Let’s first answer the question on the longevity of tation”); they canker the national economy via ple- these regimes. I ascribe it to several factors of both thoric public employment and the generalization of an internal and an external order. corruption; and they buy the populations’ consent. 2011 In sum, they clearly embody the “natural resource Internal Factors curse” known as the “Dutch disease,” where reve- Med. nues have a negative effect not only on economic First of all, these factors have to do with the efficiency, but also on democracy. This is true in nature of the post-colonial arab State. In- emirates and monarchies just as well as in repub- deed, once the threshold of independence was lics, as in the cases of Libya and Algeria. passed, the problem of affirmation of nationhood the Palestinian issue has had negative ef- 16 took precedence over everything else. The Arab fects on democracy: certainly, it is perceived as a republics, created by military coups or national source of suffering and humiliation by Arab peoples revolutions (Algeria 1962, Syria 1948, Egypt 1952, from Mauritania to Oman, but for regimes, it has Iraq 1958, Sudan 1969, Libya 1969), brought to been the object of all sorts of manipulation. Haven’t power new elites, essentially military and often of they bombarded their peoples with misleading slo- rural or petit-bourgeois origins. Under this new gans? They were supposed to “close ranks against governing class, the nationalist, socialist and Ara- the Zionist enemy,” and were told “not to create di- bist State succeeded the liberal State of the pre- versions,” not to “break the national consensus on ceding decades. These military teams posed as the struggle against Israel and its occupation” and the “saviours of the Arab nation from the clutches that “it is time for combat and not debate.” Regimes of colonialism” and “developers of societies,” but have used and abused this fallacious, so-called na- quickly lapsed into elementary populism, silencing tionalist litany. The worst thing, as indicated by the all dissent and accusing any opponents of being journalist, Khaled Hroub, is that “these bywords “agents of imperialism.” In the name of the “glori- have resounded for decades and have had a con- ous Arab nation” and its “eternal mission” (Al-ris- siderable impact on large sections of the popula- alah al-khalidah), as per slogans brandished by tion, which have accepted these regimes in return the Ba’ath Party and other parties of that type, the for the struggle against Israel” without asking them- new regimes rubbed out differences for the sake of selves whether a dictatorship is more effective than unity. They made stability take precedence over a democracy in a struggle against a national enemy. democracy, establishing a tacit social contract In monarchies, a different logic has prevailed: with their populations: the State would take charge it is what Joseph Maila called “the logic of retribu- of matters of development, political independence tion.” It is essentially a logic that seeks to maintain and social justice in exchange for the population’s the hierarchical representation of social order consent and its not demanding political participa- based on tribal order (the emirates), the use of a tion. This negative consensus could work when the “lineage indicating blood relations or proximity to the Prophet” (the Hashemite lineage), “the protec- its geographical location (key, corridor or crossroads tion of the Holy Places of Islam” (Kingdom of Saudi region), its geopolitical and geostrategic importance Arabia), or the fact of being “the Commander of the (connecting the Mediterranean with oceans and Faithful” (Morocco). bordering Africa, Europe and Asia) and its economic interest as a vast market, or even in its geotheologi- cal dimension, since the region is endowed with a Not only are populations not sort of “sacred geography” by the three major mono- involved in economic and social theistic religions. The penetrated nature of the Arab choices, but they are the victims regional subsystem predates the Cold War – since ancient times the Arab world has been coveted by of the predation of public political powers and has been the object of all sorts officials, whose corruption raises of desires and rivalries. But with the onset of the society’s sense of helplessness and Cold War, the penetration became complete; not a single remote area was spared. weakens awareness of the public Keys This produced a nearly systematic polarization in the nature of the State Arab world between the pro-American (and pro- Western) contingents and the pro-Soviet sectors.